NYAYA

PHILOSOPHY
OF
LANGUAGE

John Vattanky, S J.
 Sri Gai ib Das Oriental Series No. 187

Translation and Interpretation of

Kankavati, Muktavati and Dinakari

Volume Five

Nyaya Philosophy of Language

Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of Upamana
and Sabda sections of Kdrikdvati, Muktavati and Dinakari

John Vattanky, S.J.

Sri Satguru Publications

A Division of
INDIAN BOOKS CENTRE
Delhi
 Foreword
Published by:
I deem it a privilege and an honour to have been invited
Sri Satguru Publications
to contribute a Foreword to this excellent English translation
Indological and Oriental Publishers
and interpretation of Nyayasiddhantamuktavah of Visvanatha
A Division of
Pancanana and its commentary Dinakari of Dinakara by
Indian Books Centre
40/5, Shakti Nagar, Professorjohn Vattanky. In his explanations of Muktavahand
Delhi-110007 Dinakari Professor Vattanky has made extensive use of the
(INDIA) subcommentaries Ramarudri by Ramarudra and Subodhini by
the late Maharaja of Cochin, Pariksit Thampuran. The
Muktavali and its commentaries have been the most popular
standard work on Navyanyaya taught to the traditional
All Rights Reserved scholars especially in South India.
Yet no systematic translation and interpretation of these
First Edition: Delhi, 1995
works are available in any modem language. Though there
ISBN 81-7030435-0 were some attempts to translate Muktavali, this is the first time
that an attempt has been made to translate Dinakari into any
modem language, Indian or Western.
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission except in the Professor Vattanky has studied Navyanyaya texts from
case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and eminent traditional Pandits like Sri Damodara Pisharodi of
reviews. Cochin and Sri Srinivasa Sastriji of Pune and modem authorities
in the field like Prof. Oberhammer of Vienna and the late Prof.
Matilal of Oxford. Professor Vattanky’s Gahgda's Philosophy
Printed at: Mehra Offset Press, New Delhi of God, being an analysis, text, translation and interpretation
of the Uvaravada section of Garigesa’s Tattvacintamani with a
study on the Development of NyayaTheism was published by
Printed in India. the Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, in 1984. It
has been highly commended by discerning critics. As the
Director of the Adyar Library and Research Centre I am
particularly happy that we could publish this valuable work in
our series.
io Nyaya Philosophy of Language

I have great pleasure in presenting this new work of

Professor Vattanky, Nyaya Philosophy of Language, an English
translation and interpretation of the Upamanakhanda and
Sabdakhanda of Karikavati, Muktavati and Dinakari. This
solid introduction addressed to the serious students of Nyaya Preface
thought on iabda is lucid and it is intended to give them a first
hand knowledge of all the salient features of the Nyaya In view ofthe immensity of Indian Philosophical literature
Philosophy of Language. I am sure that this work will attract that still remains to be critically explored and explained, it is
such serious students and scholars and give a new impetus to no exaggeration to state that sustained researches into Indian
Navyanyaya studies in India and abroad. Philosophical Systems are even now in their beginnings. If this
Adyar Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja statement is valid with regard to classical systems of Indian
Madras Director, Adyar library and thought in general, it is still more true with regard to what is
Research Centre, Madras; generally known as Navyanyaya.
Formerly Professor of Sanskrit, The most fundamental text of Navyanyaya, the Tattva¬
University of Madras. cintamani of Gahgesa though edited with the voluminous
commentary of Mathuranatha stands in need of critical
analysis and studies. Only bits and pieces of this seminal work
have so far been translated and studied. There is also a large
corpus of writings by way of commentaries and subcommen¬
taries on Tattvacintamani between the time of Gangesa and
Raghunatha Siromani. They are the works of the great
Naiyayikas such as Vasudeva Sarvabhauma, Pragalbha,
Jayadeva and so on. These works still rema..i to be edited,
translated and interpreted.
But in the study of the Navyanyaya, Karikavali with its
commentary SiddantamuktavaUboth by Visvanatha Pancanana
with the commentaries Dinakari and Ramarudri by Dinakara
and Ramarudra respectively have been extremely important
for the last few centuries as advanced introductions to the
subject matter. In fact, their importance is only next to that of
Tattvacintamani and its standard commentaries. That is why,
in the traditional way of studying Navyanyaya, a mastery of
Karikavati, Muktvati, Dinakari and Ramarudri is considered
essential. This practice has been followed through out India in
w- Nyaya Philosophy of Language mt
Preface
the last few centuries. It shows therefore, the intrinsic worth of is chiefly due to the difficulties inherent in the study of
these works. In fact, any one who carefully and systematically Navyanyaya itself. It is well known that this discipline makes use
studies these treatises will marvel at the precision and depth of a high degree of abstraction and a rigorously exact
which the Naiyayikas show when they deal with the various terminology. There is also the problem arising from inadequate
problems of Philosophy. And yet no systematic translation or not yet standardized translations of technical terms. If one
and interpretation of these books are available in any mo em wants to study Navyanyaya in any depth, one has necessarily
language. to get oneself familiar with these aspects of the subject, much
In this context with a view to make available the richness in the same way as when one sets out to study mathematics one
of thought contained in these works to all those who are has to become quite acquainted with mathematical terms and
interested in Indian Philosophy in general and in Navyanyaya concepts. And just as in spite of proficiency in English one
in particular, I decided to translate the whole of Kdrikdvali, cannot understand a book on mathematics though in English
Muktavati and Dinakari, and interpret them in the light of unless one knows mathematics, even so a person who can read
Ramarudri and Subodhini. Now I have great pleasure in easily and even speak fluently classical literary Sanskrit will not
presenting to the public the volume containing the translation be in a position to follow the technical discussions in Dinakari
of the upamdna and iabda sections of Kdrikdvati, Muktdvali or even in Muktavati unless he systematically studies
and Dinakari. Although this is the first volume to appear, it is Navyanyaya. It is useful to bear these facts in mind when one
actually the fifth volume in the project of translating the whole starts on this book.
of KdrikdvaVi, Muktdvali and Dinakari and interpreting them However, it is not at all impossible to master Navyanyaya;
with the help especially of Ramarudri and Subodhini. This is one has to set about it step by step systematically. A good
because I had to give a course on the Philosophy of Language starting point for this purpose would be to study thoroughly
to my students here at Jnana-Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune and I Tarkasamgraha by Annambhatta with his own commentary,
thought a first hand knowledge of the various aspects of this Dipika, rather than any other work in any modem language
subject from the Indian perspective can be best obtained by about Navyanyaya. A mastery of the good deal of elementary
a study of Kdrikdvati, Muktavati, Dinakari and Ramarudri. knowledge that is contained in these texts is presupposed to
However, the present work is much more than a translation. work through the present book successfully.
There is an elaborate commentary on each significant line and At the first reading one should get a general idea of the
expression of Muktdvali and Dinakari taking into account all topics discussed. For this purpose the portions dealing with the
the important points and subtleties to be found in Ramarudri. Muktavati should be sufficient. The discussions in Dinakari
I have also made ample use of Subodhini, abrilliant commentary and Ramarudri are much more subtle and sophisticated. One
on Kdrikdvati, Muktdvali, Dinakari and Ramarudri by the should come back to these discussions again and again until
great royal sage Pariksit Thampuran of Cochin. Subodhini was one fully grasps them. For this purpose, constant perusal of the
also particularly helpful to establish the correct readings of original texts in Sanskrit or their translations and the
Kdrikdvati, Muktavati, Dinakari and Ramarudri. commentaries is indispensable. One who thus carefully works
Yet for all these, the present work is not an easy one. This through this book will acquire a first hand knowledge of all the
viii Nyaya Philosophy of Language

salient features of Nyaya Philosophy of Language. I would like

to add also that when I bring out the translation and
interpretation of the first part of Karikavati, Muktavali and
Ramarudri I will also include an introductory essay on the
nature of these works and their authors.
Let me conclude thanking all those who have helped me
in preparing this work. First and foremost I want to express my
profound gratitude to Sri Srinivasa Sastriji of Pune. I read and
discussed with him at length every line of Upamanakhanda
and Sabdakhanda of Karikavati, Muktavali and Dinakan and
Ramarudri. His profound knowledge of the sastra texts is
equalled only by his incisive remarks on philosophical problems
that are raised. Over the years I have not only learned the
sastras from him but a Weltanschauung that comes from the
best intellectual and spiritual traditions of India. I am grateful GEWIDMET
also to Dr. Baliram Sukhla who helped me in the final revision Seiner Exzellenz
of the manuscript. I also thank Mr. Venugopalan who assisted Bischof Franz Xaver Eder
me in the final preparation of the manuscript. in dankbarer
I thank Dr. Kunjunni Raja, the Director of Adyar Library Verbundenheit
and Research Centre, Madras, for his excellent Foreword to
this book. I am grateful to him for his continued interest in my
research works.
I would like to thank my assistants Mr .John Mathew and
Mr. Biji Vazhayil who at various stages prepared the final draft
of the manuscript.
Finally I dedicate this work to Bishop Franz Xaver Eder
as a sign of my deep appreciation of the brotherly interest and
never failing kindness he has shown me over a number of
years.

Pune. John Vattanky

March 1994
 Abbreviations

K. KarikavaU
M. Muktavali
D. Dinakari
R. Ramarudn
S. Subodhirii
Kir. Kiranavati

ft. ft^t
 Contents

Foreword jy
Preface v
Dedication jx
Abbreviations xi

I. Introduction j
H. Analysis of Karikavati, Muktdvali and Dinakari-
upamanakhanda and Sabdakhanda 51
m. Text, Translation and Interpretation of
Karikavati, Muktavati and Dinakari—
upamanakhanda qq
IV. Text, Translation and Interpretation of
Karikavati, Muktavati and Dinakari—
Sabdakhanda
1. Nature of Verbal Knowledge 113
2. Means of Knowing Denotative Function :
Grammar 133

3. Other Means of Knowing Denotative

Function 174

4. Denotative Function is in the Individual

Qualified by Form and Universal 205
5. Division of Words 261
6. Implication (laksana) 284
7. Compounds 337

8. Causes of Verbal Knowledge c

Contiguity (asatti) 407

9. Semantic Competency (yogyata) 458

10. Syntactic Expectancy (akanksa) 479
11. Intention of the Speaker (tatparya) 496
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

Appendix : Comparison and Verbal Testimony

are Separate Means of Valid Knowledge 513
Bibliography 531 Introduction
Glossary 535
Index 541 It is well known that the Nyaya system admits four means
of valid knowledge: Perception, Inference, Comparison and
Word. K.M.D.R treat about the true nature and scope of these
means of valid knowledge in detail and in depth. What follows
is a connected presentation of the basic ideas found in
K.M.D.R on Comparison (upamana) and Word (iabda), in
ordinary language, without making use of Nyaya technical
terms as far as possible. A careful study of this section will
enable the reader to follow more easily the technical discussions
found in the translation and in the commentary.

Comparison (Upamana)

Comparison is the third means of valid knowledge which

the Nyaya system accepts. The authors of K.M.D.R. discuss
three different explanations of the nature of Comparison
within the Nyaya tradition itself. These explanations are
attributed by our authors to the modem Naiyayikas, the old
Naiyayikas and one particular Naiyayika (naiyayikaikaddin).
As is to be expected the authors defend the opinion of the
modem Naiyayikas. They do so not so much by bringing
forward positive arguments in support of the position of the
modem Naiyayikas but by rejecting other positions pointing
out drawbacks in them.
First of all the authors give a description of the opinion
of the modem Naiyayikas in general terms, making use of an
example. A forest-dweller informs a villager that the denotative
function of the word gavaya is in that which is similar to a cow.
Then going to the forest the villager sees an animal similar to
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
2
Introduction 3
a cow. Such a knowledge of similarity (gosadriyajhanam) is the
instrumental cause for the knowledge arising from Comparison. Naiyayika. The reason to do so is that, in order to have upamiti
The recollection of the meaning of the sentence conveying in such places, it is necessary to have again perceptual
similarity (atideiavakyarthasmaranam) which was uttered by knowledge of the individual having similarity after the verbal
the forest-dweller is the operation of the instrumental cause. knowledge arising from the sentence conveying similarity.
The resulting knowledge of the denotative function of words Hence it is better to take perceptual knowledge of the
likegavaya etc. is upamiti, knowledge arising from Comparison. individual having similarity with a cow as the instrumental
The second explanation discussed by the authors is that cause of upamiti and the recollection of the meaning of the
of the old Naiyayikas. According to them the instrumental sentence conveying similarity as the only operation.
cause of upamiti is the verbal knowledge arising from the At this stage the authors point out the exact form of
sentence conveying similarity. The recollection of the meaning Comparison. M. states that upamiti is in the form that a gayal
of the sentence conveying similarity, after seeing an animal is to be denoted by the word ‘gayal’ and not in the form that
similar to a cow, is the operation. The perception of the this individual is to be denoted by the word ‘gayal’. The reason
individual qualified by similarity is to be considered as an for this is that if the latter were the form of the knowledge
auxiliary cause. The authors of K.M.D.R. reject this opinion arising from Comparison it would be impossible to assert that
of the old Naiyayikas because the old Naiyayikas have also to other gayals also are to be denoted by the word ‘gayal’. Since
accept that the perception of the individual qualified by the exact form of upamiti is determined in this way, it follows
similarity is the auxiliary cause of upamiti, in addition to an that upamiti is not the same as verbal knowledge arising from
instrumental cause and operation. Therefore it is logically the sentence conveying similarity (atideiavakya). The reason
simple to accept the perception of the individual qualified by for this is that verbal knowledge arising from the atideiavakya,
similarity as the instrumental cause of upamiti. gosadrio gavayah, can have only the form in which gosadria is
The third opinion on upamiti discussed by the authors of the qualificand and gavayapadavacyatva is the qualifier; it
K.M.D.R. is that of a particular Naiyayika (naiyayikaikadeiin). cannot have the form in which gavaya is the qualificand and
According to him the instrumental cause of upamiti is the gavayapadavacyatva is the qualifier.
knowledge of similarity alone and the operations are the But it may be objected against this position in the
verbal knowledge of the meaning of the sentence conveying following way: When the villager sees the individual animal
similarity and the perceptual knowledge of the individual similar to a cow, he perceives both gavayatva and gosadriya
qualified by similarity. Although these two are not produced and so both these characteristics could be considered the
by the knowledge of similarity which is accepted as the derterminants of the denotative function of the word gavaya.
instrumental cause, still they can be considered as the operations Such an objection is to be rejected because although both the
because they are actually produced by the knowledge of universal gavyatva and gosadriya are objects of perception, still
similarity in the capacity of being the knowledge of the the latter cannot be considered the determinant of denotative
qualified. function because it is cumbersome. The reason is that
The authors of K.M.D.R. reject this opinion of a particular gosadriyam is gobhinnatve sati gogatabhuyodharmavatvam and
this is indeed logically a very cumbersome characteristic.
4 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 5
Therefore upamiti does not arise in the form gosadrfo qualified by the universal earthness is the denotation of the
gavayapadavacyah but in the form gavayo gavayapadavacyah. word prthivi.
Another reason why upamiti is not in the form gosadrfo Finally, it may be objected that upamana is not a different
gavayapadavacyah. is that our experience is that from the word means of valid knowledge, for.it could be considered as
gavaya we have the verbal knowledge in which the universal perceptual knowledge. The argument in support of this
gavayatva is the qualifier. Such a form of verbal knowledge position is that the perception of gayal takes place by means
would be impossible if the form of upamiti were gosadrfo of ordinary sense contact; the perception of the denotedness
gavayapadavacyah. of the word gavaya arises from extraordinary sense contact in
In a similar way one could object that sometimes it is the form of knowledge {jndnala/csanapratydsatti). This objection
possible that a person has the knowledge that a certain cannot be admitted because after knowledge arising from
substance has similarity with a cow. Then it is impossible to Comparison one has the anuvyavasaya (reflective knowledge)
have upamiti in which the denotative function of the word in the form upaminomi (I compare). And such an anuvyavasaya
gavaya is determined by the universal gavayatva. Therefore, it does not occur after perception. Therefore, upamiti is entirely
should be accepted that the knowledge of similarity in different from perception. Neither is upamiti inference because
something which is qualified by a particular characteristic is it takes place without the knowledge of invariable concomi¬
the cause of the knowledge from Comparison in which that tance. Nor is upamiti verbal knowledge because it is not
same characteristic is the determinant of the denotative produced by the knowledge of words. Hence the conclusion
function; and hence it is possible to have upamiti in which the is that upamiti is a different kind of valid knowledge and
denotative function of the word gavaya as determined by a upamana a different means of valid knowledge.
particular configuration of parts is its object.
But such an upamiti is erroneous since particular Word (i£abda)
configuration of parts, similarity with a cow etc. are logically General Description of the Verbal Knowledge
cumbersome characteristics. Therefore, they cannot be
considered as the determinants of the denotative function of According to the Naiyayikas the fourth means of valid
the wordgavaya. But the universal gavayatva is to be considered knowledge is iabda (word). The authors of K.M.D.R go
as the determinant of the denotative function of the word deeply into the various aspects of the problems connected
gavaya. with it. The first Karika itself on iabda (i.e. Karika 81) gives a
There can also be upamiti in a negative way. As for brief description of the process of verbal knowledge. First of
example, perception of earth which is qualified by dissimilarity <dl it is stated that the knowledge of words is the instrumental
with water etc. is the instrumental cause of upamiti; the cause of verbal knowledge. Here the knowledge of words
operation here would be the recollection of the meaning of the which is the instrumental cause is the perception of words by
sentence conveying dissimilarity in the form that that which the sense of hearing, or the knowledge of words which arises
has dissimilarity with water etc. is the denotation of the word from seeing the script. The operation of the instrumental cause
ptthivi. The result is upamiti in the form that that which is is the recollection of the meaning of words. The auxiliary
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 7
6
cause is the knowledge of denotative function. Without the be produced by the knowledge of words with the help of the
knowledge of denotative function, it is impossible to have the significatory function ofwords; otherwise, the following difficulty
recollection of the meanings of words. And the final result of will arise: When one hears words like ‘jar’ etc. since these
this process is verbal knowledge which is the knowledge of the words inhere in ether one can have recollection of ether also.
relation of the meanings of words. This is because the knowledge of one relatum (viz. word ‘jar’)
Let us now go a little more in detail into this process of produces the remembrance of another relatum of the relation
verbal knowledge. The actual instrumental cause of verbal viz. ether. Hence one would have also the verbal knowledge
knowledge is not words which are actually being known, but also of ether. This difficulty is avoided when it is stated that the
knowledge itself of words. The difference between these two recollection of the meanings of words which is produced by
positions is that, in the first case, words are actually uttered the knowledge of words is to be taken in the sense that the
and, in the second case, there is no need of actually uttered recollection of the meanings of words is produced by the
words; as for example, when a person who keeps silence writes knowledge of words with the help of the significatory function
down words we come to have the knowledge of words by of words.
seeing the script. Nature of Significatory Function (pftti)
The operation of this instrumental cause is the recollection
Now a question arises: What exactly is the nature of this
of the meanings of words and this recollection itself has to be
significatory function? Significatory function is either denotative
produced by the knowledge of words. If it is stated that only
function (iakti) or implication (laksana). And these functions
padajanyapadarthajhanam and not padajanyapadarthasmara-
are in the form of relations that exist between words and their
nam is the operation, then if someone hears the word ‘jar’ etc.
meanings. Hence it is necessary to describe first of all the
and then in the next moment he sees the thing jar etc. and so
nature of denotative function.
he has perceptual knowledge of the meaning of the word, then
he would have verbal knowledge. But such a possibility is not Nature of Denotative Function (iakti)
accepted by anyone. Therefore,padajanyapadarthasmaranam Denotative function is the relation of a word with its
and not. padajanyapadarthajhanam is said to be the operation meaning. However, in explaining the nature of this relation
of the instrumental cause, viz. padajhanam. the ancient and modem schools of the Naiyayikas differ.
Here it should be noted carefully that if the qualifier Accordingto the former, denotative function of words is in the
padajanya is not given to padarthasmaranam, the following form of the will of God that ‘from this word this meaning is to
difficulty arises: When a person hears a sentence and recollects be understood’. Therefore, according to the old Naiyayikas,
the meanings of words by the knowledge of certain things terms like nadi, vrddhi etc. coined by modems only have no
which are other than the words themselves but which are denotative function. The modem Naiyayikas, on the other
related to the meanings of the words, he would have verbal hand, accept denotative function in terms such as nadi, vrddhi
knowledge. In order to avoid this possibility,padarthasmaranam etc. also since they assert that denotative function is in the form
should be qualified by padajanya. of will only and not necessarily the will of God. From this it
Further the recollection of the meanings of words should
 Introduction 9
8 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

follows that, according to both old and modern Naiyayikas, in only in a particular meaning. Therefore, the denotative
function of the word ‘jar’ is the-state-of-having-the-will-of-God
well known words such as ‘jar’, ‘cloth’ etc. there is denotative
by the relation of qualificandeness indicated by qualifemess
function in the form of the will of God. Further it should be
noted that, accordingto both the schools, from the apabhramia residing in the-state-of-being-the object-of-knowledge produced
words like gargari which means jar one gets verbal knowledge by the word ‘jar’ [ghatapadajanyabodhavisayatatvavacchinna■
prakaratanirupitaviksyatasambandhena ifvarecchavattvam
merely by the erroneous knowledge of denotative function.
If in this way the will of God is accepted as denotative ghatapadalaktih). By this specific relation the denotative
function, the following difficulty arises: The will of God exists function of the word ‘jar’ is only in jar and not in cloth.
only in God and not in the meanings of words. Therefore, how Therefore, cloth cannot be denoted by the word ‘jar’.
can there be denotative function in the form of the will of God Now another difficulty arises: It is our experience that the
in the meanings of words? The answer to this question is that word gang a can mean the particular flow of water in the river
the will of God is in the meanings of words by the relation of Ganges, and in some circumstances also the bank of the river
Ganges. Hence the-state-of-being-the-object-of-knowledge
qualificandness. The meaning of this statement is that the will
of God is in the form that from the word ‘jar’ the thingjar must arisingfrom the wordgahga (gahgapadajanyabodhavisayatvam)
be understood [ghatapadat ghato boddhavyah). In such a resides both in the flow of water and in the bank. Therefore,
description of the will of God, jar is the qualificand; in Nyaya in both, in the flow of water and in the bank, there is the will
technical terms this means that the will of God exists in jar by of God by the relation of qualificandness existing in the-state-
the relation of qualificandness. of-being-the-object-of-knowledge arisingfrom the word gahga.
If the will of God described in this way is considered as Hence even the knowledge of bank could be conveyed by the
denotative function, there would be many wills of God denotative function of the word gahga and so there is no need
according to different denotative functions of different words. of accepting implication as another form of significatory
This is logically cumbersome. In order to avoid this, the will function.
of God is to be accepted as one in the form of a conjunct will The answer to this difficulty is that although it is true that
[samuhalambanatmakeccha). Now a further difficulty can arise. the nature of denotative function is as described in the
God’s will is one and the same and so the will of God in the objection, still our normal experience is that nobody accepts
form that ajar is to be understood from the word ‘jar’ is in cloth that the denotative function of the word gahga is in bank.
also as it is in jar. Therefore, cloth could also be denoted by Therefore, the denotative function in the present instance is
the word ‘jar’ (ghatapadajanyabodhavisayatvaprakarakeccha not in the form: Let bank be the object of knowledge produced
viksyatasambandhenayatha ghate vartate tathapate’pyasti). by the word gahga [gahgapadajanyabodhavisayah tiram bhavatu).
This objection is answered by pointing out that the But the will of God for producing the knowledge of bank is a
viksyata is indicated [nirupita) by a specific qualifiemess conjunct will (samuhalambanatmakeccha) in the following
(prakarata). This means that although the will of God by the form: Let the-state-of-being-the-object be connected with the
relation of qualificandness is in all the meanings, still the knowledge produced by the word gahga; and let the bank
qualificandeness indicated by a specific qualifiemess exists have the-state-of-being-the-object (visayata gahgapadajanya-
 w Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction n
bodhiya bhavtu visayatavat tiram bhavatu). Hence the meaning is efifortness (krtitvam). This being universal is only
qualifiemess (prakarata) existing in the-state-of-being-the-object- one. Hence it is simple to accept the denotative function of
of-knowledge produced by the word gahga is determined by verbal suffix only in effort. Therefore, wherever the
mere being-the-state-of-being-the-object (iuddhavisayatatvena) Grammarians accept the denotative function of verbal suffix
and not by being-the-state-of-being-the-object-of-knowledge- in the agent, there the Naiyayikas accept the denotative
produced by the word gahga (gahgapadajanyabodhavisayatvat- function of verbal suffix in effort.
vena). Therefore, we have to accept implication also, so that Now the Grammarians raise an objection against this
there could be knowledge of bank from the word gahga. position of the Naiyayikas. According to Panini rules 2.3.1 and
Means of Knowing Denotative Function 2.3.18, if the agent is not expressed by tin (verbal suffix) and
so on, the instrumental case should be used to denote the
Eight means of knowing denotative function are discussed.
agent after the word ‘Caitra’, in such instances as Caitras
They are Grammar (vyakrana), Comparison (upamana),
tandulam pacati.
Dictionary (koia), Sentence uttered by an authoritative person
The answer of the Naiyayikas is as follows: The
(taptavakya), Action brought about by usage (vyavahara),
instrumental case-ending is used after the word ‘Caitra’ etc.
Remainder of a sentence (vakyatesa), Explanation (vivarana),
only when the verbal suffix and so on do not denote the
Proximity of a well known word (prasiddhapadasannidhya).
number of the agent. In such instances as Caitras tandulam
We shall explain them one by one.
pacati the verbal suffix denotes the singular number of the
(1) Grammar (vyakarana): Grammar is the means of
agent and, therefore, the instrumental case is not used after the
knowing the denotative function of roots, stems (pratipadikam)
word ‘Caitra’.
and suffixes etc. As for instance, from grammar we know that
Now a question arises what is the reason for the verbal
the root bhu. means ‘to be’, the tense lat means present time.
suffix to denote the number of the agent? The verbal suffix
These rules are accepted also by the Naiyayikas.
denotes the number of that which is karmatvadyanavaruddha
But in the case of other rules, when there is an opposing
andprathamantapadopasthapya. karmatvadyanavaruddha means
factor, different interpretations are given. As for instance, the
not-being-the-object-of-intention-as-a-qualifier-for-another-
Grammarians hold that the denotative function of verbal
meaning and prathamantapadopasthapya signifies that-which-
suffix is in the agent (karta) according to the Panini Sutra, lah
is-to-be-known-by-the-word-ending-in-the-nominative-case. In
karmani ca bhave cakarmakebhyah (3.4.69). Here karta means
the instance of Caitras tandulam pacati, Caitra is not intended
krtiman (one who has effort) and so kartrtvam which is the
as a qualifier for anything else and it is to be known by the word
same as krti is iakyatavacchedakam (the determinant of the-
ending in the nominative case. Therefore, the verbal suffix
state-of-being-denoted-meaning). krtayah (efforts) are many.
denotes the number of Caitra.
Therefore, to accept krti as the determinant of the-state-of-
The purpose of using the expression karmatvadyana¬
being-denoted-meaningis cumbersome. Hence the Naiyayikas
varuddha in the sense of not-intended-as-qualifier-for-another-
accept the denotative function of verbal suffix only in effort
meaning is the following: If such an expression is not used then
(krti). Here the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-
the only qualification of the reason for connection with
72 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 73

number is prathamantapadopasthapya, that-which-is-to-be- a root, although Caitra is known by the word ending in the
known-by-the-word-ending-in-the-nominative-case. In that case nominative case.
there could be connection of number which is the meaning of When the meaning of the first qualification is interpreted
the verbal suffix ti with Caitra in such instances as Caitra iva in this way, the purpose of the second qualification would be
Maitro gacchati since Caitra is known by the word ending in to avoid the connection of number (which is the meaning of
the nominative case. When, however, the qualification of the verbal suffix) with stokam in such instances as stokam pacati
karmatvadyanavaTuddha in the sense of not-intended-as-a- (he cooks a little). Here the meaning of the word stoka is a
qualifier-for-another-meaning is added, there cannot be such qualification for the meaning of the root pac. Hence it is not
a connection of number with Caitra, since Caitra is a qualifier a qualification to a meaning which is other than the meaning
to the meaning of iva, i.e. similarity. of the root. Therefore, there could be connection of number
Now the purpose of the second expression prathamanta- with the meaning of the word stoka. In order to avoid this, the
padopasthapya is pointed out. If this qualification of the reason second qualification, i.e. prathamantapadopasthapya is given
is not used then the only qualification of the reason for connec¬ to the reason for connection with number. It should be noted
tion with number is karmatvadyanavaTuddha. In that case in here that, according to the Grammarians, adverbs have
such instances as tandulam pacati, rice cooks, when tandula is accusative case endings and neuter gender and so here the
not intended as a qualifier for the-state-of-being-the-object-of- word stoka is in the accusative case and not in the nominative
action which is the meaning of the accusative case, then there case. Therefore, it cannot have connection with number. It
could be connection of number which is the meaning of the should further be noted that we have given here only the
verbal suffix with tandula. In order to avoid this possibility the outlines of the discussions between the Grammarians and the
expression prathamantapadopasthapya is used. Therefore, there Naiyayikas on the question of the denotative function of verbal
cannot be any connection of number with tandula since it is suffixes and so on. The details of these controversies can be
expressed by the word ending in the accusative case. found in the commentary to this section.
If it is argued that such a connection of number with According to the Mimamsakas, the denotative function
tandula is acceptable then in order to show the purpose of the of the tense-suffixes is in the action (vyapara). The Naiyayikas
> reject this opinion of the Mimamsakas because of considerations
v\z. prathamantapadopasthapya in another way, the meaning of simplicity. Further the Naiyayikas hold that the denotative
of the first qualification of the reason, viz. karmatvadyana- function of krt suffixes is in the agent (karta) or in the object
varuddha is given in a different way. According to this of action [karma).
interpretation karmatvadyanavaruddha means not-being-the- (2) Comparison (upamana): How denotative function
qualifier-for-a-meaning-which-is-other-than-the-meaning-of-the- can be known from comparison has been explained in the
root (dhaitvarthatiriktaviksana). Hence, in such expressions as section on Comparison.
Caitra iva Maitro gacchati there cannot be the connection of (3) Dictionary (koia): Dictionary also is a means of
number with Caitra since he is a qualifier to similarity which knowing denotative function of words. However, according to
is the meaning of iva and which is other than the meaning of dictionary, denotative function of words like nila (blue) and so
 74 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 15

on is both in blue colour and so on and in that which has blue of Philosophy on this point. We shall now give an outline
colour and so on. Naiyayikas also hold that the denotative of these controversies.
function of words like nila (blue) and so on is in blue colour According to the Prabhakaras the denotative function of
and so on, but they do not accept that the denotative function words is always grasped in meanings as connected with
, of words like nila and so on is also in that which has blue something to be accomplished (karyanvitapadarthe evapadanam
colour and so on. This is because if the denotative function of laktih). As for example, an older adult says ‘bring the jar’. A
the words like nila is accepted also in that which has blue younger adult who hears this brings the jar. A boy who sees
colour, then the determinant of denotedness would be this action infers that the action of the younger adult is brought
riilavattvam, i.e. nila (blue colour). This is many and so it is about by the knowledge produced by the sentence ‘bring the
cumbersome. Hence the Naiyayikas hold that the denotative jar’ of the older adult, because the younger adult brought the
function of the words like nila and so on is only in blue colour jar after hearing the sentence of the older adult. Afterwards by
and so on. Hence the determinant of the denotedness is the means of the sentences like ‘take away the jar’, ‘bring the cow’
universal nilatva which is only one and it is simple also. The and so on, by inclusion and exclusion of respective words, the
Naiyayikas further point out that from the word nila and so on boy grasps the denotative function of words like ‘jar’ and so on
we get the knowledge of that which has blue colour by means in jar and so on as connected with something to be
of implication. accomplished, as for instance, bringing etc. Hence the optative
(4) Statement of a Trustworthy Person (aptavakya)'. and so on are the causes of the verbal knowledge, the object
One who does not know the denotative function of the word of which is that which is to be accomplished. In sentences like
‘pika’ can arrive at the knowledge of denotative function from ‘there is ajar on the ground’ and so on, there is no optative and
the statement of a trustworthy person that cuckoo is to be so on and hence there is no verbal knowledge from such
denoted by the word pika. sentences. Therefore, the denotative function of words is to be
(5) Action brought about by usage of words (vyava- accepted in meanings as connected with something to be
hara): This is an important means of knowing denotative accomplished [karyanvitapadarthe eva padanam laktih).
function. The Prabhakara Mlmamsakas and the Naiyayikas But there is also a discussion on what exactly is the
agree that action brought about by the usage of words denotative function of the optative and so on [lihadinam)
(vyavahara) is a means of knowing denotative function. according to the Prabhakara Mlmamsakas as interpreted by
However, the Prabhakara Mlmamsakas hold that by this the Naiyayikas. Ramarudra holds that, according to the
means, the denotative function of words like ‘jar’ and so on is Prabhakara Mlmamsakas, the denotative function of the
grasped in jar and so on as connected with that-which-is-to-be- optative and so on is in karya (that which is to be accomplished)
accomplished [ghatapadasya karyanvitaghate laktih). But the both in Vedic and ordinary usage. Muktavallkara and Dinakara
Naiyayikas on the contrary hold that the denotative function hold that the denotative function of the optative and so on in
of the word ‘jar’ and so on is grasped in jar and so on as not ordinary usage is in kaiyatva (the-state-of-being-accomplished),
connected with that-which-is-to-be-accomplished, i.e. in mere according to the Prabhakaras, but in Vedic usage it is in karya.
jar. There is a long controversy between these two schools It follows, therefore, that all these three Naiyayikas interpret
76 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 17

the Prabhakara Mimamsakas’ opinion as holding the position meaning of one word by means of another word having the
that in Vedic usage the denotative function of the optative and same meaning. As for example, the meaning of the word ghata
so on is in karya in order to establish the existence of the is explained by the word kalaia which has denotative function
unseen [adrsta). The details of this discussion is to be known in jar. Therefore, we understand that the word ghata has
from the commentary on this section. denotative function in jar.
However, the Naiyayikas reject this opinion of the (8) Proximity of a Word (sannidhya): It is the proximity
Prabhakara Mimamsakas. The Naiyayikas argue that although of the word the meaning of which is well known (prasiddha-
at first the denotative function is grasped in jar and so on as padasya sannidhyam). This is the eighth and the last means of
connected with something to be accomplished, it would be knowing denotative function. As for example, when someone
better to discard afterwards the connection with that which is who does not know the meaning of the word pika hears the
to be accomplished and to accept the denotative function of sentence a pika is sitting on the mango tree and is singing
‘jar’ and so on in mere jar and so on for reasons of simplicity. sweetly’, he grasps the denotative function of the word pika in
Further our experience sh'• ws that there arises verbal knowledge cuckoo. This is because the words ‘mango tree’ and ‘sweet
even from such sentences as ‘oh! Caitra, a son is bom to you’ singing’ whose meanings are well known are used together
in which there is no optative. Hence it follows that the with the word pika. Further the hearer knows that it is the
denotative functions of words like ‘jar’ and so on is not to be cuckoo which sits on the mango tree and sings sweetly.
accepted in that as connected with something to be accomp¬
lished but only in mere jar and so on. Denotative Function is in the Individual as
(6) Remainder of a sentence (vakyasesa): There is a Qualified by the Universal and Form
Vedic statement,yavamayai carur bhavati (an oblation should
After treating the different means of grasping denotative
be made of boiledyaz>a grains). Here we do not know the exact
function, the authors take up the important philosophical
meaning of the -wordyava, because the Aryans use the word
question: Where exactly is denotative function? It was already
yava in the sense of a particular grain having long awns (<dirgha-
stated that denotative function is a relation and we know one
Suka) and the non-Aryans use it in the sense of a kind of panic
of its relata, viz. the word; we have now to explain the exact
seed (kahgu). But the remainder of this sentence is ‘in spring
nature of the other relatum.
all plants loose their leaves but yava plants stand flourishing
The Mimamsakas hold that the other relatum is the
with their spikes’. Now the plants which in spring stand
universal (jati). This means that according to them the
flourishing with their spikes are barley. Therefore, we come to
the conclusion that the word yava has denotative function in denotative function is in the universal itself. This is because, if
barley only. But non-Aryans use this word in the sense of panic the Nyaya position that the denotative function is in the
seed because of the erroneous knowledge of denotative individual is accepted, then there would be deviation. This
function. deviation is to be understood with reference to the verbal
(7) Explanation (vivarana): This is another means of knowledge which is the effect and the knowledge of the
knowing the denotative function. Explanation is giving the denotative function which is its cause. Now if we accept the
18 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 19

denotative function of the word ‘cow’ in a particular individual by the word with the help of the knowledge of significatory
cow, then we can have the verbal knowledge of that particular function. And significatory function is either denotative function
cow only. But in fact, when we hear the word ‘cow’ we do have or implication. Even though significatory function in the form
the verbal knowledge of other cows also in which the denotative of denotative function cannot be admitted in the individual,
function is not grasped. Therefore, without the knowledge of still significatory function in the form of implication is to be
the denotative function which is the cause, there occurs verbal admitted in the individual. As for instance, according to the
knowledge which is the effect. And so there is deviation with Mimamsakas, in the sentence ‘bring a cow’, the word ‘cow’
reference to the relation of cause and effect. means cowness and so there is the impossibility of relating
In order to avoid such a deviation, if the denotative cowness with the act of bringing. Therefore, here we have to
function is grasped in all the individual cows, one would have admit implication for the word ‘cow’ in the individual cow and
to accept infinite number of denotative functions since the the individual cow can be connected with the act of bringing.
individuals are infinite in number. This is cumbersome and, Therefore, we can have recollection and verbal knowledge of
therefore, denotative function is to be accepted in the universal the individual.
only. The Naiyayikas reject this also; the reason is that there is
Now one has to explain how verbal knowledge of the no such impossibility of connection ofmeanings in all sentences.
individual arises? The Mimamsakas answer this question by As for instance, the sentence ‘there is a cow’ means, according
pointing out that without the individual, the universal cannot to the Mimamsakas, there is cowness since, according to them,
become the object of verbal knowledge and, therefore, we the word ‘cow’ has denotative function in cowness. Here there
have the knowledge of individuals also. This means that the is no impossibility of connecting existence with cowness.
causal complex which brings about the verbal knowledge of Therefore, in this instance there cannot be recollection and
the universal brings about the verbal knowledge of the verbal knowledge of the individual by implication. Hence the
individual also. Naiyayikas on the contrary, reject all these Naiyayikas conclude that the denotative function is to be
arguments of the Mimamsakas and establish that the denotative admitted in the individual.
function of words is in the individual as qualified by the Now the Mimamsakas argue that if denotative function
universal. The reason is that if according to the Mimamsakas is accepted in the individual then there would be infinite
the denotative function is grasped between the word and the number of denotative functions because individuals are many.
universal, then we can have the recollection and verbal e Naiyayikas answer this objection by pointing out that they
knowledge of the universal only and not of the individual. In do not admit separate denotative function in each individual
order to have the verbal knowledge of the individual, we must belonging to a particular class but only one denotative
have the recollection of the individual from the word and for Junction in the form of the will of God in all the individuals
this the denotative function is necessarily to be grasped in the belonging to a particular class.
individual. The Mimamsakas further argue that if one denotative
Nor can the Mimamsakas answer that the cause of verbal unction is admitted in all individuals of a class, there cannot
knowledge of the individual is the recollection of the individual e a general relation of cause and effect between the knowledge
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
20 Introduction 21
of the denotative function of the word ‘cow’ and the verbal grasped in the universal cowness, so also the denotative
knowledge arising from the word ‘cow’. This is because function is grasped in the individual. The reason for this
individual cows are not qualified with a characteristic which is is that the knowledge of denotative function that cow is to be
consecutive and which does not occur anywhere else. The denoted by the word ‘cow’ means that an individual cow
answer of the Naiyayikas to this objection is that there is the qualified by cowness is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’.
consecutive characteristic of cowness in all individual cows
Therefore, this form of the knowledge of the denotative
and such a characteristic does not exist anywhere else except
function of the word ‘cow’ establishes that the denotative
in individual cows. Therefore, there could be a general function is necessarily also in the individual.
relation of cause and effect in the form that the knowledge of
If the form of the knowledge of denotative function is that
the denotative function in that which is qualified by cowness cowness is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’ (gotvam gopada-
is the cause of the verbal knowledge in which the object is that Safcyam), we cannot have the recollection and verbal knowledge
which is qualified by cowness. Here it may be noted that in which cowness is the qualifier. This is because the knowledge
arguments and counter-arguments on this point are quite of the denotative function is the cause of the recollection of the
intricate and technical and their details could be gathered meaning and of the verbal knowledge if only they have the
from the commentary on this section. same qualifier as the knowledge of the denotative function.
Now the MImamsakas object that just as, according to the
Here, the knowledge of denotative function in the form that
Naiyayikas, relation of meanings becomes the object of verbal cowness is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’ does not have
knowledge even without accepting the denotative function in cowness as the qualifier.
relation, so also individuals can become the object of verbal In order to avoid this fault, the MImamsakas state that the
knowledge even without accepting the denotative function in form of the knowledge of denotative function is that the word
them. Therefore, there is no need of accepting denotative ‘cow’ has denotative function in cowness (gopadam gotve
function in individuals. According to the Naiyayikas, the taktam). Such a knowledge of denotative function in cowness
relation of meanings becomes the object of verbal knowledge has cowness as qualifier since in such a knowledge cowness is
by means of the expectancy of words; but for argument s sake the qualifier to denotative function and so it is the cause of
accepting the objection of the MImamsakas, the Naiyayikas verbal knowledge in which cowness is the qualifier. But this
establish in another way the denotative function of words in argument of the MImamsakas cannot be admitted, because
individuals. they also accept the general principle that if something is a
The Naiyayikas argue in the following way: If the qualifier for some particular thing in the knowledge of deno¬
MImamsakas admit the denotative function in the universal, tative function, that should be a qualifier for that particular
then they have also to describe what exactly is the form of the t ing in the verbal knowledge also. Here in the present
knowledge of denotative function. If it is stated that the form
instance of the knowledge of denotative function cowness is a
of the knowledge of denotative function is that the cow qualifier to denotative function. Hence such a knowledge of
is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’ (gaurgopadaiakya), then it
denotative function cannot produce the verbal knowledge in
has to be admitted that just as the denotative function is which cow is qualificand and cowness is qualifier. Therefore,
22 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Introduction 23
the Naiyayikas assert that, in order to have the verbal knowledge
substratum also does not become the object is not an instance
in which cow is the qualificand and cowness is the qualifier,
of either a preventing knowledge or prevented knowledge.
one should have the knowledge of denotative function in the
Therefore, the knowledge of denotative function in the
individual cow (i.e. gaux gopadaiakya).
Further the Mimamsakas object that they do not agree form gotvam gopadaiakyam in which gotvatvam also does not
become the object of knowledge as the determinant of
that the knowledge of denotative function and the verbal
knowledge arising from it should have the same qualifier the-state-of-being-substratum cannot be the cause of verbal
because the knowledge of the denotative function in the knowledge. Thus the knowledge of denotative function in the
form that cowness is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’ has
universal produces the verbal knowledge in which the
necessarily gotvatvam also as object in the capacity of being
individual is the qualificand and the universal is the qualifier.
Therefore, there is no need to accept the denotative function determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted. And. gotvatvam can
be defined only with reference to all individual cows and
in the individual as qualified by the universal.
The basic answer of the Naiyayikas to this objection of so the Mimamsa position suffers from the fault of cumber¬
someness.
the Mimamsakas is as follows: According to the Mimamsakas,
But now the Mimamsakas bring forward another
the form of the knowledge of denotative function is either
objection. In the two forms of the knowledge of denotative
cowness is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’ or the word ‘cow’
function let the-state-of-being-cowness (gotvatvam) also be
has denotative function in cowness. In these two forms of the
knowledge of denotative function, the-state-of-being-cowness object, but it is not the determinant of the-state-of-being-
(gotvatvam) necessarily becomes the object as the determinant denoted since in this knowledge of denotative function the
of the-state-of-being-denoted (iakyatdvacchedakam). And cooccurrence of the-state-of-being-cowness with the-state-of-
gotvatvam can be defined only with reference to all individual being-denoted is the object and not the-state-of-being-
cows; i.e. gotvatvam (the-state-of-being-cowness) is the-state-of- determined-by-the-state-of-being-cowness. Therefore, the-state-
being-inherent-in-all-cows-without-being-inherent-in-anything- of-being-cowness is not the determinant of the-state-of-being-
other-than-cow. This is cumbersome. The Naiyayikas show denoted. And hence the Mimamsakas’ position does not have
the fault of cumbersomeness.
how gotvatvam is necessarily to be accepted as iakyatdvacche-
The answer of the Naiyayikas to this objection is as
dakam by the following arguments.
The first form of the knowledge of denotative function is follows: All instances of knowledge are to be considered as
gotvam g op ada s a ky am. If in this knowledge of denotative viiistavaiiistydvagahi. And viiistavaiiistjdvagdhijndnam is also
of two kinds: One is viiiste vaiiistyavagdhi and the other is
function the-state-of-being-cowness (gotvatvam) does not
viiistasya vaiiistyavagdhi. The form of the knowledge of
become the object as the determinant of the-state-of-being-
substratum, then the knowledge of denotative function will denotative function that cowness is to be denoted by the word
not be prevented by a sure knowledge of contradiction that cow (gotvam gopadaiakyam) is viiiste vaiiistydvagdhijndnam.
gotvam na gopadaiakyam. This is because an instance of ere cowness is qualificand, the-state-of-being-denoted-by-
knowledge in which the determinant of the-state-of-being- t -e-word- cow is the qualifier. The determinant of qualificand-
ness is the-state-of-being-cowness. This becomes the object of
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 25
24
knowledge of denotative function as connected with the of denotative function there are, in gotvatva, two instances of
qualifier, viz. the-state-of-being-denoted-by-the-word-‘cow’, by qualifiemess {prakaratadvayam).
the relation of the-state-of-being-determined through the If such a prakaratadvayam is admitted there should be a
substratum (of-the-state-of-being-cowness), viz. cowness. In difference in form in both the forms of knowledge, i.e. in
less technical terms this just means that where there is vtSesye viSesanam tatrapi viSesanam tti ritya jayamanajhanam
gotvatvam, there only is gopadaSakyatd. In this way, gotvatvam and in viSistavaiSistyajiidnam. But this is not experienced.
is to be considered as the determinant cf Sakyata and so the Therefore, the MImamsakas conclude that in the knowledge
Mlmamsa position is cumbersome. of denotative function gotvam gopadaSakyam (which is an
The other form of the knowledge of denotative function instance of viStste vaiSistyavagahijhdnam), gotvatva becomes
is gopadam gotve Saktam. And this is an instance of viSistasya the object as samsarganuyogitavacchedaka, i.e. the determinant
vaiSistyavagahijhdnam (i.e. gotvatvaviSistasya Saktau vaiSistja- of subjunctness indicated by the relation betweengopadaSakya-
vagahijndnam). Here cowness is the qualifier of denotative tva and £0/00 and not as the determinant of the-state-of-being-
function, the qualificand of the qualifier cowness is denotative denoted. In the other form of the knowledge of denotative
function, the determinant of qualifiemess is the-state-of-being- function, gopadain gotve Saktam (which is an instance of
cowness. Here, the determinant of qualifiemess, viz. the-state- viSistasya vaiSistydvagdhijhdnam), gotvatva becomes the object
of-being-cowness becomes the object of the knowledge of as samsargapratiyogitavacchedaka, i.e. as the determinant of
denotative function as connected with the denotative function adjunctness indicated by the relation between gotva and Sakti
by the relation of the-state-of-being-determined through the and not as the determinant of Sakti. Hence, the final conclusion
substratum (of the-state-of-being-cowness) which here is of the MImamsakas is that there is no fault of cumbersomeness
cowness, {gotvatvam gotvarupadharmipdratantryena avacchinna- in their position.

tvasambandhena Saktau anveti). In less technical terms this just Therefore, the Naiyayikas show cumbersomeness in the
means that where there is gotvatvam there only is gopadaSakti. Mimamsa position in another way. In the knowledge of
Thus, the-state-of-being-cowness becomes the determinant of denotative function gotvam gopadaSakyam, the determinant of
the-state-of-being-denoted and therefore, the Mlmamsa position the-state-of-being-substratum (dharmitdvacchedakam), viz.
gotvatvam, also has necessarily to become the object as
is cumbersome.
Now the MImamsakas object that gotvatvam does not pointed out earlier; otherwise, such a knowledge of denotative
become the object of the knowledge of denotative function as Junction cannot be the cause of verbal knowledge. Therefore,
the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted. This is because, J e-state-of-being-object residing in gotvatvam in the form of
as explained by the Naiyayikas, in the knowledge of denotative e state-of-being-determinant-of-the-state-of-being-substratum
function gotvam gopadaSakyam, gotvatvam is directly qualifier is included as a constituent part in the determinant of the-state-
to gotva and indirectly qualifier to gopadaSakyatva. In the other eing the-cause for verbal knowledge. And gotvatvam can
form of the knowledge of denotative function gopadam gotve e understood only with reference to all the cows. Therefore,
Saktam, gotvatvam is directly qualifier to gotva and indirectly 1S curnbersorneness in the Mlmamsa position. Hence,
qualifier to sakti. Therefore, in the two forms of the knowledge
e mal conclusion of the Naiyayikas is that the denotative
2g Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 27

function is to be accepted in individuals as qualified by form can be no connection between form and individual which are
and universal. the meanings of the word go conveyed by different denotative
Now a question arises: Why universal alone is considered functions. The answer to this objection is based upon our
as the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted and not form experience: We do not have verbal knowledge of semantic
since both are anyunanatiriktavrtti of denotedness residing in relation of sun and horse which are the meanings of the word
the individual. The answer is that for reasons of simplicity hari. On the other hand, just as in the case of the word
universal alone is to be considered as the determinant of the- eva which conveys three different meanings, viz. anya, yoga
state-of-being-denoted. This is because, by the relation of and vyavaccheda, by different denotative functions yet these
samavaya, the universal exists in the individual; on the contrary, meanings are connected, so also we have verbal knowledge
akrti, viz. avayavasamyoga exists in the individual by the of semantic relation between the form of cow and the
relation of samanadhikaranya since both form and individual individual cow which are the meanings of the word ‘cow’
exist in parts. Besides, akrti, i.e. conjunction of parts, is many conveyed by different denotative functions, if there is the
in number; on the contrary, the universal is only one. Further, recollection of the form of cow from the word ‘cow’. The
universal would become the object of knowledge by itself, but modem Naiyayikas further point out that the singular number
akrti becomes object of knowledge as having a further is used in the sutra, jatyakrtivyaktayah padarthah, in order to
characteristic, viz. avayavasamyogatva. show that there is only one denotative function in universal
Besides the old Naiyayikas hold that the denotative and individual.
function which is in universal, form and individual is only one.
The reason is that there is no knowledge of one without the Denotative Function of the Word tad
other. In order to show this the singular number is used in the The denotative function of the word tad is in jar and so
Nyaya Sutra, jatyakrtivyaktayahpadarthah. Here the meaning on which are qualified by jamess and so on which are the
of the singular number in the word padarthah cannot be determinants ofthe-state-of-being-the-object-of-the-knowledge-
related to the meaning of the stem padartha, because it of-the-speaker (vaktrbuddhivisayatavacchedakibhutaghatatvady-
is three (i.e. universal, form and individual) but to the avacchinne tacchabdasya Saktih). If such is the denotative
padarlhatavacchedaka, viz. padarthatva, i.e. padaiaktx. function of the word tad, then there would be different
Modern Naiyayikas hold that there is one denotative denotative functions for the word tad since jamess etc. which
function [padaiakti) in the individual as qualified by the are the determinants of the-state-of-being-denoted by the word
universal and there is another denotative function in form tad are many. Nor can it be argued that although the
(akrti). This is because, from the word ‘cow’ even without the
determinants of the-state-of-being-denoted (iakyatavacchedaka)
recollection of form, we have verbal knowledge of the
are many, they have the consecutive characteristic, viz. the-
individual cow as qualified by the universal. If this is the case
state-of-being-the determinant-of-the-state-of-being-the-object-
the following difficulty arises. Just as there is no connection
of-knowledge-of-the-speaker (buddhivisayatavacchedakatvam).
between horse and sun which are the meanings of the word Therefore, there is only one denotative function for the word
hari conveyed by different denotative functions, so also there tad in that which is qualified by jamess and so on which are
qualified by the-state-of-being-determinant-of-the-state-of-being-
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 29
23
object-of-knowledge-of-the-speaker (puddhivisayatavacchedaka- that which is qualified byjamess etc. which are the-determinants-
tvavUistaghatatvadyavacchinne iaktih). If such is the case, then of-the-state-of-being-indirect-knowledge-of-the-speaker.
the determinant of the-state-of-being-determinant-of-the-state- According to Dinakara, the denotative function of the word
of-being-denoted would also become the object of verbal etad is in the object of the perceptual knowledge of the speaker
knowledge arising from the word tad. and the denotative function of the word tad is in the object of
This cannot be admited: The-state-of-being-the- the knowledge of the speaker, in general. Other Naiyayikas
determinant-of-the-state-of-being-the-object-of-the-knowledge hold that the denotative function of the word idam is in the
(buddhivisayatavacchedakatvam) of the speaker is the object of perceptual knowledge of the speaker which is near
determinant of the-state-of-being-determinant-of-the-state-of- and the denotative function of the word etad is in the object of
being-denoted (Sakyatavacchedakatavacchedakam) as an adven¬ the perceptual knowledge of the speaker which is nearer to
titious qualifier (upalaksana) and an adventitious qualifier him. The denotative function of the word adas is in the object
does not become the object of verbal knowledge. Therefore, of perception which is far away from the speaker. The
the conclusion is that as stated in the beginning, the denotative denotative function of the word tad is in the object of the
function of the word tad is in jar and so on which are qualified indirect knowledge of the speaker. The denotative function of
by jamess and so on which are the-determinants-of-the-state- the word kim is in the speaker’s object of desire to know.
of-being-the-object-of-the-knowledge-of-the-speaker. The denotative function of the word sarva in sentences
such as sarve ghatah. rupavantah is in the-state-of-being-pervader,
Denotative Function of Words like
which resides in colour and indicated byjamess (ghatatvanirupite
idam, etad etc.
rupanisthe sarvapadasya Saktih). Here the verbal knowledge
The denotative functions of the words idam and etad is in from the sentence sarve ghatah rupavantah is that the jar is
the object of perceptual knowledge of the person who utters identical with that which has colour which is the pervader of
the words idam and etad. Nor can it be objected that in that jamess.
case, there would be many different denotative functions for The denotative function of the word yusmad is in that
the words idam and etad according to their use with reference which is qualified by caitratva and so on and which is being
to different things, since it is further specified that the denotative addressed at the time of the utterance of the speaker (i[alkali•
functions of these words is in that which is qualified by the- nasa in b o dhy a caitratva div isiste laktih). The denotative function
determinant-of-the-state-of-being-the-object-of-perceptual- of the word asmad is in that which is qualified by the-state-of-
knowledge-of-the-speaker (vaktrpratyaksabuddhivisayatavac- being-Caitra and so on who are the independent speakers at
chedakaghatatvadyavacchinne). Therefore, iakyatavacchedakata- the time.
vacchedakam is vaktrpratyaksabuddhivisayatavacchedakatvam
Division of Words
which is to be taken as an adventitious qualifier and so it does
not become the object of verbal knowledge arising from the Words are divided into four: Derivative (yaugika),
words idam and etad. The denotative function of the word conventional (rudha), derivatively conventional (yogarudha)
adas is in vaktrparoksabuddhivisayatavacchedakavacchinna, i.e. and derivative and conventional [yaugikarudha). Where only
 Introduction 31
Nyaya Philosophy of Language
usage is not possible because the knowledge of the denotative
the meanings of the parts of the word are cognised that word function of the word pankaja as a whole prevents the knowledge
is derivative (yaugika), e.g. the word fiacaka, which is derived of the meaning of the same word merely by means of the
from the root pac with the help of the suffix aka .Here: the root denotative functions of its parts. This opinion of the old
pac means pdkakriyd (act of cooking) and the suffix aka™e^s Naiyayikas go against the general rule that an instance of a
kartd (agent); therefore the word pacaka means by the knowledge the object of which is not contradictory to the
denotative functions of its parts (avayavaSaktya) the agent of object of knowledge which is to be prevented prevents the
the act of cooking, i.e. the cook. . .. latter instance of knowledge only by obstructing the knowledge
Where the meaning is cognised by the denotative functio which is its cause.
of the word as a whole (samudayaiaktya) without depending Therefore, the modem Naiyayikas point out that as soon
upon the denotative functions of the parts of the word, t at as the word pankaja is uttered, the hearer has immediately the
word is considered conventional (rudha). An example for knowledge of the meaning of lotus because the word pankaja
such a kind of word is gomandalam, which according to is used with the intention of conveying the meaning of lotus.
Muktavalikara is to be taken as one word meaning globe by Hence, the verbal knowledge that arises has the form that lotus
the denotative function of the word as a whole without taking is that which has origin from mud.
into account the denotative functions of the parts of the wor When however, there is the knowledge of the absence of
Dinakara and Ramarudra take gomandalam as two words. the conventional meaning of lotus, (as for instance, there can
There is a prolonged discussion on this point in R„ the details be no knowledge of lotus when the pond has no lotus but only
of which could be seen in the commentary on this section. water-lily), and when the speaker also has the intention of
Where in the meanings of the parts of words there is a so conveying the meaning of water-lily as water-lily, then from the
the denotative function of the word as a whole, there the word word pankaja there is the knowledge of water-lily by the
is derivatively conventional (yogarudhd). This means that there significatory function of implication.
is the semantic connection of the meaning conveyed by the On the contrary, if the speaker does not have the
denotative function of the word as a whole with the meanings intention of conveying the meaning of water-lily as water-lily
conveyed by the denotative functions of the parts of the same and there is the absence of lotus, then there arises the verbal
word. Here the relation between the two meanings is non¬ knowledge of water-lily as that which has origin from mud by
difference. As for example, the word pankaja by means of the means of the mere denotative functions of the parts of the
denotative function of the word as a whole (samudayaSakti) word pankaja.
conveys the meaning of lotus and this is connected y t e Words which denote independently derivative meaning
relation of non-difference, with that which has origin from and conventional meaning are derivative and conventional
mud [pankajanikarti) which is the meaning of the same wor (yaugikarudha), as for instance, the word udbhid which by
by the denotative functions of its parts. means of the denotative functions of its parts conveys the
It may be asked here why not the word pankaja be used meaning of tree etc., and by means of the denotative function
in the sense of water-lily also by means of the denotative
functions of its parts? The old Naiyayikas answer that such a
 33
^ Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction

intention of the speaker. Hence, the conclusion of the modem

of the word as a whole conveys the meaning of a particular Naiyayikas is that the impossibility of the intention of the
kind of sacrifice. speaker only is the cause of implication.
Implication Such implication is of two kinds: jahatsvartha and
ajahatsvartha. jahatsvarthalaksana is that by which the word
abandons its denoted meaning, i.e. in the verbal knowledge
conveyed'bythe arising from it the implied meaning is the object and not the
denoted meaning. As for example, from the sentence gahgayam
ghosah, there is the verbal knowledge in the form that there is
a village on the bank. Here the denoted meaning of the word
gahga, viz. stream, is totally abandoned; ajahatsvarthalaksana
is that in which the word does not give up its denoted meaning,
i.e. verbal knowledge arising from it has the denoted meaning
also as its object, as for example, chatrinoyanti. Here the word
chatrin has implication in the meaning of one group consisting
of those having umbrellas and those not having umbrellas.
And so in the verbal knowledge, the denoted meaning, i.e.
those having umbrellas is not abandoned.
Here it should be noted carefully that the statement that
the expression chatrin has implication in the meaning of one
group consisting of those having umbrellas and those not
having umbrellas is made according to the system of the

«a?ilSHS£
implication in^one who^a ^ ^ ^ but the
Grammarians. This cannot be admitted; the reason is that the
expression chatrin consists of the stem chatra, meaning
umberella and the suffix ini, meaning that which is related to
it. Therefore, since we get the knowledge of that which is
“hi holdletuchs in order that they can take their related to umbrella from the words chatra and ini, we need not
postulate denotative function for the expression chatrin in the
The modem Naiyayikas hold that everywhere °“ty *h^ meaning of that which is related to umbrella. Hence, it follows
incompatibility of the intention of t e spea er 1 that there is no implication in the expression chatrin.
postulating implication. This is because m the example of According to the Naiyayikas however, there is implication
gahgayam ghosah, sometimes there can be imp ica for the word chatra in the meaning of the-state-of-being-one-
^wor&gahga in lira, and sometimes there can be implication for group consisang of those having umbrellas and those not
the word ghosa in fish. But which word is to be taken m he having umbrellas. And the denoted meaning of the suffix ini
implied meaning can be determined only by reference
34 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Introduction 35
is that which is related. Thus the whole expression means
the implication for the word ganga in the sentence gangayam
chatrighatitaikasamudayatvavanto gacchanti, i.e. chatrighati-
ghosah is in tira which is qualified by tiratva; sometimes such
taikasamuddyo gacchati, i.e. a group consisting of those having
a knowledge of implication is in tira which is qualified by
umbrellas and not having umbrellas is going. However, it
gangatiratva. Both the instances of knowledge of implication
should be noted here that there is a prolonged discussion
produce the remembrance and verbal knowledge of the
between the Grammarians and the Naiyayikas whether there
respective characteristic qualifying tira.
is denotative function on the expression chatrin. The details of
An additional reason why implication is not accepted in
this discussion are to be seen from the commentary to this
tiratva in such instances as gangayam ghosah is that implication
section.
in the form olgahgdpadatakyapravahasamyoga (conjunction of
It should be further noted that the generally accepted
the stream, the denoted meaning of the word ganga) is not
opinion of the Naiyayikas is that where the denoted meaning
possible with the universal tiratva.
of the word which has implication is totally abandoned in
' Further Muktavalikara asserts that in a similar manner
verbal knowledge, there the implication is jahatsvarthdy as in
there is no denotative function in the determinant of the-state-
the case of the verbal knowledge in the form that there is a
of-being-denoted-meaning also. The reason is that the
village on the bank (tire ghosah) arising from the sentence
knowledge of denotative function which is qualified by a
gangayam ghosah. Where the denoted meaning of the word
particular characteristic produces the remembrance and verbal
which has implication becomes the object in verbal knowledge
knowledge ofthat which is qualified by the same characteristic.
as qualifier, there implication is ajahatsvartha as in the case of
Thus the denotative function of the word ‘jar’ is known in jar
the verbal knowledge in the form that there is a village on the
which is the substratum of a particular characteristic, viz.
bank of the Ganges (gahgatire ghosah) arising from the sentence
jamess, which is known.
gangayam ghosah. Here the denoted meaning of the word
Ramarudra, however, first rejects this opinion of
ganga is a qualifier to bank. Some Naiyayikas on the contrary
Muktavalikara, pointing out that if the denotative function is
hoid that in this latter case there isjahatsvdrtha implication and
not accepted in the determinant ofthe-state-of-being-denoted-
for them ajahatsvartha implication is where the denoted
meaning, then there would be no fixed characteristic for the
meaning of a word which has implication becomes object in
denoted meaning in the verbal knowledge arising from the
verbal knowledge as the principal qualificand.
knowledge of denotative function, just as in the verbal
Further the Naiyayikas do not admit implication in the
determinant ofthe-state-of-being-implied-meaning;yet, such a knowledge arising from the knowledge of implication there is
no fixed characteristic for the implied meaning. But in the end
determinant becomes the object of the remembrance and
Ramarudra shows that even if denotative function is not
verbal knowledge arising from the word having implication.
Then a question arises how the determinant of the-state-of- accepted in the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-
meaning, there is a fixed characteristic for the denoted
being-implied-meaning becomes the object in remembrance
meaning for the verbal knowledge arising from the knowledge
and verbal knowledge without the knowledge of significatory
of denotative function. The details of this intricate discussion
function in it. The answer is that sometimes the knowledge of
are to be known from the commentary to this section.
^ Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 37

Further there is also an important discussion whether

„ hr Uksana in the form of direct relation of denoted
there is implication in sentences. The Naiyayikas hold that
there is no implication in sentences whereas the Mlmamsakas
hold that there is implication in sentences. The Naiyayikas
explain their position as follows: There is no implication in
sentences, since implication is in the form of a relation with a
denoted meaning and there is no denotative function in
npk^ya.Now, ^Xhtwmrefore, the word sentences. Therefore, in the sentence gabhirayam nadyam
the denoted meaning of which is b . ^ in the ghosah (there is a village on the deep river) Naiyayikas accept
dvirepha has the implied meaning of be y ^ wQrd implication for the word nadi in naditira (bank of the river) and
the meaning of the wordgabhira (deep) is connected with the
'Z river which is the part of another meaning, viz. naditira which
is the implied meaning of the word nadi. If such an ekaddanvaya

SSSSStts*."^
^Tconnttion wid, dris discussion on implication it
(connection with a part of another meaning) is not accepted,
then implication for the word nadi is in gabhiranaditira (bank
of the deep river) and the word gabhira just shows the intention
of the speaker.
But the Mlmamsakas reject this position because if
~.““'=rSs^S
about any verbdknowkd^but ony^^r'^ ^
implication is accepted only for the word nadi, then the word
gabhira will become meaningless. But the speaker certainly
has the intention that the word gabhira should also be
meaningful. Therefore, they admit implication for the sentence
gabhirayam nadyam in the meaning gabhiranaditira. And in
order to meet the objection that there is no Sakti in a sentence
and therefore, there is no implication in the form of Sakyasam-
- -id to have to bandha in a sentence, the Mlmamsakas define implication as
follows: Implication is the relation with that which is conveyed
have^mpto^ation! vfz. the word gahga. brings about the verbal by a word or a sentence. As for instance, that which is
conveyed by the sentence gabhirayam nadyam is that the river
Is identical with that which is deep; its relation is in bank and
un me , y fa dull-witted man is similar
such sentences as kumatih paSuh, ( , j„ there so there is implication in the sentence also.
to an animal) where there is implication to all the words there But such an opinion of the Mlmamsakas cannot be
arises verbal knowledge. This is testified by our expenence^ Emitted. This is because when implication is accepted in the
Therefore, they assert that the word which is sai expression gabhirayam nadyam as a whole, there cannot be
implication also bring" about verbal knowle ge.
 Introduction 39
Nyaya Philosophy of Language
38
It should be pointed out here that in general ekaddanvaya
any verbal knowledge in which ghosah is qualificand and (the connection of one meaning with the part of another
eabhiranaditiravrttitva is qualifier since there is no word which
meaning) is not admitted. Dinakara brings forward a reason
brings about the knowledge of the-state-of-being-superstratum. for this. It is necessary to accept that the knowledge of the
Hence, implication cannot be accepted in the sentence. It significatory function in which something is the qualificand is
should be noted here that the discussion on this point is quite the cause for the knowledge of the semantic connection in
intricate and its details should be known from the commentary which that something is the qualificand (taddharmikanvayabodhe
corresponding to this section. taddharmikavrttijnanam karanam). If this rule is not accepted
Compounds then there could be such incorrect usages as citravrajo'sti in
the sense of a shed of cows which are variegated, whereas the
It was established in the previous section that there is no expression really means cowshed is variegated.
implication in a sentence as a whole but only in a word which Similarly in such bahuvrihi compounds as arudhavanara,
is a part of the sentence. Similarly, now it is shown there is no there is implication for the second word vanara in the object
implication in a compound as a whole but only in a word of the action of climbing by monkey (vanarakartrkarohana■
which constitutes the compound. It may be noted here in karma) and the word arudha serves only to show the intention
general that Naiyayikas admit implication for the second word of the speaker.
in bahurvihi compounds and for the first word in tatpurusa
tatpurusa Compounds
compounds. For dvandva and karmadharaya compounds they
do not accept implication. In tatpurusa compounds implication is accepted in the
first word, as for instance, in the compound word rajapurusah
bahuvrihi Compounds
(king’s man), the word rajan has implication in rajasambandhin
In bahuvrihi compounds, as for instance citraguh (one and this meaning is semantically connected with the meaning
who has variegated cows), there is implication for the second of the word purusa by the relation of non-difference. Therefore,
word of the compound^ in the meaning of gomat (the owner the verbal knowledge arising from the expression rajapurusah.
of the cows). The meaning of the word extra (variegated) is is rajasambandhyabhinnah.purusah (the person is identical with
connected by the relation of non-difference with cow which is the one who is related to the king).
a part of the meaning of gomat which is the meaning of the Here a question may arise: Why not accept direct
word ‘cow’ by implication. If such a semantic connection of re ationship between the meanings of the words rajan and
one meaning with the part of another meaning is not accepted, purusa by the relation of svatva. This cannot be admitted
then the word go has implication in citragomat (one who has ^Cause °f the rule that direct semantic connection by the
variegated cows), and the word citra shows merely the re ation of difference is not accepted between the meanings of
intention of the speaker. It is to be noted here that in bahuvrihi . 0 nouns other than particles and indeclinables. Such a rule
compounds implication is accepted in the second wor necessarily to be accepted because, otherwise, from the
because, in that case, there could be semantic connection o entence rajapurusah (king is a person) there could also be the
the meaning of the suffix with the meaning of the stem.
40 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 41
direct semantic connection of rajan with purusa by the relation dvandva Compounds
of difference (viz. here svatvasambandha) and then the According to the Naiyayikas, there is no implication in
expression raja purusah would mean rajnah purusah (king’s itaretarayogadvandva compounds. Therefore, in the verbal
man). And such a usage is not at all accepted by anybody. knowledge which arises from such dvandva compounds as
But another objection may be raised: In the compound dhavakhadirau, we have the verbal knowledge in which dhava
word rajapurusa implication for the first word rajan need not and khadira are qualificands, dvitva which is the meaning of
be accepted in the meaning of rajasambandhin\ one can easily the dual of the nominative case-ending is qualifier. Here it
remember the elided genitive case-ending of the word rajan. should be carefully noted that the dvitva which exists
Therefore, there can arise the verbal knowledge that the man combinedly in both dhava and khadira by the relation of
belongs to the king (rajasvatvavan purusah). This cannot be paryapti, exists in each dhava and khadira separately by the
admitted because even one who does not remember the relation of samavaya.
elided case-ending of the word rajan in the compound word But the Mlmamsakas do not accept this position and
rajapurusa has the verbal knowledge ofrajasambandhyabhinnah assert that there is implication in itaretarayoga compounds
purusah. Hence implication is to be admitted for the first word such as dhavakhadirau for the second word khadira in the
in tatpurusa compounds. substratum of the association of dhava and khadira (dhavakha-
According to some Naiyayikas, however, there is no
dirasahitydiraya). The Mlmamsakas argue that such an
implication in compounds. For them, the verbal knowledge
implication is to be accepted because, otherwise, there would
arising from the tatpurusa compound rajapurusa is purusaviies-
arise the knowledge of two dhava-s and two khadira-s from the
yakarajaprakarakasvatvasamsargaka, and the cause of such a dvandva compound dhavakhadirau. The reason for this is that
verbal knowledge is the knowledge of the sequence of words, the nominal suffixes bring about the knowledge of the number
viz. the word rajan immediately followed by the word purusa. which is pervaded by the determinant of the-state-of-being-the-
The reason why they accept such a verbal knowledge from the
subject supdm vdddyatdvacchedakavydpyasamkhydbodhakatvam.
expression rajapurusa is that in sentences such as daiaite The Naiyayikas, however, reject this opinion of the
rdjamatangds tasyaivami turahgamah (these ten are the elephants Mimaipsakas for the following reasons: The basic reason for
of the king and his only are these horses) by the word tad, rajan his is that it is possible to form dvandva compounds even with
cannot be referred to because he is a part of the implied
words which denote things which have no association. This is
/ meaning (i.e. rajasarnbandhin) of the word rajan in the because association (sdhityam) can be understood in two ways:
compound rajamatahgah. This is because of the rule that the ssociation can mean either existence in the same place
word tad refers to the meaning of the word tad (padartha)
[sahavrttitvam) or semantic connection with action which is
which occurs in the previous sentence and not to the
e meaning of one verb [ekakriydnvayitvam). If association is
determinant of the-state-of-being-the-meaning of the word
d7)n e,rSt00d in the f,rst meaning, then there cannot be such
(padarthatanacchedaka). Ramarudra rejects this opinion of the
n, n. Va cornPounds as gotvaSvatve with the words gotva and
other Naiyavikas with detailed arguments which should be
a vat q meanings of which do not exist in the same place.
known from the commentary to this section.
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 43
42
If, however, association is taken in the second sense, then in and the first word ahi shows the intention of the speaker. The
expressions such as dhavakhadirau paiya chindhi, the modem Naiyayikas, however, hold that from compound
compound dhavakhadirau would become invalid because words like ahinakulam the verbal knowledge is produced in
there is no semantic connection with the action which is the which the snake and the mongoose are the objects and not
meaning of one verb. And besides association in the form of their aggregate. And the singular number in the compound
ekakriyanvayitva is not at all experienced in the verbal ahinakulam is semantically connected with each one of the
knowledge arising from a dvandva compound. For these meanings of the words ahi and nakula, separately. Further
reasons the Naiyayikas do not accept implication in dvandva they also hold that the singular nominal suffix is not used to
compounds. convey the meaning of singular number but only for the sake
According to the Naiyayikas, dvaudva compound is of validity.
accepted where there is real difference of meanings of words karmadhZt raya
constituting it. Now one can raise an objection that there
In karmadharaya compounds there is no implication. As
cannot be dvandva compound in expressions such as
nilaghalayorabhedah (there is identity of jar and that which is for example, in a karmadharaya compound such as nilotpalam
(blue lotus), the meaning of the word nila (i.e. having blue
blue) because there is no difference between that which is blue
colour) is qualifier to the meaning of the word utpala (i.e.
and jar. Such an objection is answered by pointing out that the
word nila (blue) means by implication nilatva (blueness, i.e.
water-lily) by the relation of non-difference. Hence the verbal
knowledge arising from the expression nilotpalam is
blue colour) and the word ‘jar’ by implication means jamess.
nilabhinnam utpalam, i.e. lotus is not different from that which
And identity here means identity of substrata, i.e. identity of
has blue colour. Here an objection may be raised; even in
the substratum of jamess and the substratum of blue colour.
karmadharaya compounds such as nilotpala, there is implication
Therefore, there could be dvandva compound since the words
for the first word nila in the meaning of having-blue-colour
nila and ghata denote different meanings.
and, therefore, how can it be asserted that there is no
Some other Naiyayikas, however, hold that there could
implication in karmadharaya compound? The answer to this
be dvandva compound where there is the difference of the
objection is that this implication is not dependent on the
meanings of words or where there is the difference of the
determinants of the-states-of-being-the-meanings-of-words. And nature of the compound. This is because even when the word
nila is used in ordinary sentences without being a part of a
in the present instance of nilaghatayorabhedah, there is dvandva
compound, as for instance, in the sentence nilam utpalam,
compound because of the difference of the determinants of
according to the Naiyayikas, the word nila has implication in
the states-of-being-the-meanings of words, viz. the state of
that which has blue colour. Therefore, the implication which
having blue colour (nilavattva, i.e. nilarupa) and jarness
the word nila has in the compound nilotpalam is not dependent
(ghatatva).
on the nature of the compound and so the compound
In samaharadvandva compounds such as ahinakulam, if
nilotpalam as a whole does not have implication.
the aggregate also is experienced, there is implication for the
second word nakula in the aggregate of snake and mongoose
44 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 45
avyaytbhZlva Compounds between the words bhuktam and devadattena. When, however,
In avyayibhava compounds such as upakumbham (near the speaker intending to bring about the verbal knowledge in
the jar), the second word kumbha has implication in that which the form nilah patah ghato dravyam utters the sentence nilo
is connected with jar (i.e. kumbhasambandhi). This is a ghato dravyam patah, the hearer may have verbal knowledge
nityasamasa, i.e. its meaning cannot be expressed by its in the form nilo ghatah and dravyam patah. owing to the
constituent members used separately. Here the denoted erroneous knowledge of contiguity.
meaning of the word upa is samipam; the implied meaning of According to the modem Naiyayikas, contiguity is the
the word kumbha, i.e. kumbhasambandhi is connected with the juxtaposition of the instances of knowledge of two words, the
denoted meaning of the word upa, i.e. samipam, by the relation connection of whose meanings is intended by the speaker.
of non-difference. In the verbal knowledge arising from the And, such juxtaposition of the instances of knowledge of the
compound upakumbham, the denoted meaning of the word words is the cause of verbal knowledge by its mere existence.
upa, i.e. samipam, is the principal meaning, i.e. qualificand. Now an objection may be raised against this opinion of the
We can now summarize the Nyaya position in the modem Naiyayikas. It is not possible to have the contiguity of
following way: From compounds, we have verbal knowledge, the instances of remembrance of words which constitute a
by means of the denotative function and implication of words sentence. This is because there is the destruction of the
which constitute them. Therefore, there is no need of accepting remembrance of the previous word by the remembrance of
denotative function in compounds as a whole as the the following word. This objection is answered by pointing out
Grammarians do. that by means of impressions caused by the experience of each
word the conjunct remembrance of all words arises at last as
Causes of Verbal Knowledge contiguous. Hence it is possible to have verbal knowledge.
Contiguity (Ssatti) But a further objection may be raised as follows: Just as
the recollection of words, so also the instances of the recollection
Now the discussion is on the causes of verbal knowledge.
of meanings of words disappear one after another after two
Four causes of verbal knowledge are enumerated by the texts:
moments from their origin. Therefore, all instances of
These are contiguity (asatti), semantic competency (yogyata),
recollection of meanings of words do not exist simultaneously.
syntactic expectancy (akahksa) and intention of the speaker
Therefore, only the conjunct recollection of the meanings of
(tatparya). words is to be considered as the cause of all instances of verbal
The juxtaposition of two words the connection of whose knowledge. By means of this conjunct recollection, verbal
meanings is intended by the speaker is contiguity. The knowledge arises simultaneously after the manner of pigeons
knowledge of such a contiguity is the cause of verbal knowledge. in the threshing floor. This is the view of the old Naiyayikas.
This is the opinion of the old Naiyayikas. Therefore, according Modem Naiyayikas, however, hold that all instances of
to this view, from such sentences as girir bhuktam agniman verbal knowledge arise in the manner of viiistasya vailistyam.
devadattena, there is no verbal knowledge in the form that the This means that the verbal knowledge arising form a full
hill has fire and (food is) eaten by Devadatta. This is because sentence is invariably preceded by the verbal knowledge
there is no contiguity between the words girt and agnimat nor arising from the part of the sentence, Detailed discussions on
 46 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Introduction 47
these two views and in this connection the rejection of the
sphota theory of the Grammarians also are to be found in the particular thing as related to another thing is prevented by the
commentary to this section. certain knowledge that that thing is not related with that other
thing (tadvattdjnbnasamdnyam prati tadabhavavattanikayah
Semantic Competency (yogyatH)
pratibandhakah). Hence, the knowledge of semantic compe¬
Semantic competency is the relation of one meaning with tency need not be considered as a separate cause of verbal
another meaning. And the knowledge of such a semantic knowledge. Dinakara, however, rejects this opinion of the
competency is another cause of verbal knowledge. This is modem Naiyayikas on grounds of cumbersomeness.
because from such sentences as vahnina sihcati (he waters with
fire), there is no verbal knowledge. And the reason for this is Syntactic Expectancy (akanksa)

that there is no relation between the act of watering and fire The knowledge of syntactic expectancy is another cause
as instrumental cause [sekakriya and vahnikaranakatva). of verbal knowledge. A word is said to have syntactic expectancy
Therefore, there is no semantic competency between sekakriya with another word without which it cannot produce verbal
and vahnikaranakatva. Hence semantic competency is to be knowledge. More precisely syntactic expectancy is ekapade
accepted as a cause of verbal knowledge. aparapadavattvam, i.e. the-state-of-being-qualified by one word
Now if semantic competency is the relation of one in the other word by the relation either of the-state-of-coming-
meaning with another meaning and the object of verbal immediately before that word or by the relation of the-state-of-
knowledge also is the same, then it cannot be stated that following-immediately after that word (avyavahitapurvavrtti-
semantic competency is the cause of verbal knowledge. tvavyavahitottaravrttitvanyatarasambandhena ekapade aparapa-
Therefore, the old Naiyayikas hold that it is not the definite damkstatvam). As for example, in such sentences as ghatam
knowledge of semantic competency (yogyatanikayah) that is anaya, there is expectancy between the words ghata and the
the cause of verbal knowledge, but knowledge of semantic word am. Here the-state-of-being-qualified by the word ghata
competency which is common to both definite knowledge of in the word am by the relation of the-state-of-coming-
semantic competency and doubt of semantic competency immediately after the word ghata or the-state-of-being-qualified
[samkyanikayobhayasddhdranamyogyatdjnanam kbdabodham by the word am in the word ghata by the relation of the-state-
prati karanam).
of-coming-immediately-before-the word am is syntactic
The modem Naiyayikas hold that knowledge of semantic expectancy. And the knowledge of such a syntactic expectancy
competency is not a cause of verbal knowledge, but the is the cause of verbal knowledge, here in the example, the
definite knowledge of the absence of semantic competency cause of the verbal knowledge in the form ghatiya karmata.
(yogyatabhavanikayah) is a hindrance (pratibandhakah) for Now the question is why such a knowledge of syntactic
verbal knowledge. Here it may be noted that the modem expectancy is to be considered the cause of verbal knowledge.
Naiyayikas are not postulating an additional factor which The answer is that from a sentence such as ghat ah karmatvam
obstructs verbal knowledge, but they are only applying here etc., even though the hearer has the other causes of verbal
the general principle ofpratibadhyapratibandhakabhava. And knowledge such as semantic competency etc. he does not
the general form of this principle is that the knowledge of one have verbal knowledge because there is no syntactic expectancy
48 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Introduction 49
between the words ghata and karmatva. hearer verbal knowledge which has the same form as intended
But if the nature of syntactic expectancy is as described by the speaker. As for instance, from the expression ghatam,
above then from a stanza written by a person who has taken the hearer has the knowledge that the speaker has uttered this
the vow of silence, there cannot arise any verbal knowledge. expression with the desire to produce the knowledge in which
This is because a person who has taken the vow of silence does the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action (denoted by the root) is
not utter a word. Therefore, because of the absence of the the qualificand, the-state-of-being-superstratum is the relation
uttered words, there is no syntactic expectancy in the form and jar is the qualifier. Such a knowledge of the intention of
ekapade aparapadavattvam. Therefore, syntactic expectancy is the speaker is the cause of verbal knowledge.
to be defined as the-state-of-coming-after the knowledge of Further if the knowledge of the intention of the speaker
one word in the knowledge of another word or the-state-of- is not accepted as the cause of verbal knowledge, then from
coming-before the knowledge of one word in the knowledge such sentences as ‘bring saindhava\ we would not have the
of another word (avyavahitottaratvavyavahitapurvatvanyatara- verbal knowledge sometimes of horse and sometimes of salt.
sambandhena ekapadajhane aparapadajnanavattvam akahksa). When, however, the knowledge of the intention of the speaker
Therefore, there is expectancy even in the case of words which is admitted as the cause of verbal knowledge, then we can
are supplied. have verbal knowledge either of horse or of salt according to
Thus according to Dinakara syntactic expectancy is only the intention of the speaker. Hence also the knowledge of the
between stems and suffixes and not between verbs and karaka intention of the speaker is to be considered as a cause of verbal
words. This is because in the case of stem and suffix there is knowledge.
a fixed rule that one should precede or follow the other. As for There are certain other Naiyayikas, however, who hold
instance, in the case of the expression ghatam, the word am that the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is not a cause
should follow the word ghata and the word ghata should of verbal knowledge in general but only for those instances of
necessarily precede the word am. Such a fixed state of affairs verbal knowledge produced by words having many meanings,
is syntactic expectancy. In the case of the sentence ghatam as in the case of the sentence saindhavam anaya which was
anaya, however, there is no fixed rule that the expression mentioned earlier.
ghatam should precede or follow the expression anaya. This In the section on qualities in K.M.D.R., there is a part
is because, we can have verbal knowledge from both the sen¬ which deals with the question whether Words and Comparison
tences ghatam anaya and anaya ghatam. Therefore, there is no are independent means of valid knowledge. The translation of
syntactic expectancy between the verbs and karaka words. this section and commentary on it are given as an appendix.
Since the main arguments here are very much connected with
Intention of the Speaker (tatparya)
Verbal testimony and Comparison the chief points of this
The knowledge of the intention of the speaker is another discussion are now presented. According to the Vaisesikas,
cause of verbal knowledge. The reason for this is that the both Words and Comparison are means of valid knowledge
speaker always intends to convey a particular form of knowledge m the capacity of Inference and hence they have to be
by the utterance of a sentence. Therefore, there arises in the included in Inference. Therefore, they are not separate means
of valid knowledge.
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Analysis of Karikavati, MuktavaVi and Dinakan 51
50

The main argument of the VaiSesikas to establish their Analysis of Upamanakhanda

position is that when a sentence is uttered, the hearer infers that Nature of Upamiti
this sentence is uttered by a person who has the valid Analysis of KHrikavali and MuktSvali
knowledge of the relation of meanings of words constituting
Karikas 79 and 80 give a brief and accurate description
the sentence because they are words having syntactic
of the nature of upamana and upamiti according to the modern
expectancy etc. The Naiyayikas point out against this inference
Naiyayikas. Knowledge of similarity of cow etc. in gayal etc.
that this establishes only that the sentence is uttered by the
is the instrumental cause of upamiti; the recollection of the
speaker who has valid knowledge of relation of the meanings
meaning of the sentence conveying similarity is the operation;
conveyed by the words constituting the sentence. But such a
the knowledge of the denotative function of words lik t gavaya
knowledge is not the knowledge of the desired object and so
etc. is upamiti. (Text 1, p. 89)
it does not lead to any activity.
M. repeats the same ideas more elaborately and adds at
In order to meet this objection the VaiSesikas propose
the end that upamiti is the knowledge of the denotative
another inference as follows: The meaning of a sentence is the
function of words like gavaya etc. in the form that that which
connection of the meanings of the words constituting the
is qualified by the universal of gavayatva is to be denoted by
sentence. But such a connection of the meanings of the words
the word gavaya, and not in the form that a particular gayal is
of a sentence can be inferred as follows: Meanings recollected
to be denoted by the word gavaya. The reason is that,
by words have mutual relation because these meanings are
otherwise, it would be impossible to grasp the denotative
conveye d by words having semantic competency etc. Similarly
Comparison gives rise to the knowledge of denotative function
function of the word gavaya in other gayals. (Text 1 p. ,
89,11. 5-12)
of words. But denotative function also can be inferred. Since
elders use, without implication and without erroneous Analysis of Dinakart
knowledge of denotative function, words like gavaya in that
D. first of all points out that the relevance (sahgati) for
which is determined by gavayatva etc., the word gavaya has
treating upamana is occasion [avasara) and then it gives the
gavayatva as the determinant of its state-of-being-denoted-
opinion of the old Naiyayikas; the instrumental cause of
meaning. In this way, knowledge which one gains by means
upamiti is verbal knowledge arising from the sentence conveying
of Words and Comparison can be obtained by Inference.
similarity; recollection of the meaning of the sentence conveying
Therefore, Words and Comparison are not to be considered
similarity is the operation; the perceptual knowledge of the
as separate means of valid knowledge.
individual qualified by similarity is its auxiliary cause. This
Naiyayikas, however, reject this argument pointing out
opinion is rejected. (Text 2, p. 91,11. 1-5)
that it is our experience that even without the knowledge of
D. further points out that according to the modern
invariable concomitance, there arise verbal knowledge as well
Naiyayikas the recollection of the meaning of the sentence
as knowledge from Comparison. It is not the case that after
conveying similarity is the operation of the instrumental cause,
hearing words or after seeing similarity of cow in gayal etc.
viz. perceptual knowledge of the individual qualified by
there arises knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore,
similarity. Such an instrumental cause in the capacity of
Words and Compuison cannot be reduced to Inference.
 52
Nyaya Philosophy of Language

reviving the impression produces the recollection of the Analysis of Karikavati, Muktavali and Dinakan 53
waning the sentence conveying similarity. (Text 2, p. 91
Analysis of Sabdakhanda
The opinion of a certain Naiyayika that only the
Nature of Verbal Knowledge
knowledge of similarity is the instrumental cause of upamiti
Analysis of Karibovall and Muktavali
and the operations are the knowledge of the meaning of the
sentence conveying similarity and the perceptual knowledge In kanka 81a general description of the causal complex
of the individual qualified by similarity which (i.e. both of verbal knowledge is given; its instrumental cause is
instances of knowledge) are produced by the knowledge of knowledge of words; the operation of the instrumental cause
similarity in the capacity of being the knowledge of qualifier is the knowledge of the meaning of words; the auxiliary cause
is rejected. (Text 2, p. 91,11. 7-15) is the knowledge of denotative function. Verbal knowledge is
Further the objection that upamiti is in the form gosadrSo the effect. (Text 1A, p. 113,11. 1-2) 6

gavayapadvacyah and it is not a different form ofvalid knowledge M. first of all points out that it is the knowledge of words
but it is included in verbal knowledge, is rejected since upamiti and not merely words which are uttered is the instrumental
*s in f°mgavayogavayapadavdcyak (Text 3, p. 98,11. cause of verbal knowledge. The operation of this instrumental
cause is the recollection of the meaning of words produced by
The objection that upamiti is samsthanavUistah gavaya- the knowledge of the words with the help of the knowledge of
padavacyah is rejected because samsthana is logically more the significatory function. (Text 1 A, p. 113,11. 3.9)
Significatoiy function is of two kinds: Denotative function
iTu 17)S°me ttian UniverSa^ &avayaiva- (Text 3, p. og,
and implication. Denotative function is the relation of the
Just as the perceptual knowledge of the individual meaning of the word with the word. This is in the form of the
qualified by similarity is the instrumental cause of upamiti so stf? . °d *at from this word this meaning is to be under¬
also the perceptual knowledge of the individual which is wood. According to the old Naiyayikas, in terms coined by
qualified by dissimilarity is also the cause of upamiti fText 3 m rierns ythere 1S no denotative function; according to the
p. 98,11. 17-20) 1 odern Naiyayikas, denotative function is not the will of God,
The objection that upamana is not a different means of terms0 ^ ^ a u erefore’ they admit denotative function also in
valid knowledge because upamiti can be included in nns coined by modems only. (Text 1A, p. 113,11. 9-17)
perceptual knowledge etc. is rejected, upamiti is not perceptual Analysis of Dinakari
knowledge because after upamiti there is no reflective
nowledge in the form saksatkaromi; it is not anumiti because the meaf snf°f °Ut the reIevance ^gati) of treating
it is produced without the knowledge of invariable of]die valid k V kn°wledge after treating the means
concomitance; it is not verbal knowledge since it is not is the Jlr kn°^ edge fr0m ComParison. The relevance here
^e relation of cause and effect.
produced by the knowledge of words; nor is it remembrance
iS produCed on,y pre«ous experience. the denn^tSeS f Significai1t objection against the opinion that
objection uUnCti°n iS in ±e ^ °f God ^d answers The
J ohon is that since the will of God is only one, the
 Analysis of Karikavati, Muktavali and Dinakari 55
54 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Now this position of the Naiyayikas goes against the
denotative function of the word ghata is in pata also by the Panini Sutra, according to which in such sentences as Caitrah
relation of qualificandness. Therefore, the word ghata can pacati, if the verbal suffix ti does not denote the agent, then
denote pata also. Further, from the word gahga we have the there should be the instrumental case after the word Caitra,
knowledge both of the flow of water and of the bank and so but it is not so. The Naiyayikas answer this objection pointing
there is no need of implication. out that only if the verbal suffix does not denote the number
The answer to these objections is given. The denotative of Caitra, should the instrumental case be used after the word
function in the form of the will of God is accepted in the Caitra. Here the verbal suffix ti denotes the singular number
denoted meaning only by a relation of nirupyanirupakabhavd- of Caitra and so the instrumental case is not used after the
pannaviksyata. word Caitra. Now the reason for the verbal suffix ti to denote
Such relations are different in different meanings. the number of Caitra is that Caitra is not connected with the-
Therefore, the word ghata cannot denote pata. Further there state-of-being-the-object-of-action (karmatvadyanavaruddhah)
is the need of implication since it is never asserted that bank and expressed by the word in the nominative case {prathamanta•
is the denoted meaning of the word gahga. Hence, the will of padopasthapyah). (Text 2A, p. 133,11. 10-13)
God is not accepted in bank by the relation oigahgapadajanya- Now it may be objected that in such sentences as Caitra
bodhavisayalatvavacchinnaprakaratanirupitaviksyala. (Text IB, ivaMaitrogacchati, the verbal suffix could denote the number
pp. 115-116) of Caitra because Caitra is karmatvadyanavaruddhah and
Discussion on Grammar as a Means of prathamantapadopasthapyah. The answer to this objection is
that the expression karmalvadyanavaruddha is to be understood
Knowing Denotative Function
in the sense of itaraviksanatvena tatparyavisayatvam (not
Analysis of Muktavali
intended as a qualifier for another meaning). In the present
M. first of all enumerates the eight means of knowing instance Caitra is qualifier for similarity which is the meaning
denotative function and begins to discuss grammar which is of the particle iva and, therefore, there cannot be any connection
the first means of knowing the denotative function. The of number with Caitra. The second expression prathamanta-
denotative function of roots, suffixes etc. is known from padopasthapya is used in order to avoid connection of number
grammar. The Naiyayikas also admit this but when there is with tandula in such sentences as tandulam pacati where the
cumbersomeness they reject the opinion of the Grammarians. accusative case is not intended to denote the-state-of-being-
For instance, according to the Grammarians, the denotative the-object-of-action. (Text 2A, p. 133,11. 13-16)
function of verbal suffixes is in the agent (karta = krtiman). Or else the first expression karmalvadyanavaruddha could
Therefore, the lakyatavacchedakam is krtimattvam, i.e. krti. e taken in the meaning of dhatvarthatiriktaviksanatvam (i.e.
Since there are many krti-s, it is cumbersome to accept krti as not-being-the-qualifier-for-a-meaning which is other than the
iakyalavacchedakam. Therefore, the Naiyayikas admit the Cleaning of the root). Therefore, in the sentence Caitra iva
denotative function of verbal suffixes in krti. Then the aitro gacchati, there is no connection of number with Caitra
iakyalavacchedakam is krtitvam which is only one. Hence ecause it is a qualifier for the meaning of iva, i.e. similarity,
there is logical simplicity in accepting the denotative function
of the verbal suffix in krti. (Text 2A, p. 133,11. 1-10)
 56 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Analysis of KarikavaVi, Muktavah and Dinakari 57
which is other than the meaning of the root. The second
expression prathamantapadopasthapya is used to avoid the tvena tatparyavisayatvam, the word itara could be omitted and
connection of number with stoka in such sentences as stokam karmatvadyanavaruddha should be taken just in the sense of
pacati where the word stokam is in the accusative case though viksanatvena tatparyavisayatvam.
it is an adverb. (Text 2A, p. 133,11. 16-19) D. further points out that the expression viksanatvena
Thus the Naiyayikas reject also the opinion of the tatparyavisayatvam is to be taken in the sense of viksanatva-
Mimamsakas that the denotative function of the verbal suffix matrena tatparyavisayatvam because, otherwise, in such
is in action (vyapara) because of cumbersomeness. In such sentences as Caitra eva pacati, there would not be any
sentences as rat ho gacchati the verbal suffix ti has implication connection of number with Caitra. (Text 2B, p. 136,11. 7-17)
in action or in being-the-substratum. The verbal suffix ti in In the opinion of D. even the expression viksanatva-
jdndti etc. has implication in the-state-of-being-substratum; in matrena tatparyavisayatvam is to be interpreted as viksanatvama-
naiyati etc. the verbal suffix has implication in the-state-of-
traprayojakaprathamantatattatpaddnupasthdpyatvam because,
being-the-counterpositive. (Text 2A, p. 133,11. 19-22) otherwise, in such sentences as Caitra iva Maitro gacchati,
there could still be connection of number with Caitra fText
Analysis of Dinakari
2B, p. 134,11. 17-22) ' 1
D. first of all explains how grammar is a source of the Further D. discusses the purpose of the expression
knowledge of denotative function; as for instance, from prathamantapadopasthapya in the enunciation of the cause of
grammar we come to know that the root bhu means ‘to be’, that connection with number. If the expression prathamanta-
the term lat means present time etc. (Text 2B, p. 135,1. 1) padopasthapya is not used then in such sentences as tandulam
D. does not bring anything new to the M. text till the pacati, if the intention is in the knowledge of tandula as
discussion on the cause of the non-expression of number by qualifier and as principal qualificand, then there could be
verbal suffix etc. begins. Here D. points out that the expression connection of number with tandula because tandula is not
not-connected-with-the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action (kar- intended as mere qualifier to karmatva. Here it should be
matvddyanavaruddha) is used in order to avoid the connection noted that D. interprets the M. text yatra karmddau na
of number with tandula in the sentence Caitrah pacati tandulah vtsesanatve tdtparyam as yatra karmddau na viksanatvamdtre
where the nominative case in the word tandulah means by atparyam. Further, if the expressionprathamantapadopasthapya
implication karmatva. (Text 2B, p. 135,11. 2 - p. 136,1. 1) is not used, then in the sentence such as Caitrena supyate there
Karmatvadyanavaruddha is to be taken in the sense of cou d be the connection of number with svapa which is the
tlaraviksanatvena tatparyavisayatvam, because, otherwise, in meaning of the root. (Text 2B, p. 136,11. 22-26)
such sentences as Caitra iva Maitro gacchati, there could be M. takes the expression karmatvadyanavaruddha in another
connection of number with Caitra and in such sentences as ^eamng also, viz. dhatvarthaviksanatvam. In that case, there
pakvam annam bhujyate there would not be connection of
in°U u*° be D° connection of number with Caitra because
number with anna. (Text 2B, p. 136,11. 1-6)
j>-UC ,Sfntences_as Caitra iva Maitro gacchati, Caitra is
Now D. points out that in the expression itaraviksana-
a varthatiriktaivarthasadriye viksanam. But there would be
0 connection of number with Caitra in such sentences as
 58 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Analysis of Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakart 59
Caitra evapacati since here Caitra is dhdtvarthatirikte evakardrthe according to the old Naiyayikas, has implication in vyapara
anyasmin viSesanam. (D. does not give the answer to this (action); but according to the modem Naiyayikas, since
objection explicidy but R. gives the answer as follows: vyapara is obtained by the root itself, the implied meaning of
karmatvadyanavaruddhatva is to be interpreted as dhatvartha- the verbal suffix is taken as aSrayatvam, i.e. substratum of
tinktaviSesanatvamatrena tdtparyavisayatvam\ and here Caitra gamana which is the meaning of the root. (Text 2B, p. 137,11.
is both the principal qualificand and qualifier and, therefore, 13-15)
there could be connection of number with Caitra) (Text 2B* In such sentences asjandti, the verbal suffix has implication
p. 136,11. 27-28)
in aSrayatva. But it is not necessarily so because in such
When karmatvadyanavaruddha is interpreted in the sense sentences as caksurjandti, one has to admit implication of the
of dhatvarthatiriktaviSesanatvam then it should be understood verbal suffix in vyapara or janakatva. Therefore, in such
that the second expression prathamdntapadopasthapya is used sentences as icchati,yatate etc. the verbal suffix has necessarily
in order to avoid the connection of number with stoka, i.e. a implication in aSrayatva. (Text 2B, p. 137,11. 15-19)
little, in such sentences as stokam pacati, since the meaning of D. further describes the full Sabdabodha of the sentence
stokam is not expressed by a word in the nominative case. Caitras tandulam pacati and of Caitrenapacyate tandulah. The
(Text 2B, p. 136,1. 28 - p. 137,1.1)
full Sabdabodha from the first sentence is that Caitra is the
Now D. describes the opinion of Didhitikara about the substratum of effort which causes the act of cooking the object
cause of connection of number, prathamantapadopasthapyatva of which is rice and from the second sentence the Sabdabodha
is directly the cause of bhavananvayabodha. There is no verbal is that rice is the substratum of the result which is produced by
knowledge of number without having bhavana (i.e. kartrtva or the act of cooking which is produced by effort which exists in
karmatva) also as its object. Therefore, samkhyanvyabodhatva Caitra. (Text 2B, p. 137,11. 18-25)
is vyapya and bhavananvayabodhatva is vyapaka. Therefore, krt suffix has denotative function in agent or object of
where there is no prathamantapadopasthapyatva which is the action because of the experience of verbal knowledge by the
cause of bhavananvayabodha, there is also no samkhya- relation of non-difference in such places as Caitrah pakta and
nvayabodha. (Text 2B, p. 137,11. 2-11) tandulah pakvah. (Text 2B, p. 137,11. 25-27)
D. further explains how there is cumbersomeness in the
position of the Mimamsakas that the denotative function of Other Means of Knowing Denotative Function
verbal suffix is in action (vyapara). Here vyaparatva is the
Analysis of Muktavali and DinaJcari
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning of verbal
suffix. Because this vyaparatva consists of being produced etc. How denotative function is grasped by means of Com¬
it is more cumbersome compared to the universal of krtitva parison has already been explained. (Text3A,p. 174,1. l;Text
3B, p. 178,1. 1)
which is the Sakyatavachedaka, according to the Naiyayikas.
(Text 2B, p. 137,11. 11-12) Dictionary is another means of knowing denotative
Since there is no krti in chariot because it is inanimate, function. According to dictionary, the denotative function of
the verbal suffix ti in such sentences as ratho gacchati, the word riila etc. is in mlarupa etc. and in nilavUista etc. But
the Naiyayikas accept the denotative function of the word riila
etc. only in nilarupa etc. and not in nilavUista because of
 60
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Analysis of Karikavati, Muktavali and Dinakari 61
simplicity arising from the fact that if denotative function is
Refutation of JatUaktivada
accepted in mlarufa, then the determinant of the-state-of.
being-denoted is the universal mlatva which is only one but if Analysis of Muktavali
denotative function is accepted in mlmiUsta the determinant First of all M. discusses the doctrine of the Mimamsakas
of the-state-of-being-denoted is the individual nila colour that the denotative function is in the universal only and not in
the individual. (Text 4A, p. 205,1. 1)
Thmanyf n ‘he Nf'y5ylkaS adm“ implication in mla■
visista. This is further explained in M. & D. (Text 3A d 17d The reason which the Mimamsakas bring forward for
11. 1-4; Text 3B, p. 178,11. 2-7) 1 ’ P‘ 4’ their opinion is that otherwise, there would be deviation and
a mJhe ffement °jfatrustworthy Person (afiatvdkya) is also infinite number of denotative functions. (Text 4A, p. 205,1.1)
And since without the individual the universal cannot
p. 174^1 °5^0Wmg den°tatiVe function of a word. (Text 3A,
become the object of knowledge, the individual also becomes
the object of knowledge. (Text 4A, p. 205,11. 1-2)
meantCof0kn^0USh! ab°U'by ** ^makira)is ^ a
denotative function. Here the opinion of This opinion is rejected because individual cannot become
c ^r‘' ; lakara Mimamsakas that the denotative function of the object of verbal knowledge if it does not have denotative
words like ‘jar’and so on is in jar and so on in as far as they function. (Text 4A, p. 205,1. 3)
are connected with that which is to be accomplished Nor is the individual known by implication because
(.karyanntathMdau Saktih). This opinion is explained and individual is known even when there is no incompatibility
(Text 4A, p. 205,11. 34)
funct on ,‘S l0J8ically simPler to accept denotative
Now the objections of the Mimamsakas against the
3b p.‘,178,1.
78 rrjar, ™,so12)on- ^ ^ p-174’"- ^Text
7-p. 179,1. Nyaya position are answered :
^ 'emainder of a sentence (vakyaitsa) also is a means There is no infinite number of denotative functions, since
there is only one denotative function in all the individuals.
ftxncHonTf 1hn0taUT fUnCti0n‘As for ercample. the denotaUve
“ Z °f tbc word yuan in the Vedic sentence yavamayai And the individuals have consecutiveness in as far as they are
qualified by universal. (Text 4A, p. 205,11. 4-6)
of the sin '’ “ de‘erm‘ned to be in bi“% because of the rest
If the Mimamsakas say that the form of the knowledge of
explaIneT^nCI <*■ This is further
expkrned. (Text3A,P. 174,1.23-p. 175,1.5;Text3B,p. 179, denotative function is that cow is to be denoted by the word
‘cow’, then denotative function of the word ‘cow’ is accepted

denot^fSo^ Tt,S "T mrS °f kn°Win«

in the individual cows. If, on the other hand, the form of the
knowledge of denotative function is that cowness is to be
fhat h T CXP ained bythe sentence kalaSo’sti, one can know denoted by the word ‘cow’, then there would be no verbal
n owl edge and the recollection of the meaning, in both of
75 f soenT
175,11. 7,pfUnCUOn
5-9; Text °^ha‘a
3B, p. 179,11. 20-23)* (Text 3A.7
P which the universal cowness is the qualifier. The reason is that
3n instance of the knowledge of denotative function having a
particular characteristic as qualifier produces the recollection
 62 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Analysis of Karikavati, Muktavali and Dinakari 63
of the meaning and the verbal knowledge having that same
characteristic as qualifier. (Text 4A, p. 205,11. 6-10) individual, it is necessary to admit the denotative function in
And besides, if the denotative function is accepted in the the individual because the recollection of the meaning
universal of cowness, then the-state-of-being-cowness is to be produced by the word is the cause of the verbal knowledge.
accepted as the determinant of the state-of-being-denoted. (Text 4B, p. 207,11. 12-13)
This is highly cumbersome. Therefore, the Naiyayikas The Mimamsakas argue further: Implication is also a
conclude that the denotative function is to be accepted in the kind of significatory function. Therefore, if implication is
individual as qualified by the universal and form. (Text 4A, p accepted in the individual, then there would be the recol¬
205,11. 10-15) lection of the meaning of the individual produced by the
Refutation of Jatiiaktivada significatory function which (recollection) is the cause of
verbal knowledge. (Text 4B, p. 207,11. 13-14)
Analysis of Dinakari
This argument is rejected because even if implication is
D. first of all brings forward further arguments in support accepted in individuals in some places, as for example, ‘bring
of the Mlmamsa position. When the denotative function is the cow etc.’ implication cannot be admitted in individuals, in
accepted in that which is qualified by the universal, it is all places such as ‘there is a cow’, because there is no incompa¬
necessary to accept the denotative function also in the universal tibility of syntactic connection. (Text 4B, p. 207,11. 14-17)
because of the principle that the knowledge of the qualified The Mimamsakas argue that if the denotative function is
does not arise without having the qualifier also as its object. accepted in the individuals, they (the individuals) cannot be
Therefore, it is simpler to accept the denotative function only the determinants of the causality residing in the iaktijhana by
in the universal. (Text 4B, p. 206,1. 1 - p. 207,1. 3) the relation of visayita, because of the absence of conse¬
D. explains further the difficulties which would arise, if cutiveness in individuals. (Text 4B, p. 207,11. 19-21)
the denotative function is accepted in the individual. If the This objection of the Mimamsakas is answered by
denotative function is accepted only in one particular individual, pointing out that cowness and so on are the consecutive
then there would be deviation because even those individuals characteristics in the individuals and, therefore, the knowledge
in which denotative function is not grasped become the object of denotative function in that which is qualified by cowness
of verbal knowledge. (Text 4B, p. 207,11. £6) and so on is the cause of verbal knowledge in which cow and
If, on the contrary, denotative function is accepted in all so on are objects. (Text 4B, p. 207,11. 21-22)
the individuals, then there would be infinite number of The Mimamsakas reject all these arguments pointing out
denotative functions. (Text 4B, p. 207,11. 5-7) that all instances of verbal knowledge need not be produced
D. explains how the individuals also become the object by the recollection of the meanings which (i.e. recollection) is
of verbal knowledge: The causal complex which produces the brought about by words; that is why, syntactic connection also
verbal knowledge of the universal produces the verbal becomes the object of verbal knowledge. This, however, does
knowledge of the individual. (Text 4B, p. 207,11. 7-11) not imply that objects the recollection of which is not produced
D. now gives reasons to reject the opinion of the by words, could become the object of verbal knowledge. This
Mimamsakas : In order to have verbal knowledge of the is because the knowledge of the denotative function in a
 ^ Nyaya Philosophy of Language Analysis of Karikavati, Muktavali and Dinakan 65
particular universal is the cause of verbal knowledge in which same qualifier should be in the knowledge of denotative
that particular universal is the qualifier and that which is function and in the verbal knowledge when the qualifiers in
qualified by that qualifier is the qualificand. (Text 4B d 207 both instances are general properties other than universal like
11.23-26) **'
the-state-of-being-accomplished-and-so-on; but where the
Therefore, the Naiyayikas bringforward another argument universal is the qualifier in the verbal knowledge, the qualifier
to establish that the denotative function is in the individual. If need not be the same universal in the knowledge of denotative
according to the Mlmamsakas, the form of the knowledge of function. If the Mlmamsakas argue like this the Naiyayikas
denotative function is that a cow is to be denoted by the word bring forward another argument. (Text 4B, p. 208,11. 9-11)
‘cow’, then the denotative function is indeed in the individual. The Naiyayikas point out that knowledge of denotative
This is because, according to the Mlmamsakas, all instances function is either gotvadharmika or gopadadharmika and in
of knowledge are valid and an instance of valid knowledge both instancesgotvatvam necessarily becomes the object. This
necessarily establishes the existence of its object (Text 4B d is because in both instancesgo/ya/ziawz necessarily becomes the
207,11.27-28) 1 ,P'
object of verbal knowledge. Therefore, gotvatvam becomes
But if the form of the knowledge of denotative function also the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted (Text 4B
is that cowness is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’, then there p. 208,11. 12-18)
would not be the verbal knowledge in which cow is the Nor can it be doubted that such an instance of knowledge
qualificand and cowness is the qualifier. This is because the is erroneous and, therefore, this knowledge cannot establish
knowledge of denotative function is the cause of the recollection the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted in gotva. Such a
of the meaning and of the verbal knowledge in as far as it has doubt cannot be raised because, otherwise, it would be
the same qualifier. D. explains that the form of the knowledge impossible to establish the determinant of causality anywhere.
of denotative function that cowness is to be denoted by the This is because the knowledge about the determinant of
word ‘cow’ does not have as qualifier cowness. Therefore, causality could be erroneous. (Text 4B, p. 208,11. 18-22)
from the sentence ‘bring the cow’ it is impossible to have the Now the Mlmamsakas argue that the-state-of-being-
verbal knowledge in which cowness is the qualifier. Even cowness and so on need not be the determinant of the-state-
if the form of the knowledge of denotative function is that of being-denoted. Therefore, there is no cumbersomeness
the word ‘cow’ has denotative function in cowness, in which owing to the inclusion of all individual cows in the determinant
cowness is the qualifier of denotative function, there cannot
of the-state-of-being-denoted. Hence, the Naiyayikas point out
e the verbal knowledge in which cowness is the qualifier. the cumbersomeness in another way: In the form of the
This is because the qualifier should qualify the same qualificand nowledge of denotative function gotvam gopadatakyam, the
in the knowledge of denotative function and in verbal
harmitavacchedakam is gotvatvam and this is included in the
knowledge. This is also the principle by which the determinant of causality forverbal knowledge. And in gotvatva
Prabhakaras establish the existence of the unseen (adrsta) I cows are included and so it is cumbersome. (Text 4B, p
(Text 4B, p. 209,1. 1-9) ' 208,11.22-25) V H
The Mlmamsakas further object that they admit that the The Naiyayikas conclude that the denotative function is
 66 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Analysis of Karikavati, Muktavati and Dinakan 67

in the individual qualified by universal and form. Now it is The denotative function of the word idam and etad is in
pointed out that although form is the denoted meaning, it is the object of perception. The denotative function of the word
not to be considered as iakyalavacchedaka as universal is adas is in the object of indirect knowledge. Such is the opinion
considered as iakyaiavacchedaka. (Text 4B, p. 208,11. 26-28) of D; others, however, point out that the denotative function
The old Naiyayikas point out that there is only one of the word idam is in the object of direct knowledge, of the
denotative function in the individual, universal and form word etad is in that which is nearer to the speaker, of the word
because one cannot have a knowledge of the one without the adas is in that which is far away from the speaker but perceived
other. That is why in the Nyaya Sutra jatyakrtivyaktayah by him, of the word tad is in the object which is not present to
padarthah, the wordpadartha is put in the singular number, i.e. the speaker. The denotative function of the word kirn is in the
singular number is syntactically connected with padarthatva object of the desire to know, of the word sarva is in the-state-
which is in the form of jbadaiakti which is only one in form, of-being-pervader. The denotative function of the wordyusmad
universal and individual. (Text 4B, p. 208,1. 28 - p. 209,1. 1) is in the person who is addressed at that time, of the word
The modem Naiyayikas, however, point out that the asmad is in that person who is the independent speaker at that
denotative function is only in the individual qualified by the time. (Text 4C, p. 247,1. 10 - p. 248,1. 3)
universal because, even without the recollection of form, there
is verbal knowledge of cow and so on qualified by cowness Division of Words
and so on. They also hold that there is a separate denotative Analysis of Muktavati
function in form. Further, they are of opinion that sometimes
M. first of all gives the fourfold division of words:
there is verbal knowledge of cow qualified by form even
Derivative, conventional, derivatively conventional and
though they are denoted by the same word through
derivative and conventional. M. further describes the
separate denotative functions. This is because of particular
definitions of these divisions of words with appropriate
expectancy. They also hold that the singular number after the
examples.
word padartha is syntactically connected with padarthatva
With regard to derivatively conventional words, however,
which is padaiakti and this is one in the individual and
M. raises an objection and gives the different answers of old
universal. (Text 4B, p. 209,11. 2-5)
and modern Naiyayikas. It was stated that derivatively
Now the denotative function of the word tad (that) is said
conventional words are those with the conventional meaning
to be in that which is qualified by the universal potness and so
(i.e. meaning by means of the denotative function of the word
on which are the determinants of the-state-of-being-the-object-
as a whole) with which there is the syntactic connection of the
of-the-knowledge-of-the-speaker. But this does not imply that
there are many denotative functions for the word tad owing to derivative meanings (i.e. the meanings by means of the
the differ ence of sakyatavacchedaka-s like ghaiatva etc. This is denotative functions of the parts of the word). In that case,
words like pahkaja can be used also in the meaning of water-
because such iakyatavacchedaka-s are consecutive by their
lily by the mere denotative functions of the parts of the word
characteristic of being buddhivisayatavacchedaka. (Text 4C, p.
247,11. 1-8) pahkaja. According to the old Naiyayikas, the answer is that
the knowledge of the denotative function of the "word pahkaja
 68 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Analysis of Karikavati, Muktavali and Dinakan 69
as a whole is a hindering factor to the knowledge of the mere
derivative meaning, viz. water-lily. According to the modem the word) then the verbal knowledge of lotus as syntactically
Naiyayikas, however, the answer is that there is no need of connected with yaugikartha, i.e. arising from mud, cannot
bringing in the notion of a hindering factor since the arise from the word pahkaja. The answer to this objection is
conventional meaning is present immediately to the mind and that the knowledge of the denotative function of the word
the derivative meaning is syntactically connected with it. pahkaja as a whole in lotus prevents only the verbal knowledge
When the conventional meaning of the wordpahkaja is of pahkajanikartr and not of lotus as syntactically connected
contradicted there could be the knowledge of water-lily by with pahkajanikartr. According to D. the wordprancah indicates
implication. When the speaker does not intend to convey the the incongruity in this answer. This is because the general rule
meaning of water-lily as water-lily and there is the absence of is that an instance of a knowledge the object of which is not
lotus, there is the verbal knowledge of water-lily as contradictory to the object of the knowledge which is to be
pahkajanikartr by means of the denotative functions of the prevented prevents the latter instance of knowledge only by
parts of the word pahkaja. In the case of land-lotus, the obstructing the knowledge which is its cause (virodhyavisayaka-
derivative meaning of the word pahkaja is contradicted since jhanasyapratibandhakatvam janakajnanavighatakatvenaiva iti
land-lotus does not arise from mud; here from the word niyamah). And such a rule is broken here because rudhijhana
pahkaja, the knowledge of land-lotus as mere lotus arises by does not prevent the janakajhana of the knowledge of
means of the denotative function of the word as a whole. If the yaugikartha. Therefore D. points out that M. by means of the
land-lotus is a different species from lotus, then from the word word vastutastu gives the opinion of GarigeSopadhyaya. The
pahkaja the knowledge of land-lotus arises by means of opinion of Garigesa is that the meaning of the word pahkaja
implication only. (Text 5A, p. 261) by means of the denotative function of the word as a whole,
i.e. lotus, is syntactically connected with the meanings of the
Analysis of Dinakart parts of the word, i.e. that which arises from mud, because the
former meaning is immediately present to the mind of the
Words which have denotative function are divided:
hearer (sanmdhyat). D. interprets the expression sannidhyat as
Some derivatives, some conventional, some derivatively
meaning that the speaker has the intention of conveying the
conventional and some derivative and conventional. M. gives
meaning of the word pahkaja by means of the denotative
gomandalam as the example of conventional word, D. points
function of the word as a whole, viz. lotus. Therefore, there is
out that in many manuscripts instead of mandaladi the reading
no need of considering rudhijhana as a hindering factor for the
is mandapadi and such a reading is not correct. (Text 5B d
263,11. 1-3) V knowledge of yaugikartha.
Where there is no causal complex to bring about the
With reference to the third kind of words, i .e.yogarudha,
knowledge of the syntactical connection of the two meanings
D. raises the objection that if rudhijhana (i.e. knowledge of the
mentioned, there is the verbal knowledge of water-lily as
denotative function of the word as a whole) is considered as
water-lily or of that which has arisen from mud as qualified by
a hindering factor for the knowledge of the yaugikartha (i.e.
the universal of water-lilyness by means of implication. The
meaning by means of the denotative functions of the parts of
verbal knowledge of water-lily as that which has arisen from
 70 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Analysis of Karikavati, Muktavali and Dinakan 71

mud is by means of the denotative functions of the parts of the indirect relation of denoted meaning, as for example, the
word pahkaja. (Text 5B, p. 263,1. 3 - p. 264,1. 10) implication of the word dvirepha in bee. (Text 6A, p. 284,1. 23
Since in land-louts, there is no universal of lotusness, the _ p. 285,1. 3)
word pahkaja cannot denote the land-lotus by means of the M. further shows that the word which has implication
denotative function of the word as a whole. Therefore, the does not produce verbal knowledge. The cause of the verbal
word pahkaja conveys the meaning of land-lotus by means of knowledge in which implied meaning also is object, is the
implication only. (Text 5B, p. 264,11. 10-12) word having denotative function used along with the word
which has implication. (Text 6A, p. 285,11. 3-6)
Implication There is no denotative function for sentences. Hence for
Analysis of K3.rikHoali and MuktZbocUi sentences there is also no implication in the form of the
relation of denoted meaning. In such expressions such as
K. first of all states that the cause of implication is the
gabhirayam nadyam, the word nadi has implication in the bank
incompatibility of syntactic connection or the incompatibility
of the river, the meaning of the word gabhira is syntactically
of the intention of the speaker. And implication itself is in the
cc nnected with river which is a part of the implied meaning
form of a relation of denoted meaning. M. further points out
or the word nadi has implication in the bank of the deep
that if incompatibility of syntactic connection is the cause of
river and the word gabhira shows the intention of the
implication, then there would be no implication in such
speaker. (Text 6A, p. 285,11. 6-11)
instances as admit the sticks’. Therefore, M. shows that the
incompatibility of the intention of the speaker is the cause of Implication
implication. Further if the incompatibility of syntactic Analysis of Dinakari
connection were accepted as the cause of implication, then D. starts with the division of implication into two kinds:
there would be no restriction that in some places the word
jahatsvartha and ajahatsvartha. The example for the first kind
gahga has implication in bank and in some other places the of implication is gahgayam ghosah where the implication for
word ghosa has implication in fish. (Text 6A, p. 284,11. 1-17)
the word gahga is in tira\ and the example for the second is
In the sentence there is a village on the Ganges’, when kakebhyo dadhi raksyaiam where for the word kaka implication
implication is grasped in bank as bank, then there is the is in dadhyupaghatakatvaviSista. Another example of
remembrance of bank as bank; if, however, implication is ajahatsvartha laksana is chatrinoyanti where the word chatrin
grasped in bank as the bank of the Ganges, then there is the has implication in ekasarthavahitvavtiista. The mention of
remembrance of bank as the bank of the Ganges. Hence M. implication for the expression chatrin is according to the
points out that there is no implication in the determinant opinion of the Grammarians. According to the Naiyayikas,
of the-state-of-being-implied-meaning. M. holds further that in the word chatra has implication in ekasamudayatva; but this
a similar manner, there is no denotative function in the does not mean that the implication is not ajahatsvartha
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meanine. (Text 6A because here the implication is considered as ajahatsvartha
p. 284,11. 17-23)
according to the opinion of the Grammarians. (Text 6B, p.
Implied implication (laksitalaksana) is in the form of 288,11. 1-10)
 72
Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Analysis of Karikavati, Muktavati and Dinakan 73
D. explains the reason why the incompatibility of the
intention of the speaker is the real cause of implication: In the word which has denotative function and which is used along
instance gangdydm ghosah, sometimes the intention of the with the word which has implied meaning produces verbal
speaker is that the word gangd should convey the meaning of knowledge. The modem Naiyayikas hold that the word which
bank and sometimes the intention of the speaker is that the has implied meaning also produces verbal knowledge since a
word ghosa should convey the meaning offish. Therefore we sentence in which all words have implied meanings also brings
postulate implication for the wordganga in bank and sometimes about verbal knowledge. (Text 6B, p. 289,11. 9-14)
w e postulate implication for the word ghosa in fish. This cannot There is no implication in sentences because there is no
be done unless the incompatibility of the intention of the denotative function in sentences. Now an objection may be
raised that there could be implication in sentences for,
STinan)Cepted “the cause of iraplication- 6B, p. otherwise, there would be syntactic connection with the part
of the implied meanings in such instances as gabhirdyam
. ,M' Staf$ ^ injthe instance gangdydm ghosah the
mplication for the word gangd is jahatsvdrthd. D. points out nadyam ghosah where the word nodi has implication in
iat if the implication for the word gangd is in lira then the naditira. This objection is rejected because in some places
implication isjahatsvdrthd. But if the implication is in gahgdtira, syntactic connection with the part of the meaning is accepted,
en the implication is ajahatsvdrthd. In such instances as as for instance in the instance caitrasya gurukulam.
yastih praveiaya, mancdh kroSanti, if the implication is in M. states if ekadeianvaya is not accepted, then the word
yastidharatvavMsta (i.e.yastidhara) and in maficasthatvavitista nadi has implication in gabhiranaditira, and the word gabhira
shows the intention of the speaker. Here Dinakara raises an
thC impliCati°n iS aJahatsv^hd. (Text
objection that the word gabhira can have implication in
nf, Stat.eJthat there is no ^plication in the determinant gabhiranaditira and the word nadi can just show the intention
of foe state-of-being-implied-meaning. D. explains this statement of the speaker. The answer to this objection is that suffixes
m pointing out that the knowledge of implication in that convey their meanings as syntactically connected with the
which is qualified by a particular characteristic produces the meanings of their stems only and so only the word nadi can
have implication. (Text 6B, p. 289,11. 14-24)
“T Td uerbal knowledSe of that in that same
orm And besides there is no relation of stream which is the Now D. presents the arguments of the Mlmamsakas in
enoted meaning of the word ‘the Ganges’ with the-state-of- order to establish implication in sentences. According to the
Mimamsakas, implication is svabodhyasambandha and not
„ «• there is ”° ‘“P'icalion in the determinant
svatakyasambandha and so svabodhya ofthe sentence gabhirdyam
- p 289 1 n^'be'ng'imPlied-meanin8- (Text 6B, p. 288,1. 16
nadyam is deep river; the connection of deep river is in the
* ”°w sl;ows that laksilalaksani is included in <mk. Therefore, the sentence gabhirdyam nadyam has
jahatsvartha implication. (Text 6B, p. 289 1 9) ^plication in bank. In a similar manner, sentences in the form
Accncding to the old Naiyayikas, th'e word which has 0 compounds also have implication. (Text 6B, p. 289
p ie meaning does not produce verbal knowledge but the *• 24 - p. 290,1. 3)
These arguments cannot be admitted: The reason is that
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78 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Analysis of Karikavali, MuktavaU and Dinakari 79

dhavakhadirau, in the substratum of the association of dhava According to some other Naiyayikas padartha is pada-
and khadira. Hence the udddyatavacchedaka is dhavakhadi- janyapratitivisaya; nilatva and ghatatva which are padarthatavac-
rasahitya and, therefore, there would be no knowledge of two chedaka-s are also padajanyapratitivisayah and hence they are
dhava-s and two khadira-s. (Text 7F, p. 363,11. 1-8) padartha-s. Since there is difference between them, nilaghatayoh
Muktavallkara answers this objection of the Mimamsakas can be a dvandva compound. And so according to these
pointing out that dvandva compounds could be found even Naiyayikas, in some places there can be dvandva compound
where there is no sahitya. Dinakara explains further this because of the difference of padartha-s and in some other
answer of Muktavallkara by pointing out that sahityam can be places the dvandva compound occurs because of the difference
either sahavrttitva or ekakriyanvayitva. There can be dvandva of padarthatavacchedaka-s. (Text 7F, p. 364,11. 13-17)
even where there is no sahitya in the form of sahavrttitva. And Or let the dvandva compounds be only in those places
further, even if there is sahavrttitva in the form of ekakriyan¬ where there is the difference between the determinants of the
vayitva, still such ekarkriyanvayitva is not the object of verbal meanings of words. According to this opinion, there is no need
knowledge. Further, if implication is accepted in that which is of accepting ghatah as a sarupaikatesa compound as an
qualified by association, then it is not possible to connect the exception to dvandva. Nor is it necessary to accept the rule that
agency of going with those in whom the association exists a word uttered once brings about the knowledge of only one
combinedly. (Text 7F, p. 363,11. 8-p. 364,1. 2) meaning. But the rule on sarupaikatesa compound operates
If there is no implication in dvandva, then what is the only with reference to such words as hari which has many
difference of dvandva from karmadharaya which also has no meanings. (Text 7F, p. 364,11. 17-23)
implication? dvandva is enjoined where there is real difference In samaharadvandva such as ahinakulam, if the aggregate
of meanings denoted by the words constituting the dvandva is experienced, then there is implication for the second word
compound. (Text 7F, p. 364,11. 2-7) nakula in the aggregate of snake and mangoose. In fact the
If dvandva is accepted only in those places where there is aggregate is not experienced and so, here, there is no
real difference of meanings denoted by the words constituting implication. (Text 7F, p. 364,11. 23-26)
the compound, then how can there be dvandva compound in In the expression bherimrdahgam vadaya when bheri-
such instances as nilaghatayor abhedah? Similarly, how can mrdahgam is taken as a samaharadvandva compound, the
there be dvandva compound in the first Nyaya Sutra which question arises how aggregate (samahara) can be the object of
begins with the words pramanaprameya, since, according to sounding, i.e. how can samyoga which is the result of the action
the statement of the sutra, there is no difference between of sounding exist in the aggregate which is a particular kind of
pramana and prameya. The answer is that in the expression apeksabuddhP. The answer is that it exists by the relation of
nilaghatayor abhedah, there is implication for the word nila in svatryavrttitva. (Text 7F, p. 364,11. 26 - p. 365,1. 3)
nilatva and for the word ghata in ghatatva. And there is According to the modem Naiyayikas, in such expressions
difference between ghatatva and nilatva and so there could be as ahinakulam, samahara is not experienced and so there is no
dvandva compound in the form of nilaghatayoh. (Text 7F, p. implication for the word nakulam. And the singular number
364,11. 7-14) is connected with ahi and nakula separately or it may be taken
 80 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Analysis of Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari 81
that the singular number is used only for the sake of validity. nisadasthapati is taken as karmadharaya the knowledge of
Thus the term is purely technical; the purpose of this term is denotative function alone is necessary for the verbal knowledge;
to give the word the characteristic of being always in the but in the other opinion knowledge of implication also is
singular number and neuter gender etc. (Text 7F, p 365 necessary. Hence there is cumbersomeness. (Text 7H, p. 391
11.4-12) * 11. 12-19)
In virupaikaksa compounds such as pitarau, there is In the avyayibhava compound upakumbham there is
implication for the word pitr in one’s own parents. And such implication for the word kumbha in kumbhasambandhi and in
implication is to be accepted in similar compounds also (Text the verbal knowledge arising from it the meaning of the first
7F, p. 365,11. 12-20) word is the qualificand; according to some other Naiyayikas,
In the Vedic expression nisadasthapatim yajayet, the there is implication for the word kumbha in the meaning of
compound nisadasthapati is to be taken as a karmadharaya, near the jar and the word upa shows the intention of the
because of the simplicity arising from the absence of speaker. (Text 7J, p. 398,11. 1-7)
implication. Although Vedas enjoin that women and sudras Now Dinakara rejects denotative function in tatpurusa
cannot study the Vedas, still because of the impossibility of compounds such as ardhapippali etc., the verbal knowledge
conducting the sacrifice which has been enjoined by the arising from which has as qualificand the meaning of the first
Veda, it is assumed that a nisada, though he is a sudra, can word. Earlier, he had rejected denotative function in tatpurusa
study that part of the Vedas which is necessary for the compounds such as rajapurusah etc., verbal knowledge arising
sacrifice. from which has as qualificand the meaning of the second
It may be objected that the injunction of the Vedas that word. Thus without any repetition the author establishes that
women and sudras should not study the Vedas become there is no denotative function in compounds. (Text 7J, p. 398,
invalid if a nisada is allowed to study the Vedas necessary for 11. 7 - p. 399,1. 2)
the sacrifice. This objection is answered by pointing out that
the word ‘study’ in the injunction means the study of the Vedas
Causes of Verbal Knowledge
other than the study of that part of the Vedas enjoined by a
Analysis of Karikavali and Muktavali
particular injunction. Therefore, a nisada cannot study those
{Darts of the Vedas other than that which is needed for sacrifice. K. first of all states the four causes of verbal knowledge;
Sudras other than nisada-s cannot study the Vedas at all (Text they are knowledge of contiguity, knowledge of samantic
7H, p. 391,11. 1-12) 1 competency, knowledge of syntactic expectancy and
It may be objected that just as in ordinary usage, the knowledge of the intention of the speaker. Then M. repeats the
compound nisadasthapati is taken as tatpurusa having same ideas and discusses the opinion of the old Naiyayikas
implication, so also in the Vedas nisadasthapati can be taken that contiguity is the juxtaposition of two words the semantic
as tatpurusa having implication. Therefore, there is no need of connection of whose meanings is intended by the speaker, and
accepting an additional implication as cause of verbal knowledge of such a contiguity is the cause ofverbal knowledge.
knowledge. This objection is answered by pointing out that if (Text 8A, p. 407,11. 1-10)
 82 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Analysis of Kankavati, Muktavalt and Dinakari 83
This opinion of the old Naiyayikas is rejected by the
Here M. rejects the sphota theory of the Grammarians
modem Naiyayikas, because knowledge of such a contiguity
because that which, according to the Grammarians, manifests
is not at all present before every instance of verbal knowledge
sphota is, according to the Naiyayikas, the cause of the
(The opinion of the modem Naiyayikas that contiguity is the
remembrance of words. (Text 8A, p. 408,11. 24)
juxtaposition of the instances of the knowledge of two words
M. rejects the opinion of the Prabhakara Mimamsakas
the semantic connection of whose meanings is intended by the
that the supply of meaning only is necessary and establishes
speaker and that it is the cause of verbal knowledge by its mere
the Nyaya position that the supply of words is necessary. (Text
existence is to be inferred from the objection that is immediately
8A, p. 408,11. 4-10)
raised against the modern Naiyayikas in the M. text). The
Now semantic competency is defined as the relation of
objection against the modern Naiyayikas is that it is impossible
one meaning with another meaning. And its knowledge either
to have knowledge of words as contiguous because the
as doubt or as certainty is the cause of verbal knowledge.
recollection of the preceding word is destroyed by the recollec¬
According to the modem Naiyayikas, knowledge of semantic
tion of the succeeding word. The answer to this objection is
competency is not a cause for verbal knowledge; but the
that by means of the impressions arising from the experience
certainty of the absence of semantic competency is a hindering
of each word the recollection of all words arises as contiguous.
(Text 8A, p. 407,11. 10-17) factor for verbal knowledge. (Text 9A, p. 458,11. 1-14)
Next syntactic expectancy is defined; A word has syntactic
(According to both old and modern Naiyayikas the
expectancy with that word without which it cannot produce
recollection o( the meanings of words is the cause of verbal
knowledge. Here also a similar objection that it is impossible verbal knowledge. Rejecting syntactic expectancy between
verbs and words denoting karaka, M. states that syntactic
to have the recollection of the meanings of all the words of a
expectancy obtains only between stem and suffix. (Text 10A
sentence since the recollection of the meaning of the previous
p. 479,11. 1-12)
word is destroyed by the recollection of the meaning of the
tatparya is the intention of the speaker and the knowledge
succeeding word, may be raised). The answer to this objection
ofthe intention ofthe speaker is the cause ofverbal knowledge
according to some is that there takes place the conjunct
because, if it were not a cause, then from such sentences as
recollection of the meanings of all the words of a sentence and
‘bring saindhava' etc. there would not arise the verbal
by such a recollection verbal knowledge arises after the
manner of pigeons in a threshing floor (i.e. in all instances of knowledge of horse in some places and of salt in other places.
verbal knowledge the meanings of all words are simultaneously M. holds that knowledge of the intention ofthe speaker is the
connected as respective qualifier in the respective qualificand). cause of all instances ofverbal knowledge. Other Naiyayikas,
Accoiding to others the answer to the objection is that in all however, hold that the knowledge of the intention of the
instances of verbal knowledge after the comprehension of the speaker is the cause ofverbal knowledge only in some places
meaning of the part of the sentence, the comprehension of the where there are different meanings for a word. (Text 11A p
496,11. 1-16)
meaning of the full sentence takes place. (Text 8A, p 407 1
17 - p. 408, 1. 2)
 84 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Analysis of Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari 85
Causes of Verbal Knowledge
case of sentences consisting of many words. The answer to this
Contiguity [Usatti)
objection is that even though the recollection of the words of
Analysis of Dinakari
a sentence is a conjunct recollection and so it is one, still there
Dinakara first of all points out that contiguity by its mere could be contiguity between the instances of the knowledge of
existence is not the cause of verbal knowledge but the words constituting the sentence. Now an objection against the
knowledge of contiguity is the cause ofverbal knowledge. This possibility of a conjunct recollection of all the words constituting
is because from such sentences as girir bhuktam agniman a sentence is raised: In recollection and impression, the
devadattena, there arises verbal knowledge owing to the qualificands and qualifiers should be the same; but this is not
erroneous knowledge of contiguity between the words giri possible in the case of a conjunct recollection. The answer to
and agnimat. (Text 8B, p. 410,1. 1 - p. 411,1. 1) this objection is that such a conjunct recollection of all words
If contiguity is defined as mere juxtaposition of words, is possible through the impressions of individual words just as
then there is over-extension in such sentences as girir bhuktam a conjunct perception is possible through the contact of eye
agniman devadattena, since the words giri and bhukta are with different objects. (Text 8B, p. 412,11. 4-15)
juxtaposed. Dinakara points out that in order to avoid this All Naiyayikas admit that the recollection of the meanings
over-extension M. defines contiguity as the juxtaposition of of words is the cause of verbal knowledge. But it is impossible
two words the semantic connection of whose meanings is to have the recollection of all the meanings of all the words of
intended by the speaker. (Text 8B, p. 411,11. 1-9) a sentence. Therefore, it is also impossible to have verbal
There could be valid verbal knowledge even from the knowledge from a sentence. A first answer is that it is possible
erroneous knowledge of contiguity and the opinion of the old to have a conjunct remembrance of all the meanings of the
Naiyayikas that from erroneous knowledge of contiguity there words constituting a sentence and from this arises verbal
could arise only erroneous verbal knowledge is rejected. knowledge in which the meanings of all words”'’ are
(Text 8B, p. 411,11. 9-24) simultaneously connected as respective qualifier in the
In verses, there is contiguity from the constructed prose respective qualificand. A second answer to this objection is
order of the sentences and from the knowledge of such a that after the knowledge of the part of a sentence, there arises
contiguity there arises verbal knowledge. According to some the verbal knowledge of the whole of the sentence in the
other modem Naiyayikas, however, contiguity is the manner of a relation of a qualified in the qualificand. (Text 8B,
juxtaposed instances of knowledge of meanings of words. P- 412,1. 15 - p. 413,1. 21)
This knowledge of the meanings of words is produced by Dinakara introduces now the opinion of the Prabhakaras
words with the help of their significatory functions. (Text 8B that in such instances as dvaram, the word pidhehi is not to be
p. 411,1. 24 -p. 412,1. 4) supplied but only its meaning, because, according to them, the
Now D. comments on the objection raised by M. against cause of verbal knowledge is only the knowledge of the
the opinion of some other modem Naiyayikas. According to meanings of words and not the knowledge of the meanings of
these Naiyayikas, contiguity is the juxtaposition of instances of words produced by words. Such an opinion is rejected
knowledge of words. There cannot be such contiguity in the because then even without words one could have verbal
 86 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Analysis of Karikavali, MuktavaCi and Dinakart 87
knowledge of those things which are the objects of verbal
expectancy. Or in order to avoid the possibility of verbal
knowledge. These arguments are further developed; but
knowledge from words which have already produced verbal
finally Dinakara describes his own opinion that in some
knowledge, the part of the definition, viz. yena padena vina
instances as puspebhyah the supply of words is necessary but in
yasya padasyanvaydnanubhavakatvam also should be included
general the supply of meaning is enough. (Text 8B, p. 413,1.
in the definition. It is the cause of verbal knowledge by its very
21 -p. 414,1.15)
existence. Such syntactic expectancy obtains only between
prakrti and pratyaya and not between words signifying kriya
• Semantic Competency (yogyata)
and karaka. (Text 10B, p. 480,1. 1 - p. 481,1. 3)
Dinakara first of all explains the opinion of the old From a sentence such as ayameti putro rdjnah puruso
Naiyayikas as given by M. According to them, knowledge of ’pasaryatdm, according to the intention of the speaker,
semantic competency either as doubt or as certainty is the sometimes there is the verbal knowledge that the son belongs
cause of verbal knowledge. (Text 9B, p. 459,1. 1 - p. 460,1.4) to the king or that the man belongs to the king. (Text 10B, p.
The opinion of the modem Naiyayakas is that the 481,11.4-7)
certainty of the absence of semantic competency is the A discussion on whether samabhivyahara in the form of
hindering factor {pratibandhaka) for verbal knowledge; this is paaatatparya should be included in the definition of akanksa.
not a separatepratibadhyapratibandhakabhava postulated only Some say that it should be included. According to others,
for verbal knowledge; but is included in the generalpratibadhya- knowledge of samabhivyahara is an independent cause of
pratibandhakabhava with respect to all instances of knowledge. verbal knowledge. The modem Naiyayikas, however, say that
In this way the modem Naiyayikas show that the knowledge samabhivyaharajndna is not at all a cause of verbal knowledge,
of semantic competency is not a separate cause of verbal but only arthatatparyjnana is a cause for verbal knowledge.
knowledge. (Text 9B, p. 460,11. 4-14) (Text 10B, p. 481,11. 8 - 20)
Now Dinakara supports the opinion of the old Naiyayikas In order that there arises verbal knowledge from a stanza
that knowledge of semantic competency is a separate cause of written by a person who has taken the vow of silence, the
verbal knowledge, owing to reasons of simplicity in many definition of syntactic expectancy should be the-state-of-
ways. (Text 9B, p. 460,1. 14 - p. 461,1. 9) coming after the knowledge of one word in the knowledge of
another word. Therefore, it is possible to have expectancy
Syntactic Expectancy (akanksa) even with words which are supplied. Further the definitions of
adhydhdra, avrtti, anusahga and anuvrtti of words are given.
Syntactic expectancy is first defined asyenapadena vina Finally Dinakara rejects the opinion that syntactic expectancy
yasya padasyanvaydnanubhavakatvam tatpade tatpadavattvam is not the cause of verbal knowledge but that the knowledge
akanksa', there the part of the definition, Vyl. yena padena vina of the absence of syntactic expectancy is a hindering factor for
yasya padasyanvaydnanubhavakatvam should not really be verbal knowledge for reasons of cumbersomeness. (Text 10B,
included in the definition. This expression is used only as P- 481,11. 20 - 28)
indicative of those words ^between which there is syntactic
 88 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary- Upamanakhanda 89
Intention of the Speaker (tZLtparya)
Text 1
Knowledge of the intention of the speaker is a cause of
verbal knowledge. As for example, from words which have
more than one meaning, we can have verbal knowledge only
when we have the knowledge of the intention of the speaker,
^r. mtfvm w^r: wrat i
i.e. only when we know in which sense the speaker has used
the words. Further, when there is the doubt of the knowledge
of the intention of the speaker or when there is the definite
knowledge of the absence of the intention of the speaker
verbal knowledge does not arise. Hence it is also asserted that
I \6o | |
knowledge of the intention of the speaker is a cause of all
instances of verbal knowledge. (Text 11B, p. 498,11. 1- 9)
The opinion that contextual factors are causes of verbal
knowledge is rejected and the theory that the knowledge of the
intention of the speaker is a cause of all instances of verbal
knowledge is asserted. Hence the opinion of some Naiyayikas
that the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is not a cause ^flrf | ^RK TJWWdM
of verbal knowledge is rejected. (Text 1 IB, p. 498,11. 9 - 26)
oq^K: | cFTRclt
WK7M ifct ?iI*1* d^PlIcI: H
TTWI^raT WHlt ^lIctHlSWM-

Translation
Comparison
Karikavati
The knowledge of similarity with cow etc, which a
villager has when he sees for the first time a gayal etc. is
to be considered as the instrumental cause (of knowledge
arising from Comparison).
[Karikdy 79)
The recollection of the meaning of the sentence
which conveys similarity is called operation. The
knowledge of the denotative function of words like
gayal’ etc. is the result of Comparison.
(Karikdy 80)
i
 90 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Upamanakhanda 91
Muktavah M. repeats more or less the same ideas but adds at the
The author explains (the nature of) the knowledge end that upamiti is the knowledge of denotative function of
arising from Comparison with the words ‘a villager’ words like gavaya etc. in the form that that which is qualified
(graminasya). A villager is told by a forest-dweller that an by the universal gavayatva is to the denoted by the word
animal similar to a cow is to be denoted by the word ‘gayal’. gavaya and not in the form that a particular gayal is to be
Afterwards somewhere in the forest etc. a gayal is seen by denoted by the word gavaya. The reason is that, otherwise, it
the villager. Then the knowledge of similarity with a cow in would be impossible to grasp the denotative function of the
gayal which has arisen is the instrumental- cause of knowledge word gavaya in other gayals.
arising from Comparison. After this there arises the
recollection of the meaning of a sentence conveying similarity Text 2
in the form that an animal similar to a cow is to be denoted
by the word gayal; this alone is operation. Then there arises
the knowledge that gayal is to be denoted by the word tilgWMflTgpt I 'i^h^dd, I srfcl^r-
gavaya. This knowledge is knowledge arising from
Comparison (upamiti) and the knowledge that this is to be
denoted by the word gayal is not knowledge arising from
Comparison. For otherwise, the denotative function of the TO?? I t*Kul
word ‘gayal’ cannot be grasped in other gayals.
ijvjMliqd ifcTl

C omment ary
m: I t&T °Ml4K ifcT I

The Karihti’S now describe the nature of Comparison.

In order to do so they give an example which makes the
matter very clear. A villager is told by a forest-dweller that
W^ fc£hul?ud-
that which is similar to a cow is to be denoted by the word
gavaya. Then going to the forest, he sees an animal in which jjq oHIMK ^JcT ^
he perceives similarity with a cow. Such a perceptual
knowledge of similarity is the instrumental cause of the
knowledge arising from Comparison. The recollection of the
meaning of the sentence conveying similarity (atidelava-
kyarthasmaranam) which was uttered by the forester is the Translation
operation of the instrumental cause. The knowledge of the
Intending relevance in the form of occasionality (with
denotative function of words like gavaya etc. is upamiti, i.e.,
regard to the exposition of Comparison) the author states.
knowledge arising from Comparison. This is the opinion of
the modem Naiyayikas. Knowledge arising from Comparison (upamiti). There
(tatra) means in the gayal. Knowledge of similarity
 ^ Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary- Upamanakhanda 93

[sadrfyajnanam) means perceptual knowledge of similarity. meaning of the sentence conveying similarity arises, there it
That is the instrumental cause of knowledge arising is not accepted that any knowledge from Comparison arises.
from Comparison (tad upamitikaranam iti): This is according But after that (i.e. after the verbal knowledge of the meaning
to the opinion of the modern Naiyayikas. The opinion of the of the sentence which conveys similarity) (when) there is
old Naiyayikas that the verbal knowledge of the meaning of again the perceptual knowledge of the individual which is
the sentence conveying similarity is the instrumental cause qualified by similarity, and after that there is the recollection
the recollection of the meaning of the sentence conveying of the meaning of the sentence conveying similarity, there
similarity is operation and the perceptual knowledge of the arises only after that knowledge from Comparison. This is
individual qualified by similarity is auxiliary cause, is rejected
the idea.
because it is appropriate to consider as instrumental cause
only the perceptual knowledge of the individual as qualified Commentary
by similarity which is necessary as the auxiliary cause. The
recollection that arises (smaranamyajjdyata iti): The idea
Dinakara here points out that the relevance [sahgati] for
is that the perceptual knowledge of the individual qualified treating Comparison is avasara, i.e, occasion, avasara is the
by similarity in the capacity of reviving (the impression) necessity of explaining a topic after satisfying the distracting
produces the recollection of the meaning of such a sentence. curiosity of the student in respect of another topic
(pratibandhakibhutatisjajijnasanivrttya avafyavaktavyatvam
This alone is operation [tadeva vyapara iti): By this, the
(following) opinion of a certain (Naiyayika) is rejected. Where, avasarah). In the present context both anumana and upamana
after the perceptual knowledge of the individual qualified by depend upon pratyaksa: anumana is accepted by many
similarity, there arises the verbal knowledge of the meaning philosophers, and so the contradictory opinion only of a few
of the sentence conveying similarity, there there is the absence philosophers is to be rejected. So generally a student would
of dependence on the recollection of the meaning of the prefer to study anumana first, and when anumana is explained
sentence conveying similarity and so it is not the case that by the teacher, the distracting curiosity of the student with
the perceptual knowledge of the individual qualified by regard to anumana is satisfied. Hence, afterwards, the
simi arity which (i.e. knowledge) has as operation the explanation of upamana necessarily takes place. Therefore,
recoHection of the meaning of the sentence conveying after dealing with anumana, the treatment of upamana is
simi arity is the instrumental cause, but only the knowledge relevant.
of similarity is the instrumental cause and the operations are Ramarudra first of all points out that if the knowledge
e now e ge of the meaning of the sentence conveying of similarity gained by any other means except Perception is
sunilarity and the perceptual knowledge of the individual considered as the instrumental cause of upamiti, then
qualified by similarity, which (i.e. both instances of knowledge) Comparison would not be depending upon Perception. But
are produced by (knowledge of) similarity in the capacity of in fact, only after the perception of similarity, does upamiti
being the knowledge of qualification. arise. Hence, Ramarudra points out that Dinakara explains
the expression sadriyajndna in the text of M. as meaning
Where, after the perceptual knowledge of the individual
which is qualified by similarity, the verbal knowledge of the sadrtyapratyaksa, i.e. perception of similarity.
 94
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Upamanakhanda 95

Dinakara now describes the opinion of the old where there is no perception of the individual having similarity,
Naiyayikas and rejects it. According to them the instrumental there may arise the recollection of the meaning of the
cause of upamiti is the verbal knowledge arising from the sentence conveying similarity by means of other reviving
sentence conveying similarity. And when the villager, after factors such as merit etc. and so there could be upamiti.
having heard the atidelavakya, goes to the forest and sees an Their argument is that it is enough to admit that the
animal similar to a cow, then he recollects the meaning of recollection of the meaning of the sentence conveying
the atiddavakya. Such a recollection of the meaning of the similarity which (i.e. recollection) is produced by the
sentence conveying similarity is the operation. perception of the individual having similarity with a cow is
But it may be asked how can the recollection of the the operation of the instrumental cause in the form of the
meaning of the sentence conveying similarity be considered verbal knowledge arising from the sentence conveying
as the operation of the instrumental cause in the form of similarity. Therefore, one cannot raise the objection that
verbal knowledge arising from the sentence conveying even without the perception of an individual having similarity
similarity? The reason for this question is that such a recolle¬ with a cow, there could be upamiti.
ction is not directly produced by verbal knowledge, but it is This opinion of the old Naiyayikas is rejected by pointing
produced by the impression (samskdra) which is produced out that such a recollection arising from the perception of
by the verbal knowledge. The answer to this objection is that the individual having similarity with a cow is logically more
that which is produced by the verbal knowledge through cumbersome than mere recollection of the meaning of the
impression can also be considered as its operation. sentence conveying similarity (S. p.179,1.6). Hence, it follows
Now it may be objected that where there is no perception that the perception of the individual qualified by similarity is
of die individual having similarity, there may arise the the instrumental cause of upamiti.
recollection of the meaning of the sentence conveying Now a further objection may arise as follows: According
similarity by means of other reviving factors such as merit to the modem Naiyayikas Comparison (i.e. upamanam, i.e.
etc. In such places there could be upamiti. In order to avoid the instrumental cause of upamiti) is the perception of the
such a possibility, it is stated that the perception of the individual as qualified by similarity. It is further stated that
individual qualified by similarity is accepted as auxiliary the recollection of the meaning of the sentence which conveys
cause for upamiti.
similarity (atide&avakydrthasmaranam) is the operation. But
This opinion of the old Naiyayikas is rejected because this is not possible because the definition of operation is
according t° them also the perception of the individual tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvam, i.e. that which is produced
qualified by similarity is necessary for upamiti as auxiliary by a particular thing, but which is at the same time the
cause. Therefore, it is logically simple to accept the perception producer of that which is produced by that same particular
o e individual qualified by similarity as the instrumental thing. Now the recollection of the meaning of a sentence
cause of upamiti.
conveying similarity is produced only by the experience in
The old Naiyayikas may further object that they can which the qualifier is the same as in recollection (svasamana-
avoid in another way the above mentioned difficulty that prakarakdnubhavajanyam eva smaranam). Therefore, such a
 96
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Upamanakhanda 97
recollection cannot be produced by the perception of the
individual qualified by similarity. are actually produced by the knowledge of similarity in the
capacity of being the knowledge of the qualifier. The
The answer to this objection is that it is true that such a
knowledge of the qualifier is the cause of the knowledge of
recollection is produced by the previous verbal knowledge
the qualified. In the verbal knowledge arising from the
having the same qualifier as in the recollection. But the
sentence conveying similarity that which is qualified by
perception of the individual having similarity is also the
similarity is the object. Therefore, knowledge of similarity
cause of such a recollection in the capacity of reviving the
which is the qualifier is necessary in order to have the
impression produced by the verbal knowledge. Therefore
knowledge of the qualified, viz. that which is qualified by
there is no difficulty in considering such a recollection as the’ similarity.
operation of Comparison.
In the same way also in the perception of the individual
. B.y “*abllsl'i"S in this way that the perception of the
having similarity through the contact of the eye, the individual
individual having similarity is the instrumental cause and the
qualified by similarity is the object. In order to have such a
recollection of the meaning of the sentence conveying
knowledge of the qualified, knowledge of similarity which is
similarity ,s the operation, the opinion of a certain Naiyayikf
the qualifier, is also necessary. Therefore, both the verbal
is a'so rejected According to him the villlager first sljthe
knowledge of the meaning of the sentence conveying similarity
individual having similarity. Then hearing die sentence
and the perceptual knowledge of the individual qualified by
conveying similarity uttered by die forest-dweller he has
similarity can be considered as operations since both are
produced by the instrumental cause, viz. knowledge of
qualified by similarity, alter which he has knowledge arising
similarity3 and because these two are causes of upamiti since
from Comparison Therefore, according to .hi!
in the absence of any one of them upamiti does not arise.
opinion knowledge of similarity alone2 is the instLnental
Although in this way the definition of operation is
cause of upamto The operadons are the verbal knowledge
applicable to both the verbal knowledge of the meaning of
he meaning of the sentence conveying similarity and the
the sentence conveying similarity and the perceptual
perceptual knowledge of the individual qualified by similarity
knowledge of the individual qualified by similarity, still it
Now it may be asked how these two can be the
may be asked why can’t only one of them be considered as
operations of the instrumental cause in the form of the
the operation and the other as the auxiliary cause? The
knowledge of similarity, because neither the verbal knowledge
answer to this question is that there is no deciding factor to
m question nor the percepdon of the individual Sg
consider only one as the operation and the other as auxiliary
riftlmrjmPen^lUCed ^ ‘he knowled«e similarity which cause. And therefore, both are accepted as operations. The
is the instrumental cause, since verbal knowledge is produced
result is upamiti.
simte renCerd 11,6 Per“P“°" of th' indfvidual'haring The reason for the rejection of such an opinion is as
similarity is produced by die contact of the sense orgal? of
follows: upamiti is not admitted in such places as described
above; but even in such places if one wants to have upamiti,
he answer to this quesdon is that these two operations
it is necessary to have, after the verbal knowledge arising
98 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary- Upamanakhanda 99
from the sentence conveying similarity, again the perceptual
Translation
knowledge of the individual having similarity with a cow and
then the recollection of the meaning of the sentence conveying The knowledge that gayal is to be denoted by the

similarity. Therefore, it could be concluded that perceptual word gavaya (gavayo gavayapadavacya iti jhanam yajjayata
knowledge of the individual having similarity with a cow Hiy By means of this, the opinion of those who hold that
is the instrumental cause of upamiti and the only operation is knowledge arising from Comparison is not a different form
the recollection of the meaning of the sentence conveying of valid knowledge, but it is only of the form of verbal
similarity. knowledge itself, is rejected. (The argument of those who
hold that knowledge arising from Comparison is the same as
Text 3 verbal knowledge is, as follows): The knowledge arising
from Comparison is the knowledge of the denotative function
fa. W1W ifa *TFr ffa I of the word gavaya as pervading everything that is determined
by similarity conveyed by the word ‘similar’ in the sentence
‘that which is similar to a cow is gayal’; (and, that this
knowledge of the denotative function of the word gavaya)
JM^qqi^q WTc^T-
has the form that that which is similar to cow is to be
denoted by the word gavaya. The knowledge arising from
Rdl I Comparison has as object the denotative function of the
word gavaya which is determined by the universal gayalness.
qi^cq)4ftfa4 Such a knowledge arising from comparison cannot be verbal
■wTc^rR^rsw %rr^iw wnr- knowledge without the recollection produced by the word
gavaya, the object of which is that which is qualified by
TTsq^t^fcR^TTci;
universal gayalness. Nor should it be objected that when
cRTESfaT %gc^| T ? there is the perceptual knowledge of the similarity with the
cow as well as of the universal gayalness, how can there arise
the knowledge from Comparison of the denotative function
^TR; I W ? "IRT of the word gavaya as pervading only the universal gayalness
TnTtrTCT^faT and not pervading similarity. Although both similarity and
the universal are equally objects of perceptual knowledge,
oINRmhRiRIcI TFZY&: | cIW: SRc^d dl^l^-
still in relation with the universal gayalness, the similarity
iMi|ifqH(tqMc«(Ri|tl+c^lRfcl I I
with cow is known as logically cumbersome and, therefore,
^jf \^|RRmRju|c|d) ^fMt- the knowledge from Comparison in which the denotative
cql^*iqmi^facqf4|<; function of the word gavaya as pervading that (similarity)
cqhRRl: wiRcqR «flwf | does not arise. Besides (if the denotative function of the word
gavaya is grasped in that which is similar to a cow then) from
 TOO Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary- Upamanakhanda 101

the word gavaya, it is impossible to have the verbal knowledge Commentary

in which the universal gayalness is the qualifier. This is Now the authors describe the exact form of upamiti;
because the knowledge of denotative function as pervading
first of all, M. points out that upamiti is in the form that gayal
a particular thing is the cause of verbal knowledge in which
is to be denoted by the word gavaya and not in the form that
that particular thing is the qualifier. Nor can it be argued that
this individual is to be denoted by the word gavaya. The
since there is the knowledge of similarity in that which is
reason is that if the latter were the form of the knowledge
qualified by substanceness, there will not arise the knowledge
arising from Comparison it would be impossible to know the
from Comparison in which the denotative function of the
denotative function of the word in other gayals. In this way,
word gavaya which is determined by the universal gayalness
upamiti is that knowledge in which the qualificand is that
and so the knowledge of similarity in something which is
which is qualified by the universal gavayatva and the qualifier
qualified by a particular characteristic is the cause of
is the denotative function of the word gavaya (gavaya-
knowledge from Comparison, which is determined by the
tvavacchinnaviksjakagavayapadavacyatvaprakarakopamitih).
same characteristic. And in this way, when there is no This would be the exact form of upamiti.
knowledge of the universal gayalness etc., then there is the It could, however, be objected that such a form of
(perceptual) knowledge of similarity in that which is qualified upamiti is not possible since in order to know that which is
by a logically cumbersome characteristic such as a particular qualified by the universal gavayatva one should have prior
configuration of parts etc. And, it is possible for the knowledge knowledge of gavayatva, because in order to have the
from Comparison to arise in which the denotative function knowledge of the qualified, the knowledge of the qualifier is
of the word gavaya etc. is determined by that (i.e. particular necessary. This objection may be answered as follows: When
configuration of parts). This objection is acceptable to us. the individual having similarity with a cow is perceived, then
Since it (i.e. knowledge from Comparison in which the the universal gavayatva is also perceived, because it resides
denotative function of the word gavaya which is determined in something fit to be perceived. Therefore, the knowledge
by the particular configuration of parts is the object) is of similarity with a cow has arisen regarding that which is
erroneous, it cannot bring about the knowledge of denotative qualified by the universal gavayatva. Hence, the conclusion
function of the word gavaya etc. which is determined by such is that it is not at all impossible to have upamiti in the form
a logically cumbersome characteristic. that that which is qualified by gavayatva is to be denoted by
This is indicative of the following: The instrumental the word gavaya.
cause (of knowledge arising from Comparison) is the The opinion of certain others that upamiti is not a
perceptual knowledge of the individual which is qualified by different kind of valid knowledge but it is included in the
dissimilarity, the operation is the recollection of the meaning verbal knowledge, is being rejected. According to them
of a sentence conveying dissimilarity, in the form that earth upamiti is the knowledge of denotative function of the word
has quality which is dissimilar to the qualities of water and gavaya as determined by similarity which is known by the
other things. The result is the knowledge arising from word ‘similar’ in the sentence ‘that which is similar to a cow
Comparison in which the denotative function of the word is to be denoted by the word gavaya’ (gosadrjo gavayapada-
prthivi is pervaded by the universal earthness.
 102 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Upamanakhanda 103

vacyah) and that this knowledge of the denotative function of gavayatva, so also he perceives similarity with a cow.
the word gavaya has the form that that which is similar to a Therefore, because of the absence of any clinching argument
cow is to be denoted by the word gavaya. The idea is that, (vinigamanavirahena), to establish whether gosadrlyam or
according to the Purvapaksin, the form of upamiti is not that gavayatvam is the determinant of the denotative function of
that which is qualified by the universal gavayatva is to be the word gavaya, gosadrlyam, i.e. similarity with a cow, also
denoted by the word gavaya (gavayo gavayapadavacyah), but can be considered as the determinant of the denotative
of the form that that which is qualified by similarity with a function of the -word gavaya. In this way, it could be concluded
cow is to be denoted by the word gavaya. And the verbal that upamiti can be considered as verbal knowledge arising
knowledge arising from the sentence conveying similarity from the sentence gosadrio gavayapadavacyah.
(i.e. gosadrlo gavayapadavacyah) has also the same form. This objection may be answered as follows: Although
Therefore, upamiti is to be considered as verbal knowledge. both the universal gavayatva and similarity with a cow are
This opinion is rejected by pointing out that it has objects of perception, still similarity with a cow cannot be
already been established that upamiti is in the form that that considered as the determinant of the denotative function of
which is qualified by the universal gavayatva is to be denoted the word gavaya. This is because similarity with a cow
by the word gavaya. Hence, gosadrlyam, similarity with a {go. adrlyam) is gobhinnctve sati gogatabhuyodharmavattvam,
cow, is not the determinant of the denotative function of the i.e., gogatadharmasajafiyanekadharmavattvam (i.e., while being
word gavaya but the universal gavayatva is the determinant different from a cow the-state-of-having-many-qualities which
of the denotative function of the word gavaya. Such an are of the same kind as those existing in a cow). And this is
upamiti cannot be considered as verbal knowledge. The logically a very cumbersome characteristic. In relation to
reason is that where from the word gavaya recollection of this, the universal gavayatva is simple and therefore, it should
that which is qualified by the universal gavayatva arises, there be considered as the determinant of the denotative function
alone verbal knowledge in the form gavayo gavayapadavacyah, of the word gavaya. Therefore, upamiti does not arise in the
comes into existence. The verbal knowledge arising from form that that which is qualified by similarity with a cow is to
the atidelavakya, i.e. gosadrlo gavayah, cannot have such a be denoted by the word gavaya.
form; but can have only the form in which gosadrlya is the Besides, if it is accepted that upmiti is in the form that
qualificand and gavayapadavacyatva is the qualifier. Therefore, that which is qualified by similarity with a cow is to be
upamiti cannot be considered as verbal knowledge. denoted by the word gavaya, then we cannot have from the
Now it may be objected that there is no reason that word gavaya verbal knowledge in which the universal
upamiti should be only in the form that that which is qualified gavayatva is the qualifier. This is because of the rule that
by the universal gavayatva is to be denoted by the word when the denotative function of a particular word is grasped
gavaya and not in the form that that which is qualified by in something which is qualified by a certain characteristic,
similarity with a cow is to be denoted by the word gavaya: then from that word there arises the verbal knowledge of
The reason is that when the villager perceives the individual that particular thing as qualified by that same characteristic.
which is similar to a cow, just as he perceives the universal Therefore, in order to have the verbal knowledge of that
 104 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary- Upamanakhanda 105

follows: na cayadagavayatvadijatyanupasthitih tada sadrfyasam-

which is qualified by the universal gavayatva, it is necessary
sthanadigurudharmarupasya grahat tadavacchedena etc. (Cfr.
that upamiti, i.e. the knowledge of the denotative function of
the word gavaya, be accepted in the form gavayo S. p. 179, 1.12). Ramarudra explains as follows the meaning
gavayapadavacyah. of the D. text accepted by him. From the word gavaya in
Now Dinakara mentions another objection and gives order to have the verbal knowledge in which the universal
the answer. The objection is that when a person sees similarity gavayatva is the qualifier, we have to admit that the
with a cow in that which is qualified by substanceness, he determinant of the denotative function of the word gavaya is
cannot have the knowledge from Comparison in which the the universal gavayatva. We come to the knowledge that
gavayatva is the determinant of the denotative function of the
denotative function of the word gavaya is determined by the
universal gavayatva. Therefore, it should be accepted that word gavaya only when we have the upamiti in the form that
the knowledge of similarity in something which is qualified gavayo gavayapadavacyah. Still there is no proof to show that
by a particular characteristic is the cause of the knowledge from the sentence conveying similarity, there arises the verbal
from Comparison in which that same characteristic is the knowledge in which the denotedness of the word gavaya
determinant of the denotative function. Thus, when there is (gavayapadavacyatvam) only co-exists with similarity with a
no knowledge of the universal gavayatva etc., then there is cow. From the same sentence, there is no harm in having
the perceptual knowledge of similarity with a cow in the verbal knowledge in which the denotedness of the word
individual characterized by a particular configuration of gavaya is determined also by similarity with a cow.
parts which is logically cumbersome. And then it is possible In less technical language, this just means that, according
to have upamiti in which the denotative function of the word to the Siddhantin, the atideiavakya, gosadrjo gavayah, does
gavaya etc. as determined by a particular configuration of not convey the meaning that gosadriya is the determinant of
parts is the object. the denotedness of the word gavaya, but conveys only that
The answer to this objection is that even if such an the denotedness of the word gavaya exists in that in which
upamiti is accepted, still it does not establish that the denotative similarity with cow exists. But according to the Purvapaksin,
function of the word gavaya is in that which is qualified by gosadriya can be considered as the determinant of the
the particular configuration of parts. This is because this denotedness of the word gavaya. It cannot however, be
knowledge has as object the particular configuration of parts argued that the latter form of verbal knowledge is prevented
as the determinant of the denotative function of the word by the causal complex of the knowledge of denotative
gavaya. But the particular configuration of parts is logically function of the word gavaya in that which is qualified by the
cumbersome and, therefore, it cannot be considered as the Universal gavayatva. The reason is that the knowledge in the
determinant of the denotative function of the word gavaya. form that that which is qualified by the universal gavayatva is
Therefore, such an upamiti is erroneous4 and so it does not to be denoted by the word gavaya, is caused by the knowledge
establish the denotative function of the word gavaya in that of similarity with a cow in that which is qualified by the
which is qualified by the particular configuration of parts. universal gavayatva. When there is no perceptual knowledge
Now according to Ramarudra, the text of D. is as of the universal gavayatva, there is no causal complex of
 7 06 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary- Upamanakhanda 107
upamiti in which (causal complex) the knowledge of similarity
with a cow in that which is qualified by the universal gavayatva
is included (gavayatvdvachinnadharmikagosadrfyajhdnaghatito-
pamitisamagrT). Therefore, it is possible to consider the
similarity with a cow as the determinant of the denotative cl*
function of the word gavaya, because of the force of the WIFTOM dl-RkdlMvl: I
verbal knowledge itself (in the form gosadrfo gavayah) arising
from the sentence conveying similarity.
^T: I I
The answer to these arguments is that even when there
is such an upamiti (i.e. gosadrsyavacchinnah gavayapadavacyah.), Translation
since similarity with a cow is logically cumbersome, it cannot
be considered as the determinant of the denotative function It may be objected that there is no proof to establish
of the word gavaya; hence such an upamiti is erroneous and that Comparison is a different means of valid knowledge.
so it cannot be established that similarity with a cow is the Nor can it be argued that the knowledge of similarity is a
determinant of the denotative function of the word different means of valid knowledge because it is the
gavaya. But the universal gavayatva, being simple, should instrumental cause of the valid knowledge which is different
be taken as the determinant of the denotative function of the in kind from the valid knowledge such as perception etc.
word gavaya. since the knowledge arising from Comparison is not different
Now it should be noted that just as the perception of the in kind from the valid knowledge such as perception etc.
individual which is qualified by similarity with a cow is the The answer to this objection is that even in the absence
instrumental cause of upamiti, so also the perception of the of the contact with the eye etc., knowledge from Comparison
individual which is qualified by dissimilarity can also be the arises and so it cannot be of the nature of visual perception
instrumental cause of upamiti. As for example, perception of etc. Nor is it of the nature of mental perception because it is
earth which is qualified by dissimilarity with water etc. is the the object of reflective cognition of the form ‘I compare’
instrumental cause of upamiti, the operation is the recollection which does not arise after mental perception. Besides, there
of the meaning of the sentence conveying dissimilarity in the is no proof to establish that the knowledge arising from
form that that which has dissimilarity with water etc. is to be Comparison is perceptual knowledge since after the
denoted by the word prthivi. The result is upamiti, which is in knowledge arising from Comparison, the reflective knowledge
the form that that which is qualified by the universal earthness that ‘I have perceived it’ does not arise. Otherwise, it would
is to be denoted by the word prthivi. come about that inferential knowledge also would be of the
nature of mental perception. Nor is (knowledge arising from
Text 4
Comparison) inferential knowledge since it arises even without
the knowledge of invariable concomitance etc. Nor is it
verbal knowledge since it is not produced by the knowledge
of words. Nor is it remembrance because remembrance of
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary- Upamanakhanda 109
an object which is not experienced is not possible. This is the
is the object of anuvyavasaya in the form of upaminomi, is
summary.
entirely different from perception etc. Hence, upamana which
is the cause of such an upamiti is a different means of valid
Commentary
knowledge.
Further it may be objected that Comparison is not a Besides, once knowledge from Comparison has arisen,
different means of valid knowledge. In fact, it would appear there does not take place a reflective knowledge [anuvyavasaya)
that upamana can be included in the valid means of perceptual in the form ‘I perceive’ [saksatkaromi). Therefore, upamiti
knowledge. For the knowledge that gayal is the denotation cannot be considered as perceptual knowledge. The reason
of the word gavaya can be perceptual knowledge. Here the is that it is anuvyavasaya that determines the nature of
perception of gayal takes place by means of ordinary sense vyavasaya. It may further be argued that upamiti cannot be a
contact; the perception of the denotedness of the word different kind of valid knowledge, but it is just an instance of
gavaya arises from extraordinary contact in the form of mental perception. The reason is that only the-state-of-being-
knowledge (jndnalaksanapratydsatti).5 Against this, it may be the-object-of-knowledge [visayata) which is produced by
argued that even when the contact of the eyes has come to ordinary sense contact with an external object is the
an end, there could arise upamiti by the recollection of the manifesting factor of immediacy [saksatkaratva] in knowledge.
sentence conveying similarity. But mind does not have direct contact with an external
The situation envisaged here is that a person after object. Therefore, the mental perception of upamiti which
hearing the atideiavdkya goes to the forest and sees the was referred to earlier is not produced by ordinary sense
gavaya. But even after seeing gavaya, when he has no more contact with an external object. Hence there is no
sense contact with it, recollecting the atideiavakyartha, he saksatkaratva in upamiti because there is no manifesting
has upamiti. Such an upamiti cannot be perceptual knowledge. factor in the form of the-state-of-being-the-object-of-knowledge
This objection can be answered by pointing out that although which is produced by ordinary sense contact with external
such an upamiti is not perception by ordinary sense contact, object. So there never occurs anuvyavasaya in the form ‘I
it is still mental perception which is extraordinary, i.e. with perceive’ (saksatkaromi) after upamiti in the form of mental
regard to gavayapadavacyatva, it has arisen by means of perception. Hence upamiti is not a separate kind of valid
contact in the form of knowledge. Therefore, there is no knowledge. Therefore, upamana is also not a separate means
proof to establish that upamiti is a different kind of valid of valid knowledge.
know edge. Hence, upamana is not a separate means of valid These objections are answered as follows: If in this way,
knowledge.
upamiti is considered as mental perception, then inference
The answer to these arguments is that when one has the also can be taken as mental perception. Just as the object of
now e ge arising from Comparison, one has the anuvyavasaya, in the form of upaminomi is mental perception,
anuvyavasaya (reflective knowledge) in the form upaminomi (I so also the object of anuvyavasaya in the form of anuminomi
compare). An anuvyavasaya in such a form does not arise should also be mental perception. But this is not accepted by
after such a mental perception. Therefore, the upamiti which both parties. Therefore, just as the object of anuvyavasaya in
 110 Nydya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Upamanakhanda 111
the form of anuminomi should be a separate kind of valid
similarity without having the individual qualified by the universal
knowledge in the form of inferential knowledge, so also the gavayatva as the qualificand. In practice this just means that the
object of anuvyavasdya in the form of upaminomi should be a villager first sees an individual having similarity with a cow without
separate kind of valid knowledge arising from Comparison. realizing that it is a gayal.
Therefore, upamana is a separate means of valid knowledge. 3. The definition of vyapara is tajjanyatve sali tajjanyajanakatvam. By
this part of the sentence in the commentary, the part of the
It may further be objected that although upamiti is not
definition tajjanyatvam is explained; the following part of the
mental perception, it may be considered as inferential sentence explains tajjanyajanakatvam, another element of the
Imowledge produced by knowledge of negative invariable definition of operation.
concomitance. The form of the inference is as follows: A 4. Here the form of the upamiti is samsthanaviiistah gavayapadavacyah.
gayal is to be denoted by the word gavaya because it has Hence samsthana appears as the determinant of the denotative
function of the word gavaya\ but in fact, it cannot be so since it is
similarity with a cow just as that which is not denoted by the
logically more cumbersome than gavayatva. Such an upamiti in
word gavaya does not have similarity with a cow, as for which samslhai .rich is not the determinant of the denotative
example, a camel. Hence the object of anuvyavasdya in the function is taken as the determinant of the denotative function, is
form of upaminomi is the inferential knowledge of the erroneous.
denotative function of the word gavaya. This objection may 5. Here one should note clearly that in the perceptual knowledge
gavayo gavayapadavacyah, gavaya becomes the object by means of
be answered by pointing out that it is our experience that
ordinary sense contact, gavayapadavacyatva becomes the object by
even without the knowledge of negative invariable
means of jnanalaksanapralyasalti which in our present instance is
concomitance, we have upamiti. Therefore, it cannot be connection between the organ of eye and gavayapadavacyatva.
considered as inferential knowledge. Such a connection here is extraordinary, i.e. the recollection of
Further it should not be argued that upamiti is verbal gavayapadavacyatva. This recollection is caused by the prior verbal
knowledge arising from atiddavakya, gosadrio gavayapadavacyah.
knowledge. The reason is that upamiti is not produced by
6. Here it should be carefully noted that the earlier objection that
the knowledge of the word.6 Nor is it remembrance because
upamiti is to be included in verbal knowledge was based upon the
one cannot remember a thing which has not been assumption that the form of the upamiti is gosadrio gavayapadavacyah.
experienced. Therefore, after upamiti has arisen, one does Now the objection is raised accepting the form of upamiti to be
not have anuvyavasdya in the form, ‘I infer’, ‘I have verbal gavayo gavayapadavacyah.
knowledge’ or ‘I remember’, but in the form ‘I have
knowledge from Comparison’ (iupaminomi). Therefore, the
object of anuvyavasdya in the form of upaminomi is indeed a
separate kind of valid knowledge and so upamana also is a
different kind of means of valid knowledge.

Notes
1. This certain Naiyayika is Yajnapati Upadhyaya (Kir. p.289, 1.20

2. i.e., gavayatvdvacchinnaviSesjakatvam vind, i.e. mere knowledge of

Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 113

Text 1A

^ WTN SR ^ I
91K<to: W ^ I 1^? I I

I ^WPTFT
3-
•q^ ct><oi wn^sfa TfltotoT^ s*u«;q}tjKij
I «miMR: I 3FW
M^M^T: MrUfllfoTT JHI«Wlfcll4& I
cf?nPt |w m^^c4 %*t^i ^aR’-Ki^
to 3n^iw#r ?ti®?-
4lmiq^: | ?iltowuii^a<^Vy: I
^T*T-

dcW<ull^^': I 4<<?IK % t(qFto'iRt<to-

I to^T to W Wfw W*T: I ¥

ql^ I 3n^pr%
^rto 9iFcbuto TT^ts#r to tft ^f-
Rcflto^M: WTci;I au^PiWtotl ^ siRnlto
| ^ 9lfrt>: ItotoN- cHl~

^Ito^tocto *iRrKt*RcMi£: I
Translation
Nature of Verbal Knowledge

Karikavati
The instrumental cause (of verbal knowledge) is
cognition itself of words. Its operation is the knowledge
 IU Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 775

(i.e. recollection) of the meanings of words. Verbal

with that word, and that is in the form of the will of God, viz.
knowledge is the result and the knowledge of the
from this word this meaning is to be understood. Recent
denotative function is auxiliary (cause).
names (given by parents and so on) have indeed denotative
[Karika.81)
functions because with reference to them there is the will of
Muktavali
God in the following way: On the eleventh day a father should
The manner of (the origin) of verbal knowledge is
rive a name (to his child); but terms coined by modems
described with the words beginning with cognition itself of
(alone) have no denotative functions. The modem (Naiyayikas)
words [padajhanam tviti): It is not the case that a word which
hold that the will of God is not the denotative function but
is actually being known (i.e. being heard) is the instrumental
merely will and, therefore, they say that terms (coined by
cause, for even in the absence of words there is verbal
modems alone) have indeed denotative functions.
knowledge as in the case of a stanza etc. (composed by) a
person who is keeping silence. The knowledge of the
Text IB
meanings of words (padarthadhiriti)'. The operation is the
recollection of the meaning of a word which (recollection) is % Tjifr S«WlH I
produced by the word. Otherwise, a person who has the '
knowledge of a word would have verbal knowledge, even
when he has perceptual cognition etc. of the object denoted
by the word. Even the recollection of the meanings of words TfW: I 3FW
should be produced by words with the help of their significatory | ddlft I mc«ix4 I
functions; otherwise, by means of words like ‘jar’ etc. one can
3pW niRt*u«d WWRffcfe-
have the recollection of ether through the relationship of
inherence and then there would come about the verbal T rT* WTT m—
knowledge of ether.
Significatory function is only a relation which is either
I JX ^Icl I
denotative function or implication1. It is here alone (i.e. for the
recollection of the meaning of the word which is produced by ifUcJT I
the knowledge of the word) that the knowledge of the
denotative function is useful. If one does not have the
knowledge of the denotative function earlier, even though he
has the knowledge of the words, there would not arise the vilrb: I JklfcPili*-
recollection of the meaning as related with the word. This is
vciiPi^
because the knowledge of word brings about the recollection
dWkdl£¥lfotWdk37T dl£¥IM+Kdlfd*I'ta*ifl
of its meaning in the capacity of being the knowledge of the
relatum. The opinion of the traditional school is as follows: dlc^frl 31T§pf^
Denotative function is the relation of the meaning of a word ^nf^T d^fcic1 dlPd I
116 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 117

which is produced by (the knowledge of) words. That is (sa

ftrn <Mh-'i«mfcqlct I ^ *«IvnRIcr l cetif Since the will of God is only one, the will of God which
is in the form that ajar is to be understood by the word ‘jar’
is also in cloth and, therefore, there is over-extension. Likewise,
since the will which has as its qualifier the-state-of-being-the-
object-of-knowledge-which-arises-from-the-word-Ganges
Translation
(gahgapadajanyabodhavisayatvaprakarakeccha) is also in the
Accepting relevance in the form of the relation of the bank, the knowledge of bank can be attained by means of
cause and effect, it is said in the principal text cognition itself denotative function alone and, therefore, there would be the
of words (padajnanam tviti): By the words in the M. it is not elimination of implication. Still, since there is no usage that
the case that a word which is actually being known (i.e. bank is to be understood by the denotative function of the
being heard) (na tu jhayamanamiti) the author clarifies what is word ‘Ganges’, certainly the will of God by the relation of
to be excluded by the word tu which is in the principal text and qualificandness which is indicated by the qualifiemess which
which has the meaning of the word eva. By the word ‘etc’ in is determined by the-state-of-being-the-object-of-knowledge
the expression ‘the stanza etc. (composed by a) person who is which is produced by the word ‘Ganges’ and so on, is the
keeping the the vow of silence’ particular gesture of hands and denotative function of words like ‘Ganges’ and so on. The
so on which bring about the knowledge of (number) two etc. qualificandness which is in the bank and so on although
are included. Otherwise (anyathaf. i.e. if the operation is only indicated by the qualifiemess which is in the-state-of-being-the-
the knowledge of the meanings of words. There also (tatrapi): object-of-knowledge produced by the word ‘Ganges’ and so
i.e. even in the case of the recollection of the meanings of on, still it (qualificandness in bank and so on) is not indicated
words which is produced by (the knowledge of) words. Being by such a qualifiemess as determined by such a state-of-being-
a constituent partis the meaning of the locative case. Otherwise the-object-of-knowledge, but as determined by only the-state-
(anyatha): i.e. if the expression ‘ by means of significatory of-being-the-state-of-being-the-object and, therefore, there is
function’ is not mentioned. neither over-extension nor the elimination of implication.
Now it may be objected that if the significatory function In recent name (adhunike namni)'. In the name which is

is denotative function, then from the word ‘Ganges there given on the eleventh day by present day people like father
would be no verbal knowledge of the bank and so on since and so on. Of the will of God in this way (itilvarecchaya iti):
there by means of the denotative function we have no (There is the will of God) in the general form that a father
recollection of the bank which is produced by (the knowledge should give the name (to his child) on the eleventh day. This
of) the word. (In order to answer this objection) it is said is the meaning. Terms coined by moderns (adhunikasahketite)'.
significatory function is only (vrttiicetl). A relation which Terms like nadi, vrddhi and so on which are coined only by
is either (any at ar as am band hah)\ This means a relation in the the moderns. Keeping in mind the incongruity in the opinion
form of either one of them. Here alone (atraiva) means with of the traditional school the opinion of the modems is shown
reference only to the recollection of the meanings of words by the words but the modern Naiyayikas (navyas tu). No
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 719

77 8 Nyaya Philosophy of Language between the means of valid knowledge (pramana-s) of upamana
(nh/tn and between the instances of valid knowledge
denotative function [na iaktiriti). If it were so, from modern
(pramiti-s) of upamiti and iabdabodha.
terms like nadi and so on there would not be any verbal
First the relevance in the form of the relation of cause and
knowledge; this is the idea. It should be understood that
effect that exists between the means of valid knowledge of
according to both schools, from gargarf and so on which are
Comparison (upamana) and the means of valid verbal
corrupt words, there is verbal knowledge because of erroneous
knowledge [iabda) is explained accordingto the old Naiyayikas.
knowledge of denotative function.
Their opinion is that the means of the valid knowledge of
Commentary Comparison (upamana) is the verbal knowledge arising from
Nature of Verbal Knowledge the statement of similarity [atideiavakyajanyaiabdabodha) and
Words are the means of the valid verbal knowledge. How is
In Karika8\, we are given an apt and succinct description the latter, i.e. words produced by the former, i.e. upamana, in
of the causal complex of verbal knowledge. First of all, it is the form of iabdabodha? This question is answered in the
stated that the knowledge of words is the instrumental cause following way.
of verbal knowledge.3 We must immediately point out that, The forest-dweller knows that that which is similar to a
here, the knowledge of words which is the instrumental cause cow is to be denoted by the word gavaya. Therefore, he
is the perception of words by the sense of hearing, or the instructs the villager that that which is similar to a cow is to be
knowledge of words which arises from seeing the script. The denoted by the word gavaya. From this sentence uttered by the
operation of the instrumental cause is the knowledge (i.e. the forester the villager has the verbal knowledge in the form that
recollection) of the meanings of words. The auxiliary cause, that which is similar to a cow is to be denoted by the word
in order to produce the operation, is the knowledge of the gavaya. Such a verbal knowledge of the villager has the same
denotative function which is the relation of the word and its form as the knowledge of the forester before the utterance of
meaning. This just means that without the knowledge of the the sentence ‘that which is similar to a cow is to be denoted by
denotative functions of words, one cannot have the recollection the word gavaya\ In this way, the verbal knowledge of the
of the meanings of the words. The result of the whole of this meaning of the sentence which the villager has, is the cause of
process is verbal knowledge. Here verbal knowledge means the utterance of the sentence by the forest-dweller, in the
knowledge of the meaning of a sentence, i.e. the knowledge capacity of being the knowledge of the meaning of the
of the relation of the meanings of words (padarthasamsarga■ sentence as existing in the forester (Cfr. atideiavakyajanyaiabda-
jnhnam eva vakyarthajhanam). bodhasydrthajnanavidhaya goiadrio gavaya iti iabdaprayoga-
Dinakara first of all points out the relevance (sahgati) of hetutvat tadriaiabdasya upamanajanyatvena, S.p.180, 11.5-6).
the subject matter that is going to be treated. He explains how Therefore, according to the old school of Naiyayikas, there is
the section on Words has relevance with the previous section directly the relevance of the relation of cause and effect
on Comparison. Such a relevance is of the nature of the between upamanapramana and iabdapramana.
relationship of cause and effect between the two. Ramarudra Some explain the opinion of the modem school of
goes into the details of this discussion and explains exactly
how there is relevance between upamana and iabda, i.e.
no Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 72 7

Naiyayikas as follows: The knowledge of similarity is the There is also relevance between the knowledge arising
means of valid knowledge of Comparison (iupamana) and the from Comparison (upamiti) and verbal knowledge (iabdabodha).
knowledge of the word is the means of valid verbal knowledge. This is explained by both old and new schools in the following
Relevance between these two, viz. knowledge of similarity and way: upamiti (knowledge arising from Comparison) is the
knowledge4 of the word is a relation of cause and effect. knowledge of the denotative function [iaktijhdna] of words.
upamana (the means of valid knowledge of Comparison) is the And such a iaktijhdna is the cause of verbal knowledge.
cause of verbal knowledge (iabdabodha) through upamiti Therefore, there is obviously the relevance of cause and effect
which is in the form of the knowledge of denotative function. between these two.
This just means that upamana produces upamiti which is According to the old school of Naiyayikas, upamana is
knowledge of denotative function. And such a knowledge of atideiavakyajanyaiabdabodha, and this is produced by
the denotative functions of words is the cause of verbal atideiavdkya which is iabdapramana. Therefore, upamana-
knowledge. Therefore, verbal knowledge is an effect of pramana is an effect of iabdapramana. Hence, a question may
upamana. Hence, being-an-effect of the valid means of the be raised why upamanapramana is not treated after
knowledge of Comparison [uamanopafivakatva) existing in iabdapramana. The answer to this is that there is no rule that
verbal knowledge resides in the means of the valid knowledge, whatever is relevant to a particular subject should be treated
i.e. knowledge of the word [iabdapramana) through the immediately after the explanation of that particular subject;
indirect relation of svairayakaranatva (i.e., svam=upajivakatvam, but the rule is only that a subject which is treated after a
svairayah-iabdabodhah, tatkaranatvam — iabdajnanam). Thus particular subject should be relevant to the latter. Hence, there
by the relation of ivarayakaranatva, i.e. by being the is no harm in treating first either the cause or the effect.
instrumental cause of iabdabodha, which is the substratum of Further M. determines more precisely what the actual
upajivakatva, being-the-effect of Comparison (upamanopajiva- instrumental cause of verbal knowledge is: It is not the words
katva) exists in the knowledge of the word. which are actually being known, i.e. it is not the words which
This opinion, however, is not to be admitted, because we are actually the object of auditory perception, the instrumental
can show a direct i elationship between knowledge of similarity cause, but knowledge itself of words. The difference between
[sadriyajnana) and knowledge of words (padajhana). This these two positions is that, in the first case, words are actually
comes about in the following way: upamiti which is produced uttered and, in the second case, there is no need of actually
by the knowledge of similarity is the knowledge of denotative uttered words, but only the knowledge of words, as for
function in the following form: A gayal is to be denoted by the example, when a person who keeps silence writes down
word gavaya. Such an upamiti has the word gavaya also as words, we come to have the knowledge of words by seeing the
object. Therefore, upamiti also is valid means of verbal script.5 Similarly, when a person shows a particular gesture by
knowledge (iabdapramana) in as far as it too is knowledge of means of his fingers to produce the knowledge of number two
word. Therefore, there is relevance between the two, viz. etc-» one who sees the gesture comes to the knowledge of the
knowledge of similarity and knowledge of words in the form word symbolized by the gesture (here the word ‘two’). In both
of the relation of direct cause and effect. instances, there is no uttered word, still there is verbal
122 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 123

knowledge for those who see the script or the gesture. But this becomes the object of ocular perception by the extraordinary
is not possible if it were stated that only the words which are (alaukika) sense-contact of the eye with fragrance; such a
actually known as the instrumental cause of verbal knowledge; contact between the two is in the form of knowledge
but when it is stated that the knowledge of words is the (jndnalaksana pratyasatti, i.e. in the present instance,
instrumental cause of verbal knowledge, there could be verbal saurabhasmaranam, i.e. remembrance of fragrance). Similarly
knowledge from the knowledge of words symbolized by the in the perception ‘this pot is to be understood by the word ‘pot’
script or the gesture. (ghatapadabodhyo’yam ghatah) the denotedness of the word
Now M. describes the nature of the operation of the ‘pot’ is the object as qualifier to pot. Here pot which is the
instrumental cause. It is the recollection of the meanings of qualificand becomes the object of ocular perception by means
words; and this recollection itself has to be produced by the of the ordinary sense contact of conjunction [samyoga) of the
knowledge of words. If it is asserted that padajanyapadartha- eye with the pot, but ghatapadabodhyatva which is the qualifier
jhanam na tu padajanyapaddrthasmaranam is the operation, becomes the object of ocular perception by the extraordinary
then there could arise the following difficulty; someone hears sense contact of the eye with ghatapadabodhyatva; such a
the word ‘jar’ etc.; then in the next moment, he sees the thing contact between the two is in the form of knowledge (jnanala-
jar etc. and so he has the knowledge of the meanings of the ksanapratyasatti, i.e. recollection of ghatapadabodhyatva).
words in the form of perception. Then he would have verbal This just means that in the perceptual knowledge
knowledge. ghatapadabodhyo 'yam ghatah theprakara is ghatapadabodhyatva.
Against this difficulty which is proposed in M., Ramarudra But the perceptual knowledge of ghatapadabodhyatva cannot
raises an important objection as follows: The definition of take place by means of ordinary sense contact, but by the
operation is ‘being produced by that, while being the cause of extraordinary sense contactjndnalaksana, i.e. the recollection
that which is produced by that’ (tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajana-
of ghatapadabodhyatva', such a recollection is the result of the
katvam). The knowledge of jar by means of Perception is
previous experience that ghato ghatapadabodhyah. Further,
produced by the eyes and not by the knowledge of words. this recollection of the denotedness by the word ‘pot’ is to be
Therefore, knowledge of jar by means of Perception cannot considered as knowledge of the word because the recollection
be the operation of the knowledge of words. And so since the
has as object the word ‘pot’ also. Thus by means of relation of
necessary operation for the production of verbal knowledge
knowledge (jndnalksanapratyasatti) the perception that ‘the
is absent, one cannot object that there would be verbal
pot is to be denoted by the word ‘pot’ is produced by the
knowledge.
knowledge of the word. Such a knowledge which arises also
Ramarudra himself answers this objection as follows: In
from the knowledge of the word can, therefore, become the
the perception ‘this is a piece of fragrant sandalwood’ fragrance
needed operation of the knowledge of the word which is the
is a qualifier to sandalwood. Here sandalwood which is the
instrumental cause of verbal knowledge. Hence, the difficulty
qualificand becomes the object of ocular perception by means
raised in M., i.e. a person who has the knowledge of the word
of the ordinary sense contact of conjunction (samyoga) of the
‘jar’ and who has the perception of the thing jar can have the
eye with the sandalwood; but fragrance which is the qualifier
verbal knowledge of jar, still stands.
 7 24 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 7 25

In order to avoid this difficulty, M. asserts that it is not considered as the operation of the instrumental cause, viz.
padajanyapaddrthajnanam, but padajanyapadarthasmaranam knowledge of the word ‘jar’. Thus the difficulty pointed out
is the operation. Hence, perceptual knowledge cannot be earlier stands.
taken as operation since it is not smaranam, and so the above In order to avoid such a difficulty, the qualifier padajanya
mentioned difficulty also cannot be raised. is added to padarthasmarana. Now padajanyatvam means
It has been stated in M. that the operation is padajanya¬ padajhanatvdvacchinnajanakatanirupitajanyatvam, i.e. the-state-
padarthasmaranam. Now it may be asked what is the purpose of-being-produced which is indicated by the-state-of-being-
of the qualifier of padajanya? Obviously padajanya here the-cause which is determined by padajhdnatva. In the
means padajnanajanya, since according to the modern recollection of the meaning of the word which was mentioned
Naiyayikas, padajhana is the instrumental cause of verbal earlier there is no such padajhdnaivavacchinnajanakatani-
knowledge. If the qualifier padajanya is not given then the rupitajanyatvam, but only padajnananisthakdlatvdvacchinna-
operation is only padarthasmaranam. In that case let us take janakatanirupitajanyatvam. Hence, one cannot accept as
the case of a person who has the knowledge of the word ‘jar’ operation such a recollection of the meaning of the word ‘jar’
and has the recollection of the meaning of die word ‘jar’. Such which (recollection) is not produced by the knowledge of the
a recollection is produced by the knowledge of something word in the capacity of being the knowledge of the word.
which is related to the meaning of the word ‘jar’, and if such Therefore, no such difficulty as mentioned earlier can be
a knowledge of something related to the meaning of the word raised.6
‘jar’ is different from the knowledge of the word ‘jar’, then that Even in the case of the recollection of the meanings of
person having such a recollection could have verbal knowledge. words produced by the knowledge of words, we must
It may be argued that such an objection cannot be raised understand the prodcution of the recollection of meanings of
since, in the present instance, the recollection of the meaning words by the knowledge of words with the help of the
of the word ‘jar’ is not produced by the knowledge of the word significatory functions of words. Otherwise, the following
‘jar’. Therefore, such a recollection of the meaning of the word difficulty will arise: When one hears words like ‘jar’ etc. since
‘jar’ cannot be considered as the operation of the instrumental these words inhere in ether, one can have the recollection of
cause, viz. knowledge of the word ‘jar’. The answer to this ether also, because the knowledge of one relatum, viz. labda,
objection is as follows: Time is a cause of everything produced. (word) produces the recollection of the other relatum of the
But everything produced is also considered as kalopadhi (i.e, relation, viz. aka&a (ether). Hence one would have also the
limiting factor of time). Such limiting factors of time verbal knowledge of ether. But this is impossible. Therefore,
(kalopadhayah) are also considered as time. Now padajhana is the recollection of the meanings of words which is produced
something produced and, therefore, it is a limiting factor of by the knowledge of words is to be taken in the sense that the
time and so it is also considered as time. Therefore, such a recollection of the meanings of words is produced by the
recollection of the meaning also is produced by the knowledge knowledge of words with the help of the significatory functions
of the word in the capacity of being time (kalavidhaya). Hence of words.
such a recollection of the meaning of the word ‘jar’ can be Now it may be asked in what way does the knowledge of
 126 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

significatory function helps the knowledge of words to produce Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 127
the verbal knowledge? The general principle is that the
knowledge of one relatum produces the recollection of the the karika that the auxiliary cause is the knowledge of
other relatum. But for the production of the recollection of the denotative function. This means that the knowledge of the
other relatum the relation which relates both the relata is to be denotative function helps the knowledge of the word to
first known. In the present context the relation of word and produce the recollection of the meaning of the word.
meaning is the significatory function. The relata of this relation Now the real nature of denotative function is described.
are word and meaning. And only after knowing this relation It is the relation of the word with its meaning. Here all the
between word and its meaning in the form of significatory Naiyayikas are agreed; but in explaining how this relation
function can the recollection of the meaning arise when a comes about, the ancient school and the modem school of the
word is heard. If the significatory function is not known, i.e. if Naiyayikas differ. According to the former, the denotative
only words are known, one cannot have the recollection of function of words is in the form of the will of God that from
meanings, just as, if the relation of an elephant and its mahout this word this meaning is to be understood. The old Naiyayikas
is not known, when one sees the mahout one cannot have the also hold that proper names given to children by their fathers
recollection of the elephant. In this way, in order to have the have denotative functions. Such a form of denotative function
recollection of the meaning from the knowledge of word one is also in the form of the will of God in a general way because
should have the knowledge of the relation between the two. of the Vedic injunction that on the eleventh day a father
Now therefore, the question arises what exactly is the nature should give a name to his child. However, according to the ol d
of this relation in the form of the significatory function (vrtti) Naiyayikas, terms like nadi, vrddhi etc. coined by modems
of words. only have no denotative function.7 On the contrary, the
M. answers this question by stating, first of all, that the modem school of Naiyayikas accept the denotative function
significtory function is either denotative function (fakti) or in terms such as nadi, vrddhi etc. In order to justify the denota¬
tive function in these terms, they assert that denotative
implication [laksana). It should be noted that both these forms
of significatory function are relations; these relations exist function is in the form of will only and not necessarily the will
between a word and its meaning. of God.
Now the discussion centers on the nature of denotative And, besides, if the will of God is denotative function,
function (sakti). It is stated that the knowledge of the denotative then the Prabhakaras and so on who do not accept the
function is necessary for the recollection of the meanings of existence of God cannot account for verbal knowledge,
words produced by the knowledge of words. This is because because of the impossibility of the knowledge of denotative
if one does not know the denotative function of a word, one function in the form of the will of God. This is another reason
would not know also its implication, since the latter is in the why the modem Naiyayikas hold that denotative function is
form of relation with the meaning known through denotative just will.8
function. Therefore, although, strictly speaking, the auxiliary All this show that, according to both old and modern
cause is the knowledge of significatory function, it is stated in Naiyayikas, in well known words such as ‘jar’, ‘cloth’ etc., there
is denotative function in the form of the will of God; but
according to old Naiyayikas, in terms coined by modems
 128
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 129
alone like nodi, vrddhi and so on there is no denotative word ‘cloth’ the thing cloth is to be understood etc. To admit
function. The modem Naiyayikas, however, hold that there is in this way, many wills of God is logically cumbersome and so
denotative function in such words like nadi, vrddhi and so on the will of God is to be accepted as one in the form of a
in the form of the will of man. Therefore, according to the conjunct will (samuhalambanatmakeccha), viz. from the word
modems, denotative function is of the form of will only. It ‘jar’ the thingjar is to be understood and from the word ‘cloth’
should further be noted that, according to both schools, from the thing cloth is to be understood etc. In this way, the will of
the apabhramia words lik egargari which means jar, one gains God is one. But in that case by the relation of qualificandness,
verbal knowledge only by the erroneous knowledge of the will of God the qualifier of which is being-the-object-of-
denotative function.
knowledge-which-is-produced-by-the-word-‘jar’ is in cloth also
the will of God as explained above is denotative just as it is in jar [ghatapadajanyabodhavisayatvaprakarakeccha
function, then a difficulty arises; God’s will is one and the viksjatasambandhena yathd ghate vartate tat ha pate'pyasti).
same; and so the will of God in the form that ajar is to be Therefore, the thing cloth also would be that which is denoted
understood from the word ‘jar’, is in cloth also in the same way by the word ‘jar’; this is the difficulty.
as it is in jar. Therefore, cloth also could be denoted by the Such a difficulty may be set aside by pointing out that the
word ‘jar’. This difficulty and its answer form the main part of viksyaia is indicated byprakarata, i.e. qualificandness indicated
the discussion that follows. by the qualifiemess which resides in the-state-of-being-the-
First of all, the difficulty itself in more percise terms: The object-of-knowledge-produced-by-the-word ‘jar’ [ghatapada-
will of God in which the qualifier is being-the-object-of- janyabodhavisayatvanisthaprakdratdnirupitaviksyata).The-sta.te-
knowledge-which-is-produced-by-the-word-‘jar’ [ghatapada- of: ving-the-wil 1-of-G od by such a relation of qualificandness
janyabodhavisayatvaprakarakeccha) is the denotative function is the denotative function of the word ‘jar’ {ghatapadajanya-
of the word ‘jar’, and such a will exists only in God. Therefore bodhavisayatvanisthaprakaratanirupitaviksyatasambandhena
the denotative function of the word ‘jar’ will not be in the thing ikarecchavattvam ghatapadaiaktih), i.e. more precisely, the
jar. Hence, it must be said that by the relation of qualificandness denotative function of the wordghata is ghatapadajanyabodha-
(vtlesyatasambandhena) the will of God is injar. This just means visayatatvavachinnaprakaratanirupitaviksyatasambandhena
that the will of God is in the following form: From the word ‘jar’ ikarecchavattvam ghatapadaiaktih)9. Such a relation of
the thingjar must be understood (ghatapaddtghato boddhavyah, qualificandness is indicated by a specific qualifiemess (i.e.,
i^e. ghatapadajanyabodhavisayah ghato bhavatu). In the will of ghatapadajanyabodhavisayatvanisthaprakdratdnirupita). A quali¬
God so described, jar is qualificand and hence, in Nyaya ficandness specified in this way resides only in jar and not in
terms, it is said that the will of God is in jar by the relation of cloth. Therefore, by such a relation (i.e. the relation of
qualificandness. qualificandness indicated by qualifiemess residing in the-state-
Now the will of God cannot be many as if different of-being-the-object-of-knowledge which is produced by the
denotative functions of different words are different wills of word ‘jar’, ghatapadajanyabodhavisayatvanisthaprakdrataniru-
God. In that case the will of God would be in the form that pitaviksyatasambandhena),10 the will of God does not exist in
from the word ‘jar’ the thingjar is to be understood, from the cloth; hence cloth cannot be denoted by the word ‘jar’.
 130 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 131

But still another difficulty arises: From the word gahga qualifierness (prakarata) existing in the-state-of-being-the-object-
just as we get the meaning of flow of water so also we get the of-knowledge produced by the word gahga is determined by
meaning of bank. Hence, the-state-of-being-the-object-of- mere being-the-state-of-being-the-object (juddhavisayatatvena).
knowledge arising from the word gahga (gahgapadajanya- And it is not the case that it (i.e. the qualifierness existing in the-
bodhavisayatvam) resides both in the flow of water and in the state-of-being-the-object-of-knowledge produced by the word
bank. Therefore, in both, there is the will of God by the gahga) is determined by being-the-state-of-being-the-object-of-
relation of qualificandness indicated by the qualifierness knowledge-produced-by-the-word gahga (gahga-
existing in the-state-of-being-the-object-of-knowledge arising padajanyabodhavisayatbtvavacchinna). Since in the bank, there
from the word gahga (gahgapadajanyabodhavisaya- is no will of God by the relation of qualificandness indicated
tvanisthaprakbratbnirupitaviiesyatasarnbandhena livareccha by qualifierness determined by being-the-state-of-being-the-
yathapravahe tatha tire). Therefore, the will of God exists even object-of-knowledge produced by the word gahga, we cannot
in the bank by the relation of qualificandness indicated by have the knowledge of bank from the word gahga by its
qualifierness residing in the-state-of-being-the-object-of- denotative function. Hence, in order to have the knowledge
knowledge-produced-by-the-word gahga. Hence, even bank of the bank from the word gahga, acceptance of implication is
would also be known by the denotative function of the word necessary.
gahga and so there is no need of admitting implication as a
Notes
different form of significatory function.
The answer to this difficulty is the following: It is accepted Here the word ca in the expression according to Prabha means eva
and it should be connected with sambandhah which comes at the
that the denotative function of a word is the-state-of-having-
end of the sentence vrllika Saklilaksandnyatarasambandhah. (Cfr.
the-will-of-God by the relation of qualificandness indicated by Prabha, p.547, 1.5). In the translation we have followed this
the qualifierness which is determined by being-the-state-of- interpretation.
being-the-object-of-knowledge-produced-by-a-word (tatpada- 1 he apabhranrfa word gargari means pot (Cfr. S, p. 181,1.25).
In Sanksrit, verbal knowledge is expressed by different words like
janyabodhavisayatattvavacchinnaprakaratanirupitavtiesyata-
iabdabodha, anvayabodha or samsargabodha and vakydrlhabodha.
sambandhena ilvarecchdvattvam tatpadalaktih). Our normal
iabdabodha means knowledge arising from words, i.e. sentence.
experience, however, is that nobody asserts that from the anvayabodha or samsargabodha means knowledge of the relation of
wordga«gfl bank is to be understood by denotative function. the meanings of words, vakydrlhabodha means knowledge of the
Therefore, we do not accept the will of God in the form: Let meaning of a sentence. Meaning of a sentence is defined in three
bank be the object of knowledge produced by the word gahga, ways:-Relation of the meanings of words (padarthanam samsargah);
one principal meaning qualified by many subordinate meanings
but the will of God for producing the knowledge of bank is a
(ianekagunabhutapadarlhaviSistah ekah pradhanapadarlhah)-, or the
conjunct will [samuhdlambandtmakecchd) in the following connected state of meanings (padarthanam anvitavaslha). All these
form. Let the-state-of-being-the-object be connected with the three signify verbal knowledge, the process of which is as follows:
knowledge produced by the word gahga; and let the bank One comes to the knowledge of words, recollects their meanings by
have the-state-of-being-the-object [visayta gahgapadajanya- means of the knowledge of the significatory functions and arrives at
the knowledge of their relation. This whole process is being
bodhiya bhavatu; vi*ayatavat tiram bhavatu): Therefore the
accurately described here.
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 133
132

4. Here it may be noted that Ramarudra speaks of upamanopajivakatva Text 2A

as iabdanistha\ what he means is that upamdnopafwakatva is
Sabdajnananistha by svairayakaranatvarupaparampardsambandha.
-g. oLll^<ull^cl: I dMlIB-
This is clear from the statement of the argument to reject this opinion
where he explicitly asserts sddrfyajndndtmakopamdnajanyatvasya “i*lRt>TJf oMicHuftqtTFT-
sdksdtsambandhenawopamitausaUvdtupamiterapipadajndnarupatvena
iabdapramanarupatvdt, K.M.D.R.p.356, 11.22-23. [References to
K.M.D.R. are to Karikavati withMuktavah, Dinakari and Rdmarudn,
Edited by Atmaram Narayanjere, Varanasi, 1988.] It may further
be noted that Sastrakara-s speak of iabda as pramana, but the
^IrTSTcT: tteKW ^ST:” I
pramana is eitherjndyamdnah Sabdah according to the old Naiyayikas
or padajnanam according to the modem Naiyayikas.
5. In the case of the stanza composed by a man who keeps the vow of
silence, there is no actually uttered word, but only written word lipi
which is a symbol. From this the symbolized, i.e. the word, is known.
5 The objection mentioned and its answers are taken from Pariksit
I W I
Thampuran, Cfr. S.p.180, 11.12-13 and the foot note on that by wm ^ siRwtai; i
Manthitta Kunju Nambutiri.
7. yu strydkhyau nadiy Panini Sutra 1.4.3., i.e. word-forms ending in long
l and u being names of females which are always feminines are
called nadi; vrdhiradaic, Panini Sutra, 1.1.1 (a, ai and au are called
vrddhi). TO Ml I *4cqieJ-iq<3<4:
8. This explanation of Ramarudra does not seem to be satisfactory
since Prabhakaras do not accept denotative function as just will.
They accept denotative function (takli) as another category
(padarlhantara).
9. viiesane yad viiesanam lad viUsanatavaccedakam tadeva
prakaratdvacchedakam bhavati, prakrte ghatapadajanyabodhavisa-
cTSTWf WTF^t I Ml
yatvam viSesanam ghatapadajanyabodhavisayatvatvam (i.e. the same
asghatapadajanyabodhavisayatatvam). tatha ca ghat apadaj any abodha- | ^ ^ ^T-
visayatvanisthaprakarata ghatapadajanyabodhavisayatdtvavacchinnd

bhavati).
10. The subtle distinction with regard to the nature of the relation that
is referred to in the objection and in the answer should carefully be
noted: In the objection mere vifesyata is taken as the relation, in the
answer, however, nirupyanirupakabhdvdpannaviiesyala is considered
cl^un I ^
as relation.
Pi i
134 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 135

Translation places as tandulampacati, rice cooks), (rice) is not intended as

Means of Knowing Denotative Function a qualifier for the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action and so on
(there), in order to avoid that (the connection of number
Muktavah denoted by the verbal suffix with rice, the expression to be
The knowledge of denotative function is obtained from known by the word) ending in the nominative case (is used).
Grammar and so on, for learned men say: Knowledge of the Or else the meaning of the first part is not-being-the-qualifier-
denotative function is (obtained) from Grammar, from for-a-meaning-which-is-other-than-the-meaning-of-a-root.
Comparison, from Dictionary, from the Testimony of apt Therefore, in such expressions as ‘like Caitra Maitra goes’
persons, from Action brought about by usage, from the Rest (there is) the prevention of connection of number with Caitra
of the sentence, from Explanation and from the Proximity of and so on. In sentences such as ‘he cooks a little’, in order to
a well known word. avoid the (connection of number) with the meaning of the
The knowledge of the denotative functions of roots, words ‘a little’ etc. the second part is used. Because it is known
uninflected words, suffixes etc. is obtained from grammar. In by a word ending in the accusative case, (the connection with
some instances, where there is an opposing factor this is number) is avoided. Similarly there is no denotative function
rejected, as for instance, the Grammarians say that denotative in action also because of cumbersomeness. In such expressions
function of verbal suffix is in the agent. In sentences like ‘Caitra as the chariot goes’ and so on, (the verbal suffix has)
cooks’ and so on Caitra is related to the agent by the relation implication in action or in being-the-substratum. In such
of non-difference. This is rejected because it is cumbersome. expressions as ‘he knows’ and so on (the verbal suffix has) well-
But denotative function is accepted in effort because of established implication in the-state-of-being-the-substratum; in
simplicity and effort is cognized as a qualifier in Caitra and so such expressions as ‘it perishes’ and so on (the verbal suffix
on; nor can it be argued that since the agent is not expressed has) well-established implication in the-state-of-being-the
(by the verbal suffix) there should be the instrumental case counterpositive.
after the word ‘Caitra’ because the absence of an expression
to indicate the number of the agent is the cause of the use of Text 2B
the instrumental case. That thing which is to be known by the
word ending in the nominative case and which is not connected
with the-state-of-being-the-object (of action) and so on is
capable of having its number expressed (by the verbal suffix). | "2>fckq'*iicl: chmciiRc1i4: I *T
The expression ‘not-being-connected-with-the-state-of-being-
the-object (of action)’ and so on [karmatvadyanavaruddha)
*TTT: I
means that it is not intended as a qualifier for another
(meaning). Therefore, in a sentence such as ‘like Caitra Maitra
goes’ and so on there is no connection of the number ^ ^fqfcT—|
(expressed by the verbal suffix) with Caitra; where (i.e. in such
136 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 137

4ft «<°4Hfl44Kd -<d^l

?l^cqqi<eqi^+dddrt^u|)^|^ ^, flVjMi|«jW -srfct ^ TOTO^FT WTTTOTCtWTFTO %<J:

dWcdianq^cqi^ 'M^i*^qqht«j|uje4M I ^ 3iK^II^T ^HdH44lfe^M4^WJ ^l^«Hdld,

Ji^l *4M4-dk1 y^M^I^HRl: I ■g\oM|^4^Mcd<^IT«fi^Ndl^^^lMcdMf^H^,*jxddl^l-

*WM4^4^l^c4V444<»lft<^4
'dtfHIUddWcdWMKd 3^—^'4Vdl«flcM^R| | <FJT ?
‘T’^rq iRqqRkl Wwiq q.ac4 ^ MwnTlf^IcI?^ |
q^dld^te^ WITOTO^TO WTTOTOteTO ^?TO
^alwrowiifi ^ faqsii I 3ff^tWW^W ftdteidcdldj
RPHHdTftTg: | WdTO^q^TO-
^SWc,’ 3?^I * *^C^ ^ ^ ^Ffa
Ri^d^TT ’HN'ii'-qqqWqtq «i--qaiq^qq.cqiqs<qq>c^d
^H4<flq<FPFg TOT^ ■dMI'HIdl^l d+K«HM^
*nqvqPk*NH ^wei; wifc3h%c{
oqmrds^f ifcr Mw —jfkdifcft i ^Rroifc-
to ^*4\i^kH %^r
qferor fftcroi?*ftsrcT m: i
^KYqftcqqi^Kdiqqi^qiqtq ’’^fd'MMKdT Mw?T-
Tm'MdfKlH^H^l^lcH^i d-dlWdW *T Tc'dffe^ jft d^l^MId-

^^Jlcqiqi^d+Kitfi'-qR^dN't>4rqiql ^!?)6|u|cdld,^f 44M4lJ|Kd m—m I T^frTOScftcTO WTT^fWIRW

^ ^Vn-qq ffr <11^1 ftj)u|uk<Hl3ul <TTTOTff^W3W ^T%T: #■g WTWTc^fcT l4ll*HflHlBicqi6—^l^l'M^

RqRiocqiq^ I cTTTOf- %fctl cT5T°TT PiI WT: I d^lfdlta^
4^ WJMdWd: I Tjfc ? % cimt m eWP^TO^ «Hdld1c4KNK°mdWW4^
eRrfnpit ^ d^ddlcdd m-—<HKifoRl i3nf^n wf^r
•T^rw^D OKH^IMW ^m-Mdfd <11^1 m^mM- W Icq^: W: I I^T ^=f T^T ^T
ftmtqel "STT^qlfc) aicMtl?iidt’4 7THI'HM|RciJ>'°4^ ^ffc^ WelW^WTT^T: M
o
tWlfoili-irq fi^ukddl^M4%l^d|MjdTlc4dl^H^Mr4 ^^K^ldl^dl cTFIP^r ifcT d^d+4+HIW^^fcT-
*T Mm3 dlrH^f cTlc'pf^ | TOT ifcT %T: I Tsqct W& ^fcT-
? du§ci Hqalrqiql irf^ f^u|cd^p4R$)wkdl'«lf ^T^cT- ^cfiqi^wtdldlildddl
^ tTk44 TO d^rl ‘*tai-qqqKuuq *TO: | ^IW ^iwf#r cT^fer ^fcT
X^osi^| 3^ui ^rqiql ^!cq4tqi4i<?I^^M^«iKU||if I ftlf ^
I fcftTOTW tr>kh\u| ^Ff: | TO cFfcT: W ^c4KN^4M4!^-
%3NWl4^^M4d1y^!<^r49lcdlRc4^1fl f^R: I
 138 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 139

Translation of‘being-the-object-of-the-action-of-cooking with rice’, and so

Means of Knowing Denotative Function there is the absence of not-being-connected-with-the-state-of-
From Grammar (;vyakarandt): (e.g) the root bhu is used
being-the-object-of-action etc. In order to avoid (this fault) (the
in the sense ‘to be’, the tense-suffix lat is used in the sense of author) interprets the words being-the-object-of-action
present time. In such cases (we have the knowledge of the (karmatvadityasyeti) etc. And so the expression ‘being-the-
object-of-action’ and so on mean another thing; ‘being-not-
denotative function from grammar); this is the meaning.
connected’ means the-state-of-not-being-intended-as-qualifier.
Because of simplicity (laghavat): If the universal effortness is
taken as the determinant of denotedness there is simplicity; In fact, another (thing) is also not intended. Merely not-being-
this is the meaning. Nor can it be argued that since the the-qualifier is intended. (If it is stated that not-being-the-
object-of-intention-as-being-a-qualifier is not the cause of the
agent is not expressed (na ca karturanabhidhanaditi): The
connection with number (viksanatvena tatparyavisayatvam
instrumental case is enjoined in the meaning of the agent when
samkhydnvayaprayojakam mastu) but merely not-being-the-
the agent is not expressed (by the verbal suffix etc.) by the rule
that the instrumental case is employed to denote the agent or qualifier is the cause of connection with number
[aviksanatvamatram samkydnvayaprayojakam bhavatu), then
the instrument. (This rule is) under the governing rule ‘not
being expressed’. This is the idea. There (tatra): In the there would be the following fault): The-state-of-not-being-
instrumental case. The cause of (tantratvat): i.e. being the qualifier means being-bereft-of-qualifiemess. Even Caitra
cause of. In order to answer the question what is the cause of occurring in the sentence such as ‘like Caitra Maitra goes’ and
so on would get connected with number because Caitra and
the mention of the number of the agent, the (author) shows its
so on are devoid of qualifiemess before verbal cognition.
cause with the words the mention of number (samkhyd-
Since the verbal knowledge arising from the part of the
bhidhdneti). In such places as ‘Caitra cooks rice’ (i.e. caitrah
sentence in the form of similarity belonging to Caitra exists
pacah tandulah) in order to avoid connection of number with
already before (the verbal knowledge arising from the whole
rice and so on which are to be known by the word ending in
sentence), how can the-state-of-not-being-qualifler belong to
the nominative case which by implication signifies the meaning
Caitra? Such an objection should not be made. Where,
ofbeing-the-object-of-action etc., the expression not connected
according to the maxim of pigeons-in-a-threshing-floor, there
with the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action (karmatvddya-
is verbal knowledge arising (from the whole sentence), there
navaruddha) is used. Now it may be objected: Let the connection
is prior to it no knowledge of the part of the meaning of the
of number denoted by the verbal suffix in the singular number
sentence, viz. similarity belonging to Caitra. Therefore (i.e in
be with Caitra in such a sentence as ‘like Caitra Maitra goes’,
such sentences as ‘like Caitra Maitra goes’, before the verbal
because Caitra is not associated with being-the-object-of-an-
knowledge, there is no qualifiemess in Caitra and so in Caitra,
action etc. and also because Caitra is connected with the-state-
there could be connection with number; in order to avoid this
of-being-known by the word ending in nominative case.
fault) it is said not-being-the-state-of-being-object-of-intention-
Besides in such places as ‘cooked rice is being eaten’ and so
as-being-the-qualifier (viksanatvena tatparyavisayatvam). Nor
on there would be the inapplicability of the connection of
can it be argued that in such sentences as ‘Caitra alone cooks’,
number with rice and so on, because there is the connection
 T40 Nyaya Philosophy of Language U1
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda

‘Caitra sees Caitra’ and so on, Caitra is (respectively) the case’ etc. is used. This is the idea. This indicates the following
qualifier of another which is the meaning of the word eva and
also. In such sentences as ‘there is the sleeping of Caitra’
of the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action and so on (which is
(caitrena supyate), in order to avoid the connection of number
the meaning of the accusative case); hence, how can number
with sleeping etc. which is the meaning of the root, it is
be connected (with Caitra?). What is meant is that it (i.e. that
necessary to use the expression ‘being-known-by-the-word-
which is appropriate to have connection with number) should
ending-in-the-nominative-case’. In order to point out the
not be the object of intention as a mere qualifier. In the above
purpose of the second part in a different way, the meaning of
mentioned cases (‘Caitra alone cooks’, ‘Caitra sees Caitra’),
the first part is explained in another manner with the words or
Caitra is the object of intention as qualifier and as principal
else [yadva). There is the prevention of (the connection of
qualificand (i.e. Caitra is not intended merely as qualifier);
number with) Caitra and so on (Caitrader varanam iti):
hence it is proper that there could be connection with number
Because he [caitra) is qualifier of similarity; this is the idea.
in Caitra. If it is stated that in such sentences as ‘Maitra goes Because it is known by a word in the accusative case
like Caitra’, Caitra and so on are not the objects of intention [dvitiyantapadopasthapyatvad iti): This means because of the
as qualifier, then in Caitra also there could be the connection absence of being-known-by-a-word-ending-in-the-nominative-
with number. Nor can it be argued that for verbal knowledge, case. In this alternative, in such sentences as ‘Caitra alone
knowledge of the intention (of the speaker) is the cause and so cooks’ and so on how number is to be connected with Caitra
this is not the case (i.e. ‘Maitra goes like Caitra’; in this sentence is to be thought out by wise men. The following, however, is
Caitra is intended as a qualifier of similarity and so it is to be carefully noticed: In order to bring about the knowledge
not the case that Caitra is not intended as a qualifier of of the connection of number, the-state-of-being-known-by-the-
similarity; hence one cannot object that there is the possibility word-in-the-nominative-case is not the independent cause.
of connection of number with Caitra; this is the idea). Since The verbal suffix never brings about the knowledge of the
there is no proof that in verbal knowledge, in sentences connection of number without having effort also as its object
other than where a word has many meanings, the knowledge (i.e. the object of knowledge). Therefore, there is no possibility
of the intention of the speaker is the cause, the absence of connection with number in that which is not to be known
of the-state-of-being-qualifier means, the-state-of-not-being- by a word in the nominative case, because of the mere absence
known-by-the-respective-words which are ending in nominative of the cause in such a form of being known by a word in the
case and which are the cause of the-state-of-being-qualifier nominative case which is the cause of knowledge qualified by
alone. the-state-of-being-knowledge-of-connection-with-effort [bha-
Not intended as a qualifier [na viiesanatve tatpaiyam)
vananvayabodhatvam), which is the pervader of the-state-of-
means the intention is not in the-state-of-being-qualifier alone. being-knowledge-of-connection-with-number. Noris there the
And so in such sentences as ‘rice cooks’ and so on, if the absence of a clinching argument to establish one of the
intention is in the knowledge of rice as qualifier and as alternatives whether the-state-of-being-the-knowledge-of-
principal qualificand, in order to avoid the connection of connection-with-effort or the-state-of-being-the-knowledge-of-
number with rice, the expression ‘ending in the nominative connection-with-number is the determinant-of-being-produced-
by-the-aforesaid-state-of-being-known-by-th e-word-ending-in-
 142 Nyaya Philosophy of Language 143
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda
the-nominative-case. This is because there is no proof to show (i.e. the result-of-action, kriyajanyaphala); the connection of
that the-state-of-being-the-knowledge-of-connection-with- rice with that (the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action) is by the
number is the-determinant-of-being-produced, since it is relation of being-superstratum (adheyataya); (the connection)
established by experience that there could be knowledge of
ofthe-state-of-being-the-object-of-action (i.e. the result of action)
connection with effort even if connection with number is not
with the act of cooking is (by the relation of being-the-cause,
its object, and so it is necessary that the-state-of-being-knowledge-
janakatasambandhena); (the connection) of the act of cooking
of-connection-with-eflfortbe the determinant of being-produced.
with effort which is the meaning of the verbal suffix (is by the
Now the (author) criticizes the opinion of the Munamsakas
relation of being-the-cause, janakatasambandhena); (the
that the meaning of all the tense suffixes is action, with the
connection) of that (i.e. effort) with Caitra (is by the relation of
expression because of cumbersomeness {gauravaditi). Since,
being-substratum, alrayatasambandhena). In this way, the
in comparison with the universal effortness, the state-of-being-
verbal knowledge is that Caitra is the substratum of the effort
action which consists of the-state-of-being-produced and so
which causes the act of cooking the object of which is rice. In
on, is cumbersome; this is the idea. Now it may be objected
such a case as ‘rice is being cooked by Caitra’, the meaning
that the meaning of verbal suffix is not effort, since in such
of the instrumental case is effort; the connection of Caitra and
expressions as ‘chariot goes’ and so on although the effort is
so on with that (i.e. effort) is by the relation of being-
absent (in chariot), the verbal suffix is used and so (i.e. in order
superstratum (adheyata); the connection of that (i.e. effort)
to answer this objection, the author introduces (the text
with the act of cooking which is the meaning of the root (is by
beginning with the words) chariot [ratha iti). In the expression
the relation of being-produced, janyatasambandhena)\ the
‘chariot goes’ there is no knowledge of action causing going
connection of that (i.e. the act of cooking) with the result which
(i.e. uttaradeiasamyogah), but there is only the knowledge of
is the meaning of the suffix of the middle voice (atmanepada)
the-state-of-being-the-substratum-of-going (i.e. uttaradeia- (is by the relation of being-produced, janyatasambandhena);
samyoganukulavyaparairayah):Taking into account this opinion the connection of that (i.e. the result) with rice is by the relation
of the moderns, it is said, or in-being-the-substratum of being-substratum. Therefore, the verbal knowledge is in the
(airayatve). Implication [laksana] means implication based following way: Rice is the substratum of the result which is
upon accepted usage. In some places, this is the reading also. produced by the act of cooking which is produced by the effort
In such sentences as ‘the eye knows’ and so on since implication existing in Caitra. The meaning of krt suffix is agent and object
is accepted in the meaning of action or causality, in such of action. This is because in such instances as ‘Caitra is the
sentences as ‘knows’ and so on the verbal suffix does not have agent of cooking’, ‘rice is cooked’ and so on the verbal
necessarily implication in the meaning of the-state-of-being- knowledge of the relation of non-difference (i.e. of Caitra and
substratum and, therefore, to answer this objection the words the agent of cooking; of rice and what is cooked) is experienced
and so on (iadaviti) are used. With the words ‘and so on’
and because for verbal knowledge the knowledge of the
desires, makes effort, and so on are also included.
relation of difference (i.e. of relation other than non-difference)
In this context, the following should be understood. In
between the two meanings of two substantives there is no
such sentences as ‘Caitra cooks rice’ and so on, the meaning
expectancy. This is described at length in other places.
of the accusative case is the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action,
1 44 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 145

Commentary is gained from grammar. This is because grammar teaches us

Means of Knowing Denotative Function : Grammar that the rootpac means cooking (pakah); the krt suffix aka after
the root pac means the agent of cooking. It is to be noted here
First of all, M. quotes an early source and points out that that the knowledge of the denotative function of independent
there are eight means of knowing denotative function. They nouns in their uninflected state such as go (cow) and so on is
are Grammar, Comparison, Dictionary, Sentence uttered by gained from dictionary only.
an authoritative person, Action brought about by usage, the Ramarudra sees a difficulty in this explanation: It was
Remainder of a sentence, Explanation and Proximity of a well pointed out that the word ‘stem’ (prakrti) stands for the nouns
known word. These means are discussed by the texts. But the in their uninflected state (pratipadika); it was again pointed out
discussions centering around grammar as a means of cognizing that the word ‘etc.’ in the expression ‘roots, stem, suffixes etc.’
the denotative function are long and intricate. And it is to an stands for compounds which are also nouns in their uninflected
exact delineation of these discussions that we now turn our state (pratipadika).This is not right since ‘stem’ (prakrti) meant
attention. pratipadika in which compounds are also included. Therefore,
M. first of all explains that grammar is a means of Ramarudra interprets the expression ‘root, stem, suffixes etc.’
cognizing the denotative function in the sense that the denotative in another way: ‘root-stem’ (dhatuprakrti) means stem in the
function of roots, stems and suffixes and so on is known from
form of verbal root (dhaturupaprakrti). Hence, it is possible to
grammar. We know from grammar that the root bhu means ‘to
take the word ‘etc.’ in the expression ‘root-stem, suffixes etc.’
be’, the tense-suffix lot means present time and so on.
in the sense of compound and other pratipadika-s. In order to
Dinakara does not give much explanation of the text.
point out the difference between verbal roots and suffixes,
Ramarudra, on the contrary, goes into details: He first explains
verbal roots are stated as stems (prakrti).
the meaning of the expression ‘roots, stems, suffixes etc.’
A statement in grammar like vartamane lat (i.e. lat suffix
(dhatuprakrtipratyayadi) in the following way: ‘root’ (dhatu)
means present time) is the means of knowing the denotative
means verbal root ‘stem’ (prakrti) means the base, i.e. a noun
function of lat suffix. These rules are accepted by the Naiyayikas
in its uninflected state (pratipadika), ‘suffixes’ (pratyayah)
also. However, whenever there is an opposing factor, they are
mean cases of nouns (vibhakti), affixes forming nouns from
not accepted. As for instance, the Grammarians hold that the
other nouns (taddhita), verbal suffix (akhyata), affixes used to
denotative function of verbal suffix is in the agent; as for
form derivatives like nouns and adjectives etc. from roots (krt).
example, in the sentence Caitrah pacati (i.e. Caitra cooks).
The word ‘etc.’ in the expression ‘roots, stems, suffixes etc.’
Here the Grammarians assert that the verbal knowledge
means compounds (samasa), since the Grammarians accept
arising from the sentence is by means of the relation of non¬
denotative function also for compounds. The statements in
difference of Caitra with the agent, i.e. the verbal suffix ti
grammar, as for instance, the root bhu means ‘to be’ etc., help
means agent and Caitra is related to this agent by the relation
us to know the denotative function of roots. The knowledge
of non-difference. The Naiyayikas reject this on grounds of
of the denotative function of derivative nouns in their
cumbersomeness. They point out that the verbal suffix ti has
uninflected state (pratipadika) like the wordpacaka and so on
denotative function in effort (krti) because of simplicity and
 146 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 147
that effort is a qualifier of the meaning of the word ending in objects other than the universal and indivisible imposed
the nominative case. Dinakara explains the reason for this property (akhandopadhih) become objects of knowledge with
simplicity: The universal ‘effortness’ (krtitvajati) is the some distinctive property (jatyakhandopadhyatiriktanam
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning and this is kimcidrupenaiva bhanam iti niyamah). If an individual becomes
simpler than efforts which are many and which are such object of knowledge, the universal residing in it also becomes
determinants according to the Grammarians. the object of knowledge, but without any further distinctive
Ramarudra goes into the details of the reason why there characteristic in the universal itself becoming the object of
is simplicity. We must note here at the very beginning of this knowledge. As for example, when a cow is the object of
discussion that Dinakara and Ramarudra brilliantly summarize knowledge, cowness [gotvam) also becomes the object of that
the long-drawn out arguments between the Grammarians and knowledge by itself without any further characteristic, i.e.
the Naiyayikas on these points. Following those authors we cownessness (gotvatvam) also becoming the object. But a
shall now give an exact picture of these sophisticated universal designated as universal becomes object of knowledge
controversies. We have already mentioned that the basic only with some distinctive characteristic (jatyullikhitapratitau
position of the Naiyayikas is that the denotative function of jatih kimcidrupenaiva bhasate iti niyamah). As for instance,
verbal suffix is in effort (krti). The argument in support of this ‘cowness’ in the knowledge ‘there is cowness’ becomes object
view is as follows: If the denotative function of the verbal suffix of knowledge only with the characteristic of cownessness
is accepted in effort, then the universal effortness (krtitvajatih) (gotvatvam)} Therefore, effort (krti) which, according to the
would be the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted- Grammarians, is the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-
meaning (lakyatavacchedaka), and such a determinant is meaning can never become an object of knowledge without
simple in comparison with efforts which are taken as some distinctive characteristic, i.e. effortness (krtitva). But if, as
determinants by the Grammarians. The reason is that, the Naiyayikas assert, effortness is taken as the determinant of
according to them, the denotative function of verbal suffix is the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning, it can become the object
in the agent (karta), and an agent means one who has effort of knowledge by itself (svarupatah) and so there is simplicity.
(krtiman). Therefore, the determinant of the-state-of-being- In order to avoid this difficulty of cumbersomeness
denoted-meaning is the-state-of-having-effort (krtimattvam) (gauravam) in their position, the modem Grammarians hold
which meansjust effort (krtih) and efforts are many. Therefore, that the active and passive suffixes of verbs have their
there is the fault of logical complexity (gauravam). But if effort denotative function in mere substratum (of actions from
is taken as the denoted meaning of verbal suffix as the volitional effort up to bodily action (krtiparyanto vyaparah
Naiyayikas say, then effortness (krtitvam) would be the dhatvarthah) and of result respectively. We note that effort,
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning and, action and result are denoted by the roots themselves.2 The-
therefore, there would be no such fault since effortness is only state-of-being-substratum (aJrayatva) is an indivisible imposed
one and so simple.
property which can be an object of knowledge by itself without
Now Ramarudra explains in detail how effortness any further distinctive characteristic. And so there is no
{krtitvam) is simpler. The general rule of the Naiyayikas is that cumbersomeness (gauravam).
 148 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 149
Naiyayikas, however, point out that such an interpretation
(akhyatarthatdvacchedakam). And this is indeed simpler, for,
is against the Panini Sutra, lah karmanica bhave cakarmakebhyah
the-state-of-being-substratum cannot be taken as an indivisible
(3.4.69) . The full meaning of the sutra as given by Battoji
imposed property (akhandopadhi) because there is no argument
Diksita is as follows: lakarah sakarmakebhyah karmani karatri
to do so. Hence the-state-of-being-substratum is different
ca syuh akarmakebhyo bhave kartari ca, i.e. after the roots of
according to the different substratums because the-state-of-
transitive verbs the tense-suffixes [lakarah) are enjoined in the
being-substratum is the relation in the form of substratum
meaning of agent and object of action (i.e. substratum ofresult
[ddharatarupasya airayatvasya svarupasambandharupatvat). For
which is produced by action) and after the roots of intransitive
all these reasons the denotative function of verbal suffix is in
verbs the tense suffixes [lakarah) are enjoined in the meaning
effort [krti).
of bhava (i.e. dhatvartha, meaning of the root) and in the
Now the Grammarians raise an objection against this
meaning of the agent. Hence they [lakarah) do not have the
position of the Naiyayikas. Panini gives a rule (2.3.18) which
meaning of mere substratum [airaya). Nor should the word
enjoins that the instrumental case should be used to express
‘agent’ [karta] be interpreted as substratum [airaya) as such an
agent.4 This rule occurs under the governing rule anabhihite
interpretation would render useless another Panini Sutra viz.,
(2.3.1). So when the agent is not expressed by tin (verbal suffix)
svatantrah karta (1.4.54) according to which the agent is one
and so on, the instrumental case should be used to denote the
who is independent, and independence is defined as the-state-
agent. Now if in such places as Caitras tandulam pacati,
of-having-an-action-not-depending-on-the-actions-of-other- according to the Naiyayikas, the verbal suffix denotes only
karaka-s [karakantaraiyapdrdnadhinavydpdravattvam).There- effort, then ti does not denote agent and so the instrumental
fore, if the active verbal suffix denotes the meaning of agent, case-ending should be used after the word ‘Caitra’ to denote
then the-state-of-being agent is [kartrtva) which is defined as the agent. This is the objection.
independence [svatantryam). Such a determinant is indeed The answer of the Naiyayikas to this objection is as
very cumbersome as we have just explained. Similarly, the follows: The reason for using the instrumental case-ending
statement of the Grammarians3 that root denotes action as after the word ‘Caitra’ is that the verbal suffix does not denote
well as result and verbal suffixes denote substratum, is also the number of the agent. This means that in such places as
against the Panini Sutra lah karmani ca bhave ca akarmakebhyah Caitras tandulam pacati, the verbal suffix denotes the number,
(3.4.69) which was mentioned earlier. i.e. singular number of the agent, and so the instrumental case
Another difficulty against taking substratum [diray ah) as is not used after the word ‘Caitra’ in order to signify the agent.
the meaning of the verbal suffix is the following: Since Panini In such places as Caitras tandulam pacati the verbal suffix
took the meaning of verbal suffix as agent (i.e. one who has it denotes only the number of Caitra and not the number of
effort, krtiman), the modern Grammarians can take the iandula (rice). For this there must be some definite reason;
meaning of verbal suffix as substratum only by implication otherwise, in such places as Caitrena pacyate tandulah also,
[laksana). If this is so, then it would be easier to take effort [krti) there is the possibility of the verbal suffix denoting the number
as the implied meaning since effortness [krtitva) is the °f Caitra, and so the instrumental case cannot be used after the
determinant of the-state-of-being-the-meaning-of-verbal-suffix word ‘Caitra’, since, according to the Naiyayikas, only when
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 151
150 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
‘Maitra goes like Caitra’, since Caitra is not the qualifier of the-
the verbal suffix does not denote the number of the agent in
state-of-being-the-object-of-action and since he is only the
question can the instrumental case be used after it. Therefore,
the question arises what is the reason for the verbal suffix to qualifier of similarity which is the meaning of the word iva,
denote the number of the agent? M. shows the reason: That- there could be the connection of number which is the
which-is-not-connected-with-the-state-of-being-the-object (of meaning of the verbal suffix ti with Caitra. If we take the
action) etc.5 and that-which-is-to-be-known-by-the-word-ending- second meaning, then in such instances as ‘cooked rice is
eaten’ (pakvam annam bhuj'yate), since rice is connected with
in-the-nominative-case is capable of having its number
the-state-of-being-the-object-of-the-action-of-cooking, there
expressed by verbal suffix. Dinakara and Ramarudra give
could not be the connection of number which is the meaning
detailed explanation of the two qualifiers of the reason.
First of all, Dinakara explains why the expression ‘that- of the verbal suffix te with rice [anna). Therefore, the expression
which-is-not-connected-with-being-the-object (of action)’ karmatvadyanavaruddhatvam is defined in another way, viz.
not-being-the-object-of-intention-as-a-qualifier-for-another
[karmatvadyanavaruddha) is to be used. If this expression is not
used, then prathamantapadopasthapya alone would be the meaning [itaraviksanatvena tatparyavisayatvam).
Now the question is how can the expression karmatva¬
cause for the verbal suffix to denote number. In that case, in
dyanavaruddhatva be understood in the meaning of not-being-
such places as Caitrah pacati tandulah, the word tandula is in
the-object-of-intention-as-a-qualifier-for-another-meaning.
the nominative case which conveys the meaning of being-the-
Dinakara points out that such a meaning is obtained by taking
object-of-action by implication (laksanaya), and since tandula
the expression karmatvadi in the sense of another [itara) and
is in the nominative case, it is possible that the verbal suffix ti
by interpreting the expression anavaruddhatva in the sense of
may denote the number of tandula. When, however, it is
not-being-the-object-of-intention-as-a-qualifier. But there could
added that the verbal suffix can denote the number of only
that-which-is-not-connected-with-being-the-object-of-action, be an objection against this interpretation. If the expression
anavaruddhatva means not-being-the-object-of-intention-as-a-
then the verbal suffix ti cannot denote the number of tandula
qualifier, then the expression karmatvadi in the sense of
since it is connected with being-the-object-of-action (i.e. it is
another is useless because a qualifier is always for another.
karmatvadyavaruddha and not karmatvadyanavaruddha).
Therefore, it is pointed out that the whole expression
Now an objection can be raised against this position. The
karmatvadyanavaruddhatvam means not-being-intended-as-a-
expression karmatvady anavaruddhatva can be explained in
qualifier [viksanatvena tatparyavisayatvam).
two ways: First, not being a qualifier of the meaning of the
Now Dinakara introduces a couple of objections and
karakavibhakti like the accusative case etc. (dvitiyadikaraka•
answers on this point. In such places as Caitras tandulam
vibhaktyarthdviksanatvam). And karakavibhakti means a case
pacati, the number which is the meaning of the verbal suffix
of nouns which (i.e. case) denotes a karaka, and a karaka is the
is connected with Caitra. The reason for this is that Catira is
meaning of the case which (i.e. the meaning) brings about the
not the object of intention as qualifier for anything [viksanatvena
action which is the meaning of the root. Second, not-being-
related-to-the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action (karmatva■ tatparyavisayatvam) but it is enough to say that the reason is
Merely the-state-of-not-being-qualifier [aviksanatvamatram).
dyananvitatvam. If we take the first meaning, in such cases as
 152 153
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda

In the above mentioned place Caitra is the qualificand and so jcnowledge of the meaning of the whole sentence. This kind
he is not a qualifier for anything and, therefore, the connection of verbal knowledge is produced after the pattern of the
with number takes place with regard to Caitra. Therefore, the maxim of‘pigeons in the threshing floor’ (khalekapotanyayena).
reason for connection with number is simply the-absence-of- When the verbal knowledge arising from a whole sentence is
being-a-qualifier (aviksanatvam). But this cannot be admitted produced in this way, there is no prior verbal knowledge
because of the following reasons. arising from the part of the sentence in such sentences as ‘like
First of all, what is the-absence-of-being-a-qualifier? It is Caitra Maitra goes’. Therefore, Caitra has the absence of
!!!efate"0f'n0t'haVing'qualifierness' But qualifierness qualifierness. So it is possible for Caitra to have connection
(prakarata) is always associated with an instance of knowledge. with number. Hence the objection stands. Therefore, it is said
Verbal knowledge (idbdabodha) is an instance of knowledge that the cause of connection with number is not-being-
and so before the verbal knowledge from sentences such as intended-as-a-qualifier (viksanatvena tatparyavisayatvam).
like Caitra Maitra goes’ takes place, there is the absence of Hence, in such sentences as ‘like Caitra Maitra goes’, Caitra
qualifierness (prakarata) in Caitra. Therefore, there could be is intended by the speaker as a qualifier of similarity denoted
connection of number (which is the meaning of the verbal by the word iva (like), and so in Caitra there is no absence-of-
suffix ti) with Caitra. This objection is answered by pointing being-intended-as-qualifier. Hence it is not possible for Caitra
out thatin the sentence ‘like Caitra Maitragoes’, the qualifierness to have connection with number.
m Caitra is indicated by the qualificandness in similarity But now another objection arises: In such cases as Caitra
(sddriya) and the expression ‘like Caitra’ is a part of the same evapacati (Caitra alone cooks), Caitra is a qualifier of another
sentence. Now, it is impossible to have the verbal knowledge which is the meaning of eva. Therefore, in Caitra there is the
of the meaning of the whole sentence without having the absence of absence-of-being-intended-as-qualifier. Hence, in
knowledge of the meaning of the part of the sentence prior to Caitra there could not be connection with number, but
So how can there be the-absence-of-qualifiemess in Caitra? actually there is connection with number. This is the objection.6
Therefore, it is impossible to have the connection of number This could be answered by pointing out that karmatvadyana-
with Caitra.
varuddhatva means not-being-intended-as-being-a-qualifier-to-
This argument cannot be admitted. In the Nyaya system, anything-other-than-the-meaning-of-mz (another) and so Caitra
there are two opinions about how verbal knowledge from could have connection with number.7
sentences arises: According to one, the prior verbal knowledge But then another difficulty arises: In such cases as ‘Caitra
arising from the partial sentence is the cause of the verbal sees Caitra’, Caitra is intended as a qualifier to the-state-of-
knowledge arising from the whole sentence; it is according to being-the-object-of-action and such a state is different from the
this opinion that the objection is raised. But the other opinion meaning of eva. Hence, there could not be any connection
at t ere is no need of the verbal knowledge arising from with number of Caitra. This is the objection. The answer to this
the part of the sentence for the verbal knowledge arising from is as follows: In order that Caitra in the example given can
the whole sentence; the recollection of the meanings of all the have connection with number, it is enough that Caitra is not
wor s of the sentence simultaneously brings about the verbal intended as a mere qualifier, because it is now asserted that the
 7 54 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 155

cause of connection with number is not-being-intended-as-a- Caitra Maitra goes’, the word ‘Caitra’ ending in the nominative
mere-qualifier {viksanatvamatrena tatparyavisayatvam). case brings about the knowledge of the mere state-of-being-
Now Ramarudra clarifies what exactly is meant by not- qualifier for Caitra with reference to similarity which is the
being-intended-as-a-mere-qualifier. What brings about the meaning of iva. Therefore, there is no connection of number
connection with number is the absence of the-state-of-being- with Caitra. In such places as ‘Caitra alone cooks’, Caitra is
intended as the qualifier while not-being-intended-as-the- both the principal qualificand and at the same time a qualifier
principal-qualificand. In the above mentioned instances of of another which is the meaning of eva. And so since Caitra is
‘Caitra alone cooks’, ‘Caitra sees Caitra’, although the subject not merely a qualifier, there is no difficulty in having the
Caitra is a qualifier of the meaning of eva (another) in the connection of number with Caitra.
former, and a qualifier in the meaning of being-the-object-of- Now an objection may be raised as follows: In such
action in the latter, still in both instances the subject Caitra is instances as ‘like Caitra Maitra goes’, before the verbal
intended also as the principal qualificand and so there is no knowledge there is the recollection of Caitra by means of the
difficulty in having the connection of number with Caitra. word ‘Caitra’. In that knowledge in the form of recollection,
But another objection may be raised against the statement Caitra is the object of knowledge as principal qualificand, and
that what brings about connection with number is not-being- so it is not a mere qualifier. Hence, there could be connection
intended-as-a-qualifier. According to the Purvapaksin, of number with Caitra. The answer to this objection is the-
knowledge of intention cannot be said to be a cause of verbal state-of-being-mere-qualifier as understood here is with
knowledge in general. Where words with many meanings like reference to the verbal knowledge (iabdabodhanirupitaviksa■
saindhava (salt, horse) are used, sometimes the word is natvamatram) and not with reference to recollection. In verbal
understood in the sense of horse, sometimes in the sense of knowledge Caitra is only qualifier and not qualificand.
salt. We can assert that the knowledge of intention is a cause Therefore, there is no connection of number with Caitra.
of verbal knowledge only in such places where words have It has been stated that the cause of connection with
many meanings. When words have only one meaning, number is the-state-of-not-being-denoted-by-the-respective-
knowledge of intention cannot be said to be a cause of verbal words which are ending in the nominative case and the
knowledge. Therefore, in such instances as ‘like Caitra Maitra instances of the knowledge ofwhich bring about the knowledge
goes’, the words have only one meaning and, therefore, here of the-state-of-being-mere-qualifier. Now the purpose of the
knowledge of intention is not a cause of verbal knowledge. words ‘ending in the nominative case’, which are mentioned
Hence Caitra is not intended as a qualifier. So there could be above in the explanation of the-state-of-not-being-a-qualifier
connection of number with Caitra. [aviksanatvam), is being discussed. In such sentences as
The answer to this is as follows: The-absence-of-the-state- ‘Caitra sees Caitra’ (i.e. himself), the word ‘Caitra’ used in
of-being-qualifier means the-state-of-not-being-denoted-by-the- second place is in the accusative case. Hence, Caitra denoted
respective-words which are ending in the nominative case and by the word ending in the accusative case is only a qualifier to
instances of knowledge of which bring about the knowledge the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action (karmatva). Now this
of the-state-of-being-mere-qualifier. In such cases as ‘like Caitra is the same as the Caitra denoted by the word ‘Caitra’
 156
Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 157
ending in the nominative case which was mentioned in the first
nisthaprakarata and prathamantarthanisthaviksjata) which
place. Therefore, it would be impossible to have connection
are brought about by both (i.e. that particular word ending in
of number with Caitra. But when the words ending-in-the-
the nominative case and the tense suffix) mutually indicate.
nominative-case are added, this difficulty is avoided since
Thus for example by a sentence like Caitrah pacati is
Caitra is denoted by the word ‘Caitra’ in the second place,
produced the verbal knowledge in which the-states-of-being-
as ending in the accusative case and not in the nominative'
case. object (i.e. dkhydtdrthanisthaprakdrata and prathamantacaitra-
paddrthanisthaviksyata) mutually indicate. And this word
But then another difficulty arises: In such instances as
‘Caitra’ ending in the nominative case is also not
caitrah pacati, caitra tva maitrah sundarah (Caitra cooks; like
viksanatamatraprayojaka. Therefore, there is no difficulty in
Caitra Maitra is handsome) when there is a conjunct verbal
having the connection of number with Caitra. In the instance
knowledge (samuhalambana) brought about by these two
of the conjunct knowledge mentioned above, such a verbal
sentences, then there could not be the connection of number
knowledge is not produced by the verbal suffix ti in the
which is the meaning of the tense-suffix ti in the sentence
sentence Caitrah pacati and by the word ‘Caitra’ ending in the
Caitrah pacati, with Caitra. This is because there is the
nominative case occurring in the sentence Caitra iva Maitrah
knowledge of Caitra brought about by the word ‘Caitra’ in the
sundarah. Therefore, although in Caitra there is the-state-of-
sentence Caitra iva maitrah sundarah which is ending in the
being-object-of-knowledge brought about by the word ‘Caitra’
nominative case and which is the cause of the knowledge of
ending in the nominative case which is the cause of the
the-state-of-being-mere-qualifier. And since the Caitra knowledge of being mere qualifier and which occurs in a
mentioned in both sentences is the same, there is the absence
different sentence, still there is no harm in having connection
of the absence of the-state-of-being-denoted by the word of number with Caitra in the instance Caitrah pacati, Caitra iva
ending in the nominative case and which is the cause of the Maitrah sundarah.
knowledge of the-state-of-being-mere-qualifier (samkhydn- We have stated already that the cause of connection with
vayamyamakasya viksanatvamdtraprayojakaprathamdnu- number is karmatvadyanavaruddhatva andprathamantapadopa-
pasih apyatvasyabhavat).
sthapyatva. So far all the discussions centered on the first part
The answer to this objection is as follows: The cause of
of the expression describing the cause for connection with
connection of number (which is the meaning of the verbal
number, viz. karmatvadyanavaruddhatva. Now the purpose of
It o I " ?bsenCeof the'state_of-being-the-object-of- the second part of the expression describing the cause for
knowledge brought about by that particular word ending in
connection with number, viz. being-known-by-the-word-ending-
ie nominative case which (i.e. that particular word) is the
in-the-nominative-case is being discussed.
Thewn’ ‘he,knowied*e °f Ihe-state-of-being-mere-qualilier. M. starts the discussion pointing out that in some instances
as Ihs, rdendl"S'n the nominative case:should be understood
1 ha. particular word ending in the nominative case by
as tandulam pacati, i.e. rice cooks, when the speaker does not
intend rice as a qualifier of the-state-of-being-the-object-of-
knowlede-W 'he tense'sufflx * produced the verbal action, then rice is not the object of intention as qualifier of
knowledge in which the-states-of-being-object (i.e. akhyatarlha- another. Hence, tandula could have connection of number. In
 158
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 159

order to avoid such a possibility in mentioning the cause of producing the act of cooking the object of which is rice), then
connection with number, being-known-by-the-word-ending- it would be acceptable that there should be connection of
in-the-nominative-case is also added. In the present case, the number with rice. Accordingly the expression ‘being-known-
word tandula is used in the accusative case and so in tandula by-the-word-in-the-nominative-case’ as a part of the description
there is the absence of being denoted by the word ending in of the cause of connection with number would be useless in
the nominative case, therefore, there is no possibility of
such places as tandulam pacati, rice cooks; and so another
tandula having connection with number.
place where such an expression (i.e. prathamantapadopastha-
Now Dinakara points out a possible objection to this pyatvam) would be needed, in order to avoid connection with
answer: When in the above-mentioned place of tandulam
number, is pointed out by Dinakara.
pacati, rice cooks, if tandula is not intended as a qualifier for In such places as ‘there is sleeping of Caitra’ which is the
the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action, then the word tandula verbal knowledge arising from the sentence Caitrena supyate
cannot be put in the accusative case. This is because of the in the impersonal voice (bhave prayogah) the real meaning of
Panini Sutra, karmant dvitiya (2.3.2.), i.e. the accusative case is the suffix te is the meaning of the root, i.e. sleeping (Cfr. Panini
enjoined only when the meaning of the stem is intended as a Sutra, lah karmani ca bhave cakarmakebhyah,3A.69). Actually,
qualifier for the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action. sleeping which is the meaning of the root is conveyed by the
Dinakara answers this objection by pointing out that the root itself; therefore, the suffix te is used in order that the
M. words, not-intended-as-a-qualifier’ mean ‘not-intended-as- sentence may be correct, i.e. in Sanskrit the root itself is never
mere-qualifier’ (na viksanatvamatre tatparyam). Here tandulah used alone, but only with an appropriate suffix. Therefore, the
is intended as qualifier and as principal qualificand in the meaning of the root which here is sleeping has the cause of
following way: Rice is having action producing the act of connection with number, viz. not-intended-as-qualifier-of-
cooking the object of which is rice [tandulakarmakapa- another (itaraviksanatvena tatparyavisayatvam). Therefore,
kanukulavyaparavams tandulah). Thus there could be
sleeping could have connection with number. In order to
connection with number here since ‘not-intended-as-a-qualifier- avoid this fault the expression ‘that-which-is-to-be-known-by-
for-another-(meaning)’ is explained as meaning not-intended- the-word-ending-in-the-nominative-case’ [prathamantapado-
as-mere-qualifier. In order to avoid this fault the expression
pasthapyatvam) is also added to the description of the cause of
‘being-known-by-the-word-ending-in-the-nominative-case’ is connection with number. And when this is done sleeping will
added to the cause of connection with number. In the present not have connection with number since it is not denoted by a
instance tandulam pacati, since rice is denoted by the word
word ending in the nominative case but by the root svap.
tandula ending in the accusative case, it is not denoted by the
Now the meaning of the first part of the description of the
word tandula in the nominative case. Hence tandula cannot
cause of the connection with number is given in another way
have connection with number.
in order to explain the purpose of the second part in a different
( ^ someone says that in such places as tandulam pacati manner. Thus the meaning of the first part is said to be not-
rice cooks’ when there is intention of having the above being-the-qualifier-for-a-meaning-which-is-other-than-the-
mentioned verbal knowledge, (i.e. rice is having action meaning-of-the-root’. Therefore, there is no connection of
 7 60 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 767

number with Caitra in such sentences as Caitra iva Maitro there is no difficulty to have the connection of number with
gacchati since Caitra is a qualifier for similarity which is the Caitra.
meaning of iva and which is other than the meaning of the Now the opinion of the author of Didhiti is being
root. The second part, viz. ‘that-which-is-to-be-known-by-the- proposed and discussed. Actually, what follows is a summary
word-in-the-nominative-case’ is added in the description of of Raghunatha Siromani’s AkhyataJaktivada.10 And the
cause for connection with number in order to avoid the discussion is about what exactly is the effect which is brought
connection of number with the meaning of stokam in such about by that which is known by the word in the nominative
instances as stokam pacati ‘he cooks a little’.8 The reason for case. The-state-of-being-denoted-by-the-word-in-the-nomina-
this is that the adverbial meaning is denoted by a word not in tive-case is not independently or directly the cause of bringing
the nominative case, viz. stokam, a little. It should here be about the knowledge of connection with number. This is
noted that, according to the Vaiyakaranas, adverbs have because the tense-suffix invariably brings about the knowledge
accusative case endings and neuter gender.9 of connection with bhavana, i.e. the-state-of-being-agent or the-
If this is the meaning of the first part of the description of state-of-being-the-object-of-action; but not invariably the
the cause of connection with number (i.e. if karmatvadyana- knowledge of connection with number, because the tense-
varuddhatvam means dhatvarthatiriktdviiesanatvam), then in suffix does not bring about the knowledge of connection with
such sentences as ‘Caitra alone cooks’, Caitra evapacati, there number, without having at the same time bhavana also as its
would be no connection of number with Caitra, because object.11
Caitra is a qualifier of another which is the meaning of‘alone’ Or, in other words, the-state-of-being-knowledge-of-
[eva), and so in Caitra,. there is the absence of not being a connection-with-the-state-of-being-an-agent or the-state-of-
qualifier of a meaning which is other than the meaning of the being-knowledge-of-connection-with-the-state-of-being-an-
root. object-of-action [bhavananvayabodhatvam) is the pervader and
In order to avoid this difficulty, the meaning of ‘not- the-state-of-being-knowledge-of-connection-with-number
being-the-qualifier-for-a-meaning-which-is-other-than-the- (samkhyanvayabodhatvam) is the pervaded. So the cause of the
meaning-of-the-root’ is described as not being intended as knowledge of connection with the-state-of-being-an-agent or
mere qualifier for a meaning which is other than the meaning the-state-of-being-an-object-of-action is the-state-of-being-
of the root (dhatvarthatiriktavUesanatvamatrena tatparya- denoted-by-the-word-in-the-nominative-case. Therefore,
visayatvam). Here, however, Caitra is not intended as a mere because of the absence of the-state-of-being-denoted-by-the-
qualifier of another which is the meaning of eva, but also word-in-the-nominative-case which is the cause of the
intended as the principal qualificand of the meaning of the knowledge of connection with bhavana (i.e. the-state-of-being-
tense-suffix. More technically this could be expressed as agent or the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action), there cannot
follows: That which is not intended as the principal qualificand, be the connection of number with something which is not
while at the same time intended as a qualifier of something denoted by the word in the nominative case.
which is other than the meaning of the root, the absence of this Someone may object here that there is no argument to
is what brings about the connection with number. Therefore, establish whether the knowledge of connection with number
 164 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 165
therefore, vyapara is the movement of the chariot. Such a
movement which brings about connection with a place which
vyapara is defined as tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanaka.
is further [uttaradelasamyoganukulakriyanukulavyaparavan
Similarly in the sentence Caitras tandulampacati, Catira
cooks rice, that which is denoted by that (tad) is Caitrah; and rathah)
that which is produced by that (tajjanya, i.e. Caitrajanya) is But the modem Naiyayikas, however, hold that the
action [vyapara) and the second tajjanya (Caitrajanya) is verbal knowledge from the sentence ‘the chariot goes’ is as
cooking (paka). If such an action is taken as the meaning follows: The chariot is the substratum of the action which
brings about connection with a place which is further
denoted by the tense-suffix, the-state-of-being-action
[uttaradeSasmyoganukulakriyaSrayah). Therefore, the modems
[vyaparatvam) is the determinant of the-being-denoted
say that the meaning of the verbal suffix in such places ^s
(.iakyatavacchedakam); if effort is the meaning of the tense-
‘chariot goes’ is ‘being-substratum’ [alrayatvam) by implication
suffix, then the-state-of-being-eflfort [krtitvam) is the determinant
and not action [vyapara] as the old Naiyayikas hold.
of the-state-of-being-denoted (takyatavacche-dakam). Of these
In such instances as ‘Caitra knows’ the tense-suffix means
two, the latter is simple in comparison with the former which
the-state-of-being-substratum’ [airayatvam] (of knowledge) by
is cumbersome because it has to be defined as tajjanyatve sati
implication, because the Naiyayikas do not admit that
tajjanyajanakatvam.
knowledge is produced by effort and so the verbal suffix in this
So the difference between the Mlmamsa position and the
instance cannot mean effort by denotative function. But an
Nyaya position is that according to the former the tense-suffix
objection to this position may be raised as follows: In such
means action by denotative function; according to the latter it
instances as ‘knows’ (janati) one cannot say that invariably the
means action by implication; i.e. according to the Naiyayikas,
tense-suffix means ‘being-substratum’ by implication, because
the tense-suffix means by denotative function effort and
in such sentences as caksurjanati, the eye knows, the eye is not
wherever such meaning cannot be accepted because of
the substratum of knowledge. Therefore, the tense-suffix here
contradiction, as in the present case of ‘chariot goes’ (where
means ‘action’ [vyapara) or ‘being-the-cause’ (janakatva) by
chariot being insentient one cannot predicate of it effort), the
implication, i.e. eye has action that produces knowledge or the
tense-suffix is taken as meaning action by implication. It
eye is the cause of knowledge.
should, however, be noted that this is the opinion of the old
The answer to this objection is that by the word ‘etc’. (adi)
Naiyayikas.
in the M. expression ‘knows etc.’ [janatityadau) one takes also
This is to be explained as follows: The stem gam means
desires, endeavors [icchati,yatate). Here the tense-suffix means
action, i.e. that which brings about connection with a place
invariably the-state-of-being-substratum because there is no
that is further. The tense-suffix means action in the form of the-
effort to produce desire or endeavour. Thus the verbal
state-of-having-connection of a rope which is tied to the horses
knowledge in such sentences as Caitra icchati or Caitroyatate,
and so on which brings about the action which is the meaning
is that Caitra is the ‘substratum of desire or effort’ [icchatrayah
of the root gam. Thus according to the old Naiyayikas, the full
0r krtyaSrayah) since ‘to desire’ and ‘to endeavour’ can be used
verbal knowledge of the sentence ‘the chariot goes’ is as
only with sentient beings. Therefore, in such sentences as
follows: Chariot is having action which brings about
Kchati andyatate implication is necessarily to be accepted in
•he-state-of-being-substratum.
 166 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 167
In such instances as ‘it perishes’ (naiyati) the tense-suffix
means the-state-of-being-counterpositive by means of well the-state-of-being-superstratum (adheyatvam); rice is connected
established implication (nirudhalaksana). Here, it may be with the-state-of-being-superstratum by the relation of‘being-
asked why the-state-of-being-substratum is not considered as indicated’ (nirupitatvam); the-state-of-being-superstratum is
the meaning by implication? The answer is that after destruction, connected with the result by the relation of being-substratum
the thing itself does not exist and, therefore, the thing cannot (i e., akayata). Resultis connected with the action (of cooking,
be the substratum of destruction. Hence, the verbal knowledge i.e. vyapara) by the relation of being-producer (janakata). This
of the sentence ‘pot perishes’ is pot is the counter-positive of vyapara is connected with effort which is the meaning of the
destruction [ghaio naiapratiyogi). tense-suffix ti by the relation of being-producer {janakata).
Now the actual form of verbal knowledge from some This effort is connected with Caitra by the relation of being-
sentences is being described. As for instance, what is ‘the substratum (akayata). Hence me full form of the verbal
verbal knowledge from the sentence Caitras tandulam pacati, knowledge is that Caitra has effort which produces the action
Caitra cooks rice? The meaning of the accusative case is the- which is the substratum of the-state-of-being-superstratum
state-of-being-the-object-of-action (karmatvam). This means which is indicated by rice (tandulanirupitadheyatakaya-
the result (produced by action); mere action is root meaning. phalajanakavyaparajanakakrtimamtcaitrah).13
Rice is connected with this result which is the meaning of the In such sentences as ‘the rice is being cooked by Caitra’
accusative case by the relation of being-superstratum:12 This (Caitrenapacyate tandulah), the verbal knowledge is as follows:
just means that the result of the action of the cooking of rice, The instrumental case after the word ‘Caitra’ means agency
i.e. softness of rice (viklitti), resides in rice. The result is related (kartrtvam); agency is the-state-of-having-effort (krtimattvam),
to cooking which is the meaning of the root pac by the relation i.e. effort; so Caitra is related to effort by the relation of being-
of causality. This cooking is related to effort which is the superstratum.14 Thus we arrive at the meaning, the effort of
meaning of the tense-suffix by the relation of causality. This Caitra, i.e. Caitranisthakrtih; this is related to the act of cooking
effort is related to Caitra by the relation of being-substratum. by the relation of ‘being-produced’ (janyatasambandhena)
Hence the full form of the verbal knowledge is as follows: since cooking is the result of the effort. This cooking is
Caitra has the effort which produces the action of cooking connected with the result (i.e. the softness of the rice, vtklittih)
which produces the result in the form of the softness which which is the meaning of the suffix of middle voice (i.e. te) by
resides in rice (tandulanisthaviklittirupaphalajanakapa- the relation of‘being-produced’ (janyata) since the softness of
kakriyanukulakrtimamkaitrah). This is according to the old rice is caused by cooking. This result, i.e. the softness of rice,
school of Naiyayikas. is connected with rice by the relation of being-substratum.15
According to the modem Naiyayikas, however, the Hence the full form of the verbal knowledge of the sentence
verbal knowledge arising from the sentence Caitrastandulam Caitrena pacyate tandulah, ‘rice is being cooked by Caitra’, is
pacati is as follows: The meaning of the root pac is result and as follows: The rice is the substratum of the result (i.e.
action [phala and vyapara, i.e. viklitti and pakakriya); the softness of rice) which is produced by the cooking which is
meaning of the accusative case in the expression tandulam is produced by die effort which is in Caitra (Caitravrttikrti•
janyapakajanyaphalairayah tandulah).
 168 Nyaya Philosophy of Language 169
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda
Now the meanings of the krt suffixes is being discussed; superstratum (adheyata). Therefore, the verbal knowledge of
it is said that the denotative function of krt suffixes is in the connection of meanings of two substantives by the relation
agent or in the object of action (i.e. karma, i.e. kriyajanya- other than non-difference is not admitted, because when the
phalairayah). The reason for this is that in such instances as
meanings of two substantives having the same case are
Caitrah pakta, ‘Caitra is the agent of cooking’, Caitra and the
connected by a relation other than non-difference, there is no
agent of cooking are related by the relation of non-difference. expectancy (akahksa) which is the cause of the verbal
Similarly also in the sentence tandulah pakvah, rice and what knowledge. In the present example bhutalam ghatah (floor
is cooked are related by the relation of non-difference. Thus pot) there is no expectancy which would bring about the
that which is signified by the substantive ending in krt suffix verbal knowledge that pot is on the floor. In order to have such
(i.e. pakta or pakva) and the meaning denoted by the other a verbal knowledge, there should be the locative case after the
substantive are respectively experienced as identical. Therefore
word bhutala.
krt suffixes have denotative function in the agent or the object A further objection to this position may be raised. There
of action. is the word ‘Caitra’ after the word pakta; the knowledge of
But an objection against this position may be raised as these words in this order is the cause of the verbal knowledge
follows: Caitra and the agent of cooking and rice and what is in the form that Caitra is connected with agency of cooking by
cooked need not be related by the relation of non-difference; a relation other than non-difference, i.e. by the relation of the-
krt suffix can have denotative function in agency (kartrtva) or state-of-being-substratum [airayat a). Similarly, there is the
the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action (karmatva). These could word tandula after the word pakva, the knowledge of these
be related to the meanings of the respective other substantives words in this order is the cause of the verbal knowledge in the
by a relation other than non-difference, i.e. by the relation of form that rice is connected with the-state-of-being-the-object-
‘being-substratum’ (airayata). According to this explanation, of-action karmatva, i.e. result of cooking (i.e., phala, here
the verbal knowledge of such sentences as Caitrah pakta and viklittih, softness of rice), by a relation other than non-
tandulah pakvah is respectively Caitra is the substratum difference, i.e. by the relation of the-state-of-being-substratum
of the agency of cooking (pdkakartrtvairayah Caitrah) and rice (dir ay at a). This kind of particular instance of expectancy is the
is the substratum of the-state-of-being-the-object-of-cooking cause of the verbal knowledge of the connection of the
(pakakarmatvairayah tandulah). Therefore, the meaning of meanings of two substantives by a relation other than non¬
the krt suffix is the-state-of-being-agent (kartrtvam) or the-state- difference. In the expression bhutalam ghatah (floor pot) there
of-being-the-object-of-action (karmatvam). is no such expectancy and, therefore, there is no verbal
The answer to this objection is as follows: If the connection knowledge of connection of the meanings of the two
of the meanings of two substantives by a relation other than substantives by a relation other than non-difference, i.e. the jar
non-difference is admitted, then from the words ‘floor pot’ is on the floor. Therefore, the krt suffix has denotative function
(bhutalam ghatah) there could be the verbal knowledge that in agency (kartrtva) and the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action
pot is on the floor. This is because floor can be connected with (karmatva). Such is the objection.
pot by the relation of difference, i.e. the-state-of-being- The answer to this objection is that if we accept the
170 Nyaya Philosophy of Language TeXt, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 777

causality of verbal knowledge in the above mentioned manner, 6 Here Ramarudra goes into a very interesting discussion of the
meaning of evay which could be summarized as follows: The
then we will have to take countless number of words ending
meaning of eva (alone) is threefold: Absence of relation with another
in krt suffixes and words following them and then attribute (anyayogavyavacchedah), absence of non-relation (ayogavyavacchedah)
causality to them for bringing about verbal knowledge of the and absence of absolute non-relation (atyantayogavyavacchedah).
meanings of two substantives by a relation other than non¬ Absence of relation with another is the meaning of eva when it is
difference. Therefore, the Naiyayikas hold that expectancy is associated with the word which denotes the qualificand (viiesjasa-
mgataivakarasya anyayogavyavacchedo arthah). As for instance, in
the cause only for the verbal knowledge of connections of
such sentences as ‘Caitra alone cooks’ [Caitra eva pacati) the relation
meanings of substantive and suffix by a relation other than of the agency-of-cooking [pdkakartrtva) with persons other than
non-difference and not for the verbal knowledge of the Caitra is denied. Now an objection could be raised: Relation is a
connection of meanings of two substantives by a relation other universal positive (kevalanvayi) and so absence of relation is
than non-difference. Thus since in our experience the unestablished. Hence the denotative function of the word eva
knowledge of connection of the meanings of two substantives cannot be cognized in absence of relation. Therefore, the denotative
function of the word eva is cognized separately in another (anyasmin),
is by the relation of non-difference, Naiyayikas hold the view
in relation {yoga) and in absence (vyavaccheda). Thus the word eva
that krt suffixes have denotative function in agent and object has three separate denotative functions. The meaning ‘another’
of action.16 becomes object of knowledge as qualificand of Caitra. This is the
meaning of Caitranya, i.e. a person other than Caitra. The connection
Notes of effort which (i.e. effort) is the meaning of the verbal suffix ti with
relation which is one of the meanings of eva is by means of its (i.e.
of relation) being-an-adjunct (pratiyogitaya, i.e., =nirupakataya). The
1. Cfr. The discussion on R. (K.M.D.R. p. 376, 11. 29-30).
connection of such a relation with absence which is one of the
NirdharmitavacchedakaviSistabudher badhabuddhyapratibadhyalaya.
meanings of the word eva is by means of its being a counterpositive.
2. The point of the modem Grammarians is this: In the example
This absence is related to ‘another’ (i.e., the person other than
Caitras tandulam pacati, the active verbal suffix ti denotes directly
Caitra) which is one of the meanings of eva as a qualifier
the substratum of effort and action. But the volitional effort (krti) and
(vitesanavidhaya). Thus the whole form of the verbal knowledge is
bodily actions [vyapara) are denoted by the root itself, viz.pac. In the
in the following form: Caitra has the effort which brings about the
example Caitrena pacyate tandulah the verbal suffix te also means
cooking; any person other than Caitra has the absence of the relation
mere substratum (of result). The final result of the act of the cooking,
of effort which brings about cooking (Caitrah pdkdnukulakrlimdn,
viz. softness of rice (viklilti) itself is denoted by the root pac.
Caitranyah pakanukulakrtyabhavavan).
3. Phalavydpdrayor dhalur diraye tu tihah srmidhy Cfr. Vaiyakarana-
The meaning of eva associated with a word which denotes the
bhusanasara, section on dhatvarthanirnayah, Karika, No.2.
qualifier is absence of non-relation (vitesanasarngataivakarasya
4. Here the full sutra is: kartrkaranayos trtiyd (2.3.18.) and the governing
ayogavyavacchedo’rthah). As for instance, when it is said ‘conch is
sutra (adhikdra) is anabhihite (2.3.1). Therefore, the whole sutra
only white’ (fankhah pandura eva)y the meaning is that the absence
means when the agent or instrument is not expressed (by tin and so
of the relation of whiteness is denied with reference to conch.
on) the instrumental case-ending is to be used in the meaning of
agent or instrument The meaning of eva associated with a verb is the absence of
absolute non-relation [kriyasamgataivakdrasya atyantayogavya-
5. We have translated karmatvam as the-state-of-being-the-object-of-
vacchedo ’Tihah). As for example, in such instances as ‘there is indeed
action, although the full meaning of karmatva is kriyajanya-
phalairayatvam, the-state-of-being-the-substratum of result which is blue lotus1 [mlam sarojam bhavatyeva)y absolute non-relation of
produced by action. blueness with lotus is denied; and not just non-relation of blueness
 172 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 173
with lotus is denied since in some cases lotus is not related with blue¬ Similarly, adheyah adhare adharatasambandhena anveti i.e. svanisth-
ness, i.e., in some cases lotus can be white, red etc. Now a difficulty adheyatanirupitadharaldsambandhena anveti ityarthah; svam adheyam.
can be raised against this explanation. Here absoluteness in non- 15. Here, the softness of rice is the adheya and rice is adhara and so
relation (ayoga) means the-state-of-being-pervader oflotusness (ayoge softness is connected with rice by the relation of adharata (airayala),
atyantatvam sarojatvavyapakatvam). And so since lotus can also be i.e. being-substratum, Cfr. note no. 12.
blue, it would be impossible to deny the relation of blueness with 16. Now Pariksit Thampuran adds another powerful argument to show
lotus because there is no state-of-being-pervader of lotusness that the denotative function of krt suffixes is in karta (agent) and not
[sarojatvavyapakatvam) in the absence of relation of blueness in kartrtva (i.e. krti, i.e. effort). In such sentences aspaktapafyati, i.e.
[nilatvasambandhdbhave)\ yet it is possible to deny absoluteness the cook sees, if the krt suffix means agency (kartrtvam)y then the
[atyantatvam, i.e. sarojatvavyapakatvam) in non-relation (of blueness). connection of meaning (i.e. being-substratum, ddrayatvam) of the
This is what is called absence of absolute non-relation. And so the tense-suffix with the meaning of krt suffix (i.e. agency) is not
aforesaid difficulty does not arise. possible; in ordinary language the usage is that the agent of cooking
7. In M. karmatvadyanavaruddhatvam is itaravtfesanatvena tatparya- is seeing and not the effort of cooking is seeing; hence, the meaning
visayatvam. Dinakara pointed out that the word itara is not necessary. of krt suffix is agent or the object of action. (Cfr. S. p. 185,1. 21 ff).
Now, according to the present explanation of Ramarudra, the word
itara becomes useful because itaraviiesanatvam now means
evakararthadatirikte viiesanatvam.
8. Note that here a little, stokam, is qualifier to the action of cooking
(pakakriyayam viiesanam)y and not in the sense of cooking a small
quantity of rice.
9. Cfr. Ramarudra: kriyavitesananam karmatvam napumsakata ca. He
ascribes this to Vdrttikam\ for further discussion Cfr. Sdbdatarahgini,
V. Subrahmanya Sastri, p. 205-206.
10. Cfr. S. 185,1.3ff and also Tattvacintamani by GangeSa Upadhyaya,
Sabdakhanda> pp. 867-1009, edited by Pandit Kamakhyanatha
Tarkavagish, Calcutta. 1897.
11. bhavanatvam kartrtvakarmatvdnyataratvam, Cfr. K.M.D.R. p. 365 11
15-16.
12. prakrtipratyayau sahartham brulah, tayostu pratyayah pradhanyena.
This means that the stem and suffix together convey the meaning.
Among the two of them, the suffix is the principal part, i.e. the
meaning of the suffix is the qualificand [vi$esyam)\the meaning of the
stem is the qualifier [vifesanam). So in the present instance of
tandulam, the meaning of the accusative case, result (of the action),
is the qualificand and the meaning of the stem, i.e. rice, is the
qualifier. Hence in verbal knowledge, we say that the rice is
connected with the result and not that the result is connected with
the rice.
13. Cfr. S. p. 185, LIME
14. adharah adheye adheyatasambandhena anveti, i.e. svanisthadhara-
tanirupitadheyatasambandhena anveti ityarthah. Here svam is adharah.
 Text, Translation and Commentary—^abdakhonda 175
174 Nydya Philosophy of Language
tj *cl'et9Nl^ I % ddR ^TPTt
Text 3A
«n*R Md^lldd^l 4R^HP^ R^cbRd TO
stiRnRRM

■flR suyqi I 'flcllRq^HI rficl<e‘Hl£l

^9iRt),y^idkM4Rr: i dHWiRb+<rM^ 4Udictj eqiR*R

-fldlRRRl^ ^ <^cMlRcfT cT«#t

^ RRummidM mimRh*m^ I ^ R<huirR
ilRhtff: | RtoT ^ dctWMl4+4<<l'*Ruf TOfc^f I
dNqi^dK'R? 'TMiRRRt^ ^ ef^l
i^Mqi+MI^R I W cflR>d: tel^T^T ^cmiR- W MdlMsflcdW q>d^Tl^cH^d Rq^lld, mchiwm
R<t,|R^|«iKT «RR>ei ^iRhUF: I ^ ■^K# JJlRb^: I ^ h-'kTH^ W ‘hCkflcq^d
R^n^aiK^id^ dcdifcq dur^R i ^'^teroq'
oMdSkiqR I W'Wto^T tKrii'iV^h
^ 3fpf^KWf
fliRimrcR sflRbfll: I W dS'maO R*R
ftfteiret Rq^KW sjiRbiif i
UdMtH^T wf I
Translation
■q^prt cMM^pctd^dl^t ¥Tpb ^TlrlR I ^ ^del -fldl Other Means of Knowing Denotative Function
^ ^d-llR^M ?IT^4W: I ^iciRh^HI 'W^iRdd-
Muktavali
t|d|R4tsf dW^Ryi<uTI^ ^1^1414 3#^ Id5-14)df The manner in which the knowledge of the denotative
W®^t?r iR RRfr^ I dH I MMrid: function can be obtained from Comparison has already been
explained.
^mfPddMdldl WTOk^tsR cii*Rd TITOdW Similarly, one can have knowledge of denotative function
HRcMI^Rldlld; I 3RT 'Qcf Rjf "5^% TO T-dl ^ from Dictionary also. When there is an opposing factor, it is
rejected. As for instance, denotative function of words like
‘blue’ and so on is given by dictionary in blue colour and so
dc^Km^T HR^l^ll^lsddlsf Rp4R d^ddl R on and in that which is qualified by blue colour; still the
<*i®c^qt(Kt)R | d^I ^ oqRi'dKiH ‘WdlRd^ s#lfct>: I denotative function (of words like ‘blue and so on) (is
^"^■cr?Tcf M^dllR^I<^lni^bm^l4 *iMmiqid,"t?T accepted) only in blue (colour) and so on because of simplicity.
Implication (is accepted) in that which is qualified by blue
Wt ^d^rMIdt dd^iqi^ I ^
(colour) and so on.
WTO^RsfrTERsR inRh cTO?T Similarly, denotative function is known also from the
statement of a trustworthy person. For instance, from such
siRmot-wR i tR wretareR I w
statements as ‘a cuckoo is to be denoted by the word pika’, we
WFP^fRf^^r wwf sn^rf
 ^ Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 777
come to know the denotative function of words like pika and is to be accomplished because of deviation. Nor can it be
so on in cuckoo.
argued that in those instances words like ‘look at him’ are to
Likewise, from action brought about by usage also (one be supplied, because of the lack of proof and because in such
can have knowledge of denotative function). As for example, instances as ‘oh! Caitra, a son is bom to you, and he is dead’
an elderly person directs another grown up person with the such words cannot be supplied. And thus on account of
words ‘bring the jar’; hearing that ajar is brought by the latter; simplicity rejecting the denotative function in jar as connected
seeing that a boy who is standing nearby understands that the (with another meaning) one understands the denotative
action of bringing the jar is brought about by the sentence function of the word ‘jar’ in mere jar.
bring the jar .Afterwards by means of the sentences like ‘take Likewise, knowledge of denotative function can be
away the jar, bring the cow* and so on, by inclusion and grasped from the remainder of the sentence also. As for
exclusion (of respective words, the boy) grasps the denotative example, there is the sentence ‘the oblation should be made
functions of words like ‘jar’ and so on in jar and so on which of yava grains’; Aryans use the word yava in the sense of a
are connected with that which is to be accomplished. Thus particular long-awned grain (barley) but the non-Aryans use
from sentences like ‘there is a blue jar on the ground’, there it in the sense of a kind of panic seed. In that statement, from
is no verbal knowledge. Words like ‘jar’ and so on are the remainder of the sentence, viz. ‘in spring all plants lose
ascertained to have the capacity to produce the knowledge of their leaves, butyava plants stand flourishing with their spikes’,
jar and so on as connected with that which is to be accomplished the denotative function of the word.yava is determined in that
and so the optative and so on have the capacity to bring about grain which has long awns (i.e. barley). But this word yava is
the knowledge of the-state-of-being-that-which-is-to-be used in the sense of a kind of panic seed because of the
accomplished by effort; therefore some say (that in the above erroneous knowledge of denotative function, for it is
mentioned sentences) they (i.e. the optative and so on) are cumbersome to accept multiple denotative functions. But in
absent, and so there is no verbal knowledge. That is not such words as hari and so on, since there is no clinching
correct. Although at first the denotative function is grasped in argument to establish one denotative function as definite, we
jar and so on as connected with that which is to be accomplished, accept multiple denotative functions.
it would be better afterwards to discard it (i.e. the connection Likewise, from explanation also the knowledge of
with that which is to be accomplished) on account of simplicity; denotative function (is obtained). Explanation is the rendering
Therefore, in such sentences as ‘oh! Caitra, a son is bom to of the meaning of one word by means of another word having
you , your unmarried daughter is pregnant’ and so on, from the same meaning. As for instance, the sentence ‘there is a
the brightness or the affliction of the face, having inferred ghata .(jar)’ could be explained by the sentence ‘there is a
happiness or sorrow (respectively), one determines by a kalata' and so we can grasp the denotative function of the
process of elimination the verbal knowledge as the cause of word ghata in kalasa (jar). Likewise, the expression pacati
that (i.e. of happiness or sorrow) and one determines that (cooks) is explained by the words pakam karoti (he does the
sentence as the cause of verbal knowledge. Thus denotative cooking) and so the meaning of the verbal suffix ti is considered
function is not in that which is connected with that which to be effort.
178 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 179
Likewise, denotative function is grasped also from the
4>l4c4l4^l44>faS[R44mi4M ^ 'TZ 1c4lfcd: W^T
proximity of a word which is well known. As for example,
from the sentence ‘here on the mango tree a pika is sweetly ifcr^TFT: 1 Cim^fel l^l4c4lf^d4d¥IKc4ftfl4I ^VlKcdRM
singing’ we can grasp the denotative function of the word pika ci(M^cq«f: I m '*w4c4|R6W«mW 3lf^
in cuckoo. ■q^PTt I drt>K«l^'1 '^£:<e14): '4>Kul^d I

Text 3B clfa^tPTT dl£¥l¥ll<Mlqi^d4l I oqfaRKlf^fa I ^3jfafa

ifrT fafa «rf^WKlRc*l«r: I
fa. cptoftfa I vdWHpWIMtK ffrT I 9lRf)Ue ifcT 1 fr4lR43«HdlRld m: I
#T: I I ^ #
JJPlfasrRiJ dskRRf VlRtiillS+cdlRfcr *1FT: ^i4dlR(sl4+4ltHd!|4)c4Klv| cTf^lfafa oqfa^R ifa tTFT: I
dN^lfacT I ^Tc^Tfasnt^niT dCHHI^Rl 1 I

*maiq^‘<cK4lI'tRl I •TlcllRRRl^ tj cRFlfa I W %fa | rn^lRRl I

ifcT t+Kull^H +1^4 Rfawf- <«pquq2 yifrt)'T>vH'iiH«t14l xpETTTT^ dc+c^} cnwfajfa: |

4llKMi«rf 44fcr I d'^44H4dH. I ^«tqei\ull- 4q44t*W4t4 ^gci)4)4-4RdM4: I tT?T% 'dlg¥lfeRqoqejgftu|

d^dfadl^dMiMtl'^nRyl^f'+'+l^l^ WTf «muicq wt ?r wm vifaRft wrew ifcr

dm«lkH<c4l+»«ft}4 ? ^TCnc'TTjqW m 4lqq^4l4UR^t> TlfrfjfaoffqcT 1f^v44: I ^F4Rg WRW

et,|4c4!f^dRq44^IKc4l4R*M 3fa 4<fr3d ^^414, ?lfa: WT4ft TORi'WM

c+>i4W>lLul'HI£f: H4qRd: I ^4+14 ^Ffff^cT arm-Hl'IlstlrnlRl I rrff TTdrVlfrM^^Md

s^-prffafa Ic^fai RPi<i'Met>miqiRlcl icnT^tVT^twr
S^cqiqJ ^ ^ WlMf Rfam^TfacT Wt: I
TlfaUF ^fcT WRTSft ci-HU^d cPW- <HI<?4ldW ^TT^fa^fafa
tefa ^cmfarr i ^ ^TSTWmRfafcT 41^1 3TIWicf qHc4RP?l^ w

^l^ld+yiRbM'tyrd^^ciftcilNI^'f PkWI I ^ ’JcTeT 'tFdc4Rl^l^ij|rb4i0^M^4lRdl4Mf^4l44>T4lRc4j)HldRq4l

TfZ suited: 444dlR<444>4lqi4lrT: I ^ ^frnyieq^qi^ I MRl«&Hw)Rl I I
WWfw^^lRfrT cdJldlrbcdlRcTO 3lfa fiWqfifli vrfaus^kiikuiPifci
%fa I tllWTK'MIdfafa I wfcn^tlT Rl£lR44FTT ^ I fa if: '5J5W T^frT fa^tSvT fasfcff^f^cT ^c4l<tl frt^f-

^v.1^^l4c4l4MdKI %gr^l HdlR44Mf +nfc4l$*tf W-44^Rd cIT|?lrPW?Trf^: I

■srfcT kld|R4^ +l4‘c=HrHK+^l'fr4<Tfa;T Wk+VI+flir
180 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 181

Translation words) is in as far as it (i.e. the causality) is determined by the-

Other Means of Knowing Denotative Functions state-of-being-words. In this way, the cause and effect relationship
is finally ascertained. This alone is the power of words which
Has been already explained (tathoktamiti): i.e. on the
brings about experience in the form of verbal knowledge the
occasion of treating Comparison; this is the rest of the sentence
object of which is that which is connected with that which is
(in M.). to be accomplished. The pervader of the-state-of-being-verbal-
Knowledge of denotative function (iaktigraha itij*
Icnowledge die object of which is that which is connected with
After these words the words ‘takes place’ are to be added. Is
the-state-of-being-accomplished, is the-state-of-being-verbal-
given by dictionary [koiena vyutpaditeti): When the words
knowledge the object of which is the-state-of-being-
Sukla and so on denote quality, then they are in the masculine
accomplished which is brought about by words like the
gender; when (the words tukla and so on) denote something
optative and so on which denote the the-state-of-being-
having these qualities, they are in the gender of that which is
accomplished. (And) because of the absence of such words,
qualified; thus, according to dictionary, the denotative function
how can there be the knowledge of denotative function from
(of words like tukla and so on) is in both (i.e. in quality and in
dictionary and so on? Such is the objection of Prabhakara; in
that which has quality); this is the idea. Because of simplicity
order to criticize his objection by pointing out the defects of
[laghavaditi]: In comparison with the-state-of-having-blue-colour
his opinion (the author) describes the doctrine held by the
and so on, the universal being-blue (colour) and so on is more
Prabhakara school with the words thus and so on
simple and so it is accepted as the determinant of the-state-of-
(ithamcetyadina). By this the objection that in the context of
being-denoted; this is the idea. Implication is accepted by
discussing the denotative function which brings about the
them in that which is qualified by blue (colour) and so on
recollection of the meanings of words, an explanation of the
[niladivitiste tu laksaneti): Some say that the elision of matup
capacity of words which brings about the experience of verbal
suffix after the words denoting quality is desired (by
knowledge is improper, is rejected.
Grammarians); according to this rule by means of matup suffix
Now it may be objected that in such instances as ‘on the
alone which is elided, one gets the knowledge of that which is
ground there is the blue jar’, there would be (the verbal)
qualified and, therefore, there is no need of implication.
knowledge the object of which is the-state-of-being-
That (tad) means the bringing of the jar. Now it may be
accomplished, because you yourself have admitted that the
objected as follows: The causality of words with reference to
capacity of such words for producing verbal knowledge (the
knowledge which is inferred by the act of bringing (the jar) and
object of which is the-state-of-being-accomplished) is accepted.
so on and in which the bringing of the jar and so on are the
In order to refute this objection (the sentence beginning with
qualificands (and the qualifier) is that which is to be
the words) the knowledge of the-state-of-being-that-which-
accomplished, is understood on account of simplicity as
is-accomplished-by-effort (karyatabodhamprati ceti) is used.
determined only by the-state-of-being-words. Thus for that
Because (optative and so on) have the capacity, because
which is determined by the-state-of-being-verbal-knowledge
of their absence (samarthyat tadabhavad iti): With reference
in which that which is connected directly or indirectly with the-
to the verbal knowledge the object of which is the-state-of-
state-of-being-accomplished is the object, the causality (of
being-accomplished, the words like the optative and so on are
182 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 183
the causes through the recollection of the-state-of-being-
is the idea. Because of its absence (tadabhavacceti): Since it
accomplished which (i.e. recollection) is brought about by
is not possible to supply the words ‘look at him’ and so on
them (i.e. by the optative and so on). The idea is that although
which convey the meaning of the-state-of-being-accom-plished.
the words ‘jar’ and so on are the causes for the verbal
This is the meaning. Rejecting the opinion of Bhatta (the
knowledge of the-state-of-being-accomplished, they do not
author) sums up his views with the words and thus (ittham
have the denotative function which brings about the recollection
ceti). On account of simplicity (laghavad iti): In comparison
of the-state-of-being-accomplished. Therefore, because of the
with accepting the denotative function in jar as connected
absence of the words like the optative and so on which bring
(with another meaning) it is simpler to accept (the denotative
about the recollection of the-state-of-being-accomplished by
function) in jar only. This is the meaning.
means of denotative function which brings about the
The wordyavapadasya is to be construed according to the
recollection, there is no verbal knowledge from such sentences
maxim of the lamp placed over the threshold. In that (statement)
as ‘there is jar on the ground’ and so on. On account of
because of such two-fold usage, when there is doubt whether
simplicity (laghaveneti): Because in comparison with the-
the denotative function of the word^am is in a kind of panic
state-of-being-verbal-knowledge the object of which is jar
seed or in that which has long awns, i.e. barley, the denotative
which is connected with the-state-of-being-accomplished, the-
function of the wordj'flwz is determined to be in that which has
state-of-being-verbal knowledge the object of which is jar is
long awns from the remainder of the sentence (as mentioned
simpler as the determinant of the-state-of-being-an-effect. This
in M.). This is the construction. Now it may be objected: Let
is the meaning. Therefore (ata eva): Since the causality of
the denotative function of the vtordyava be in the grain which
words is indeed with reference to verbal knowledge the object
has long awns, i.e. barley, because of the remainder of the
of which is not the-state-of-being-accomplished.
sentence, but even if the denotative function of the word j>az>a
As the cause of that (tatkaranatvena): As the cause of
is also in a kind of panic seed there is no harm. In order to
happiness and sorrow. As the cause of that (tadhetutaya): As
answer this objection, it is said multiple denotative function
the cause of such verbal knowledge. Because of deviation
[nanaiaktiti). Then how can multiple denotative functions be
[vyabhicarad tit): Because of deviation in the rule which states
assumed for such words as hari and so on? In order to answer
that words like ‘jar’ and so on invariably produce the verbal
this objection it is said in such words hari and so on
knowledge the object of which is the-state-of-being-
[haryadipade tviti). Since there is no clinching argument
accomplished. This is the meaning. Since the sentences like
[vinigmakabhavad iti): Because, in that case, dictionary is of
‘oh! Caitra, a son is born to you’ and so on produce the verbal
equal authority for both meanings. In the present instance,
knowledge the object of which is not the-state-of-being-
however, the remainder of the sentence is itself the clinching
accomplished. This the idea. To be supplied (adhyaharyam
argument establishing one meaning as definite. This is the
tit): Thus there also is the verbal knowledge the object of idea.
which is the-state-of-being-accomplished and which is produced The meaning of the verbal suffix is considered to be
by the imperative and so on. And so, since only the verbal effort (akhyatasyayatnarthakatvam iti): It cannot be objected
knowledge the object of which is the-state-of-being-accom- how explanation can be means of grasping denotative function
plished is produced, there is no deviation in such a rule. This Slnce there is no word to express denotative function. (This
 184 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 185

objection) is rejected because explanation gives rise to the there is red colour in flower and so on. In such places nilah,
knowledge of denotative function in the form of an Inference raktah and so on mean blue colour, red colour and so on
(in the following way): The tense-suffix has denotative function which are qualities, and at the same time the words nilah,
in that which is qualified by the-state-of-being-effort, because raktah and so on are used in masculine gender only. When,
it expresses the meaning which is expressed by the word karoti however, these words have their denotative function in those
(does) which has the denotative function in that which is which have these qualities, they are in the gender of those
qualified by the-state-of-being-effort. which have these qualities. As for instance, when the word nila
Of a word which is well-known [prasiddhapadasyeti): is used in the expression niloghatah, blue jar, the denotative
i.e. of a word the meaning of which is well known. This is the function of the word nila, ‘blue’, is in that (i.e. substance)
meaning. It cannot be objected that the syntactic connection which has the blue colour; in such places nila (blue) takes the
of the meaning of a noun with the subject in the form of the gender of that which has blue colour, i.e. ghata, jar. Therefore,
meaning of the tense-suffix is not allowed, and so this is not an in the expression nilo ghatah, the word nila is put in the
example for grasping denotative function. This cannot be masculine gender. Similarly when that which has blue colour
accepted. This is because such a rule is unestablished since in is in the feminine or in the neuter gender the word nila is put
such sentences as ‘the agent of cooking, who cooks food for in the feminine or in the neuter respectively; as for example,
a Sudra and who is a brahmin is despicable’ we find such a nila bhumih, blue earth, nilam puspam, blue flower etc.
syntactic connection with the subject which is the meaning of The Naiyayikas, however, do not accept this position:
the tense-suffix. According to them, on grounds of simplicity, the denotative
function of words like ‘blue’ and so on is in blue colour; the
Commentary implication [laksana) of these words is in that which has blue
Other Means of Knowing Denotative Function colour and so on. This may be explained as follows: If one says
that the denotative function of the word nila and so on is also
The second means of knowing denotative function is
in that which has blue colour and so on, then the determinant
Comparison (upamana). How one can obtain the knowledge
of the-state-of-being-denoted [lakyatavacchedakam) is the-state-
of denotative function from Comparison has been explained of-having-blue-colour-and-so-on [niladimattvam) and this is
in the section on Comparison.
just blue colour [nila) and so on. This blue colour and so on
The third means of knowing denotative function is are many and they become the object of our cognition as
dictionary [kola) like Amarakola and so on which give the qualified by the universal the-state-of-being-blue-colour-and-
meanings of words. According to them the denotative function so-on [nilatvadijatih). But if it is held, as the Naiyayikas do, that
of words like ‘blue’ and so on are in blue colour and so on as the denotative function of words like blue and so on is in blue
well as in that which has blue colour and so on. D. quotes the colour and so on, then the determinant-of-the-state-of-being-
following rule from Amarakola on this point: When words like denoted [lakyatavacchedakam) isthe-state-of-being-blue-colour-
‘white’ and so on have their denotative function in quality, and-so-on [nilatvadijatih) and this becomes the object of our
then they are in masculine gender only. Thus we say ghate cognition without any further qualification.1 This is simple.
nilah, puspe raktah and so on, i.e. there is blue colour in jar;
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 187
186 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Now the fifth means of knowing denotative function, viz.
Hence the latter, i.e. the-state-of-being-blue-colour-and-so-on
action brought about by usage of words (ivyavahara) is being
is to be considered the determinant-of-being-denoted, i.e. the
discussed. Here basically an account of the opinion of the
denotative function of words like ‘blue’ and so on is in blue
Prabhakara MImamsakas is given and then it is rejected. As
colour and so on and not also in that which is qualified by blue
conclusion, the Nyaya position is established. According to
colour and so on. Hence, the Naiyayikas conclude that the
word nila means by implication that which is qualified by blue Nyaya, action brought about by usage is a valid means of
knowing the denotative function ofwords. But the Naiyayikas
colour.
Now an objection against this position by the Vaiyakaranas assert that the denotative function of the word ‘jar’ is in the

is discussed. According to Katyayanavarttikam on Panini mere thing jar [ghatapadasya ghatamatre Saktih) and not in jar
as connected with something else, i.e. that-which-is-to-be-
Sutra, tasau matvarthe (1.4.19), the matup suffixes are elided
accomplished [karya) (ghatapadasya karyanvitaghate iaktih),
after the words denoting qualities like blue, white and so on
(gunavacanebhyo matupo lugistah).2 This means that the actual as the Prabhakaras assert.
form of the expression niloghatah is nilavan ghatah] however, The position of the Prabhakaras regarding the way in
the matup suffix is elided. The elided matup suffix denotes which the denotative function is gained through action arising
possessing; and so the expression means that jar is identical from usage [vyavahara) is described in M. as follows: An older
with that which has blue colour. adult says ‘bring the cow’. The younger adult who hears this
The answer to this difficulty is the following: In the brings the cow. The boy who stands by infers as follows: The
expression mlo ghatah it is better to accept implication for action of the younger adult has been brought about by
words ‘blue’ and so on in that which has blue colour and so knowledge, because it is an action like my action. And this
knowledge of the younger adult which is the cause of his
on rather than to accept the matup suffix and its elision and
action, is brought about by the sentence of the older adult
before the verbal knowledge its recollection. Further, a person
‘bring the cow’, because the younger adult brought the cow
who does not recollect the elided matup suffix would not have
after hearing the sentence. By the repeated knowledge of such
verbal knowledge from the words niloghatah etc. But in fact,
sentences and the actions immediately following them, the
even when a person does not recollect the elided matup suffix,
boy understands at first the sentence ‘bring the cow as having
he has verbal knowledge from the words nilo ghatah.
The fourth means of knowledge of denotative function is the meaning of the action of bringing the cow.
And afterwards he hears the sentence ‘bring the horse’;
the statement of a trustworthy person (aptavakya). One who
does not know the meaning of the word pika approaching a hearing this sentence the younger adult brings the horse, then
trustworthy person asks him what is the meaning of the word the boy understands that in this sentence, the word horse is
pika. The latter answers kokila, i.e. Cuckoo is to be denoted included, and the word ‘cow’ is excluded. Therefore, the boy
by the word pika. Hearing the statement he understands that comes to know that the act of bringing is connected with horse
the denotative function of the word pika is in kokila, i.e. only and not with cow. Hence, he concludes that the word
Cuckoo. Thus, the statement of a trustworthy person is also a ‘horse’ has denotative function in the horse as connected with
something to be accomplished [karya) and the word ‘cow has
means of knowing denotative function.
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 191
1 90 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
From the ordinary usages of imperatives such as ‘make
meaning of the-state-of-being-accomplished (i.e. karyatva).
ajar’, ‘bring ajar’ and so on, one has the verbal knowledge that
Only in the first statement does D. speak of the knowledge of
ajar is to be made, bringing of ajar is to be accomplished and
that-which-is-to-be-accomplished (karyajhana)', therefore, here
so on. Therefore, the listeners grasp the denotative function of
the word karya is to be interpreted as karyatva.™
the imperative, optative and so on in that which is to be
In contrast to the opinions of M. and D., R. holds that
accomplished, i.e. in the making of the jar, in the bringing of
even if the denotative function of the optative and so on is
the jar and so on in as far as they are the things to be
accepted in that which is to be accomplished [karya), the
accomplished. A person who has thus grasped the denotative
Prabhakaras’ position can be explained properly. It is true that
function of the optative and so on in jar and so on in as far as
there is simplicity in accepting the denotative function of the
they are the things to be accomplished (i.e. as karya), hears the
optative and so on in karyatva rather than in karya because if
Vedic sentence ‘one who is desirous of heaven should
the denotative function of optative and so on is accepted in
perform the jyotistoma sacrifice’ where there is the optative
the latter, there would be infinite number of denotative
‘should sacrifice’ (yajeta). From this he gets the verbal knowledge
functions, since that which is to be accomplished is infinite in
that that which is to be accomplished is produced by sacrifice
number. Hence it is appropriate to accept the denotative
[yagajanyam karyam). Here from the optative, the hearer
function of the optative and so on in the-state-of-being-
remembers that that-which-is-to-be-accomplished is usually
accomplished [karyatva) which is only one.
such things as jar and so on. In these things which are
But still R. thinks that the Prabhakaras* position ran be
remembered, viz. jar and so on, the- state-of-being-produced
explained properly even if the denotative function of the
by sacrifice is contradicted [yagajanya-tvam badhitam). Since
optative and so on is accepted in that which is to be accomplished
the-state-of-being-produced by sacrifice could be appropriately
[karya). This is to be explained as follows: Prabhakaras admit
connected with the unseen, it follows that in the verbal
that the verbal knowledge arising from the Vedic sentences
knowledge the unseen is grasped as that- which-is-to-be-
with an optative and so on has as object the unseen [apurvam)
accomplished.
as that-which-is-to-be-accomplished. In order to have the
Now the Prabhakaras who do not accept the apprehen-
verbal knowledge of the unseen [apurvam), one should have
sional connection in the form of the universal explain the
the recollection of the unseen from the optative and so on.
process of gaining the knowledge of the unseen as follows:
Further, in order to have the recollection of the unseen, one
According to the Naiyayikas, the denotative function of the
should have the knowledge of the denotative function of the
word ‘cow’ is grasped in a cow which is the object of
optative and so on in the unseen. Since the unseen is not
perception and then after hearing the word ‘cow’ one has the
known earlier by any other means of valid knowledge, the
verbal knowledge of a cow which is not experienced. This
denotative function of the optative and so on is not grasped in
comes about because of the strength of congruity [yogyata-
it. However, although it is not possible to grasp the denotative
balam), i.e. when a person grasps the denotative function of
function of the optative and so on in the unseen as unseen, it
the word ‘cow’ in a cow as belonging to a particular time and
is still possible to have the verbal knowledge of the unseen.
place, the same person hearing afterwards the word ‘cow’ has
This is to be explained as follows.
the verbal knowledge of another cow belonging to another
 7 92 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-§abdakhanda 193

time and place, because only with such a cow the action of Now an objection may be raised as follows: Prabhakaras
bringing etc. could be connected. It is by the strength of admit denotative function in the universal only, and not in the
congruity that this latter cow becomes the object of verbal individual. This is because, if the denotative function is
knowledge. The Prabhakaras argue that, by a similar process, grasped in the universal, since the universal is one, the denota¬
one can have by the strength of congruity the verbal knowledge tive function is also one. The universal becomes the object of
of the unseen as something to be accomplished from Vedic knowledge by itself. Therefore, the-state-of-being-denoted
optative and so on. (lakyata = lakti) is also without determinant (niravacchinna).
This process, as has already been explained, takes place Hence, accepting denotative function in the universal is
in the following way: A person who has grasped the denotative simpler and so it is to be preferred. Therefore, the objection
function of the optative and so on in jar and so on in as far as is that the Prabhakaras cannot admit the denotative function
they are things to be accomplished, hears the Vedic sentence of the optative and so on in karya which is not a universal.
‘one who is desirous of heaven should perform the jyotistoma The answer to this objection is that when that which is
sacrifice’. Here, the optative cannot mean that jar etc. have to different from a universal becomes the determinant of the-
be accomplished, since they are not a means of heaven. Hence state-of-being-denoted, then the MImamsakas accept denotative
by the force of congruity the person obtains the verbal function in that which is qualified by that determinant; as for
knowledge of the unseen. example, the words adhya and palu mean respectively one
Pariksit Thampuran explains this process more accurately. who has wealth and that which has a tail with hair and so on.
According to the Prabhakaras, yogyata which is conducive to Here, the-determinant-of-the-stateof-being-denoted (takyatava-
verbal knowledge is anvayaprayojakarupavattvam, the-state-of- cchedakam) is wealth and tail with hair respectively. And hence
having-a-form (in the meaning) conducive to verbal knowledge. is such cases, the denotative function is accepted, even by
Such ayogyata in the case of ajar which is meant for bringing those who admit the denotative function in the universal, in
water is not to have holes; in the case of sacrifice, it is to be a that which is qualified, i.e. in the rich person and in the animal.
means of obtaining heaven which is the object of desire. And Both are qualified (viiista), since the person is qualified by
sacrifice cannot be a direct means of obtaining heaven since wealth and the animal by tail with hair.
sacrifice which is a particular form of action and which comes Thus even by those who admit the denotative function in
to an end soon cannot exist immediately before the obtaining the universal in some instances as described above the
of heaven which comes after a long time. Nor can sacrifice be denotative function is accepted in that which is qualified and
an indirect means (i.e. through the unseen) for heaven since which is many without taking into account the principle of
the unseen is not yet established. Hence, one has to accept simplicity. Similarly, here too, the denotative function of the
some characteristic in sacrifice so that it can be taken as a optative and so on is accepted in that which is qualified by the-
means of obtaining heaven. Such a characteristic is the state-of-being-accomplished, i.e. in that which is to be
unseen.14 Hence R. concludes that there is no harm even if it accomplished (karya) in order to establish the unseen from
is said that the Prabhakaras’ position is that the denotative Vedic injunctives.
function of optatives and so on is in that which is to be According to the Prabhakaras, the power of words is of
accomplished (karya).
194 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Textf Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 195
two kinds; one brings about the recollection of the meaning of
. ^ s0 on as connected with the-state-of-being-accomplished.
the word; the other brings about the verbal knowledge. The
This means that, as we have already explained, a boy at first
former is called the power to bring about the recollection of
asps the denotative function of words like ‘jar’ and so on in
the mere meaning of the word (smarakalakti) and the latter is
the things jar and so on in as far as they are connected with
called the power to produce verbal knowledge [anubhavikl
action like bringing and so on. Afterwards he understands that
lakti). The smarakalakti of words like ‘jar’ and so on is in the
it is better to leave aside the element of being connected with
thing jar and so on as not connected with that-which-is-to-be-
action and grasps the denotative function in jar only on
accomplished [karyananvitaghatadau)}5 By means of anubha-
account of consideration of simplicity.
vakalakti the words bring about verbal knowledge the object
If it is said that the word ‘jar’ has denotative function in
of which is connected with that-which-is-to-be-accomplished; jar, then the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted is the-
i.e. the anubhavikl lakti, is in the form of the causality of words state-of-being-jar (jamess). And further, if it is said that the
for producing verbal knowledge. denotative function of the word ‘jar* is in jar as connected with
But, according to the Prabhakaras, there is no instance of action, then the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted is
a verbal knowledge without having the-state-of-being- the-state-of-being-jar-as-connected-with-action (karyanvita-
accomplished also as its object. By producing the recollection ghatatvam). And naturally the former determinant is simpler
of the-state-of-being-accomplished the optative and so on are than the latter. Besides, there is the following principle:
the causes of verbal knowledge the object of which is the-state- ananyalabhyah fabdarthahy i.e. when a particular meaning is
of-being-accomplished. Although the words ‘jar’ and so on are obtained by a word used together with another word, then that
the causes for the experience in the form of verbal knowledge meaning also cannot be ascribed to the latter word; in the
the object of which is the-state-of-being-accomplished, yet the present context, viz. ‘bring the jar’, the meaning of the
words ‘jar’ and so on have no smarakalakti in the-state-of- imperative is the-state-of-being-accomplished, the act of bringing
being-accomplished. Only the optative and so on have the is the meaning of the root ‘to bring’; their connection is
smarakalakti in the-state-of-being-accomplished. Therefore, brought about by expectancy (samabhivyahararupa akanksa).
from those sentences in dictionary and so on in which the Therefore, the meaning of the imperative also cannot be
optative and so on which bring about the recollection of the- included in the meaning of the word ‘jar’ and so on and hence
state-of-being-accomplished through the smaraklakti do not the meaning of the word ‘jar’ is only the thing jar as not
occur, there does not arise any verbal knowledge. Hence from connected with the-state-of-being-accomplished.
dictionary and so on we do not have the knowledge of This is supported also by ordinary usages such as the
denotative function. Such is the objection of the Prabhakaras. following. When one says ‘oh! Caitra, a son is bom to you’,
This objection of the Prabhakaras is rejected by the happiness is seen on his face. This shows that Caitra has
Naiyayikas. The arguments of M. for doing so are as follows: understood the meaning of the sentence; i.e. there arises
The Naiyayikas also consider the actions brought about by verbal knowledge from this sentence although there is no
usage as an important means of grasping denotative function. optative and so on in it. Therefore, words do not have
They also admit that, at first, denotative function is grasped in denotative function in things which are connected with the-
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 197
state-of-being-accomplished, but only in things themselves. As
for example, the word ‘jar’ means only the thing jar and not The Mlmamsakas of the Bhatta school assert that all have
jar as connected with the-state-of-being-accomplished. to admit the principle that in verbal knowledge only those
In explaining M., it was already stated that at first from things become objects the recollection of which is brought
action arising from usage (vyavahara), even though the about by the words with the help of their denotative functions;
denotative function of the words like ‘jar’ and so on is grasped otherwise, from the sentence ‘there is jar’, there could as well
in jar and so on as connected with action (karyanvitaghatadau), be the verbal knowledge of cloth. Further, in verbal knowledge
afterwards for the sake of simplicity of the determinant of the- not only the meanings denoted by the words but also the
state-of-being-denoted, it would be better to accept the relations between the meanings are objects. If the knowledge
denotative function of words ‘jar’ and so on in mere jar and so of the relation of the two meanings also is not brought about
on. D. also holds that, at first, from action arising from usage by the words, then the principle mentioned in the beginning
[vyavahara] words are understood as causes for verbal as accepted by all will be broken. Therefore, the Bhattas say
knowledge the object of which is connected with the-state-of- that the denotative function of words is to be admitted not only
being-accomplished [karyatvanvitavisayakaiabdabodham prati in mere meanings but in meanings as related to other
padanam karanala). But afterwards, one comes to the conclusion meanings, i.e. the denotative function is to be admitted also in
that it is simpler to take as determinant of the-state-of-being-an- the relation between meanings.
effect, the-state-of-being-verbal-knowledge the object of which But relation is invariably between two meanings; as for
is jar rather than the-state-of-being-verbal-knowledge the object instance, in the sentence ‘the pot is blue’ the denotative
of which is jar which is connected with the-state-of-being- function of the word jar is to be admitted in jar as connected
accomplished. Therefore, words are causes for verbal with another (itara), here, blue [sarvasyapadasya itarapadarthan-
knowledge the object of which is not connected with the-state- mte arthe iaktih) and not merely in jar, but the blue thing (i.e.,
of-being-accomplished. the meaning of the word ‘blue’) is grasped by the word
Hence from such sentences as ‘oh! Caitra, a son is bom blue. Therefore, we should not include the blue thing
to you’ which have no optative and so on, there arises verbal also in the meaning of the word ‘jar’. But the denotative
knowledge. Thus there is a deviation for the Prabhakaras’ rule function of the word ‘jar’ and so on is to be grasped in jar and
that words are causes for verbal knowledge the object ofwhich so on as qualified by the relation which is indicated by the
is connected with the-state-of-being-accomplished. Therefore adventitious qualification of the-state-of-having-something-as-
although at first, by means of action arising from usage, one the-adjunct [itarapratiyogikatvopalaksitatattatsamsargavi-
understands that words are causes of verbal knowledge the tetaghatadau).16
object ofwhich is connected with the-state-of-being-accompli- This is rejected by the Naiyayikas for the following
s ed, afterwards by the process of exclusion and inclusion, masons. In verbal knowledge there are three kinds of objects,
one grasps the denotative function of individual words in the vifesyah, qualificand, prakarah, qualifier, and samsargah,
respective meanings only, i.e. as not connected with the-state- re ation. Only those things which are denoted by words
of-being-accomplished. mselves can become the qualificand and qualifier in verbal
owledge, i.e. for all instances of verbal knowledge the object
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 199
198 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
viiesena). This is exactly the Nyaya position which in this way
of which is something other than relation (samsarga), viz.
has necessarily to be admitted by the Prabhakaras also.
qualiflcand (viiesja) and qualifier (prakara), the cause is the
Now the sixth means of grasping denotative function
recollection of meanings brought about bywords. This means
(yakyaJesa) is described; here the remainder of the sentence is
that in verbal knowledge nothing would become object as
shown to be a means of cognising the denotative function of
qualiflcand and as qualifier, if the recollection of this is not
words. As for instance, there is the Vedic statement that ‘an
caused by the word.17 This is the rule.
oblation should be made of boiledyaz>a grains’; here we do not
Now a question arises: How does relation (samsarga) the
know what the meaning of the word yava is. Aryans use the
recollection of which is not brought about by a word with the
word in the sense of a particular grain having long awns and
help of the knowledge of denotative function become the
the non-Aryans use it in the sense of a kind of panic seed. Now
object of verbal knowledge? The answer is that the relation of
naturally a doubt arises in what exactly is the denotative
the meanings is not brought about directly by words but by
function of the wordyava. This doubt can be resolved from the
their particular combination. Therefore, the objection raised
meaning of the remainder of the sentence, viz. ‘in spring all
earlier that if the relation which is not denoted by words
plants lose their leaves bat yava plants stand flourishing with
becomes the object of verbal knowledge, then from the
their spikes’. Now the plants which do so are barley and so we
sentence ‘there is jar’ one can have as well the verbal know¬
can understand that the denotative function of the word yava
ledge of cloth which is not made known by the word ‘jar’, is
is in barley.
not valid. This is because the knowledge of relation of
But it may be objected that the non-Aryans use this word
meanings is brought about by the particular combination of
in the sense of a kind of panic seed and so it must have
words, as stated earlier. Therefore, according to the Naiyayikas,
denotative function in that also. The answer to this objection
the denotative function of words is in mere things themselves
is that non-Aryans use this word by the erroneous knowledge
and not in things as connected with anything else.
of the denotative function. It may be further objected that let
Further, the Naiyayikas reject the opinion of the
the wordyaz/fl have multiple denotative functions like the word
Prabhakaras by the following argument: According to the
hari and so on and so it could mean both barley and a kind
Prabhakaras a word denotes its meaning as connected with
of panic seed. In answer to this objection, it is pointed out that
another meaning. They describe this connection only in
for words like hari and so on, dictionary gives many meanings
general and not in particular. But in an actual instance of
and there is no argument for restricting the meaning to only
verbal knowledge the relation of meanings becomes the
one. In the case oiyava the remainder of the sentence is the
object as a particular relation and not as relation in general.
decisive argument to use it only in one meaning as explained
Such a verbal knowledge of the particular relation of meanings
already. Hence, with reference to such words as hari and so
can never be brought about by such a knowledge of denotative
°n, the cumbersomeness owing to the acceptance of multiple
function in which the relation of meanings is object only in a
denotative functions is not to be considered a fault, because
general form. Therefore, they also have to admit that in verbal
there is no decisive argument to restrict them to one meaning,
knowledge the particular relation becomes object only by the
whereas in the present instance of the word yava, there is
particular combination ofwords (padasamabhivy'aharakahksa-
 200
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 201
decisive argument to restrict it to one meaning and so the because such a tense-suffix expresses the meaning which is
cumbersomeness owing to the acceptance of multiple conveyed by the root kr which has denotative function in
denotative functions is indeed a fault.
effort. In other words the argument is as follows: pacati is
The seventh means of grasping denotative function is explained aspakam karoti; the wordpaka conveys the meaning
explanation (vivarana). Here explanation (vivarana) is used in of the root pac; the word karoti, i.e. the root kr, conveys the
the sense of giving the meaning of one word by means of meaning of the tense-suffix ti. Therefore, the argument is that
another word having the same meaning. The example given since tense-suffix ti is explained as having the meaning of
m the text for this is the following: The sentence ‘there is ghata' karoti (i.e., the root kr) which means effort, the tense-suffix ti
is explained by the sentence ‘there is kalaAa' and so one can has the denotative function in effort. In this way, explanation
understand that the denotative function of the word ghata is
also becomes a means of grasping denotative function.
in kalaia (jar). Similarly, when the meaning of the verbal suffix Now the eighth and the last means of knowing denotative
h in the verb fiacati is explained as having the meaning of
function is being described. This last means is the proximity
pakarri karoti (he does the cooking), we can grasp the denotative
(sannidhya) of a word the meaning of which is well known.
function of the verbal suffix in effort.
And the example for this is the following. Someone does not
Now a question may rise how explanation can be a know the meaning of the word pika. But when he hears the
means of grasping denotative function, because in explanation sentence ‘a pika is sitting on the mango tree and is singing
there is no word expressive of denotative function unlike in sweetly’, he understands that the word pika means cuckoo
dictionary where the denotative function is expressed by the because the words ‘mango tree’ and ‘sweet singing’ bring to
ocative case m such examples as ‘vinayake vighnarajah\ Here
the hearer the notion of a cuckoo.
the locative case signifies vacakatvam, viz. the-state-of-being- Here it should be noted, as R. rightly points out, that the
that-which-indicates denotative function (Saktinirupakata). This proximity of a word the meaning of which is well known, is a
means that the denotative function of the word vighnardja is means of grasping denotative function in the form of an
m vinayaka. Although in dictionary, in such instances as amara inference in the following manner. The speaker utters the
mrjara devah, there is no word to express denotative function sentence ‘on the mango tree a pika is singing sweedy. From
yet, one has to supply the words ete iabddh ekdrthavdcakdh, i.e.’ this sentence, the hearer has the verbal knowledge that the
these words have denotative function in the same meaning. agent of the sweet singing is to be denoted by the word pika.
herefore, in such instances also there are words expressive And so when he sees the kokila (cuckoo) on the mango tree,
of denotative function. But in explanation there is no such although he does not know the meaning of the word pika, he
word expressive of denotative function and, therefore, the makes the following inference: The cuckoo is to be denoted
objection is how explanation can be a means of grasping by the word pika because it is the agent of sweet singing on the
denotative function. 6
mango tree. Thus also from the proximity of a word the
D. gives the answer to this objection: Explanation becomes meaning of which is already known, we can grasp the
a means of grasping denotative function in the form of an
denotative function.
m erence. The tense-suffix ti has denotative function in effort With reference to this D. raises an objection and answers
 202
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 203
it in the following way. The example brought forward by M. Notes
to show that the proximity of a word the meaning of which is
1 jatih akhandopadhiica svarupatah bhdsate, jalyakhandopadhyaliriklam
well known is a means of grasping the denotative function is
kimcidrupena bhdsate Hi niyamah.
not correct. This is because the verbal knowledge arising from
2 Cfr. Siddhdntakaumudi, edited by Pandita Gopala Sastri Nene, Vol.
the example is not valid, since it is in the following form: The 2, Chaukhamba Samskrta Samsthana, Varanasi, 1982, p. 866.
agent of sweet singing on the mango tree is to be denoted by 3 Cfr. Sabdalarangini, by Subrhmanya Sastri, Sanskrit Education
the word pika. However, such a connection (anvaya) by the Society, Madras, 1969, p.22.
4 Here Pariksit Thampuran makes an interesting objection and
relation of non-difference (abheda) cannot be admitted since
answers it The objection is that if words have denotative function
the meaning of a noun is thus brought into relation with the only in that which is connected with that which is to be accomplished
meaning of the verbal suffix ti, viz. agent, kartd, the substratum [karydnvile iaklih), then how can the optative and so on have
of effort. This meaning is gained by implication since according denotative function in kdrya (that which is to be accomplished) since
to the Naiyayikas the denotative function of verbal suffix is in kdrya cannot be connected with karya (karye karyanvitalvdsambhavat).
effort (krti). This is the objection. The answer to this is that the expression ‘being
connected, anvita, means that which has connection, i.e., relation
The idea of the objection is that usually the meaning of (sambandha) with kdrya. One of the relata in this relation is kdrya, the
the verbal suffix is connected with the meaning of the noun by other is that which is other than kdrya. Hence this relation is in kdrya
the relation of difference. As for instance, in Caitrah pacati the by the relation of the-state-of-being-adjunct (pratiyogitaya) and in that
meaning of the suffix ti, effort, is connected with Caitra by the which is other than kdrya by the relation of the-state-of-being-
subjunct [anuyogitaya), just as when the jar is on the ground we can
relation of difference, i.e. dirayatd. On the contrary, in the
say that the relation (samsarga) is in jar by the relation of being
present example, madhuram rauti, the meaning of verbal adjunct (praliyogitayd) and in the ground by the relation of being
suffix ti, by implication is agent. And the meaning of the noun subjunct (anuyogitaya). S. p.186,1.9.
pika is connected with it by the relation of non-difference. 5. K.M.D.R., p.369,1.4.
Such an objection cannot be admitted because we find 6. Ibid., 1.6.
such statements asjyoyah iudrasyapacati dvijo ’nnam where the 7. Ibid., 1.7.
8. Ibid., p.507,11.6 & 7.
syntactic connection is iudrasya annam pacati yo yah dvijah. 9. kdrya itipadanirdeiah bhavapradhanah, Cfr. S. p. 187,1.13.
From this the verbal knowledge is iudrasya annap'dkakartd 10. K.M.D.R., p.368,11.5-7.
yadyaddvijabhinnah, i.e. the agent of cooking rice for iudra is 11. Ibid., 1.8.
brahmin. Here we find the connection of the meaning of noun 12. Ibid., p.368,1.10, p.369,1.9.
13. air dpi bhavapradhano nirdetail. Pariksit Thampuran also holds the
with the meaning of the verbal suffix by the relation of non¬
view that D. is to be interpreted like this. Cfr. foot note No.9.
difference. Therefore, what was stated in the objection, viz.
14. Cfr. S. p. 187,11.1-7.
t ere is no connection of the meaning of a noun with the 15. Here it should be noted that the word kdrya is to be understood in
meaning of a verbal suffix (here, agent) by the relation of non¬ the sense of karyatva, Cfr. foot No. 13.
difference is not right. Hence the example in the M. for consi¬ 16. Practically all commentators point out that the view explained
above is that of the Bhattas. But actually this is the opinion of the
dering the proximity of a word the meaning of which is well
Prabhakara school. Cfr. Salikanatha, Prakaranapancika, p.376,
known as a means of grasping denotative function is valid.18 padandmanvildbhidhdyila. The real opinion of the Bhatta school is as
 204
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 205

follows: Verbal knowledge which is the knowledge of the relation of Text 4A

the meanings of words which form the sentence, is brought about
by meanings which are denoted by the words forming the sentence
wuh the help of expectancy etc. Therefore, the direct cause of verbal
knowledge is the meanings of words and not words themselves. This
I^TT oiktUft “HH^lfct 3^1
IS called abhihitanvayavada which is attributed to the Bhatta school.
padamsvam svam artham abhidhdya nivrttavydpdrdni; atheddnm cTvTI I ^
padarthaavagatassantah vdkydrtham avagamayanli" fabarabhdsya
on 1.1.25 quoted in Sabdatarangini, pp. 36-37. The difference eTSFFTT I ^ ^T
between the two schools is that, according to the Bhattas, words Trap 7T#:
denote their meanings only without their connection [ananviU arthe
eva padandm iaktih) and the knowledge of the relation of meanings *4)+ITRf I ^ I I W
is brought about by meanings themselves with the help of expectancy
etc.; according to the Prabhakaras, however, words denote their
^ ift: ^ cRT I ^^
meaning as connected with one another (anvite arthe evapaddndm
skalih). The Nyaya position in this respect is that words denote their
respective meanings; the relation of meanings become the object of
verbal knowledge by means of the particular combination of words H<sl«JVuui su«<qly ^cqiqj W ^ ^
[samsargabhanamtuiabdabodhepadadvayasamabhivya,hdravUesarubd-
kanksaniyamyam eva, Cfr. Ramarudra, K.M.D.R. p.371,125)
17. fmsargalabhinnataUannisthavisayatdSdlUdbdatvavacchinnam prali
padapanyataitadvisayakopasthititvena hetulvdl. prakdraviSesya-
moryadaydSabdabodhepaddnupasthitasya bhandsambhavat. KM.D.R.
p.371,11.23-25. * ’ *
18. S.p. 189,1.18ff. Here PariksitThampuran holds an opinion different
from that of Dmakara. According to the fonner, the connection of WWT ^STFq^fcT I
the meaning of a noun with the meaning of the verbal suffix by the
relation of non-difference is not to be admitted at all; otherwise, in
the meaning oipaiyan gamanakarld, Le., one who sees is the agent Translation
o going, one would be able to use paiyatigacchan, because here
Denotative Function is in the Individual as Qualified
paJyat, would mean the agent of seeing and, therefore, the expression
by the Universal and Form
would mean the agent of seeing is going. Similarly, in the meaning
f hanla dandyah, the murderer is to be punished, one could use Muktavati
hant, dandyah, because hanti means by implication the agent of Some are of the opinion that the denotative function (of
killing and with that dandyah, to be punished, is to be connected
words) is in the universal only, and not in the individual
because of deviation and of infinite number (of denotative
functions). Since it is impossible to have the knowledge of the
universal without the individual, the individual also becomes
the object of (verbal) knowledge. This cannot be admitted.
Without denotative function (i.e. if the denotative function is
 206 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 207
not admitted in the individual) it is not possible that the
individual becomes the object (of verbal knowledge). Nor is
the individual known by implication since we know the qidl'frr VlfrtKlfqca^l
individual even without the knowledge of incompatibility.
gfluwfrhffvM ifcT «JW: I Wit
Nor is the denotative function infinite, if it is admitted in the
individual. This is because only one denotative function is ^fcT 3frd oqft'q KlRRl I
admitted in all individuals. Nor can it be argued that there is
no consecutiveness (in the individuals), since cowness etc. are
indeed consecutive characteristics. Besides, if the denotative
function is grasped in the form that cow is to be denoted by
the word ‘cow’, then the denotative function is in the individual. cqRt>*Hq4>c4lfcfcl m: I
If (the denotative function) is grasped in the form that cowness +«llfclM+Ktt>vll«tqltl t^cdldj TT'^‘
is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’, then there would not be
the recollection of the meaning and the verbal knowledge in disfita ifcT I ^ ^fjTTW^tWTFTf^r I
both of which cowness is the qualifier. This is because the
I VIK4W ^fcT tgcTCT
knowledge of denotative function is the cause of the recollection
of the meaning and the verbal knowledge in as far as it has the f^TT d^HlPldfsiftfcl Wt: I cl$1«lltl I
same qualifier (as the recollection of meaning and verbal ^IT ^^qcjtqfqJ^ipfqfgT^ Wi: I <*l
knowledge). Besides, if the denotative function is grasped in
cowness, then the-state-of-being-cowness should be considered
as the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted. The-state-of- ifrwr lift
being-cowness is the-state-of-being-inherent in all cows without mvm:
being inherent in anything other than cows. Thus, since the ftft m: I Ffift ^cdlRdl I
individual cows also are included in the determinant of the-
I^T 3/1*1
state-of-being-denoted, it is your opinion alone that has (the
fault of) cumbersomeness. Therefore, the denotative function I Jl’MrfHHdj/lddqi ftqftdlW^^lf^H+kuidWI-
which is postulated because of the impossibility of the knowledge
Wf: I ficdR^R I W ^ %n^-
of particular individuals qualified by particular form and
universal is established only in the individual as qualified by
form and universal. KFTRM: ! WFW

Text 4B

%^dKdl3dl£¥llRHdifR<t?lR<Sld 3fTF-4¥ fttcT I cRT

otRht UlRtiftR | iff: W»ft ftfS^UFf
r=l-Hrl^'4KQmc4'MMId> WJRET *TFT: I
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 209

I «7lcc?5icT>i*T

<<W <.»!VIK^Inq) ^HHRlR^: I ^ dotj^ ^FTPTTJTta^t Jl’Mlf^TT

P4ftl&d*ld>I^VTfcft: VlRf): I oyslvi3fa*ITO
? Wt TfkWKfrrtkl ^ ^WK^^I^m^HHRlRfcT TRTUFTOfa: I Wf
^ ^to4rflR»Vll^l»»*>3cMlg I

^iRM+K+rtft^OI^KIHMil+K+rtW TWti

drq|cU 3^ ^ ?Tf^>- Translation

HF $c*ti¥i§-v +l*Wd MciR^ KlfrbUglc^ %WTT ^TlTOtif- Denotative Function is in the Individual as Qualified

i’^fanPuyti clRfci | T3 t+>l4cqi^Hif^M+l<+^||«^4|y- by the Universal and Form

^ tnfcYWWHM*K+rf*H cPr^dc^fl *nfim»K4>¥IK- (Keeping in mind relevance in the form of) not omitting
^T^eT \ll£«rc*inx<m<Kq T cf^cWF 3HF-W ^fct | what is remembered, (the author), in order to reject the
opinion of others and to establish the denotative function in
^aiq-^q*^ ^IMpiR) | %^f%WTc^TPTW
that which is qualified by the universal and so on according to
jil'iqypr^^rsiR^iRD^iNtM FT W^He?^' %^c5T- his own view, describes the doctrine of the MImamsakas with
~ciRts'“'i'ucqR^HdNi Rt^tt <in<^+: i RrtMdN-^<^^~ the words in universal only (jataveveti): If the denotative
^rf^FTW iltrqicivl fWhk*¥lRMHW ^ fanfld. function is accepted in that which is qualified by the universal,
?lniRtlIt<d: W ? %ejc^ ^d|. it is necessary to grasp the denotative function in universal also
because of the maxim that (the knowledge of the qualified
^^^i^FTfWMT wrm-
does not arise) without having the qualifier as its object. Thus
^^^rfeRfcr to: i ci% TfkdftiRl i ^ ^r the denotative function is grasped only in the universal
^iWsiqfeHft^+iflRtwIHW ^Kmc^R^ffRtT^cfW because of simplicity. Therefore, it is said that the denotative
Pm^i^eqRld cmr ^ function does not bring about the knowledge of the qualificand
because its strength is exhausted after denoting the qualifier.
TOklN^+rtl^ifil ^ WTcTCT ^RR-
This is the idea. (Now the MImamsakas object to the Naiyayikas
vIN-CW^dl ^FTft fafetf ^ | 3Rg te^TT-
in the following way): Is the denotative function in any one
TUs^^rq cPqifa ^d^m^d^lRMfTd^cdcclRtMdl- individual or in all the individuals? (The author) points out the
T^™ie4ic*i<r»?|R°NaNi: W^tW<uidN^<f<H?|R- defect in the first alternative with the words because of
deviation [vyabhicdrad iti): Because there arises the verbal
^^<4 Wld^^-cIFTlf^ I
knowledge the object of which is an individual in which the
"IMlffIdfqR|&cogtb|^fc| |
denotative function is not grasped, there is indeed deviation,
3^f^: ^It4c^R T ^iifclq^qq-^ci^ci^i WTPTTRRR'Jir- since there is the absence of the knowledge of the denotative
dq-utq VI4qaiq^qcr>ciiq^qqicqqi(rH^ TfUdlcfl 3T5T ? function in that individual. This is the idea.
wiw ^unroi^ ^ i
 210 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 211

(The author) points out the defect in the second alternative of the cause of implication, in the form of the incompatibility
with the words because of infinite number [anantyad iti). 0f relating existence etc. with the universal cowness. This is the
Because of difference of denotative function owing to the idea. (The author now) mentioning the objection raised (by
difference of individuals, the denotative function would be the MTmamsakas) earlier against his position refutes it with the
infinite in number. This is the meaning. Since it is impossible words nor and so on (nacetyadina). One (ekasya iti): Because
(asambhavad iti): Because the causal complex alone which it (i.e. the denotative function) in the form of God’s will is one.
brings about the knowledge of the universal, brings about the This is the meaning. Nor can it be argued that there is no
knowledge of the individual. This is the idea. If you ask how consecutiveness (na cananugama iti): Since the individual
this itself comes about, the answer is that the cause of verbal cows do not have the consecutive character it is impossible for
knowledge in which the individual is qualificand and universal them by the relation of the-state-of-having-object to be the
is qualifier is the knowledge of denotative function the object determinant of the-state-of-being-the-cause residing in the
of which is the universal. Nor can it be argued that accepting knowledge of denotative function. This is the meaning. Only
the knowledge of denotative function in the individual as the cowness etc. (gotvader eveti). Thus with reference to the verbal
cause for such a knowledge (viz. the verbal knowledge in knowledge of cow, the cause is the knowledge of denotative
which the individual is qualificand and the universal is function the object of which is that which is qualified by
qualifier) why is it not admitted that the denotative function is cowness; therefore, there is no fault as mentioned above. This
only in the individual? If such be the case, then there would is the idea. Now it may be objected that there is no proof to
come about the faults already mentioned, viz. the infiniteness show that the recollection of meaning produced by the word
(of denotative function) and so on. is the cause everywhere (i.e. for every instance of verbal
Without denotative function (laktim vineti): The knowledge). Otherwise, how can relation become the object
recollection of the meaning produced by the word is the cause in verbal knowledge? Nor can it be objected that in this way,
of the verbal knowledge and so without the denotative jar and so on the recollection of which is not brought about by
function in the individual, it is impossible to have the knowledge words would become the object of verbal knowledge. Since
of that (i.e. the individual). This is the idea.1 Implication it is stated that the cause of the verbal knowledge in which cow
(laksaneti): Even by this (i.e. by accepting implication) through is qualificand and cowness is qualifier is the knowledge of the
the significatory function, i.e. the relation of the meaning with denotative function the object of which is cowness, there
the word, the recollection of meaning produced by the word would not be such a fault and so, in order to answer (this
is possible. This is the idea. Even without the knowledge of objection), it is said besides (kimceti): The denotative function
incompatibility (anupapaitipratisamdhdnam vinapi): In such is established in the individual (tad a vyaktau laktir iti). The
instances as bring the cow’ and so on, because of the knowledge of the qualified which is in the form that a cow is
impossibility of relating the act of bringing with the universal to be denoted by the word ‘cow’ is indeed an instance of valid
cowness, even though implication of the word ‘cow’ is knowledge because in your opinion there is no erroneous
accepted in the cow, in such instances as ‘there is a cow’ and cognition and because valid knowledge establishes the
so on implication cannot be accepted because of the absence existence of things. This is the idea.
 272
Nydya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 213
In as far as it has the same qualifier (samdnaprakdra-
katvena). In such a knowledge of denotative function, cowness aS the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted
is not the qualifier and so in such instances as ‘bring a cow’ and (iakyatavacchedakam vacyam iti). When the knowledge of the-
state-of-being-denoted in which cowness is the property-
v
S° hni T , bC imp0SSible t0 have the ^collection and
verbal knowledge in which cowness is the qualifier. This is the possessor (dharmin) or when the knowledge of denotative
meaning Nor should it be argued that it would not be function of cowness and so on in which the word ‘cow’ is the
impossible to have a verbal knowledge having that (i e property-possessor is the cause of verbal knowledge, the
cowness) as qualifier since only such aknowledge of denotative inclusion ofthe-state-of-being-objectresidingin cowness which
unction, viz. the word ‘cow’ has the denotative function in (i.e. the-state-of-being-object, visayata) is determined by the-
cowness, is the cause of the verbal knowledge, and since in that state-of-being-cowness, is necessary.2 The knowledge of
nowledge (i.e. m the knowledge that the word ‘cow’ has the denotative function in which there is no determinant for the-
enotative function in cowness) cowness is qualifier to the state-of-being-property-possessor or the knowledge of the
denotative function in which there is no qualifier for the part
<2 uC T°n WhiCh iS a Part °f the meaninS of Ae word of cowness etc. would not be contradicted by an opposite
it J V-uueCfUSe * iS established to the opinion of the
instance of knowledge and so they would not be the causes of
thtr8 "e,Prabbabaras) tbat to have the same qualifier means
that m the knowledge of denotative function to which part (i e verbal knowledge. In this way the state-of-being-cowness is
qua ificand cowness etc. are qualifiers to that part (I.e. established to be the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted,
qualificand) should cowness etc. be qualifiers in the verbal because such a valid knowledge in which the-state-of-being-
now e ge a so. Therefore, in the section dealing with unseen cowness as the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted is an
men since unseen merit has not been experienced earlier (i.e. object, establishes (the existence) of the object. This is the
idea.
efore verbal knowledge) how can there be knowledge of
denotative function (in unseen merit)?. This objection is Your opinion is indeed cumbersome (tavaiva

considered by them pointing out that since denotative function gauravam): Nor should it be objected that even though the
in jar and so on is grasped as things to be accomplished the knowledge of denotative function in which the object is that
unseen merit becomes the object in verbal knowledge by which is qualified by the-state-of-being-cowness (viz. cowness-
means of congruity. Now it may be objected that in such ness) is the cause (of verbal knowledge), that (knowledge) is
nstances as the verbal knowledge in which the-stateof-being- erroneous and, therefore, it does not establish the object.
en such is the case, since it is possible to assert that with
thaCn7 “1 S° °n WhiCh 3re g6neral Pr°Perties reference to the part of the-state-of-being-determinant of
I he,rf arKe ^hers such a state-of-having-the-
causality, the knowledge (i.e. knowledge of denotative function)
suchinstf Gr> uUgh f Cep'ed by them (Pr^bhakaras), in is erroneous and so nowhere would it be possible to establish
is the n liT68 ^ V6rbal kn°Wledge in which the universal
< Ier’SUchastate-°f-havmg-the-same-qualifierisnot
j e^tate-of-being-the-determinant of causality and so on. Or
etthe-state-of-being-cowness and so on be not the determinant
ohiVrtCd thej (Prabhakaras)‘ In order to answer this
jec 10n> 111S Said besides (kimceti). Should be considered c Ve'State'oPbeinS'denote(i); still, it is impossible to avoid
cumbersomeness which is caused by the inclusion of the-state-
 214 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 215

of-being-the-object-residing-in-the-cow in the determinant of Commentary

the causality of verbal knowledge. This (i.e. the-state-of-being- Denotative Function is in the Individual as Qualified
object) is in the form of the-state-of-being-the-determinant of by the Universal and Form
the-state-of-being-property-possessor and so on residing in the-
So far the different means of grasping the denotative
state-of-being-cowness consisting of not inhering in everything
function have been discussed. Now an important philosophical
which is not cow and so on. (The author) concludes his own
question arises. We have already stated that the denotative
opinion (with the word) therefore [tasmad iti). To the
function is a relation between the word and its meaning. We
individual as qualifier by the universal and specific form
already know that one of the relata in this relation is the word.
(jatyakrtivtiistavyaktaveva): Although the form which is of the
We have to explain now the exact nature of the other relatum
nature of the particular conjunction of parts is denoted (by the
(sambandhin), viz. meaning. On this point there are basically
word) it is not a determinant of that (i.e. the-state-of-being-
two schools of thought which oppose one another, the
denoted) like the universal. This is because there is
Mlmamsakas and the Naiyayikas. The present section is
cumbersomeness in postulating the relation of co-existence
indeed a brilliant summary of the long drawn out conflict
[samanadhikaranya) as the relation which controls the-state-of-
between the two schools. Naturally the authors establish the
being-determinant of denotedness. Here it is to be noted that
Nyaya position. The basic position of the two schools is that
the denotative function is only one in all the three because
while the Mlmamsakas hold that the denotative function is in
there is no knowledge of one thing without the other thing
the universal (i.e. the universal is one relatum in the relation
(also becoming the object of knowledge). According *o
which is the denotative function while the other relatum is the
tradition, it is indeed to show this that in the aphorism ‘the
word), the Naiyayikas hold that the denotative function is in
universal, the form and the individual are the meanings of the
the individual as qualified by the universal. First of all the
word’, the singular number is used (for the word padartha).
position of the Mlmamsakas is described with all the arguments
The moderns, however, say that the denotative fimction is
in support of it.
only in the individual qualified by the universal since there is
The doctrine of the Mlmamsakas is as follows: The
the verbal knowledge of the cow and so on as qualified by
denotative function of the words is grasped only in the
cowness and so on, even though there is no recollection of the
universal and not in the individual. The argument in support
form. (According to them) there is indeed a separate denotative
of this position as described by Dinakara is that if the
function in form. Because of the particular expectancy, there
denotative function is grasped in the individual as qualified by
is knowledge of mutual relation of form and individual
the universal as the Naiyayikas assert, then it is necessary to
although they are meanings of the same word (denoted by
grasp the denotative function also in the universal. This is
separate instances of denotative function). And they say that
because of the principle that the knowledge in which the
the singular number of the word padartha in the aphorism is
qualifier is not an object cannot have as its object that which
for the sake of showing that there is only one denotative
is qualified [nagrhitavilesana buddhir vilistesupajayate). In the
function in the universal and in the individual.
present instance, the individual is that which is qualified and
the universal is the qualifier. Therefore, because of simplicity
 216
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 217
the denotative function is to be accepted in the universal alone function is not grasped in the latter. But in fact, when we hear
which is the qualifier and which is one and unqualified rather the word ‘jar’, we have also verbal knowledge of the latter and
than in infinite number of individuals qualified by universal as so there is deviation with reference to the cause and effect
for example, it is better to accept for reasons of simplicity relation.3
the denotative function of the word ‘jar’ in jamess which If, however, the denotative function is grasped in all the
one and unqualified rather than in individual jars which are individuals, obviously there would be no such deviation, but
many and qualified by jamess.
one would have to accept infinite number of denotative
In support of this opinion the Mlmamsakas point out that functions, since the individuals are infinite in number. This is
the denotative function of words is not connected with the indeed cumbersome. Therefore, because of these two faults
qualificand {vtiesya) because its capacity ceases to operate denotative function ofwords cannot be accepted in individuals,
once it is related to the qualifier (vilesana)). This is the meaning but in the universal only.
o t e saying vilesyam nabhidha gacchet ksinalaktir vilesane. If such is the case how can we have knowledge of
I hus, according to the Mlmamsakas, there is no need to individuals?To this the answer of the Mlmamsakas as explained
accept the denotative function in the qualificand because we by the Muktavalikara is as follows: Without the individual, the
can have the verbal knowledge of the qualified through the universal cannot become the object of knowledge (vyaktim
word which has the denotative function only in the qualifier. vina jatibhanasyasambhavat). This reply does not seem to be
How this comes about will be explained immediately. satisfactory; for, when the word cow is uttered, according to
According to the Mlmamsakas, there are other difficulties the Mlmamsakas, the hearer has the recollection of cowness
also to accept the denotative function in the individual, viz. without any reference to the individual cow. Therefore, how
deviation and infinite number of denotative functions. First of can we say that the knowledge of the universal cannot arise
all, this deviation is to be understood with reference to the without making the individual also as its object. Further, when
verbal knowledge which is the effect and the knowledge of the question is about the causal complex which brings about
denotative function which is its cause. Now if we accept the the verbal knowledge of the individual, the answer should
denotative function in the individual, i.e. in some particular point out that causal complex. Instead it is just asserted that
individual, the deviation comes about in the following way: In without making the individual also as its object knowledge of
order to have the verbal knowledge of a particular thing, one the universal cannot arise.
should have the knowledge of the denotative function of a This objection seems to be hardly answered by the
word in that particular thing; otherwise, i.e. if words can be Mlmamsakas; therefore, the answer does not seem to be apt.
used without reference to their distinct denotative function, Hence Dinakara explains the Muktavalt text pointing out the
en om the word jar, one can have the verbal knowledge actual causal complex which brings about the verbal knowledge
ot cloth’ and so on. Such a possibility cannot obviously be °f the individual, viz. the verbal knowledge of an individual
accepted; similarly if the denotative function is grasped in only thing is brought about by the same causal complex which
one particular individual, e.g. a particular jar, then we cannot brings about the knowledge of the universal. But the further
have the verbal knowledge of another jar since the denotative question is in what manner does this itself take place? The
 218 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 219

answer is that the knowledge of the denotative function in following ways: Even if the individual does not become the
which the object is the universal is the cause of the verbal object of knowledge by means of the significatory function in
knowledge in which the individual is the qualificand and the the form of denotative function, it becomes the object of
universal is the qualifier. But then it may be asked why not by verbal knowledge by means of implication (laksana). This
a similar reasoning accept that the knowledge of the denotative means that since the universal which is the denoted meaning
function in which the individual is the object is the cause of the is related to the individual, there is in the individual the
verbal knowledge in the above mentioned form? In this way, significatory function of implication which is in the form of a
there is no difficulty in accepting the denotative function in relation with the denoted meaning. Therefore, there is the
individual only. But this cannot be admitted because of the recollection of the meaning of the individual by means of the
faults already mentioned, viz. deviation and infinite number word and so there could be verbal knowledge the object of
of denotative functions. For these reasons the denotative which is the individual.
function is to be admitted in the universal only. This argument cannot be admitted because of the
Now the Naiyayikas reject all these arguments of the absence of the knowledge of impossibility [anupapattipratisam-
Mlmamsakas and establish their own position that the dhana). Although in such sentences as ‘bring a cow’ and so on
denotative function of words is in the individual as qualified there is impossibility in the sense that cowness cannot be
by the universal. And the fundamental argument of the brought and so the word ‘cow’ has to be taken in the meaning
Naiyayikas is that unless the denotative function is grasped in of individual cow by means of implication, this is not the case
the individual we cannot have the verbal knowledge of the in all sentences. As for instance, in the sentence ‘there is a cow’,
individual. This is to be explained as follows: The verbal there is no impossibility if one takes the word ‘cow’ as having
knowledge of a particular thing arises from the recollection of the denotative function in the universal cowness as the
that particular thing which (i.e. recollection) is produced by Mlmamsakas assert. In this case the sentence ‘there is a cow’
the word. Now the denotative function is a kind of relation that means there is cowness and in the sentence there is cowness
exists between the word and the meaning. If according to the there is no impossibility in connecting existence with cowness
Mlmamsakas, the relation of denotative function is grasped (gotve astitvasyanvayanupapattir nasti). Therefore, in all places
between the word and the universal, then by means of the where the word ‘cow’ is taken as having denotative function
knowledge of one relatum, viz. the word, we can have the in cowness, there is no knowledge of impossibility which is the
recollection of the universal only which is the other relatum. basis of implication and, hence, implication cannot be accepted
Therefore, there cannot be the recollection of the individual. everywhere. Besides, in all instances, individual is the object
Hence there cannot arise also verbal knowledge of the of verbal knowledge without any knowledge of impossibility.
individual. In order to have verbal knowledge of the individual, This is our experience. Hence, denotative function is to be
we must have the recollection of the individual from the word accepted in the individual also.
and for this, the denotative function is necessarily to be Now the objection against the Nyaya position is answered.
grasped in the individual. The objection was that if denotative function is accepted in all
Nor can the Mlmamsakas answer these objections in the individuals, then there would be infinite number of denotative
 220 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 22 7

functions since the number of individuals is infinite. In answer that which is qualified by cowness is the cause of the verbal
to this it is pointed out that the Naiyayikas do not accept knowledge the object of which is cow, i.e. that which is
separate denotative function in each individual belonging to qualified by cowness (gotvavacchinnavisayakaiabdabodhamprati
a particular class, but one denotative function in all the gotvdvacchinnavisayakalaktijnanam karanam). This is the
individuals of a class. And further, according to the Naiyayikas, relation of cause and effect (karyakaranabhava) that is to be
denotative function is in the form of the will of God and this admitted here. Hence for the causality that resides in the
indeed is one. knowledge of denotative function, that which is qualified by
If, however, the denotative function of the word ‘cow’ is cowness becomes the determinant (gotvavilistam avacchedakam
accepted in the individual cow, then the knowledge of the bhavati) since it is consecutive. Therefore, there is no difficulty
denotative function in the individual cow is to be accepted as in accepting the denotative function in the individual.
the cause of the verbal knowledge of cow. But the individual The MImamsakas raise objections against this position
cow by the relation of the-state-of-having-object (visayitdsam- and point out that the individual can become the object of
bandhena) cannot be the determinant of the causality which knowledge, even if it is not direcdy denoted by the word. It is
resides in the knowledge of the denotative function which not necessary to accept as general rule that die verbal
produces the verbal knowledge of cow. This is because knowledge of one particular thing is caused by the recollection
individual cows are not qualified with a characteristic which is of that particular thing which is brought about by the word for
consecutive and which does not occur anywhere else. If the the following reasons. In verbal knowledge the relation of
individual cow, by the relation of visayila, were the determinant meanings also becomes the object. As for example, in such
of the causality residing in the knowledge of the denotative sentences as ‘jar is blue’ (nilo ghatah), the relation of identity
function, then it would be impossible to have verbal knowledge also becomes the object of verbal knowledge since, according
of an individual cow which was not seen before and in which to the Naiyayikas, the verbal knowledge arising from the
the denotative function has not been grasped. Therefore, the sentence nilo ghatah is nilabhinno ghatah, i.e. jar is identical
individual cow, by the relation of visayitd, cannot be* the with that which has blue colour.
determinant of causality which resides in the knowledge of the But neither the word ‘jar’ (ghata) nor the word ‘blue’
denotative function. This is the objection. The answer is that, (nila) brings about the recollection of identity with the help of
by the relation of the-state-of-having-object, the individual cow the knowledge of denotative function. Similarly, in the sentence
is itself the determinant of the causality residing in the ‘bring the jar’ (ghatam an ay a) (here jar is in the accusative
knowledge of denotative function, not indeed as individual as case), the relation of being superstratum (adheyatasambandha)
such, but as qualified by the universal cowness. And such a the recollection of which is not produced either by the word
cowness is a consecutive characteristic seen in all cows and ghata or by the word am with the help of the knowledge of the
does not occur in anything except cows.4 denotative function, becomes also the object of verbal
This is to be explained as follows: Cowness is the knowledge.5 Thus, in these instances before the verbal
consecutive character in all the individual cows. And so the knowledge is produced there is no recollection of the relation
knowledge of the denotative function the object of which is of meanings brought about by any word. Therefore, there is
 222 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 223
no proof that everywhere recollection of the meaning brought
about by the word is the cause of verbal knowledge. And so knowledge of words; such a relation becomes the object in
just as relation (samsarga) becomes the object of verbal verbal knowledge because of expectancy of words, viz.
knowledge without its recollection being brought about by particular combination of words (i.e. padasamabhivyahara-
any word, individual also can become the object of verbal rupa.kah.ksa).6 Still acceptingfor argument’s sake the objection
knowledge without its recollection being produced by the of the Mlmamsakas, the Naiyayikas establish in another way
word. This is the objection of the Mlmamsakas. the denotative function of words in individuals.
The Mlmamsakas further point out that against this The Mlmamsakas accept that the denotative function of
position of theirs it should not be objected that if the individual words is in the universal; now they have to explain what
the recollection of which is not caused by the word can exactly is the form of the knowledge of denotative function. If
become the object ofverbal knowledge,jar also the recollection it is stated that the form of the knowledge of the denotative
of which is not produced by the word can become the object function is that the cow is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’
ofverbal knowledge. This is because the cause of the verbal (gaur gopadaJakya), then it has to be admitted that just as the
knowledge in which the qualificand is cow and the qualifier is denotative function is grasped in the universal cowness, so also
cowness is the knowledge of the denotative function in the denotative function is necessarily grasped in the individual.
cowness. Similarly, the cause of the verbal knowledge in This is because the form of the knowledge of denotative
which the jar is the qualificand and jamess is the qualifier is the function that cow is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’ means
knowledge that the denotative function of the word ‘jar’ is in that the individual cow qualified by cowness is to be denoted
jamess. Thus, only a person who has grasped the denotative by the word ‘cow’ (i.e. gotvavitistamgopadaSakyam). And such
function of the word ‘jar’ in jamess and who by the help of this a knowledge is always a valid cognition since the Mlmamsakas
denotative function recollects the meaning of the word ‘jar’ do not admit erroneous cognition. Hence the valid knowledge
(i.e., jamess) can have the verbal knowledge in which jar is the of the denotative function in the form that cow is to be denoted
qualificand andjarness is the qualifier. One who does not have by the word ‘cow’, establishes that the denotative function is
such a recollection of jamess through the word ‘jar’ with the necessarily also in the individual.
help of the knowledge of the denotative function does not If, however, the form of the knowledge of denotative
have the verbal knowledge of the jar. And so from the function is that cowness is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’
sentence ‘there is cloth’ if a person who has also the knowledge (gotvam gopadalakyam), there would not arise either the
of denotative function that the word ‘jar’ has denotative recollection or the verbal knowledge in which cowness is the
function in jarness, has the verbal knowledge in which cloth qualifier and cow is the qualificand. This is because the
is the object, jar also does not become the object of that knowledge of the denotative function is the cause of the
knowledge. In this way, the Mimamsakas answer a possible recollection of the meaning and of the verbal knowledge if
objection of the Naiyayikas against their position. only they have the same qualifier as the knowledge of the
Here it should be noted that the Naiyayikas do not accept denotative function. Here, however, both recollection of the
that the recollection of the relation of meanings arises from the meaning and the verbal knowledge do not have the same
qualifier (prakara) as the knowledge of denotative function.
 224 Nyaya Philosophy of Language 225
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda

This is because the knowledge of denotative function in the which is the cause of a verbal knowledge in which cow is the
form gotvam gopadaJakyam, i.e. cowness is to be denoted by qualificand and cowness is the qualifier that is to be explained;
the word cow, does not have as qualifier cowness.7 and the MImamsa position that the knowledge that the word
Therefore, in such instances as ‘bring the cow’ and so on ‘cow’ has denotative function in cowness cannot produce an
we cannot have the remembrance and verbal knowledge with instance of verbal knowledge in which cow is the qualificand
the qualifier as cowness. And only the knowledge in which and cowness is the qualifier for the reasons adduced.
cow is the qualificand and cowness is the qualifier [govilesyaka• It is to be noted that the Mlmamsakas make use of this
gotvaprakarakajhanam) leads to the action of bringing an general principle that if something is a qualifier for some
actual individual cow. particular thing in the knowledge of denotative function that
The Mlmamsakas may try to answer this objection as should be a qualifier for that particular thing in the verbal
follows: The form of the knowledge of denotative function is knowledge also, in order to show that the unseen (adrsta) can
not gotvam gopadalakyam, but gopadam gotve laktam, the word become the object cl crbal knowledge. However, this principle
‘cow’ has denotative function in cowness. Such a knowledge of the Mlmamsakas by which they show that the unseen can
of denotative function in cowness [gopadam gotve Saktam) has become the object of verbal knowledge has to be interpreted
cowness as qualifier and so it is the cause of verbal knowledge in the way in which Ramarudra does it. We now give an exact
in which cowness is the qualifier. This is because cowness is account of the explanation of Ramarudra on this topic.
qualifier to denotative function in the knowledge of denotative Here it should be noted, first of all, that Ramarudra
function in the form the word cow has denotative function in interpretsyadamSe etc. in D. as svatmakayaddharmafrayamle,
cowness [gopadam gotve laktam):8 Therefore, it is possible to tadamse, taddharmairayamk, yattadpadadvayam ekadharma-
have the verbal knowledge in which cowness is the qualifier param. The meaning of this interpretation is that that
from the knowledge of denotative function in the form the characteristic which is the qualifier to the substratum of that
word cow has denotative function in cowness. characteristic in the knowledge of the denotative function
But this answer cannot be accepted. This is because of should be the qualifier to the substratum of that same
the general principle of the Mlmamsakas that if something is characteristic in verbal knowledge also. As for instance, the
a qualifier for some particular thing in the knowledge of knowledge of the denotative function in the form gaur gopa-
denotative function that should be a qualifier for that daiakya, is goviiesyakagotvaprakarakajhanam. Here, cowness
particular thing in the verbal knowledge also. In the present is the qualifier to cow which is the substratum of cowness. The
instance of the knowledge of denotative function, cowness is knowledge of the denotative function in such a form produces
qualifier to the denotative function [gotvam laktau prakarah). verbal knowledge in which also the same form should occur,
From such a knowledge of denotative function it is possible to i.e. the substratum of cowness should be the qualificand and
have only a verbal knowledge in which denotative function cowness should be the qualifier.
[iakti) is qualificand and cowness is qualifier and not a verbal Having explained the general rule in this way, Ramarudra
knowledge in which cow is the qualificand and cowness is the shows how, according to the Mlmamsakas, the unseen becomes
qualifier. It is the form of the knowledge of denotative function the object of verbal knowledge. The Mlmamsakas admit the
 226 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary- Sabdakhanda 227
verbal knowledge of the unseen from such Vedic optative
heaven should perform jyotistoma sacrifice) he has the verbal
sentences as ‘one who is desirous of heaven should perform knowledge in the following form: One who is desirous of
sacrifice . Since the unseen is unknown earlier how can there
heaven should accomplish something appropriate to obtain
be the knowledge of denotative function of optatives and so
heaven by the performance of jyotistoma sacrifice. This is
on in the unseen? The answer of the Mlmamsakas to this
because one who is desirous of heaven does not perform
objection is as follows: In normal life in such sentences as
sacrifice in order to produce jar and so on. The proper thing
‘make ajar’ and so on, the denotative function of the optative
produced by the performance of sacrifice is the unseen which
and so on is grasped in jar and so on which are qualified by
gives heaven. This is the meaning when it is asserted that the
the-state-of-being-accomplished [karyatvavUiste ghatadau unseen becomes the object of verbal knowledge as the
lihddeh iaktih grhyate). Hence, the knowledge of denotative
substratum of the-state-of-being-accomplished by means of
function has the following form: That which is qualified by the-
congruity.
state-of-being-accomplished, viz. jar and so on, are the
If Ramarudra had not interpreted the general rule in the
qualificands and the-state-of-being-accomplished is the qualifier
way explained above, it would not have been possible for him
{kdryatvavihstaghatadiviksyakakdryatvaprakarakam Sakti- to show how, according to the Mlmamsakas, the unseen
jhanam). And from this knowledge of denotative function we
becomes the object of verbal knowledge. This is because the
have the verbal knowledge in a similar form, viz. that which meaning of the general principle as given in the text is that if
is qualified by the-state-of-being-accomplished, viz. jar and so something is a qualifier for some particular thing in the verbal
on, are the qualificands and the-state-of-being-accomplished is knowledge that should be a qualifier for that particular thing
the qualifier (karyatvavihstaghatadivUesyakakaryatvapra• in the knowledge of denotative function also. This means that
karakah sabdabodhah).
the qualifier in the knowledge of the denotative function and
And so just as in ordinary instances of optatives and so in the verbal knowledge should be the same. Therefore, from
on the denotative functions grasped in jar and so on which are the knowledge of the denotative function of optatives and so
the substrata of the-state-of-being-accomplished, so also from on in jar and so on as qualified by the-state-of-being-
the Vedic injunctions we have the verbal knowledge of the accomplished, one can gain the verbal knowledge of jar and
unseen as the substratum of the-state-of-being-accomplished, so on as qualified by the-state-of-being-accomplished and not
for with regard to the Vedic injunctions, jar and so on cannot of the unseen as qualified by the-state-of-being-accomplished.
be understood as the substrata of the-state-of-being- From these discussions it follows that if the denotative
accomplished. Hence the unseen becomes the object of function is accepted in the form that the word ‘cow’ has
verbal knowledge as the substratum of the-state-of-being- denotative function in cowness [gopadam gotve Saktam), it is
accomplished by congruity (yogyata). This means that when impossible to have the verbal knowledge in which cow is the
the person who has already the knowledge of denotative qualificand and cowness is the qualifier since denotative
function of optatives and so on in jar and so on as qualified by function is not the substratum of cowness. Therefore, the
the-state-of-being-accomplished, hears the Vedic injunctions conclusion of the Naiyayikas is that, in order to have the verbal
such as jyotistomena svargakamo yajeta (one who is desirous of knowledge in which cow is the qualificand and cowness is the
228 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 229
qualifier, one should have the knowledge of the denotative
jyiowledge by itself [svarupatah). Hence there is no simplicity;
function in the individual cow (i.e. gaur gopadaiakya).
therefore, they accept the denotative function of the word paiu
But the Mimamsakas raise a further objection to this
in lomavalldhgulddiviiistavyakti, i.e. in an individual animal.
position. In such instances as when the-state-of-being-accomp-
Therefore, the Mimamsakas conclude that there is
lished and so on are the qualifiers in the verbal knowledge,
simplicity if one accepts the denotative function in the universal
there should be the same qualifier in the denotative function
as explained above, and where there is no such simplicity they
also which is the cause of verbal knowledge, but not when the
admit the denotative function in the individual. Hence, the
verbal knowledge has the universal as qualifier. Here the
final position of the Mimamsakas is that they do not agree that
knowledge of denotative function which is its cause need not
the knowledge of denotative function and the verbal knowledge
have the same qualifier, the universal. This means that there
ensuing from it should have the same qualifier in every
is no rule that the verbal knowledge in which the universal is
instance because the knowledge of the denotative function in
the qualifier should have as its cause the knowledge of
the universal produces the verbal knowledge in which the
denotative function in which the qualifier is the universal.
individual is the qualificand and the universal is the qualifier.
Hence, even without the recollection in which the universal is
Hence, there is no need to accept the denotative function in
the qualifier, there could be the verbal knowledge in which the the individual as qualified by the universal. This is the
universal is qualifier. This is because when the denotative objection of the Mimamsakas.
function is accepted in the universal, the denotative function The Naiyayikas reject this opinion of the Mimamsakas by
(i.e. lakyatd, the-state-of-being-denoted) is not determined by pointing out that, in their position, there is not only no
any determinant [niravacchinna] and hence, the universal simplicity [laghavam) but in fact there is cumbersomeness
becomes the object of knowledge by itself (svarupatah), i.e. [gauravam). The arguments here are extremely intricate which
without any further qualifier. we will now explain step by step. If, as the Mimamsakas say,
This means that the denotative function is in the universal the denotative function is to be grasped in cowness, the
which is only one and not many like the individuals and so the knowledge of denotative function itself can have two forms as
denotative function also is only one. Therefore, the position of
follows: (1) Cowness is to be denoted by the word cow (gotvam
the Mimamsakas has the advantage of simplicity also. Where
gopadalakyam). In this form of knowledge, cowness is the
there is no such simplicity even the Mimamsakas admit the
dharmin (substratum, i.e. that in which something resides); the-
denotative function in the individual, as for example, the
state-of-being-denoted [lakyatvam) is the dharma (that which
Mimamsakas also admit the denotative function of the word resides in something). Hence, the-state-of-being-denoted which
palu (animal) in the individual (animal) qualified by tail etc. is the dharma resides in cowness which is the dharmin. Thus
Here the argument should be understood in the following this knowledge in which cowness is the dharmin and lakyatvam
sense: The wordpalu means lomavallahgulddimdn. Therefore, ls the dharma is the cause of verbal knowledge in which
according to the Mimamsakas, the denotative function of the cowness is the qualifier and cow is the qualificand (gotvaprakara-
word paiu should be in lomvalldhgulddimattva, i.e. languid, kagovitesyakalabdabodha). In this knowledge of denotative
tail, which is many and which does not become the object of function which is the cause of the verbal knowledge cowness
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 23 7
230 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
in-anything-other-than-cows. This is indeed cumbersome. This,
is object as the dharmin; the contentness, viz., the-state-of- in brief, is the argument of the Naiyayikas.
being-the-object-of-knowledge residing in gotva which is the But how can gotvatvam be accepted as the iakyatava-
dharmin (gotvanisthadharmitakhyavisayata), should necessarily cchedakam, when the Mimamsakas assert that gotvam becomes
be determined by the-state-of-being-cowness (gotvatva). (2) the object of knowledge by itself (svarupatah) without any
The other form of the knowledge of the denotative function further qualifier. The Naiyayikas show that gotvatvam is
is the following: The word ‘cow’ has the denotative function necessarily to be accepted as the iakyalavachedaka by exact
in cowness (gopadam gotve iaktam). In this form of knowledge arguments in the following way.
of denotative function, the word ‘cow’ is the dharmin; denotative We take, first of all, the first form of the knowledge of
function is the dharma; cowness is a qualifier of the denotative denotative function, viz. cowness is to be denoted by the word
function (iakti), (gotvam iaktau prakarah). This form of the ‘cow’ (gotvamgopadaiaky am). If in this knowledge of denotative
knowledge of denotative function is also the cause for the function the-state-of-being-cowness (gotvatvam) does not
verbal knowledge in which cowness is the qualifier and cow become the object as the determinant of the-state-of-being-
is the qualificand. In this knowledge of denotative function substratum (dharmitavacchedakatvena), then such a knowledge
cowness is the qualifier of denotative function and the of denotative function will notbe the cause ofverbal knowledge
qualifiemess (prakarata) residing in cowness should necessarily and so no verbal knowledge will arise from such a knowledge
be determined by the-state-of-being-cowness [gotvatva). of denotative function.
Now it is clear that in both the forms of the knowledge of Why is it so? This is because the definite knowledge of
denotative function the-state-of-being-cowness (gotvatva) also contradiction (badhaniicaya) prevents the qualificative
necessarily becomes the object. From this it follows that the knowledge (viiistajhana). As for instance, the definite
forms of the knowledge of denotative function would be as knowledge that the lake has the absence of fire prevents the
follows: Cowness qualified by the-state-of-being-cowness is to qualificative knowledge that the lake has fire. In both the
be denoted by the word cow (gotvatvaviiistam gopadaiakyam) instances of knowledge, viz. the instance of knowledge which
or the word ‘cow’ has the denotative function in cowness prevents and the instance of knowledge which is prevented,
qualified by the-state-of-being-cowness (gopadam gotvatvaviiiste the same characteristic of lakeness becomes the object as the
iaktam). In both these forms of the knowledge of denotative determinant of the-state-of-being-substratum (dharmitavaccheda-
function gotvatvam is the determinant of the-state-of-being-
denoted (Sakyatavacchedakam). Now the Naiyayikas argue The certain knowledge that the lake is without fire does
that there is cumbersomeness in accepting denotative function not prevent the knowledge that there is fire, without specifying
in gotvam which is the universal. This is because, if denotative the particular place where there is fire (vahnyabhavavan hradah
function is accepted in this way, the-state-of-being-cowness iti niicayah kevalam vahniman iti jhanam na pratibadhnati).
(gotvatvam) is necessarily iakyatavacchedakam as shown above. This is because in the latter instance of knowledge the
And gotvatvam can be defined only with reference to all determinant of the-state-of-being-substratum (dharmitava-
individual cows, i.e. gotvatvam, the-state-of-being-cowness, is cchedakam) does not become the object of knowledge. In
the-state-of-being-inherent-in-all-cows-without-being-inherent-
232 Nyaya Philosophy of Language 233
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda
other words, in the knowledge ‘there is fire’ (vahniman)
that gotvam gopadaiakyam, if he has also definite knowledge
although some unspecified place becomes also the object of
that cowness is not to be denoted by the word ‘cow’ (gotvam
knowledge as related to fire by the force of the possessive suffix
nagopadaiakyam) in which cowness is the object as determined
(matuppratyaya), still no particular place is mentioned as
by the-state-of-being-cowness (gotvatvena gotvavagahi), then
related to fire. Therefore, it follows that if the determinant of
from the word ‘cow’ there could be the verbal knowledge in
the-state-of-being-substratum does not become the object of
which cowness is the qualifier and cow is the qualificand. The
knowledge, the place related to fire cannot be specified.
possibility of such a verbal knowledge when there is real
Similarly, the mere knowledge that there is no fire does not
knowledge of contradiction is denied by all iastrakara-s.
prevent the knowledge that the lake has fire because here also
Therefore, in order to avoid the possibility of verbal
in the knowledge that there is no fire the determinant of the-
knowledge when there is the knowledge of contradiction, it is
state-of-being-substratum-of-the-absence-of-fire (vahnyabhava-
necessary to admit that in the knowledge of the denotative
dharmitavacchedakam) does not become the object. This is to
function in the form that cowness is to be denoted by the word
be explained in the way described above. Therefore, one
‘cow’, the-state-of-being-cowness (gotvatvam) is also object as
instance of knowledge prevents another instance of knowledge
the determinant of the-state-of-being-substratum. Thus the
only if the determinant of the-state-of-being-substratum
knowledge of denotative function in the form that cowness is
(dharmitavacchedakam) being the same becomes the object in
to be denoted by the word ‘cow’, has necessarily the-state-of-
both the instances of knowledge.
being-cowness also as object in the capacity of being-the-
In the present instance the Mimamsakas accept that the
determinant-of-the-state-of-being-denoted. In this way, we
knowledge of denotative function is in the form that cowness
establish that the-state-of-being-cowness is the determinant of
is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’. According to them, this
the-state-of-being-denoted (gotvatvam iakyatavacchedakam).
is nirdharmitavacchedakakam jnanam, i.e. the-state-of-being-
And if the-state-of-being-cowness is the determinant of the-
cowness (gotvatvam) does not become the object of knowledge
as the determinant the-state-of-being-substratum. Therefore, state-of-being-denoted, then the Mlmamsa position suffers
from the fault of cumbersomeness since in the concept of the-
such a knowledge is not prevented by the knowledge that
state-of-being-cowness (gotvatvam) all individual cows are
cowness is not to be denoted by the word ‘cow’; in this
knowledge, however, the-state-of-being-substratum-residing- included, as mentioned earlier.
The word ‘cow’ has denotative function in cowness
in-cowness is the object of the knowledge as determined by
(gopadam gotve iaktam)’, this is the other form of the knowledge
the-state-of-being-cowness {gotvatva).
Against this position the Mimamsakas cannot argue that of denotative function. In this form of knowledge, cowness is
the knowledge of denotative function in which the determinant the qualifier (prakara) of denotative function. And in the-state-
of the-state-of-being-substratum is not the object, can be the of-being-qualifier (prakarata) residing in cowness, the-state-of-
cause of verbal knowledge. This is because of the following being-cowness (gotvatvam) is to be taken as the determinant
(prakaratavacchedakam); this determinant also should
reason. If the position of Mimamsakas is admitted, when a
person has the knowledge of denotative function in the form necessarily be the object of the above mentioned form of
knowledge. Otherwise, such a form of knowledge, viz. the
234 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 235

word ‘cow’ has denotative function in cowness in which the cowness, a person who has the knowledge of denotative
determinant of the-state-of-being-qualifier [prakaratava- function that the word ‘cow’ has the denotative function in
cchedafcam), i.e. the-state-of-being-cowness (gotvatvam), does cowness, would have from the word ‘cow’ the verbal knowledge
not become object, would not be prevented by the contradictory in which cow is the qualificand and cowness is the qualifier,
knowledge, viz the word ‘cow’ does not have denotative does not stand.
function in cowness. This is because in the contradictory The Naiyayikas answer this objection as follows: The
knowledge the-state-of-being-cowness is object as the universal is a qualifier by itself only by the relation of inherence
determinant of the-state-of-being-qualifier. and not by any other relation [samavayenaiva jateh svarupatah
Against this position an objection may be raised: In the prakaratvam abhyupagamyate nanyasambandheneti niyamah).
knowledge of denotative function in the form that the word This is the rule; otherwise, just as one can say that knowledge
‘cow’ has denotative function in cowness, cowness is object by is a quality one would also be able to say that knowledge is jar.
itself without any further qualifier. The answer to this is as This is because, in knowledge there is the universal of
follows: Suppose there is an instance of contradictory know¬ qualityness (gunatva) by the relation of inherence and so we
ledge, viz. the word ‘cow’ does not have the denotative can say that knowledge is quality. If the universal by itself is
function in cowness in which form of knowledge the-state-of- qualifier by any relation other than inherence, then the
being-cowness also becomes the object as the determinant of following difficulty arises.
the-state-of-being-qualifier. In such a case a person having the We normally use the sentence ‘knowledge is quality’
knowledge of denotative function in the form that the word [jhanam gunah) in order to produce the verbal knowledge in
‘cow’ has the denotative function in cowness in which cowness which knowledge is the qualificand and the universal qualityness
is object as the qualifier of denotative function without having (gunatvam) by itself is the qualifier by the relation of inherence.
gotvatvam as further qualifier, could also have from the word Similarly, if the universal by itself is qualifier by any relation
‘cow’ the verbal knowledge in which cow is the qualificand other than inherence [yadi jatih samavayabhinnasambandhena
and cowness is the qualifier. svarupatah prakarataya bhaseta) it would be correct to use the
Now a further objection may be raised by the Mimamsakas sentence ‘knowledge is pot’ [jhanamghatah iti vyavaharapattih)
as follows: The knowledge that this is a cow is prevented by the in order to produce the verbal knowledge in which knowledge
knowledge that this is not a cow. In both instances of is qualificand, the universal potness by itself is qualifier by the
knowledge, cowness is qualifier by itself (svarupatah). Similarly relation of the-state-of-having-object [visayitasambandhena).
also in the two instances of knowledge, viz. the word ‘cow’ has This is because in knowledge the universal potness resides by
denotative function in cowness and the word ‘cow’ does not the relation of the-state-of-having-cbject. Therefore, there
have denotative function in cowness, cowness is qualifier to must be the rule that a universal by itself is qualifier only by
denotative function by itself [svarupatah). Therefore, let the the relation of inherence and not by any other relation.
former be prevented by the latter. Hence, the previous In the present context of the knowledge of denotative
objection that when there is the contradictory knowledge that function in the form that the word ‘cow’ has denotative
the word ‘cow’ does not have the denotative function in function in cowness, cowness is qualifier to denotative function
236 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 237

(takti) by the relation of the-state-of-being-superstratum being-cowness [gotvatvam) also be object, but it is not the
(adheyatasambandhena) and not by the relation of inherence. determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted; since in this
Therefore, here cowness is the qualifier to the denotative knowledge of denotative function the co-occurrence of the-
function as qualified by the-state-of-being-cowness [gotvatva) state-of-being-cowness with the-state-of-being-denoted is the
and not by itself (svarupatah). This means, in the knowledge object and not the-state-of-being-determined by the-state-of-
of denotative function the-state-of-being-cowness [gotvatvam) being-cowness [iaktijnane Sakyatayam gotvatvasamanadhi-
is the determinant of the-state-of-being-qualifier [prakaratava- karanyam eva visayah natu tadavacchinnatvam). Therefore, the-
cchedakam) residing in cowness. Therefore, the-state-of-being- state-of-being-cowness is not the determinant of the-state-of-
cowness is the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted. The being-denoted, and hence the Mimamsa position does not
determinant of the-state-of-being-qualifier is to be taken as the have the fault of cumberson.eness.
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted. This will be Naturally the Naiyayikas do not admit this argument.
explained immediately. According to them, all instances of qualificative knowledge
It may further be noted that, if the opinion of the have as object the relation of something in something else
Mimamsakas is accepted, the first form of the knowledge of qualified (iviiiste vaiiistyam) or the relation of a qualified thing
denotative function cannot be prevented because it does not in something else [vifistasya vailistyam). Now in the form of the
have the determinant of the-state-of-being-substratum. The knowledge of denotative function that cowness is to be
second form of the knowledge of denotative function cannot denoted by the word ‘cow’ [gotvam gopadaSakyam) cowness is
be prevented because such a form of knowledge does not the qualificand, the-state-of-being-denoted by the word ‘cow’
even arise. The reason is that the-state-of-being-qualifier residing [gopadaiakyatvam) is the qualifier. The determinant of
in cowness determined by the relation of being superstratum qualificandness is the-state-of-being-cowness (viiesjatava-
does not have a characteristic as its determinant, but in fact, cchedakam gotvatvam), and so this form of knowledge has as
it should have.10 Therefore, the knowledge of denotative object the relation of the-state-of-being-denoted with that
function in the form gopadam gotve iaktam has necessarily which is qualified by the-state-of-being-cowness. Here in this
gotvatvam as prakaratavacchedaka. Now, it should be noted form of knowledge, the determinant of qualificandness is the-
that gotvatvam is defined as inhering in all individual cows state-of-being-cowness. And the-state-of-being-cowness which
while not inhering in anything other than cows is the determinant of qualificandness also becomes the object
[sakalagosamavetatve sati gavetarasamavetatvam). In this of knowledge of denotative function as connected with the
definition all individual cows are also included. Thus in the qualifier (viz. the-state-of-being-denoted) by the relation of the-
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted, viz. the-state-of- state-of-being-determined [avacchinnatvasambandhena] through
being-cowness, all individual cows are included and so the the substratum of the-state-of-being-cowness, viz. cowness. So
Mimamsakas’ opinion that the denotative function is in the here gotvatvam is the determinant of iakyata and so the
universal is extremely cumbersome. Mimamsa position is cumbersome [viksjatavacchedakasya
Now the Mimamsakas object to this position: In the two
forms of the knowledge of denotative function let the-state-of- vasambandhena bhanam).n
238 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 239
Similarly also in the other form of the knowledge of
denotative function, viz. the word ‘cow’ has denotative function In order to avoid such a cumbersomeness, both the
in cowness (gopadam gotve laktam), cowness is the qualifier of instances of the knowledge of denotative function are to be
denotative function; here the qualificand of the qualifier accepted in the form: There is a qualificand in which there is
cowness, is denotative function. The determinant of a qualifier in which there is a further qualifier and so on (viksye
qualifierness is the-state-of-being-cowness [gotvatvam). Hence veksanam tatrapi viksanam iti ritya jayamanam jhanam). And
in this form of the knowledge of denotative function the in such an instance of knowledge, the-state-of-being-cowness
relation of cowness which is qualified by the-state-of-being- (gotvatvam) does not become the object of knowledge as the
cowness with the denotative function becomes the object. determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted (Sakyata). Hence,
Here again, the determinant of qualifierness, viz. the-state-of- the conclusion of the Mlmamsakas is that in their position
being-cowness, becomes the object of the knowledge of there is no fault of cumbersomeness.
denotative function as connected with denotative function by Besides, even if all instances of qualificative knowledge
the relation of the-state-of-being-determined through the are vikstavaikstyavagahi, still in the two forms of the knowledge
substratum (of the-state-of-being-cowness) which here is cowness of denotative function as described earlier the-state-of-being-
(;viksanatavacchedakam gotvatvam gotvarupadharmiparatantr- cowness {gotvatvam) does not become the object of knowledge
yena gotvarupaviksanasya viksyabh utayam laktau as the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted [Sakyatava-
avacchinnatvasambandhena bhasate). In this way, the-state-of- cchedakam). This is because in all forms of vikstavaikstya-
being-cowness becomes the determinant of the-state-of-being- jhana it is necessary that viksanatavacchedakavachinnapratiyogi-
denoted and, hence, the fault of cumbersomeness remains in takatvam or viksyatavacchedakavachinnanuyogitakatvam
the Mlmamsa position. becomes object in the relation (samsarga) as qualifier. The
The Mlmamsakas, however, object to this: All general reason for this is the following: In all instances of qualificative
rules have exceptions. In our present context the two forms of knowledge in their both forms, viz. in vikstasya vaikstyavaga-
the knowledge of denotative function are not to be considered hijhana and in vikste vaikstyavagahijhana, there are two quali-
as instances of vikstavaikstyavagahijhana. This is because, in fiemess in the determinant of the-state-of-being-qualifier (viksa-
our present case, there are factors such as cumbersomeness natavacchedaka) and in the determinant of the-state-of-being-
which set aside this general rule that all instances of qualificative qualificand (viksyatavacchedaka). In the instance of the know¬
knowledge are vikstavaikstyavagahi. This cumbersomeness ledge of denotative function gopadam gotve iaktam, the deter¬
comes about because of the fact that the-state-of-being-cowness minant of the-state-of-being-qualification is the-state-of-being-
(gotvatvam) is the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted cowness; in it there are two qualifierness: One is indicated by
(lakyata). And in the-state-of-being-cowness, all individual the qualificandness residing in gotva\ the other is indicated by
cows also are included since the-state-of-being-cowness is the qualificandness residing in denotative function. In the
the-state-of-being-inherent-in-all-cows-without-being-inherent- instance of the knowledge of denotative function, gotvamgopa-
in-anything-other-than-cow. In this way, there is cumber¬ dalakyam also there are two qualifierness in the-state-of-being-
someness. cowness, one indicated by qualificandness residing in cowness,
the other indicated by qualificandness residing in the-state-of-
240 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 241

being-denoted-by-the-word-‘cow’, i.e. in the denotative function vatiistydvagdhijnanam, i.e. gotvatvavtiistasya gotvasya iaktau
of the word ‘cow’. This is the state of affairs. vatiistydvagdhijnanam) f the relation ofgotva with iakti becomes
But this cannot be accepted. And the reason is that in the object as qualified by the-state-of-being-that-which-indicates-
both kinds of knowledge, i.e. in viksye vtiesanam tatrdpi the-adjunctness (pratiyogita) which resides in the universal
vtisanam iti ritya jdyamanajnana, and in vtiistaoatiistyajnana, gotva and which is determined by gotvatvam which is the
there is no difference in form. If in the latter, two qualifiemess determinant of the-state-of-being-qualifier (iaktinisthagotvasam-
are accepted as explained above, then there should be a sargah vtiesanatavacchedakibhutagotvatvavacchinnapratiyogita-
difference in the form of this knowledge. But this is not katvena visayibhavati). Therefore, in both the forms of the
experienced. Therefore, in vtiistavatiistyajnana as vtiistasya knowledge of denotative function the-state-of-being-cowness
vatiistyavagahi, the relation becomes the object in the capacity does not become the object as the determinant of the-state-of-
of being that which indicates the adjunctness (pratiyogita) being-denoted.
which resides in the qualifier and which is determined by the Therefore, D. shows cumbersomeness in the Mlmamsa
determinant of the-state-of-being-qualifier (samsargah position in another way. For the verbal knowledge, the
vtiesanatdvacchedakdvacchinnapratiyogitakatvenavisayibhavati). knowledge of denotative function is the cause. And in this
In the second form of vtiistavatiistyajnana as vtiiste knowledge of denotative function the determinant of the-state-
vatiistyavagahi, the relation becomes the object in the capacity of-being-substratum (dharmitavacchedakam) has necessarily
of being that which indicates the subjunctness (anuyogita) also to be the object since, otherwise, such a knowledge
which resides in the qualificand and which is determined by cannot be the cause of verbal knowledge as was shown earlier.
the determinant of the-state-of-being-qualificand [samsargah But the present instance of the knowledge of denotative
vtiesyaldvacchedakdvacchinndmyogitdkatvenavisaytbhavati).Tfns function is that cowness is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’
general principle is to be applied to the two instances of the (gotvam gopadaiakyam). And in this instance of the knowledge
knowledge of denotative function, viz. gotvam gopadaiakyam of denotative function the substratum of property (dharmi) is
and gopadam gotve iaktam. cowness and the determinant of the-state-of-being-substratum
In the form of the knowledge of the denotative function is the-state-of-being-cowness (gotvatvam). The-state-of-being-
gotvam gopadaiakyam (This is vtiiste vatiistyavagahijnanam, i.e. object residing in gotvatva in the form of the-state-of-being-the-
gotvatvavtiiste gotve gopadctiakyatvasya vaiiistydvagdhijndnam), determinant-of-the-state-of-being-substratum is included as a
the relation of the denotative function with the universal gotva constituent part in the determinant of the-state-of-being-the-
becomes object as qualified by the-state-of-being-that-which- cause for verbal knowledge (dharmitavacchedakatarupa-
indicates-the-subjUnctness which resides in the universal gotva gotvatvanisthavisayata iaktijndnanisthaidbdabodhakdranataydh
and which is determined by gotvatva which is the determinant avacchedakakotau pravista). And the-state-of-being-cowness is
of the-state-of-being-qualificand (gotvanisthagopadaiakyatvasam- the-state-of-being-inherent-in-all-cows-without-being-inherent-
sargah viiesyatdvacchedakibhutagotvatvdvacchinndnuyogitdkat- in-anything-other-than-cow. Therefore, when it is said that the-
vena visayibhavati). In the form of the knowledge of the state-of-being-cowness also is the object as dharmitavacchedaka
denotative function gopadam gotve iaktam (This is vtiistasya in the knowledge of denotative function which is the cause of
242 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 243
verbal knowledge, it means that all cows also become the
object of the knowledge of denotative function. Hence, there because, first of all, samanadhikaranya is to be further
is certainly eumbersomeness in the Mimamsa position. This is postulated as the iakyatavacchedakatavacchedakasambandha.
the conclusion of the Naiyayikas. Besides, if the universal is accepted as iakyatavacchedaka, it
After all these intricate arguments and counter arguments >

Muktavalikara concludes the position of the Naiyayikas as but if form (akrti) is taken as iakyatavacchedaka, it becomes
follows: The denotative function is to be accepted only in the object of knowledge as having a further characteristic (kimci-
individuals as qualified by form and universal. This is because, ddharmavattvena) which here is akrtitva, i.e. avayavasamyogatva.
otherwise, it would be impossible to arrive at the verbal Further, form is conjunction of parts and this is many in
knowledge of the individual qualified by form and universal number; on the contrary the universal is only one. For these
for reasons which have been discussed at length earlier. reasons it is logically simple to accept universal as iakyatavac¬
Now D. and R. explain carefully this position of the chedaka.
Naiyayikas which has been summarised by the Muktavalikara. Now, according to the old Naiyayikas, there is denotative
First of all, according to M., the denotative function is in the function in all the three, viz. form, universal and individual.
individual as qualified by the universal and form. Now since This means that there is iakyata, in all the three, viz. form,
the universal and form are anyunavrtti and anatiriktavrtti with universal and individual. However, since universal does not
respect to the-state-of-being-denoted (iakyata), they both are exist in form as well as in the universal itself, the universal is
determinants of the-state-of-being-denoted. This being the nyunavrtti with respect to iakyata. Therefore, the universal
cannot be the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted. The
case, why is it that only the universal is accepted as the
answer to this objection is as follows: The universal is the
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted? The reason is that
pervader of iakyata, which is qualified by existence in the
there is simplicity in accepting the universal as the determinant
individual (vyaktivrttitvaviiistaiakyatavydpaka) and it is also
of the-state-of-being-denoted. This is because only those
pervaded by iakyata without any qualifier (iuddhaiakyatdnati-
characteristics which exist in the same substratum can have
riktavrtti). This just means that wherever there is iakyata which
the relationship of the determinant and the determined
is qualified by the individual there is the universal and
(iavacchedyavacchedakabhavah).
wherever there is no iakyata (i.e. iuddhaiakyata, unqualified
By the relation of samavaya the universal exists in the
iakyata) there is no universal. And hence, universal can
individual which is the substratum of iakyata. Form (akrti)
without any difficulty be the determinant of iakyata which is
which is conjunction of parts [avayavasamyoga) exists in parts
qualified (viiistaiakyata). If this answer is not accepted and if
by the relation of samavaya; form, however, exists in the
both form and universal are taken as determinants of iakyata,
individual by the relation of samanadhikaranya since both
the same objection could be raised, since iakyata is in
form and individual exist in parts. But to accept this relation
universal, but in it there is no form and, therefore, akrti cannot
of samanadhikaranya as the relation of the determinant of the-
be iakyatavacchedaka. Similarly, there is iakyata in form, but
state-of-being-determinant-of-the-state-of-being-denoted (iakya-
in form there is no form. Hence akrti also cannot be iakyatavac¬
tavacchedakatavacchedakasambandha) is cumbersome. This is
chedaka.
244 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 245

Further, the Naiyayikas of the old school hold that the cow) is recollected by means of the word ‘cow’, then there is
denotative function which is in the universal, form and the verbal knowledge of the individual cow as qualified by
individual is only one. The reason is that there is no knowledge form and universal. In the opinions of both the old and
of the one without the other; i.e. form does not become the modem Naiyayikas, the individual is the qualificand and the
object of knowledge without the individual and universal and form and the universal are qualifiers. This is because of the
the individual does not become the object of knowledge relation of cause and effect existing between the knowledge of
without form and universal. This means that there is the verbal denotative function and verbal knowledge. As for instance,
knowledge of all the three, viz. universal, form and individual the knowledge of the denotative function of the word ‘cow’
by means of one denotative function. In contrast to this, when produces the verbal knowledge in which cow is the qualificand
for one word there are different meanings by means of and form and universal are qualifiers.
different denotative functions, as for example, in the case of Now an objection may be raised against this. There is no
the word hari, there is no verbal knowledge in which all instance of verbal knowledge in which there is connection
meanings are objects simultaneously; but the verbal knowledge between meanings which are conveyed by different denotative
is only of one meaning at one time. As opposed to this, there functions of one word. Otherwise, there would be connection
is only one denotative function in the three, viz. form, between horse and sun which are the meanings conveyed by
universal and individual and, in order to show this, the different denotative functions of the same word hari.
Nyayasutrakara uses the singular number for the wordpadartha, This objection cannot be raised. Is verbal knowledge of
in the sutra jatyakrtivyaktayah padarthah. Here, the meaning the semantic connection postulated by the relation of non-
of the ekavacanasupraiyaya is singular number. This cannot be difference or by the relation of difference? There cannot be
related to the meaning of the stem (prakrtyartha i.e. padartha) any verbal knowledge by the relation of non-difference, since
which is three. Therefore, the meaning of the suffix of the there is no congruity (yogyata) for such a relation between sun
singular number is to be related to the determinant of the-state- and horse, the meanings of the word hari. Nor can there be
of-being-the-meaning-of-the-stem {prakrtyarthatavacchedakam, any verbal knowledge by the relation of difference since it is
viz. padarthatvam, i.e. padafakyatvam, i.e. padafaktih). In this not accepted by anybody that there is the relation of difference
way, it is shown by the sutrakara that there is only one between the meanings of nouns, because there is no expectancy
denotative function (Sakti) in form, universal and individual. for the relation of difference. If, however, the semantic
This in short, is the opinion of the old Naiyayikas. connection between horse and sun is rejected for these
According to the modems, there is one denotative reasons, then for similar reasons semantic connection between
function in the individual as qualified by the universal. This is form and individual should be rejected.
because from the word ‘cow’ there is the verbal knowledge of But in fact, we have verbal knowledge of form and
the individual cow as qualified by cowness, even if there is no individual by the relation of difference. In order to account for
recollection of form from the word ‘cow’. According to them, this verbal knowledge, if it is postulated that there is no
there is also another denotative function for the word ‘cow’ in expectancy for the connection by the relation of difference
the form (akrti) of the cow. When, however, the form (of the only between the meanings conveyed by different nouns, then
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 247
246 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Now a problem arises for the modern Naiyayikas: As
in the present case, one can have verbal knowledge of form pointed out earlier, according to them, there is one denotative
and individual by means of the relation of difference since the function in the form and another in the individual qualified by
meanings of form and individual are conveyed by the same the universal. Therefore, they cannot hold that the singular
word with different denotative functions. Ifthe verbal knowledge number of the word padartha in the sutra is connected with
of form and individual is explained in this way, then it would padarthatva, i.e.padalakti. They solve this problem by pointing
be impossible to avoid verbal knowledge of sun and horse by out that the singular number is used to show that there is only
the relation of difference since both are meanings conveyed one denotative function in the universal and the individual.
by the same word hari by different denotative functions. Such Ramarudra, however, points out a fault in this position. The
is the objection. singular number is to be connected with padarthatva, i.e.
The answer to this is based on our experience. We do not padalakti. Such apadalakti, according to them, is not merely
have verbal knowledge of sun and horse by the relation of one, but two, viz. in the form and in the individual as qualified
difference; on the other hand, we have verbal knowledge of by the universal. Therefore, singular number cannot be
form and individual by the relation of difference. Therefore, connected with padaiakti.
we rightly postulate expectancy for the relation of difference
Text 4C
of form and individual. This is similar to the case of the word
eva which conveys three different meanings, viz. anya, yoga ft.
and vyavaccheda by different denotative functions. Here our
3W qccqi<£Hi VleNUierct9<t‘t>>l«;rctjIrt)~
experience is that there is the verbal knowledge of the
connection of these three meanings and so we conclude that
there is expectancy for the connection of the meanings of the
word eva. Therefore, the conclusion is that, by the strength of rlW *icNaiq'^<‘T>oiqtk‘t>i:^ 'd^MNvlRfcl I
expectancy, there is the verbal knowledge of the semantic
connection between the form of cow and individual cow
»!HHsfW>KldJ
which are the meanings conveyed by the word ‘cow’ through
^iTHaiq^qqicq <STd*d*q
different denotative functions by the relation of difference.
It should further be noted that, according to the opinions TdRiq'HqiRaqft I
of both the old and modem schools of Nyaya, the recollection TfaTffeftspI Tift: | m TTcr |
of the meaning as well as the verbal knowledge have as I McqmMd Wfl
qualifier the universal and form and as qualificand the "dRRl f^fpfhTTfejTR T<tRd i
individual. This is to be explained on the basis of experience
RlflmiRqqcqftR^ Tlfrf); I ctJH+cc) | TfcTT
of karyakaranabhava, viz. the knowledge of the denotative
^cqiqj qccqoqiqq> ^q^qRiRl |
functions of words; for example, the word ‘cow’ etc. produce
the knowledge in which the individual is qualificand and the TIc+lcThdqlbq^cqiR '9T;tqdN^<ttt>h> I
universal and form are qualifiers.12
248 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-fabdakhanda 249

have their denotative functions in the objects of direct

knowledge. The denotative functions of words like adas are in
¥ tl^Ml*?! ff •HcM'ilc^ ^4Ttl ^cMltnl Rwk: II
the objects of indirect knowledge. Therefore, these words
VlfcblF^: I have different meanings. Similarly the words etad (meaning
this) and tad (meaning that) (have also different meanings).
Translation Some say that the word idam means that which is directly
Denotative Function of the Words Like ‘that’ etc. perceived, and the word etad means that which is nearer. The
word adas signifies that which is distant; the word tad denotes
The denotative function of the word ‘that’ is in that which
that which is the object of indirect knowledge. The denotative
is qualified by the universal of potness and so on which is the
function of the word him (meaning what) is grasped in the
determinant of the-state-of-being-object-of-the-knowledge-of-
object of the desire to know. (The denotative function of) the
the-speaker. Now it may be objected: If potness and so on are
word sarva is to be grasped in the-state-of-being-that-which-is-
accepted as determinants of the-state-of-being-denoted, there
the-pervader. In such sentences as ‘all pots have colour’, we
would be difference of denotative functions (of the word ‘that)
have the knowledge that the-state-of-having-colour is the
owing to the difference of the determinants of the-state-of-
pervader of potness. The determinant of the-state-of-being-
being-denoted. Nor should it be objected that although there
denoted of the word tvam (i.e. the word yusmad) is the-state-of-
is difference of the determinants of the-state-of-being-denoted,
because the-state-of-being-the-determinant-of-the-state-of-being- being-Caitra and so on who are to be addressed at that time.
In the same way (the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted)
object-of-knowledge (of the speaker) which is the determinant
of the-state-of-being-the-determinant-of-the-state-of-being- of the word aham (i.e asmad) is the-state-of-being-Caitra and so
on who are the independent speakers at that time. By means
denoted is one, there is no difference in denotative functions
of the qualifier of independence (of the speaker) in such
(of the word ‘that’). If it (i.e. the-state-of-being-determinant-of-
the-state-of-being-the-object-of-knowledge-of-the-speaker) is the sentences as ‘that king is to be told by you upon my word’, the
determinant of the-state-of-being-the-determinant-of-the-state- word ‘my’ (mat) does not bring about knowledge of the poet.
of-being-denoted, it would also be the object of verbal There is no need of further expansion (of the subject). Here
ends the section on the denotative function.
knowledge. This is not so because the-state-of-being-the-
determinant-of-the-state-of-being-the-object-of-knowledge is the
determinant of the-state-of-being-determinant-of-the-state-of- Commentary
being-denoted as an adventitious qualifier. An adventitious Denotative Function of Words Like ‘that’ etc.
qualifier is not accepted as the object of verbal knowledge.
Potness and so on are the determinants of the-state-of-being- Now Dinakara and Ramarudra enter into a detailed
denoted as qualifier only. Therefore, it becomes an object of discussion about the denotative functions of such words as tad
verbal knowledge. and so on. Dinakara, first of all, states that the denotative
(The denotative functions of words like ‘this’ and so on function of the word tad is in pot and so on which are qualified
(are to be understood) like this. The words like idam and etad by potness and so on which are the determinants of the-state-
250 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 251

of-being-the-object-of-the-knowledge-of-the-speaker. Potness A possible answer to this objection is as follows: Although

and so on are the determinants of the-state-of-being-the-object- the determinants of the-state-of-being-denoted are different,
of-knowledge of the person who utters the word tad. The the determinant of the-state-of-being-determinant-of-the-state-
denotative function of the word tad uttered by that particular of-being-denoted {:iakyatavacchedakatavacchedakam) is only
person is in that which is qualified by potness and so on. one. This is in the form of the-state-of-being-the-determinant-
Now it may be objected that on grounds of simplicity, it of-the-state-of-being-object-of-knowledge (huddhivisayalavacche-
would have been easier to state that the denotative function of dakatvam) (of the speaker).14 Therefore, there are no different
the word tad is in the object of the knowledge of the speaker denotative functions for the word tad.
rather than in that which is qualified by potness and so on, This cannot be admitted. This is because, if the-state-of-
which are the determinants of the-state-of-being-the-object-of- being-the-determinant-of-the-state-of-being-the-object-of-
knowledge-of-the-speaker. The answer to this objection is that knowledge-of-the-speaker is accepted as the determinant of
after hearing the sentence ‘that is there’ {so’sit), the verbal the-state-of-being-the-determinant-of-the-state-of-being-denoted,
knowledge arising from the sentence is that the pot qualified then it would also become the object of verbal knowledge
by potness is there, and not the pot qualified by the-state-of- lyadi vaktrbuddhivisayatavacchedakatvam iakyatavacchedaka¬
being-the-object-of-the-knowledge-of-the-speaker is there. tavacchedakam syat tarhi iabdabodhe tasya bhanam syat).
Therefore, even if there is cumbersomeness, we have to hold As for example, the-state-of-being-tail-having-hair and so
that the denotative function of the word tad is in that which is on [lomavallahgulatvadi) being the determinant ofthe-state-of-
qualified by potness and so on which are the determinants of being-determinant-of-the-state-of-being-denoted by the word
the-state-of-being-the-object-of-the-knowledge-of-the-speaker. paiu and so on also become the object of verbal knowledge
A further objection may be raised: If potness and so on produced by the word paiu and so on. But such is not the case
are considered to be the determinants of the-state-of-being- here. Our experience is that from the statement that ‘that is
denoted by the word tad, then there would be different there’ (so’sti), there arises the verbal knowledge the form of
denotative functions according to the difference of the which is that there is ajar and not that which is qualified by the
determinants of the-state-of-being-denoted by the word tad. determinant of the-state-of-being-the-object-of-knowledge (of
Further if different denotative functions are admitted for the the speaker) is there. And therefore, since buddhivisayatavac-
word tad, then the word tad will have different meanings like chedakatvam does not become the object of verbal knowledge,
the word hari. This is not admissible because, according to the how can it be considered iakyatavacchedakatavacchedakam?
maxim that a word which denotes different meanings by The answer to this is that buddhivisayatavacchedakatvam
different denotative functions uttered once produces the is iakyatavacchedakatavacchedakam as an adventitious qualifier
knowledge of only one meaning, the word tad with the suffix {upalaksana) and an adventitious qualifier does not become
of dual number cannot produce the meaning of jar and cloth the object of verbal knowledge. The reason for this is that
by one utterance. Besides in the lexicons like Amarakoia the vaktrbuddhivisayatdvacchedakatvam does not become the obj ect
word tad is not mentioned in the chapter dealing with of the will of God as the object of verbal knowledge produced
words having different meanings.13 by the word tad. The will of God is in the following form: Let
 ^ Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-§abdakhanda 253
those things which are qualified by the characteristics such as
word tad since it is the determinant of the-state-of-being-
potness etc. that are the determinants of the-state-of-being-
denoted as qualification.
object-of-the-knowledge-of-the-speaker be the objects of the
Now Dinakara and Ramarudra explain the denotative
knowledge produced by the word tad. Therefore, the-state-of-
function of words like idam (this), etad (this) and so on. The
being-the-determinant-of-the-state-of-being-the-determinant-of- denotative function of the words idam and etad is in the object
the-state-of-being-denoted in the capacity of being an
of perceptual knowledge {pratyaksabuddhivisaya). This is to be
adventitious qualifier (upalaksanatayd tadpadaiakyatavac-
explained as follows: The perceptual knowledge is that of the
chedakatavacchedakatvam) means the-state-of-being-consecu-
person who utters the words idam and etad. If the denotative
tive character of the determinants of the-state-of-being-denoted
function of these words are so described, then since these
by the word tad and not being the object of God’s will as the
words can be used with respect to different things, the
object of verbal knowledge produced by the word tad
denotative function would also be different. In order to avoid
{tadpadajanyaidbdabodhavisayatvena bhagavadicchayam avisa-
this R. points out that the denotative function of these words
yatve sail tadpadaSakyatavacchedakanugamakatvam upalaksana¬ is in that which is qualified by the determinant of the-state-of-
tayd tatpadaiakyatavacchedakatavacchedakatvam). being-the-object-of-perceptual-knowledge-of-the-speaker
On the other hand, the-state-of-being-tail-having-hair and (vaktrpratyaksabuddhivisayatavacchedakaghatatvadyavacchinne).
so on which is the determinant of the-state-of-being-determinant When the denotative function is so described, it is pointed out
of the-state-of-being-denoted by the wordpaiu in the capacity that the consecutive character of the determinants of the-state-
of being qualification (viiesanatvena) becomes the object of of-being-denoted-by-the-words-i</am-and-^fl^/ is the-state-of-
verbal knowledge produced by the wordpaiu. This is because
being-the-determinant-of-the-state-of-being-object-of-
the-state-of-being-tail-having-hair and so on becomes the object perceptual-knowledge-of-the-speaker (vaktrpratyaksabuddhi-
of God’s will as the object of verbal knowledge produced by
visayatavacchedakatvam). By means of such a formulation of
the word paiu. The will of God is in the following form: Let
the denotative function of the words idam and etad, the
those things qualified by the tail having hair and so on which
possibility of different denotative functions for these words is
(ilomavallahgulddi) are qualified by the-state-of-being-tail-having-
avoided. It is to be noted that here also vaktrpratyaksabuddhi-
hair and so on be the objects of verbal knowledge produced
visayatavacchedakatvam is to be taken as iakyatavacchedakata-
by the word paiu. Therefore, the-state-of-being-determinant- vacchedakam as an adventitious qualifier as described earlier
of-the-state-of-being-determinant-of-the-state-of-being-denoted with reference to the word tad. In this way, it is possible to have
by the word paiu and so on in the capacity of being qualification
the verbal knowledge of pot as qualified by potness (ghatat-
[viiesanavidhaya iukyatavacchedakatavacchedakatvam) means vadina ghatadiiabdabodhah) from the words ayam and esah.
the-state-of-being-consecutive-character-of-the-determinants-of- But now an objection may be raised against this position;
the-state-of-being-denoted by the word paiu and so on and at if the denotative function of the word idam and so on is in that
the same time the object of God’s will as object of verbal which is qualified byjamess and so on (which is vaktrpratyaksa-
knowledge produced by the word paiu and so on. Potness and buddhivisayatavacchedakam), then there cannot be any verbal
so on become the object ofverbal knowledge produced by the knowledge from such sentences as ayam ghatah, since the
254 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 255
word ghata also has denotative function in that which is
qualified by potness. This is because then the sentence ay am object of perception. The meaning of the word tad is the object
ghatah would mean ghato ghatah. And so just as in this of indirect knowledge.
sentence, there is no syntactic connection by the relation of The denotative function of the word kim is in that which
non-difference15 there would be also no syntactic connection is qualified by the-state-of-being-the-object-of-the-desire-to know.
in the sentence ayam ghatah by the relation of non-difference. The desire is of course of the one who utters the word kim. And
The answer to this is that in the sentence ayam ghatah so from the question ‘what is the pot’?, the verbal knowledge
although the word idam has denotative function in that arises is that the pot is the object of questioner’s desire to
vaktrbuddhivisayatavacchedakavacchinna, this vaktrbuddhivisa- know.
yatavacchedakam here is actually etaddeiaitatkalavrttitvam. The denotative function of the word sarva is in the-state-
Therefore, the sentence ayam ghatah means etadddaitatkala- of-being-pervader (vyapakatva), i.e. in the sentence ‘all jars
vrttih ghatah (i.e. the pot is existing in this time and in this have colour’ (sarve ghatah rupavantah),jar is the subject, and
place). Therefore, there is no difficulty in having verbal ‘having colour’ is the predicate. The determinant of the-state-
knowledge from the sentence ayam ghatah by the relation of of-being-subject is jamess, the determinant of the-state-of-
non-difference as in the case of riilo ghatah. being-predicate is the-state-of-having-colour, i.e. colour.
The word adas has denotative function in the object of Therefore, more exactly the denotative function of the word
indirect knowledge. Here also the denotative function is to be ‘all’ is in the-state-of-being-pervader which resides in the
understood in vaktrparoksabuddhivisayatavacchedakavacchinna, determinant of the-state-of-being-predicate and which is
in the way in which it was explained with respect to the word indicated (nirupita) by the determinant of the-state-of-being-
subject (uddefyatavacchedakanirupitevidheyatavacchedakanisthe
idam. Therefore, the difference in the meanings of idam and
etad on the one hand and of adas on the other hand is clear; vyapakatve sarvapadasya Saktih).
the former has denotative function in pratyaksabuddhivisaya, In other words, in the present instance of the sentence ‘all
the latter has denotative function in paroksabuddhivisaya. jars have colour’, the denotative function of the word ‘all’ is in
In a similar manner, there is difference between the the-state-of-being-pervader which resides in colour and
meanings of the words etad and tad; etad means the object of indicated by jamess (ghatatvanirupite rupanisthe vyapakatve
perceptual knowledge and tad the object of knowledge in sarvapadasya saktih). It may further be noted that the-state-of-
general. This is the opinion of Dinakara on this point. being-pervader which exists in colour is the-state-of-having-
However, he adds the opinion of some other Naiyayikas also coloumess which is not the determinant of the-state-of-being-
in this respect. Both for Dinakara and others the meaning of the-counterpositive-of-the-absence which resides in jar which
the word idam is the object of perceptual knowledge. (For has jarness (ghatatvavannisthatyantabhavapratiyogitanavac-
others the meanings of etad, adas and tad are different). The chedakarupatvavattvam rupeghatatvavyapakatvam).Therefore,
meaning of etad is an object nearer to the speaker which is the the verbal knowledge from the sentence ‘all jars have colour’
object of perceptual knowledge. The meaning of the word is that the jar is identical with that which has colour which is
adas is that which is far away from the speaker and which is the the pervader of jamess.
Now the denotative function of the wordyusmad is being
 256 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 257
described. First of all it should be noted, as Ramarudra points explained above, which is a qualification of Caitra is made
out, that the word is yusmad and not tvam; the reason is that known by means of the vocative case which comes after the
tvam is a sentence and not a word in the opinion of the word Caitra. It should be noted here that caitratva is not really
Naiyayikas who define a word as that which has denotative qualified by the co-occurrence (samanadhikaranya) of
function (iaktam padam). Hence in the expression tvam there sambodhyatva but only adventitiously qualified (upalaksita) by
is both pratipadika (i.e. here yusmad) and suffix (here, su) both the same. This is because in the verbal knowledge ‘Caitra, you
of which have denotative functions. Besides, if the word tvam
eat’ sambodhyatvasamanadhikaranacaitratvavan does not
is taken as having denotative function, then there would be no become the object, but mere caitratvavan. Hence caitratva
denotative function in yuvam etc. And the denotative function and so on which are adventitiously qualified by the co¬
of the word yusmad is in that which is qualified by caitratva and occurrence of tatkalinasambodhyatva is the determinant of the-
so on and which is being addressed at the time of the utterance state-of-being-denoted-by-the-word yusmad.
of the speaker. Therefore, the determinant of the-state-of- Now the denotative function of the word asmad is stated
being-denoted is tatkalinasambodhyacaitratvadikam. This to be in that which is qualified by the-state-of-being-Caitra and
means that caitratva and so on co-exist with the-state-of-being- so on who are the independent speakers at the time. Therefore,
addressed (sambodhyatvam) in the same substratum, i.e. in the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted of the word
Caitra and so on. This is because of the general principle that asmad is the-state-of-being-Caitra and so on which are co¬
the bhavapratyaya after a karmadharaya compound brings existing with the-state-of-being-independent-agent-of-utterance
about the knowledge of one determinant ofthe-state-of-being- in the same substratum. The utterance, of course, is of the
meaning (ekapadarthatavacchedakam) which is occurring in word asmad; independence in utterance means the absence of
the same substratum in which the other determinant of the- dependence of utterance on another person, i.e. not repeating
state-of-being-meaning resides. And so in the present instance what another has said. By stating that the speaker should be
of sambodhyacaitratva, the bhavapratyaya produces the know¬ independent, it is pointed out that in sentences such as
ledge of caitratva which has co-occurrence with sambodhyatva, vacyastvaya madvacanat sa raja the word mat does not refer to
the-state-of-being-addressed.16 the poet but to Sita. This is because the poet is not making a
It was already pointed out that the determinant of the- statement of his own, but is repeating the words of Sita.
state-of-being-denoted of the word yusmad is tatkalinasam- Similarly, with regard to the wordyusmad which was discussed
bodhyacaitratvadikam. Now it remains to be explained what is earlier, the speaker of the word yusmad should be understood
tatkalinasambodhyatvam. It means the-state-of-being-the-object- as the independent speaker and not someone who repeats the
of-the-desire-of-the-speaker in as far as this (the object, in the words of others.
example here, is Caitra) is the substratum of the verbal
knowledge arising from the sentence which immediately Notes
follows the word Caitra and so on ending in the vocative case
1. bhanam strictly means visayata, i.e. when it is said asminjnane ghato
and which is uttered at the time. As for instance, in the
bhasate, the meaning is jnananirupilavisayalavdn ghalab; in the
sentence ‘oh, Caitra, you eat’ such a sambodhyatvam, as present case vyaklibhananirvahal means that the individual will not
have the characteristic of Jndnavisayala; this is the idea.
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 259
258 Nyaya Philosophy of Language 4. Here, one should understand clearly the nature of karanatavacchedaka
that is described. It is best to start with an example. Stick [danda) is
2. This is the translation of a sentence with many highly technical
the cause of pot dandatva is the karanatavacchedakadharma. But the
terms. The idea behind the sentence is the following: The knowledge
stick is the cause of the pot by the relation of conjunction (samyoga).
of denotative function can be in two forms: gotvam gopadafakyam
This is karanatavacchedakasambandha. dandatva which is the
(cowness is to be denoted by the word ‘cow’); or gopadam gotve
karanatavacchedakadharma is in danda by the relation of samavaya.
iaktam (the word ‘cow’ has the denotative function in cowness).
This is the karanatavacchedakatavacchedakasambandha. Similarly in
Both forms of the knowledge of denotative function give rise to
the present instance, the question is about the karanatavacchedaka-
verbal knowledge the object of which is cow. However, in both
dharma of the causality that resides in the knowledge of denotative
forms of the knowledge faktam (i.e. the word, i.e. nirupakatasam-
function which is the cause of verbal knowledge. Here the karanalava-
bandhena iaktimat padam, e.g. ghatapadarthanisthaiaktinirupakam
cchedakadharma is gotvaviiistavyakti and this is in iaktijnana by
ghatapadam) and iakyam (i.e. meaning, i.e. visayatasambandhena
visayitdsambandha, since karanatavacchedakatavacchedakasambandha
faktyafrayah, e.g. ghatapadanirupitaiaktydirayah ghatapadarlhah)
is that relation by which the karanatavacchedakadharma resides in
are the same, but there is difference with regard fo their position as
karana; here the karanatavacchedakatavacchedakasambandha is
property-possessor (dharmin) and as qualifier (viiesanam). This
visayitdsambandha since gotvaviUstavyakti is in the knowledge of
means that in the first form of knowledge, viz. gotvam gopadaiaky am,
denotative function by visayitdsambandha. And since samavayena
gotvam is the dharmin and Sakyatvam is the qualifier [prakarah). In
taktijnanam produces samavayena iabadbodham, the
the second form of knowledge, gopadam gotve iakatam, gopadam is
karanatavacchedakasambandha is samavaya. It may be noted that the
dharmin and taktatvam is qualifier [prakarah). Both forms of
Naiyayikas call kdranasambandha as karanatavacchedakasambandha.
knowledge, as mentioned earlier, produce the verbal knowledge the
This is because the karana, e.g. danda, exists in many ways by
object of which is cow. Here it should be noted that the term dharmin
means of many relations e.g. the stick is in its parts by samavaya, in
is used rather than the term viiesja because of the principle, viz.
knowledge whose object is stick by means of visayitdsambandha, in
samanadharmavacchinne adhikarane tadvattdjndnatadabhdvavattam-
another substance by conjunction [samyoga) etc. But not all these are
icayayoh pratibadhyapratibandhakabhavah; e.g. hradatvavacchinne
kdranataniyamakasambandha; that relation which controls the
dharmini vahnimattdjnanam prati hradatvavacchinne dharmini
causality is the kdranaldvacchedakasambandha. Hence, in our example
vahnyabhdvavttdniicayah pratibandhakah. Here the term dharmin is
since the danda is the cause of pot by the relation of samyoga, this is
used rather than the term viiesja in order to show the
pratibadhyapratibandhakabhavah. This is to be understood in the the karanatavacchedakasambandha. Similarly, that relation by which
following sense: The pralibadhyapratibandhkabhava is to be karanatdvacchedakata is controlled is the karanatavacchedakaldvac-
chedakasambandha.
understood, strictly speaking, only with reference to the
Note that, according to the Nyaya system, by the juxtaposition of
dharmidharmabhava, i.e. adhikaranddheyabhava. This means that
words in a particular order in such instances as nilo ghatah and
only by taking the same substratum can we have the knowledge of
ghatam, the relation of identity and relation of being superstratum
partibadhyapralibandhakabhava. As for example, with reference to
become respectively the object of verbal knowledge. Substratum,
the knowledge in the form bhutalam ghatavat or bhutale ghatah, the
ddhdra, here is jar; superstratum, adheya, is karmatva which is the
certainty that bhutalm ghatabhavaval or bhutale ghatabhavah is
meaning of am which is a word according to Naiyayikas whose
pratibandhaka. This is because by both forms of knowledge, in the
definition of word is iaklam padam. In contrast to this, note that the
bhutala which is the adhikarana the absence ofghala is ascertained.
It is to be noted here that even if the vtiesyaviSesanabhava changes relation of samavaya between jar andjamess becomes the object of
the dharma, dharmibhava never changes. Therefore, R. states: verbal knowledge by the denotative function of the word ‘jar’ itself.
samanadharmitavacchedakayoh badhaviiistabuddhyor eva In other words, according to Nyaya, the word ‘jar’ has one meaning
pralibadhyapralibandhakabhavat. K.M.D.R. p.376, 1.28. viz., that which Is qualified by jamess (ghatalvaviiistam) which has
3. Here of course, the deviation is vyatirekavyabhicara, i.e. even in the three elements, viz. jar, jamess and inherence.
absence of cause, viz. the knowledge of denotative function, there
is the effect in the form of verbal knowledge.
 260 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 261
6. Cfr. K.M.D.R. p.371,11.25-26; for a full explanation of the position
of Prabhakaras, Bhattas and Naiyayikas cf. Commentary. Text 5A
7. This form of the knowledge of denotative function is gotvam
gopadaiakyam. In this knowledge there are two states-of-being-
qualificand (viiesyate) in gotva; one is gopadaiakyatvanistha- 3- ^ ^PqejlIW ^r^iW
prakaratanirupita gotvatvavacchinnd viiesyata, the other is
cmT TTcr
gotvatvanisthaprakaratanirupita niravacchinna viiesyata. Therefore,
in this knowledge, gotva is not at all qualifier. Hence, this knowledge ?rd)R]c^| w
cannot produce the verbal knowledge in which gotva is qualifier.
8. gopadam gotve iaktam means that the word go has denotative ^§6^ | | iff
function in gotva. Therefore, gotva is adhara and iakti is adheya.
Hence, here, gotva is prakara and iakti is viiesya, just as in the verbal
knowledge arising from the sentence bhutale ghatah, bhutala is
prakara and ghata is viiesya.
9. Cfr. K.M.D.R. p.377,1.15 ff.
10. gopadam gotve iaktam iti iaktijnane iaktinisthaviiesyatdnirupitd ^ ^qciqi
ddheyatasambandhavacchinna golvanisthaprakarata gotvatvavacchinnd
na tu niravacchinna.
11. What this means in ordinary language is the following: iakyata-
niyamakam gotvatvam, Le. wherever there is gotvatva there is
gopadaiakyata and wherever there isgopadaJakyata there \s gotvatvam
12. Cfr. S. p. 192,1.2* ff.
13. The full form of this principle is: sakrduccaritah iabdah sakraeva
5 TO cTPT WW ^ ^- 5
artham gamayati, a word (having different meanings) uttered once I ^ i vW
produces the knowledge of only one meaning.
14. ? mum ,
The speaker uses the word tad sometimes to denote ghata and at
other times to denote pata. Here the vaktrbuddhivisayatvam is
ghatatva, patatva etc. In all these ghatatva, patatva etc. there is a
common characteristic, viz. vaktrbuddhivisayatavacchedakatvam. ^u| 1 ^ I FJcJW ^
Therefore, if ghatatva, patatva etc., are considered sakyatavac-
chtdaka-s, then vaktrbuddhivisayatavacchedakatvam becomes
I3 4W^ntTw«T4l:
iakyatavacchedakatavacchedakam.
15. The reason for this is that here there is no difference between the
uddeiyatavacchedaka and vidheyatavacchedaka.
16. In the verbal knowledge arising from a karmadharaya compound,
the meaning of the qualification [viiesanapadam) is related to the Translation
meaning of the qualificand [viiesyapadam) by the relation of non¬
Division of Words
difference. Therefore, the two determinants of the-state-of-being-
Aluhtavafr
meaning are residing in one substratum; as for example, in the
present instance sambodhyatva and caitratva reside in the one
deriv^0^ Wh‘Ch ^ denotative function is in some place
substratum Caitra since sambodhya is not different from Caitra. ive, in some place conventional, in some place
nvative y conventional and in some place derivative and
262 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 263

conventional. For instance, where only the meanings of the from the denotative functions of the parts of the word
parts (of the word) is grasped, it is derivative as for example, (pahkaja) with land-lotus and so on, there is verbal knowledge
words like pacaka (cook) and so on. Where (the meaning) is (of land-lotus) as lotus by the denotative function of the word
grasped by the denotative function (of the word as a whole) as a whole. If land-lotus is considered to belong to a different
without taking into account the denotative functions of the species altogether, (then the verbal knowledge of land-lotus)
parts (of the word), it is conventional; tts for example, the word arises only by means of implication. Where the derivative
gomandala etc. (globe). Where, in the object of denotative meanings and the conventional meanings are obtained
functions of the parts of the word (i.e. in the meaning conveyed independently of each other, there the word is derivative and
by the denotative functions of the parts of the word), there is conventional, as for instance, the word udbhid and so on. The
also the denotative function of the word as a whole, the word meaning conveyed (by means of denotative functions of parts
is derivatively conventional, as for example, words likt pahkaja of the word udbhid) is that which shoots up, viz. tree, shrub and
(lotus) and so on. The reason is that the wordpahkaja conveys so on; (and the meaning by the denotative function of the word
the meaning of that which has origin from mud by the udbhid as a whole) is a particular kind of sacrifice.
denotative functions of the parts of the word; (the same word)
conveys the meaning of lotus as lotus by the denotative Text 5B
function of the word as a whole. Nor can it be argued that by
the mere denotative functions of the parts of the word it may fo '5fTrT> ■'K I ‘tqfaRRl I I
be used also in the meaning of water-lily. The reason for this, licIHftsft | Wdltor WWJtfcT TnS: I ¥
according to the old Naiyayikas, is that the conventional
meaning of the word is the hindering factor for the knowledge
of the mere derivative meaning (viz. water-lily). But in reality,
with the lotus remembered by the denotative function of the
word (pahkaja) as a whole, there is the connection of the
meanings of the parts (of the word pahkaja), i.e. that which has
origin from mud, because (the conventional meaning) is
cqiRfcl I Piq+wsf+wui
brought to the mind immediately. But where the absence of
conventional meaning (of the word pahkaja, i.e. lotus) is
known, there is the knowledge of water-lily etc. by implication. ^#rsnf^T I wpfcr U'PltedNM+cqI
Where it is not known that the intention (of the speaker) is to cuRfrHdHf tififedutrtflqqifcfo m:\ w ^ 'qtr
produce the knowledge of water-lily as water-lily and there is
the absence of lotusness, there by the mere denotative
functions of the parts of the word (pahkaja) there comes about
(the verbal knowledge of water-lily as arising from mud).
Where there is absence of connection of the meaning arising Vjf T I TO I
 264
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 265

of-being-the-object which is determined by being-the-

I ^ul ^rsfefWMi-v>lP|+<£^ ^T cTSFr^FTT substratum-of-origin-from-mud and which (visayata) is
^ * *McMHMrar f | produced by the denotative functions of the parts of the word
pahkaja and which is not indicated by the-state-of-being-
Mlcto'd^a WFrft ^ ? Tllc^fcl |
qualificand which is determined by lotusness. Therefore, the
knowledge in which the derivative meaning (is the qualifier)
WcPPi^mI: WH|<HlTlR«)HeU«u|Hd^ I and lotus is the qualificand, is not included in the determinant
^*W±tHKR<e?W*lfI| cTTOT ofthe-state-of-being-that-which-is-to-be-hindered.The-state-of-
being-a-hindering-factor is only by obstructing the knowledge
^i^qTtil 3RimfrfjTTT^r I wfcl
which is the cause; this is the general rule which is broken.
d«nuiniq<: ^Pd: I Pi dft?: H^r«iPien^£c=i i ^j^¥| |«<4) si¬
(The author) pointing out the incongruity (arising from this
ft qfe iw4: | H'hPH %T: tr^%%T: I cT^Tm^P | breaking of the general rule) by the mention of the word
^S^TT tTalfcHKWiRRl prahcah (old Naiyayikas) presents the opinion of Manikaraby
*TFT: I the words but in reality (vastutas tu). Because of the
proximity (sannidhyaditi): Because the conventional meaning
is immediately present in the mind. This is the meaning. The
rule is that the words conveying the meanings of individuals
Translation
are used by the speaker with the intention of denoting the
Division of Words
particular individual which is immediately present (in the
(The author) divides the word which has denotative mind of the hearer). This is the idea. In this way, since there
function with the expression word which has denotative is the intention of the speaker to convey the meaning of lotus
function (iaktam padamiti): This means some (words). (by the wordpahkaja) and since there is another cause (viz. the
Similarly in the following sentence also. In some place recollection of the conventional meaning which is other than
(kvacid) means some words. In many texts the reading is absence of hindrance) which produces the verbal knowledge
mandapadi instead of mandaladi. That is erroneous; because of mutual syntactic connection between the conventional
of being the hindering factor (praiibandhakatvaditi). Nor meaning and the derivative meaning, there is the connection
can it be argued that, if the knowledge of the denotative of the derivative meaning only with the conventional meaning
function of the word pahkaja as a whole is the hindering factor (i.e. lotus) and not with water-lily and so on. Therefore, the
for the verbal knowledge of the derivative meaning of the knowledge of the denotative function of a word as a whole is
word pahkaja, then there would be no knowledge of being the not a hindering factor for the knowledge of derivative meaning.
substratum of origin from mud which is the derivative meaning Thus, where there is the causal complex for the knowledge of
of the wordpahkaja, with reference to lotus also. The knowledge mutual syntactic connection between the conventional meaning
of the denotative function of the word pahkaja as a whole is the and the derivative meaning, there is no verbal knowledge of
hindering factor for the verbal knowledge in which the-state- water-lily and so on from the word pahkaja. But where there
 266 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 267
is the absence of causal complex of knowledge of mutual
Knowledge as lotus [padmatvena bodhah): The verbal
syntactic connection between the two (i.e. padma and
knowledge (of land lotus) only as lotus. Only by means of
pahkajanikartr), there is indeed the verbal knowledge of
implication (laksanayaiva iti): Because in the case of land-
water-lily and so on. But when (the intention of the speaker is
lotus, there is the absence of the universal lotusness which is
to denote by the wordpahkaja water-lily as water-lily or as that
the determinant of the-state-of-being-conventional-meaning
which has origin from mud which is qualified by the-state-of-
(of the word pahkaja), there is no possibility of conveying the
being-water-lily), there is the verbal knowledge of water-lily as
meaning of land-lotus by the denotative function of the word
water-lily or as that which has origin from mud which is
as a whole. This is the idea.
qualified by the-state-of-being-water-lily by implication. (When
the intention of the speaker is to denote water-lily as that which
Commentary
has origin from mud) then there is the verbal knowledge of
Division of Words
water-lily and so on as that which has mere origin from mud
(i.e. without having any qualification of kumudatva and so on) Now the discussion is about the division of words.
by the denotative functions (of the parts of the word pahkaja). Ramarudara first of all raises an objection taking the text of D.
This meaning is brought about by the words but where (the as padam vibhajate faktam padamiti; the author proposes to
absence of) conventional meaning (yatra tu divide words but actually defines words with the expression
rudhyarthetyadina). After the wordpratisamdhiyate the following ‘word has denotative function’ [laktam padamiti). Now this
sentence is to be added ‘Intention of the knowledge (of water- obviously is a definition of word; i.e. word is something that
lily) as water-lily’. By implication (laksanayeti): The knowledge has denotative function and such a definition is not division.
(of water-lily) as water-lily which has origin from mud is by Ramarudra answers this objection by pointing out that the
means of implication. This is the meaning. This (i.e. mention word iti means beginning, i.e. beginning with definition the
of the knowledge of absence of lotus) indicates also the author divides the words. The idea is that the author first
absence of the causal complex of knowledge of mutual defines the words and then divides them.
connection between conventional meaning and derivative But Parlksit Thampuran thinks otherwise: The text in D.
meaning. Therefore, even if there is no knowledge of the should be iaktampadam vibhajate. Earlier it has been stated in
absence of conventional meaning (i.e. of lotus) where there is M. that denotative function is the relation of meaning with the
the absence of the other cause (i.e. recollection of conventional word. From this one can conclude that a word is the adjunct
meaning which is other thanyogyata), there arises indeed the of the relation of denotative function (iaktirupasambandha-
knowledge of water-lily by implication. By the mere pratiyogitvam padatvam). This definition of words is again
denotative functions of the parts of the word repeated in order to show that apabhramia words are excluded
(avayavaiaktimatrena): By the word ‘mere’ implication is from the division. Such words have no denotative functions in
excluded. The bringing about (the knowledge of water- themselves but produce verbal knowledge because of mistaken
lily nirvahah): The bringing about the knowledge of water-lily knowledge of denotative function.
as that which has origin from mud. This is the meaning. M. states that words are in some places (kvacit) derivatives,
in some places (kvacit) conventional etc. D. interprets the
 268 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 269
word kvacit in the sense of kimcit. This means that some words parts of the word. Besides for all other divisions of words, the
are derivative, some other words are conventional etc. and it example given is in one word together with the word adi, viz.
is not the case that the same word is conventional in a pacakadi, pahkajadi, udbhidadi. Hence, it is appropriate to
particular meaning and derivative in another meaning. The infer that the example for conventional words should also be
reason for this interpretation as given by R. is that words are given in one word. Therefore, we conclude that according to
different according to the different instances of their utterance Muktavallkara the word gomandala is one word and it means
and so one and the same word cannot be conventional in one globe.2
meaning and derivative in another meaning. This is also But Dinakara and Ramarudra interpret the word in a
supported by the general principle that a word uttered once different way. Dinakara, first of all, points out that many
conveys only one meaning [sakrd uccaritam padam sakrdeva manuscripts have mandapa instead of mandala and, according
artham gamayati). Therefore, there is no possibility of the same to him, the reading mandapa is wrong. This implies that,
word being derivative, conventional etc.1 according to Dinakara, the correct reading of the Muktavali
Now words are divided into four, viz some are derivatives text is mandala. Therefore, gomandala is to be taken as two
(yaugika), some are conventional (rudha), some are derivatively words because if the word is to be taken as one word, then
conventional (yogarudha) and some are derivative and Dinakara would not have pointed out that the part of a word
conventional [yaugikarudha). Where only the meaning of the is wrong, but that the whole word is wrong. When taken as two
parts of the word is cognised that word is derivative {yaugika). words in the compound gomandaladi, go means cow and
An example for this is the word pacaka (cook). mandala means globe.
Now Ramarudra raises an objection against this: It is not Now Ramarudra also holds that gomandala is two words
right to include the word pacaka among derivative words but, unlike Dinakara, he thinks that the reading gomandapa is
because it has no denotative function in any meaning since it correct. We now proceed to give an exact account of the
is a sentence. The answer is that we consider the suffix aka interpretations of Ramarudra. Some object that the Muktavali
after the root pac as the word pacaka. This aka suffix has text is mandapa and it is not correct to take this word as an
denotative function in the agent and hence it is word. Therefore, example of conventional words [rudha). The reason for this is
it is proper that it is included among derivative words. that the word mandapa can be etymologically explained as
Where meaning is congnised by the denotative function mandam pibati (he drinks the scum of boiled rice) or as
of the word as a whole without depending upon the denotative mandam raksati (he protects the scum of boiled rice). Therefore,
functions of the parts of the word, that word is considered mandapa means one who drinks the scum of boiled rice or one
conventional (rudha); as for example, the word gomandalam. who protects the scum of boiled rice by means of the
This word is to be taken as one word the meaning of which is denotative functions of the parts of the word [avayavadakti). By
globe. We arrive at this meaning for the following reasons: means of the denotative function of the word as a whole, the
First of all, the word gomandalam gets the meaning of globe by word mandapa can be understood in any one of its denoted
means only of the denotative function of the word as a whole meanings like pavilion etc. Therefore, the word mandapa is to
without taking into account the denotative functions of the be included among words that are both derivative and
 2 70 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdak handa 271

conventional {yaugikarudha) and not in the class of rudha of rudha when it means a particular kind of house. In this way,
words. This is the objection; in order to answer this, it is Ramarudra establishes that in M. the text could as well read
pointed out that Dinakara takes the Muktavati text as mandala, mandapa. But this implies that the characteristic [vibhajaka-
meaning a particular sort of house. And this word mandala is dharma) by which the words are divided into four is only for
no where taken as a derivative word, and therefore, the word ordinary usage [iyavahara) and not for strict distinction
mandala is to be included in the class of rudha words. This (vyavrtti). This is because the word mandapa, although
interpretation of the Dinakara text given by some commentators yaugikarudha, is also given as an example for rudha in the way
is not appropriate. This is because all yaugikarudha words are explained above.
yaugika-s in one particular meaning and rudha-s in another Now, it may be objected that, if it can be shown that the
particular meaning. The word mandapa also, as pointed out characteristics by which words are divided into four are meant
earlier, is yaugikarudha and, therefore, it is yaugika in the for strict distinction [vyavrtti), then it is not appropriate to hold
meaning of mandapanakartr and rudha in the meaning of a that these characteristics are meant only for ordinary usage.
particular kind of house. Hence, the word mandapa can be The argument to show that these characteristics are meant for
given as an example of rudha words. strict distinction is that in the definition of yaugikarudha the
This is the reason why in the Muktavati text the definition word ‘where’ (yatra) is to be interpreted as that which is
ofyaugika is given as follows: Where only the meanings of the qualified by a particular order of letters [anupurvi). Hence a
parts of the word is cognised, the word is derivative. And word which \s yaugikarudha conveys the mere meanings of the
further rudha is defined as follows: Where the meaning is parts of the word as qualified by a particular order of letters
grasped by the denotative function of the word as a whole, and conveys the mere meaning of the whole of words by the
without taking into account the denotative functions of the same order of letters. Therefore, the yaugikarudha words
parts of the word, it is rudha. In order not to includ e yogarudha cannot be included in rudha, since rudha words do not have
in yaugika, the word ‘only’ (eva) is used in the definition of yaugika meanings by the same order of letters. This argument
yaugika word. Similarly, if it is argued that sinceyaugikarudha cannot be admitted since explanations supporting it require
words have also a yaugika meaning, the words like udbhid such cumbersome interpretations. And besides, there is no
could also be included myaugika in the (meaning) of agent of harm if the yaugikarudha words are also yaugika and rudha.
shooting up (i.e. tree). Such an argument is valid since such an But now another objection may be raised: Ifyaugikarudha
inclusion is acceptable. words could be included in yaugika and rudha, then there is
In order not to include yogarudha words in rudha the no need of accepting yaugikarudha as a separate class of
expression ‘without taking into account the denotative functions words. Therefore, words need to be divided only into three;
of the parts of the word’ is added in the definition of rudha. It yaugika, rudha and yogarudha. This objection is to be rejected
should be noted here that the word udbhid which isyaugikarudha because there are words which are only yaugika or only rudha
could be included also in rudha when it means a particular which are different from yaugikarudha.
kind of sacrifice. Thus although the word mandapa is Then it could be objected that in that case it would come
yaugikarudha, it is not inappropriate to give it as an example about that the characteristics by which words are divided are
 272 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 273
meant for strict distinction. This objection is answered as rudha words. The answer to this objection is that the expression
follows: In some instances like pacaka, the word could be the avayavaJaktinirapeksaya itself is the proof that there is no
name given to a person by his father; hence, here in the sense avayavaiakti in rudha words. Therefore, the word mandapa
of the name of a person the word is rudha and rudha words denoting a house is rudha, not yaugikarudha. In the South
cannot be yaugika. Therefore, the word pacaka cannot be Indian recensions of theAmarakola also the reading is mandapo
given as an example of yaugika words as M. does. But M. ‘stri janalrayah, signifying that the word mandapa has the
actually takes it as a yaugika word meaning cook. Therefore, meaning of a house and it is masculine or neuter in gender.
since the word pacaka is both rudha and yaugika, the Now it may be asked how Dinakara can state that the
characteristics by which words are divided are meant only for reading mandala is correct and not mandapa. The answer is
ordinary usage. that in the Bengali recension of M. instead of mandapa,
But a further objection may be raised as follows: M. gives mandala is used just as instead ofjapa (i.e. China rose or shoe
as the example oiyaugika words, only those words which are flower) java is used. Therefore, in the Bengali tradition the
not given as the name of their children by their parents. word is mandala and not mandapa in the meaning of house.
Therefore, it follows, as mentioned earlier, that the characteristic Following this tradition Dinakara establishes that the reading
by which the fourfold division is made is for strict distinction of mandapa is wrong and the reading of mandala is the correct
(vyavrtti). But this objection cannot be admitted. This is one and the word means house. This is the interpretation of
because M. gives the definition of rudha words as follows: Dinakara as given by Ramarudra.
Where the meaning is grasped by the denotative function of Pariksit Thampuran (S.p.194,1. 26ff) rejects this opinion
the word as a whole, without takinginto accountthe denotative of Ramarudra. His argument is thatjagadlsa who is a Bengali
functions of the parts of the word, it is rudha. This means that in his Sabdalaktipraka&ika, takes the reading of mandapa in the
in rudha words there is denotative functions of the parts of the meaning of house. Therefore, it is wrong to assert as Ramarudra
word; only such a denotative function is not taken into account does, that in the Bengali tradition the reading is mandala. And
when the meaning of the word is rudha. If the division were for besides, in Sabdaiaktiprakalika, there are such usages as
strict distinction, then the author should have said that there mandapan bhojayati (he feeds those who drink the scum of
is no avayavalaktiin rudha words. Therefore, the characteristics boiled rice)3. This shows that in the Bengali tradition, the word
by which the division of words is made are only for ordinary mandapa is yaugikarudha since the word mandapa as yaugika
discourse. means one who drinks the scum of boiled rice and as rudha
Ramarudra puts forward a final argument to show that means house. Hence the word mandapa is accepted as
the characteristics by which the division of words is made are yaugikarudha by Bengalis. Therefore, Pariksit Thampuran
for strict distinction and not for ordinary usage. This is because concludes that the word mandapa cannot be given as an
m rudha words there is no avayavaiakti. But then it may be example of mere rudha; and therefore Dinakara is right in
objected that if there is no avayavaJakti in rudha words, instead taking mandala as the correct reading, and accepting it as an
of the expression avayavaJaktinirapeksaya, the expression example of mere rudha words in the meaning of globe.
avayavalaktim vina should have been used in the definition of Now the discussion is about words which are derivatively
274 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 275
conventional {yogarudha). They are defined as follows: Where
in the object of the denotative functions of parts of words, there (pakakartr) by the relation of non-difference. Therefore, the
is also the denotative function of the word as a whole, there the word pacaka cannot be taken as an example of yogarudha.
words are derivatively conventional. Ramarudra explains this Pariksit Thampuran however thinks that the text of R.
as follows: The expression ‘in the object of denotative functions should be avayavataktijhdnajanyaiabdabodhavisaye instead of
of the parts of words’ (avayavaiaktivisaye) is to be understood avayavataktijhanajanyatdbdabodhe and samudayaiakti-
as ‘in the verbal knowledge produced by the knowledge of the smdritarthanvayah instead of samudayaSaktismaritdrtha-
denotative functions of the parts of the word’. The expression, visayakatvam. And the reading suggested by Thampuran
‘there is also the denotative function of the word as a whole’ seems to be better. This is because one can have as object of
(.samudayaiaktirapyasti) is to be understood as there is also the- a conjunct knowledge (samuhdlambandtmakajhdnam) both
state-of-having-object in the form of the meaning called to the agent of cooking and the person named pacaka (pakakartd
mind by the denotative function of the word as a whole pdcakaka). In this way, since both have become the objects of
(samudayaSaktismaritarthavisayakatvam apyasti). verbal knowledge, the word pacaka which is onlyyaugika, can
If both these expressions are not taken in the meanings also be considered as yogarudha. When, however, the text is
indicated, then words like pacaka and so on could also be taken as Thampuran suggests, viz. avayavaiaktijhanajanya-
taken as derivatively conventional {yogarudha). This is because Sabdabodhavisaye samudayafaktismdritarthdnvayah, the word
a father might give his son the name pacaka. And it is also pacaka cannot be taken as yogarudha. This is because in the
possible that this person whose name is pacaka is also by conjunct knowledge of the agent of cooking and the person
profession a cook. This implies that the object of the denotative named pacaka, there is no semantic connection (anvaya) of the
functions of the parts of the word pacaka (viz. the agent of person named pacaka in the agent of cooking.
cooking, pakakartd) is the same as the object of the denotative Thus it is clear that appropriate examples of yogarudha
function of the word pacaka as a whole (viz. the name pacaka). words are words like pahkaja and so on. This is because the
Therefore, the word pacaka also would be derivatively word pahkaja denotes by the denotative functions of the parts
conventional; but this is not acceptable because the word of the word ‘that which has origin from mud’ and by the
pacaka is used only as derivative (yaugika) and not as derivatively denotative function of the word as a whole ‘lotus’. This
conventional {yogarudha). obviously has to be explained as above, viz. lotus is semantically
When, however, both the expressions are given the connected with the meaning of that which has origin from
meanings described above, such a difficulty would not arise. mud by the relation of non-difference.
This is because from the word pahkaja, one gets the verbal Now an objection may be raised as follows: By the
knowledge in which lotus is connected to that which has origin denotative functions of the parts of the word without including
from mud by the relation of non-difference (pahkajanikartari the denotative function of the word as a whole, one can use the
padmatvavacchmnasya abhedanvayabodhah). But from the word word pahkaja in the meaning of water-lily. This is because the
pacaka we do not get the verbal knowledge in which the
mere meaning conveyed by the denotative functions of the
person named pacaka is connected with the agent of cooking
parts of the word pahkaja is applicable also in the case
of water-lily. Such an objection, however, cannot be admitted.
276 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 277
According to the old Naiyayikas, the reason to reject this
objection is that the knowledge of the denotative function of Hence the knowledge of the denotative function of the word
pahkaja as a whole in lotus prevents the knowledge in which
the word as whole (rudhijhanam, i.e. samudayaiaktijhdnam) is
the-state-of-being-object is determined by the-state-of-being-
a hindrance for the knowledge of mere derivative meaning
arisen-from-mud and which (ivisayata) is caused by the
(kevalayaugikarthabuddhi), i.e. in the present instance know¬
denotative functions of the parts of the word pahkaja and
ledge of water-lily.
which is not indicated by the-state-of-being-qualificand which
Dinakara raises an objection against this answer of the
is determined by lotusness. In simpler terms this means that
old Naiyayikas. If the knowledge of the denotative function of
the knowledge of the denotative function of the word pahkaja
the word as a whole is a hindrance for the knowledge of
as a whole (rudhijhanam, i.e. samudayaiaktijhdnam) in lotus
derivative meaning, then there would be no knowledge of
prevents the knowledge of water-lily as arisen from mud by
lotus also as having origin from mud which is the derivative
means of the denotative functions of the parts of the word.
meaning of the word pahkaja. This means that from the word
Therefore, from the word pahkaja we can have the verbal
pahkaja we cannot have knowledge of lotus as having origin
knowledge of lotus as arisen from mud.
from mud. Such an objection is to be rejected for the following
Ramarudra, however, points out that such an objection
reasons.
raised by Dinakara is not appropriate. This is because M. says
From the derivatively conventional word pahkaja there
that knowledge of mere derivative meaning is prevented by
arises the verbal knowledge in which the-state-of-being-object
the knowledge of the denotative function of the word pahkaja
(i.e. the-state-of-being-qualifier) which is determined by the-
as a whole. Now the knowledge that lotus i that which has
state-of-being-arisen-from-mud which (i.e. visayata) is caused
origin from mud is not the knowledge which is brought about
by the denotative functions of the parts of the word pahkaja
by the knowledge of mere denotative functions of parts of the
and which is indicated by the-state-of-being-qualificand which
word pahkaja. Such a knowledge is brought about both by the
is determined by lotusness (padmatvavacchinnaviiesyatvani-
denotative functions of the parts of the word pahkaja and by
rupitapahkajapadayogajanyapahkajanikartrtvdvacchinnavisaya-
the denotative function of the same word as a whole. Hence
taialibodhah). And so the knowledge that the lotus is that
the objection of Dinakara is not valid.
which has origin from mud is not prevented by the knowledge
D. further points out the incongruity in the opinion of the
of the denotative function of the word pahkaja as a whole in
old Naiyayikas. The general rule is that an instance of
lotus. When the word pahkaja is used in order to produce the
knowledge the object of which is not contradictory to the
verbal knowledge in which the-state-of-being-object is
object of the knowledge which is to be prevented prevents the
determined by the-state-of-being-arisen-from-mud which (i.e.
latter instance of knowledge only by obstructing the knowledge
visayata) is caused by the denotative functions of the parts of
which is its cause, (pirodhyavisayakajhanasyapratibandhakatvam
the word pahkaja, then such a state-of-being-object is not
janakajhanavighatakatvenaiva iti niyamah). The meaning of
indicated by the-state-of-being-qualificand which is determined
this rule is best explained by taking an example from the
by lotusness. Such a knowledge is prevented by the knowledge
Action on inference. The certain knowledge of contradiction
of denotative function of the word pahkaja as a whole in lotus.
(badhamkayah) prevents the inference directly, as for instance,
 278 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 279

the inference ‘lake has fire’ is prevented by the certain meaning of lotus. And ‘that which has origin from mud’ which
knowledge that ‘the lake has no fire’. Here the knowledge is the meaning conveyed by the denotative functions of the
which prevents, viz. lake has no fire, has as object absence of parts of the word pahkaja is semantically connected with the
fire which is contradictory to the object of inferential knowledge meaning of lotus. So the opinion of GangeSa is that the
which establishes presence of fire in the lake. Now knowledge pratibadhyapratibandhakabhava (i.e. the relation of that which
of deviation (zyabicarajhana) also can prevent an inference. is obstructing and that which is obstructed) between the
But knowledge of deviation does not have as object something knowledge of mere derivative meaning of the word pahkaja
contradictory to the object of inferential knowledge. Still such and the knowledge of the denotative function of the word
a knowledge prevents inferential knowledge by obstructing pahkaja as a whole cannot be admitted.
the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the cause An objection may be raised against this position. A
of inference. As for instance in the inference ‘there is smoke person may use the word pahkaja with the intention of
because of fire’, the knowledge of deviation in the form of the expressing the meaning ofwater-lily by the denotative functions
existence of fire where there is no smoke prevents the of the parts of the word. But if the opinion of the modems as
inference that there is smoke by obstructing the knowledge of described earlier is accepted, it would come about that even
invariable concomitance of smoke in fire, viz. where there is here (i.e. kumudatatparyena pahkajapadaprayogasthale) also
absence of smoke there is no fire. the verbal knowledge is in the following form: Lotus is that
Such a general rule is broken here for the following which has origin from mud. This is because of the fact that the
reasons. The object of the knowledge of the denotative word pahkaja brings about the recollection of lotus by the
function of the word as a whole (rudhijhanavisayah=samudaya- denotative function (smarakaiakti).
iaktijhanavisayah, i.e. here, lotus) is not contradictory to the In order to answer this objection it is pointed out that the
object of knowledge which is to be prevented, viz. knowledge expression sannidhyat (because of the proximity of the
of mere derivative meaning, i.e. that which has origin from conventional meaning, viz. lotus) really means because the
mud. In other words, the knowledge of the denotative function intention of the speaker of the word pahkaja is to convey the
of the word pahkaja as a whole in lotus does not prevent the meaning of lotus. This means that words denoting particular
knowledge of that which has arisen from mud by means of the individuals are used with the intention of conveying the
denotative functions of the parts of the same word. Therefore, meaning of the individual which is immediately present As for
the knowledge of rudhi (samudayaJakti) can prevent the instance, when someone says ‘bring ajar’ the hearer brings a
knowledge of mere derivative meaning only by obstructing jar that is nearby and not the one at a distance. Similarly, since
the knowledge which is the cause of the knowledge of mere the word pahkaja is used with the intention of conveying the
derivative meaning. Such is not the case here. This is the meaning of lotus which is immediately present in the mind, the
incongruity in the opinion of the old Naiyayikas. Therefore, verbal knowledge is that lotus is that which has origin from
M. gives the opinion of Gangesa on this point as follows. mud because of congruity (yogyata). When, however, the word
According to GangeSa, as soon as the word pahkaja is pahkaja is used only with the intention of conveying the
uttered, the hearer has immediately the knowledge of the meaning of water-lily, since lotus does not exist there, the
280 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 287

hearer determines that the intention of the speaker is to When there is no knowledge of the intention of conveying
convey the meaning of water-lily only. Therefore, there is no the meaning of water-lily as water-lily and there is the absence
verbal knowledge that the lotus is that which has origin from of lotus, then there is the verbal knowledge of water-lily as that
mud. which has origin from mud by means of the mere denotative
Thus, according to the opinion of the modems, from the functions of the parts of the word pahkaja. If it is accepted that
word pahkaja there would be no verbal knowledge of water- the universal lotusness [padmatva) resides in both land-lotus
lily where there is the causal complex necessary for the and lotus, and if by tht yogarudha wordpahkaja, the meaning
knowledge of the semantic connection between the derivative of land-lotus is desired to be conveyed, but the derivative
meaning and the conventional meaning. And where there is meaning is contradicted with reference to land-lotus there is
the absence of such a causal complex for the knowledge the knowledge of land-lotus as lotus and not as land-lotus by
of the mutual connection between derivative meaning and the denotative function of the word pahkaja as a whole. If,
conventional meaning there arises necessarily the verbal however, it is held that land-lotus is of a different species from
knowledge of water-lily and so on. The required causal lotus then there arises the knowledge of land-lotus from the
complex includes the absence of contradiction of the conven¬ word pahkaja by means of the significatory function only of
tional meaning [rudhyarthabadhabhavah) and recollection of implication.
the conventional meaning (rudhyarthasmaranam) of words R. now raises an objection against the concept ofyogarudha
like pahkaja etc. words in general. It is not possible from the word pahkaja to
But how does the verbal knowledge of water-lily and so have the verbal knowledge in the form that lotus is not
on arise from the word pahkaja? When there is the knowledge different from that which has origin from mud. This is because
of the absence of the conventional meaning of lotus and when of the general principle that a word uttered once conveys only
the speaker also has the intention of conveying the meaning one meaning [sakrduccaritah iabdah sakrdevarthamgamayati).
of water-lily as water-lily or as that which has origin from mud And, according to this principle, when the word pahkaja is
as qualified by the-state-of-being-water-lily, then from the word uttered only once, we cannot have both the meanings of lotus
pahkaja, there is the knowledge of water-lily by the significatory and that which has arisen from mud. This principle is also
function of implication. When, however, the speaker has the substantiated from the fact that yaugikarudha words convey
intention of conveying the meaning of water-lily merely as that one meaning only at one utterance.
which has origin from mud, then that meaning is brought The answer to this objection is that in the case of
about by the denotative functions of the parts of the word yogarudha words the aforesaid principle should be necessarily
pahkaja. Further, when there is no knowledge of the absence restricted. In other words in the case of yogarudha words this
of conventional meaning, if there is the absence of cause, viz. principle does not apply, just as in the case of the word eva in
the recollection of conventional meaning which is other than the sentence caitra eva pacati. Here the word eva conveys the
the cause in the form of the absence of contradiction meaning of any a, yoga and vyavaccheda by means of different
(bbdhabhava), there would be the knowledge of water-lily as denotative functions, but by a special expectancy there is
water-lily by the significatory function of implication.4 mutual semantic connection among them by the relation of
 282 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-iabdakhanda 283

difference, although in words like hari and so on which have appropriate. R. answers that objection as follows: The division of
many meanings, no semantic connection by the relation of words is to be given only after giving the definition of words.
Therefore, by the expression iaklam padam the definition of words
difference is admitted among them because in this case
is given. And the word iti in the expression iaklam padam iti,
expectancy is not at all accepted.
occurring in the D. text means ‘beginning’. Therefore, the expression
Words which denote independently derivative meaning iaklam padam iti means iaktapadddikam, Le. iakiapadadikam kvacid
and conventional meaning are derivative and conventional yaugikam, meaning that the sentence kvacid yaugikam in the Muklavati
('yaugikarudha) y as for instance, the word udbhid by means of text has as beginning iaklam padam. According to this explanation,
by the expression iaklam padam, first of all, the definition of the
denotative functions of its parts conveys the meaning of that
word is given and then its division; such a procedure is appropriate
which shoots up, viz. tree etc., and by means of the denotative
and so the Dinakan text as accepted by R. padam vibhjate iaklam
function of the word as a whole means a kind of sacrifice. This padam iti is correct
means that in the knowledge produced by words which are Pariksit Thampuran, however, does not agree with this
derivative and conventional only one meaning becomes the interpretation oiDinakan text by Ramarudra. First of allThampuran
points out that from the statement already made in the M. iakliica
object at one utterance. On the other hand, in the verbal
padtnasahapadarthasya sambandhah (K.M.D.R. p.358,1.1), we can
knowledge produced by derivatively conventional [yogarudha) easily arrive at the definition of word, viz. iaktipraliyogitvam, i.e. iakli
words two meanings, viz. derivative and conventional become is a kind of relation; its two relata are pada and artha and since our
the objects in one utterance itself. experience is that artha ispadanirupitaiaktyairayah, pada ispratiyogi
If it is objected that words like udbhid are different words and artha is anuyogi of such a relation. Therefore, Thampuran points
out that there is no need to give the definition of words again; but
when they are uttered at different times, and so different words
Muktavalikara repeats the definition of word which has already
have different meanings and it is not the case that one word been given and then he mentions its division. The purpose of the
denotes different meanings, the answer is as follows: Although repetition of the definition is not to include apabhramia words which
words are different at different instances of utterance, still there do not have any denotative function, in the division of words. This
is the same sequence of letters in all instances of utterance of is the opinion of Dinakara according to Pariksit Thampuran (Cfr.

that word. Therefore, yaugikarudha words are considered as Sp.193,1. 25fi).

2. Cfr. K.A Sivaramakrishna Sastri, The word gomandalam and
one word in all instances of their utterance.
commentators, Raja Sir Annamali Chettiar Commemoration Vol.
edited by Dr. B.V. Narayanswamy Naidu, Annamali University,
1941.
Notes 3. Cfr. Sabdaiaktiprakdiika, p.162,1. 2ff.
4. The text of D. is samagryantara\ but it should be karananlra, as R.
1. In this connection the following points may also be noted. According points out Cfr. samagnpadam sdmagnghatakakdranamatraparam.
to Dinakara and Ramarudra, the Muklavati text is iaklam padam This is because for one particular effect there can be only one causal
kvacidyaugikam etc. In the printed book the Dinkan text is iaklam complex, but there can be many causes for it
padam vibhajate iakatam padam iti, According R. the Dinakan text
is padam vibhajate iaklam padamiti, Here R. raises an objection by
pointing out, first of all, that the expression iaklam padam is the
definition of the word and not the division of the word and,
therefore, the D. text padam vbhajate iaklam padam iti is not
284
Nydya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 285

Text 6A
crsrfapjch w Bfrwffrft HsWdV*ft
^ emr 1 U^cT WT-RW ^ tlVfcft SPft 'ffi dl^ld-

(Karika 82ab)
eRFTT I W ^ cTTS#l¥ ^ d I dH#l+l*fw
sj||«<4fa $J TO^TC WI^I ^iRr)ci^uii-qd<-

?• iwr 3dcT wrf

T^Jr WTarfw^TRi;i Wt ^ ■^rav^TRRi; wrt^wtt
^ ^ ^ cTSFRT cfU*d 4fa: | cisrft ^nfcri ^r ji4Uwt to 4H ciw

^ ^ I c^n%—'5^H^<eHVI«W|sf- #WT cTST^Tr ^|41<.McT[^ to wt-

teTFR^! W: W«r- *fcdl^: ddfa^b^lMd^lft ^dcdlc^ I ^

^ <J ^-qt(|'J(4qfvfc%U||4)'ji' WrRT d^^iRqt ^ <rer dflm^ d41cd~41^:
ciW Jl^lw dlMill^l
^lq|d, • clrS^t' 4)dddlcddf^Hl-M[ irf&grEJ^
Translation
^^1 ^ =FT^>% "£f^r TSddiPicqiql WOT
Implication
emr i
Karikavati
^ ^I'rflcmq) ‘Sfaqqt3d;>dl4dllj?c^ eRMT I
Implication is the relation with that meaning which
^qMScwmf eT5T^5^ | T^l^lfi^d nM is denoted by the denotative function, because of the
incompatibility of the intention of the speaker [Karika 82
ab).

Muktavali
^ ^ ^ "41 m d,—'9[+M | e|V<s| -iyl ijfc Implication is the relation with that meaning

^°r ^IcRtRT cffe^T Ottfm: | 5 which is denoted by the denotative function [laksana
Sakyasambandha iti): In such sentences as ‘there is a village (i.e.
^IsfltfKr^d (J^lqttiqi cl^q V^ul ^j<u|^ | gfcT
a colony of cowherds) on the Ganges’, when the incompatibility
^ cfSfddiq-’^qqj dT eTSFTT I cTcWR^ffaW d?T of syntactic connection of village with stream which is the
I Tt Wldld^k^R meaning of the word ‘Ganges’ by its denotative function or the
incompatibility of the intention of the speaker is cognized,
3rict WKW there is the knowledge of the bank by implication. That
^d-qcqiRfcl f^ncpfl^! W <£ (implication) is only in the form of a relation with the meaning
wti4W WTrnEf^wrr ^mr w effecr- conveyed by the denotative function. To explain: There is the
 286 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 287
recollection of the bank since the relation of the denoted
meaning in the form of stream is cognized in the bank. From implied-meaning. This is because it is possible to account for
this there is the verbal knowledge. But if incompatibility of the knowledge in which the qualifier is that (i.e. the determinant
syntactic connection is the cause of implication then there of the-state-of-being-implied-meaning) even if implication is
would not be implication in such sentences as ‘admit the sticks’ not admitted in that (i.e. laksyatavacchedaka). But in the same
since there is no incompatibility of syntactic connection of manner, denotative function is not to be admitted also in the
sticks with admission. Therefore, there is implication in those determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning. This is
who carry sticks because of the incompatibility of speaker’s because one should understand that it could as well be said
intention of feeding if admission is with regard to sticks. In the appropriately that a word is capable of bringing about the
recollection of the denoted meaning in which that (i.e.
same way in sentences such as ‘let the curd be protected from
the crows’, there is implication for the word ‘crow’ in all iakyatavacchedaka) is the qualifier. Where, however, the
implication is in the form of an indirect relation of the denoted
creatures which destroy the curd since the object of the
meaning, there it is called implied implication. As for example,
intention of the speaker is the protection of the curd from all
in words such as dvirepha etc. the relation of the two Vs is
such creatures. In the same manner in sentences such as ‘those
cognised in the word bhramara. The relation of the word
having umbrellas are going’, there is implication for the
bhramara is cognised in bee; in that word (i.e. in the word
expression ‘those having umbrellas’ in the-state-of-being-one-
dvirepha) there is implied implication (i.e. this kind of relation
group (consisting of those having umbrellas and those not
of the word dvirepha with bee is called laksitalaksanay i.e.
having umbrellas). Only this kind of implication is called
implied implication). But the word which conveys meaning by
implication that does not discard the denoted meaning (of the
implication does not produce verbal knowledge; but the other
word which has implication). This is because here there is the
word (i.e. the word conveying the meaning by denotative
knowledge of the those having umbrellas and of those other
function which is mentioned together with the word which
than them as one group. If the incompatibility of syntactic
coveys the meaning by implication) is the cause of the verbal
connection is the cause of implication then there would be no
knowledge of the implied meaning. This is because it is
restriction that in some places the word ‘Ganges’ has implication
understood that the words have ability to produce verbal
in bank, and in some other places the word ‘village’ has
knowledge of their denoted meaning in as far as they are
implication in fish etc. The following, however, is to be borne
connected with other meanings brought about by the relation
in mind: If the relation of (stream) which is the denoted
either of denotative function or of implication.
meaning is grasped (with the bank) as bank, then (from the
In a sentence, however, there is also no implication in the
word ‘Ganges’) there is the knowledge (viz. recollection) of the
form of relation with denoted meaning because of the absence
bank as bank. If (the relation of (stream) which is the denoted
of denotative function in sentence. Where it is stated that ‘there
meaning) is grasped (with the bank) as the bank of the Ganges
is a village on the deep river’, there, there is implication for the
then (from the word ‘Ganges’) there is recollection of the bank
word ‘river’ in the river bank; the syntactic connection of the
in that form only (viz. as the bank of the Ganges). Therefore,
meaning of the word ‘deep’ is with (the meaning of the word)
there is no implication in the determinant of the-state-of-being-
‘river’ by the relation of non-difference. This is because in
288
Nydya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 289

rrr ‘S“C“Pted ^‘“ticconnection isaiso sjtxic^ | d^dd^lWI 3||fa«Wdl¥l^ PScWmfdM-d^W

thaf nt rPVh me“iDg (i'e' P^^toMch'daka). If in
that place, the syntactic connection with part of the meaning PpfNcTl I wtefe-
wra^wi p p & ^ p^fcr
bal ofXdthen lhe tap!icati0“ofthe word w is in ** PSPtT PPPlftp P WPT PPT:
inte„ultofX"d ^ 'd-p’ *
'T'C^Mcl $C^fll4ch PIPPSTHs^ Hl'Kl-
tfp^rwremri tH p pffcHp ctsfttt dmfaftr
Text «B
ettem
pHHHt fRT^wN^n^Wft:, PcPPTPf MJcHqlPddwtf-
^ ^"'Wlhr-TOnenil "Tl fnraf dH+cdll'tRl I P^£ d-tflPpH a'cwawdMc3d f^qicni-
<#ippi^pfc: pH wfcqp m 1¥ IcpfcT i H4i-d<*l
? OTTO Tl 8*1 ^fnr 1%,
PHfa°*JI£d PIP> PP^I 5<lRr)Cl*t1«1Rl 3PWW^T P
^ l|-H-RiilvllUelqri»Kuji|Miu+rtU|i||»<f I X3t_ wf: wf: I 4^ftrMlfaHen<flfa-
PPPeT XIKjlH^ljftdRlddm
jllhl-|il|ii|Nir.l-,oiliaiey I ^ntw» g pop: | p^ PlPPPPPt P OTHI PPT Pfo WP

^1 TO'UwSrtffcRR,:, WPIHfto? PP PPPT P PPlftfcT #TTPPTM5teTWTT

^ntf t?r tf atwrtfrgwtri fhmjiinr PUi^ct wrfcpfih p^ pftw psrt Hp ifqKt
■Hl-Jltew.nww,™; , ,
#KW pMt TpD<H«il4^l+^HII-:<lPlcRPI
^KmwMiRHMtr tRPraRif^i ^ ^
*"w uran* ^RiRRi i i t<^«r>drqi^Rl i

1 ’f * ’wnRwi# « o^cHRl^'ild. P^T PPT c^cH^^rHllRItl PIP: I

■d 1 pp-fcrl JHd 1^ >\^\ <qpvq- cTSFir P^t4P
’W<8«8f <iFt ^ di^jfiii8«*»pRW# p^ ^ippcpra; pH wit-
uttS: H5^: tferotr- tapfHcr PI^I PcWPt PfPPPffHptPPfpHPcP-
tMi^WcHitfa fW« 8*7(1 3^^- ■^PT^WPIPPPP^FWPPK^I siP^HfPPPPT^nHp: I
Bfluinisgr t=T ^Nlifaiami^ufr * P^tTP^P PTc^^l^PP^PPPP’TjPH I
***"” 1 viwdi^t,gT vtf p P PlHr PPWPIPip; WTPPWTT PPPTf^ P dPd^lcT
l^i JtBaesw rgfflfai^rtiir^? HR: I pppp;i ^ppHHsfppH P^FTnPFfpid; phpI pH ifp^t
^^SWWCI TOKuwtWM^tt, trarf^ PfFfP^HlW PPI5PT PPPR^ft pfcT PP WIT I P^HlPf
daW PTPPPT PHrr tHHiHfPT P^t pfcT
 290
Nydya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 29 7
ctsftti xtf wmm$
by which words do not discard their denoted meanings
fouRMI %qr^M4ltjR|q^c| (ajahatsvartha). Among them the first is being described with
the words on the Ganges (gahgayam iti). Because of the
n TOc^i wrf ^ 1^ WPllfWlft incongruity which will be pointed out, it is said or the
incompatibility of the intention of the speaker
(tatparyanupapattir veti). That (implication) (sa ca) means and
implication. The second kind of implication is being described
^trorfomwi
with the words In the same way...from the crows (evam
tot mrft kakebhya iti). (In all creatures) which destroy the curd
T|s?l^ *rauliy«Ri: W#r cW (dadhyupaghatake): In that which is qualified by the-state-of-
'smw ^m^cHjq^iqi^i being-destroyer-of-curd which is common to crow, cat and so
I T?¥|^cMfa^ 1 TOM^q^lRdlcWl^lfr on. In the-state-of-being-one-group (ekasarthavahitve) means
in that which is qualified by the-state-of-being-one-group. The
^hWqnw tTCfa-mHUid^-r T^-. ?imj)unqgm
mention of implication for the word chatrin is according to the
^ ? *wuf«-uflwr tott pc^T m
opinion of those who hold implication for sentence. But
^?U>K!^ 1 ? ? "n^tTRTf Torf^rfcT ftoft according to the Nyaya school the word umbrella (chatra)
TT^knqMceitji <*><■=! ^ dl£<Kfkitlqc||«|)iy|^44Rf; 3fT^qdr- alone has implication in the-state-of-being-one-group; the
meaning of the suffix is that which has relation. Thus the verbal
knowledge is that those who form a group are going. (Here the
^ihkw^^cii^i ij^kmf ^tfcT
word) ekasdrthavdhitva means only the-state-of-being-one-
er?T^ cfTfTT- group (and) not the action of going as a group, because of the
vTl<i^l't'l-shihRi: I ^cq^iii ^^HrPqOWI^V+^o^rHTl: undesirable possibility of the absence of syntactic connection
*Wf W^fctoWNiqj ^ ? tt^FTT of the meaning of the expression ‘they are going* on account
'TejlPifcl "'Hki+^Titq TT^Ud^cik^Fnccl eTST'llR^fcl 7Tg^| of the absence of expectancy. Nor should it be objected that
vll^ldl^Ricqtq ^KI=M4lj,HHx): I this statement (that this implication is one) by which words do
TF^Ic^m^, cTTf^Tcfofrft eWT-
not discard their denoted meanings is contradictory (to what
was stated earlier in M.). This is because the statement that this
^ T| ariftdH^fr
implication is ajahatsvartha is according to the opinion of
^HI-lPiRn-DcqtM TF^lR^IWI f^H: |
those who admit implication for sentences. In some places
(kvacid) means where it is known that the intention of the
Translation speaker is that the word ‘Ganges’ should mean bank. In some
Implication places (kvacid) means where it is known that the intention of
the speaker is that the word ‘village’ should mean fish etc. In
Implication is of two kinds: Implication by which words
that form only (tenaiva rupena): It should not be objected that
discard their denoted meanings (jahatsvartha) and implication
 292 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 293

if from the sentence ‘in the Ganges etc.’ there is the knowledge relation for the word dvirepha in bee since the following
of bank as the bank of the Ganges, then this implication is not explanation is itself sufficiently appropriate: The word dvirepha
jahatsvartha. This is because implication is accepted by all as is to be etymologically explained as that which has two ‘r’s and
jahatsvartha if implication (of the word ‘Ganges’) is in bank so it implies the word bhramara in which there are two ‘r’s
only as bank. But when the bank becomes the object of which [rephadvayam) are its [dvirephapadasya] denoted meaning
knowledge as the bank of the Ganges then the implication is and the word bhramara conveys the meaning of bee by its
indeed ajahatsvartha. In the same manner it should be denotative function. Thus let laksana, i.e. making known by
understood that in the sentences mentioned earlier, viz. ‘admit means of that which is implied, (i.e. by the word bhramara
sticks’, ‘beds are crying* and so on, if there is the knowledge which is conveyed by implication by the word dvirepha) be the
of those as carrying sticks or of those lying on the bed and so meaning of the word laksitalaksana. (The answer to this
on, the implication is only ajahatsvartha. Therefore (ata eva) objection is that) if such is the case, from the sentence ‘bring
means because only the knowledge of implication in that the dvirepha' etc. there would be the impossibility of syntactic
which is qualified by a particular characteristic produces the connection of the meaning of the word bhramara with the-
recollection and verbal knowledge of that in that same form. state-of-being-the-object-of-action etc. This is because of the
Thus, it is easy to have the verbal knowledge in which the rule that the suffixes convey their meanings as syntactically
determinant of the-state-of-being-implied-meaning is the object connected with the meanings of their stems.
even though it [laksyatavacchedaka) is not the object of Now it may be objected that for a verbal knowledge of
recollection brought about by a word.1 The fault of over- a particular meaning the cause is the knowledge of the word
extension is indeed to be avoided by the use of the expression which has denotative function in that (i.e. in that particular
beginning with ‘qualified by that characteristic’ etc.. This is the meaning) and, therefore, how can'there be verbal knowledge
idea. in which the object is the meaning conveyed by the word
This is indicative (of another argument also to show that having implication. Therefore, it is said but [kimtvity). The
in the determinant of the-state-of-being-implied-meaning there other word [padantram) means the word having denotative
is no implication). It is to be noted that there is also absence function which is spoken together with (it, i.e. laksanikam
of the relation of stream which is the denoted meaning of the padam). (By the relation either of) denotative function or
word ‘Ganges’ with the-state-of-being-bank. In order to (remove) implication (Saktilaksaneti). Its own (denoted) meaningwhich
the doubt that implied implication is one more kind of is connected with the meaning of another word (which is
implication, it is pointed out that it is included in jahatsvartha conveyed) by means of one of the relations. This is the sense.
implication with the words where however (yatratviti). In the The modem school, however, points out that in such sentences
form of an indirect relation [paramparasambandharupeti) as kumatih patuh (a dullwitted man is similar to an animal)
means in the form of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning etc. where there is implication in all the words it is the well
of the word in which there are two ‘r’s which (rephadvayam) are established fact that there is verbal knowledge (and so the
its denoted meaning. It is not to be objected that there in no word) which conveys the meaning by implication also produces
need of accepting implication in the form of the indirect verbal knowledge.
 294 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 295
Now it may be objected that implication is not a relation
of the denoted meaning. If such is the case, since it is absence of denotative function in a sentence, implication in
unestablished that sentences convey their meanings by their the form of a relation of the denoted meaning is also not
denotative function, there would not be implication in them. possible. The answer is that the word laksana means only the
This objection of the Mlmamsakas is rejected by pointing out relation with that which is conveyed by it (i.e. by the word) or
that such a position is acceptable (to the Naiyayikas) with the by the sentence in which implication is intended. Therefore in
word in a sentence (vakyetviti). Now it may be objected that such sentences as ‘there is a village on the Ganges’ that which
in such sentences as ‘there is a village on the deep river’ etc., is conveyed by the word gahga is the stream and its relation is
if the implication is accepted for the word nadi in the bank of in the bank and so there (i.e. in the word gahga) there is
the river, then it would come about that there would be implication. That which is conveyed by the sentencegabhirayam
syntactic connection of the meaning of the word gabhira with nadyam is that the river is identical with that which is deep; its
the part of the meaning of the sentence. Therefore, there relation is in bank and so there is implication in the sentence
cannot be implication for the word and hence implication in also. Similarly also by the sentence citragu which is in the form
sentence is necessarily to be accepted and, therefore, it is said of a compound word that which is conveyed by the denotative
where...deep, (yatra gabhireti). In some places (kvaciditi): functions of the parts of the word citragu is that the cow is
The meaning is that in such sentences as ‘the house of the idf ntical with that which is variegated. That which is conveyed
teacher’ (gurukulam) of Caitra etc. Accepted (svikrtatvaditi): by that which is intended to have implication, (i.e. by a word
The idea is that when the words are different, the instances of or a sentence) means only the object of the knowledge which
expectancy are also different and so in the present instance we is produced by the same. Therefore, there is the relation of that
do not accept such a rule (i.e. vyutpattih = niyamah, padarthah (variegated cow) in the owner. (Hence the sentence citragu
padarthena anveti natadekadeiena). Word river (nadipadasyeti): means the owner of variegated cows).
Nor should it be objected that because of the absence of a These arguments cannot be accepted. The-state-of-being-
supporting argument in favour of one position, one can as well that-which-is-conveyed (by that which is intended to have
say that implication is in the word gabhira and the word nadi implication) does not mean the-state-of-being-the-object-of-
indicates the intention of the speaker. Therefore, how can one the-knowledge-produced-by-it. This is because in the sentence
assert that only the word nadi has laksana? The answer to this ‘there is a village on the Ganges’, it would be possible to
objection is that it is pointed out that (implication is only in the consider (the expression) gahgayam also as having impli¬
second word) because of the rule that the suffixes convey their cation. Therefore, that which brings about knowledge is to be
meanings as syntactically connected with the meanings of considered as that in as far as it is that (i.e. the word gahga
their stems. On this point the followers of Mlmamsa school itself). Even by this (the appropriate definition of implication)
argue as follows: It is not proper to take the word gabhira as has not been given. This is because it would be possible to
indicating the intention of the speaker because (verbal consider apabhramia words also as having implication.
knowledge) can be explained by means of implication of the Therefore, only the-state-of-being-the-cause-of-knowledge
sentence. Nor should it be objected that since there is the which is determined by denotative function and determined
by the-state-of-being-that is to be introduced (in the definition
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 297
296 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
by the relation of the-state-of-being-superstratum. If the sentence
of implication).2 Therefore, how can there be implication in a
gabhirayam nadi in which the word nadi is without the locative
sentence? If in reality the-state-of-being-conveyed-by-that (in
case-ending is taken to have implication in the bank there
which implication is intended) means the-state-of-being-the-
would not be the syntactic connection of such a bank etc. with
object-of-verbal-knowledge-produced-by-that in which
the-state-of-being-superstratum etc. which is the meaning of
implication is intended, then in such sentences as ‘there is a
the locative case. This is because of the rule that the suffixes
village on the Ganges’, it would be impossible for the word
bring about the knowledge of their meanings as syntactically
‘the Ganges’ to have implication. This is because there by the
connected with the meanings of their stems and so the part of
word ‘the Ganges’ the verbal knowledge in which the object
gabhirayam nadi cannot be considered as the stem of the
is stream is not produced sinre stream is not that which is
locative case. Nor can it be objected that the expression
conveyed by the word ‘Ganges’.3 But that (which is conveyed
gabhirayam nadyam which has the ending of the locative case
by that which is intended to have laksana) is to be described
is taken to have implication in existence-on-the-bank-of-the-
as that which is the object of the knowledge which is produced
deep-river. This is because of the impossibility of syntactic
by its denotative function. Nor should it be argued that the
connection of the existence-on-such-a-bank with a village etc.,
expression ‘by its denotative function’ is useless addition. This
owing to the principle that the meanings of two nouns cannot
is because it is possible that ether also which is the object of
be syntactically connected by the relation of difference. Nor
recollection brought about by the word ‘jar’ by means of
can it also be stated that the part ending in the locative case
relation of inherence can become that which is conveyed by
has implication in that which exists on such a bank and it is
it (i.e. the word ‘jar’). Therefore, by means of the knowledge
syntactically connected with village etc. by the relation of non-
of relation with it (i.e. ether) it would come about that from the
difference. This is because the knowledge of syntactic
word ‘jar’ there would be the verbal knowledge of cloth and
connection by the relation of non-difference depends on the
so on. And in this manner the relation with that which is
fact that nouns should have the same case-endings. In this way,
conveyed by that which is intended to have implication by
there is no need of further elaboration.
means of its denotative function is more cumbersome than the
relation of the denoted meaning. Therefore, the former is not
implication. And, besides, if the words gabhirayam nadyam
Commentary
ending in the locative case are taken as having implication in
Implication
the bank of deep river, there would not be the verbal
knowledge of the-state-of-being-superstratum in such village In K. we find a succinct statement of the Nyaya position
(i.e. the-state-of-being-superstratum as indicated by such a on the nature of implication. Implication is defined as the
bank). This is because of the absence of a word which brings relation with the meaning which is conveyed by denotative
about the knowledge of the-state-of-being-superstratum. Owing function. Such an implication is accepted in places where,
to the principle that the meanings of two nouns do not have otherwise, the sentence would not give rise to any verbal
syntactic connection by the relation of difference, there would knowledge or, to put it technically, the intention of the speaker
not be syntactic connection of bank with the village etc. even would be incompatible, if the word does not convey another
 298 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 299
meaning which stands in relation to the denoted meaning. As protect the curd from crows), chatrinoyanti (i.e. those having
for example, in the sentence gahgayam ghosah (i.e. there is a umbrellas are going) etc. This is because in such sentences as
village on the Ganges), since the word gahga denotes stream, ‘make the sticks enter’, there is no impossibility of the semantic
it is clear that a village cannot exist on the flow of water and, connection of sticks with entering etc. However, there is
therefore, such a meaning cannot be intended by the speaker. impossibility of the intention of the speaker, because the
Therefore, bank is the implied meaning of the word gahga intention of the speaker is not to admit the sticks, but the
since in the bank the relation of the denoted meaning of the persons who hold the sticks in order that they can take their
word gahga, viz. stream, is seen. The ablative case of the word food. Hence if the impossibility of semantic connection is
tatparyanupapattitah in K. means, according to Pariksit considered as the cause of postulating implication, then there
Thampuran (S.p.197,1.2), jhanajhapyatvam, i.e. made known would be no implication in such cases as ‘make the sticks
by knowledge. This means that the knowledge that the enter’?
intention of the speaker is incompatible is that which brings But when the incompatibility of the intention of the
about the knowledge of implication which is the relation of the speaker is considered as the cause of postulating implication,
denoted meaning. In the present instance the relation in the it is possible to have implication in these instances also.
form of conjunction (samyoga) of the denoted meaning, viz. Postulation of implication in the other instances of ‘protect the
stream, is seen in the bank and, therefore, bank (tira) is the curd from crows’, ‘those having umbrellas are going’ etc. is to
implied meaning of the word gahga. This in short is the be explained in a similar manner. Therefore, the modem
doctrine of the modem Naiyayikas according to K. Naiyayikas hold that the impossibility of the intention of the
But M. states that (K.M.D.R. p.385,1.8-386,1.1) implication speaker is to be considered as the sole cause of postulating
occurs where there is the incompatibility of semantic connection implication.
(anvayanupapattih) or where there is the incompatibility of the M. further points out that if the impossibility of the
intention of the speaker [tatparyanupapattih). It should be semantic connection were accepted as the cause of postulating
noted that, according to the old Naiyayikas, the incompatibility implication, then in such sentences as gahgayam ghosah (i.e.
of semantic connection also is the cause of the postulation of there is a village on the Ganges), it cannot be held that
implication. As for instance, in the sentence gahgayam ghosah sometimes the word gahga has implication in bank and
(i.e. there is a village on the Ganges), it is not possible to have sometimes the word ghosa has implication in fish. This is
the semantic connection of the denoted meaning of the word because one can use the sentence ‘there is a village on the
gahga, viz. stream, with the denoted meaning of the word Ganges’ with the intention of giving the implied meaning of
ghosa, viz. village. Such an incompatibility of semantic bank to the word gahga. Then the verbal knowledge arising
connection is the cause of postulating implication of the word from the sentence would be there is a village on the bank of
gahga in bank. But if the impossibility of semantic connection the Ganges. Sometimes, however, one can use the same
were the only cause of postulating implication, then there sentence with the intention of giving the implied meaning of
would be no implication in instances such asyastih praveiaya fish to the wordg/rof a. Then the verbal knowledge arising from
(i.e. make the sticks enter), kakebyo dadhi raksyatam (i.e. the sentence would be there is fish in the river Ganges.
300 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 301

In both instances of implication, i.e. when the word gahga from ajahatsvarthalaksana the denoted meaning also is an
is intended to convey the implied meaning of bank or when object. A typical example of such an implication is found in
the word ghosa is intended to convey the implied meaning of the sentence kakebhyo dadhi raksjatam (i.e. protect the curd
fish, the cause of the postulation of implication can be said to from the crows). Here the intention of the speaker is to protect
be the impossibility of semantic connection, since in both the curd from all those creatures which would destroy curd.
instances the denoted meaning of the word gahga, viz. stream Therefore, here the word ‘crow’ has implication in all those
cannot be connected with the denoted meaning of ghosa, viz. creatures which would destroy the curd. In this implied
village, and so the one or the other word should be taken with meaning, the denoted meaning of crow also is included in as
an implied meaning; i.e. either the word gahga should be far as it destroys the curd. Therefore, this kind of implication
taken in the implied sense of bank or the word ghosa should is called ajahatsvartha.
be taken in the implied sense of fish. But which word is to be Similarly, in the sentence chatrinoyanti (i.e. those having
taken in the implied sense? This can be determined only by umbrellas are going), we find ajahatsvartha implication for the
having recourse to the intention of the speaker. Therefore, the expression chatrin, ‘those-having-umbrellas’. This is because
impossibility of the intention of the speaker is considered by the expression chatrin brings about by implication the verbal
Muktavalikara as the cause of postulating implication. knowledge of one group consisting of those having umbrellas
Dinakara gives the division of implication (laksana) and those not having umbrellas.
(K.M.D.R. p.385, 1.13). The first form of implication is Commenting on these examples, Ramarudra enters into
jahatsvartha. The etymological derivation of this word is given a detailed discussion of the controversies about implication for
by Ramarudra (K.M.D.R. p.385,1.26) as follows: jahatsvartha a sentence between the Grammarians and the Naiyayikas.
laksana is that by which the word abandons its denoted The occasion for these comments by Ramarudra is the
meaning, i.e. such an implication produces the verbal statement of Dinakara that the opinion of Muktavalikara that
knowledge in which the denoted meaning is not the object, the expression ‘those having umbrellas’ [chatrin) is said to
but only the implied meaning is the object. This kind of have implication, accordingto the doctrine of the Grammarians.
laksana has already been explained earlier with the example Now it is objected that the expression chatrin cannot have
of ‘there is a village on the Ganges’. The point is that when implication at all. This is because the expression chatrin is
from this sentence by means of implication there is the verbal etymologically derived from the word chaira which is followed
knowledge in the form that there is a village on the bank of the by the derivative suffix ini. And therefore, this expression is a
Ganges, the denoted meaning of the word gahga, viz. stream, sentence and since, according to the Naiyayikas, there is no
is totally abandoned. That is why this kind of implication is
denotative function in sentences, it is also not possible for them
called jahatsvartha.
to accept implication for sentences since implication is in the
The second kind of implication is ajahatsvartha. form of connection of the denoted meaning. It is to meet this
Ramarudra gives the etymological derivation of this word.
objection that Dinakara points out, as mentioned earlier, that
ajahatsvartha laksana is that in which the word does not give
the statement that the expression chatrin has implication only
up its denoted meaning, i.e. in the verbal knowledge arising
according to the opinion of the Grammarians.
302 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 303

However, the theory of the Grammarians does not stand the verbal knowledge of the agent of cooking. Hence, the
rational scrutiny for the following reasons. According to them, opinion of the Grammarians that the expression pacaka
compound words such as rajapurusa have denotative function should have a separate denotative function is to be
in a person who belongs to the king (rajasvatvavatpuruse rejected.
laktih). The expressions likepacaka and chatrin have denotative Nor can the Grammarians argue that it is necessary to
function in the agent of cooking (pakakartari laktih) and in accept the denotative function in compounds for the following
one who has chatra (chatrasambandhini laktih). Such a theory reasons: If denotative function is not accepted in compound
cannot be accepted because if it is so there is the fault of words, then such usages as rddhasya rajamatahgah in the sense
cumbersomeness owing to the need of admitting many of the elephants of the rich king would become grammatically
denotative functions without any purpose, i.e. one has to correct. For, according to the Naiyayikas, the word rajan
accept denotative function in three words viz. chatra, ini and means king and to this the meaning of the word rddha, rich,
chatrin etc. can be semantically connected by the relation of non-difference.
The Naiyayikas explain the verbal knowledge arising Therefore, the whole expression can be used to mean the
from a compound word like rajapurusa thus: There is implica¬ elephants of the rich king. But such a usage is not accepted as
tion for the word rajan in the one who belongs to the king correct by anybody. If, however, the "opinion of the
(rajasambandhini laksana) and there is denotative function of Grammarians that there is denotative function in compounds
the wordpurusa inpurusa (a person). And therefore, the verbal is accepted, as for example, if the compound rajamatahgah is
knowledge arisingfrom this compound is that the person is not said to have denotative function in elephants which belong to
different from the one who belongs to the king (rajasambandhya• the king (rajasambandhimatahge Saktih), then king, a part of
bhinnah purusah). In the expression chatrin, the word chatra the denoted meaning of the compound word rajamatahgah is
has denotative function in umbrella and the suffix ini has the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning
denotative function in that which is related to (sambandhini (padarthatavacchedaka). And it is the accepted rule by all that
iaktih). And, therefore, from the word chatrin there arises the one meaning is connected with another meaning and not with
verbal knowledge of one who is related to umbrella. Hence, the determinant of the-state-of-being-the-meaning-of-the-word
there is no reason to accept the denotative function of the (padarthah. padarthena anveti na tu padarthatavacchedkena iti
expression chatrin in one who is related to chatra. niyamah.).4 Hence, in the present instance, according to the
Similarly, according to the Grammarians, the expression opinion of the Grammarians, the meaning of the word rddha
pacaka has denotative function in the agent of cooking cannot be semantically connected with king, the determinant
(pakakartarilaktih). The Naiyayikas reject this opinion pointing ofthe-state-of-being-denoted-meaning, i.e. apart ofthe denoted
out that the expression pacaka is derived from the root pac meaning. Therefore, according to the theory of the Gram¬
having denotative function in the act of cooking (pakakriyayam marians, the possibility of validity for such incorrect usages as
iaktih) and the suffix aka having denotative function in agent rddhasya rajamatahgah will not arise.
(kartari laktih). Therefore, the expression pacaka is asentence, The Naiyayikas, however, answer this objection by
according to the Naiyayikas, and from this sentence there is pointing out that in their theory that which is conveyed by
304 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 305
implication by the word rajan, the first word in the compound
chatra here is padarthatavacchedaka and, therefore, ketapa¬
rajamatahgah, is that which is related to the king
dartha cannot be semantically connected with chatra.
(rajasambandhi). Hence, king is the determinant of the-state-
This objection of the Grammarians cannot be accepted.
of-being-implied-meaning which is conveyed by the word
This is because of the rule vrttasya na viiesanayogah,
rajan in the compound rajamatahgah, and just as a meaning
viksanayuktasya na vrttih. This is to be explained as follows: A
of a word is not semantically connected with the determinant
word, as for instance, chatra, which is part of a vrtti (i.e. a
of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning (fakyatavacchedaka), it
complex formation of chatrin) cannot be connected with
is also not connected with the determinant of the-state-of-
another word, e.g. ketam, which is not a part of that complex
being-implied-meaning-of-a-word (laksyatavacchedaka). Hence,
formation chatrin and which signifies qualification. Further if
the argument of the Grammarians to show that if the denotative
a word, as for instance, chatra has already a qualifier, e.g.
function is not accepted in compounds there would be the
ketam, it (i.e. the word chatra) cannot further admit a complex
validity for incorrect usages, does not stand.
formation, e.g. chatrin. Therefore, the Grammarians cannot
Further, the Grammarians raise an objection as follows:
object that, according to the Naiyayikas, the usage ketam
According to the Naiyayikas, the expression chatrin is a
chatri is possible.
sentence and it consists of the stem chatra and suffix ini which
But actually this rule also need not be admitted. This is
have denotative functions in chatra (umbrella) and in sambandhi
because in the expression such as Caitrasya dasabharya (the
(that which has relation) respectively. Hence, here according
wife of the servant of Caitra), iaraih iatitapatrah (having leaves
to the Naiyayikas, chatra is not a padarthatavacchedaka but a
which are made to fall by arrows), there is semantic connection
padartha. Now the rule accepted by all is that padarthah
of one meaning with the part of another meaning, i.e.
padarthena anveti na tu padarthatavacchedakena, i.e. one
padarthatavacchedaka, in the following manner: The dasatva
meaning is semantically connected with another meaning and
(the-state-of-being-a-servant) which is a part of the meaning of
not with the determinant of the-state-of-being-the-meaning-of-
the word dasa is semantically connected with ‘being-indicated’
a-word. Hence, a usage such as ivetam chatri, in the sense of
[nirupitatvam) which is the meaning of the genitive case¬
one having a white umbrella would become possible because
ending of Caitra; the Satanam (the action of causing to fall)
ketapadartha could be semantically connected with chatra-
which is a part of the meaning of the word Satita in the
padartha (which is denoted by the word chatra which is a part
compound iatitapatra is semantically connected with the
of the expression chatrin). But such a usage is not accepted as
instrumentality (which is the meaning of the instrumental case¬
valid by anybody.
ending) of arrow. In both instances, however, the semantic
The Grammarians continue their arguments pointing
connection is by means of the relation of difference, viz. in the
out that if their theories are accepted, then such an objection
first instance ‘being-indicated’ [nirupitatvam) is semantically
cannot even arise. This is because, according to them, chatrin
connected with the-state-of-being-servant [dasatva) by a relation
is not a sentence, but a word, i.e. a taddhitavrtti (complex
of difference, viz. the-state-of-being-substratum (i.e. akayata);
formation of nominal suffix), which has denotative function in
and in the second instance, the instrumentality [karanatvam)
chatrasambandhi (i.e. that which is related to chatra). Hence,
is semantically connected with the action of causing to fall
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
306 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 307
imam) by a relation of difference, viz. the characteristic of
And such a knowledge of semantic connection by the relation
indicating (nirupakatd). Therefore, the general rule should be
of non-difference is brought about by the fact that the words
that one meaning cannot be semantically connected with the
conveying those meanings are put in the same case-endings.
part of another meaning by means of the relation of non¬
Hence there is no need of the rule that a meaning is connected
difference. with another meaning and not with the part of another
This means that semantic connection between a meaning
meaning.
and part of another meaning is not possible by the relation of
But this rule cannot be rejected by these arguments for
non-difference. But there is no difficulty in accepting semantic
the following reasons: It is admitted by all that there could be
connection between one meaning and another meaning by
semantic connection of a meaning with the part of another
the relation of difference. Now if the rule mentioned earlier
meaning in such instances as caitrasyapita etc., i.e. when the
vrttasya na viksanayogah viksanayuktasya na vrttih is not
words are correlative (sasambandhikapadam), the semantic
accepted, then such ausage as ketam chatriwouldbe possible,
connection of one meaning with the part of another meaning
since, according to the Naiyayikas, the meaning of the word
is admitted by all.5 In instances other than correlative words,
chatra in the expression chatrin is a padartha and not a
one meaning is not semantically connected even by the
padarthatavacchedaka. Naiyayikas point out that such a usage
relation of difference with the part of another meaning. If in
is not possible even though the general rule vrttasya etc. is not
instances other than correlative words semantic connection of
accepted. This is because semantic connection by the relation
one meaning by the relation of difference with the part of
of non-difference between the two meanings is brought
another meaning is accepted, then such incorrect usages as
about by the fact that the words expressing these meanings
gavi pakr gauh meaning a cow is that which has tail with hairs
have the same case-ending. Here the words ketam and the
existing in cow should be considered valid. This is because the
word chatra in the expression chatrin are not in the same case¬
meaning of the word pak is lomavallahgulavdn, i.e. that which
ending and so they cannot be connected by the relation of
has tail with hairs. Therefore, lomavlldhgulah (tail with hairs)
non-difference. is the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning of
In a similar manner it cannot be argued that there is no
the word pak and so lomavallahgula is part of the meaning of
need of accepting the rule that a meaning is semantically
the word pak. The meaning of the locative case in gavi is the-
connected with another meaning and not with the part of
state-of-being-superstratum (adheyatvam). The meaning of the
another meaning, for, in such expressions as caitrsya pita (the
stem go (cow) is semantically connected with the-state-of-
father of Caitra) the-state-of-being-progenitor (janakatva) (which
being-superstratum by the relation of difference, vizi nirupitatva
is a part of the meaning of the word pitr since the word pitr
(the-state-of-being-indicated). This meaning of the locative
means janakapumdn, a male progenitor) is semantically
case (adheyatvam) is semantically connected with lomavallah-
connected by the relation of difference with the-state-of-being-
gula by the relation of difference (i.e. akayata, the-state-of-
indicated which is the meaning of the genitive case. Therefore,
being-substratum). The verbal knowledge arising from the
the rule should be that a meaning is not connected with the
sentence gavipakrgauh is a cow is that which has tail with hairs
part of another meaning by the relation of non-difference.
existing in cow (govrttilomavallahgulavan gauh). Therefore, in
308 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 309

order to avoid giving validity to such incorrect usages, the the word chatra it would go against the earlier statement (Cfr.
rule which states that a meaning is connected with another K.M.D.R. p. 387, 1.1) that in the expression ‘those having
meaning and not with the part of another meaning is to be umbrellas are going’ [chatrino yanti), there is ajahatsvartha
accepted. implication. Such an objection is made by Dinakara on the
The point of all these arguments proposed by Ramarudra assumption that there is ajahatsvartha implication only in
is to reject the theory of the Grammarians that there is those places where in the verbal knowledge the denoted
denotative function in compound words. By doing so meaning of the word which is considered to have implication
Ramarudra also explained how the verbal knowledge arising becomes the object as principal qualificand. Thus, in the
from compound words etc. can be explained without accepting present instance, when implication is accepted in the word
the denotative function and implication in them. chatra, the denoted meaning of the word chatra, i.e. umbrella,
It was pointed out that, according to the Naiyayikas, in will not be the principal qualificand in the verbal knowledge
the instance such as chatri the word chatra has implication in arising from the expression chatrino yanti. Therefore, the
the-state-of-being-one-group (ekasarthavahitva). The meaning implication will not be ajahatsvartha. Dinakara’s answer to this
of the suffix ini is that which is related (sambandhi). Therefore, objection is that it is an instance of ajahatsvartha laksana,
the verbal knowledge arising from the expression chatrino according to the opinion of the Grammarians. For, according
yanti is that ekasarthavahitvasambandhinah, i.e. those who to them, the implication is on the word chatrin and so,
form a group are going. It should be noted, however, that according to them, the whole meaning of the expression is a
ekasarthavahitvam means only the-state-of-being-one-group group of those having umbrellas and those not havingumbrellas.
[ekasamuddyatvam) and not the-agency-of-going-as-a-group Hence the denoted meaning of the expression chatrin, viz.
[ekasdrthagantrtvam). Otherwise, i.e. in case the word chatra those having umbrellas also is the object of the verbal
means by implication the-agency-of-going-as-a-group (ekasar- knowledge as principal qualificand. Therefore, it is proper to
thagantrtvam), in the sentence catnno yanti, the predicate consider the implication here as ajahatsvartha.
(vidheyam) is gamanakartrtvam (agency of going, i.e. the root Dinakara further asserts that even when the denoted
yd means gamanam, go'ing, and the verbal suffix ti means meaning is the object of verbal knowledge as a qualifier, there
kartrtvam, i.e. agency) and the determinant of the-state-of- could be ajahatsvartha implication. According to him
being-subject (uddetyatavacchedakam) also is gamanakartrtvam jahatsvartha implication will be in such places where the
(agency of going). Therefore, there is no difference between denoted meaning of the word in no way, i.e. neither as
the determinants of the-state-of-being-subject and the-state-of- principal qualificand nor as qualifier, becomes the object of
being-predicate. Hence, there cannot also arise the verbal the verbal knowledge. That is why, it is stated that when the
knowledge by the relation of difference (i.e. by the relation of word gahga has implication in the bank of the Ganges, the
dirayatd,\iz. the-state-of-being-substratum) owing to the absence ^plication is ajahatsvartha since here the denoted meaning
of expectancy (akanksa) which is one of the causes needed for °f the 'word gahga becomes the object of verbal knowledge as
bringing about verbal knowledge. a qualifier; when, however, the implication is in just bank, then
Now it may be objected that if implication is accepted in the implication isjahatsvartha since here the denoted meaning
310 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary—fabdakh anda 311
of the word gahga does not become the object of verbal
that here the implication is accepted for the word chatra in
knowledge either as principal qualificand or as qualifier. In
only the-state-of-being-one-group (ekasamudayatva) and not in
this way, in the expression chatrinoyanti, even if implication is
chatrighatitaikasamudayatva. In this interpretation, the verbal
accepted for the word chatra in ‘the-state-of-being-one-group’
knowledge is only of one group; therefore, chatra does not
consisting (also) of those having umbrellas, it can be considered
become the object of verbal knowledge either as principal
as an instance of ajahatsvartha laksana since the denoted
qualificand or as qualifier. Therefore, here the implication is
meaning of the word chatra also becomes the object of verbal
not ajahatsvartha. But this interpretation of the sense of the
knowledge as a qualifier.
objection by Dinakara cannot be accepted, because in that
These statements seem to involve a contradiction with
case, he cannot have answered that the implication in chatrino
what has been stated earlier by Dinakara. Dinakara raises an
yanti is given as an example of ajahatsvartha, according to the
objection with regard to the implication of the word chatra,
opinion of the Grammarians. He should have rather answered
that it may not be an instance of ajahatsvartha implication
that here implication is ajahatsvartha because the word chatra
since the denoted meaning of chatra is not an object as
principal qualificand in the resulting verbal knowledge. The has implication in the-state-of-being-one-group consisting also
answer to this objection is given following the opinion of the of those having umbrellas (i.e. chatrighatitaikasamudayatve).
Grammarians. According to them it is the word chatrin that Therefore, in the verbal knowledge the denoted meaning of
has implication in the-state-of-being-a-group connected with the word chatra is the object as qualifier. Hence here the
those having umbrellas. In the verbal knowledge arising from implication can be considered as ajahatsvartha.
this, the denoted meaning of chatrin, i.e. those having umbrellas, Ramarudra finally interprets the D. text in such a way that
is also the principal qualificand. Therefore, here the author there would not arise any contradiction between the earlier
seems to be asserting that only where the denoted meaning is and later statements. According to some Naiyayikas, in such
the principal qualificand, there is ajahatsvartha laksana, and places as chatrinoyanti, even when the implication is admitted
where the denoted meaning is an object in the verbal for the word chatra in chatrightitasamuddyatva, the implication
knowledge as a qualifier, there is no ajahatsvartha implication. ajahatsvartha. This is because the denoted meaning of the
But now the author explicitly says that where the verbal word chatra, i.e. umbrella, does not become the object of
knowledge has as object the bank of the Ganges, the implication verbal knowledge as the principal qualificand. That is why
is ajahatsvartha. Here the denoted meaning of the Ganges is Dinakara afterwards states that in such instances as gahgaydm
the object of verbal knowledge as qualifier and still the author U^1Cn implication of the word ganga is in mere lira,
holds that the implication is ajahatsvartha. This is clearly in Naiyayikas accept that the implication is jahatsvartha. Here
contradiction to the statement which he made earlier. because of the significance of the word ‘all’ (sarva), it follows
Ramarudra points out a possible way out of this at when the implication of the word gahga is in gahgatira (i.e.
• contradiction. Dinakara raises the objection that if the bank of the Ganges) some Naiyayikas hold that the implication
implication is accepted for the word chatra then it may not be lsja atsvartha. This means that, according to the opinion of
an instance of ajahatsvartha implication. By this he may mean me Naiyayikas, where the denoted meaning is semantically
connected with another meaning there only there is ajahat-
312 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 313
svartha implication. Therefore, according to these Naiyayikas, An objection may now be raised against this statement as
if the implication of the word chatra is accepted in chatrighati- follows: If file determinant ofthe-state-of-being-implied-meaning
tasamudayatva, it cannot be ajahatsvartha, since the denoted becomes the object of verbal knowledge (i.e. if something
meaning of the word chatra, i.e. umbrella, is not semantically becomes the object of verbal knowledge without that thing
connected with another meaning in the verbal knowledge. having already become the object of recollection brought
But Muktavallkara takes it as ajahatsvartha. Therefore, about by the word by means of the knowledge of its vrtti,
Dinakara justifies the M. position that there is ajahatsvartha significatory function), then from the word ‘cloth’ we can have
implication in the expression chatrino yanti. He does so by the verbal knowledge of jar, i.e. any word can produce the
accepting here the opinion of the Grammarians (Cfr. S.198, verbal knowledge of anything. But this objection can be easily
1.9fl). answered. When one has knowledge of implication of a word
Further, it may be pointed out that in the instances such the qualificand in which knowledge is qualified by a particular
as ‘admit the sticks’ ‘beds are crying’ and so on, the implication characteristic, the recollection and verbal knowledge brought
is indeed ajahatsvartha, if from these expressions the verbal about by that knowledge of implication should have the same
knowledge is respectively of those carrying sticks or of those qualificand qualified by that same characteristic. In this way,
lying on the bed. This is because, in the first example, sticks even if there is no implication in the determinant of the-state-
become the object of verbal knowledge as qualifier and, in the of-t eing-implied-meaning, it becomes the object of verbal
second, beds become the object of verbal knowledge as knowledge. Therefore, from the word ‘cloth’ one cannot have
qualifier. the verbal knowledge of jar.
Now M. points out that there is no implication in the- Dinakara gives an additional reason why the determinant
determinant-of-the-state-of-being-implied-meaning. The reason of the-state-of-being-the-implied-meaning does not have
for this statement is further explained by Dinakara pointing implication is that the denoted meaning of the word gahga, i.e.
out that the knowledge of implication in that which is qualified stream, does not have any connection in the form of conjunction
by a particular characteristic produces the recollection and the with the universal or the-state-of-being-bank [tiratva).
verbal knowledge of that thing in that same form. This means Ramarudra raises an objection against this opinion as follows:
that even without implication in the determinant of the-state- The denoted meaning of stream is connected with the-state-of-
of-being-implied-meaning, that determinant becomes the object being-bank [tiratva) by the relation of inherence in bank which
of verbal knowledge arising from the knowledge of that is conjoined with stream [pravahasamyuktatiranuyogika-
implication. In less technical terms, this means only that from samavaya). And therefore, there could be implication in the-
the word gahga in the sentence gahgayam ghosah sometimes state-of-being-bank [tiratva).
we get tlie knowledge oltira, sometimes asgahgatira, sometimes The answer to this objection is that just as the verbal
as bhukhanda. Therefore, there is no fixed rule that the word knowledge of two different meanings by two different
gahga conveys only the implied meaning of tira as tira. Hence denotative functions are not admitted for one word at the
it follows that there is no implication in laksyatavacchedaka like same time, so also the verbal knowledge of two different
tiratva etc. implied meanings are not admitted by different implications
314 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 315

for the same word at the same time. Therefore, the wordgahga denotative function of the word prthivi either in the form that
cannot convey at the same time the implied meanings of tira the earth is to be denoted by the word prthivi or the substance
and tiratva by means of the relations of pravahasamyoga and which is different from the other eight substances is to be
pravahasamyuktasamavaya respectively. denoted by the word prthivi, or that which has smell is to be
In such sentences asgahgayamghosamatsyau stah, however, denoted by the word prthivi, just as one can have the
the word gahga has two different significatory functions (vrtti); knowledge of implication of the word gahga either in the form,
by means of implication, the wordgawga means bank and by the bank is conjoined with stream or the bank of the Ganges
means of denotative function the word gahga means stream. is conjoined with stream. Therefore, just as there is no fixed
And therefore, the sentence means in the stream there is fish rule in the verbal knowledge arising from the implication that
and on the bank of the Ganges there is a village. If this sentence its object is qualified by one fixed characteristic, so also the
is considered as valid, then the rule that we can have verbal object of verbal knowledge arising from denotative function
knowledge of two different meanings from one word at the would not be qualified by one particular characteristic.
same time by means of two different kinds of significatory If however, the denotative function is accepted in the
functions, i.e. iakti and laksana, and not by means of two same determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning, there
kinds of significatory functions, i.e. Saktidvaya and laksana- would invariably be the verbal knowledge of earth as earth
dvaya should be accepted. from the word prthivi. This is because the denotative function
Similarly, it should be noted that there is no denotative of the word prthivi is grasped in the earth and in the universal
function in the determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted- of earthness and also because of the rule that only the denoted
meaning. The reason is that a word is capable of bringing meaning becomes the object of verbal knowledge. Hence the
about the recollection of the denoted-meaning in which the verbal knowledge arising from the word prthivi has as its object
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning sakyatavac- earth as qualified by the universal earthness. Therefore,
chedakam) is the qualifier. according to our experience that there is the recollection and
Ramarudra now proceeds to present his own reasons verbal knowledge of prthivi as characterised by prthivitva and
why there is denotative function in the determinant of the- not by gandha etc. we have to admit there is denotative
state-of-being-denoted-meaning. But afterwards he rejects this function in prthivitva which is the iakyatavacchedaka. On the
opinion and establishes in an original manner (parairaparisilitah contrary, by implication that which is not implied also becomes
panthah) that there is no denotative function in the determinant the object of verbal knowledge and so it follows that in verbal
of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning. He first points out that knowledge arising from implication of the word gahga the
if the denotative function is not accepted in the determinant bank becomes the object sometimes as bank, sometimes as
of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning, then, from the word bank of the Ganges. Hence there is no implication in
prthivi one can have the verbal knowledge sometimes of earth laksyatavacchedaka.
as a substance that is different from the other eight substances, This theory also has to be reconsidered as follows: The
sometimes of earth as that which has smell, sometimes of earth cause of the verbal knowledge is the knowledge of the
as earth. This is because one can have the knowledge of the denotative function in which the determinant of the-state-of-
 316 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 317

being-substratum (dharmitavacchedakani) is the object as the qualifier (prakara) the universal the-state-of-being-earth owing
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning. Now the to the valid knowledge of the denotative function in the form
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning is that that the earth is to be denoted by the word prthivi. It is only by
characteristic which exists where there is the-state-of-being- mistaken knowledge of denotative function in the form that
denoted-meaning, (i.e. lakyata) and where the-state-of-being- that which has smell is to be denoted by the word prthivi, there
denoted-meaning does not exist, there is no such characteristic arises from the word prthivi the verbal knowledge in which that
either. And such characteristic should be also simple. This is which has smell is the object.
because when there is a characteristic which is simple, another Now it may be asked just as prthivitva is accepted as
characteristic which is cumbersome cannot be accepted as the svarupasambandharupavacchedaka of denotative function why
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted-meaning. It should not accept tiratva as svarupasambandharupavacchedaka of
be noted that here such a state-of-being-determinant is in the implication? The answer to this question is that in the
form of self-relation (prakrte avacchedakatvam svarupa- determinant of the-state-of-being-implied-meaning (laksyatavac-
sambandhatmakam). chedaka) the-state-of-being-determinant in the form of self¬
Therefore, only the knowledge of the denotative function relation (svarupasambandharupam avacchedakatvam) cannot
in the form that the earth is to be denoted by the word prthivi be accepted. This is because the knowledge of implication can
is valid, since denotative function (i.e. lakyata) is determined be in various forms; as for instance, in the example of
by the universal the-state-of-being-earth (prthivitva), which is gahgayam ghosah, the knowledge of implication can be that the
simple. The knowledge of the denotative function in the form bank is connected with stream or the bank of the Ganges is
that the substance which is different horn the other eight connected with stream or a portion of earth is connected with
substances like water and so on is to be denoted by the word stream. In such instances of knowledge of implication, neither
prthivi cannot be considered as valid form of the knowledge the-state-of-being-bank (Tiratva) nor the-state-of-being-the-bank-
of the denotative function because the-state-of-being-a- of-Ganges (gahgatiratva) nor the-state-of-being-a-part-of-earth
substance which is different from the other eight substances (bhukhandatva) can be the substratum of the-state-of-being-
like water etc. cannot be accepted as the determinant of the- determinant (avacchedakatva) of implication in the form of
state-of-being-denoted-meaning, since such characteristics are self-relation (svarupasambandharupa). Therefore, there is no
cumbersome in comparison with the universal the-state-of- implication in the determinant of the-state-of-being-implied-
being-earth (prthivitvam). meaning such as tiratva etc.
Hence, even if denotative function is not accepted in the There is a further kind of implication which is called
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted, from the word laksitalaksana. Now it was already stated that there are two
prthivi, we have invariably the verbal knowledge of earth only kinds of implications, namely, jahatsvartha and ajahatsvartha.
as earth and not as that which has smell etc. Hence, the Therefore, how .can there be a third kind of implication? This
conclusion is that there is no denotative function in the doubt is clarified by pointing out that the implication which is
determinant of the-state-of-being-denoted and hence, the called laksitalaksana is included in jahatsvartha implication.
verbal knowledge arising from the expression ‘earth’ has as When the relation of the denoted meaning is indirect, then the
318 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 319

implication is called laksitalaksana: As for example, the instance, if the indirect implication is not accepted in the word
meaning of the word dvirepha has only indirect connection dvirepha, then the word dvirepha does not convey the meaning
with bee and, therefore, the word dvirepha is said to have of bee, but conveys the meaning of the word bhramara by
implication in bee. What is the exact nature of the indirect nirudha implication. Now in the expression the implied
relation here? It is the-state-of-being-the-denoted-meaning of meaning of the stem dvirepha is the word bhramara-, the
the word bhramara in which there are two Vs, which are meaning of the accusative case-suffix am is the-state-of-being-
the denoted meanings of the word dmrepha (.svavacyarephadva- object-of-action (karmatvam). Such a meaning of the suffix
yaghaiitapadavdcyatvam). This means that the word dmrepha cannot be semantically connected with the word bhramara
means by denotative function two Vs and these two Vs are which is the meaning of the word dvirepha. This is because in
found in the word bhramara which denotes the meaning of the sentence dvirepham anaya, karmatvam, the meaning of the
bee. accusative case suffix am, cannot be semantically connected
Now an objection may be raised against this explanation with the word bhramara but only with bee. Therefore, the
as follows: It is not necessary to accept such a kind of indirect implication laksitalaksana should be accepted for the
implication for the word dmrepha in bee in the form of an word dvirepha in the meaning of bee.
indirect relation. This is because the word dmrepha It should be noted that the word which is said to have
etymologically means that which has two Vs. In other words, implication does not bring about any verbal knowledge. But,
the word dmrepha conveys the meaning, viz. word bhramara, the word which is said to have implication, brings about only
by implication. Here the implication is in the form of the the recollection of the meaning but not verbal knowledge
relation of the denoted meaning of the word dmrepha, viz. two (laksanike pade smarika iaktireva nanubhaviki). But now the
Vs, with the word bhramara which has two Vs. And the word question arises: How then can the meaning by implication
bhramara conveys the meaning of bee by denotative function. become the object of verbal knowledge? It is indeed the other
And therefore, when everything can be explained properly in word conveying the meaning by denotative function, which is
this way, there is no need of accepting implication in the form mentioned together with the word which is said to have
of indirect relation for the word dvirepha in bee. Thus the implication that brings about the verbal knowledge. As for
expression laksitalaksana can also be explained in the following instance, in the expression gahgdyam ghosah, i.e. there is a
way. laksana here means jhapanam, i.e. making known. village on the Ganges, it is the word ghosa that brings about the
Therefore, the whole expression means making known by verbal knowledge of bank which is the implied meaning of the
means of that which is implied. Hence the implied meaning word gahga. Therefore, the Nyaya doctrine is that the word
of the word dmrepha, namely, the word bhramara, brings about which has denotative function (in the example given, the word
the verbal knowledge of bee by its denotative function (i.e. the ghosa) and which is mentioned together with the word which
denotative function of the word bhramara). is said to have implication (viz. the word gahga) brings about
This objection is rejected because when someone asks the verbal knowledge of the implied meaning (viz. bank)
‘bring dvirephano one brings the word bhramara, but bee. which is brought to the mind by that word (i.e. gahga). This is
This is because the suffixes convey their meaning as semantically the opinion of the old Naiyayikas.
connected with the meanings of their stems. In the present
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 321
320 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
the word gabhira, i.e. deep, will be semantically connected
The opinion of the modern Naiyayikas is that the word
with apart (viz. river) of another meaning, i.e. the bank of over
which is said to have implication also brings about the verbal
which is the implied meaning of the word nadi. Therefore, the
knowledge. And the reason for this is that in such sentences as
Mlmamsakas conclude that, in orderto avoid this ekadeianvaya,
kumatih paiuh, i.e. a dull-witted man is similar to an animal,
implication of the sentence gabhirayam nadyam should be
where there is implication in all the words, it is admitted by all
that there is verbal knowledge. In this sentence the word mati accepted in gabhiranaditira.
The answer of the Naiyayikas to this objection is that in
has implication in one who is dull-witted and the word ku
some places, semantic connection of a meaning with a part of
shows the intention of the speaker. Since the-state-of-being-an-
another meaning is also accepted. Therefore, here even 1 y
animal cannot be predicated of a man though he is dull-witted,
the relation of non-difference, the meaning of the word
the wordpaiu, animal, is said to have implication in one who
gabhira, deep, is semantically connected with a part (viz. nver)
is similar to an animal. Therefore, in this sentence, none of the
of another meaning (i.e. bank of river which is the implied
words is understood in its denoted meaning and so if the word
meaning of the word nadi), there is no harm. This is because
which is said to have implication does not produce any verbal
there are some expressions such as caitrasya gurukulam, the
knowledge, then there could not be any verbal knowledge
house of the teacher of Caitra, where we find ekadeianvaya.
from it. But the fact is that, according to our experience, there
Here the meaning of the genitive case in the expression
is verbal knowledge from this sentence. Hence, in order to
caitrasya is nirupitatvam, the-state-of-being-indicated. This is
explain the possibility of verbal knowledge from sentences
semantically connected with the-state-of-being-teacher (gurutva)
like this, the modem Naiyayikas hold that the word which is
which is a part of the meaning of the word guru in the
said to have implication also produces verbal knowledge.
expression gurukulam. In fact, ekadeianvaya could be seen
Now the authors begin to discuss an important point of
even in expressions such as caitrasya guruh, i.e. the teacher of
controversy between the Mlmamsakas and the Naiyayikas,
Caitra. Here the meaning of the genitive case can be said to
namely, the theory of the Mlmamsakas that there is implication
be semantically connected with the-state-of-bemg-a-teacher
also in sentences. The Naiyayikas on the contrary deny that
(gurutva) which is a part of the meaning of the word guru.
there is implication in sentences. The basic reason for the
Therefore, Ramarudra points out that in the expression
opinion of Naiyayikas is that there is no denotative function in
caitrasya gurukulam which is the example Dinakara gives for
sentences and, therefore, there cannot be any implication also
ekadeianvaya the word kulam is used without any purpose.
in sentences, since the implication is in the form of a relation
ButPariksitThampuran rejects this opinion of Ramarudra.
of denoted meaning.
According to Thampuran, in the expression caitrasya guruh,
But it may be objected that if there is no implication in
the word guru may also be taken as meaning gurutva
sentences, then in such expressions as gabhirayam nadyam Therefore, without the semantic connection
ghosah, i.e. there is a village on the deep river, there would be
of one meaning with the part of another meaning (ekadeianvaya)
semantic connection of one meaning with the part of another
the expression is meaningful. Hence Dinakara gives an
meaning (ekadeianvayah). This is because, if implication of
example caitrasya gurukulam where the word guru means
nadi is accepted in the bank of the river then the meaning of
 322 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 323
gurutvavtiista. And so here ekadeianvayah between the meaning ekaddanvaya, i.e. the semantic connection of one meaning
of the genitive case (iniriipitatvam) andgurutvam is possible. (S. with the part of another meaning, becomes the object, this rule
p.200,11.2-4). (viz. padarthah padarthena anveti na tadekadetena) is not
Here it cannot be objected that in the compound word accepted.
gurukula the word guru has implication in that which is related Thus, for instance, by the expression caitrasya guruh,
to the teacher (gurusambandhin). Hence guru is a part of the such a verbal knowledge with ekaddanvaya is produced and
implied meaning and so the meaning of the genitive case in so this rule is not accepted. But where the particular sequence
the expression caitrasya, viz. relation (sambandha), is semanti¬ of words produces the verbal knowledge in which ekaddanvaya
cally connected with guru. Thus, as an example of ekaddanvaya, does not become object, there this rule is accepted, as for
the expression caitrasya gurukulam itself can be given. But this instance by the expression rddhasya rajamatahgah, there is no
is not possible, for in that case we could use the expression verbal knowledge of the semantic connection of rddha (rich)
caitrasya guruh with reference to a person who is really the son with rajan which is the part of the meaning of rajasambandhi
of Caitra. This is because this son of Caitra can be a teacher (which is the implied meaning of the word rajan in the
of somebody else. Hence in the son of Caitra, there is a relation compound rdjamdtahga) and, therefore, in this case such a
with Caitra (cailrasambandha) since the genitive case means rule is accepted. But in the present instance by the expression
only sambandha and also the-state-of-being-teacher (gurutvam) gabhirayam nadyamghosah, verbal knowledge with ekadetanvaya
which is indicated (nirupita) by someone else. But such a usage as object is produced. This is because, here the word nadi has
is not accepted by anybody. Therefore, one should conclude implication in naditira (the bank of a river) and the meaning
that the meaning of the genitive case is indeed niriipitatvam of the word gabhira is semantically connected with nadi.
(indicatedness) and not merely sambandha and such a meaning Therefore, the rule mentioned above is not accepted.
of genitive case is related only with the-state-of-being-a-teacher If the semantic connection of one meaning with the part
(gurutva) and not with guru. of another meaning is not accepted, then the word nadi has
Now it can be objected that since the word guru and so implication in gabhiranaditira (the bank of a deep river) and
on are correlative words, there could be semantic connection the word gabhira indicates the intention of the speaker. It
of a meaning with the part of another meaning. But the word cannot, however, be objected that because of the absence of
nadi (river) is not such a correlative word and so the meaning a supporting argument in favour of one position, one can as
of the word gabhira cannot be semantically connected with a well say that implication is in the word gabhira and the word
part (viz. river) of another meaning, i.e. bank of river, which nadi indicates the intention of the speaker. Hence, one cannot
is the implied meaning of the word nadi. This objection is assert that only in the word nadi there is implication. The
answered by pointing out that different words have different answer to this objection is that implication is to be accepted
expectancy and in the present instance, such a rule (i.e. only in the second word because of the rule that the suffixes
padarthah padarthena anveti na tu padarthaikaddena) is not convey their meanings as semantically connected with the
accepted. Hence in those instances where the particular
meanings of their stems. Therefore, the locative case-ending
sequence of words produces verbal knowledge in which the brings about its meaning only as connected with the meaning
324 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 325

of the' word nadi, which by implication, here means speaker and the word nadi as having implication in
gabhiranaditira. gabhiranaditira. This is not appropriate because we can
One should not further object that there is also the explain the verbal knowledge arising from this sentence, by
locative case-ending after the word gabhira and, therefore, means of implication in the sentence gabhirayam nadyam. It
even if the implication is accepted in the word gabhira the cannot, however be objected that there is no denotative
locative case can bring about its meaning as connected with function in sentence and, therefore, there cannot be also any
the meaning of the stem gabhira. This objection does not stand implication in the form of a relation of the denoted meaning.
because, it is admitted by all that the case-endings of adjectives This is because implication consists of the relation of what is
are meaningless. Further, in that case, there w'ould be no conveyed by the word or sentence. (svabodhyasambandhasyaiva
contiguity (asattiwhich is one of the causes of verbal knowledge) laksanapadarthatvat).
between the locative case-ending after the adjective gabhira In the examplegahgayamghosah what is conveyed by the
and the word ghosa. This is because when implication is word gahga is the stream and the relation of the stream is
accepted on the word gabhira, the meaningful words are only grasped in the bank and therefore bank is the implied
gabhira and ghosa. The word nadi which is meaningless meaning of the word gahga. That which is conveyed by the
because it shows only the intention of the speaker comes sentence gabhirayam nadyam is that the meaning of the word
between the words gabhira and ghosa. Therefore, there is no nadi is connected with the meaning of the word gabhira by the
contiguity between the words gabhira and ghosa. Hence there relation of non-difference and that the relation of
cannot be any verbal knowledge from the expression gabhirabhinnanadi is grasped in the bank. Therefore, there is
gabhirayam nadyam ghosah. If the sentence is gabhiranadyam implication of the whole sentence, viz. gabhirayam nadyam, in
ghosah, then in no way can there be implication in the first the bank of the deep river. In the same manner from the
word gabhira, because of the rule just explained (viz. compound expressions such as citraguh that which is conveyed
pratyayanam prakrtyarthanvitasvarthabodhakatvam). This is by the denotative functions of the parts of the compound is that
because here the word gabhira is not the stem of the locative the meaning of the word ‘cow’ is connected with the meaning
case, but the word nadi. Therefore, implication cannot be of the word citra (variegated) by the relation of non-difference.
given to the word gabhira but to the word nadi. And the relation of the var iegated cow is grasped in the owner
Now Dinakara and Ramarudra enter into a detailed (of the cows) and therefore, the implied meaning of the
discussion of the arguments of the Mimamsakas and the sentence is ‘the owner of the variegated cows’. For these
Naiyayikas, in support of their respective positions. Naturally reasons, the Mimamsakas conclude that implication is to be
the Naiyayikas reject the Mimamsa position that there is accepted in the sentence.
implication in the sentences and establish that there is The Naiyayikas, however, reject these arguments and
implication in words only and there is no implication in the establish that there is implication only in word and not in the
sentences. The Mimamsa position is first of all presented as sentence. They, first of all, point out that the-state-of-being-
follows: The Naiyayikas take the word gabhira in the sentence conveyed by that which is intended to have implication is not
ghabhiraydm nadyam ghosah as indicating the intention of the the-state-of-being-object-of-knowledge produced by it [svabodh-
 326 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

yatvatn na svajanyabodhavisayatvam). The reason for this is that Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 327
in the sentence ‘there is a village on the Ganges’ it would be
in which stream is object. Therefore, there is no implication in
possible to consider the expression gahgayam also as having
the sentence.
implication. It should be noted that in the example gahgayam
Now it may be objected that the knowledge of the
ghosah, everybody admits that there is implication only in the
particular sequence of words gahga followed by dm as
word gahga and not in the expression gahgayam. Even the
knowledge of expectancy (akanksajhanavidhaya, i.e. gahga-
Mlmamsakas admit implication in sentence only when there
padottarasaptamirupasamabhivyaharajhana) is the cause of the
is impossibility in admitting implication in words and here
verbal knowledge of that which exists on the bank of the river,
there is no impossibility in admitting implication in the word
the Ganges. Such a knowledge of expectancy is to be accepted
gahga. But the expression gahgayam also produces verbal
as the cause of verbal knowledge. Otherwise, it would come
knowledge the object of which is gahgatiravrtti and in this
about that the knowledge of the locative case dm followed by
verbal knowledge pravaha is also included as the object. And
gahga would also produce the verbal knowledge. Thus
the relation ofpravaha is grasped in bank. Therefore, it would
implication is also to be admitted in the sentence gahgayam
come about that the expression^rigayaTH also has implication.
It should be noted that obviously this opinion holds good since the words gahga and dm having such sequence in this
only if implication of the word gahga is said to be in gahgatira oraer produce the verbal knowledge in which stream also is
object and its relation is grasped in bank.
and not in just lira, because when the implication is in
just lira, then pravaha does not become the object of verbal The answer to this objection is that even in this case that
knowledge. which produces the verbal knowledge is the knowledge the
In order to avoid such an implication in the expression object of which is the words qualified by such a sequence and
gahgayam the word sva in svabodhya should be defined as that not merely the words which are qualified by such a sequence.
in as far as it is that (taitvena, i.e. the word gahga itself). And And therefore, there is no implication in sentences such as
the meaning of this is as follows: Implication is on that which gahgayam. Against this answer, it should not be further
is qualified by the sequence of those letters (viz. the word objected that the cause of verbal knowledge is the knowledge
gahga itself) which is desired to have implication. More of words and not words themselves and, therefore, there
precisely, implication is the relation of the object of knowledge cannot be any implication in the word gahga also. Such an
which is produced by this word which is qualified by this objection is to be rejected because, it is accepted here that the
particular sequence of letters. Therefore, the expression word which is being known is the cause of the verbal
gahgayam having another sequence of letters cannot be knowledge. Hence there is implication on the word itself.
considered to have implication since the sequence of letters of It may be objected against this as follows: Even when
the expression gahgayam is not the determinant of the-state-of- there is the absence of word as in the case of a composition by
a person who has taken the vow of silence, there is verbal
being-the-cause-of-the-verbal-knowledge in which stream is
object, but only the sequence of letters of the word gang a is the knowledge and, therefore, the theory that the word which is
determinant ofthe-state-of-being-the-cause-of-verbal-knowledge being known is the cause of the verbal knowledge cannot be
adimitted. Hence it follows that implication is the relation of
the object of verbal knowledge which is produced by the
328 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 329

knowledge of word which is qualified by such a particular word gahga. So there cannot be any implication for the word
sequence of letters. It has been already stated that if the gahga.
knowledge of the particular sequence of words [samabhivya- For these reasons in order to have implication for a word,
hararupakahksa) is the cause of verbal knowledge then there svajanyabodhavisayatva should be defined as the-state-of-being-
could be implication in such sentences as gahgayam also. the-object-of-recollection which is produced by the word in
Therefore, it follows that implication irl sentences has to be question by means of its denotative function. Hence in the
admitted. present instance, the word gahga produces the recollection of
But such implication in the sentences could be avoided stream by its denotative function and the relation of the stream
by defining implication in another way as follows: Implication with the bank is implication. It cannot be argued that here the
is the relation of the object of knowledge which is produced qualification of‘by denotative function’ is superfluous. This is
by the knowledge of denotative function of that which is because ether also can be the object of recollection brought
qualified by such a particular sequence of letters. And since about by the word ‘jar’ which inheres in ether by the relation
there is no denotative function in sentences, it also comes of inherence. Hence ether which has thus become the object
about that there is no implication in sentences. Similarly, there of recollection brought about by the word ‘jar’ is also known
is no denotative function in apabhramla words and so there is as connected with cloth and so cloth also becomes the object
no implication in apabhramla words also. of verbal knowledge brought about by the word ‘jar’.
Now it may be objected that just as there could be In order to avoid this possibility, it is necessary to add the
implication in sentences even though there is no denotative qualification of ‘by means of denotative function’ and so by
function in them, so also there could be implication in denotative function the word ‘jar’ does not bring about the
apabhramia words even though there is no denotative function recollection of ether. Thus implication cannot be defined as
in them. In order to reject the possibility of such an objection the relation with that which is conveyed by that which is
Dinakara tries to show by other arguments that there is no intended to have implication by means of its denotative
implication in sentences. In fact, the-state-of-being-conveyed function since it is more cumbersome than the definition of
by that for which the implication is intended is the-state-of- implication as the relation of the denoted meaning. Therefore,
being-the-object-of-verbal-knowledge produced by that for the former is not implication, but only the latter. And in this
which implication is intended. If such is the case then it would way, the Nyaya theory that implication is only for the words
be impossible to have implication for the word gahga in such and not for sentences is established.
instances as gahgayam ghosah. This is because here by the Now those who admit implication on the sentences may
word gahga the verbal knowledge of stream is not produced, argue as follows: If for the expression gabhirayam nadyam,
since the relation of the denoted meaning of the word gahga implication is accepted only for the word nadi, then the word
is grasped in bank as bank and not as bank of the Ganges. gabhira will become meaningless. But the speaker certainly
Therefore, the verbal knowledge arising from the word gahga has the intention that the word gabhira also should be
has as object only bank as connected with stream. Hence, meaningful. Therefore, in order to take into account the
stream is not the object of verbal knowledge produced by the intention of the speaker, implication has to be admitted in the
 330 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 337

sentence also. Therefore, the expression gabhirayam nadyam constituting it. Therefore, the recollection brought about by
itself should be taken as having implication in gabhiranaditira. the sentence is also the recollection brought about by noun,
Such an opinion cannot be admitted, because, in that since noun is also included in the collection of words. If such
case, there cannot be any verbal knowledge in which ghosa is is the case, then the recollection brought about by the
qualificand and gabhiranaditiravrttitva is qualifier, since there sentence is also the recollection brought about by suffix, since
is no word which brings about the knowledge of the-state-of- suffix is also included in the collection of words.
being-superstratum. This argument cannot be accepted, because in that case,
But it may be argued that even though there is no word one could as well use the expression gabhirayam nadirajana in
which brings about the knowledge of the-state-of-being- the sense of a washerman’s stone on the bank of the deep river
superstratum, the-state-of-being-superstratum can be the object (gabhiranaditiriyarajana). This is because what is taken to have
of verbal knowledge by the force of the particular sequence of implication is the expression gabhirayam nadi in which there
words [samabhivyaharabalat) just as in the sentence tandulam is also a suffix. The implied meaning is gabhiranaditira. This
pacali, the expression tandulam means tandulanisthakarmatvam. has to be considered also as the meaning of the suffix in the
Here tandula is connected with karmaiva by the relation of expression gabhirayam. Now the meanings of a noun and
adheyata. But the knowledge of this adheyata is not brought suffix can be connected by the relation of difference (here
about by any word but by samabhivyahara of the words relation of the-state-of-being-superstratum which is a relation
tandula and am. of difference). Therefore, the implied meaning of gabhirana¬
Similarly, here also, let bank be connected with the ditira can be semantically connected with rajana by the
village by the relation of being-superstratum. But this cannot relation of adheyata. But this is not admitted by anybody.
be admitted because of the principle that although the Hence Dinakara’s objection stands.
meaning of a noun and the meaning of a suffix may be If it is argued that the expression gabhirayam nadi where
connected by the relation of difference, still the meanings of the word nadi is without the locative case is taken to have
two nouns cannot be semantically connected by the relation implication in the bank, then there would be no semantic
of difference. Therefore, bank cannot be connected with the connection of bank with the-state-of-being-superstratum which
village by the relation of the-state-of-being-superstratum which is the meaning of the locative case. The reason for this is that
is a relation of difference. the suffixes bring about the knowledge of their meanings as
It cannot be objected that the-state-of-being-the-meaning- semantically connected with the meanings of their own stems.
of-a-noun (namarthatva) is the-state-of-being-an-object-of- And the expression gabhirayam nadi cannot be considered as
recollection which is brought about by the noun by means of the stem of the locative case for the following reasons.
significatory function. And since a sentence is not a noun, we A case-suffix is enjoined for a stem. A stem is that after
cannot consider the bank of deep river which is the meaning which a suffix is enjoined. And a stem (pratipadikam) is
of the sentence gabhirayam nadyam as the meaning of a noun. defined as that which has denotative function and which is
It may be argued that a sentence is simply a collection of words different from a root and suffix. Now the expression gabhirayam
and a collection is not anything separate from the individuals nadi has no denotative function in any meaning and, therefore,
 332 Nyaya Philosophy of Language 333
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda
it cannot be considered as the stein of the locative case. It tavrttya prakrtijanyabodhavisayatvam, but vrttya prakrti¬
cannot be objected against this explanation that the expressions janyabodhavisayatvam. Therefore, gabhiranaditira also can be
such as nilotpala, pacaka etc. are sentences and, therefore, considered as prakrtyartha; hence it can be semantically
they do not have denotative function in any meaning and connected with the meaning of the locative case-suffix.
hence they cannot be considered as stems of any suffixes. This Therefore, the objection of Dinakara that gabhiranaditira
is because krdanta, taddhitanta and samasa are also considered cannot be semantically connected with the meaning of the
as stems of suffixes, by another sutra, viz krttaddhitasamdsdka locative case-suffix does not stand.6
(Panini Sutra, 1.2.46).
Further, it is not possible to take the expression gabhirayam
Ramarudra seems to differ from this opinion; according nadydm which has the ending of the locative case as having
to him, the meaning of a stem is only the object of knowledge implication in existence-on-the-bank-of-the-deep-river. The
which is produced by the stem by means of significatory reason is that in this case there cannot be any semantic
function (vrtti). And here gabhiranaditira also is prakrtyartha, connection of the existence-on-such-a-bank with village. This
i.e. it is the object of the knowledge produced by gabhirayam is because of the principle that the meanings of two nouns
nadi (in which the stem nadi also is included) by means of the cannotbe semantically connected by the relation of difference.
significatory function of implication (laksanavrtti). A whole Nor can it be held that the expression gabhirayam nadydm
group is not different from the individual constituting it and, which has implication in existing-on-the-bank-of-the-deep-
therefore, that which is produced by a whole which consists of river {gabhiranaditiravrtti) and it is semantically connected
a stem is indeed produced bystem also. And therefore, the with village by the relation of non-difference. The reason is
opinion of Dinakara that gabhiranaditira is not prakrtyartha is that, in order to have the knowledge of semantic connection
not correct.
by the relation of non-difference, the nouns should have the
Further, in order to support Dinakara’s position, it is of same case-ending. The idea here is that the expression
no use to state that the meaning is produced only by the stem. gabhirayam nadydm taken as whole is not the stem of any
In fact, it is not even possible to do so, because in such case-ending because the whole expression consisting of the
examples as caitrasya gam anaya, we find semantic connection locative case-ending also is taken as that which has
of the cow that is related to Caitra (and not of mere ‘cow’ which implication.
only is the meaning of the stem go) with the-state-of-being-the- An objection may be raised against these arguments as
object-of-action which is the meaning of the accusative case. follows: In the compound word rajapurusa the word raj an has
Again in order to support the opinion of Dinakara, it no case-ending. The meaning of the word rajan which
should not be stated that in the definition ofprakrtyartha, vrttya immediately preceds the word purusa is by implication
prakrtijanyabodhavisayah should be changed to prakrtinirupi- rdjasambandhin and this meaning is connected with the
tavrttya prakrtijanyabodhamsayah. This is because in that case meaning of the word purusa by the relation of non-difference.
in such expressions as nilotpalam, the stem of the suffix is Similarly, in the present case also, the expression gabhirdyam
nilotpala which is a sentence. And therefore, there is no nadydm immediately precedes the word ghosa^ and, therefore,
significatory function which is indicated by the stem nilotpala. the meaning of the expression gabhirdyam nadydm by
Hence the definition of prakrtyartha cannot be prakrtinirupi- implication, viz. gabhiranaditiravrtti can be semantically
 334 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 335
Nydya Philosophy of Language
the expression gabhirdydm nadydm does not precede
connected ly the relation of non-difference with the meaning
immediately the word ghosa. For these reasons, Dinakara’s
the word ghosa. Therefore, the statement of Dinakara that
opinion that the implied meaning of the expression gabhirdydm
nnn^dff ^ Semantic connection by the relation of nadydm, i.e. gabhiranaditiravrtti, cannot be semantically
non-difference, the nouns should have same case-ending, and
connected with the meaning of the word ghosa is valid. For
so e ^phed meaning of the expression gabhirdydm nadydm
these reasons the Naiyayikas hold that there is no implication
gabhnamditnavrtti cannot be semantically connected
in sentence but only in words.
i h the meaning of the word ghosa by the relation of non-
i erence, because the expression gabhirdydm nadydm being
a sentence cannot have the same case ending as the word
ghosa, is wrong. Notes

But such an argument against the position of Dinakara 1. This statement of Dinakara is plainly contradictory to what he
cannot be admitted, because, in order to have such a semantic asserted in the previous sentences in which it was stated that
laksjotdvachedakam also becomes the object of recollection by
connection by the relation of non-difference with the meaning
means of the word. In the previous sentence he stated clearly that
of the immediately preceding part, such a part should be a
the determinant of the-state-of-being-implied-meaning is the object
wor ^ aving enotative function. But the expression gabhirdydm of recollection and now he is denying it. In order to do away with
nadyam is not a word with denotative function and so its this contradiction Pariksit Thampuran points out that the word
meaning cannot be semantically connected with the meaning padanupasthapyasya means padanirupilavrttyand&rayasya i.e.
laksanarupavritih does not reside in laksyalavacchedaka. S. p.198,

difference °Wing ^ ^ ***** ^ ** reIation °f non 1.14.

2. yddrsyanupurvyavacchinna laksanabhimata tadrjydnupurvy-
This argument cannot be admitted, because in the avacchinnaSakiijndnajanyabodhavisayasambandhd tadrjydnu-
expression nilaghatarupa, the expression nilaghata is a sentence purvyavacchinnasya laksand, i.e. Suppose one wants to have implication

and so it is not a word having denotative function. Yet the in a word which has a particular sequence of letters, implication is
in that word, the relation of the object of knowledge which is
meaning of the expression nilaghata by implication,’ i e
produced by the knowledge of denotative function of that word
mlaghatasambandhi, is semantically connected by the relation which has the same sequence of letters.
o non-difference with the meaning of the word rupa. Therefore 3. Here, the idea is that, if in the sentence gangdyam ghosah implication
m order to have semantic connection of two meanings by the’ is accepted for the word ganga only in lira and not in gangatlra, then
re ation of non-difference, it is not necessary that the the object of iabdabodha arising from the word ganga is lira and not
pravaha.
me ate y preceding part should be a word having denotative
4. As for example, in the expression ghatah anityah, anityapada-
unction. Hence in the present instance, the implied meaning
janyopasthitiviiesyah anityapadarlhah ghatapadajanyopaslhitivtfesjena
of the expression gabhirdydm nadydm can be semantically ghatapadarthena anveli na tu ghatapadajanyopasthitiprakdrena
ghatatvena.
5. Correlative words, i.e. sasarnbandhikam padam niyatasambandhya-
kanksotlhapakam, i.e. word which produces the expectancy of a
These arguments against Dinakara’s position cannot be
meaning of another word which is invariably connected with it; as
w:Pted;,beCaUSe,ren fr°m tHe sentence ghoso gabhirdydm for instance, the word pilr gives rise to the expectancy (i.e.jijnasd)
nadyam, there could arise the same verbal knowledge Here
336 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 337

of son who is invariably related to father which is the meaning of the Text 7A
word pitr.
6. Here, Pariksit Thampuran points out that Ramarudra’s criticism of
tj.
Dinakara does not stand scrutiny, prakrti is that for which suffix is
enjoined. In the present instance in the expression nadyam, the stem cRT %RW ifalcr eRRIT ^
of the locative case is the word nadi. Therefore, the meaning of the
word nadi only is prakriyartha and not the implied meaning of | c3^IHRT ^ cRT
gabhiranaditira from the expressiongabhlrayam nadi. llgabhiranadifira
ttR^FT f^l^lct cRRTT clics4y 15=^1
is accepted as the prakriyartha of the locative suffix after the word
nadi, then one could use as well the sentence gabhlrayam nadim ijcimWHft fST W& eRFT qi'-KiCWlftl
paiya in the meaning of‘see the bank of the deep river’. Such a usage
is not accepted by anybody and so the objection of Dinakara stands.
eRRTT 3TTWR R- I
7. Here Pariksit Thampuran raises a subde objection and gives also an
appropriate answer for it Dinakara stated that the implied meaning Translation
of the expression gabhlrayam nadyam viz. gabhiranadiliravrtlitva
Compounds: bahuvrihi
cannot be semantically connected vnthghosa. The reason for this is
that the meanings of two nouns cannot be semantically connected Muktavali
by the relation of difference. Now Thampuran raises the question In the compounds called bahuvrihi also (the process of
how the expression gabhlrayam nadyam can be a name? If it is argued verbal knowledge) is in the same way (i.e. accepting implication
that it is a namay because nama-s are also included in the sentence only in word). This is because in compound words such as
gabhlrayam nadyam then since pratyaya-s are also included in the
citragu (owner of variegated cows) etc. if the syntactic connection
sentence gabhlrayam nadyamy it could as well be a pratyaya.
Therefore, gabhiranadiliravrtlitva can be considered as with the part of the meaning is accepted, the word ‘cow’ has
pralyayarlha and so it can be rightly connected with ghosa by the implication in the person having cows. Then there is the
relation of difference, viz. airayala. The answer to this objection is syntactic connection of variegated with cow by the relation of
as follows: Panini defines nama as arlhavadadhalur apralyayah
non-difference. If, however, the syntactic connection with the
pratipadikam (i.e. nama) (Panini Sutra 1.2.45). The meaning of the
part of the meaning is not accepted, then the implication of the
sutra is that pratipadika (i.e. nama) is that which is different from
dhatu and palyaya while having a meaning. Here different from word ‘cow’ is in the person having variegated cows; the word
dhatu and pratyaya means dhalupratyayaparyapladharmavat, i.e. citra (variegated) indicates the intention (of the speaker). In
having a characteristic which does not exist in pratyaya and dhatu by like manner, in the sentence arudhavanaro vrksah (a tree
the relation olparyapli. Having a meaning means having significatory climbed by a monkey) the word monkey has implication in the
function in a meaning. The definition of nama applies also to the
object of the action of climbing by monkey (and) the word
expression gabhirayam nadyamy because it is arlhavaty i.e. it has the
significatory function of implication in the meaning olgab hiranadifir a- drudha (climbed) indicates the intention (of the speaker). This
vrttitva and at the same time dhalupratyayaparyapladharmavat i.e. is the procedure elsewhere also (i.e. in other bahuvrihi
having a characteristic, viz. gabhlrayam nadyam Hipadaviiesasamu- compounds also).
dayalvam which does not exist in dhatu and pratyaya by the relation
olparyapli. In this way, it is possible to considergabhiranadiCuavrllitva Text 7B
as namarlha.
/ ^ ^ I #R^lfcT 1
338 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 339
’HwiPiPi i ^ ifcri tM%- semantic connection of one meaning with the part of another
^Rldl^q diwiw+rtl^l 3FW AfrflcqKHfl meaning (ekadeianvayah) is accepted, the word go means by
Wiqpfeq #f[WR?t^t fa^MqHUsfklJ Tisfa implication gomat (the owner of cows) and the meaning of the
-gqqcr cWTPr dKlr^-1 cTgn^q) ^ word citra, viz. variegated, is semantically connected by the
*41fiqd fqtR; I relation of non-difference with cow which is part of the
meaning of gomat which is the meaning of the word go by
implication. It is to be noted that implication is accepted for
Translation
the second word of a bahuvrlhi compound in order to have the
Compounds: bahuvrlhi
semantic connection of the meaning of the suffix with the
In the same way (evam): This means that there is meaning of the stem. If, however, semantic connection of one
implication only in the parts (of a compound word) and there meaning with the part of another meaning is not accepted,
is no implication in a sentence. The word cow (gopadasyeti): then the word go has implication in citragomat (one who has
The idea is that it is proper to attribute implication to the variegated cows), and the word citra serves only to show the
second word in the compound in conformity with (the intention of the speaker.
principle that) the meaning of the suffix is to be related (with Dinakara gives a reason why ekadeianvayah cannot be
the meaning of the stem). Gomati means in the person having accepted: It is necessary to accept that the knowledge of the
cows. Not accepted (na svikriyata iti): Because it is necessary significatory function in which the cow is the qualificand is the
to accept that the knowledge of the significatory function in cause for the knowledge of the semantic connection in which
which the cow is the qualificand is the cause for the knowledge the cow is the qualificand. This means that the knowledge of
of the syntactic connection in which cow is the qualificand. the significatory function in the form gauh gopadaiakyah (i.e.
Otherwise, in such expressions as ‘there is a variegated cow- godharmikagopadavrttijildnam) is the cause of the knowledge
pen’, there would also be the syntactic connection of variegated of the semantic connection of something in cow [godharmikd■
with cow which is a part of cow-pen which is the meaning of nvayabodhah). As.for example, in the sentence nlloghatah, the
the word vraja. Although syntactic connection with a part of knowledge of the significatory function of the word ghata in
the meaning is seen in such expressions as ‘having absence of pot (ghate ghatapadavrttijhanam, i.e. ghatadharmikaghatapada-
jar’ yet such a syntactic connection by the relation of non- vrttijfianam) is the cause of the knowledge of semantic
difference is not accepted. This is the heart (of the matter). connection of nila in ghata.
But in the compound word citragu, we have the knowledge
Commentary of significatory function of the word go in gomat, i.e. owner of
cows. Here there is no knowledge of significatory function of
Compounds: bahuvrlhi
the word go in cow, i.e. here there is no godharmikavrttijhanam
In bahuvrlhi compounds also implication is to be admitted but only gopraKarakavrttijhanam.Therefore, here the semantic
only in the part of the compound word and not in the connection of the meaning of the word citra cannot be
compound as a whole. So in the compound word citragu, if the admitted in cow: If the rule that the knowledge of the
340 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 341

significatory function in which something (i.e. cow etc.) is the the action of climbing by monkey (i.e. vanarakartrka-
qualificand is the cause for the knowledge of the semantic rohanakarma) and the word arudha shows the intention of the
connection in which that something (i.e. cow etc.) is the speaker. Implication is accepted in this way in the second word
qualificand is not accepted then, in such sentences as only. With regard to bahuvrihi compound words such as
citravrajo’sti, meaning there is a variegated cow-shed (where arudhavanara we have to note the following: From the sentence
variegated agrees with shed and not with cow) the meaning of analyzing the compound we have the verbal knowledge,
the word citra, i.e. variegated, could be semantically connected yatkarmakarohanakarta vanarah, the monkey is the agent of
with cow which is a part of the meaning of the word vraja (vraja the action of climbing of which the object is the thing (viz.
means gosthanam). This would lead to the incorrect usage of tree). But from the compound we have the verbal knowledge
the expression citravraja in the sense of a shed of cows which in the form of vdnarakartrkarohanakarma (the object of the
are variegated. action of climbing, the agent of which is monkey). This is
In such expressions as ‘having-absence-of-jar’ (ghataJun- because of the general rule that the verbal knowledge arising
yam) the semantic connection of one meaning with the part of from a bahuvrihi compound, will have as qualificand that
another meaning is grasped. This is because the expression which is the qualifier in the verbal knowledge arising from the
ghataiunyam (having-absence-of-jar) meansghatabhdvavat and, sentence analyzing the same compound and as qualifier that
therefore, the meaning of the word ghata is semantically which is qualificand in the sentence arising from the analyzing
connected with abhava (which is the part of the meaning of the of the same compound.
word tunya) by the relation of the-state-of-being-counter- In the present example of arudhavanara, the word arudha
positive (pratiyogitakatvasambandhena).' And this is a relation ending in kta suffix which denotes agent, conveys the meaning
of difference. But here the semantic connection of one of the agent of climbing. The word vanara denotes only
meaning with the part of another meaning is by the relation of monkey. So, in order to get the meaning of the compound, viz.
difference (bhedasambandhena) and this is acceptable to all. vdnarakartrkarohanakarma, we have to accept implication for
But the semantic connection of one meaning with the part of the word vanara in the sense oivdnarakartrka, and implication
another meaning by the relation of non-difference for the word arudha in the sense of arohanakarma, i.e. the
(abhedasambandhena) is not accepted by anybody. This is the object of the action of climbing. If, in this way, implication is
heart of the matter. The conclusion of this discussion on accepted in both words, then the rule which has already been
ekadelanvaya is that in bahurvrihi compounds, implication is to established that in a bahuvrihi compound implication is to be
be accepted in the second word and the first word shows the accepted only for the second word will be broken.
intention of the speaker, as for example, in the bahuvrihi Besides, if implication is accepted in this way in both the
compound citragu, the second word go has implication in first and second words of a bahuvrihi compound like
citragosvamin and the first word citra shows the intention of the arudhvanara, then the meaning of the compound will be
speaker. vdnarakartrkarohanakarma (the object of the action of climbing
In the same way in the expression such as arudhavanaro which has monkey as its agent). Here arohanakarma which is
vrksah there is implication for the word vanara in the object of the meaning of the first word in the compound is the principal
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 343

Nyaya Philosophy of Language (king) etc. with the meaning of the word purusa (person) etc.
342
The reason is that direct syntactic connection by difference
qualificand. But the rule is that in the verbal knowledge arising between the meanings of two nouns other than particles is not
from bahuvrihi compound, the meaning of the second word accepted. Otherwise, also in the sentence ‘king is a person the
should be the principal qualificand. Therefore, if implication knowledge of syntactic connection would be in the same
is accepted in both the words constituting the compound, this manner. Since in sentences such as ‘cloth is not jar’ there is
rule also will be broken. Therefore, implication in bahrvrihi indeed direct syntactic connection of the meaning of‘not’ with
compounds is accepted only in the second word and the first (the meaning of the words) ‘jar’ and ‘cloth’, the words ‘other
word constituting the compound is taken as indicating the than particles’ are used. Since in sentences such as ‘ajar is blue
intention of the speaker. Hence in the present instance of there is the syntactic connection of the two meanings of nouns
arudhavanarah, the second word vanara has implication in by the relation of non-difference, the words ‘by the relation o
vanarakartrkarohanakarma, and the first word arudha shows difference’ are used. Nor could it be argued that in compound
the intention of the speaker. words such as rajapurusah (king’s man) the recollection of the
case-ending which is elided is to be postulated. This is because
Text 7C even one who does not recollect the case-ending has verbal
knowledge from those words themselves. Therefore, the
tj. mi i implication of words like ‘king’ etc. is in the one who is
connected with th. king; the syntactic connection of that (i.e.
PlMltlllclRTh-
the implied meaning of the word ‘king’) is with the meaning
3FHT TUT of the word ‘man’ by the relation of non-difference.
I ITt 1 IT
Text 7D
lof: I 'Tlelt

PdMMilclR^ri ^
THJ^T cjklP'Mt}): TTTl 41-°^ I $c4KlPMl4l£A >irdMlPmMH4l44p(: I
lit
HSNTT 1HT I %r ifcT I I
| ijrTeT^
Translation
cgcrnt Pflgiifefa m i ^T: Tsrafafr-
Compounds: tatpurus a
Muktavati vqrron i w
In the compound called tatpurusa, however, implication <I*T I
is to be accepted in the first word. This is because in a T MW TRT:
compound word like rajapurusah (king’s man), there is no
direct syntactic connection of the meaning of the word rajan
 Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 345
Nyaya Philosophy of Language
a sentence such as daiaite rajamatangas tasyaivami turahgamah
3FW ^IcT
(these ten are the elephants of the king and (his only are) these
^WTT Ic^FSt d'°s?«3'i TIW: WT# ^ d^+^VI-
horses) by the word tad king cannot be referred to because he
is the part of the meaning (i.e. the implied meaning, viz.
rajasambandhi) of the word rdjan (in the compound
Translation
rajamatahga).
Compounds : tatpuruya
Commentary
Other than particles (nipatatirikteti): The word particle
indicates also indeclinables. Therefore, in such expressions as Compounds: tatpurus a

‘like the moon’ there is the syntactic connection of moon by In tatpurusa compounds, there is implication in the first
the relation of the-state-of-being-the-indicating-factor-with- word; as for instance, in such tatpurusa compound words like
similarity which is the meaning of the word iva. Otherwise rajapurusa (king’s man), the word rdjan has implication in
(ianyatha): If the knowledge of syntactic connection by the rajasambandhi and this meaning is semantically connected
relation of difference is accepted also between the meanings with the meaning of the word purusa by the relation of non¬
of two nouns other than particles and indeclinables. The difference. This is because of the rule that direct semantic
knowledge of syntactic connection would be in the same
connection by the relation of difference is not accepted
manner [tathanvayabodha iti): There would be knowledge of
between the meanings of two nouns other than particles. The
syntactic connection by the relation of difference; this is the
reason for this rule is that, otherwise, from the sentence like
meaning. Indeed direct (saksadeva): Without, indeed, bringing
raja purusah (king is a person) there could also be the direct
the meanings of the suffixes in between. The idea is that in
semantic connection of rdjan with purusah by the relation of
such sentences as bhutale ghatah (there is ajar on the ground)
difference (viz. here svatvasambandha) and then the expression
there could be the syntactic connection ofjar with ground by
rajapurusahwiW mean rajnahpurusah (king’s man). This is not
means of the relation also of the-state-of-being-superstratum
accepted by anybody.
and so the word ‘directly’ also is included in the rule. Nahah In such sentences as pato na ghatah (cloth is not jar) there
means of the mutual absence which is the meaning of nan.
is direct semantic connection of the meaning of na (not) with
Recollection is to be postulated (smaranam kalpyam iti):
the meanings of the words ‘jar’ and ‘cloth’ by the relation of
The idea is that thus there also there would be no contradiction
difference. Here the verbal knowledge is in the following
of the rule which has already been mentioned because of the
form: Cloth is the substratum of difference the counterpositive
fact that the syntactic connection of king with person is only
of which is jar (ghatapratiyogikabhedavanpatah). That is why in
through the meaning of the suffix. Others, however, (say) that
the rule the expression nipdtdtirikta (other than particles) is
there is no implication in tatpurusa compounds like rajapurusa
used. , . ,
etc. since they accept the knowledge of syntactic connection In such sentences as nilo ghatah (jar is blue), mere is
of the king with person and so on by the peculiarity of the
semantic connection of the meanings of the nouns ni/a and
expectancy through the relation of possession. Otherwise, in
ghata (viz. the implied meaning of nila, i.e. nllavUista and the
 346 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 347

denoted meaning of ghata, i.e. jar) by the relation of non¬ in between the meanings of two nouns. In such sentences as
difference. So the expression bhedena, i.e. ‘by the relation of bhutale ghatah, the semantic connection of the meanings of the
difference is used in the enunciation of the rule. It cannot nouns is understood through the meaning of the suffix of the
further be urged that in compound words such as rajapurusa, locative case. The expression ‘through the meaning of the
one can easily remember the genitive case-ending (of the word suffix’ means that there is no semantic connection of the
rajan) which is elided. Therefore, there can arise the verbal meanings of two nouns by a relation of difference other than
knowledge that the man belongs to the king (rajasvatvavan the meaning of the suffix. This means that when there is direct
purusah). Hence there is no need of implication for the first semantic connection of the meanings of two nouns it is by a
word of a tatpurusa compound. This cannot be admitted. The relation of difference which is conveyed by the suffix as its
reason is that even one who does not remember the elided meaning.
case-ending of the word rajan in the compound word raja- If, in the rule nipatatiriktandmarthayoh. saksad bhedena
purusa, has the verbal knowledge of rajasambandhya- anvayasya avyutpannatvam, the expression saksad is omitted,
bhinnapurusah. Therefore, in such tatpurusa compound as then the form of the rule is nipatatiriktandmarthayoh. bhedena
rajapurusa, the implication is to be accepted for the first word anvayasya avyutpannatvam. But the rule in this form is wrong
rajan of the compound in rajasambandhin and this is to be because in such instances as bhutale ghatah, there is the seman¬
semantically connected with purusa by the relation of non¬ tic connection of the meanings of two nouns, viz. bhutala and
difference. ghata, by the relation of difference, viz. adheyata. Here it
It was stated earlier that the direct semantic connection should be noted that the verbal knowledge arising from the
by the relation of difference is not accepted between the sentence bhutale ghatah has two forms. One form is ghato
meanings of two nouns other than particles [nipdta). Here bhutalavrttitvavan, i.e. bhutalavrttitvaprakdrakasvarupasam-
particles include also indeclinables (avyaya).^ This is because, sargakaghataviksyakatvam. According to this form of the
otherwise, in such sentences as candra iva mukham (the face is verbal knowledge the rule is not wrong because the semantic
like the moon) from which the verbal knowledge is candraniru- connection is between the meanings of suffixes and nouns and
pitasadrfyavan mukham (face has similarity indicated by the not between the meanings of nouns. The other form of verbal
moon), there would be no semantic connection of moon with knowledge is gahto bhutalavan, i.e. bhutalaprakarakadheyata-
similarity by a relation of difference, i.e. by the relation of the- samsargakaghataviksyakatvam. Here there is semantic connec¬
state-of-being-indicated (nirupitatvasambandhena) since iva is tion between the meanings of the two nouns, viz. ghata and
not a particle, but only an indeclinable. bhutala, by the relation of difference, i.e. adheyata. So the rule
Further in the rule, it is stated that direct semantic in the form that nipatatiriktandmarthayoh bhedena anvayasya
connection by the relation of difference is not accepted avyutpannatvam is wrong, because here the semantic connection
between the meanings of two nouns other than particles and is between the meanings of the two nouns bhutala and ghata
indeclinables. The meaning of the word ‘direct’ (sdksat) in the through the meaning of the locative case, i.e. adheyata.
expression ‘direct semantic connection’ which is used in the In order to avoid this fault the word saksat, meaning
rule is that the meanings of the suffixes should not be brought pratyayartham advarikrtya is introduced in the rule. And now
348 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 349

the rule is not broken. This is because in the case of the verbal the hindrance for this doubt can only be the certainty that
knowledge arising from the sentence bhutale ghatah, in the ghatah adheyatasambandhena bhutalavikstah and not bhuta¬
form ghato bhutalavan, i.e. bhutalaprakarakadheyatasamsargaka- lavrttitvavan ghatah. Therefore, the verbal knowledge from
ghataviksyaka, the semantic connection of bhutala andghata the sentence bhutale ghatah must necessarily have also the
by the relation of difference, viz. adheyata, is brought about form adheyatasambandhena bhutalaviksto ghatah, i.e. ghatah
through the meaning of the suffix of the locative case. bhutatvyah.
Now Ramarudra, first of all, brings an argument against Ramarudra brings a further reason to show that in the
this position of Dinakara and then rejects it. The argument is present instance adheyata becomes the object of verbal
based upon the principle that any meaning conveyed by knowledge as a relation also. The argument is that, otherwise,
words through significatory function becomes object in verbal we will have to accept as hindrance the causal complex of the
knowledge either as qualifier or as qualificand and never as verbal knowledge in which jar is qualificand and existence on
relation. Therefore, from the sentence bhutale ghatah, verbal the ground is qualifier and which is produced by the sentence
knowledge can only arise in the form bhutalavrttitvavan bhutale ghatah for the perception in which the qualificand is
ghatah, i.e.bhutalavrttitvaprakdrakasvarupasamsargakaghata- jar, the determinant of the-state-of-being-qualificand is absence
viksyaka. Here vrttitva is adheyata and this becomes the object of ground by the relation of being-superstratum and that
of verbal knowledge as qualifier to ghata and not as relation. which has blue colour is qualifier [adheyatasambandhena
Hence this form of verbal knowledge is valid. On the other bhutalabhavavikste ghate nilavaikstyavagahi pratyaksam prati
hand, from the same sentence the verbal knowledge in the bhutale ghatah iti vakyajanyabhutalavrttitvaprakarakaghata-
iovmghato bhutalavan (i.e. bhutalaprakarakadheyatasamsarga- viksyakatabdabodhasamagri pratibandhika). This is because
kaghataviksyaka) is, accordingto some Naiyayikas, inadmissible the causal complex of verbal knowledge is hindrance for the
since adheyata which is the denoted meaning of the locative perception in which the object is different from the object of
case-ending is taken as the object of verbal knowledge as verbal knowledge [vibhinnavisayakapratyaksam prati tabda-
relation. bodhasamagryah pratibandhakatvat).3 This is indeed
Ramarudra himself brings an answer to this objection as cumbersome.
follows: From the sentence bhutale ghatah, we have the verbal In order to avoid this cumbersomeness it is necessary to
knowledge bhutalavrttitvavan ghatah and after the verbal admit that adheyata which is the meaning of the locative case-
knowledge in this form, we cannot have a doubt in the form suffix becomes the object of verbal knowledge also as relation
ghatah adheyatasambandhena bhutalaviksto na va (the jar is [samsarga). And when this is admitted, it follows that the
qualified by ground by the relation of being superstratum or verbal knowledge arising from the sentence bhutale ghatah has
not). The reason for this is that after the certainty about a also the form adheyatasambandhena bhutalaviksto ghatah, i.e.
particular thing there cannot be doubt about the same thing. ghatah bhutaliyah. For the knowledge adheyatasambandhena
In the present instance after the verbal knowledge arising from bhutalaviksto ghatah, adheyatasambandhena ghate bhutala-
the sentence bhutale ghatah, there does not arise any doubt in bhavajhanam is contradicting knowledge (badhajnanam).
the form ghatah adheyatasambandhena bhutalaviksto na va and Therefore, where there is the causal complex in order to
 350 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

produce the verbal knowledge in the iovmghaiah ddheyatasam- Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 351
bandhena bhutalabhavabhavavan, i.e. bhutalavan, the causal
complex for the perception which was already mentioned (i.e. nipata is directly connected with the meanings of other nouns
adheyatasambandhena bhutalabhavavan ghatah nilah) does not (i.e pata and ghata) by the relation of difference (i.e. by the
relations of praliyogitva and anuyogitva). Therefore, it was
exist. Therefore, we need not consider the causal complex of
stated that there is no direct semantic connection of the
the verbal knowledge in the form of adheyatasambandhena
meanings of nouns other than nipata.
bhutalavan ghatah as hindrance for the perception in the form
In the rule the word bhedena (by the relation of difference)
of adheyatasambandhena bhutalabhavavan ghato nilah.
is included because in such sentences as riilo ghatah, there is
Therefore, we have to admit that the verbal knowledge arising
the semantic connection ofthe meanings of two nouns by the
from the sentence bhutale ghatah has also the form ghato
relation of non-difference. It was objected that in compound
bhutatiyah, i.e. adheyatasambandhena bhutalavan ghatah.
words such as rajapurusah (king’s man) the recollection ofthe
This implies that there could be semantic connection
case-ending which is elided is to be postulated. And so here
between the meanings of two nouns by the relation of
also there is semantic connection of the meanings of two
difference which is in the form of the meaning of the suffix
nouns rajan and purusa by the relation of difference, viz.
(pratyayarthatmakabhedasambandhena). Therefore, the word
svatva, which is conveyed by the suffix of the genitive case.
‘direct’ (saksat) is introduced in the rule. In the present
Therefore, there is no violation of the rule mentioned earlier.
instance the semantic connection of the meanings of two
The answer to this objection was that even one who does not
nouns bhutala and ghata by the relation of difference, i.e.
remember the case-ending has verbal knowledge from those
adheyata, is brought about through the meaning of the suffix
words themselves.
of the locative case. Therefore, the final conclusion is that the
An objection my be raised against this answer as follows:
rule should be enunciated as nipatatiriktanamarthayoh saksad
In a tatpurusa compound, e.g. rajapurusah, traditional
(i.e. pratyayartham advarikrtya) bhedena anvayah avyutpannah.
implication [nirudhalaksana) is accepted on the first word, in
It was stated earlier that in sentences such as ‘cloth is not
the sense of rajasambandhin, i.e. rdjavttistavibhaktyarthasam-
jar’ [pato na ghatah) there is direct semantic connection of the
bandhavUista, i.e. in that which is qualified by the relation in
meaning of‘not’ {nan) with the meanings ofthe words ‘jar’ and
the form of the meaning of the suffix which is qualified by the
‘cloth’. Here the meaning of ‘not’ {nan) is mutual absence
meaning of the word rajan. Therefore, if nirudhalaksana is
(ianyonydbhava). This is because in order to show absolute
accepted, the laksyartha of the first word of the compound
absence (aiyantabhava) by the word ‘not’ there should be the
cannot be determined, since its suffix is not remembered.4
locative case-ending after the word indicating the subjunct
And if implication is not cognised then there would be no
(ianuyogi). Since there is no such suffix after the wordpata the
recollection of meaning and consequently there would also be
absence here is mutual absence. And the verbal knowledge
no verbal knowledge. Hence the statement that even one who
arising from the sentence is in the following form: Cloth has
does not remember the case-ending has verbal knowledge is
mutual absence the counterpositive of which is jar {ghataprati-
not correct.
yogikabhedavan patah). Here the meaning of nan which is a
The answer to this objection is that although there is no
determination of nirudhalaksana without recollecting the
352 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 353

appropriate case-ending, there can be the cognition of followed by the word purusa, is the cause of the verbal
implication in a general manner. And there is no rule that only knowledge in which purusa is the qualificand, rajan is qualifier
through the knowledge of nirudhalaksana, there can be and svatva is the relation (purusaviSesjakarajaprakarakasvatva-
recollection of the meaning. If so in such a sentence as samsargakaSabdabodha). From a sentence such as rajapurusah
gahgayam ghosah, there would be no recollection of the there is no such verbal knowledge since there is no such
meaning of bank. And so there would be no verbal knowledge sequence of words. It should be noted here that word raja has
of bank; but in fact, we have verbal knowledge of bank. nominative case-ending whereas rajan in rajapurusah has no
Therefore, everywhere the recollection of the implied meaning case-ending.
is not through the knowledge of nirudhalaksana only. It may If from tatpurusa compound such as rajapurusah the
be noted here that it is admitted by all that there is only laksana verbal knowledge in which purusa is qualificand, rajan is
in the word gahga and not nirudhalaksana. since, otherwise, qualifier and svatva is realtion, is not admitted, then in
whenever the wordganga is used it has to be understood in the sentences such as daiaite rajamaiahgas tasyaivami turahgamah
sense of bank. (these ten are the elephants of the king and his only are these
In this way, it is logically more complex to accept the horses) by the word tad which is the stem of the word tasya,
recollection of the respective suffixes in various compounds. rajan cannot be referred to because he is a part of the implied
Hence on grounds of logical simplicity it is accepted that in meaning (i.e. rajasambandhin) of the word rajan in the
compounds such as rajapurusah the word rajan has general compound rajamalangah. And the rule is that tatpadena
implication in rajasambandhin and this is semantically purvavakyasthapadarthasyaiva paramariah na tu tadrSapad-
connected with the meaning of the word purusah by the arthatdvacchedakasyapiti niyamah, i.e. the word tad refers to
relation of non-difference. If the compound rajapurusah is the meaning of the word [padartha) which occurs in the
taken as karmadharaya there is no reason to accept implication previous sentence and not to the determinant of the-state-of-
since there is no impossibility of semantic connection etc. being-the-meaning of the word {padarthatavacchedaka). If this
which is the basis of implication. And, therefore, in such an rule is not admitted, there would be the possibility of usages
instance the verbal knowledge that the person is not different such as Suklo ghato’sti sa na dravyam, i.e. ‘jar is white (i.e.
from the king (rajabhinnah purusah) is produced by means of having white colour) it (i.e. white colour) is not a substance’.
recollection of the denoted meanings of the words rajan and If the rule mentioned earlier is admitted, such usages can be
purusa. avoided. The reason is that here fukla (white) means by
There are other Naiyayikas who hold that there is no implication iuklaviSista (that which is qualified by white
need of accepting implication in tatpurusa compound such as colour), and, therefore, the word tad cannot refer to the white
rajapurusah. According to them in the tatpurusa compound colour which is part of the meaning of the word iukla. In the
rajapurusah, there is the semantic connection of king with present instance, if, from the compound rajamatahga, the
person by the relation of possession through the peculiar verbal knowledge in which matahga is qualificand, rajan is
expectancy (vyutpattivaicitrya). In other words, the knowledge qualifier and svatva is relation is admitted, the word tad can
of the sequence of words, viz. the word rajan immediately
refer to rajan, since it is z.padartha and not padarthatavacchedaka.
354 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 355

the analysis of the compound, then the knowledge of none of

Now Ramarudra enters into a detailed discussion by
these expressions (i.e. rdjapurusah and rdjnah purusah) can be
which he shows the drawbacks of this position of the other
Naiyayikas who hold that from the tatpurusa compound considered as the cause of the verbal knowledge mentioned
rdjapurusah there arises the verbal knowledge in which purusa (i.e. svatvasambandhena rajavUistahpurusah iti bodhah). This is
because both are independent causes of the same effect, viz.
is qualificand, rajan is qualifier and svatva is relation. If such
the verbal knowledge in the above-mentioned form. So each
a form of verbal knowledge is accepted for the compound
one of the causes could produce this effect without the other.
rdjapurusah, it would be possible to admit that the same form
Therefore, since the effect is brought about without the
of verbal knowledge would arise from the sentence rdjnah
presence of one of the causes, there would be deviation and
purusah also. The idea behind this argument is that the verbal
so none of them would be a cause. The answer to this
knowledge arising from the sentence in the form of a tatpurusa
objection is that the effect should be qualified by tattaddnupurvi-
compound and in the form of analysis of the same compound
jndnavyavahitottaratva (i.e. coming immediately after the
(i.e. samasavakya and vigrahavakya) should have the same
knowledge of the respective sequence of words); i.e. for the
form. Nor can the other Naiyayikas, referred to by the
effect in the form of the verbal knowledge which comes
expression pare tu in D., according to whom svatva becomes
the object of verbal knowledge as a relation in tatpurusa com¬ immediately after the knowledge of one particular kind of
sequence of words that knowledge of that particular sequence
pounds such as rdjapurusah, say that this (i.e. svatvasamsargaka-
of words is the cause. Hence there is no deviation.
iabdabodhah from the sentence rdjnah purusah) is acceptable,
Now the Naiyayikas referred to by the expression pare tu
since in that case the genitive case in the sentence rajiiah
purusah would become useless, because even without the use in D. could argue in the following way: We ourselves do not
of the genitive case the same form of verbal knowledge arises. admit svatvasamsargakaJabdabodha from the sentence rdjnah
purusah, but only svatvaprakarakaiabdabodha. But it is you
It cannot be further objected against this position (i.e.
who impose upon us the position, viz. svatvasamsargakaSabda-
there is svatvasamsargakatabdabodhah from the sentence rdjnah
bodha from the sentence rdjnah purusah and then point out
purusah) by the Naiyayikas referred to by the expression pare
ways of solving the difficulties arising from such an opinion.
tu in D. that the same form ofverbal knowledge may arise from
All this is cumbersome. It is just enough to admit svatvapra-
the sentence rdjapurusah also. This is because the knowledge
karakaiabdabodha from such sentences as rdjnah purusah as
of the combination of the word rajan ending with genitive case
we do just like you.
with the word purusa is the cause for the verbal knowledge in
But then the other Naiyayikas who admit implication for
the form mentioned above. In the sentence rdjapurusah, no
the first word of the tatpurusa compounds argue as follows:
such verbal knowledge is produced since there is no
Even when svatvaprakarakaSabdabodha is admitted from such
combination of the word rajan ending in genitive case, with
sentences as rdjnah purusah, similar difficulties arise. First of
the word purusa.
all, one might argue that just as one gets rajasvatvaprakara-
Now it may be objected by the Naiyayikas referred to by
kalrayatvasamsargakapurusavtiesyakaSabdabodha from the
the expression pare tu in D. that if the same verbal knowledge
sentence rdjnah purusah, so also one can get the same form of
is accepted as arising from the compound word as well as from
356 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 357

verbal knowledge from the sentence rajasvatvam purusah. svatvasambandhena rajabhavavan purusah. This is because the
This is not admitted by anybody. In order to avoid such a form svatva relation is vrttyaniyamaka (i.e. adheyataniyamaka, i.e.
of verbal knowledge from the sentence rajasvatvavanpurusah, not determining the-state-of-being-superstratum). Therefore,
it is to be accepted that the knowledge of the combination such a relation cannot be the relation which determines the-
of the word rajan, ending in genitive case with the word state-of-being-counterpositive-of-absence [abhavapratiyogitavac-
purusa is the cause of the verbal knowledge in which chedakasambandhah).5 Therefore, in the sentence puruso na
rdjasvatva is qualifier, purusa is qualificand, airayatva is the rajhah, the particle nah should convey the absence of svatva
relation. by the relation of airayata in purusa. Hence it follows that
But then another difficulty arises: The synonymous svatva is the meaning of the genitive case. Therefore, such
expressions such as nrpasyapurusah produce the same verbal sentences as rajhah purusah should produce the verbal
knowledge as rajhah purusah; therefore, even without the knowledge rajanirupitasvatvavan purusah, in which svatva is
knowledge of the combination of words rajhah purusah, there prakara. Hence the genitive case-ending is meaningful.
is the verbal knowledge in which the qualificand is purusa, Now Ramarudra argues against this position by pointing
qualifier is rdjasvatva and airayatva is samsarga. Therefore, out that there is no harm in accepting vrttyaniyamakasambandha
there are many independent causes for the same effect and so as abhavapratiyogitavacchedakasambandha. Therefore, such
there is deviation; in order to avoid this deviation the effect sentences as puruso na rajhah can produce the verbal know¬
should be qualified by tattaddnupurvijhanavyavahitottaratva. ledge svatvasambandhena rajabhavavan purusah. in which
Thus even when svatvaprakarakaiabdabodha is admitted from rajabhava is prakara, purusa is viiesja and samsarga in the form
the sentence rajhah purusah, there are difficulties which have of svatva is abhavapratiyogitavacchedakasambandha.
to be solved in the manner explained above. Therefore, let the But the Naiyayikas referred to by the expression pare tu
iabdabodha arising from the sentence rajhah. purusah be in D. answer this objection by pointing out that there is
svatvasamsargaka. But then a serious difficulty arises: the cumbersomeness in this position since one has to admit
genitive case-ending will be without any meaning other than another absence also in which vrttyaniydmakasambandha is
that of number. This is because svatva becomes the object of pratiyogitavacchedakasambandha, i.e. svatvasambandhena
verbal knowledge as mere relation by means of padasama- rajabhavah. Ramarudra answers this by stating that absences
bhivyahara without being recollected as the meaning of the which are mutually pervaded and pervader (i.e. samaniyata,
genitive case-ending. i.e vyapyatve sati vyapakatvam), are identical. Hence airay ata¬
This objection cannot be admitted. The genitive case¬ sambandhena rdjanirupitasvaivabhdva (i.e prakaratavadimata)
ending has to be considered as meaningful for the following and svatvasambandhena rajabhava (i.e. samsargatavadimata)
reasons: In the sentence purusah na rajhah. (the person is not are the same; therefore, there is no cumbersomeness.
of the king) the negative particle na conveys the meaning of Nor can it be argued against this position that even
the absence of svatva by the relation of airayatva in purusa (i.e. though absences which are samaniyata are the same, the-state-
diray atasambandhena rdjanirupitasvatvabhdvavan purusah) and of-being-counterpositive (pratiyogita) which is determined by
not the absence of rajan in purusa by the relation of svatva, i.e. the relation of svatva (svatvasambandhavacchinnarajanistha-
 Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 359
358 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
prakaratbvada and those who hold samsargatavada, when the
pratiyogita) is to be taken as different from the-state-of-being- expression rajapurusa is used as a karmadharaya compound in
counterpositive which is determined by the relation of aSrayata which the word rdjan is given at one’s own will, the implied
(dirayatdsambandhdvacchinnasvatvanisthapratiyogita). This is meaning of rajasambandhin, the verbal knowledge arising
cumbersome.
from the expression would be: rajasambandhyabhinnahpurusah
Ramarudra argues against this position oiprakaratdvadin (i.e rajanirupitasvatvavan purusah). Such a form of verbal
as follows: If svatva is accepted as the meaning of the genitive knowledge is not different from the form of the verbal
case-ending, denotative function of genitive case is to be knowledge which arises from the same expression when it is
accepted in svatva', the recollection of the meaning of svatva taken as a tatpurusa compound according to theprakaratavadin-
which is produced by the genitive case as the cause for the s. Therefore, in the opinion of the prakaratavadin-s there
verbal knowledge in which svatva is prakara is to be further would be only one form of verbal knowledge from the
accepted; again the causal complex of verbal knowledge is compound rajapurusah, whether it is taken as karmadharaya
hindrance for the perception in which the object is different
or as tatpurusa. Therefore there is simplicity.
from the object ofverbal knowledge. Therefore, the recollection But according to the samsargatavadin-s, when the same
of the meaning of svatva is to be included in the causal compound rajapurusah. is taken as tatpurusa, then the verbal
complex of verbal knowledge which (causal complex) is knowledge is svatvasambandhena rajavan purusah. Therefore,
hindrance for the perception in which the object is different there would be two forms ofverbal knowledge from the same
from the object ofverbal knowledge. Instead of accepting all expression rajapurusah. This is cumbersome.
these it is more simple to hold that the-state-of-being- Thirdly for the visistavaitistyavagahipratyaksa in the form
counterpositive of absence is determined by the relation in the rajasambandhibhinnah purusah prameyah. the causal complex
form of svatva? Therefore, from the sentence puruso na rajfiah, of the verbal knowledge in the form svatvasambandhena
it is more simple to accept the verbal knowledge in the form rajavan purusah (i.e. samsargatavadimata) would be a separate
svatvasamban-dhena rajabhavavan purusah. This means that it hindrance. Butin the case oiprakaratdvadin (i.e. rajanirupita-
is more reasonable to accept the samsargatavadimata. svatvavan purusah), such a verbal knowledge would not be a
However Ramarudra rejects this opinion for the following separate hindrance: There would be only hindrance as
reasons. First of all, there would be no meaning other than knowledge of contradiction (bhdhajnhnavidhaya). This is
number for the genitive case in the opinion of those who hold because when there is the causal complex of such a verbal
the samsargatavada (i.e in the opinion of the Naiyayikas knowledge, there would not be the causal complex for the
referred to in D. with the expression pare tu). This is because instance of vttistavailistydvagahipratyaksa already mentioned.
svatva is accepted as a relation which becomes object of verbal The reason is that for viiistavaiiistydvagdhijdna the cause is
knowledge by samsargamarybda and not as a prakara which vitesanatavacchedkanirnaya. Here it is the knowledge of
becomes the object of verbal knowledge as the meaning of rajasambandhibhinnah. purusah. This is contradicted by the
suffix, in the present instance the meaning of the genitive case causal complex of the verbal knowledge where the absence of
in rajnah purusah, the vigrahavakya of rajapurusa. contradiction (badhabhava, i.e. here, rajasambandhyabhinnah.
Secondly, according to the opinion of those who hold the purusah) is also included.
 360 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 361

But against this position it cannot be argued that there

would equally be cumbersomeness in the prakdratavadimata.
This is because in the samsargatavadimata for the vtiistavaiHstya- qifedWsflfo TOU^l TO
vagahijndna in the form svatvasambandhena rajabhavavan
purusah prameyah the causal complex of the verbal knowledge
svatvasambandhena rajavan purusah, would not be a separate
hindrance but just hindrance in the capacity of being the dllidllfafi ^TFf: I 1¥ ^ ^ ^ cT3T
knowledge of contradiction {bddhajnanavidhaya) in the way ^Sf; I qxqldlcl qr°q*ij W
explained earlier. It would be a separate hindrance in the case eTQTW I
of the prakdratavadimata. This is because according to the
latter the verbal knowledge is in the form rajanirupitasvatvavan
purusah and the causal complex for this verbal knowledge in
which badhabhava also is included does not contradict the
crernr 1 1 ^^
vitesanatavacchedakanirnaya in the form svatvasambandhena
rajabhavavan purusah. Therefore, the causal complex of the cj|(flcH3T TO 31^r?3T|fef^lWlW TO WTT-
verbal knowledge rajasambandhyabhinnah purusah is to be WlfttcT dMdJ dq-qqidj ^
considered as a separate hindrance for the instance of the I cqBd^ciftcMiqiqli^cr^
vtiistavatiistyavagahipratyaksa mentioned. This is because
here the verbal knowledge has as object something different Hdta^q>cqi,-qq: I ^
from that of the vitesanatavacchedakaprakaranirnaya.
But this objection also cannot be admitted. The reason
d^iRqRl qqPti I ’“•q^tifacqiql
is that with regard to the vUistvaUistjavagahipratyaksa in the
form rajakiyabhinnasambandhahprameyah,the causal complex
of the verbal knowledge svatvasambandhena rajavan purusah TO d" ?fW I TO%d" did mil-
would be a separate hindrance. It would be just a hindrance ufiyjD^HirT l
in the opinion of the prakaratavadin, in the capacity of being
hindrance (bddhajnanavidhaya). For all these reasons the
Translation
prakdratavadimata is to be preferred and so implication is to
Compounds : dvandva
be accepted for tatpurusa compounds in the first word.
Muktavah
Text 7E In the compound called dvandva, in such sentences as
dhavakhadirau etc. (i.e. dhava tree and khadira tree) dhava and
khadira are cognised with duality which is the meaning of the
dT d*Huii I cisi^lcl qMqj (nominative) dual case-ending as qualifier; there, there is no
implication. Nor should it be argued that there is implication
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 363
362 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

in association, because even with those two (meanings) which in compound words like pahcamuti (group of roots of five
have no association dvandva compound is found. Nor should kinds of plants). Others, however, say that by compound
it be urged that there is association in the form of syntactic words like ahinakulam snake and mangoose are known; the
connection with the same action (i.e. the meaning of the root), singular number is connected with each one (separately). The
for even when there are different verbs in such sentences as term samdhara is applied only there (i.e. only to those
‘see and put dhava and khadira\ we find dvandva compound. compounds) where singular number and neuter gender are
Moreover, there is no verbal knowledge of association. enjoined by the aphorism praniturya etc. In other places (i.e.
Therefore, in such sentences as ‘let the king and priest who are in dvandva compounds other than samahara) the use of
desirous of union with God should perform sacrifice’, the singular number is invalid. In (compound words) pitarau
compound called dvandva is accepted because there is no (parents) and SvaJurau (mother-in-law and father-in-law) etc.,
implication (in it). Therefore, association etc. are not the there is implication for the word pitr in the parents and for the
meanings (of dvandva compound). But where there is real word Ivaiura in the parents of one’s wife. Similarly, in other
difference between (the meanings of the words constituting cases also. In the words like ghatah there is no implication,
the dvandva compound) there is the compound called dvandva. because it is possible to have the knowledge of many jars as
Nor can it be argued how there can be dvandva compound in qualified by the generic attribute of jarness.
sentences like ‘there is non-difference ofjar and that which has
blue colour’. There the word ‘blue’ means by implication
blueness (i.e. blue colour) and the word ‘jar’ means by Text 7F
implication jarness. The word non-difference means non-
difference of substrata (of jarness and of blue colour). ft. 5% <5 wtcRteft I ^
In the compound called samdharadvandva, however, if it
is said that the aggregate also becomes the object of verbal
knowledge in compound words such as ahinakulam (snake
and mangoose) and so on then there is implication for the 5W T&zsm ^ I Tt I <stfe<tKST
second word in the aggregate of snake and mangoose. The
first word indicates the intention of the speaker. Nor can it be
argued how there can be (knowledge of the aggregate) in such
sentences as ‘sound the kettledrum and tabor’, since the
TTfrf T ^ 'tflftctl ^fct I Wf: I
aggregate in the form of a kind of knowledge of addition
cannot be (the object of the action of) sounding. This is
because there is semantic connection of that by indirect Htftf ^T-^T I 3PT^-
relation (i.e. there is semantic connection of the-state-of-being-
the-object-of-sounding with aggregate in the form of a kind of
knowledge of addition). The same (explanation) holds good Tqfaqgr WWtumNltW: I ^wi^l
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 365
Nyaya Philosophy of Language

oqid^Ridqi mcd^dM^d^^ddl^VI^^ q+neiUtt'^H qwn^^T-

ql&MdJ ddull cRT +4yKqig-£t-q q?t 1 1 aq-qMici

M*T w m-ft tr^tcT I ^ S^T tcH^YIKHH. I cnr qKd^M^l ^ ^ISKd^W: I

■^wf^qcqK: I U^qi-qi^a}fl<.qlMti'iigi<>lqidJ cT3T d^HdHTg-H^Tcqfa I ^ dHI6lCl^4lRf qH: I

d^qMi-qqql: Wff: I IcftcK^kWIfSK^I:
*1*11*1: | ^ ^l4tq ^c^cqi'-qcq^ <pg- *u*jwi4ftc4fo
I W^r anfaR'f wqq^ta^nftllF: I ■qqfor 1 T% mRlMK^dlR:
## I ^ TRRTMd+H«{lWi| eFSfrtdl WT «HI51uftdre ang-WtfK^ftl ^%l
'fld^<iql^qi'Hiqiq> | tt^ 3Wiuiq2RcqiR- MlftmPHta *Tl m:\ ^
^ <*nc»TVI0\Ps(J||«r^r^LH’1:3|^f^|<lB(5|ciJ'H|emKi^:4Gtm<4 dl^lUdWT: M^Nd^cT 3n5-<H*-M^Rl I d^l6l<.lIciR^-u
'^4Wg[Ky|RyM^w4d^'?l5"^p5i^l'J|| 3RFR^f

wwJiqql^i'HMi^ s^sr wf: 1 erer^tfct 1 <rar ? <m m-. i farft M^iftrMwil^ri ^

m I IcWW 'fldr=mdrq^<- PkKiftcuift ffrgtofcrcqft wf: i «**i»*1Rt i 3*fc:
'Idl'Hlqiqo 3flF-3I^ | qqi4c=f 'q^3Rr- *T?T Rdl *ic*i>iiqiRR MM: I
1 ^^'qqf^^qi4'^qi^qq^^i4'dN-^d+- RvWvlq&sft *T* ^1dl*lRYI«UrH<.u>fa yu^urd
*Rl<v eRT: I 3^ ^ 'flcirqMccqql: TRFfeTTE^3>ql^I^ cre^tcq^ri ^-qsll'Wctl ^TT^I^q^T q5q>^tdfl
1 mimwfai^q+*kv$1 4cm3 «l5JU|MM^dn^ d^qlRrqt'Ji
^FS^TIW^k^T dqqqiqq>: ^T wRfcf I TOft ^iRc^jiiR wqpti^r t^lq^qdi^ 1tn^ft
^ihtI: I d?i Mc.qqlH^ml^cl^qgrqi’-qMi^q qfjHcqW^qiqj W^iil Rv^+v)^ ?
^iRo^dl I *rMl4)
UltacqiqJ ^f^qif^q^r: | -qt <J
WfqR$r f*ft I q*^dl cfRfcT *T Translation
^Ig: I *Hl5K ^fcT I <nfdH<^ciP)eMl4t 4f?T<£d4l: WSK Compounds : dvandva

^ ^^qf^cqfadJ'ii: 1 ’<K^dW*llfe'1'j>dHli|- dvandve tui here dvandva means itaxctaxayogadvandva. In

y^thTd^ '«q random 1 ^m^Rdif^c4)d>Hr-'3f^ 1 such places as dhavakhaditau and so on! The-state-of-being-
dhava and the-state-of-being-^Aflrf/rfl are not separately
^HqPlRl 1 ■q?W7TTftfcr <^cH*)RpHm<rqiRfcl *TFT: I
determinant of the-state-of-being-that-which-is the subject. This
^IdR) 1 qtf M5R# wrf: I CT3T fcpMT^TT- is because it is fixed that nominal suffixes bring about the
^’^Hdll^Rl | >alI>iMicii<eqdql<iiqr^'-'if^qiqi i<q qiq-iHqi<laqi
knowledge of number which is pervaded by the determinant
366 Nyaya Philosophy of Language 367
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda
of the-state-of-being-the-subject, because of the fear that such It may now be objected that if there is no implication in
expressions as akaiau and so on may have validity and so a dvandva compound then what is the difference between a
there would be the knowledge of two dhava-s and two dvandva compound and a karmadharaya compound; therefore,
khadira-s. But the implication for the word khadira is accepted it is said but (kimtviti). The rule is that a dvandva compound
in the substratum of the association of dhava and khadira is used in the sense of ca (and). There are four kinds of
(trees). The number two existing in two dhava-s or the number meanings for ca. They are samuccaya (conjunction), anvacaya
two existing in two khadira-s are not pervaded by such an (joining something subordinate with the principal), itaretarayoga
association which is in the form of the determinant of the-state- (mutual connection) and samahara (collection); of these
of-being-the-subject. But the number two existing in both samuccaya and anvacaya do not have the capacity to form a
dhava and khadira is so pervaded. Therefore, there is no compound, itaretarayoga and samahara have the capacity to
verbal knowledge of two dhava-s or of two khadira-s. Such an form a compound. Here the meaning of ca is pervaded by
opinion of the Mimamsakas is objected to by the words nor difference and so when there is difference of meanings
in association (na ca sahitya iti):This means in the substratum
conveyed by the words constituting the compound, there is
of the association. Giving alternative definitions of association the dvandva compound. Such is the idea. By the word ‘etc.’ in
either as existence together or syntactic connection with the ityadau the Nyaya Sutra which begins with the wordpramana-
action which is the meaning of one verb, (the author) finds prameya is taken. How (katham iti): If it is stated that w ere
fault with the first alternative with the words even those two there is difference between the meanings of the words forming
which have no association (sahityaSunyayorapiti). The second the compound there alone is the dvandva compound, then it
alternative is objected to with the words nor (nacaiketi). No may be asked how riilaghatayoh can be a dvandva compound,
verbal knowledge (ananubhavacceti): The meaning is that
since there is the absence of difference between tula and
although in reality there is the syntactic connection of dhava ghata. Thus in the sutra (1.1.9) in which soul, body, sense
and khadira with action which is the meaning of one verb, still organs, objects of these organs, knowledge, mind, activity,
there would be absence of the verbal knowledge of the fault, transmigration, fruits, pain and release are mentioned as
syntactic connection with action which is the meaning of one
twelve objects of valid knowledge mind, knowledge and sense
verb. This is indicative of the following also. It is also to be organs are included. (These three) which are mentioned as
understood that in such sentences as ‘Caitra and Maitra are
objects of valid knowledge are also means of valid knowledge.
going’ (caitramaitrau gacchatah), if there is implication in that Therefore, since there is no difference between means of valid
which is qualified by association (sahitya) for the word ‘Maitra’ knowledge and objects of valid knowledge, how can there be
and so on, then since association (sahitya) exists combinedly a dvandva compound in the sutra beginning with the words
in both (by the relation ofparyapti), it is not possible to connect pramanaprameya. This is the meaning. Implication (aksaneti).
syntactically the agency of going (i.e. the effort which brings And in this way, since there is difference between them there
about the action of going) which is avyasajyavrtti (i.e. existing is dvandva compound. This is the idea. Now it may be objected
separately in both) with those in whom the association exists that the word non-difference is incorrect, since there is the
combinedly. absence of non-difference between the-state-of-having-blue-
 368 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 369

colour and jamess. Hence it is said non-difference [abheda function (in the compound) and so it is said if (yaditi). The
ityasyeti): Others say that the-state-of-being-an-object is the- first word purvapadam iti): The idea is that the rule that the

state-of-being-the-object-of-knowledge-produced-by-a-word. In suffixes (bring about their meanings as syntactically connected

this way, in some places because of the difference of meanings with the meanings of their stems) is a supporting argument for
of words and in some other places because of the difference one position (viz. implication is in the second word). How
>
[katham iti): How is there the knowledge of aggregate?; this is
there is dvandva compound. In the present instance since there the meaning. The reason for this is pointed out with the words
is difference of the determinants of the-state-of-being-the- cannot be the object of the action of sounding

meanings-of-words, namely, the-state-of-having-blue-colour and (vadandsambhavad iti): Since the meaning of the word
jamess, there is a dvandva compound. ‘sounding’ is only the action which is determined by conjunction
Or let there be dvandva compound only in such places as called striking, such a conjunction which is the determinant of
there is difference between the determinants of the-states-of- the-state-of-being-the-meaning of the root does not exist in the
being-the-meanings-of-words. Nor is it to be objected that aggregate (in the form of a kind of knowledge of addition).
since in such words as ghatah etc. dvandva compound is not Therefore, it cannot be the object of the action of sounding.
possible, sarupaikaiesa cannot occur as an exception to that This is the meaning. By indirect relation [paramparasam-
(i.e dvandva). This objection is acceptable to us. There is the bandhena) means by (the relation) in the form of existence in
knowledge of many jars, because of the syntactic connection its own substratum. Because there is the semantic
of plural number with that which are made known by the word connection (tadanvaydt)): Because of the semantic connection
of the-state-of-being-the-object-of-the-action (i.e. that which
‘jar’. And also because there is no proof supporting the rule
that a word uttered once brings about the knowledge of only has the result of action) of sounding. The same [evamiti):
one meaning. The rule concerning sarupaikatesa is valid in There is implication of the second word in the aggregate. This
only such places as hari (which has different meanings). Or let is the meaning. The opinion of the modem school of Naiyayikas
there be the rule that a word uttered once brings about the is pointed out with the words others [pare tviti): Not aggregate
knowledge of only one meaning. But the meaning of the word also is the remainder of the expression ‘is known’ [budhyate).
‘once’ is a qualification to vrtti which is a part of the meaning Now it may be objected that if the aggregate is not known then
of the word artha. In fact, it (i.e. the meaning of the word sakrt) where is the semantic connection of singular number
is a qualification to verbal knowledge and, therefore, there is [ekatvasamkhya) since there is the absence of singular number
no fault. Aggregate (samahara iti): The meaning is that in in those two which are brought into an aggregate. And
such compound words as ahinakulam etc. the verbal knowledge therefore it is said with each one [pratyekam iti). Some say that
of an aggregate of snake and mongoose etc. arises from the there singular number is for the sake of correctness. Now it
compound word ahinakulam and so on. This is established by may be objected that if compound words such as pdnipddam
our experience. In reality, if the knowledge is only of snake (hands and feet) do not bring about the knowledge of the
and mqngoose^hen there is no implication of aggregate in the aggregate how can the technical term of aggregate [samahara)
second word (of the compound), nor is there any denotative be applied to them? And therefore, it is said the term
370 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 371

samZihZLra [samdharasamjneti). Only there (tairaiveti): In and implication for the word putra (son) in putra and duhitr
this way, it is only technical. The idea is that if the term is true (i.e. son and daughter). This is the meaning.
to its meaning, there would be over-extension (of the term
samahara) in other places. Now it may be asked what is the use Commentary
of such a term [samahara) and, therefore, it is said in other Compounds: dvandva
places (anyatreti): The meaning is that in dvandva compounds
Now the authors discuss how verbal knowledge arises
other than those which are called samahara. In this way, the
from itaretarayogadvandva compounds. From such compound
idea is that the technical term samahara is not without purpose
as dhavakhadirau, there arises the verbal knowledge dvitvavan
because it is meant to give the word the characteristic of being
dhavah and dvitvavan khadirah. This means that the dvitva
always in the singular number and neuter gender etc. In
(compound words) parents, mother-in-law and father-in-
which exists combinedly in both dhava and khadira by the
law etc. [pitarau JvaJuravityddaviti): The meaning is that in relation ofparyapti, exists in each dhava and khadira separately
such instances of virupaikaiesa compounds as caitrasyapitarau by the relation of samavaya. In this verbal knowledge dhava
etc. (parents of Caitra etc.). Implication (laksaneti): The idea and khadira are qualificands and duality (<dvitvam) which is the
is that since it is not possible to have two fathers for one Caitra meaning of the dual nominative case-ending is qualifier. Here
and so on it is impossible not to accept there virupaikaJesa therefore, there is no implication unlike in bahuvrihi and
compounds. Others, however, (hold) that also in such places tatpurusa compounds. This is the position of the Naiyayikas.
as virupaikaJesa compounds the verbal knowledge is produced However, the Mimamsakas hold that in itaretarayoga¬
only by the recollection of the words ‘mother’ etc. which are dvandva compounds also there is implication in the second
elided, and so there is no implication. Similarly in other word. As for instance in the dvandva compound dhavakadtrau,
cases also (evamanyatrapiti): Where, by puman striya (Panini implication is accepted in the substratum of the association of
Sutra, 1.2.69) ekaJesa compound occurs, there is implication, dhava and khadira (dhavakhadirasahityairaya) for the second
as for example, in the section which deals with worship of word khadira. The Mimamsakas argue that if such an
husband and wife (when it is enjoined) ‘bring the brdhman.au’ implication is not accepted, there would arise the verbal
(there is implication for the word brahmana in brahmani and knowledge of two dhava-s and two khadira-s from the dvandva
brahmana, (i.e. brahmin wife and husband). When it is compound dhavakhadirau. This is because of the rule that the
enjoined ‘worship Sivau' (there is implication for the word Siva nominal suffixes bring about the knowledge of the number
in Parvati and Siva). Also in such instances as bhratarau and which is pervaded by the determinant of the-state-of-being-
putrau, when it is known by other means of valid knowledge subject [supam uddeiyatavacchedakavydpyasamkydbodhakatvam
that the word bhratr is intended to convey the meaning of svasr iti niyamah). And the number which is pervaded by the
(sister) also and the word putra is intended to convey the determinant of the-state-of-being-subject (uddeiyatavac-
meaning of duhitr (daughter) also, in these instances by means chedakavyapyasamkhyd) means in whichever uddeJya, i.e. subject,
of (Panini Sutra, 1.2.68), bhratrputrau svasrduhitrbhydm there there is number two, there is also dhavatva and khadiratva.
occurs virupaikaieasa compound. And so there is implication Hence there is the knowledge of two dhava-s and two
for the word bhratr in bhratr and svasr (i.e. brother and sister) khadira-s. In other words, if the dual nominal suffix denotes
372 Nydya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 373

the number two which is pervaded by the determinant of the- knowledge of semantic competence in the form akaiau. Nor
state-of-being-subject, i.e. here dhavatva and khadiratva, then should it be argued that in the case of ether, the existence of
the verbal knowledge would be of two dhava-s and two duality by the relation ofprayapti is unestablished. The reason
khadira-s. Thus it would come about that in the compound is that in ether number one exists by the relation of paryapti.
dhavakhadirau, number two would be predicated of both Hence duality existing in jar and ether is erroneously cognised
dhava and khadira. as existing in ether by the relation of akalatvavyapyaikaiva-
Now a question may arise, why should this rule be paryapti which is a non-co-existent (vyadhikarana) relation. In
accepted? The answer is that this rule is necessary in order to this way an answer is given to the objection that the meaning
avoid the validity of expressions such as akaiau. If this rule is of the case-ending cannot be duality pervaded by the
not accepted, the following difficulty arises: Everywhere determinant of the-state-of-being-subject since the erroneous
nominal dual suffix denotes only number two. This number knowledge of duality from the sentence akaiau does not arise
is semantically connected with the meaning of the stem by the because the duality pervaded by akalatva is not established.
relation of paryapti. In expressions such as ghatakalau, the Further it is not correct to take the meaning of the case¬
reference is to the number two as existing in ghata and akala ending merely as duality (and not as uddelyatavacchedakavyapya-
together. Hence we have the knowledge that pot has number dvitva) owing to the erroneous knowledge of denotative
two by paryapti relation and that akala has number two by function. This is because there could be duality ofjar and ether
paryapti relation. Now taking the number two as existing in existing in ether by the relation of paryapti. Hence the verbal
ghata and akaia, one can use the expression akaiau in order knowledge of duality from the expression akaiau is not
to convey the meaning dkdlahparyaptisambandhena dvitvavan, erroneous.
i.e. akaia has number two by paryapti relation. Such a usage, In the sentence caitro maitral cagacchatah the dual suffix
however, is inadmissible. If sup denotes the uddelyatavac- of the verb does not denote duality which is pervaded by
chedakavyapyasamkhyd, then since there is no number two caitratva and maitratva. Therefore, in the rule as enunciated
which is pervaded by akasatva, which is the determinant of by the MImamsakas the expression supam (nominal suffixes)
the-state-of-being-subject in the expression akaiau, such a is used and not vibhaktinam (which include both nominal and
usage cannot be considered valid. From this it follows that the verbal suffixes). It cannot be objected against this ih the
meaning of the case-ending in the production of the valid following way: According to the Naiyayikas in such expressions
knowledge of duality etc. is pervaded by the determinant of as ghatapatau number two exists by mere paryapti and not by
the-state-of-being-subject. This is because to have duality by uddelyatavacchedakavyapyaparyapti. Hence the rule enunciated
the relation of prayapti means the pervasion (vyapyata) of by the MImamsakas will apply only in those places where the
duality as the determinant of the-state-of-being-subject. It is uddelyatavacchedaka is only one. Therefore, there is no need
stated that the meaning of the case-ending is the production of of stating that supam is used instead of vibhaktinam. The reason
the valid knowledge of duality. Here the expression ‘valid is that, according to the Naiyayikas, the rule is that ekadharmo-
knowledge’ is used in order to avoid the apprehension of ddelyatavacchedakasthale supam uddelyatavacchedakavyapya-
duality in ether from the word akaiau because of the erroneous samkhyabodhakatvam, but according to the MImamsakas,
 374
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 375

sahitya which is only one is uddelyatavacchedaka in dvandva palya (see cowness and horseness), there is semantic connection
compounds. And so the expression ekadharmoddelyatavacche- with action which is in the form of seeing which is the meaning
dakasthale need not be used in the enunciation of the rule. of the root drl. Hence in this instance it is not impossible to
In expressions such as ghatapatau tisthatah, number is have the dvanda compound. But in other places such as
not the meaning of the verbal suffix, but of the nominal suffix. dhavakhadirau palya chindhi used in the sense of dhavam palya
Therefore, it cannot be objected that the verbal suffixes also (see dhava) and khadiram chindhi (cut khadira), although there
denote number and so the expression vibhaktinam should be is no association in the form of ekakriyanvayitva, still dvandva
used instead of supdm. Therefore, implication is accepted for compound is validly used.
the word khadira in the meaning of the substratum of association Further there is another difficulty if one accepts association
of dhava and khadira. in the from of ekakriyanvayitva. It is necessary that the
For these reasons the conclusion of the Mimamsakas is determinant of the-state-of-being-implied-meaning should also
that the number two existing in two dhava-s or the number two become the object of verbal knowledge. If, however, ekakri¬
existing in two khadira-s are not pervaded by the association yanvayitva is accepted as the determinant of the-state-of-being-
of dhava and khadira which (association) is the determinant of implied-meaning, then our experience is that it does not
the-state-of-being-subject. But the number two existing in both become the object of verbal knowledge. This is because
dhava and khadira is pervaded by the association of dhava and ekakriyanvayitva is the-state-of-being-object-of-verbal-knowledge
khadira. Therefore, there is no verbal knowledge of two (labdabodhavisayata) which (visayata) is indicated by the-state-
dhava-s or two khadira-s. of-being-relation which [samsargata) is indicated by the-state-
But this opinion of the Mimamsakas cannot be accepted, of-being-object which (visayata) resides in the same action
because it is possible to form dvandva compounds with words which is the meaning of one verb (ekakriyavisayatanirupitasam-
denoting things which have no association. This is clear when sargatanirupitalabdabodhavisayatva). In such ekakriyanvayitva
we examine the nature of association. Association is in the verbal knowledge (labdabodha) also is a constitutive part. And
form of existence together (sahavrttitvam) or semantic obviously in verbal knowledge verbal knowledge itself cannot
connection with action which is the meaning of one verb, become object. Therefore, ekakriyanvayitva cannot be taken
ekadhatupasthapyakriyanvayitvam. Existence together (sahavrtti- as the determinant of the-state-of-being-implied-meaning of
tvam) means existence in one place. The universal cowness the last word of the dvandva compound. Hence also the
(gotvam) and the universal horseness (alvatvam) do not exist in opinion of the Mimamsakas cannot be accepted.
the same place, but still we find valid the dvandva compound It was stated in M. that association is not experienced in
formed by these words, viz.gotvalvatve. Therefore, the opinion the verbal knowledge arising from the dvandva compound
of the Mimamsakas that there is implication in the sense of [sahityasya ananubhavacca). Dinakara takes this as an argument
association as existence in one place for the last word in the for rejecting association (sahitya) in the form of ekakriyanvayitva.
dvandva compound cannot be admitted. If, however, Ramarudra thinks differently. According to him, the Mimam¬
association means semantic connection with action which is sakas can make a further objection as follows: Association
the meaning of one verb, then in such instances as gotvalvatve means ekakalavrtlitva existing in mahakala (undivided time)
 376 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 377

by temporal relation [kalikasambandha) and it is not existing is avyasajyavrtti, i.e. existing separately in both, in whom the
in the same place; nor is it semantic connection with the same association exists combinedly.
action which is the meaning of one verb [ekasmin dele vrttih or The idea is that according to the Mimamsakas, in such
ekakriyanvayitvam). Even eternal substances which do not expressions as caitramaitrau gacchtah, there is implication for
exist in any substratum, exist in mahakala by the relation of the word maitra in that which is the substratum of association
temporality (kalikasambandha). Therefore, all things exist in (i.e. maitra and caitra, who are the substrata of association).
mahakala by the relation of temporality. Hence in all dvandva The first word caitra shows the intention of the speaker. This
compounds the last word can have implication in the sense of means that according to the Mimamsakas in the sentence
that which is the substratum of the existence in the same time caitramaitrau gacchatah, the subject [uddelya) is the substratum
(i.e. mahakala) by the relation of temporality. Thus in dvandva of the association of caitra and maitra (caitramaitrasahitya-
compounds such as atmakalau, gotvaivatve, dhavakhadirau, Irayah) and the predicate [vidheya) is the agency of going, i.e.
the meanings of the constituent parts of dvandva compounds effort which produces the action of going [gamanakartrtvam),
are the substratum of association [sahitya) in the form of i.e. gamananukulakrtih). Here the determinant of the-state-of-
existence in the same time, mahakala, by the relation of being-subject (uddelyatavacchedakam) is association [sahitya)
temporality. In this way, no where is dvandva compound and the predicate [vidheya) is effort [krti). Now it should be
impossible. asserted that wherever there is association which is the
Now according to Ramarudra, the statement ofMuktavali- determinant of the-state-of-being-subject, there, there is effort
e which produces the action of going. But this is not possible.
arising from the dvandva compound [sahityasya ananubhavacca) This is because association which is vyasajyavrtti exists
is to be taken as an answer to this objection. This means that combinedly in both Caitra and Maitra. But the effort which
if association in the form of existence in the same time (i.e. produces the action of going that exists in Caitra is different
mahakala), is the determinant of the-state-of-being-implied- from similar effort that exists in Maitra, since effort is
meaning, then this also should become the object of verbal avyasajyavrtti, i.e. existing separately in Caitra and Maitra.
knowledge; but in fact, it is not the case. Therefore, there is no Therefore, it is not possible to connect semantically effort
implication in dvandva compounds. with Caitra and Maitra in whom association exists
Now Dinakara adds another reason why there cannot be combinedly.
any implication for the last word in the dvandva compound in It may, however, be objected that association in the form
the sense of the substratum of association. In such sentences of existence on the same locus [ekadelavrttitva) or semantic
as ‘Caitra and Maitra are going’ (caitramaitrau gacchatah), if connection with the same action which is the meaning of one
implication is accepted for the second word, viz. Maitra, in that verb [ekakriyanvayitva) is not vyasajyavrtti. And, therefore, this
which is qualified by association, then since association criticism by Dinakara is not correct. The answer to this is that
[sahitya) exists combinedly in both by the relation oiparyapti, since Dinakara is criticizing both the definitions of association
it is not possible to connect semantically the agency of going, [sahitya) namely,sahavrttitva and ekakriyanvayitva, association
(i.e. the effort which brings about the action of going) which is to be understood here as the-state-of-being-object-of-the-
378 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 379

notion-of-addition (apeksabuddhi). This indeed is vyasajyavrtti meaning of ca in such expressions as ghatam patam canaya
and therefore, the objection raised by Dinakara is correct. (bring jar and cloth). Here both jar and cloth are semantically
However, Ramarudra thinks otherwise. According to connected with action which is the meaning of the verb which
him, Dinakara’s criticism is only apparendy correct. The is not a constituent part of the compound. Hence the meanings
reason is that in such instances as dvau gacchatah, there is no of ghat a and pata are dependent on the meaning of anaya.
difficulty in attributing effort to both the subjects although the Therefore, there is no compound. Pariksit Thampuran,
dvitva in both is vyasajyavrtti. This is accepted by all. however, points out that this opinion of Ramarudra is wrong.
But Pariksit Thampuran rejects the opinion of Ramarudra The reason is that if the kind of dependence that is just
and supports Dinakara’s views (Cfr. S. p. 209,1.5). According mentioned renders the words incapable of being formed into
to Thampuran, in the example of dvau gacchatah verbal a compound then in expressions such as ghatapatau anaya,
knowledge arises only by supplying the word purusau. Hence there cannot be the dvandva compound ghatapatau. This is
in the verbal knowledge arising from this sentence the because the words ghata and pata are the constituent parts of
determinant of the-state-of-being-subject is purusatva and it is the dvandva compound and the meanings of the words ghata
avyasajyavrtti. Therefore, there is no difficulty in connecting and pata are semantically connected with the meaning of
gamanakartrtva with the two purusa-s separately. Therefore, the word anaya which is not a constituent part of the
the criticism of the Mlmamsa position by Dinakara, viz. it is not compound.
possible to connect semantically effort with Caitra and Maitra According to Thampuran, however, words can be tormed
in whom association exists combinedly, is correct. into a compound, if they bring about directly or indirectly the
It is because association is not experienced in itaretarayoga- states of being objects of knowledge which are mutually
dvandva compound, there is no implication in such instance as indicated (saksat paramparaya va nirupyanirupakabhdvapanna-
rajapurohitau sdyujyakdmauyajeyatam. Hence, the compound visayataprayojaka). As for example, in the compound
rdjapurohitau is taken as dvandva and not as tatpurusa. p'itdmbarah, the words pita and ambara bring about verbal
If the Naiyayikas do not admit implication in dvandva knowledge. And the visayata in pita and ambara directly
compounds, what is the difference of the dvandva from indicate mutually. This is because in the expressionpitambara,
karmadhdraya in which also there is no implication? M. points pita is directly the qualifier of ambara and ambara is directly the
out that dvandva compound is accepted where there is real qualificand of pita. Therefore, these two words could be
difference of the meanings of words constituting it. The rule formed into a compound. In expressions such as ghatapatau
is carthe dvandvah? This means that when a set of several anaya, the visayata, in ghata and pata do not mutually indicate
words ending with case affixes, stands in a relation expressible directiy but indirectly. This is because by the expression
by ‘and’, the set is optionally made into a compound; and the ghatapatau anaya, verbal knowledge is produced in the
compound so formed is called dvandva^There are, however, manner of ekatra dvayam, i.e. in the one act of bringing which
four kinds of meanings for the particle ca, viz. samuccayah, is the qualificand in the verbal knowledge bothghatakarmatva
anvacayah, itaretarayogah and samaharaff and patakarmatva are qualifiers (prakara). Now prakarata in
There is first of all samuccaya (conjunction), i.e. the ghata and pata do not mutually indicate directly but only
380 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 381
Nyaya Philosophy of Language

indirectly, i.e. through the viiesjata residing in anayanakriyd. the substratum of blue colour. Therefore, since the meanings
From the sentence ghat am patam canaya the verbal knowledge by implication of the words nila and ghata are different, there
that arises is conjunct (samuhalambanaiabdabodhah); therefore, can be dvandva compound.
these words ghata and pata do not bring about directly or Similarly, in the Nyaya Sutra (1.1.9) soul, body, sense
indirectly nirupyanirupakabhavapannavisayata. Hence here organs, objects of these organs, knowledge, mind, activity,
these words cannot be formed into a compound. fault, trasnmigration, fruits, pain and liberation are mentione
The second meaning of ca is anvacaya (i.e. joining as the twelve objects of valid knowledge. In these twelve,
something subordinate with the principal), as for example, in mind, knowledge and sense organs which arepramana-s are
such instances as bhiksam ata gam canaya (go for begging and also included.12 Therefore, since there is no difference between
bring the cow). Here also the word bhiksa (begging) andgauh the means of valid knowledge and objects of valid knowledge,
(cow) cannot form a compound, because the meanings of how can there be dvandva compound in the sutra beginning
these words are semantically connected with actions which are with the word pramanaprameya and ending in nighrahastha-
meanings of the words (i.e. ata and anaya) which are not ndndm. The answer to this question is that the word pramana
constituent parts of the compound. Hence the meanings of the means by implication pramanatva and the word prameya
word go and bhiksa are dependent on the meanings of ata and means by implication prameyatva. And therefore, there could
anaya. Therefore, there is no compound.11 be dvandva compound, because there is difference between
The third meaning of ca is itaretarayoga, as for instance, pramanatva and prameyatva.
Others, however, hold that the-state-of-being-the-meamng-
in such expressions as rdmalaksman.au. The fourth meaning of
of-the-wordisthe-state-of-being-object-of-knowledge-produced-
ca is samahara, as for instance, in the expression ahinakulam.
Although in these four instances of ca, the meaning of the by-the word. In this way, there could be dvandva compound
particle is difference, still when there is difference among the where there is the difference of the meanings of words, or
meanings of words, there is the dvandva compound. This is the where there is the difference of the determinants of the-states-
meaning of the aphorism carthe dvandvah', therefore, only in of-being-the-meanings-of-words. In the present instance o
the last two meanings of ca, viz. itaretarayoga and samahara, nilaghatayor abhedah, there is dvandva compound, because of
there is dvandva compound and not in samuccaya and anvacaya, the difference of the determinants of the-states-of-being-the-
for the reasons mentioned earlier. meanings-of-words, namely, the-state-of-having-blue-colour
Here an objection may be raised: How can there be (nilatva) and jamess (ghatatva). And in the Nyaya sutra
dvandva compounds in expressions such as nilaghatayor abhedah mentioned earlier, there is the difference between the
determinants of the-states-of-being-the-meanings-of-words
(there is identity ofjar and that which is blue), since there is no
difference between that which is blue and jar? The answer to [padarthatavacchedaka], i.e. pramanatva and prameyatva and
this objection is that the word nila (blue) means by implication therefore, there also, there can be dvandva compound.
nilatva (blueness, i.e. blue colour) and the word ‘jar’ by Now a question may be asked: What is the reason for t e
implication means jamess. And identity here means identity rule that the difference of the padartha-s denoted by the words
of the substrata i.e. the identity of the substratum ofjamess and constituting dvandva compounds is the cause for the validity
 382 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 383
Nyaya Philosophy of Language

of the dvandva compound? The answer is that in the expression so in all such instances there can only be dvandva compound.
ghatai ca ghatai ca ghatau in order to account for the dvandva The answer to this question is that a karmadharaya compound
compound oighatau, we must assert that dvandva compound is enjoined when it is intended that there is non-difference
occurs where there is difference of padartha-s, i.e. here, between the meanings of the words which are the
qualificands, viz. jars which are objects of instances of knowledge constituents of the compound. Hence dvandva compound is
which are produced by the words. The reason is that ghatatva accepted only where non-difference of meanings of the words
which is here the padarthatavacchedaka, i.e. the determinant constituting the compound is not intended.
of the-state-of-being-an-object as qualificand of knowledge Or it may be accepted that only where there is the
produced by the word ghata, is the same in all jars whereas the difference of the determinants of the-states-of-being-an-object-
padartha-s, viz. jars, are different. of-knowledge produced by word, there is dvandva compound.
It may be objected that there is no dvandva compound in Nor can it be objected that in the expression ghatah, there
the form olghatau because the form of the compound should would be no possibility of a dvandva compound and so
have been ghataghatau and the first word ghata is elided sarupaikaiesa cannot also occur since it is an exception to die
according to the Panini Sutra sarupanamekaiesa ekavibhaktau former. This objection is acceptable. But then the following
(1.2.64). Therefore, ghatau is an ekaiesa compound and not a difficulty arises. Only if sarupaikaiesa is accepted, we can have
dvandva compound. Hence, in order to show \h&t ghatau is a the knowledge of many jars by the ekaiesa compound ghatah.
dvandva compound we need not accept that the difference of This is because ghatah. really means ghatai ca gahtai ca ghatai
padartha-s is that which brings about the validity of dvandva ca ghatah and, therefore, we can have the knowledge of many
compounds. The answer to this objection is as follows: The jars, although by the Panini rule [sarupanam ekaiesa
sutra sarupanam ekaiesa ekavibhaktau sets aside dvandva ekavibhaktau, 1.2.64) only one word ghata remains and the
compound. But only where there is the possibility of the other words are elided. Therefore, if sarupaikaiesa is not
dvandva compound can there be the operation of the rules on accepted, it is not possible to have the knowledge of many jars
sarupaikaiesa. Therefore, here the possibility of the dvandva from the expression ghatah. This objection is to be rejected
compound should be first established on the basis of the because, here the knowledge of many jars arises owing to the
difference of padartha-s, i.e. here the difference of individual semantic connection of plural number with those many jars
jars. There only the sutra on sarupaikaiesa can operate. Hence which are made known by the word ‘jar’.
the difference ofpadartha-s also is to be accepted as the cause But it may further be objected here that a word which is
of the validity of dvandva compound. uttered once brings about the knowledge of only one individual
Now if the difference of the determinants of the-states-of- object and, therefore, how can there be the knowledge of
being-meanings-of-words also is the cause for the validity of many jars by the knowledge of the word ghatah? Dinakara
dvandva compounds, then there would be no possibility of answers this objection by stating that there is no proof in
karmadharaya compound at all. This is because in all instances support of the principle that a word uttered once brings about
of karmadharaya compounds there is the difference of the the knowledge of only one individual object. Hence in order
determinants-of-the-states-of-being-th e-meanings of words and to have the verbal knowledge of many jars, sarupaikaiesa
 384 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 385

compound in the form of ghatah need not be accepted. If this produces by one significatory function (vrtti) the knowledge of
is so, then the Panini Sutra sarupanam ekaiesa ekavibhaktau its meaning. Therefore, by means of one denotative function
(1.2.64) would become useless since from the one wordghata of the word ghata in that which is qualified by ghataiva
we can have knowledge of many jars and so it would be (jamess), there is the knowledge of many jars.
improper to assume other words and enjoin their elision as the But in fact, from such sentences as harayas tisthanti where
rule demands. Such is not the case, because sarupaikaiesa the word hari has many meanings sun, horse etc., if the
occurs in such words as hariwhich has many meanings as sun, speaker has the intention of conveying many meanings, then
horse etc. Therefore, in the case of hari since there is difference the hearer has the verbal knowledge of many meanings oy
of the determinants ofthe-states-of-being-objects-of-knowledge means of many significatory functions of the word hari.
produced by the word, viz. suryatva, aJvatva and so on, there Therefore, the meaning of the word sakrt cannot be semantically
could be dvandva compound and as an exception to this there connected with vrtti.
could be sarupaikSesa compound. In this way, the above Hence it is further stated that the meaning of the word
mentioned Panini rule is also useful. sakrt is semantically connected with bodha which is the
But a further objection may be raised: If the rule that a meaning of the root gam in the expression gamayati in the rule
word uttered once brings about the knowledge of only one mentioned earlier. This means that by means of the knowledge
meaning is not accepted, then when the word saindhava is of one word there will be only one verbal knowledge and not
uttered, one can have the verbal knowledge of salt and horse two instances of successive knowledge. Hence the conclusion
at the same time. Nor can it be objected against this that is that from a word which has many meanings, when the
because of the intention of the speaker the knowledge of these speaker has the intention of conveying many meanings, the
two meanings will not occur. This is because even if there is hearer has one conjunct verbal knowledge (samuhalam-
the intention of the speaker to convey the verbal knowledge banatmakah ekah iabdabodhah) of many meanings and not
of these two meanings at the same time by the word saindhava many instances of successive verbal knowledge. This also
the hearer does not have the knowledge of these two meanings implies that words having many meanings such as hari etc. are
at the same time. Therefore, the validity of the rule that a word the examples of ekaiesasamasa and not the words ghata etc.
uttered once brings about the knowledge of only one meaning which have only one meaning. But the Grammarians accept
is to be accepted. ghatah also as the example of ekaiesasamasa. This is the
But then this rule has to be interpreted differently, viz. the incongruity of this opinion.
word sakrt (once) is to be taken as a qualification for vrtti, In the compound cd\\edsamaharadvandva> if the aggregate
which is a part of the meaning of the word artha. In other also becomes the object of verbal knowledge, then there is
words, in the rule sakrduccaritah iabdah sakrdartham gamayati, implication for the second word and the first word shows the
the word artha means vrttyapadabodhyah. Now the word sakrt intention of the speaker. As for example, in the compound
means ekatvam and it is semantically connected with vrtti, ahinakulam, if the aggregate is experienced, there is implication
which is a part of the meaning of the word artha (i.e. vrttya for the second word nakula in the aggregate of snake and
padabodhyah). This means that the word which is uttered once mongoose and the first word ahi shows the intention of the
 386 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 387
speaker. The reason why implication is admitted not for the
first word but for the second, is that the suffixes convey their The answer to this objection is the following: Although
meanings as connected with the meanings of their stems this kind of conjunction does not exist in the aggregate by
(pratyayandmprakrtyarthanvitasvarthabodhakatoam iti niyamah). direct relation, it exists by indirect relation of svalrayavrttitva.
As for instance, in the sentence ahinakulam paiya, the second Here svam means conjunction (i.e. abhighatakhya conjunction);
word in the compound is the word nakula which is the stem its substratum is ketde drum and tabor; existence on the same
of the suffix am\ the word ahi is not the stem of the suffix am. substratum belongs to the aggregate. This is because aggregate
Hence the suffix am can convey its meaning as connected with is a kind of knowledge of addition which exists in kettle
the meaning of the stem nakula. Therefore, implication is to drum and tabor by the relation of visayata. Therefore, the
be accepted for the second word nakula and not for ahi. In aggregate of kettle drum and tabor can be connected with
fact, if there is no knowledge of the aggregate, but only of vadanakarmatva, i.e. the-state-of-having-conjunction (i.e
snake and mongoose, then there is no implication in the abhighatakhya conjunction) produced by the action of striking
^gregate for the second word, nor is there any denotative (vadanakriya).
function in the compound. The compoundpahcamuU (group of roots of five kinds of
It may be objected how there can be a knowledge of the plants) should be explained in the same way, i.e. implication
aggregate in such sentences as ‘sound the kettle drum and is to be accepted for the second word of the compound in the
tabor’ since the aggregate is in the form of a kind of knowledge aggregate of five plants; the first word pahca shows the
of addition and such a knowledge of addition cannot be the intention of the speaker.
object of the action of sounding. The meaning of the root of The modem Naiyayikas, however, point out that from
the word vadana (to sound) is only the action which produces the compound words like ahinakulam the verbal knowledge
conjunction called abhighata, i.e. a conjunction which produces is produced in which the snake and the mongoose are the
sound. If samahara is the implied meaning of mrdahga, then objects and not their aggregate. Now it may be objected that
the object of the action of sounding (vadanakriya) is samahara if an aggregate does not become object in the verbal knowledge
since karma is kriyajanyaphalafraya, then abhigatakhyasamyoga arising from the compound ahinakulam, then it would be
which is the result of the action of sounding should exist in impossible for the singular number to have semantic
samahara. But such a conjunction which is produced by action connection. This is because the total number of things brought
(vadanakriya) cannot exist in the aggregate. This is because together in the aggregate is two and, therefore, singular
this aggregate is a quality in the form of a kind of knowledge number cannot be connected with these two.
of addition. Conjunction producing sound is also a quality. The answer to this objection is that the singular number
According to the Nyaya principle one quality cannot exist in is semantically connected with each one of the meanings
another quality [gunegunanahgikarat), and so the conjunction separately. Further it is stated that the singular nominal suffix
which produces sound (abhighata), cannot exist in the is not used to convey the meaning of singular number but only
for the sake of validity.
aSSreSate- Hence the aggregate cannot be the object of
sounding. If the compound called samaharadvandva does not bring
about the meaning of aggregate, then how can this name be
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 389
388 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
When the expression pitarau is used with an expression
applicable to such a compound? The answer to this objection
indicating another person, as for instance caitrasya pitarau,
is that the technical term of samahara is applied only to those
then the parents of Caitra are intended. When no other person
compounds where singular number and neuter gender are
is mentioned together with the compound word pitarau, then
enjoined by the aphorism dvandvalca pranituryasenanganam
the parents of the speaker are intended.
etc.13 In fact this aphorism which means a dvandva compound
In the compound ivalurau (i.e. ivalruica svaJuraica
is singular in number, when it is compounded of words
tvaJurau) by the sutra Svalurah tvalrvd (1.2.71) the word Svairu
signifying animal body, members of a band of players (or
is elided and the word Svalura which is the rest of the
singers or dancers) and component parts of an army, enjoins
compound has implication in the parents of one’s wife.
only singular number for samahdradvandva.
Similarly, in other cases such as ‘bringthe brahmanau’ (brdhmani
Another Sutra, sa napumsakam14 which means the dvigu
ca brahmanai ca brahmanau) where by the Panini Sutrapuman
or the dvandva compound, with regard to which singular
striya (1.2.67) ekalesa compound is enjoined, there is implication
number has been ordained by the rules 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 is
for the word brahmana'm brdhmani and brahmana, i.e. brahmin
always neuter gender, enjoins neuter gender for the same
wife and husband. In like manner, when it is enjoined ‘worship
compound. Therefore, this term samahara is only technical
Sivau' (Siva ca lival ca Sivau) there is implication for the word
and not true to its meaning. If, however, the term is true to its
Siva in Siva and Parvati. Again when the expression bhratarau
meaning, then there would be over-extension of the term
and putrau are used when it is known by other means of valid
samahara in other places such as in the word samudaya which
knowledge such as Inference etc. that the word bhratr is
denotes the meaning of aggregate; thus the word samudaya
intended to convey the meaning of svasr (sister) also and the
could also be signified by the term samahara.
word putra is intended to convey the meaning of duhitr also,
Then it may be asked what is the use of the technical term
there is implication for the word bhratr in brother and sister
samahara? The answer is that the technical term samahara is
and for the word putra in son and daughter. This is because,
used in order to show that in dvandva compounds other than
in these instances virupaikaiesa compounds are enjoined by
samahara the use of singular number would be invlaid. In this
Panini Sutra bhrdtrputrau svasrduhitr bhydm (1.2.68).
way, the technical term samahara is not without purpose
Other Naiyayikas, however, hold that in virupaikaesa
because it is meant to give the word the characteristic of being
compounds verbal knowledge is produced only by the recollec¬
always in the singular number and neuter gender. Such is the
tion of the words mdtr etc. which are elided and so there is no
opinion of the modem Naiyayikas.
implication. There seems to be incongruity in this opinion,
In such instances of virupaikatesa compounds, such as
because even one who does not have the recollection of the
pitarau, there is implication for the word pitr in parents.
words mdtr etc. has the verbal knowledge of parents. There is
Therefore, when the words constituing the compound have a
also the added incongruity that there is cumbersomeness in
different sequence of letters, i.e. in virupaikalesa compounds
accepting many instances of recollections.
like pitarau, i.e. maid capita ca pitarau, the word matrix elided
In the expression such asghatah, there is no implication,
by the Panini Sutra pita matra (1.2.70). And the word pitr
since it is possible by denotative function to have the knowledge
which is the rest of the compound has implication in parents.
 Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 391
390 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
nisada. On account of simplicity one has to accept the
of many jars as qualified by the generic attribute ofjarness. It
syntactic connection of the primary meaning (i.e. nisada with
should be here noted that in such instances as ghatah, there is
yajana). This is impossible (without the postulation of the
no sarupaikaksa compound.
study of the Vedas for nisada) and such a postulation giving
rise to cumbersomeness is no fault because it is dependent on
Text 7G
the result (i.e. the ascertainment ofyagakartrtva for nisada).

^ eremr i m Text 7H

eTWHMktJ ^ ^ Pi^KHI <tf<K«lllcl-

HR: I ^ I ifcf I
MtWI 3<<Hi*tokKJ|wMltl*W ^ dMHJ
‘hKlftfcl | dltSVlIdlftc^T HTT: I
^WPTT^I cn^T^pf-
qMHKTHT I HR: I <RT
dq^HMvMl WTTTOT:
'd^l^l'HcdlRIcI I
TflWTcT 3nf-dl^^l ^5 HliJtaldifofir

Translation ^<MHIulll4RlI^RT

Compounds : kartnadharaya
VJjtq<c^ ftwr I WWW TPTft-

Muktavati
ifcT I TT WtHrf: I
In the case of the compounds called karmadharaya, as for
^Wll^dilUiq^citlWJ^dPl^: yjai-ocH cHd-
instance, mlotplam etc. (blue lotus) the meaning of the word
nila is qualifier to the meaning of the word utpala by the I 3RhcTTf^T I ’fj
relation of non-difference; there, there is no implication.
Therefore, in the sentence ‘let one make nisadasthapati (king dmulldMW^<T+cmHft|+Plfrl 4MH. I ^THKPTtWlfclftfcr
who is a nisada) perform sacrifice’, there is no tatpurusa
<^c4dll j^cqid,
compound since in that case there would be implication, but
there is karmadharaya compound since in that case there d<^<ltH dWuiMMfcgc'Ufl
would be no implication. Nor should it be argued that there I ?l<*4^"U^4dtHulldHW SlftbTPf fodltTH^d Tlfo-
is the impossibility of conducting a sacrifice for a nisada who dHW d4Mfe4KPn WHcT Tjf
is a hybrid caste, since he is not entitled to study the Vedas.
Only because of that (i.e. only from the injunction
msadasthapatim yajayet) the Vedic study is postulated for the
 Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 393
392 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

Translation other than nisdda-s are prohibited to study (the Vedas) at all.
Is not a fault (adosatvdd iti): It may be objected that even if
Compounds : karmadharaya
implication is accepted, there is no fault, since implication in
No implication (na laksaneti): The idea is that the
the form of the relation of the denoted meaning is accepted by
knowledge of many in which it is appropriate to have the
all. Nor should it be argued that accepting the knowledge of
semantic connection of plural number arises by means of
implication as the cause of verbal knowledge is an addition.
denotative function alone. No tatfiuruja compound (na
It is established in ordinary sentence that by the etymological
tatpurusa iti): The remainder of this expression is ‘accepted’
derivation in the form of the king of the nisdda-s, verbal
(svikryate), Not entitled to study the Vedas (veddnadhi-
knowledge of a king who is not different from someone
kdraditi): The idea is that because of the prohibition by means
connected with the nisdda-s arises. In accordance with this,
of the statement that women and sudras should not study
everybody accepts that the knowledge of implication (as the
the Vedas. Impossibility of conducting a sacrifice
cause of verbal knowledge) and therefore, there is no need of
(yajanasambhava iti): The idea is that because of the absence
accepting any addition with reference to the Vedas. This
of knowledge acquired on account of the injunction of the
cannot be accepted because the knowledge of implication
study (of the Vedas). Only because of that (tata eveti): Only
which is in the form of the relation of denoted meaning is not
because of the impossibility of conducting the sacrifice which
possible without the knowledge of denotative function. Hence,
has been enjoined by the Veda. This is the meaning. Now it
both parties accept the knowledge of denotative function.
may be objected that there is cumbersomeness in postulating
Therefore, in your opinion, cumbersomeness in the form of
the knowledge of the Vedas in a ntsada. And, therefore, it is
postulating an individual instance of the knowledge of
said on account of simplicity (laghaveneti). It may be
implication before the verbal knowledge arising from Vedic
objected that (consideration) of simplicity here is insignificant
sentences as its cause, unavoidably exists.
because of the fear that the Vedic statement that women and
sudras should not study the Vedas would become invalid. If
Commentary
it is stated that the word ‘sudra’ is intended to mean sudras
Compounds: karmadharaya
other than nisada-s then it would come about that a nisada can
study other Vedas. If it is stated that the word ‘study’ is In karmadharaya compounds there is no implication. As
intended to mean study other than the study (of the Vedas) for instance, in the expression nilotpalm (blue lotus) the
which is useful for sacrifice, then it would come about that the meaning (i.e. having blue colour) of the word riila is qualifier
study (of the Vedas) which is useful for sacrifice (would be to the meaning (i.e. water-lily) of the word utpala by the
allowed also for sudras other than nisdda-s). These objections relation of non-difference. It may be objected that even in
cannot be admitted. This is because there the word ‘study’ is karmadharaya compounds like nilaghata etc. there is implication
intended to mean the study other than the study which is for the first word riila in the meaning of having-blue-colour,
enjoined by a specific (Vedic injunction). Therefore, it is therefore, how can it be asserted that there is no implication
established that a nisada is prohibited to study the Vedas other in karmadharaya compound? The answer is that this implication
than those which are necessary for sacrifice. (And) sudras is not dependent on the nature of the compound. This is
 394 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 395

because even when the word nila is used in ordinary sentences nisada to perform a sacrifice. Hence making nisada perform
without being a part of a compound, as for instance, in the
sacrifice also is impossible.
sentence riilo ghatah, according to the Naiyayikas, the word The answer to this objection is that since the Vedas
nila has implication in that which has blue colour. On the enjoined that a nisada could be made to perform sacrifice, it
other hand, in the sentence rajnah purusah, it is obvious that follows that he could study the Veda also in as far as it is
there is no implication for the word rajan; but in the tatpurusa needed; otherwise, the injunction in the Vedas that a nisada
compound rajapurusah, the word rajan has implication in the could be made to perform sacrifice would turn out to be
meaning of rajasambandhin since the word rajan is a part of useless. Nor can it be argued that the postulation of Vedic
the tatpurusa compound.
studies for a nisada causes cumbersomeness, i.e. cumbersome¬
This is the reason why in the injunction ‘let one make ness in the form of the postulation ofVedic studies for a nisada.
nisadasthapati, king who is a nisada j5 perform sacrifice’, the This is because such a cumbersomeness is no fault, i.e. the
expression nisadasthapati is not a tatpurusa compound but a postulation of the V edic studies for a nisada is not cumbersome.
karmadharaya. If tatpurusa compound is admitted then there The knowledge of such a cumbersomeness does not prevent
would be implication for the first word nisada of the compound the ascertainment of yagakartrtva for a nisada. This is to be
in the meaning of one who is related to nisada (nisadasam-
explained as follows.
bandhin). If we take this compound as karmadharaya, then When the compound nisadasthapati is taken as tatpurusa
there would be no implication.
there is implication, but when it is taken as karmadharaya there
It may be objected that it is impossible to make a nisada is no implication and so it is simple. So the meaning of the
perform sacrifice. This is because a nisada is a hybrid caste and Vedic injunction nisadasthapatim ydjayet means that one
he is not entitled to study the Vedas, because of the injunction should make a nisada who is a king perform sacrifice. Thus
that women and sudras should not study the Vedas. Only a ydgakartrtvam is ascertained for nisada. For this the study of
person who is wealthy, able and learned can perform the that part of the Vedas which is needed for sacrifice is neces¬
sacrifice. This implies that a person should have the various sary. Therefore, it comes about that a nisada can study the
accessories needed for performing the sacrifice; he should be Vedas. But such a postulation ofVedic study for a nisada is
capable of performing sacrifice and he should have appropriate cumbersome. This is because there is another Vedic injunction
knowledge. Only such a person is entitled to perform sacrifice. which states that sudras should not study the Vedas. However,
However, appropriate knowledge is acquired by means of the such a cumbersomenss arising from the postulation ofVedic
study of the V edas, according to the Vedic injunction svadhya- studies for a nisada is not a fault because this postulation is
yah adhyetavyah, i.e. one’s own branch of the Vedas is to be made after the result is ascertained, i.e. after ydgakartrtvam is
studied for the sake of the knowledge of the meanings of the ascertained for a nisada. Therefore, there is no fault, i.e. the
Vedas which serve a purpose. Because of another Vedic knowledge of cumbersomeness arising from the postulation of
injunction strtiudrau nadhiyatam, the study of the Vedas is Vedic studies for nisada cannot prevent the ascertainment of
prohibited for a nisada. Hence he does not have the appropriate yagakartrtva for nisada.
knowledge of the Vedas. Therefore, it is also impossible for a An objection may be raised here: The simplicity which
396 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 397

arises because implication is not accepted for the compound Another objection may be raised as follows: Even if the
nisadasthapati is insignificant. In fact, the simplicity is not to be expression nisadasthapati is taken as tatpurusa compound and
taken into account since, otherwise, the statement of the implication accepted in it there is no harm. The reason is that
Vedas that women and sudras should not study the Vedas both parties accept that implication is in the form of a relation
would become invalid. Nor can it be argued as follows: The of denoted meaning. Nor can it be argued that although
Vedas state that no living being is to be killed. But here the implication is accepted by both parties, the knowledge of
killing of any living being which is forbidden is to be implication is an additional cause for the verbal knowledge
understood as the killing other than the killing which is arising from the Vedic statement nisadasthapatim yajayet and,
enjoined by specific Vedic injunctions. In other words, the therefore, there is cumbersomeness. Hence also just as in
killing which is forbidden is to be understood as the killing of ordinary statements the knowledge of implication is necessary
animals other than the animals required for sacrifice as stated for the production of verbal knowledge so also knowledge of
by other Vedic statements. Similarly, here also the statement implication is necessary for verbal knowledge arising from
that women and Sudras should not study the Vedas is to be Vedic statements. This means that expressions, like
understood as referring to sudras other than nisada-s or nisadasthapati can be found in ordinary usage (e.g.
meaning that the Sudras should not study the Vedas other than nisadasthapatih gacchati) and not merely in the Vedas. In
those parts which are necessary for performing sacrifices, since ordinary usage, the expression nisadasthapati could be taken
there is the explicit statement of the Vedas that a king who is as tatpurusa and the verbal knowledge arising from it would
a nisada should be made to perform sacrifice. be nisadasambandhyabhinnasthapatih. Thus the knowledge of
This argument is not correct because if the word ‘Sudra’ implication for nisada in nisadasambandhin is necessary for
means Sudras other than nisada-s, then it would come about verbal knowledge. This is accepted by all. Similarly in the
that a nisada can study the other portions of the Vedas which Vedic statement nisadasthapatim yajayet, the knowledge of
are not required for sacrifice. If it is argued that study means implication is accepted as the cause of verbal knowledge.
study of the Vedas except those parts which are useful for Hence no additional cause is postulated.
sacrifice, it would follow that the Sudras other than nisada-s The answer to this objection is that the knowledge of
would be allowed to study the parts of the Vedas which are implication which is in the form of the relation of denoted
necessary for sacrifice. meaning is not possible without the knowledge of denotative
These objections against simplicity which arises because function. Therefore, the knowledge of denotative function is
of not accepting implication for the compound nisadasthapati necessary before verbal knowledge for both parties. But
cannot be admitted. The reason is that the word ‘study’ here according to the opinion of those who hold that there is no
means study other than the study which is prescribed by a cumbersomeness in accepting implication for nisadasthapati
specific injunction. Therefore, a nisada is prohibited from the in the statement nisadastapatimyajayet, individual instances of
study of the Vedas other than those parts of the Vedas which the knowledge of implication for individual instances of the
are necessary for sacrifice and sudras other than nisada-s are verbal knowledge produced by Vedic statements have to be
prohibited to study the Vedas at all. admitted. This is indeed cumbersome.
398 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 399
Text 71
| 44914^fell

"5. dc^’qpttpi d$iuu

Translation
^ *fe 1 -q^i^r MW 1 Compounds : avyaytbhava

In such compound words as upakumbham and ardhapi-

Translation
ppali (upakumbhamardhapippalityadaviti): Here the
Compounds : avyaytbhava
etymological derivation of the word is that which is near the
Muktavati
jar. This is an asvapadavigrahah, because a compound of the
In such compound words as upakumbham (near the jar),
avyayibhava class is a necessary compound (i.e. a compound
ardhapipali (half of long pepper) the second word has
the meaning of which cannot be expressed by its constituent
implication in that which is connected with it. From these
members used separately). The meaning of the first word
compounds there arises the verbal knowledge in which the
is the qualificand (purvapadarthapradhanatayeti): The
meanings of the first words of the compounds are principal,
meaning is that because of the semantic connection by the
i.e. qualificands. Thus in compound words nowhere there
relation of non-difference of that which is related to jar which
is denotative function since only the denotative functions
is implied by the word ‘jar’ with nearness which is the meaning
of (constituent) words bring about (the verbal knowledge).
of the word upa, there is verbal knowledge in which the
meaning of the word upa, namely near, which is not different
Text 7J
from that which is related to jar is the qualificand. Others,
however, hold that the meaning of the word upa is nearness
ft. and not near. If, however, implication of the word upa is
accepted in near, then it would be necessary to accept the
implication for two words. Rather than this, implication is to
be accepted only for the word ‘jar’ in the meaning of near jar.
wf: I The word upa points out the intention (of the speaker). (And
WTCltf: FPM ^ 5 ¥#Fi; I Jrtft f so) the verbal knowledge will be near jar. Here although in
efW WTF such a tatpurusa compound as ardhapippati the rejection of the
1?^: 1 3R- ira^Tjf- denotative function is a repetition because it has been rejected
ft'-Hcflfcl JJ'Krdi dPdtKil^ earlier in tatpurusa compound, still earlier the (denotative
function) was rejected in such compounds as rajapurusa where
dP'1<lct)<ui
the meaning of the second word is the principal one by means
"W '3WKeT51W
of accepting implication in the first word. And here in such
'dPdKI+^lPlPl s}qq;| tww tatpurusa compounds as ardhapippati and so on in which the
400 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 401

meaning of the first word is principal (the denotative function) is because of the rule pratyayanam prakrtyarthanvitasvartha-
is rejected by accepting implication in the second word. bodhakatvam.16 Only the word kumbha which immediately
Therefore, it is to be understood that because of (this) follows upa is the stem of the ablative case and not the word
difference there is no repetition. Now the author finds fault upa. Therefore, the meaning of the ablative case can only be
with the opinion of the Grammarians with the word thus semantically connected with the meaning of the word kumbha
(itthamceti). By denotative function of words [pada- and not with the meaning of the word upa, i.e. samlpa. Hence
iaktyaiveti): The meaning is that by means of implication and we cannot have the verbal knowledge: kumbhasamlpadagatah
denotative functions of the words which are the constitutive from the sentence upakumbhadagatah.
elements of compounds. Ramarudra himself answers this objection stating that the
rule referred to here is not applicable in the present instance
Commentary for the following reasons. There are two kinds of compound
Compounds : avyaylbhava words: One conveys the meaning of the second word as the
principal (e.g. kumbhasamlpam),the other conveys the meaning
In such avyaylbhava compounds as upakumbham (near
of the first word of the compound as the principal, e.g.
the jar) there is implication for the second word kumbha in that
upakumbham. The rule mentioned earlier, viz pratyayanam
which is connected with jar (i.e. kumbhasambandhin). Here the
prakrtyarthanvitasvarthabodhakatvam is applicable only in the
etymological derivation is kumbhasya samipam upakumbham,
former kinds of compounds, but not applicable in the latter
i.e. the place which is near the jar. This is an asvapadavigrahah
kind, i.e. in compounds like upakumbhat. Here another rule is
because upakumbham is an avyaylbhava compound. It is called
accepted: The ablative case immediately preceded by the
a nityasamasa, i.e. its meaning cannot be expressed by its
compound word upakumbha is the cause of the verbal
constituent members used separately.
knowledge kumbhasamipat. Thus according to the difference
The verbal knowledge, however, that arises from the
of words different rules become operative.
compound upakumbham is kumbhasambandhyabhinnasamlpam.
Some Naiyayikas, on the other hand, hold that in com¬
This is because the word kumbha has the implied meaning of
pounds like upakumbham, which is an avyaylbhava compound,
kumbhasambandhin and the denoted meaning of upa is samipam.
there is implication for the second word kumbha in the
And the implied meaning of the word kumbha,i.e. kumbhasam¬
meaning of kumbhasamlpa (near the jar); and the first word upa
bandhin, is connected with the denoted meaning of the word
shows only speaker’s intention. This is because, according to
upa, i.e. samipam, by the relation of non-difference. In this way,
them, the denoted meaning of the word upa is samlpyam
the denoted meaning of the word upa, i.e. samipam, is the
(nearness). Therefore, in order to get the meaning of samlpa
principal meaning, i.e. qualificand in the verbal knowledge.
for upa, we have to accept implication for the word upa in
Ramarudra raises an objection against this interpretation:
samlpyavitista, i.e. samlpa. Besides, implication is to be accepted
In such sentences as upakumbhadagatah, the meaning of the
for the word kumbha in kumbhasambandhin in order to have
ablative case, i.e. apadanalvam (i.e. the-state-of-being-that-
the verbal knowledge of kumbhasambandhyabhinnam samipyavi-
from-which-departure-takes-place) cannot be semantically
Sistam (i.e. samipam) from the expression upakumbham. There¬
connected with the meaning of the word upa, i.e. samlpa. This
fore, implication is to be accepted in both words upa and
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 403
402 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
But still there seems to be incongruity in the opinion
kumbha. In comparison with this, it is more simple to accept attributed to some Naiyayikas as explained above. According
implication only for the word kumbha in the meaning of kum- to them the denoted meaning of the word upa is nearness.
bhasamipa and so we have the verbal knowledge of kumbha- This, however, is not proper because the word upa is never
samipam. Therefore, in the sentence upakumbhadagatah the used as a separate word, but only in conjunction with other
ablative case, can convey its meaning, viz. apadanatva as words like upakumbham. Further, in an avyayibhava compound,
connected with the meaning of its stem, viz. the word kumbha. the analysis of the compound is made by means of other words
In this way, the rule, i.e.pratyayanamprakrtyarthanvitasvartha- which have the same meaning as the avyaya-s in the compound.
bodhakatvam, is operative in this instance too and hence we The word samipa denotes the meaning of samipyavUista and,
need not resort to another rule because of the difference of therefore, the word upa also should mean the same and not
words. samipya. And finally if a word can have meaning it would be
But Ramarudra raises a possible objection against the improper to consider it as meaningless. In the present instance
position of Dinakara (whose opinion is that in the expression the word upa should not be taken as merely indicating the
upakumbham there is the verbal knowledge otkumbhasamipam) intention of the speaker, i.e. as meaningless when it can have
as follows: From the word kumbha, one gets only the recollection the meaning of samipam.
of the implied meaning of kumbhasamipa and not the verbal In the tatpurusa compound ardhapippati (half of a long
knowledge of kumbhasamipa. The reason is that in order to pepper) the second word, viz. pippali, has implication in that
have a verbal knowledge there should necessarily be the which is connected with it. In the verbal knowledge that arises
semantic connection of two meanings from two words. In the from this, the qualificand is the meaning of the first word (i.e.
present instance there is only one meaning from one word half) since the verbal knowledge has as object half of long
and, therefore, there cannot be any verbal knowledge. pepper (i.e. ardhaviiesyakabhedasamsargakapippalisam-
Ramarudra himself gives an answer to this objection. An bandhiprakarakaiabdabodhah). Now it may be noted here the
avyayibhava compound is an avyaya. And, according to Panini rejection of denotative function in tatpurusa compound, viz.
Sutra 2.4.82, case-endings are added to avyaya-s and then ardhapippati, seems to be redundant. The reason is that in
elided. Therefore, in the present instance of upakumbham tatpurusa compounds such as rajapurusa denotative function
there is nominative case-ending the meaning of which is has already been rejected. But it may be objected that in
singular number. This is semantically connected with the tatpurusa compounds such as rajapurusah, implication has
implied meaning of the word kumbha. Hence, we can have the been established in the first word and it is not the case that the
verbal knowledge in which kumbhasamipa is the qualificand denotative function in the compound has been rejected. In the
and singular number is qualifier. However, PariksitThampuran tatpurusa compound ardhapippati it is shown that there is
thinks that the word anvayabodha in D. is to be interpreted as implication in the second word of the compound and it is
meaning anvayabodhopayogyupasthitih (i.e. recollection of the again not the case that the denotative function in the compound
implied meaning of the word kumbha which is the cause of is rejected. Therefore, how can it be asserted that the denotative
verbal knowledge) and, therefore, there is no need of the function of the tatpurusa compound is rejected again and so
explanations given by Ramarudra in support of Dinakara. there is repetition?
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 405
404 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
to Panini Sutra svaradinipatam avyayam (1.1.37) the words svar etc.
The answertothis objection is that when itwas established and nipala-s are called avyaya (i.e. indeclinable). Hence all
that there is implication in the first word in such tatpuxusa nipdla-s are also avyaya-s and so, as Ramarudra points out, the rule
compounds as xajapuxusa the intention was to reject denotative could have been stated as avyayatiriktanamarlhayoh saksad bhedena
function of such tatpuxusa compounds. By this it is also anvyasya avyutpannalvam.
3. As for instance, when there is the causal complex for the perception
established that in tatpuxusa compounds such as axdhapippaU
of jar, if there is the causal complex of verbal knowledge in which
also where there is implication in the second word, there is no something, i.e. cloth, is the object, then there arises the verbal
denotative function. Hence the objection of Dinakara that knowledge of cloth and not the perception of jar.
there is repetition of the rejection of denotative function in 4. Here Ramarudra seems to accept nirudhalaksana only in svarlha-
tatpuxusa compounds stands. vilesitavigrahavakyasthavibaktyarthavilista. As for example, in the
compound rajapurusa there is nirudhalaksana for the word rajan in
The answer to this objection is as follows: Earlier denotative
rdjavilistasvatvavilista. Thus here svarlha is the meaning of the word
function was rejected for such tatpuxusa compounds as xaja¬
rajan, i.e. king, which qualifies the meaning (svatva) of the genitive
puxusa where the meaning of the second word is the qualificand case-ending of the word rajan. Such a genitive case appears in the
in the verbal knowledge by establishing implication in the first sentence which analyses the compound. However, such a concept
word. Here denotative function is rejected in such tatpuxusa of nirudhalaksana as occurring only in compound words seems to
compounds as axdhapippati etc. where the meaning of the first stand in contradiction to what was mentioned earlier. M. stated that
in such sentences as ralho gacchali the akhyala, viz. the suffix ti> has
word is the qualificand in the verbal knowledge by establishing
implication in vyapara or airayalva. D. takes such a laksana as
implication in the second word. Because of such a difference, nirudhalaksana which Ramarudra defines as anaditatparyavisaya-
there is no repetition either. laksana (K.M.D.R., p.366,1.27).
In this way, by means of the denotative function and 5. abhavapraliyogilavacchedakasambandhah is always vrttiniyamaka.
implication of words which are the constituent parts of the This is because of our experience thztyadyena sambandhena yatra
variate iliprariyate tat tena sambandhena laira nasti ityucyale. Therefore,
compounds, one can have the appropriate verbal knowledge
in the present case it is not our experience that rajan exists in purusa
from compounds. Hence there is no need of accepting by svatvasambandha and, therefore, we cannot also assert that rajan
denotative function anywhere in compounds. Therefore, the does not exist in purusa by svatvasambandha. This is the idea.
opinion of the Grammarians that there is denotative function 6. Why in this case the recollection of the meaning of svatva is to be
in compound words is to be rejected. included in the causal complex of verbal knowledge is to be
properly understood. From the sentences rdjriah purusah, if the
genitive case is considered to denote the meaning of svatva^ then the
verbal knowledge ispurusavilesyakardjanirupitasvalvaprakaraka. Here
Notes since svatva is the meaning of the word in the form of the genitive
1. More precisely here the sambandha is ghatatvavacchinnapratiyo- case, in order that it becomes the object of verbal knowledge, the
gitanirupakatvam\ i.e. the-state-of-being-indicator-of-counter- recollection of meaning, i.e. svatva, is necessary. In this case,
obviously the recollection of the meaning, viz. svatva, is included in
positveness which is determined by potness.
2. According to Panini Sutra cadayo *salve (1.4.57) the word ca (and) the causal complex of the verbal knowledge.
etc. when they do not signify substances are called nipala-s (i.e. If from the same sentence rdjriah purusah, the verbal knowledge
particles). Further Panini Sutrapradayah (1.4.58) the wordpra etc. is accepted as purusaviiesjakardjaprakdrakasvatvasamsargakay then
are called nipala-s when they do not signify substances. According svatva becomes the object of verbal knowledge by samsargamarydda.
406 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Textf Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 407
i.e. akanksa, i.e. padasamabhivyahara. Therefore, the recollection of
relation in the form of svalva is not needed as the cause of the verbal
Text 8A
knowledge since it is not the meaning of the word. Hence in this case
the recollection of relation in the form of svalva is not included in the
causal complex of verbal knowledge. I I CR I I
7. Panini Sutra, 2.2.29.
8. Vasu, Siddhantakaumudiy Vol. 1, p.520. ^PrsFT $ i
9. Parasparanirapeksasyanekasya ekasmin anvayah samuccayah
[Karika 82cd, 83ab)
anyatarasya anusangikalve anvacayah militandm anvaye ilarelarayogah
samuhah samaharahy Cfr. Siddhantakaumudi edited by Gopala Sastri
Nene, Benares, 1982, Vol.2, p.603-604.
TJ. anqRlftrinfr I aildftldH ^dldl'RI+lfldH
10. Cfr. S. p.205,1.7. dl<rM4dH R I
11. Here also, the criticism of Pariksit Thampuran is to be taken into
account From the sentence bhiksam ala gam canayay verbal knowledge 'd’Piypi It*# I
arises in the form of samuhalambana. Therefore, the words bhiksd
and gauh do not bring about directly or indirectly
nirupyanirupakabhdvdpannavisayatd. Hence, these words cannot be
formed into a compound.
12. Here a question may arise: How is knowledge (buddhi =jnanam)
which is here mentioned as prameya be considered as pramanam?
This is because anumanapramanam is vydplijndnam, upamanapra-
manam is sddrjyajnanam, iabdapramanam is padajnanam. ^5 rn Irgd)
13. Panini Sutra, 2.4.2.
14. Panini Sutra, 2.4.17. OTK-
15. A nisada is a low caste person having a brahmin father and a sudra
mother.
16. For the explanation of the meaning of the rule Cfr. supra. I dMKflV
Hl'i KK+ftVbW I

i xnr ^ dMdwwfdf vrm-

dMdKMFdl f^TT-

wft
w^rr-

WRT | cR <R'lP*Tcf: wf: I WR

 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 409
408 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
knowledge. In the series of words ‘blue jar substance cloth’
and so on, there is no contiguity; from erroneous cognition of
^ng: I T^r W#TO: Wbldkft contiguity there is verbal knowledge. In fact there is no need
faW: I cTf^W^R^rNRfd<J|T4d J-*W ^T- of the knowledge of juxtaposition (of words). Even though
there is absence of erroneous verbal cognition owing to a
^r$^4lHHTlRRl ^ aRftc^h cDf mistaken notion of contiguity, there is no harm (i.e. there is no
^tSf: ^ g ^Mlf^^HI^- impossibility of true verbal knowledge, even though there is
erroneous cognition of contiguity). The objection that there is
?fFn^ I I
no possibility of the recollection of words as contiguous
W ^ ^I^M^Ili W tfl'Wljvdl^ %^T because of the destruction of recollection of the preceding
I^»*llH«5 f^TT %T: WcJI W *cm£l word by the recollection of the succeeding word in such a
sentence as ‘Devadatta (is) with umbrella, earring and dress’
f^TT ^*4^44^: TRTWfR
cannot be admitted. This is because after the impressions
3Tf^W: I arising from the experience of each word, the recollection of
all words arises as contiguous. Just as by means of diverse
Translation contacts (of eye with its objects) there arises a single perception
Causes of Verbal Knowledge so also it is possible for diverse impressions (of different words)
Contiguity (asatti) to give rise to a single recollection (of all the words); this is
because the knowledge of the last letter combined with the
Karikavati
impressions of all the words revives (the collective impression
The knowledge of contiguity, semantic competency,
syntactic expectancy and the intention (of the speaker)
of words). Otherwise, how can there be the recollection of a
are the causes (of verbal comprehension). The juxta¬ single word by means (of the impressions) of different letters.
position of words is called contiguity. [Karika 82cd, 83ab). But some Naiyayikas hold the view that by means of the
recollection of all the meanings (of the words) after the manner
MuktavaVi
of pigeons in a threshing floor, there arises simultaneously
Contiguity etc. (asattir ityadi): The knowledge of
verbal knowledge in the form of knowledge of semantic
contiguity, knowledge of semantic competency, knowledge of
connection of all meanings as actions (root-meanings) and that
syntactic expectancy and knowledge of the intention (of the
which helps to bring about actions (karaka). Just as those
speaker) are the causes of verbal knowledge. Now (the author)
pigeons, old, full-grown and young ones, simultaneously fall
explains the nature of contiguity with the words juxta¬
on the threshing floor, similarly all the meanings of the words
position [sannidhanam tviti). The knowledge of the
are semantically connected simultaneously with one another.
juxtaposition of two words the semantic connection of whose Others, however, say that the meaning of word is (first)
meanings is intended (by the speaker) is the cause for verbal cognised bywords themselves as semantically connected with
knowledge. Therefore, from the series of words such as ‘the
whatever meaning which is expected, semantically competent
hill eaten having fire by Devadatta’ etc., there is no verbal
 410 Nydya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 411

and contiguous (svarthopasthityavyavahitopasthitivisayah). In wrnm i rfdMR fonf-

this very same way, after the comprehension of the meanings
of the part of the sentence, through the recollection of the
meanings of words the comprehension of the meaning of the
full sentence arises. ^4d4l <oqe|UMtMKdt cqix|c^—I aRlRld:
By means of this, eternal word also is rejected; this is dlcH4T^spT: I I cRt: 444)Rdtf: I
because (the recollection of words) can be explained by UM^wRlW^IW: +K,JlRlc4^: I W
means of the knowledge of the last letter of the word combined
^ dlc44Rq4Uft % PiR^iMlpTidWltf-
with impressions of all the letters of the word which manifests
that [sphota). 4R4fd d4l tdMHHWWM iRMlRlRfa m:
This also is to be understood. Where the word ‘door* is I ^ "Saf ^
uttered the verbal knowledge arises by means of the knowledge ^d4dl^4d4dl*ftMflMqt 4<ftj,*dk44Rqq1' ^ 1 ’flciH«u4-
of the word ‘shut’ and not by means of the knowledge of (its)
Md4dl'44lWJI rfld4dMd4<t4kmRi'f
meaning in the form of shutting etc. The cause of the verbal
dlc44R^4c4mMlci;i ^ ^cqiRdl I
knowledge of a particular meaning is the recollection of that
particular meaning which (recollection) is produced by the
word. Besides, how can there be verbal knowledge by means %r^ri t $ uJu^RiRRi m: i
of the word denoting the object of action without the word
■TJ rf?r t|<UI«RWHKTCT SIK'M SRlc^: T
denoting action, since among the words denoting action as
well as the object of action (the word denoting the object of
action) has syntactic expectancy only with the word which xjiyRlUHI^l^PT ifcT Ml4'h‘ii'uRClU ^4cf
o.p>r>o. ■JIIJI mil ITT
denotes action. In the same way, since in expressions like in »i u i n ill ij~

puspebhyah (for flowers) etc., the use of the dative case-ending Ri $ i aiwfawi^iCTTift
cannot be explained without supplying the word sprhayati
MhfldMRT *nT: I ^
(desires) etc., the supply of word is necessary.
VIK«i)H ^^W:^dlc4jJNfaRlRfcTW?:

Text 8B ¥^"q?T frSHR^-T tw*dlc4ftraf dk44ftq41^1Hq'ftq-

R^4)^dl^U4>4dk44<eTIT ‘^4'Pl T *11®^>*
ft. <HWRl4r^ai«r>lJRl IT +Kulc4 I '4T5F^R ‘WvnRi'T’RlRl I T ^TcfiBir

ePqrT I 1HWT ¥W- 3tre%: WW1W# cmNT-

^ wRfcf
T P)R4dlRdhc4d4U-
oHflWKMdl ^d^HI«Rl4d4WRl- 4<i|o44UHW'ii<JTci; drbKlRuiHRd^ 9U«t«4ltf-
412 Nyaya Philosophy of Language 413
Text, Translation and Commentary-^abdakhania
I cqoqqsii^d fW
JcM 3TWT ^ ^4: I ^ ^
<I^Ri«i^i^oqqyn|!<il ^ 1 qiK^liy srfcT qq«RT-
dcd^ldj dFTIfW ^ Mddld^c^t Md|R4<l4^F*TTJ
4q«i’^qqnqTqft<qRi<.K)f^n.cqi§: I qqtqf^qfcT: d^ld^td^FcKNW^ ^TW^I cFT
q.KU|^c4^^|
■q^tq? +4clc41+K+|qiMn<.^iK4iy^l4 qq^qqql^N^ft^M
4qlqItqcq«>i=||Rrqivi§Tl dPqfcl I ^<^d^4d\HrlRft qd^4^id^FdcqiRdbi4Wi^uf:ii4FbrKi; i ^r %
1 ^ dfc^<KWK*^f ¥II«mW ^ I 7m^~
^ <nfe*l'*iq>acM+l <4>dVbl <c=H «F|<*>c=lld, ^Tef 3TdH4<<-
tt'tq>itqFqn'^ylcq+^<ui f^FTf^R^RcT 3n5_^TFTT- ^Hi^fcp v$ T[5Fnwf^T: I 3RT d4fl <qusqiqqi4-

^‘Pi+TOh wtREt I W ? w ^<iq^'4lJIH( qtq^HW R^4uldl4^qq>>H4<.q»R^4<r4 d^qi&Ri^W

4cxcqsii*] WMwM ^dq^:^JHd^^’qij||-u||I|<+; ^psgqfirfcT Oi$ft F^TWTFf^ra’ vJc4<£FT ^fcTI **&

^Tcqqf cFTT dddKJ|H<.*H+k*q RF^f^Hq+^l%«H+cV ^ud^WI^Mdl^IR <qu«qiq4l4-

sft dnrti't<T>i<.^-qtH<u|A+^ ^rpTcf WM'HMlRfcl Wt: I ■m^mt wft wto RRi^Ri^yPiqfe ^

'^,nMtll dnm^KHi^+{4KUMd+cdl'HI=l | ^MMujRFtl | H$i*R*ic*llct I 3t^q 41*4*11 ^ <qusqMl4-

^ii-ii^iFdi ^<t>dVbftRM: 1 thhuF- ■sftm^i d<H4^^TTt d^RKcl* <a^qiq4l4f^-

WHUH^d<RHMdl q^fWIT
‘Hq'q-qqqmTqftqdlqmFq ^ddld'H^ w«{^Fl f^l&d3[3lw4lMdPFft cET RM R^FlftR
qq- dcdIHift cf? Rf^F^FT 3Rlc“C'qf*-tR {icqc^Mfl Rtd<: I
^^WrWqfcT: ^gMHdllcd^ q>KU|^|
31^M^I44l4'^U^4'+H^MI4qi^qiyiqi^<4lq^i4't+i<.'Jl^4
^h^q ticr>ciqqi'qFqi ~4F)^ ¥IK4l4) T
qq^Tip^l I qqvMLKll4T-
^ Rf^W 3FW^PiIcl 'fcqT d^dfrfc^ldN-^^-
qfMcT: qnr^i wfc\ %^rg;i
4q^q>Mqdq^4dHMlRR) Ml4)ddd ^Fqft-TR farMI-
^ Rtt^fcr WK: 1¥ ^fPTTFRJ^r
Rdi r<4<f>33Ri id‘^'trddM^eqi41 wf 'q^qrqr^f^
inm*m ^ ^ ^wjPMifcn I hw^I
dly^qq-cK ^ qdqi^nqdRrqiR^U 1cqif^f^l?q«f: I
T^fqf^fcWFTW McqtHlRdlHl^dWlR VIW^MT-
f^r ^FT IrqFT T«il£RrtlR: | 3f*
MRlf^T «n^: I 51r4»dl4R«d+d'<l4<n^: ^l|sgqVd4N-
‘t>q)3Rq<d<.rqWRIeki^ldl'+dHI W#rf %q^|
^llc^NIdcd^ I^M14[^r3ng-W I I
RRrR^r ^iMf ^Fxrw3FRFc^r 1

c^i|(^ jjp£ F^tl^lcqi^'FT^qi+iji^uq^^^i'^^ qi^a^l

4[^cq<^q[£^HfM^qq) *FrfcT cTF %%ff^T: ^f; qt:
dl^ll4>I^NK[4 RMFcTq^TTOT mw? I^r ^T?: I ^
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 415
414 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
and ‘having fire’. Hence there is deviation and, therefore, the
dKH<kUIH<- word ‘contiguity’ (asatti) which is in the primary text is
¥qw Pftflcui+iu-n wf STt interpreted as knowledge of contiguity, with the words
knowledge of contiguity [asattijhanam iti). The text
falFf ffaRw*HKJI*<WtaMRl: I W gRfic^
dsattiyogyatd in which there is no visarga is the correct one It
WtfcT TRW 7TTOTj?R: I ? cn^IFJ'Jplf: H<.m
may be objected that if the juxtaposition of words is called
°4RmK: I 3I^%^R?^r Pl^VII^ I t ? contiguity, then the definition of contiguity which is mentioned
SR ftspf ffoRfrl Sit fWtfcT ^ TRTrf^r in the primary text has the fault of over-extension in such
SK^+ftllHI^rt^:'VIK^ymRlRIcl <1M^ I'^NtI: I sentences as ‘mountain eaten’ etc. since the words ‘mountain’
McWHI^HHlfeHhl&kl^ PUl+lfH^Hf&dWlft and ‘eaten’ are juxtaposed. Therefore, this is explained with
the words with that word [yatpadartheti). Intended by the
siW+WMKd 3TTF-TM ifcT I '^taflcHlRdl
speaker [apeksitah) means the object of the intention of the
^gricf^i^ frtoi <ntj^iR hRm i^f^qq^R^t i speaker. Of those two [tayoriti) means of those two words.
^F*Wfe^nrf: '^Rl4Vl %FTTRfa m i The juxtaposition of two such words is contiguity; knowledge
f^Ffl <JR^4(lr4l ■«MRcM<l«JI^KWMdlR of that is the cause; this is the meaning. Thus the semantic
connection of the meanings of the words ‘mountain’ and
‘eaten’ is not intended by the speaker, but only of the
'«H+dM^«i't>rtld>l sm ? SK^I^l
meanings of the words ‘mountain’ and ‘havingfire’. Therefore,
RuMi^«iTt| diy+l'HiqKqf&mgKHiJi ^qlRo ^ |
there is no contiguity of those two words (‘mountain’ and
‘eaten’) and so there is no fault of over-extension. This is the
Translation idea. Therefore [tend): By explaining contiguity by expressions
Causes of Verbal Knowledge in which such words as ‘which’ (yat) and ‘that (tad) occur.
Contiguity (ZLsatti) Now it may be objected in such sentences as’ blue pot
substance cloth’ where the semantic connection of the meaning
From the primary text (beginning with the words)
Contiguity, Semantic competency, Syntatctic expec¬ of the word ‘cloth’ and the meaning of the word ‘blue’ is
tancy, we can conclude that contiguity is the cause by itself intended by the speaker and not of the meaning of the word
and knowledge of contiguity like the knowledge of semantic ‘pot’ and the meaning of the word ‘blue’, there would not be
competency etc. is not the cause. This is because the word the contiguity of the two words ‘blue’ and pot because the
‘knowledge’ (jhana) is a part of the compound and so it (i.e. semantic connection of meanings of such words as ‘blue’ and
the meaning of the word ‘knowledge’) cannot be connected ‘pot’ is not intended by the speaker. Therefore, it is pointed out
with the meaning of the word ‘contiguity, which is not a part that (such an absence of contiguity between the two words
of the compound. Contiguity by itself is not a cause of verbal ‘blue’ and ‘pot’) is acceptable, with the words ‘blue pot’ [nilo
knowledge because from such sentences as ‘mountain eaten’ ghatah).
etc., there could arise verbal knowledge on account of the Now it may be asked how there can be verbal knowledge
erroneous knowledge of contiguity of the words ‘mountain’
 417
416 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda

from such sentences as ‘blue pot’. The answer is given with the there is the ascertainment of a particular factor (i.e separation
words beginning with from erroneous cognition (of of words, padavyavadhanam), so the erroneous knowledge o
contiguity) there is verbal knowledge (bhramacchabda• the juxtaposition of words also is absent there. Therefore,
bodhah). Thus the idea is that there is only verbal knowledge there would not be verbal knowledge. The answer is ( a
of the erroneous knowledge of contiguity, but there is no verses etc. it is accepted drat the verbal knowledge arises only
contiguity. Now it may be objected that if there is the from the constructed prose order of the sentence.
erroneous knowledge of contiguity, then verbal knowledge Naiyayikas, however, hold that in the case of the verses
would also be erroneous. Nor can it be argued that this is composed by a person who has taken the vow of silence the
acceptable, because there is no contradiction of the object of aforementioned contiguity does not exist. There is the absence
blue pot because blue colour exists in the pot. If valid of words and so there is also the absence of the juxtapositio
knowledge is accepted from the erroneous knowledge of of words. Because of the delay of the knowledge of contiguity
contiguity, then the statement of the old Naiyayikas that there which has been mentioned earlier, there is no delay of verbal
is erroneous verbal knowledge from erroneous knowledge of knowledge. But contiguity is the juxtaposed instances of
contiguity would be contradicted. And therefore, it is said knowledge of meanings of words which (instances ofknowledge
owing to mistaken notion of contiguity [asattibhrameneti). of meanings) are produced by words with the help of he
There is no harm (na ksatir iti): Erroneous cognition of signatory function of words. Here also (i.e. in the definition
contiguity does not bring about erroneous verbal knowledge; of contiguity) the element of juxtaposition need not be
but erroneous knowledge of semantic competency brings included. This is because the cause of verbal knowledge is
about erroneous verbal knowledge. However, the statement knowledge of the meanings produced by words and it (i.e.
of the earlier Naiyayikas that there is erroneous verbal knowledge of meanings) arises only as contiguous. And
knowledge from erroneous knowledge of contiguity is not therefore, contiguity is the knowledge of the meanings of
acceptable since it has no supporting reason. This is the idea. words produced by the significatoiy function of words.
In some books, the reading is as follows: After the words Now it may objected that it is improper to say that the
na Sabdabodliah and before the words ntlo ghatah, there is the cause of verbal knowledge is the knowledge of contiguity of
expression tatparyagarbhasattih. And this is to be explained by words. In sentences which consist of many words, the
adding the word yatah in the beginning and therefore, the knowledge of contiguity of words is impossible. This objection
meaning is that since contiguity includes also the intention of is raised by the words the objection (nanviti). Arises as
the speaker, i.e. contiguity which has been explained earlier contiguous lavyavadhanenotpatter iti): Eventhough there is

is in the form of the connection of words which bring about non-difference (of recollection of words) there is the possibility
the knowledge of the meanings which are the objects of the of contiguity. This is the idea. Now it may be objected, since
knowledge of the semantic connection which is intended by the impression which has a particular thing as quahficand and
the speaker, there is no verbal knowledge. The other reading a particular thing as qualifier produces the recollection in
is imaginary.1 Nor should it be objected that the contiguity which the same things are qualificand and qualifier, how can
which has been mentioned is absent in verse and therefore, there be a recollection of many words as qualificands by
 418 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 419

means of the impressions of individual words because the in this way the order of knowledge is that in such sentences as
objects of these (i.e. of recollection and impressions) are ‘bring the jar’ etc., there is first of all the knowledge of the-state-
different? Therefore, it is said by means of diverse contacts of-being-an-object-of-action (i.e an action denoted by a verb)
(inanasannikarsair iti). It is possible [sambhavad iti). Although with reference to a pot and afterwards there is the knowledge
the conjunction of the eyes with pot is not the cause of the of the action of bringing the object of which is a pot. Such is
perception of cloth, there is one perception (of pot and cloth) the meaning. The expression tadahuh should be added before
by means of the conjunctions of the eyes with pot and with the expression vrddha yuvanah. Here by the expression ‘old,
cloth, similarly, although the impression the object of which is grown up and young ones’, the similarity of the meanings
one particular word does not produce (a recollection) having (which are expressed by words uttered) just now, earlier, and
a different object, there arises only one recollection which is further earlier, is to be understood. Pointing out the
produced by the impressions of respective words, because of inappropriateness which is shown by the word kecit, another
the absence of any cause for contradiction. This is the idea. opinion is shown by the words others (apare tviti). Whichever
Otherwise (anyatha): Since many impressions do not produce (yadyad iti). The meaning of a word is first (i.e. before the
one recollection. By means of different letters (nanavarnair verbal knowledge of the meaning of the full sentence) cognised
iti): By means of individual impressions of different letters. by means of words as connected with that meaning which is
Recollection of a single word (ekapadasmaranam): Recollec¬ expected by the meaning (of some particular word) and
tion of one word the objects of which (i.e. recollection) are semantically competent to have relation with the same and
many letters. Like the recollection of words, simultaneous contiguous with the same, i.e. being the object of knowledge
occurrence also of the instances of the recollection of meanings which is immediately after the knowledge of that same
of words which (instances of knowledge) are produced by meaning. And after this, there is the knowledge of the meaning
words which are sequential and disappearing quickly, is of the full sentence. This is the meaning. In this way, even
impossible. And so everywhere the cause for verbal knowledge without the recollection of the meanings of the words in the
is the recollection of the meanings of words which is produced form of a conjunct recollection as mentioned earlier (verbal
by the words and which is certainly in the form of a conjunct knowledge) takes place. This is the idea. Nor can it be argued
recollection. In this way, everywhere verbal knowledge occurs that in such sentences as ‘bring the pot’, at the time of the
in the following way: The meanings of all words are simulta¬ recollection of the meaning of the last word, since there is the
neously connected as respective qualifier in the respective destruction of the recollection of the meanings of words like
qualificand and not in the manner of a relation of the qualified ‘pot’ etc., it is necessary to have the recollection in the form of
in the qualificand. The reason for this is that the certain a conjunct recollection. In this case, even when the recollection
knowledge in which the determinant of the-state-of-being- of pot is destroyed there is the subordinate verbal knowledge
qualification is qualifier producing that (i.e viiistasya in the form that the-state-of-being-an-object-of-an-action (i.e
vaiSistyajhanam) does not exist earlier. Such an opinion of the root meaning) exists in the pot. (This subordinate verbal
early Naiyayikas is shown by the words but etc. (param knowledge) itself as knowledge of meanings which (knowledge)
tvityadina). Simultaneously [ekadaiveti): It is not the case that is produced by words brings about the verbal knowledge of
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 421
420 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
complex, there (the verbal knowledge) arises only in the
the full sentence that the action of bringing has as object the
manner (of the knowledge) of the relation of that which is
pot and so on. This is because the recollection of the meanings
qualified. This is described in detail in other places.
of words which is produced by words as recollection is not the
Only the recollection of the meaning of the partial
cause of the verbal knowledge, but only the knowledge of the
sentence is the cause of the knowledge of the meaning of the
meanings of words as qualified by the-state-of-being-such-a-
whole sentence, which is preceded by the knowledge of the
knowledge which is common to subordinate verbal knowledge
meaning of the partial sentence and not a conjunct recollection.
(is the cause of verbal knowledge). Thus, according to this
The reason is that it is not the case that the knowledge of the
opinion, the knowledge of the meaning of the full sentence is
meaning of words produced by words is the cause of verbal
preceded invariably by the knowledge of the meaning of the
knowledge. On account of logical simplicity, the cause could
part of the sentence. And therefore, everywhere (i.e in all
be considered as only the knowledge ofthe meaning of words.
instances of verbal knowledge) before (the knowledge of the
And, therefore, in such expressions as ‘door’ (dvaram), the
meaning of the full sentence), since there is the certain
word ‘close’ [pidhehi) is not to be supplied, but only its
knowledge in which the qualifier is the determinant of the-
meaning is to be supplied. Such an opinion ofthe Prabhakaras
state-of-being-qualification in the form ofthe knowledge of the
is found fault with with the words this is to be understood
meaning of the part of the sentence, the knowledge of the
(idam tu bodhyam ityadina). Which is produced by words
meaning of the whole sentence is produced only in the
(padajanyeti): If the cause of verbal knowledge is the mere
manner of the relation of that which is qualified. Where, after
knowledge of the meanings of words, verbal knowledge
the destruction ofthe knowledge ofthe meaning ofthe part of
would have as object also that which is known by Perception
the sentence there is the knowledge of the meaning of the full
etc. This is the idea. Now it may be objected that there is no
sentence, there also one has to postulate a recollection which
verbal knowledge of cloth, pot etc. which are known by means
has a similar form as the knowledge of the meaning of the part
of Perception, since there is no such intention of the speaker.
of that sentence and in this way, there comes about the
And if there is such an intention, then it is acceptable; therefore
knowledge of the relation of that which is qualified. Thus, it is
it is said besides (kim ceti). Only with that (tenaiveti)'. From
Stated only in the same way, through the recollection of
the sentence ‘door the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action the
the meanings of words (tathaiva padarthasmrtyeti)‘. This is to
action of closing effort’, there does not arise the verbal
be understood here. When after the knowledge ofthe meaning
knowledge of the action of closing whose object is door and,
ofthe partial sentence, there is the recollection ofthe last word
therefore, it is necessary to accept as cause (of the verbal
and after this, there is the recollection of its meaning, there
knowledge) the knowledge of syntactic expectancy in the
since the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the partial
form of the sequence (of words) ‘close the door’ [dvaram
sentence is destroyed, a conjunct recollection is necessary. In
pidhehi). In order to have such a knowledge of syntactic
this way, where there is no causal complex of the verbal
expectancy, it is necessary to supply the word ‘close’ (pidhehi);
knowledge of the relation of that which is qualified, there the
this is the idea. Now it may be objected that in order to have
verbal knowledge arises only by (the) way (ofthe knowledge)
the verbal knowledge of the effort which produces the act of
of a qualifier in the qualificand; where there is such a causal
422 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 423
closing whose object is the door, the cause is the knowledge
of the particular sequence of words either of the word am after (by words); on account of logical simplicity, the-state-of-being-
the word dvara or in the form of the wordpidhehi? Therefore, the-knowledge-of-the-meaning should be considered as the
there is no possibility of having verbal knowledge from the determinant of the-state-of-being-the-cause. In this way, from
sentence ‘door the-state-of-being-object-of-action action of the sentence dvaram, in the accusative case meaning door,
closing effort’. Therefore, in this way, when the word dvaram there is no hindrance for the verbal knowledge of closing etc.
is uttered, there is no need of supplying the word pidhehi. Nor which is known by some means to arise and so the opinion
can it be objected that when there is such a sequence of words, that the meaning is to be supplied is appropriate.
there is mutual deviation since in the determinant of the-state-
of-being-an-effect, the-state-of-being-immediately-after-(that) is
Commentary
included. Nor can it be objected that when it is uttered dvaram
Causes of Verbal Knowledge
(i.e. here the word dvaram (door) is in the accusative case) the
action of closing, effort’ or ‘door the-state-of-being-the-object- Contiguity (asatti)

of-action and close’, there would be the verbal knowledge of Now the authors discuss the causes of verbal knowledge.
effort which produces the act of closing whose object is the Kdrika 82cd, 83a enumerates these causes; they are the know¬
door. The reason is that (such a verbal knowledge) is acceptable. ledge of contiguity [dsatt?), semantic competency {yogyata),
Just as there is no annulling factor for the verbal knowledge of syntactic expectancy (akanksa) and the intention of the
that which is known by means of Inference or Perception, so speaker (tatparya). This means that the knowledge of these
also there is no annulling factor for the verbal knowledge of four are the causes of verbal knowledge.
that which is known by means of Words which do not have It should, however, be noted that from the Karika itself
syntactic expectancy. And therefore, it is said likewise in the it is not clear that the knowledge of asatti is the cause of verbal
expression ‘for flowers’ (tathapuspephya it?)'. With the word knowledge. In the Karikavati text the word asatti is used with
etc. in the expression sprhayatityadi (desires etc.) verbs like visarga and, therefore, it cannot be a part of the compound.
krudhyati (he becomes angry), druhyati (he harms), irsjati (he Hence, it would come about that whereas the knowledge of
is envious), asuyati (he is jealous) etc. are included. The use of the other causes bring about verbal knowledge, it is not the
dative case-ending cannot be explained (caturthyanupa~ knowledge of asatti that is the cause of verbal knowledge, but
patterit?)'. The idea is that the dative case in the sense of the- asatti itself by its mere existence (svarupasati) is the cause of
state-of-being-an-object-of-action is enjoined by the rule (of verbal knowledge.
Panini), only when there is the connection of the verb sprhayati This, however, cannot be admitted, because in such
(to desire). Here the following is to be considered. In this way, sentences as girir bhuktam agniman devadattena there arises
in some places let there be the supply of words, but because verbal knowledge, because of the mistaken knowledge of
of this, the knowledge that is produced by it (word) cannot be asatti between the words giri and agmmat. Hence there is
considered as the cause of verbal knowledge in as far as the deviation, because even in the absence of asatti (i.e. svarupasati
knowledge of the meaning which (knowledge) is produced asatti) there arises verbal knowledge. Hence as there is the
effect of verbal knowledge even in the absence of svarupasati
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 425
424 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
on the other. Therefore, there is no verbal knowledge in the
asatti which is considered its cause, there is negative deviation form that the hill has fire and (it is) eaten by Devadatta.
(vyatirekavyabhicara). In order to avoid this deviation, M. Now it may further be objected that in such a sentence
interprets the word asatti as meaning asattijhana. Therefore, as nilo ghato dravyam patah (blue pot substance cloth) the
it is the knowledge of asatti that brings about verbal knowledge connection of the meanings of the words mla md pata is
and not asatti itself by its mere existence. intended by the speaker and the connection of the meanings
Instead of such an interpretation Dinakara suggests that of the words nila and ghata is not intended by the speaker.
in the text of the Karika, it is better to have the word asatti Hence there would not be any contiguity between the words
without visarga. In this case, obviously the word asatti would nlla and ghata since the relation of the meanings of the words
become a part of the compound and hence it would be the nila and ghata is not intended by the speaker. This objection
knowledge of asatti that is considered as the cause of verbal is acceptable because actually there is no contiguity between
knowledge and not asatti itself by its mere existence^ the words nila and,ghata since the speaker does not intend the
Now in the Karika, it is stated thatjuxtaposition of words connection of the meanings of these words. But then another
(padanam sannidhanam) is contiguity (asatti). An objection difficulty arises: In actual fact, there is verbal knowledge in the
may be raised against this definition of asatti by pointing out form niloghatah. If there is no contiguity between these words,
that in such sentences as girir bhuktam agniman devadattena ho- / can there be such a verbal knowledge?The answer to this
there is over-extension because there is the juxtaposition of the objection is that here the verbal knowledge in the form mlo
two words giri and bhukta, but actually there is no asatti ghatah arises owing to the mistaken notion of contiguity.
between them. A further objection may be raised as follows: If the
In order to avoid this fault of over-extension M. explains knowledge of contiguity is erroneous, then the verbal know¬
this definition of asatti in the following way: The juxtaposition ledge arising from that sentence would also be erroneous. Nor
of two words the connection of whose meanings is intended can one answer this objection stating that such an objection is
by the speaker is contiguity. The knowledge of such a acceptable, because actually there is blue colour in the pot and
contiguity is the cause of verbal knowledge. Hence, here so the verbal knowledge in the form niloghatah is valid. If the
although there is the juxtaposition of the two words giri and verbal knowledge that arises from erroneous cognition ot
bhukta, still the connection of their meanings is not intended contiguity is considered as valid, then this is contradictory to
by the speaker; but the connection of the meanings of the the statement of the old Naiyayikas that the verbal knowledge
words giri and agnimat is intended by the speaker; therefore, which arises from the erroneous cognition of contiguity is also
there is no asatti between the two words giri and bhukta. erroneous.
Hence there is no over-extension. Therefore, in the sentence These arguments cannot be admitted because erroneous
girir bhuktam agniman devadattena, the connection of the knowledge of contiguity does not bring about erroneous
meanings of the words giri and agnimat, and of the meanings verbal knowledge, but the erroneous knowledge of semantic
of the words bhuktam and devadattena is intended by the competency brings about erroneous verbal knowledge. And
speaker. But there is no contiguity between the words giri and the statement of the old Naiyayikas that there is erroneous
agnimat on the one hand and between bhuktam and devadattena
 426
Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 427
verbal knowledge from erroneous cognition of contiguity
words in this sense, there is no absence of verbal knowledge.
does not have any supporting reason and so it is invalid.
Hence, contiguity is to be considered as the juxtaposed
ere Dmakara refers to another reading of the text of M.
instances of knowledge of meanings arising from the words
according to which after the words na Sdbdabodhah and before
with the help of significatory functions.
die words mlo ghatah there is the sentence tdtparyagarbhdsattih.
In such a definition of contiguity as given by the modem
Supp ying the wordyat ah, Dinakara interprets the expression
Naiyayikas in the expression ‘knowledge of the meanings of
as follows: In the definition of contiguity we have to include
words’ the knowledge need not be expressly mentioned as
also the intention of the speaker. This implies that contiguity
qualified by juxtaposition. This is because the knowledge of
is in the form of connection of words which brings about the
the meanings of words is the cause of verbal knowledge. And
knowledge of the meanings of words. Such meanings are the
such a knowledge of the meanings ofwords arises as juxtaposed
objects of verbal knowledge. And the connection of such
only. Therefore, contiguity is the knowledge of meanings
meanings is intended by the speaker. And therefore, there is
arising from words with the help of significatory functions.
no verbal knowledge from such sentences as girir bhuktam
Such an opinion, however, cannot be accepted, since
agmman devadattena. However it should be noted that this
reading of the text is not genuine. contiguity so described is the same as vrttya padajanya-
padarthopasthiti, which was already mentioned as the cause of
An objection may be raised here as follows: In the case
verbal knowledge and hence knowledge of contiguity which
of verses there would be no verbal knowledge because of the
is considered by all Naiyayikas as a separate cause of verbal
absence of contiguity. In verses there is absence of contiguity
knowledge, will not any more be a separate cause of verbal
since words the meanings of which are to be connected are not
knowledge.
always placed consecutively, but with other words coming in
between them. But it may be objected that there could be Here in this section, there is difference of opinion
between Dinakara and Ramarudra about the M. text.
verbal knowledge because of the erroneous knowledge of
According to Ramarudra, after the pratikam, sannidhanam
contiguity. Such an objection, however, also is not possible
tviti, M. text has the following sentences: anvayapratiyogyanu-
since there is the certainty of the absence of contiguity which
yogipadayor avyavadhanam asattih tajjhdnam Sabdabodhe
prevents even the erroneous knowledge of contiguity. Hence
karanam. kvacidvyavahitepiavyavadhanabhramadSabdabodhad
here could be no verbal knowledge. The answer to this
iti kecit. vastutas tu avyavadhdnajnanasya anapeksitatvat.
objection is that in verses etc. verbal knowledge arises from the
According to Dinakara, however, the M. text does not have
prose order of the sentence that is construed from the verses.
these sentences. Therefore, the M. text as accepted by
he modem Naiyayikas, however, think that there is no
contiguity in the case of verses composed by a person who has Dinakara has the following sentences after the pratikam,
sannidhanam tviti: yatpadarthena yatpadarthasya anvayah
en t e vow of silence. There is, in fact, the absence of words
as spoken and so there is also the absence of contiguity in the apeksitah tayor avyavadhanena upasthitih Sabdabodhe karanam,
tenagirir bhuktam agniman devadattena ityadau na Sabdabodhah,
orm of the juxtaposition of words. Further it is also the case
that because of the absence of the knowledge of contiguity of nilo ghato dravyam paiah. ityadau na asattih, bhramad
Sabdabodhah. asattibhramena Sabdabhramabhavepi na ksatih.
 428 Nyaya Philosophy of Language 429
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda
Now Dinakara interprets this passage as describing the
mere existence, then from the sentences such asginr bhuktam
opinion of the old Naiyayikas, i.e. contiguity is the juxtaposition
agniman devadattena there could not be any verbal knowledge
of two words the connection of whose meanings is intended
that mountain has fire owing to the erroneous cognition of
by the speaker. Ramarudra, on the contrary, interprets in a
contiguity between the words giri and agnimat. In fact, there
roundabout manner the same M. text as well as Dinakara’s
is no real contiguity between the words giri and agnimat since
commentary on it as describing the opinion of the modem
the word bhuktam comes in between them. Hence in order to
Naiyayikas, i.e. contiguity is the juxtaposition of the instances
account for the verbal knowledge arising from erroneous
of knowledge of two words the connection of whose meanings
cognition of contiguity, we have to assert that contiguity by its
is intended by the speaker. And such juxtaposition of the
mere existence is not the cause of verbal knowledge, but the
instances of knowledge of words is the cause of verbal
knowledge of contiguity is the cause of verbal knowledge.
knowledge by its mere existence, i.e. knowledge of such
And this knowledge is common to both valid knowledge and
juxtaposition is not needed [tadriapadadvayopasthityor avyava-
erroneous knowledge.
dhanam asattih. sa ca svarupasatyeva labdabodhe karanam. Now with the sentence vastutas tu avyavadhanajhanasya
K.M.D. R. p. 11. 410-411). The precise difference between the anapeksitaivat, according to Ramarudra, such an opinion of
two interpretations is the following: According to the old the old Naiyayikas is rejected. This is because it is not the case
Naiyayikas, contiguity would be the juxtaposition of words the that all instances of verbal knowledge are necessarily preceded
connection of whose meanings is intended by the speaker and by the knowledge of contiguity of words. The reason is that
the knowledge of such a contiguity is the cause of verbal even when there is the absence of the knowledge of the
knowledge. According to the modems, however, contiguity contiguity of words, when there is the contiguity of the
would be the juxtaposition of the instances of the knowledge instances of knowledge of the meanings of words, we can have
of words the connection of whose meanings is intended by the verbal knowledge.
speaker and such a contiguity is the cause of verbal knowledge Now Ramarudra proceeds to interpret the Muktavati
by its mere existence. text yatpadarthena etc. as describing the opinion of the
Now we proceed to give the interpretation of Ramarudra modem Naiyayikas, as opposed to Dinakara who explains this
for the M. pahkli, viz. anvayapratiyogyanuyogipadayor section as dealing with the opinion of the old Naiyayikas.
avyavadhanam asattih tajjhanam labdabodhe karanam. kvacid According to Ramarudra the sentence yatpadarthena yatpa-
vyavahite’pi avyavadhanabhramad labdabodhad iti kecit. As darthasya anvayah apeksitah tayor avyavadhanena upasthitih
noted earlier, only Ramarudra considers these sentences as labdabodhe karanam means contiguity is the juxtaposition of
belonging to M. text. According to Dinakara the M. text does the instances of the knowledge of two words the connection
not include these sentences. And Ramarudra explains these of whose meanings is cognized with certainty by the hearer as
sentences as describing the position of the old Naiyayikas, i.e. intended by the speaker. Therefore, according to the modems,
contiguity is the juxtaposition of two words the connection of contiguity is the juxtaposition of the instances of knowledge of
whose meanings is intended by the speaker. If such a words and not the juxtaposition ofwords, as the old Naiyayikas
juxtaposition of words is the cause of verbal knowledge by its hold.
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 437

430 Nyaya Philosophy of Language interpretation the express statement of Dinakara that the K.
In order to arrive at this meaning, Ramarudra interprets text without visarga is the correct one: visargatunyapathas tu
M. and D. passages in his own way. Thus Dinakara interprets rjur eva.
the words tayoh in M. as tadrlapadayoh and this expression is But now another problem arises for Ramarudra regarding
interpreted by Ramarudra as tadrtapadajndnayoh. The meaning the interpretation of the M. text. For according to M, even the
of the expression tadupasthitih in D. as intended by Dinakara erroneous knowledge of asatti can produce verbal knowledge
obviously is tasyah (padavyavadhanarupasattyah) upasthitih, which shows that the cause of verbal knowledge is the
i.e. knowledge the object of which is asastti. But Ramarudra knowledge of asatti. And this is the opinion of the old
interprets the same expression tadupasthitih as tena upasthitih Naiyayikas. But in order to be consistent, Ramarudra has to
meaning tena (avyavadhanena) vttista upasthitih, i.e. avyava- show that this is the opinion of the modem Naiyayikas. He
dhanavUista padadvayavisayakopasthitih. Thus asatti, according does so by interpreting the expression asattibhramat as meaning
to the school of modern Naiyayikas as presented by Ramarudra, bhramanirvdhydsatteh.3 This means that the verbal knowledge
is juxtaposition of the instances of knowledge of two words. is not caused by erroneous cognition of asatti but that the
And such an asatti brings about verbal knowledge by its mere verbal knowledge is caused by asatti which is brought about
existence. What is to be noted here is that for the old by the erroneous cognition of the intention of the speaker by
Naiyayikas juxtaposition is of words, but for the modem the hearer. Thus in the instance of nilo ghato dravyam patah,
Naiyayikas juxtaposition is of the instances of knowledge of there is the verbal knowledge of nilo ghatah because the
words. And it is to give this difference in the meanings of asatti hearer erroneously thinks that the speaker intends the
that Ramarudra interprets the expression tadupasthitiin D., in connection of nila and ghata, though he actually intends it
the way explained above. In this way, Dinakara takes the between mla andpata. Ramarudra thus interprets the expression
Muktavah textyatpadarthena etc. as expressing the opinion of dsattibhramena in the M. text dsattibhramena tabdabhrama-
the old Naiyayikas while Ramarudra takes it as describing the bhave’pi na ksatih, as meaning bhramanirvahya asattih, i.e. by
opinion of the modem Naiyayikas. asatti which is brought about by the erroneous cognition of the
It should further be noted that according to the M. text intention of the speaker by the hearer. It should also be noted
accepted by Ramarudra, the readingyatpadarthena etc. cannot that Ramarudra invariably interprets the expression asatti-
express the opinion of the old Naiyayikas since the pahktijust bhrama as bhramaprayojya asatti.
before (i.e. vastutastu avyavadhanajndnasydnapeksitatvdt) rejects Now Dinakara raises an objection against the position of
the opinion of the old Naiyayikas. Hence for Ramarudra the the old Naiyayikas; there is no contiguity in the case of verses
reading yatpadarthena etc. has to mean the opinion of the and, therefore, there cannot be any verbal knowledge from
modern Naiyayikas and Ramarudra arrives at such a meaning them. Nor can there be erroneous cognition of congituity
of the text by such roundabout interpretations. According to because, there is the certainty of the absence of contiguity
the modem Naiyayikas, contiguity is the cause of verbal which hinders the erroneous knowledge of contiguity. Now
knowledge by its mere existence and so Ramarudra suggests such an objection against the position of the old Naiyayikas is
that in the text of K., the reading of asattih with visarga, is not appropriate in a context which according to the interpreta-
appropriate. However, Ramarudra cannot reconcile with his
432 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 433

tion of Ramarudra deals with the opinion of the modem inserted and we follow this suggestion. By means of this
Naiyayikas. Hence Ramarudra considers this objection as a sentence the opinion of the old Naiyayikas is rejected. And the
denial of the position of the old Naiyayikas that the knowledge meaning of this sentence is that before every instance of verbal
of the contiguity of words is the cause of verbal knowledge and knowledge, invariably there is no knowledge of contiguity of
not the contiguity of the instances of knowledge of words by words. Hence the knowledge of the contiguity of words is not
its mere existence. the cause of verbal knowledge.
Ramarudra does so by showing that in verses it is According to the modem Naiyayikas, however, contiguity
impossible to have even erroneous cognition of the contiguity is the juxtaposition of the instances of knowledge of words
of words since absence of contiguity (i.e. separa tion of words) (padajhanayoh avyavadhanam asattih). And it is the cause of
is actually experienced. The meaning is that in verses, words verbal knowledge by itself.
which are connected are not always placed consecutively, but Now the following objection is raised against this position.
with other words comingin between. Therefore, the knowledge It is not possible to hold that contiguity in the form of the
of contiguity of words is not the cause of verbal knowledge. In juxtaposition of the instances of knowledge of words, is the
this way, Ramarudra shows that the objection in the Dinakari cause of verbal knowledge because from a sentence consisting
text is appropriate. Ramarudra further shows that even though of many words, it is not possible to have the contiguity of the
in verses composed by one who has taken the vow of silence, instances of recollection of these words. As for instance, take
there is the absence of words and hence there is also the the sentence chain (having umbrella) kundati (having earrings)
absence of contiguity in the form of the juxtaposition of the vasasvi (having dress) devadattah (person named Devadatta).
instances of the knowledge of words, still such a contiguity Here since there is destruction of the recollection of previous
could be brought about by inferential knowledge of words word by the recollection of the following word we cannot have
from the script. Hence there could be verbal knowledge even contiguity of the instances of the recollection of all words.
in the case of verses composed by one who has taken the vow The answer to this objection is that by means of the
of silence. impressions caused by the experience of each word, the
Here we, first of all, make some remarks on the text: conjunct recollection of all words arises at last as contiguous.
From the words nanu etc. (K.M.D.R. p.412,1.1) M. discusses Now, it may be asked how there can be contiguity since this
objections against the position of the modem Naiyayikas. But last recollection being conjunct [samuhalambandtmakam
the immediately preceding section, i.e. the section beginning smaranam) is only one. The meaning of the question is that
with the wordsj^/>a</artforaa....(K.M.D.R.p.410,1.6) and ending there are not many instances of recollection brought about by
with na ksatih (K.M.D.R. p.411.1.1) deals with the opinion of the impressions caused by the knowledge of words, but only
the old Naiyayikas. Now without rejecting the position of the one conjunct recollection. Therefore, there cannotbe contiguity
old Naiyayikas, it is not proper to introduce a discussion on the of many instances of recollection. The answer to this question
opinion of the modern Naiyayikas. Therefore, Pariksit is that the final recollection that is brought about by the
Tampuran suggests that between these sections the sentence sentence chain kundaB vasasvi devadattah, though conjunct
vastutas tu avyavadhanajhanasya anapeksitalvat should be can be rightly said to be recollection of chatri, recollection of
 434
Nyaya Philosophy of Language

kundati etc. Such instances of recollection are not different Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 435
from one another since the final recollection is only one, and
so they can all the more be said to be contiguous. because the mountain is known by Perception and fire is
Now a further objection may be raised: Such a conjunct known by Inference. Since Perception and Inference are of
recollection cannot arise for the following reasons. Whatever different kinds of knowledge, we cannot have a conjunct
be the qualificand and qualifier in a particular recollection, knowledge combining perceptual and inferential instances of
that must be the qualificand and qualifier in the impression.’ knowledge, because they are of different kinds. But there
This is the kind of causal relation obtaining between impression could be conjunct knowledge of the perceptual knowledge of
and recollection. And so for a conjunct recollection a conjunct jar and cloth. Similarly, there could also be conjunct recollection
impression is necessary; but there are only individual of different words, because in both cases the instances of
impressions of individual words. Hence a conjunct recollection knowledge are of the same kind. Now it may be asked how
is impossible. The answer to this objection is that for a there could arise conjunct recollection of all words? In other
particular recollection in which one particular thing is words, what is it that revives the impressions of all the words
qualificand and another particular thing is qualifier is caused which (impressions) produce the conjunct recollection of all
by an impression in which the same things are respectively the words of the sentence? It is the knowledge of the last letter
qualificand and qualifier. But the instances of recollection in of the last word which (the knowledge of the last letter) is
which whatever things are qualificands require impressions in coexistent with the impressions of all the words that awakens
which those particular things are qualificands. the impressions of all the words of the sentence. If many
In the present case of conjunct recollection, the causal impressions do not produce one recollection, how can there
relation is as follows: Whatever particular things are qualificands be the recollection of one word consisting of many letters by
in the recollection, the same things should be qualificands in means of individual impressions of letters?
the impressions which produce it. Therefore, it is possible to Further, a word is a collection of letters. And there is no
have a conjunct recollection through the different impressions experience of collection of letters and so there cannot be an
of particular things; just as conjunction of the eyes with pot is impression of collection of all letters. Still only by means of the
not the cause for the perception of cloth and the conjunction individual impressions of individual letterswhich (impressions)
of eyes with cloth is not the cause for the perception of pot. But are produced by the instances of the experience of individual
both instances of conjunction of the eyes with cloth and pot letters, the recollection of one single word consisting of many
produce one perception of cloth and pot. Similarly although letters is produced.
the impression the object of which is one particular word does Now Ramarudra raises an objection against the opinion
not produce a recollection which has a different object, there of the modem Naiyayikas as follows: There is actually no
arises only one recollection which is produced by the purpose to postulate contiguity in the form ofjuxtaposition of
impressions of respective words. instances of knowledge of two words which produce the
The following, however, should also be noted. There knowledge respectively of the adjunct and the subjunct of
cannot be any conjunct knowledge of mountain and fire semantic connection. It is possible to have verbal knowledge
because there is the knowledge of two words through the
recollection of meanings which li.e. recollection^ is nroHnoAri
 Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 437
436 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

by knowledge of words. We cannot have verbal knowledge by of the instances of knowledge of two words ‘pot’ and ‘white’.
And hence it is impossible for the verbal knowledge ‘the pot
means of instances of the knowledge of words which (i.e.
instances of knowledge) are not contiguous. The reason is that is white’ to arise.
Here Pariksit Thampuran remarks4 that the argument of
in the moment immediately preceding the verbal knowledge,
Ramarudra supporting the opinion of the modem Naiyayikas
one of the instances of knowledge of words is absent, if the
cannot be admitted; he also brings forward arguments in
knowledge of words are not contiguous.
support of the opinion of the old Naiyayikas. He first of all asks
It is true that the contiguity of the instances of knowledge
what does it precisely mean when it is said that contiguity is the
of words invariably exist before the verbal knowledge, but it
juxtaposition of the instances of knowledge of two words. If it
is not necessary to consider it as ananyathasiddha. Hence asatti
means thatjust as the knowledge of words is the cause of verbal
is not a cause of verbal knowledge. This is because the
knowledge since it invariably precedes verbal knowledge, so
Naiyayikas consider as ananyathasidda only that thing without
also the contiguity of the instances of knowledge of two words
which the effect would not come into existence. In the present
is also the cause of verbal knowledge, because it invariably
case, although the contiguity of the instances of knowledge of
precedes it, then it would come about that the juxtaposition
words exists invariably before the verbal knowledge, it cannot
itself of stick, wheel etc, would also have to be considered as
be considered as ananyathasiddhayist as the colour of the stick
causes for pot, since such a juxtaposition also invariably
though invariably existing before the production of the jar is
precedes pot. If it is argued that the juxtaposition of stick,
not ananyathasiddha. Thus the congituity of the instances of
wheel etc. is not a cause because it is anyathasiddha, then the
the knowledge of words is not the cause of verbal knowledge
juxtaposition of the instances of the knowledge of two words
just as the colour of stick is not the cause of jar.
is also not a cause since it is anyathasiddha. But according to
The answer of Ramarudra to this objection is as follows:
the theory, after the manner of the pigeons in the threshing
Imagine the instance of a person who first has the knowledge
floor (khalekapotanyayena), before every instance of verbal
of the word ‘pot’ and afterwards the knowledge of the word
knowledge conjunct recollection of all the words of a sentence
‘cloth’. In the third moment he has the conjunct recollection
invariably exists. In this way it could be asserted that for every
in which the meaning of the word ‘pot’ and the word ‘white’
instance of verbal knowledge, the cause is such a recollection
are objects. It should be noted here, that in the conjunct
of words and not the contiguity of the instances of the
recollection the meaning of the word ‘pot’ becomes the object
knowledge of words.
by the knowledge of the word ‘pot’ and the word ‘white’
In the other opinion, according to which the verbal
becomes object by means of another reviving factor. In the
knowledge of the full sentence is brought about by the verbal
fourth moment there is the recollection of the meaning of the
knowledge of the parts of the sentence, there is no conjunct
word ‘white’. Then in the fifth moment, there could arise the
recollection of all the words before the verbal knowledge
verbal knowledge that pot is white. In order to avoid such a
arising from the whole sentence. Therefore, there is no
verbal knowledge, we have to admit that the contiguity of the
question of contiguity in the form of the juxtaposition of the
instances of knowledge of two words is the cause of verbal
instances of knowledge of words. Pariksit Thampuran further
knowledge. In the example mentioned there is no contiguity
 Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 439
438 Nydya Philosophy of Language
Now an objection may be raised against this as follows:
points out that the argument of Ramarudra, in order to When some one utters the sentence girir bhuktam agniman
establish the opinion of the modem Naiyayikas that the devadattena, if the hearer grasps the intention of the speaker as
juxtaposition of the instances of the knowledge of words is the conveying the meanings ofgirir agniman devadattena bhuktam,
cause of verbal knowledge, is invalid for the following reasons: then he (the hearer) would have the conjunct recollection of
Ramarudra pointed out earlier that when one has the knowledge all the words and then the conjunct recollection of the
of the word ghata in the first moment and in the second meanings of all words, and then the verbal knowledge in the
moment the knowledge of the word pata and in the third form that mountain has fire (and this) is eaten by Devadatta.
moment the conjunct remembrance of the meaning of the From this it follows that the juxtaposition of the instances of the
word ghata and the word iukla and in the fourth moment the knowledge of words by its (of juxtaposition) mere existence
recollection the meaning of the word ‘white’ there could be in would have to be considered as the cause of verbal knowledge.
the fifth moment the verbal knowledge that the jar is white. But The answer to this objection is that the hearer under¬
such a possibility cannot arise. The reason is that immediately standing the intention of the speaker and construing the
after the knowledge of the word ghata, in the second moment sentence according to the proper order arrives at the verbal
the recollection of the meaning of the word ghata should arise. knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge of the juxtaposition of
Ramarudra, however, holds that the recollection of the words is to be accepted as the cause of verbal knowledge. In
meaning of the word ghata arises in the third moment; but this way, Pariksit Thampuran defends the opinion of the old
there is no justification for this. Therefore, Ramarudra should Naiyayikas thatjuxtaposition of words is asatti and its knowledge
have pointed out that the verbal knowledge ‘pot is white’ is the cause of verbal knowledge.
should arise in the following order: In the first moment, there Now it may be asked just as the recollection of words, so
is the knowledge of the word ghata, in the second moment the instances of recollection of meanings of words disappear
there is the conjunct recollection of the meaning of the word one after another after two moments from their origin.
ghata and the word pala\ in the third moment there is the Therefore, all instances of recollection of meanings of words
conjunct recollection of the meaning of the word pata and the do not exist simultaneously. Therefore, only the conjunct
word iukla and in the fourth moment there is the recollection recollection of meanings of words is to be considered as the
of the meaning of the word iukla and in the fifth moment there cause of all instances of verbal knowledge. By means of this
is the verbal knowledge that the pot is white. Such a process, conjunct recollection verbal knowledge arises simultaneously
however, cannot take place because in the fourth moment the after the manner of pigeons in the threshing floor. This means
recollection of the meaning of the word ghata is destroyed. that just as old, full grown and young ones simultaneously fall
Therefore, in the fifth moment it is just impossible for the on the threshing floor, similarly all the meanings of the words
verbal knowledge that the pot is white to arise. Therefore, the are connected simultaneously with one another. The meaning
argument that in order to prevent such a verbal knowledge, intended is that in a sentence like chatri kundati vasasvi
the juxtaposition of the instances of knowledge of words by its devadattah, devadatta is the qualificand or viiesja. The meaning
mere existence is to be considered as the cause for verbal which is mentioned at the time which is near to the time at
knowledge, is to be rejected.
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 441
440 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
the meanings of the words could be mutually related? The
which the qualificand is mentioned, is suggested by the
answer may be given taking the sentence ghatam anaya as an
expression ‘young ones (of doves)’; the expression ‘full grown
example. Here the meaning of the word ghata is related with
(doves)’ suggests the meaning which is earlier than that and in
the meaning of the word am. Now the meaning of the word am
like manner the expression ‘old (doves)’ suggests the meaning
is expected by the meaning of the word ghata; it is also
which is mentioned earlier to that. Now just as these different
semantically competent to be related with the meaning of the
kinds of doves fall simultaneously on the floor, similarly the
word ghata and it is also contiguous with the same (i.e the
meanings of all these words are connected with one another
meaning of the word am is the object of knowledge which is
and then we have simultaneously the verbal knowledge of
immediately after the knowledge of the meaning of the word
connected meanings. The purpose of this theory is to reject the
ghata). After such a verbal knowledge arising from the part of
opinion of the modem Naiyayikas that before the verbal
the sentence (i.e. ghatiya karmata) there arises the verbal
knowledge arising from the whole sentence, there should be
knowledge from the whole sentence ghatam anaya, i.e. ghata-
the verbal knowledge from the parts of the sentence. Therefore,
karmakdnayanam. In this way, it is possible for verbal knowledge
the aim of these discussions is to establish the position of the
from a full sentence to arise even without the conjunct
old Naiyayikas that, in order that an instance of verbal
recollection of the meanings of words constituting the sentence.
knowledge may arise, the meanings of all words are
Now an objection may be raised against this position: In
simultaneously connected as respective qualifier in the
a sentence like ghatam anaya, after the verbal knowledge of the
respective qualificand and not in the manner of a relation of
part of the sentence in the form ghatiya karmata, there cannot
the qualified in the qualificand [viksye viksanam iti ritya
arise the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the full sentence
Sdbdabodhah na tu vikstasya vaikstyam iti ritya). Thus in a
in the form ghatakarmakanayanam. The reason is that after the
sentence like ghat am anaya we do not have first of all the verbal
recollection of ghata and karmatva there arises the verbal
knowledge in the form ghatiya karmata (i.e. the-state-of-being-
knowledge of the part of the sentence in the form ghatiya
the-object-of-action, i.e. the root meaning associated with jar)
karmata; in the next moment, there is the knowledge of the
and then the verbal knowledge ghatakarmakam anayanam
word anayana; then in the next moment there is the recollection
(i.e. the action of bringing has pot as its object).
of the meaning of anayana', at this moment by this recollection,
But since there could be verbal knowledge even without
the recollection of the meaning of the word ‘pot’ etc. is
the conjunct recollection of the meanings of all the words of
destroyed. Therefore, in the next moment, it is not possible to
a sentence, another opinion about how verbal knowledge
have the verbal knowledge from the full sentence as viksta-
arises is being described. According to this opinion, the verbal
vaikstydvagdhi. Therefore, it is not true that every instance of
knowledge arising from a full sentence is invariably preceded
verbal knowledge from a full sentence is preceded by verbal
by the verbal knowledge arising from the part of the sentence.
knowledge arising from the part of a sentence. Hence, in order
This is to be understood in the following way: From a sentence
to have the verbal knowledge from a full sentence, it is
we have verbal knowledge of meanings which are related to
necessary to postulate a conjunct recollection of meanings of
one another. These meanings of course are the meanings of
all the words constituting the sentence. Therefore, the
the words constituting the sentence. Now, it may be asked how
 442 Nyaya Philosophy of Language 443
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda

connection of these meanings takes place as vilesye vilesanam in the form ghatakarmakanayanam should arise; but this is not
tatrapi vilesanam in the manner of khalekapotanyaya. In this possible since at the moment of the recollection of the
way, the verbal knowledge of the full sentence arises. meaning of the last word, the verbal knowledge arising from
The answer to this objection is that although the the part of the sentence is destroyed.5 Hence, the verbal
recollection of the meanings of the words like ghata etc. is knowledge arising from the full sentence is not invariably
destroyed, there could arise the verbal knowledge of the full preceded by the verbal knowledge arising from the part of the
sentence, even without the help of the conjunct recollection of sentence.
the meanings of all the words constituting the sentence. This The answer to this objection is that it has to be accepted
is because there is the subordinate verbal knowledge in the here that the recollection of the meaning of the last word is to
form ghatiya karmata which is produced by the words ghata be considered as a conjunct recollection in which the meaning
and am. And in this subordinate verbal knowledge ghata and of the part of the sentence [ghatiya karmata) is also included
karmatva are objects. Therefore, there could arise without any as object. Hence, there is the knowledge of the meaning of the
difficulty the verbal knowledge from the full sentence. However, part of the sentence as the certain knowledge in which the
if it is argued that verbal knowledge arises only from the qualifier is the determinant-of-the-state-of-being-qualifier
recollection of the meanings of words and not from the [vilesanatavacchedakaprakarakanilcayah).Therefore, the know¬
experience (anubhava) of the meanings of words in the form ledge of the meaning of a full sentence is always preceded by
of the subordinate verbal knowledge, the answer is that the the knowledge of the meanings of the parts of the sentence.
cause of the verbal knowledge is to be considered the Now Dinakara points out that according to him both the
knowledge of the meanings of words as knowledge which is opinions are acceptable. Where the recollection which brings
common to anubhava and smrti and not as recollection. about the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the part of the
Therefore, it can be concluded that all instances of verbal sentence is to be considered as conjunct recollection in which
knowledge arising from a full senten ce are invariably preceded
the last word is also included as object, there at the time of the
by the verbal knowledge of the part of the sentence. Hence,
recollection of the meaning of the last word there exists also
this verbal knowledge of the part of the sentence is to be
the knowledge of the meaning of the part of the sentence.
considered as vilesanatavacchedakaprakarakanilcaya and every Therefore, here since the causal complex of vilistavailistyd-
instance of the verbal knowledge arising from a full sentence vagahijhana exists, there arises the verbal knowledge from the
is vilistavailistyavagahi.
full sentence as vilistavailistyavagahi.
Now a further objection may be raised against this Where the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the part
position. From such sentences as ghatam an ay a, there arises of the sentence has arisen as upeksatmakajhana? (i.e. knowledge
the verbal knowledge ghaliyd karmata from the parts of the which does not produce any impression, samskaranadhayakam
sentence ghata and am. In the next moment, there is the jhanam), there, after the verbal knowledge of the meaning of
recollection of the last word anaya. In the moment after this the part of the sentence there is the recollection of the last
there is the recollection of the meaning of the word anaya. In
word; in the next moment there is the recollection of the
the next moment the verbal knowledge from the full sentence
meaning of the last word. At this moment the verbal knowledge
444 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 445

of the sentence is destroyed. In this moment there cannot arise According to the Grammarians, sphota only brings about
also conjunct recollection in which the meaning of the part of the knowledge of meanings of words like ghata etc. This is
the sentence is also included as object. This is because the because the vrovd. ghata never exists as a whole in one moment
verbal knowledge arising from the part of the sentence was and the existence of the word as a whole is necessary to
upeksatmaka and so did not leave behind any impression. produce the recollection of the meaning of the word in
Therefore, in order to have the verbal knowledge arising from question. The reason why words like ghata do not exist as a
the whole sentence, we have to postulate the conjunct recollec¬ whole in one moment is the following: The word ghata consists
tion of meanings of all the words constituting the sentence as of these four letters gh, a, t and a in a definite order. Now in
the cause of verbal knowledge. Here the verbal knowledge the first moment there is the knowledge of the letter gh, in the
arises from the full sentence after the manner of khalekapo- second moment there is the knowledge of the letter a, in the
tanyaya, i.e. viksye viksanam tatrapi viksanam iti ritya. third moment there is the knowledge of the letter t and in the
Now it may be noted that perception like nilaghatavat fourth moment there is the knowledge of the letter a. At this
bhutalam is experienced in two ways, i.e. when the contact of moment the knowledge of the first letter gh is lost/ Therefore,
the sense organ of eyes with blue pot and ground takes place when there is the knowledge of the last letter a, we do not have
simultaneously, then we have the perception viksye viksanam the knowledge of the word ghata since the knowledge of the
tatrapi viksanam iti ritya. On the other hand, when the contact letters gh and a are lost. Hence, the argument of the
of the sense organ of eyes is first with pot qualified by blue, Grammarians is that since the words like ghata etc. do not exist
then with the floor, we have the perceptual knowledge as at one moment as explained just now, they cannot bring about
vifistavaiSistjavagahi. Similarly verbal knowledge also takes the knowledge of their meanings. It is only sphota which can
place in two ways as explained above. bring about the knowledge of the meaning of words.
Here a remark on the text should be made: According sphota is the eternal word which is different from the
to Dinakara, the words in the M. text viz. idam tu bodhyam letters which are pronounced and which constitute a particular
immediately follow the sentence apare tu...ityahuh because he word, but manifested by them. SarvadarSanasamgraha by
does not comment upon the sentence in between on which he Madhava as quoted in NyayakoSa defines sphota as varnatiriktah
should have normally commented. According to Ramarudra, varnabhivyahgyah arthapratyayakah mtyah iabdah, i.e. the eternal
however, in M. text the sentences etena tavad varnabhivyahgyah word which is different from the letters and which brings about
padasphoto'pinirastah. tattadvarnasamskarasahitacaramavarno- the knowledge of meaning manifested by the letters. It is this
palambhena tadvyahjakenaiva upapatter iti come in between sphota which really brings about the knowledge of the meaning
the sentences apre tu.ityahuh and idam tu bodhyam. We have of the words. Such a sphota is according to the Grammarians
followed the M. text as accepted by Ramarudra. Here he Brahman itself, the ultimate reality.
enters into a detailed discussion on the theory of sphota as Now, it may be objected as follows: ghatapadasphota
advanced by the Grammarians and rejects it by cogent brings about the knowledge of the meaning of the word ghata.
arguments. We shall now present an accurate picture of these patapadasphotz. brings about the knowlege of the meaning of
discussions. the word pata. But both ghatapadasphota and patapadasphota
 446 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 447
are Brahman which is only one and, therefore, both are
identical. Hence just as ghatapadasphota brings about the Now a further question is how can the conjunct
knowledge of the meaning of the word ghata, it could also recollection of all the letters arise? The answer is that the
bring about the knowledge of the meaning of the word pata experience of the last letter of the word which (i.e. the
and so on. The answer to this objection is that the Brahman as experience) co-exists with the impressions which are produced
sphota is manifested by a series of letters which are uttered. A by the instances of experience of earlier letters revives them.
particular manifestation of sphota (i.e. Brahman) is brought It produces its own impression. This last impression together
about by a particular series of letters which are uttered. And with the revived impressions of the experience of earlier letters
such a manifestation of sphota brings about only the knowledge produces the conjunct recollection of all letters in the due
of the meaning of the word which is constituted by that order.8
particular series of letters. Therefore, ghatapadasphota does The Grammarians also admit the experience of the last
not bring about the knowledge of the word pata and vice letter of the word which (i.e the experience) co-exists with the
versa. impressions which are produced by the instances of experience
It may also be noted here that the terms padasphota and of earlier letters as the cause for the manifestation of sphota. But
vakyasphota are to be understood as arising from the different the Naiyayikas, argue that instead of accepting sphota as the
manifestations of Brahman brought about by pada and vakya. cause of verbal knowledge, one can as well accept the
But the Naiyayikas, however, do not accept this opinion knowledge of the word (i.e. the conjunct recollection of the
of the Grammarians regarding sphota. And the basic reason of particular series of all the letters of a word which comes about
the Naiyayikas to reject the opinion of the Grammarians is that in the way described earlier) as the cause of the verbal
only the word consisting of particular series of letters brings knowledge by producing the recollection of the meaning of
about the knowledge of the meaning of word and not spota. the word.
First of all what does it mean to say that a word produces the Now the Grammarians bring an objection rejecting this
knowledge of the meaning of the word? In other words, it may argument of the Naiyayikas and establishing sphota. According
be asked how the knowledge of words brings about the to the Naiyayikas, the characteristic of a word denoting its
knowledge of the meanings of the words, since words consist meaning [padasya arthavacakatvam) resides collectively in the
of many letters and at no moment, the knowledge of all the word, i.e. in the series of letters as a whole and not in any
letters exists at the same time in order to have the knowledge particular letter [padarthavacakatvam paryaptisambandhena
of the word. kramikavarnasamudaya eva vartate); otherwise, there would
The ansvyer is that although the letters are many, there is arise the recollection of the meaning of the word from each
a conjunct recollection of the particular series of all the letters letter of the word. Letters are evanescent and the series of
of the word after the experience (anubhava) of the last letter of letters as a whole in which the characteristic of a word
the word. From this recollection, there arises the recollection denoting its meaning resides collectively, does not exist at any
of the meaning of the word and from this the verbal knowledge time. Therefore, the characteristic of a word denoting its
arises.
meaning cannot reside collectively in a word which is in the
form of a collection of letters in a particular order. Therefore,
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 449
448

a permanent word in which vacakatva resides is to be vyaktasphotad ayam arhto boddhavyah, i.e. from the sphota
admitted. This permanent word is padasphota. which is manifested by the word which is uttered, this meaning
The Naiyayikas, however, reject these arguments for the is to be known. Therefore, sphota brings about the knowledge
following reasons: It is not admitted by them that the of the meaning and not the word that is uttered.
characteristic of denoting meaning [arthavacakatva] inheres in The answer to this objection is that according to the
the collection of letters in a particular order. If this opinion modem Naiyayikas the word does not bring about the
were admitted by the Naiyayikas, then the objection of the knowledge of the meaning, but only the knowledge of the
Grammarians would have been valid since the inherent cause word brings about the knowledge of the meaning. But the
should exist at the same time as the effect. This is because the knowledge of the word can exist without any difficulty in the
collection of letters in a particular order does not exist at one moment immediately preceding the knowledge of the meaning.
particular moment. The Naiyayikas, in fact, hold that the Hence, the meaning of the ablative case here is to be taken as
characteristic of denoting meaning is the-state-of-being-the- jnanajanyatva, i.e. being produced by the knowledge (of the
object-of-desire-of-God in the form that a particular word word). Further, even if the ablative case is taken as meaning
should bring about the knowledge of a particular meaning. janyatva, the word that is uttered can be considered as the
Such a characteristic of denoting meaning {arthavacakatva) cause of knowledge of the meaning. This is because a word is
resides in letters which follow one after another. not a collection of letters in a particular order, but the last letter
Now the Grammarians raise another objection against which comes after the respective previous letters (purva■
this answer of the Naiyayikas: The characteristic of denoting purvavarnottaracaramavarnah). And the word in the form of
meaning (<arthavacakatva), according to the Naiyayikas, is the last letter can exist without any difficulty in the moment
either the will of God itself in the form ‘from this word this immediately preceding the effect, i.e. the knowledge of the
meaning is to be cognized’ (asmat tabdad ayam artho meaning of the word. In this way, there is no need of accepting
boddhavyah) or the-state-of-being-the-object of such a will. padasphota as bringing about the meaning of the word.
Here the meaning of the ablative case [slabdat) is the-state-of- After presenting this discussion on sphota by Ramarudra
being-effect (janyatvam)\iabdad boddhavyah means iabdajanya- we go back to the text of the M. beginning with the expression
idam tu bodhyam. Dinakara introduces this text as follows. The
bodhavisayo bhavatu. This means sab da (word) is the cause and
occurrence of the verbal knowledge after the manner of
bodha (knowledge) is the effect. But the cause (i.e. the word)
khalekapota and the theory of verbal knowledge according to
should exist in the moment immediately preceding the effect,
i.e. the knowledge of the meaning. The Grammarians argue which verbal knowledge arising from full sentence is invariably
that this cannot happen since a particular series of letters which preceded by the verbal knowledge arising from the part of the
constitute the word cannot exist at one moment. Hence God s sentence have been explained. It should be noted that when
will would not be consonant with facts, i.e. something which it is stated that the verbal knowledge arising from the whole
does not exist is considered as the cause of the knowledge of sentence is preceded by the knowledge of the meaning of the
meaning. Therefore, the form of the will of God asmat tabdad part of the sentence, it means that only the recollection of the
ayam artho boddhavyah is to be interpreted as etacchabdabhi- meaning of the part of the sentence is the cause of the verbal
knowledge arising form the full sentence.
 450 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 451

This is because at the first moment we have the verbal Prabhakaras is rejected by the Muktavallkara. When someone
knowledge arising from the part of the sentence; in the second utters the word dvaram (door), verbal knowledge (i.e. dvara-
moment we have the recollection of the last word of the karrnakapidhanavisayakaiabdabodhah) arises only by means of
sentence; in the third moment we have the recollection of the the knowledge of the word pidhehi (shut) which is supplied,
meaning of the last word. In the fourth moment, the verbal and not by means of the recollection of the meaning of the
knowledge of the full sentence should arise. But this is not word pidhehi. This is because the cause of a particular instance
possible because in the third moment in which there is the re¬ of verbal knowledge is the recollection of the particular
collection of the meaning of the last word, the verbal knowledge meaning which (recollection) is produced by that word.
from the part of the sentence which occurred in the first The reason for holding this opinion is the following. If it
moment is lost. Therefore, in order to have the verbal know¬ is argued that there could arise verbal knowledge by means
ledge arising from the full sentence, we must have the conjunct merely of the knowledge of the meaning and not by means of
recollection of the meaning of the last word together with the the knowledge of the meaning produced by the word, then
meaning of the part of the sentence, and not a conjunct when there is the perceptual knowledge of jar, ground and
recollection of the meanings of all words which (recollection) their conjunction, there could be the verbal knowledge that
is produced by the conjunct recollection of all words. And in the ground has conjunction with jar. This certainly cannot be
this conjunct recollection of the meanings, the meaning of the accepted; therefore, the knowledge of the meaning produced
part of the sentence (khandavakyartha) also is object. by the word should be considered as the cause of verbal
Now a question arises: If the cause of the verbal knowledge knowledge.
arising from the full sentence is said to be the knowledge of the Such an argument cannot be accepted because it is
meaning of the part of the sentence, then it follows that the accepted that the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is
recollection of the meaning of words which (i.e. recollection) also the cause of verbal knowledge. But in order to have the
is produced by words is not the cause of the verbal knowledge knowledge of the intention of the speaker some word is
since the recollection of the meaning of the part of the necessary. Only then can the hearer have the knowledge that
sentence which is accepted as the cause of verbal knowledge this word is intended by the speaker to convey a particular
arising from a whole sentence, is produced not by words but meaning. Therefore, where no word is uttered, it is not
by the impression of the verbal knowledge of the meaning of possible to raise the objection that by means of the perceptual
the part of sentence. Therefore, on account of simplicity the knowledge, there could arise verbal knowledge. However,
recollection of meanings only is the cause of verbal knowledge when a word is uttered and the intention of the speaker is
and not the recollection of meanings which is produced by known by the hearer, the perceptual knowledge of another
words (padarthopasthitih iabdabodhe karanam na tupadajanya- meaning which is to be connected with the meaning of the
padarthopasthitih). word that is uttered, can give rise to verbal knowledge;
Hence the Prabhakaras argue that when the word dvaram therefore, everywhere supply of words is not necessary but
(door) is uttered the wordpidhehi (close) is not to be supplied, only the supply of meaning.
but only the meaning of the word pidhehi. This opinion of the Now the Muktavallkara brings another argument to
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-fabdakhanda 453
452

show that the supply of words is necessary to produce verbal verbal knowledge in the form dvdrakarmakapidhdndnuku¬
knowledge. As for instance, words denoting action [kriyapadam) lakrtih. Therefore, in order to have verbal knowledge in the
has syntactic expectancy only with the words denoting the form mentioned, it is necessary to accept as the cause of verbal
object of action (karmapadam) and vice versa, i.e. the words knowledge the knowledge of syntactic expectancy in the form
denoting the object of action has syntactic expectancy only of the sequence of words dvaram pidhehi. And if the kriyapada
with words denoting action. Therefore, where only karmapada is not supplied, then we cannot have the knowledge of
is uttered kriyapada is to be supplied and vice versa. Therefore, syntactic expectancy which is required for verbal knowledge.
the supply of words is necessary to produce verbal knowledge. Therefore, the kriyapada, i.e. pidhehi, is to be supplied.
The idea behind the argument of Muktavalikara seems Now the Prabhakaras again try to establish their real
to be that without kriyapada if karakapada produces verbal position that the supply only of meaning and not the word is
knowledge, then if the word dvaram in the accusative case is necessary. In order to have the verbal knowledge dvdrakarma¬
uttered and afterwards without uttering the word pidhehi, the kapidhdndnukulakrtih, the cause is the particular sequence of
words pidhanam and krtih which do not have syntactic words in the following form: It could be the sequence of the
expectancy with the word dvaram in the accusative case, are word am after the word dvara or it could be in the form of the
uttered, then there could arise the verbal knowledge in the words pidhehi which also consist of two words viz. the root and
form dvdrakarmakapidhdndnukulakrtih. This is because the the lot suffix. Hence there arises no verbal knowledge from
meaning of the word pidhehi is brought about by the words merely the following sequence of words without syntactic
pidhanam and krtih. In order to avoid this possibility one has expectancy: dvaram (in the nominative case) karmatvam
to admit that karakapadam does not produce verbal knowledge pidhanam krtih. Therefore, since the knowledge of the particular
without kriyapada and vice versa. sequence of words in either of the two forms mentioned is the
Such an interpretation of the M. text does not seem to be cause of the verbal knowledge, when the word dvaram in the
correct. This is because just as the Prabhakaras admit verbal accusative case is uttered, we can have the verbal knowledge
knowledge in places where one meaning is known by word without the supply of the word pidhehi, but only with the
and another meaning suitable in the context is known by supply of the meaning of the word pidhehi.
perception etc., so also they admit verbal knowledge in places It may be objected against this position that there would
where one meaning is known by a sdkdhksdpada (i.e. dvaram be mutual deviation in the following way: dvarakarmakapi-
in the accusative case) which is uttered and other meanings dhdnanukulakrtivisayakaiabdabodha is the effect. And for such
suitable in the context are known by words without syntactic an effect two independent causes have been ascertained, viz.
expectancy with the word dvaram (i.e. the words pidhanam dvaram itydnupurviviksayddnam or pidhehi itydnupurviviksa-
and krtih). jnanam. When one ofthese two causes, viz. dvaram ityanupurvi-
Therefore, Dinakara explains the argument that is really viksajnanam is present, the effect in the form of the verbal
intended by Muktavalikara. Even if it is possible to know the knowledge takes place, even when the other cause, viz .pidhehi
intention of the speaker from the series of words dvaram (in the itydnupurvijhanam is absent. Similarly, when the knowledge of
nominative case) karmatvam pidhanam krtih nobody accepts the particular sequence of words pidhehi (i.e. of the two words
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 455
454 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
by the utterance of the word pidhehi which has syntactic expec¬
dhatu and lot), the effect of the verbal knowledge arises even tancy, there could be verbal knowledge.
when the knowledge of the particular sequence of words The Prabhakaras answer to this objection pointing out
dvaram is absent. Therefore, even in the absence of one that this is acceptable to them. The reason is that it is quite
particular independent cause there is the effect. Hence, possible for verbal knowledge to arise when the hearer knows
negative deviation (vyatirekavyabhicdra, i.e. karanabhave pi the meaning from the uttered word which has syntactic
expectancy and also knows the other suitable meanings by
also cannot be admitted. The reason is Perception, Inference etc. Similarly, there could also arise
verbal knowledge when the hearer knows the meaning from
that deviation takes place only when the effect is the same^ But
the uttered word which has syntactic expectancy and also
the effects here are different because the determinants of the
knows the suitable meanings, from the words without syntactic
state-of-be ing-an-effe ct (kdryatdvacchedakam) in both cases are
expectancy. For these reasons the Prabhakaras conclude that
different. The reason is that avyavahitottaratvam (the-state
only the supply of meanings is necessary and not of words.
being-immediately-after-that) is given as a qualification of the-
Now the Naiyayikas propose a final argument in support
state of-being-an-effect in both cases. And, therefore, the
of their position that the supply of words and not the supply
karyatavacchedaka in one case will be qualified by
of meanings is necessary for verbal knowledge. In Sanskrit we
vyavahitottaratvam and in the other case will be qualified by
have the sentence puspebhyah sprhayati in the meaning, he
pidhehipaddvyavahittoratvam. This means that in the case of the
desires flowers; only when the verb sprhayati is used can the
verbal knowledge which is immediately after knowledge
word puspa be put in the dative case which has the meaning
of the particular sequence of words in the form oi pidhehi, the
of karmatva, the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action. When the
cause is the knowledge of that particular sequence of words m
word puspebhyah is uttered, the hearer cannot have the supply
the form of pidhehi. And in the case of the verbal knowledge
of the meaning of the word sprhayati by some means in order
which is immediately after the knowledge of the particular
to have the verbal knowledge. This is because of the Panini
sequence of words in the form of dvaram, the cause is the
rule9 that the word puspa be put in the dative only when it is
knowledge of that particular sequence of words m the form o
used along with the word sprhayati. Therefore, the word itself,
(i.e. sprhayati) is to be supplied and not its meaning.
Now a further objection may be raised against the
Similarly when roots10 like krudh, to be angry, druh, to
Prabhakara position that in order to have the verbal knowledge
injure, trsya to envy, asuya to be jealous and roots having the
only one word with syntactic expectancy (sdkdhksam padam)
same meaning are used, the person against whom the feeling
needs to be uttered, and the other suitable meanings y any of anger etc. are directed is called sampradana which should
means. The objection of the Naiyayikas is that when the word be put in the dative case. Therefore, when the word Satrave is
dvaram in the accusative case which has syntactic expectancy uttered, the hearer cannot have the supply of the meaning of
is uttered followed by the utterance of words pidhanam and the word krudhyati etc. in order to have the verbal knowledge.
krtih which are without syntactic expectancy, there cou d e Therefore, the words themselves krudhyati etc. are to be
verbal knowledge. Or when the words dvaram and karmatvam
which are without syntactic expectancy are uttered followed
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 457
456
from this sentence remembering the meaning of karmatva
supplied and not their meaning as explained with regard to the
after the word dvara, just as from the sentence dvaram
word sprhayati. Therefore, everywhere it is the supply of words
pidhanam krtih there could be verbal knowledge as discussed
that is needed and not the supply of meaning.
earlier. If the expression puspebhyah is not connected with the
But Dinakara prefers the opinion that the supply of
meaning only is necessary for verbal knowledge. Although in word sprhayati, from the dative case one cannot have the
such instances puspebhyah the word sprhayati is necessary to be knowledge of karmatva. In order to bring about this knowledge
supplied, for otherwise, the dative case is invalid, still from this of karmatva, the supply of the word sprhayati is necessary.
it does not follow that in all instances of verbal knowledge Therefore, the meaning of the Muktavali expression caturthya-
where only a part of the sentence is uttered, the words nupatteh is caturthya karmatvabodhanupapatteh, i.e. if the word
themselves should be supplied. Therefore, in all such instances sprhayati is not supplied, it is not possible to have the
of verbal knowledge, knowledge of the meaning as produced knowledge of karmatva from the dative case. In this way,
by words is not necessary, but only knowledge of meaning Pariksit Thampuran defends Dinakara’s position that the
(padarthopasthitih iabdabodham pratipadajanyapadarthopasthi- supply of meanings only is necessary and not of words.
titvena na karanam, api tu padarthopasthititvenaiva karanam). It may be noted here that if the opinion that the supply
Where the word dvaram (i.e. word in the accusative case) is of meanings is accepted, the objection that any meaning
uttered, there one can have verbal knowledge by gaining the which is known by means other than word could also become
knowledge of closing etc. by means other than words. the object of verbal knowledge may arise. Such an objection
Therefore, the supply of meanings only is necessary for verbal cannot be admitted because the knowledge of the intention of
knowledge. the speaker is also a cause of verbal knowledge and here the
Ramarudra, however, rejects this opinion of Dinakara11 speaker has no intention of producing verbal knowledge in
and asserts that the supply of words is necessary. This is which meanings known by means other than words are
because where the sentence dvaram (in the accusative case) objects, as pointed out earlier.12
pidhanam kuru is uttered, one cannot have verbal knowledge
because here in this sentence, the accusative case after the
word dvara is invalid. The appropriate case after the word
dvara is genitive according to Panini rule kartrkarmanoh krti
(2.3.65). Therefore, just as in such cases as puspebhyah, the
supply of words is necessary, so also in such instances as
dvaram, the word pidhehi is to be supplied for the validity of
the accusative case after the word dvara.
PariksitThampuran, on the contrary, rejects the opinion
of Ramarudra and defends the position of Dinakara. In the
sentence dvaram pidhanam kuru, the accusative case after the
word dvara is invalid. Still there could be verbal knowledge
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 459
458

Text 9A from sentences such as ‘he waters with fire’ and so on because
of the absence of the knowledge of that (semantic competency).
Now it may be objected that everywhere before verbal
-q^f ^TT mR^I&IT I knowledge takes place, there is no knowledge of semantic
(.Karikh 83 cd) competency, because the connection of meanings is not
ascertained earlier. This objection is to be rejected because
i when particular meanings of words are remembered it is
q)^cH4: 1 ‘ifadT possible to have the knowledge of semantic competency in
some places as doubt and in some other places as certainty.
cqRt I ri*^d<rMI mNoimI ^TFT 9ii®<<"
The modem, Naiyayikas, however, hold that the knowledge
of semantic competency is not the cause of verbal knowledge.
| dTUrM^W^t ‘drT ^Fqcti^iM^MHf <w\%~ In sentences such as ‘he waters with fire’ and so on, there is no
verbal knowledge because of the hindrance owing to the
tfrudW WfW ^1^1
certainty of the absence of semantic competency in the form
qbqdldH "T 9ll«WlU^: I ^TT faoqjVm^t %% of the absence of the-state-of-having-fire as the instrumental
dl^^l^mM^Miql^ellPr^^T Mlaq-yrd cause of watering. Since the certainty of the absence of a
particular thing is that which causes hindrance for all forms of
^lK4l£[; 1 d'i'HId^r5^1^
knowledge of that particular thing except for the knowledge
R^^M'-qd'^lM^I^ wld^-^cqid, 911®*5^ produced by normal sense contact or by a particular kind of
te^l 4iJMdidnRdHI-4 ^iw^- defect, it follows that it (i.e. the certainty of the absence of a
particular thing) is established as that which causes hindrance
for the verbal knowledge also. It is also not established that
because of the delay of the knowledge of semantic competency,
Translation
there is the delay of verbal knowledge.
Semantic Competency (yogyata)

Text 9B
Karikavati . ,
The connection of one meaning with another
meaning is called semantic competency. fa ^ dskll dddK$ drftwf-
(Karika 83cd).

Muktavali t^TRKT^rW: Wf
Now the author defines semantic competency. The ftcM ^
meaning (padartha iti): The meaning (of the statement in K.)
ffa I jflHldldMW 'fii®qq|t«?g(c3
is that the semantic competency is the relation of one meaning
with another meaning. There arises no verbal knowledge
460 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 461

I ^PlfWr- ^r*rm^rc^ cJ5% rwm<mK+ftRl W^fttoit-

«IUK“l4lHfclUIH£sT ^lfe% I m fWwft ■HMPi^vH Ml^4)Hldl^-yMir^H!HRl4l^dl'+>d<'HN^ri|'MI^

q^folci—■wfdRRl i ^ 1% ac>)crKq>Picq»i*iiuq«gmiqPi^'i ^ jfkdl&mPlM^el

d«J1Hid<^i'-4aqiHiqiq^qq>PtJc^ft: 3ffct^^^TT%%-
¥IK«ftq wf: I ri°mRcqlcl I ^ awl^dlPl^W
W5%%l tt^ ^JildldHHI T|||«t«i)yRd<+>^ VII^hM
d<WMc^d d^^f cii^d
%HdldHmi=lf^Ii)l^l^HMydK'J|W rTJT HlK«raWT: 3|%-
4VWdldH^c^^dc=IKd 3(15-0^IqPl^Mt^Rl I
d-yq>cq ^pM^i% %^;i qNdidM<rM s*n®qql*wm^
«ng%JHtj+|^s% d1f^+y*Pi+4«l^d^ll!^^<3<AIKcr
^ rT* '^dldHNM^Hf^Wldl^ T dl£VHHdfaft
3n^-dlR»+^Plit»,Hr«i^Rl i Tift %r %«%5fr
W^fll*UfiMf^+cd T W3cT ^ ril^PlrilKl^HJ I
f^mif^twn^ %■; w iRr
Tgrfit T^raftfcT ?1Mlri< qh«i-qt«k' T^RlftfcT SRFT Translation
c(KU||i| f^^tfcTI RriH^+dtUO’q'llRql^ril'if: I d^lriril^ Semantic Competency (yogyata)

dfeftl^RsiHI^ I lri«gJriftl I W ^W'WdldHtM viwqly In the primary text, by the stanza padarthe tatra tadvatta
31% MlcM-y+cd« fgklcdl'^ Mr f¥# ^^RTT^PTW yogyata parikirtita, it is stated that semantic competency is the-
%^T ^ ^ dhNdl’ilFf T m state-of-having-a-particular-meaning in that same particular
meaning. This is inappropriate and also useless. One thing
4l^dldM' TT5T VIKdltlNfrlfVfd 3TTF-4Hdl?lM-
cannot have itself as it substratum. Besides, the knowledge of
I W rn: I 3flfftcq^W: I this (i.e. svasmin svadhikaranakaiva) is not the cause of verbal
^#3f ^ ■qfs^tWT^f^nf^ T W VII«tdlU 3£T W: knowledge. Therefore, (the author) interprets the first word
d^Rl^^l^^^dldHmNc^ffW ciH^d qhqaninc^ ‘that’ (tad) as conveying the meaning of one word and the
second word ‘that’ [tad) as conveying the meaning of another
%^dT%fe: I ^ °in%Tsfefr5Bil^TFTr%
word with the words one meaning [ekapadartha iti). The
4l^dldMc^T i^IWhi vdri^cqi^-
reason why the knowledge of the semantic competency is the
^dl^dldHMft^y+cdFT qtatunid, jg^iMlcMsi- cause of verbal knowledge is shown by the expression because
dld^^l^Rl^: VII^Udmk^WMId, 'vus^ft of the absence of the knowledge of that [tajjnanabhavacceti).
c^^Jij(:c(p|M^Wllcl^Mlcls|-yc+>dl+<rll^ Mkqid, cilM^d Not ascertained earlier [apurvatvad iti): The meaning is that

4l^dldld^< I ^T ^ everywhere (i.e in all instances of verbal knowledge) it is not

determined (as existing) before verbal knowledge. In some
^HmPl*dt|mM*d3 %^uf d^SWIHWI^dHWIclRfol^T-
places as doubt [kvacit samiayarupasyeti): The knowledge of
^J^dlPlM^mM^ efN^dcT 4l^dl?IH^
semantic competency which is common to doubt and certainty
%jp% d^^M^fcT dcM+K+f^l^+RyWHI^ugmiqPl^d is the cause (of verbal knowledge); this is the idea. Therefore,
dm^ld.1 ^iNdlPl^^ MfcM-y+cv <J W^II# certainty is also shown by the words in some places [kvacid
iti): i.e. in verbal knowledge which arises after the perceptual
462 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 463
certainty that there is pot on the ground; this is the meaning.
The modern Naiyayikas (navyastviti): It may be objected that delay of the knowledge of semantic competency [yogyata-
if the certainty of the absence of semantic competency causes jhanavilambacca): Thus this is acceptable; this is the idea. With
hindrance, then its absence is to be considered as the cause. the words they say (ahuh), incongruity is indicated. The
In comparison with this, on account of logical simplicity, it is reason for this is that when inference etc. as having one
appropriate to consider as the cause of verbal knowledge the particular thing as its object have not arisen and only verbal
knowledge of semantic competency. Therefore, it is said knowledge has arisen, then in comparison with the absence of
certainty of the absence of a particular thing (tadabhava- the knowledge of the absence of semantic competency it is
nikayasyeti): Even at the time of the certainty of the absence logically simple to consider the knowledge of semantic
of (one particular thing), there could be the knowledge of competency as the cause (of the verbal knowledge of something
something qualified by that particular thing which (know¬ which is qualified by that particular thing, which is not the
ledge) is produced by normal sense contact. And therefore, it object of inference etc.). In this way, by the force of the general
is stated except for the knowledge produced by normal principle yadviksayoh, it is established that for all instances of
sense contact (laukikasannikarsajanyeti): Even though there verbal knowledge the knowledge of semantic competency is
is the certain knowledge that a conch is not yellow, there could cause; this is unavoidable. In like manner, desire to have a
arise the perceptual knowledge that a conch is yellow on contradictory knowledge overcomes the hindering factor of
account of defects such as bile etc. and, therefore, the the contradicted knowledge and so the-state-of-being-those-
expression ‘not produced by a particular defect’ is added. which-cause-hindrance existing in the knowledge of the absence
With reference to the oyster shell, after the knowledge that this of semantic competency is to be understood (as hindering
is not silver, in order to avoid an erroneous knowledge that this only) the particular. The-state-of-being-inferential-knowledge
is silver, the word viksa is added. The word viksa means etc. which are established as the determinants of the-state-of-
defects like bile and ointment produced from the fat of a frog being-that-which-are-to-*be-obstructedarenot common to verbal
etc. For all forms of knowledge of that particular thing knowledge. Therefore, it is logically more complex to postulate
(tajjhanamatre): In all congnitions of something which is the certain knowledge of the absence of semantic competency
qualified by that. It is established (stddham iti)'. And so as a separate hindering factor for verbal knowledge. Therefore,
because it is established that the knowledge of the absence of on account of logical simplicity, it is appropriate to consider
semantic competency hinders verbal knowledge and only the knowledge of semantic competency as a cause (for verbal
because of this there would be no (verbal knowledge). Hence knowledge). Nor should it be objected that if the knowledge
the knowledge of semantic competency is not at all postulated of semantic competency is accepted as the cause (of verbal
as a cause (of verbal knowledge). This is the idea. knowledge), then the absence of the certain knowledge of
Now it may be objected where there is no knowledge of non-validity is to be given as qualification to that (i.e. knowledge
the absence of semantic competency or no knowledge of of semantic competency); and in comparison with this it is
semantic competency, there could be verbal knowledge. In logically simple to accept as cause (of verbal knowledge) the
order to answer this objection, it is stated because of the absence of the certainty of the absence of semantic competency
which (certainty) is qualified by the absence of the knowledge
 Text, Translation and Commentary-&abdakhan4a 465
464 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

of invalidity. When, however, the knowledge of semantic complex of verbal knowledge, there would arise the mental
perception of self having the absence of knowledge of semantic
competency is accepted as the cause of verbal knowledge,
there is simplicity, because of the insertion of the absence of competency. In order to avoid this, we must postulate the
one kind of knowledge of invalidity in which a substantive not causal complex of verbal knowledge as hindering factor for
that mental perception. There is logical complexity here. But,
having an attribute is cognised as having that attribute. When,
on the contrary, if the knowledge of semantic competency is
on the contrary, the certain knowledge of the absence of
accepted as the cause of verbal knowledge, there such a
semantic competency is considered as the hindering factor (of
mental perception cannot arise only because of the absence
verbal knowledge), there is logical complexity because of the
of the object in the form of the absence of the knowledge of
insertion of the absence of the knowledge of two forms of the
semantic competency. Therefore, we do not accept the causal
knowledge of invalidity (as qualification for the certain
complex of verbal knowledge as hindering factor of that (i.e
knowledge of the absence of semantic competency). (These
mental perception). Thus it should be noted that there is
two forms of the knowledge of invalidity occur as follows): A
knowledge in which a substantive having the absence of the logical simplicity, etc.
absence of an attribute is cognised as having the absence of
Commentary
that attribute as qualifier; a knowledge in which a substantive
having an attribute is cognised as having the absence of that Semantic Competency (yogyata)

attribute as qualifier. (This logical complexity occurs) also Now the authors discuss semantic competency (yogyata)
because of the insertion of the absence of the knowledge of which is another cause of verbal knowledge. K. defines it as
invalidity (as qualification to the certain knowledge of the padarthe tatra tadvatta yogyata. It may appear that this
absence of semantic competency) in which (knowledge), the sentence means that semantic competency is the-state-of-
qualificand is the absence having the absence of something in having-a-particular-meaning in that same particular meaning.
which the counterpositiveness is determined by the relation of This is inappropriate and useless, because one thing cannot be
the-state-of-being-counterpoisitive and the qualifier is that the substratum of the same thing. And even if it is admitted that
something by the relation of counterpositiveness. Just as in the one thing could be the substratum of the same thing, the
case of the certain knowledge of the absence of a particular knowledge that one meaning is related to the same meaning
thing is hindering factor (for the knowledge of that thing), the cannot be the cause of verbal knowledge. Therefore,
certain knowledge of something which is pervaded by the Muktavalikara interprets the first tad as conveying the meaning
absence of that particular thing and the certain knowledge of of one word, and the second tad as conveying the meaning of
the determinant of the absence of that particular are hindering another word. Hence the meaning of the definition of semantic
factors. Therefore, there is much logical complexity (and so competency as given in K. is that semantic competency is the
the absence of the certain knowledge of the absence of relation of one meaning with another meaning. Such a
semantic competency is not the cause of verbal knowledge). knowledge of semantic competency is absent in sentences
Thus if the knowledge of semantic competency is not considered such as vahnind siiicati (he waters with fire). Therefore, there
as the cause of verbal knowledge, then at the time of the causal is no verbal knowledge from these kinds of sentences.
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 467
466 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
as the instrumental cause of watering (sekakriyayam vahni-
Now an objection is raised against this definition of
karanakatvabhavarupayogyatanikayah) obstructs the verbal
semantic competency. Whoever has verbal knowledge does
knowledge to arise from the sentence vahnina sincati.
not have definite knowledge of semantic competency before
A further objection may be raised against this answer. If
that verbal knowledge arises. The reason is that semantic
the definite knowledge of ayogyata causes hindrance then its
competency is the relation of one meaning with another
absence [ayogyatanikayabhava) is to be considered as the
meaning and the object of verbal knowledge is also the
cause of verbal knowledge. In comparison with this it is
relation of one meaning with another meaning. Hence, before
simpler to consider knowledge of semantic competency as the
verbal knowledge semantic competency which is identical
cause of verbal knowledge. The answer to this objection is that
with vakyartha (“semantic relation of meanings) is not
the modem Naiyayikas are not postulating an additional
ascertained. And, therefore, how can the definite knowledge
factor which obstructs verbal knowledge but they are only
of semantic competency be the cause for verbal knowledge?
applying here the general principle oipratibadhyapratibandha-
The answer to this objection is that after the recollection
kabhava (i.e. the relation between that which prevents and that
of meanings of words in the sentence, there could arise the
which is to be prevented). The general form of this principle
knowledge of semantic competency either as certainty or as
is tadvattajndnasdmdnyam prati tadabhavavattanikayah prati-
doubt. This means that knowledge of semantic competency
bandhakah. (i.e the knowledge of one particular thing as
which is the cause of verbal knowledge is that knowledge
related to another thing is prevented by the definite knowledge
which is common to both certainty and doubt. Such a
that that thing is not related with that other thing). This implies
knowledge of semantic competency is the cause of verbal
also that tadabhavavattdnikayabhdvah tadvattdjndnam prati
knowledge, i.e. the determinant of the-state-of-being-cause-of-
karanam (i.e. the absence of definite knowledge that one
verbal-knowledge is the-state-of-being-knowledge-of semantic-
particular thing is not related to another particular thing is the
competency (yogyatajhanatvam. iabdabodhakaranatavac-
cause of the knowledge that that thing is related to the other
chedakam). The knowledge of semantic competency as certainty
particular thing).
occurs in such instances as when the object of verbal knowledge
Now the expression tadvattdjndnam in the enunciation of
has already been the object of direct perception; in other
the general principle is to be given two qualifications: laukika-
places the knowledge of semantic competency is in the form
sannikarsajanya and dosaviksajanya. Therefore, the full form of the
of a doubt.
general principle is laukikasannikarsajanyadosaviksajanyatad-
The modern Naiyayikas, however, hold that the know¬
vattajndnasamdnyam prati tadabhavavattanikayah. pratiban-
ledge of semantic competency in the form of relation of one
dhakah. The qualification laukikasannikarsajanya means ‘not
meaning with another meaning is not the cause of verbal
produced by normal sense contact’, i.e. the knowledge that is
knowledge. Now it may be objected that in that case, there
to be prevented should not be produced by normal sense
could arise verbal knowledge from such sentences as vahnina
contact. If such a qualification is not given, then even at the
sihcati. The answer to this objection is that the definite
time of the certainty of the absence of one thing (badhani-
knowledge of ayogyata (absence of semantic competency)
kayakale), there could be the knowledge of something qualified
which is in the form of the absence of the-state-of-having-fire
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 469
468 Nydya Philosophy of Language
means certain defects would not produce erroneous cognition
by that thing which is produced by normal sense contact. As of a thing when there is the certainty of its absence (badhani-
for example, after the verbal knowledge arising from the kayakale), whereas certain other defects such as bile etc.
sentence that there is no pot on the ground, there could be the would produce erroneous cognition of a thing even when
perceptual knowledge that there is pot on the ground by there is the definite knowledge of its absence. For these
normal sense contact. Therefore, the qualification lauktkasanm- reasons in the qualification dosaviksajanya the expression
karsajanya is given as qualification for tadvattajnana. viksa is used. Similarly when the ointment produced from the
The second qualification is dosaviksajanya. The meaning fat of a frog (mandukavasaiijana) is applied on the eye of a
is ‘not produced by a particular defect’. Therefore, dosaviksa- person, he has the erroneous cognition, the bamboo stick is a
janyatadvaUbjndnam prali tadabhavavattdnikayah pratiban-
snake (vamioragabhrama) although he has the definite
dhakah. Now the qualification dosaviksajanya (not produced
knowledge that the bamboo stick is not a snake.
by a particular defect) is used for the following reasons: Even Therefore, it must be concluded that the definite
when one has the definite knowledge that a conch is not knowledge of the absence of semantic competency prevents
yellow, one can have the perceptual knowledge that the cone verbal knowledge. As for example, in such instances as vahnind
is yellow, because of a particular defect like bile. Therefore, sincati, the definite knowledge of the absence of semantic
the definite knowledge of the absence of one thing does not competency in the form sekah na vahnikaranakah (action
prevent the knowledge of that same thing if the latter knowledge of watering does not have fire as its instrument) prevents the
is produced by a particular defect. Therefore, it is stated verbal knowledge that the action of watering has fire as its
dosaviksdjanyatadvattdjndnam prati tadabhdvavattamkayah instrument. This is accepted by both old and modem
pratibandhakah. ...... Naiyayikas. Therefore, the modem Naiyayikas conclude that
Now a question may be raised: Why is it that the from such sentences as vahnind sincati there does not arise any
expression dosaviksa indicating particular defects such as bile verbal knowledge, because the definite knowledge of the
etc. are used and not dosasdmdnya, i.e. defects in general. In absence of semantic competency serves as the hindering
other words, why not the pratibadhyapratibandhakabhava be factor. Hence the knowledge of semantic competency need
dosdjanyatadvattajhanam prati tadabhavavattamkayahpratiban- not be considered as the cause of verbal knowledge.
dliakah? Such a pratibadhyapratibandhakabhava would mean Now the early Naiyayikas raise an objection as follows:
that even though there is the certainty of the absence of one Where there is neither definite knowledge of the absence of
thing any defect would not produce the knowledge of that semantic competency nor the knowledge of semantic
particular thing. But this is not the case. As for instance, a competency, there could be verbal knowledge. The point of
person having a defect in the eye (kdea) or looking at a conch the objection is that according to the old Naiyayikasyogyatd-
shell from a distance has the erroneous cognition, this (cone jnanam is also the cause of verbal knowledge and since this is
shell) is sliver. When he approaches the conch shell, he has the absent here, there cannot be verbal knowledge. The modem
definite knowledge, this is not silver. When the person has Naiyayikas answer that such an objection is acceptable, i.e. in
such a certainty of the absence of silver, the defect of his eyes such instances verbal knowledge can indeed arise because the
does not produce the erroneous knowledge, this is silver. This
470 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 471

absence of definite knowledge of the absence of semantic is the relation of cause and effect between all instances
competency is also a cause of verbal knowledge and since this of the classes of those two individual things) yogyatajhana
is present here, even if there is no knowledge of semantic is to be considered as the cause of all instances of verbal
competency, there could be verbal knowledge. knowledge.
Further Dinakara refutes the opinion of the modem Now it may be objected that without knowing the relation
Naiyayikas and establishes the doctrine of the old Naiyayikas. of meanings of words constituing a sentence one cannot use
The argument to do so is as follows: Take, for example, an a sentence. Such a knowledge of the relation of meanings
instance of verbal knowledge that there is a particular medicinal should be perceptual or inferential; if this also is verbal
plant in a cave of Vindhya mountain. There is neither knowledge there would be an infinite regress. Therefore, the
perceptual nor inferential knowledge about this. Here the statement of Dinakara, viz. ‘when inference etc. as having one
general principle that tadvattajhanam prati tadabhavavattani- particular thing as its object have not arisen, only verbal
kayah pratibandhakah does not apply to inference and knowledge has arisen’ is incorrect. The reason is that the
perception since by supposition there is neither perception speaker cannot utter a sentence without having prior knowledge
nor inference regarding the medicinal plant. Therefore, a of the connected meanings of words constituting a sentence.
separate pratibadhyapratibandhakabhava is to be postulated in And such a knowledge of the speaker should either be
the following way: For the verbal knowledge that the Vindhya perceptual or inferential as pointed out earlier. And further for
cave has that particular medicinal plant, the definite knowledge the same reason, the general principle yadviksayoh etc. cannot
that the Vindhya cave has the absence of that particular be applied here. Therefore, the opinion of the early Naiyayikas
medicinal plant is to be considered as the hindering factor. thatyogyatdjhanam is the cause of verbal knowledge does not
Therefore, for the verbal knowledge of this medicinal plant stand.
yogyatabhavanitcayabhavah (i.e. absence of the definite The old Naiyayikas, however, raise an objection against
knowledge of the absence of semantic competency, i.e. taking this position of the modem Naiyayikas in the following
yogyatabhavanikaya here as the definite knowledge that the manner. The principle advanced by the moderns that the
Vindhya mountain has the absence of that particular medicinal certainty of the absence of a particular thing is that which
plant) is to be considered as the cause. This is cumbersome. causes hindrance for all forms of knowledge of that particular
Besides in order to have the definite knowledge of the absence thing except for the knowledge produced by normal sense
of semantic competency, one should have the knowledge of contact or by a particular kind of defect (laukikasarinikarsajanya-
semantic competency since one cannot have a knowledge of dosaviksajanyatadvattabuddhisamanyetadabhavavattanikayah
absence without the knowledge of its counterpositive. Therefore pratibandhakah) cannot in general be admitted.
it is simple to acceptyogyatajhana as the cause of this particular In this principle already mentioned tadvattajhanam
verbal knowledge. Now by the principle yadviksayoh includes all instances of knowledge, viz. perceptual, inferential
karyakaranabhavah asati badhake tatsamanyayorapi (i.e when and verbal. However, all these forms of knowledge together
there is the relation of cause and effect between two particular cannot be taken as instances of knowledge to be prevented.
individual things, then if there is no contradiction then there But we have to take separately perceptual knowledge, inferential
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 473
472 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
such a knowledge of something having that particular thing is
knowledge and verbal knowledge and separately state the
other than perceptual knowledge. (pratyaksanyatadvattajhanam
principle. This is because even when one has the definite
prati tadabhavavattanikayah pratibandhakah). Here by the
knowledge of the absence of pot on the ground, one can have
expression ‘knowledge which is other than perceptual
the knowledge of pot on the ground by the force of the desire
knowledge’, we mean inferential and verbal knowledge.
to have the perceptual knowledge that the pot is on the
Therefore, it is not necessary to admit a separate hindering
ground. This latter knowledge, however, is aharya, i.e. a
factor for verbal knowledge. Hence, it would be enough to
knowledge of pot produced by desire, even though there is the
hold that the absence of the hindering factor, in the form of the
definite knowledge of the absence of pot. Such a knowledge,
definite knowledge of the absence of a particular thing is also
however, cannot be produced by normal sense contact, but it
the cause of verbal knowledge. Therefore, the conclusion is
is a kind of extraordinary perception by means of the appre-
that the knowledge of semantic competency as a separate
hensional connection in the form of knowledge (ghatasmarana-
cause for verbal knowledge is cumbersome.
tmakajhanarupapratyasatti). Therefore, we have to state
The old Naiyayikas answer to this objection as follows: In
separately that die definite knowledge of the absence of the
the present instance that which is to be prevented is pratya-
particular thing which (knowledge) co-exists with the absence
ksanyajhanam, i.e. knowledge other than perceptual. Here
of desire for the perceptual knowledge of that particular thing
pratibadhyatavacchedakam (the determinant of the-state-of-being
prevents perceptual knowledge of that particular thing.
that which is to be prevented) is both pratyaksanyatvam, i.e.
In the case of inferential knowledge without the
the-state-of-being-other-than-perception and jhanatvam, the-
qualification, tadanumiticchavirahavtiistatva (coexisting with
state-of-being-knowledge. Now a doubt may arise whether
the absence of desire for the inferential knowledge of that
pratyaksanyatvaviSistajhanatvam (i.e. the-state-of-being-know-
particular thing) the definite knowledge of the absence of that
ledge which is qualified by the-state-of-being-other-than-
particular thing prevents the inferential knowledge of that
perception) or jhanaivamtistapratyaksanyatvam (i.e. the-state-
particular thing, becauseparoksajhana (i.e knowledge other than
of-being-other-than-perception which is qualified by the-state-
perception) is not at all admitted as aharya. Therefore, we have
of-being-knowledge) is the determinant of the-state-of-being-
to admit separately the definite knowledge of the absence of
that which is to be prevented. And there is no decisive
semantic competency as the hindering factor of verbal
argument in favor of any one. Therefore, there will be two
knowledge and its absence as the cause of verbal knowledge.
pratibadhyapratibandhakabhava, i.e two forms of the relation
In comparison with this owing to logical simplicity, it would be
of being that which prevents and that which is to be
better to take knowledge of semantic competency as the cause
prevented. These two forms would be: pratyaksdnyatvaviiista-
of verbal knowledge.
tadvattajhanatvavacchinnam prati tadabhavavattaniicayah
Now the modem Naiyayikas raise an objection against
pratibandhakah and tadvattajhanatvaviSistapratyaksanyatvava-
this position. There is no need of accepting a separate hinder¬
cchinnam prati tadabhavavttanikayah pratibandhakah.
ing factor for verbal knowledge; it is enough to state that the
In comparison with this, it is simple to consider
definite knowledge of absence of a particular thing prevents
anumititvam, the-state-of-being-inferential-knowledge, and
the knowledge of something having that particular thing and
474 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 475

iabdatvam, the-state-of-being-verbal-knowledge, separately as certainty of the invalidity of that knowledge, i.e. the actual
the determinants of the-state-of-being-that-which-is-to-be- kdryakaranabhava with respect to verbal knowledge and
prevented, and to accept two simplerpratibadhyapratibandha- knowledge of semantic competency would be as follows:
kabhava, i.e. two simpler forms of the relation of being that apramanyanikayabhavavUistam yogyatajhanam iabdabodham
which prevents and that which is to be prevented. These two prati karanam, i.e. the knowledge of semantic competency as
simpler forms would be: tadvattanumititvavacchinnam prati qualified by the absence of the certainty of the invalidity of that
tadabhavavattanihayah pratibandhakah and tadvattaiab- knowledge is the cause of verbal knowledge. Since in such a
datvdvacchinnamprati tadabhavavaitanikayah pratibandhakah.13 qualification nikaytva, i.e. samtayanyajhanatva, is included, it
Therefore, we have to admit separately the definite knowledge is cumbersome.
of the absence of semantic competency as the hindering factor When, however, the certainty of the absence of semantic
for verbal knowledge. This means that the absence of definite competency is accepted as the hindering factor of verbal
knowledge of the absence of semantic competency is to be knowledge, then the absence of knowledge of invalidity of that
considered as the cause of verbal knowledge. In comparison definite knowledge can be given as qualification of that
with this, owing to logical simplicity, it would be better to take definite knowledge which is the hindering factor of verbal
knowledge of semantic competency as the cause of verbal knowledge. This is because the doubt of the invalidity also
knowledge. prevents the certainty of the absence of semantic competency
The modem Naiyayikas raise an objection against this from being the hindering factor. Therefore, in the qualification
position as follows: Where an instance of knowledge either as nikayatva is not included and so it is simple. Hence, it is
doubt or as certainty is the cause for something, the doubt of cumbersome to acceptyogyatajhanam as a separate cause for
invalidity of that knowledge does not prevent it from being a verbal knowledge.
cause. This is because, the doubt of invalidity of a particular Now the old Naiyayikas answer to this objection of the
instance of knowledge ultimately leads to the doubt about the modem Naiyayikas as follows: For the verbal knowledge that
object of that knowledge. In this way, since knowledge in the there is pot on the ground, the knowledge of semantic
form of a doubt is also accepted as a cause, the doubt about competency in which ground is the qualificand and pot is
the invalidity of a particular instance of knowledge does not qualifier is the cause. Now it has already been stated apraman-
prevent it from being a cause. Therefore, an instance of
knowledge cannot be considered a cause only when there is nam. Here the knowledge of the invalidity of the knowledge
the certainty of the invalidity of that knowledge. Hence the of semantic competency is the knowledge in which the ground
absence of the certainty of the invalidity of that knowledge is without pot is the qualificand and pot is the qualifier. Such a
to be given as a qualification of that knowledge which is the knowledge of invalidity has only one form.
cause of something. The old Naiyayikas continue their argument pointing out
Therefore, the modems argue that if the knowledge of that for the verbal knowledge in which ground is qualificand
semantic competency is accepted as the cause of verbal and pot is qualifier, the hindering factor is the certainty of the
knowledge, then it should be qualified by the absence of absence of semantic competency in the form of the certain
476 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 477

knowledge in which ground is qualificand and absence of pot thing (tadvattajnanam prati tadabhavavacchedakatvena grhitah
is qualifier. For this certain knowledge of the absence of yo dharmah tannikayah pratibandhakah),14 is the hindering
semantic competency, the knowledge of invalidity could factor of the knowledge of that particular thing. Therefore, the
come about in three ways. modem Naiyayikas have to admit that just as the absence of
First, there could be a knowledge in which that which has the certainty of the absence of semantic competency is the
the absence of the absence of pot is the qualificand and cause of verbal knowledge, in the same way the absence of the
absence of pot is the qualifier. Secondly, there could be a certainty of that which is pervaded by the absence of that and
knowledge in which that which has pot is the qualificand and the absence of the certainty of that which is cognized as the
absence of pot is the qualifier. Thirdly, there could be a determinant of the absence of that, are to be considered as the
knowledge in which the qualificand is the absence having the causes of verbal knowledge. But these need not be considered
absence of pot by the relation of counterpositiveness (i.e. the as the cause of verbal knowledge by the old Naiyayikas
absence that does not have pot as its counterpositive) and the according to whom the knowledge of semantic competency is
qualifier is pot by the relation of counterpositiveness (ghata- the cause of verbal knowledge.
pratiyogikatvabhavavati abhave ghatapratiyogikatvaprakarakam But here the modern Naiyayikas raise an objection: If the
jhanam). In this way with reference to the certainty of the absence of certain knowledge of absence of semantic
absence of semantic competency which is the hindering factor competency etc. are not accepted as the cause of verbal
for verbal knowledge, we have to give the qualification of the knowledge, when there is certainty of absence of semantic
absence of the knowledge of three kinds of invalidity. In competency etc. there could be the verbal knowledge. In
comparison with this, with reference to the knowledge of order to avoid this verbal knowledge we have to accept the
semantic competency which is the cause of verbal knowledge, absence of certainty of absence of semantic competency etc.
we have to give the qualification of the absence of certainty of should be considered as the cause of verbal knowledge. The
only one kind of invalidity. This is simple. old Naiyayikas, however, answer this objection, pointing out
Besides, where for the knowledge of one particular thing that when there is the certainty of the absence of semantic
as related to another thing, the certainty of the absence of the competency etc. the knowledge of semantic competency
relation of that particular thing with the other thing is the which is cause of verbal knowledge cannot arise. Therefore,
hindering factor (yatra tadvattajnanam prati tadabhavavat- because of the absence of the knowledge of semantic
tanikayah pratibandhakah) two more hindering factors are to competency, there cannot be verbal knowledge.
be admitted. First, with reference to one particular thing as Further, the old Naiyayikas find fault with the position of
related to another thing, we have to admit that the certainty of the modem Naiyayikas as follows: If the absence of certainty
the relation of that which is pervaded by the absence of that of the absence of semantic competency is the cause of verbal
thing is also a hindering factor (itadvattajnanam prati tadabhava- knowledge, then when there is the causal complex of verbal
vyapyavattanikayah pratibandhakah). Secondly, we have to knowledge that there is pot on the ground, in which absence
admit that the definite knowledge of one particular thing of certainty of absence of semantic competency is included,
which is cognized as the determinant of the absence of that there could be the mental perception that one has the absence
478 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 479

of knowledge of semantic competency, i.e. in the present Text 10A

instance, the knowledge in which ground is qualificand and
pot is the qualifier. In order to avoid this mental perception,
^T. f^TT I
modems should accept that the causal complex of verbal
knowledge is the hindering factor of such a mental perception. SII+'lfT
If the knowledge of semantic competency is accepted as the [Kdrika 84 abc)
cause of verbal knowledge, there cannot be such a mental
perception. The reason for this is that there is no object of tMfth-W'k'lcqiR I Tfcr fa^rr
mental perception in the form of absence of knowledge of
semantic competency. Therefore, the causal complex of
verbal knowledge need not be accepted as the hindering fan
factor of such a mental perception. In this way, there is
simplicity, if the knowledge of semantic competency as
dftflTfo I M ^ '5ffa‘
advanced by the old Naiyayikas is accepted as the cause of
verbal knowledge.
^ I TTW:

^Vl W dl<^4ih? ^ nfar 1

Translation
Syntactic Expectancy {akSnkfS)

Karikavati
A word has syntactic expectancy with another word
without which it cannot produce verbal knowledge.
(Kdrika 84abc)

Muktavali
Now the author explains syntactic expectancy with the
words a word etc. (yatpadenetyadi): A word has syntactic
expectancy with that word without which it cannot produce
verbal knowledge. This is the meaning. A word denoting
karaka (i.e. that which is related to kriya) does not produce
verbal knowledge without the word denoting kriya, i.e. action;
therefore, the former (i.e. word denoting karaka) has syntactic
480 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 481
expectancy with the latter (i.e. word denoting kriya).15 In fact,
&qiq'-q-qqqluiqci: R>qi<mq>4qqkiq>igi utr^q I ft ^
the purpose of the juxtaposition of words denoting karaka and
verbs is already accomplished by means of contiguity. However, i d^r^wdTTRWftrr err^Td; "stcft
the cause of the verbal knowledge that the-state-of-being-the- »2>c^xiccq«P'SicT>isi5]i'i qttj>aRcqcqiR*ii |
object-of-an-action denoted by a verb exists in jar is the
TTW $cqiqiq'qpiai-qqq)uq¥iiqi’
knowledge of syntactic expectancy in the form of the accusative
^wftdr^TTTTfRT^IW: ‘Sc*FT'T%T: '■WKd
case coming after the word ‘jar’. Therefore, a series of words
like ‘jar’ ‘being the object of an action denoted by a verb’ ‘the 3TT^—3nTftcfrfcr I -m ^ WT^WT^lkTTT^;
action of bringing’ ‘effort’ etc. does not produce verbal wrofaNM m: i W^R) i Wftpft: i
knowledge. By the sentence such as ayam eti putro rajhah ^ wrcw dicsfdiW
puruso ’pasaryatam verbal knowledge is produced because of
^Hq^Hd^+qiddcdldiqR^q^
the knowledge of the intention (of the speaker) that the word
cnr jwftr m Prw+ifiJii: ifcf
‘king’ being connected with the word ‘son’ should produce
verbal knowledge connecting king with son. But if there is the
knowledge that the intention of the speaker is that the word
‘king’ is to be connected with the word ‘man’, then the verbal WT?rf 3^ ? ^fiMmiqixidf^di-
knowledge connecting king with man would indeed be ^IfldMI'Hiq I ^Tf^TT^TTW WTfRTfft 3^T: ft 3
produced.
Vll«qq]i) +KuiPicq^ | q°qi^ apfalcHtf-
<.mq ^qRqqqHMd'dJ[4'M^^4l^RdRlrdl-
Text10B
4>K4>diqcqiRqi el^cqiqqifclHtf
ft. Tftr W I ddWfefolM^ dc4<*^c*l*f: I 'RTdTRTT: I ^qTcMWRMISk^ WT?rf-
TtZTR f^TT '^T3'crT— ^ FdftT 'SlKdlb
fiffazswft arrcnir itc q>4qftcmq) q4cqft R^k: I ^ ^ I ^iqiifiTJcWFRt
$ W -^fcrfcT ’ftft^q^i^cluiqa Xiq|b4lgd^dMI+lflPiqfe: I 3TSTTFR-
3RT <TW|
^WlffFWTHI'fdd; I ’*T5T
I *n«qq|i) d*d ^RFRT ^qlnqM: I rTT 'qfddMq- W^TtJTWjT??: ^qWMI-d^dWI^db'HH^Rl: |
I ¥RT ^ R&iqc^l^a^^q’^Rdsit^dlqlcqtlfrl I Rl <.iq’igcq?iMtq
I cfr ftjFftf I cTFT | 3nr ^r- MRq-uq>cq c4l+lg-ldH*d tcJTdRrfcT pi(|M ^TcRT-
+ia-i>iiqaerqiiqaqq^qqiti4?iNNi Mfch-uqxR ^IR'dlRcHe!^
efT*T: I WWTWRI: ^Hdf^dcdld, I drUcd ^ \cdl+l|H |
^l+K+H^di^dH. I TdfcT TdfcT ^ ^ WT-
482 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 483
Translation
between stems and suffixes. Here also the part of absence of
Syntactic Expectancy (3k3Akf3)
interval between words is obtained by contiguity. The
With that word (tenapadena saha tasyeti): The-state-of- knowledge of syntactic expectancy in the form of the-state-of-
having-one-word in another word; this is the meaning. In such coming-after a stem existing in a suffix is the cause of (verbal
a sentence as ghatam anaya without the word ghata the word knowledge). This is explained by the words in fact
am does not bring about verbal knowledge and, therefore, (ivastutastvityadina). It may be objected that in the sentence
syntactic expectancy is the-state-of-having-the-word ghata in beginning with ayam etiputro rajriah,when the verbal knowledge
the word am. On the contrary, in such sentences as ghat ah is not yet produced, there could arise verbal knowledge that
karmatvam etc. the-state-of-having-the-word-gAa/a in the word the man belongs to the king, because there is syntactic
karmatva is not syntactic expectancy, because the non¬ expectancy of the word rajan with the word purusajust as there
production of the verbal knowledge in the form that the-state- is syntactic expectancy of the word rajan with the word purusa.
of-being-an-object-of-an-action denoted by a verb with reference In order to answer this objection, it is said here comes
to ajar is not brought about by the absence of word ‘jar’. Here (iayametiti). Thus even when there is syntactic expectancy of
the non-production of the verbal knowledge indicates those the word raj an with the word purusa since there is no such
words (which are considered to have syntactic expectancy) (intention of the speaker) there is'no such verbal knowledge.
and is not included in the definition of syntactic expectancy.
This is the idea. Would indeed be [syadeveti) means surely
Or let the non-production of verbal knowledge also be
there is. It may be objected that even if there is the knowledge
included in the definition of syntactic expectancy; in order to
of the intention of the speaker to produce the verbal knowledge
produce verbal knowledge, it is useful by itself; therefore, from
by connecting the word rajan with the words purusa and putra,
a sentence that has already produced verbal knowledge, there
when there is the certainty of one sentence (i.e that which
is no possibility of further verbal knowledge. The part of the-
produces one connected meaning) with the words putra and
state-of-having-one-word-in-another-word is useful only when
rajan, and the certainty of the absence of one sentence (i.e. that
it is known. Tena means with the word, i.e. a root denoting
which produces one connected meaning) with the words
action; tasya means of the word that denotes that which is
purusa and rajan, then there is syntactic expectancy of the
related to the action denoted by a root. Here also the-state-of-
word rajan with the word purusa and therefore, there could be
having-one-word-in-another-word means the-state-of-coming-
verbal knowledge that the man belongs to the king. This
immediately-after-the-other-word; there the part of absence of
objection cannot be admitted because the meaning of the
interval is obtained indeed by contiguity. This is because
expression ‘without that word’ is ‘without that word which has
contiguity has already been explained as absence of interval
been mentioned together with’. Therefore, mentioning together
between words. The-state-of-being-after is not necessary in the
also is included in syntactic expectancy. ‘Mentioning together’
case of verbs and karaka-s. Since from both sentences caitrah
means the intention of the speaker with regard to words that
pacati and pacali caitrah there arises verbal knowledge, there
this word as connected with that word should produce the
is no syntactic expectancy between the words in the form of
knowledge of semantic relation. In the present instance, since
verbs and karaka-s\ but there is (syntactic expectancy) only
there is the absence of the knowledge of that (i.e the intention
484 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 485

of the speaker with regard to words), there is the absence of the flow of the Ganges. It is also not appropriate to consider
the knowledge of syntactic expectancy in which that (samabhi- the knowledge of the absence of syntactic expectancy as the
vyahara) is included. Others, however, hold that ‘mentioning hindering factor (of verbal knowledge) and not to consider the
together’ is not to be included in syntactic expectancy, but its knowledge of syntactic expectancy as the cause (of verbal
knowledge is a cause of verbal knowledge independently. The knowledge). If such is the case, the knowledge of the absence
opinion of the modems is as follows: Since the knowledge of of syntactic expectancy of that which is pervaded by it (i.e.
the intention (of the speaker) with regard to the meaning is absence of syntactic expectancy) and of the characteristic
indeed the cause (of verbal knowledge) as the knowledge in which is the determinant of the absence of syntactic expectancy
the form that the word rajan is uttered with the desire to would have to be considered as hindering factors and,
produce the knowledge of semantic connection of rajan with hence, there would be cumbersomeness. Therefore, no further
purusa, there is no over-extension (i.e. there is no possibility of discussion is needed. Here ends the discussion on syntactic
verbal knowledge as proposed earlier). Therefore, there is no expectancy.
reason to consider that the knowledge of mentioning together
is a cause of verbal knowledge. When there is the certainty of Commentary
the intention of the speaker as pointed out, though there is the Syntactic Expectancy (akankqa)
doubt about ‘mentioning together’ as mentioned earlier,
Now K. defines akahksa, i.e. syntactic expectancy, the
which is in the form of the intention of the speaker with
third cause of verbal knowledge. A word is said to have
reference to the words or the certainty of its absence, there is
syntactic expectancy with another word without which it
indeed verbal knowledge. This is explained at length in other
cannot produce verbal knowledge. Muktavalikara first of all
places. The following, however, is to be understood: In the applies this definition of syntactic expectancy to verbs and
definition of syntactic expectancy, the expressions which
karaka words, i.e. a verb cannot produce verbal knowledge
word is to be understood as meaning the knowledge of‘which
without the help of the appropriate karaka word. Similarly, a
word’ are used, in order that the (definition of syntactic
karaka word cannot produce verbal knowledge without the
expectancy may be applied to) the stanzas composed by a
help of the appropriate verb. Therefore, verb has syntactic
person who has taken the vow of silence. And, therefore, it is
expectancy with karaka word; similarly karaka word has
possible to have syntactic expectancy even with the words that
syntactic expectancy with verb. But Muktavalikara points out
are supplied, adhyahara is the supply of words which are not
that such a juxtaposition of verbs and karaka words is
mentioned. Therefore, in comparison with all others (i.e. avrtti
contiguity which is the first cause and which has already been
anusahga, and anuvrtti), it is the least in importance. This is
explained and not syntactic expectancy. Therefore, Muktavali¬
because avrtti is repeating again (a word) which exists in its
kara rejecting this opinion asserts that syntactic expectancy
own place; anusahga is connecting (a word) which exists in
obtains only between stems and suffixes.
another place which is near, and anuvrtti is connecting (a
Now the authors give an exact description of the nature
word) which exists in another place which is far. This (anuvrtti) of syntactic expectancy which is yena padena vina yasya
is of three kinds, like the gaze of a lion, the jump of a frog and padasya sa bdabodh aja nakatve sati avyavahitapurvavrttitvavyava■
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 487
486 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
is used only as indicative of {paricdyakam) those words
hitottaravrttitvanyatarasambandhena tatpade tatpadavisistatvam
between which there is syntactic expectancy.
akahksa, i.e. a word has syntactic expectancy with that word
But if this expression is used only as indicative of those
without which it cannot produce verbal knowledge, i.e. when
words between which there is syntactic expectancy, there
one word does not produce verbal knowledge without the
could arise the following difficulty. Even when words have
help of another, then the-state-of-being-qualified-by one-word
already produced verbal knowledge once, they could still
in the other word by the relation either of the-state-of-coming-
continue to produce verbal knowledge since syntactic
immediately-before-that-word or by the-relation-of-the-state-
expectancy in the form tatpade tatpadavtiistatvam exists. In
of-following-immediately-after-that-word is called syntactic
order to avoid this difficulty, therefore, in the definition of
expectancy. As for example, in such instances as ghatam
syntactic expectancy, the expression ananubhavakatva also
anaya, bring the jar, since without the wordghata, the word am
should be included. When this expression also is used in the
cannot produce the verbal knowledge in the form ghatiyam
definition of syntactic expectancy, then verbal knowledge
karmatvam, there is syntactic expectancy between the words
cannot be produced again, since it is already produced. It may
ghata and am. Here the-state-of-being-qualified by the word
be noted further that one part of the definition of syntactic
ghata in the word am by the relation of the-state-of-coming-
expectancy isyena padena vinayasya padasya anvayananubhava-
immediately after the word ghata is syntactic expectancy,
katvam. Here there are two negations which would enable us
akahksa.
to conclude that tatpadajanyatabdabodham prati tatpadajanya-
But this does not mean that there is syntactic expectancy
Sabdabodhabhavo hetuh,16 i.e. for the verbal knowledge arising
between the word ghata and karmatvam in the sentence ghatah
from a particular word, the absence of the verbal knowledge
karmatvam, although there is the-state-of-being-qualified by
arising from the same particualr word is the cause. But such an
the word ghata in the word karmatva by the relation of
absence of the verbal knowledge is the cause of verbal know¬
avyavahitottaratva. The reason is that it cannot be held that the
ledge by its very existence and not in as far as it is known
word karmatva does not produce the verbal knowledge in the
(tatpadajanyaidbdabodhabhavah svarupatah eva karanam na tu
form of ghatiya karmata owing to the absence of the word
jnatah san). However, the part of the definition of syntactic
ghata, since the word ghata is present here. It should be noted
expectancy, viz. ekapade aparapadavattvam, is the cause of
here that according to our experience the word karmatva,
verbal knowledge only in as far as it is known. Now when
even though qualified by the word ghata does not produce the
verbal knowledge has already arisen from a particular sentence,
verbal knowledge in the form ghatiyam karmatvam (i.e. the-
it cannot go on producing verbal knowledge because there is
state-of-being-object-belongingtojar). Hence the-state-of-being-
no absence of verbal knowledge which is also included in the
qualified-by-the-word ghata in the word karmatva is not
nature of syntactic expectancy.
syntactic expectancy. In fact, though in the definition of
It is stated that syntactic expectancy is ekapade aparapada-
syntactic expectancy, the expression yena padena vina yasya
vyavahitotaratvam. Here it is to be noted that the element of
padasya Sabdabodhajanakatvam (i.e. when one word does not
avyavahitatvam which is avyavadhanam, i.e. juxtaposition, is
produce verbal knowledge without the help of another word)
obtained by contiguity itself. This is because contiguity has
is in the definition of syntactic expectancy, still this expression
 Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 489
488 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
verbs and words denoting karaka-s. Therefore, there is no
already been explained as juxtaposition of words. Therefore
need of the knowledge of syntactic expectancy for the verbal
Dinakara asserts that akahksa is not merely avyahitatvam or
avyavadhanam, but ekapade aparapadottaratvam, i.e. syntactic knowledge arising from verb and karaka word.
However, from reading a stanza written by one who has
expectancy is the-state-of-coming-after-one-word-in-another-
word. It is not the case that there could be such an akahksa taken the vow of silence, a person obtains verbal knowledge.
with reference to verbs and words denoting karaka-s, as for Here there is no uttered word and, therefore, there cannot also
instance, in the sentence caitrahpacati, the verb pacati comes be syntactic expectancy in the form of the-state-of-coming-
immediately-after-one-word-in-the-other-word. Therefore,
after the karaka word caitra. The reason for this is that it is not
necessary for the verbs to come after words denoting karaka. syntactic expectancy is to be considered as the-state-of-coming-
immediately-after-the-knowledge-of-one-word-in-the-know-
This is because in Sanskrit, there is no fixed rule about the
ledge-of-other-word, (ekapadajhane aparapadajhanottaraivam
place of the verb in the sentence and so just as verbal
akahksa). Here the expression of the absence of interval
knowledge arises from the sentence caitrah pacati, verbal
(avyavahitottaratvaghatakibhuto vyavadhanamfah) is obtained
knowledge arises also from the sentence pacati caitrah. Hence
by contiguity in the form of absence of interval among the
it could be concluded that there is no syntactic expectancy
ins:ances of knowledge of words. Hence syntactic expectancy
between verbs and words denoting karaka-s. Therefore,
is the-state-of-coming-after-the-knowledge-of-one-word-in-the-
syntactic expectancy is to be accepted only between stem and
knowledge-of-another-word (ekapadajhane aparapadajhanot-
suffix, and it is the-state-of-coming-after-the-stem in suffix
(pratyaye prakrtyuttaratvam akahksa); its knowledge is the taratvam akahksa)}7
Now when the verbal knowledge is not already produced
cause of verbal knowledge.
from sentences such as ay am etiputro rajnah puruso \pasaryaiam,
It should be noted here that the statement that in the
there could arise verbal knowledge that the man belongs to
definition of syntactic expectancy the expression of the absence
the king because there is syntactic expectancy of the word
of interval between words is included in contiguity itself, is
rajan with the word purusa just as there is syntactic expectancy
made according to the opinion of the old Naiyayikas. They
of the word rajan with the word putra. Therefore, because of
hold that contiguity is absence of interval among words and
the absence of any deciding factor, we cannot have the verbal
its knowledge is the cause of verbal knowledge. According to
knowledge only in the form that the son belongs to the king.
the modem Naiyayikas, however, contiguity is the absence of
interval of the instances of knowledge of words, and it is the If it is objected like this, the answer is that even though there
is syntactic expectancy of the word rajan with the word purusa
cause of verbal knowledge by its mere existence. Therefore,
according to this opinion, in the definition of syntactic since the speaker does not intend to produce knowledge of
semantic relation of the king with the person, no verbal
expectancy, the expression of the absence of interval between
knowledge in the form that the person belongs to the king does
words, is not included in contiguity itself. But verbal knowledge
arise. If, however, the speaker intends to produce the knowledge
arises by the mere absence of interval among instances of
of semantic connection between the person and the king, then
knowledge of verb and of words denoting karaka-s. Further
the verbal knowledge in the form that the person belongs to
there is no fixed rule about the priority and posteriority of
 490 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 491
the king arises. When, on the other hand, the speaker intends
padatatparya, i.e. .the hearer has no knowledge of the intention
to produce the knowledge of semantic connection between
of the speaker that the word rajan as connected with the word
the son and the king, then the verbal knowledge in the form
purusa should produce the verbal knowledge. Therefore, the
that the son belongs to the king arises indeed. Therefore, it
hearer has no knowledge of syntactic expectancy in which
could be concluded that according to the intention of the
mentioning together in the form of the intention of the speaker
speaker sometimes we have the verbal knowledge that the son
with regard to words is included. Hence the hearer cannot
belongs to the king and sometimes the verbal knowledge that
have verbal knowledge that the man belongs to the king.
the man belongs to the king. Therefore, the deciding factor for
Other Naiyayikas, however, hold that in the nature of
the production of verbal knowledge is only the intention of the
syntactic expectancypadatatparyarupasamabhivyaharah should
speaker and not the syntactic expectancy of words.
not be included; but the knowledge oipadatatparya is indepen¬
Now it may be objected that in such sentences as ayam
dently the cause for verbal knowledge. This means that
etiputro rajriah puruso’pasaryatam, when it is even known that
syntactic expectancy does not consist in padatatparya but the
the intention of the speaker is to produce verbal knowledge of
knowledge oipadatatparya is an independent cause of verbal
the relation of king with both the son and the man, if there is
knowledge. Hence, in the present instance, ayam eti putro
the certain knowledge that the words ‘son’ and ’king’ convey
rajriahpuruso ’pasaryatam, although there is syntactic expectancy
one connected meaning (ekavfikyata) and that the words
between the words purusa and rajan, there is no knowledge of
man and king do not convey one connected meaning [eka-
the intention of the speaker that the word rajan being
vakyatabhavamkayah), then since there is syntactic expectancy
connected with the word purusa should produce the verbal
between the words ‘king’ and ‘man’, there could arise the
knowledge. And such a knowledge of tatparya is, according to
verbal knowledge that the man belongs to the king.
the Naiyayikas, an independent cause of verbal knowledge.
The answer to this objection is as follows: The definition
And since such a cause of verbal knowledge is absent, the
of syntactic expectancy is yatpadam vina yasya padasya
hearer cannot have the verbal knowledge that the man
anvayananubhavakatvam tatpade tatpadavattvam. Here the
belongs to the king.
expression yatpadam vina, i.e. ‘without that word’, means
The modems, however, hold that it is not the knowledge
samabhivydhrtayatpadam vina, i.e. without that word which has
oipadatdtparya the cause of verbal knowledge, but knowledge
been mentioned together with it. And samabhivyahara,
of arthatatparya. arthatatparya is that the word is uttered with
‘mentioning together with’, means idam padam etatpadena
the desire to produce the knowledge of semantic connection
saha anvayam bodhayatu itipadatatparyam, i.e. the intention of
of one meaning with the other. In the present instance, the
the speaker with regard to words that this word as connected
word rajan is uttered with the desire to produce the knowledge
with that word should produce the knowledge of semantic
of semantic connection of king with man. If the knowledge of
connection. Thus padatatparyarupah samabhivyaharah,
the intention of the speaker with regard to the meanings is
mentioning together in the form of the intention of the speaker
accepted as the cause ofverbal knowledge, no verbal knowledge
with regard to words is included in the definition oiakanksa.
which is not intended by the speaker can take place. In the
In the present instance, the hearer has no knowledge of
present instance, if the hearer has the knowledge of the
492 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 493

intention of the speaker with reference to the meaning in the sentence nor in any other previous sentence occurring in the
form that the word rajan is uttered with the desire to produce context. As for example, when the sentence ghatam anaya is
the knowledge of semantic connection of king with man, used the word tvam is to be supplied in order to have verbal
though the doubt about the intention of the speaker with knowledge.19
reference to words (samabhivydhdrarupapadatdtparyasamiaye) dvrtti is the repetition of words which actually exist in the
or the certain knowledge of its absence (samabhivyahararupa- context. As for instance, the Panini Sutra halantyam (1.3.3) is
padatatparyabhavanikaye), the verbal knowledge in the form repeated in order to avoid the fault of mutual dependence and
that the man belongs to the king certainly arises. Therefore, to arrive at another instance of verbal knowledge.
samabhivyahararupapadatatparyanikaya is not an independent anusanga is connecting a word which exists, in another
cause of verbal knowledge. Besides, Dinakara has already place which is near. As for example, in syllogism in the
pointed out that the syntactic expectancy is only for the stem upanayavakya (i.e. tatha cayam) there is the word ayam. But the
and suffix. This also is not admissible because Dinakara nigamanavakya is only tasmat tatha where there is no word
himself in sentences like ayam etiputro rdjnahpuruso’pasbryatbm ayam. However, the word ayam is in the upanayavakya which
accepts syntactic expectancy between the words putra and is near to nigamanavakya. And this word ayam is joined with
rajan, and between purusa and rajan.*® the word tatha and hence the full form of the nigamanvakya is
It was already pointed out that because of the verbal tasmat tathayam from which verbal knowledge is produced.
knowledge arsing from a stanza written by a person who has anuvrtti is connecting words which exist in another place
taken the vow of silence, the definition of syntactic expectancy which is far. As for example, from the Panini sutra ikoyan aci
should be the-state-of-coming-after-the-knowledge-of-one-word- (6.1.77) the word aci in the locative case is joined with the Sutra
in-the-knowledge-of-another-word [ekapadajnane aparapada- adgunah (6.1.87) which is far away. Now this anuvrtti is of three
jnanottaratvam akahksa). However, the full definition of syntactic kinds like the gaze of a lion, the jump of a frog and the flow
expectancy is as follows: When the knowledge of one word of the Ganges [simhavalokitavat mandukaplutivatgangasrotovat).
does not produce verbal knowledge without the knowledge of anuvrtti like the gaze of a lion is as follows: The lion gets out
another word, then the-state-of-coming-after-the-knowledge- of its cave, walks a distance and turns back to look at its cave.
of-one-word-in-the-knowledge-of-the-other-word or the state- In the same way a certain word is connected with a sentence
of-coming-before-the-knowledge-of-one-word-in-the-know- after many sentences with which it is not connected. This is like
ledge-of-another-word is syntactic expectancy. [yatpada.jndna.rri the gaze of a lion. The previous example of the word aci in the
vina yatpadajhanam anvayabodham na janayati tatpadajnane sutra ikoyan aci is an example for this kind of anuvrtti. anuvrtti
tatpadajnanotaratvam tatpadajndnapurvatvam va akanksd). like the jump of a frog occurs when words occurring in the
Therefore, there is syntactic expectancy even with words previous sentence are connected with the following sentences
which are supplied. without being connected with some sentences in between.
Now it may be asked what this supply of words (adhyahara) anuvrtti like the flow of Ganges takes place when words in the
really means. In order to have verbal knowledge from certain previous sentence is continuously connected with the following
sentences, we must supply a word which is neither in the sentences. As for example, the word angasya in Panini Sutra
494 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 495
6.4.1 is connected with all the sutras till the end of the seventh
expectancy is to be considered as hindering factor after the
chapter. In conclusion it may be noted that all these four, viz.
manner of jewel etc. which are hindering factors for burning.
adhyahara, avrtti, anusahga and anuvrtti are supplying or
But this also is not possible since the absence of syntactic
connecting words in one way or other. But adhyahara is
expectancy (nirakahksatva) cannot be defined. This is because
supplying of words which are neither present in the sentence
nirakahksatva is not the-state-of-being-am-/>a*/a-not-coming-
nor in the context in any way. And therefore, this way of
after-the-word-g^a/fl, for, otherwise, there would be verbal
supplying of words is of the least importance.
knowledge from the sentence ghat ah. karmatvam, where there
Now the opinion of certain Naiyayikas is being discussed.
is no knowledge of the-state-of-being-am-/>a*/a not coming
According to them knowledge of syntactic expectancy is not
after the word ghata. Neither can the absence of syntactic
the cause of verbal knowledge, but the knowledge of the
expectancy be defined as absence of ampada coming after the
absence of syntactic expectancy is a hindering factor for
word ghata for otherwise there would be no verbal knowledge
verbal knowledge. This cannot be admitted. The reason is that
in the form ghatiya karmata from such sentences as ghatah
if the knowledge of the absence of syntactic expectancy is
karmatvam ghatam. This is because in the expression ghatah
considered as the hindering factor for verbal knowledge, then
karmatvam, there is the hindering factor in the form of the
the knowledge of that which is pervaded by absence of
knowledge of the absence of the word am after the word ghata.
syntactic expectancy and the knowledge of that property
Therefore, knowledge of syntactic expectancy in the form of
which determines the absence of syntactic expectancy are also
the particular sequence of stem and suffix or the particular
to be considered as the hindering factors for the verbal
sequence of the instances of knowledge of stem and suffix is
knowledge. This is cumbersome.
the cause of verbal knowledge. Pariksit Thampuran further
It may be noted here that PariksitThampuran rejects the
points out that not only the particular sequence of stem and
opinion of these Naiyayikas as described by Dinakara for the
suffix is syntactic expectancy, but also in such instances of
following reasons:20 The absence of syntactic expectancy
verbal knowledge as riilo ghatah syntactic expectancy is
which is the object of the knowledge, which obstructs the nilapadavyavahitottaraghatapadatvam or nilaghatapadayoh
verbal knowledge, is not the absence of that which is the object samanavibhaktikatvam etc. (S. p.217, pp.19-24). And it is not
of knowledge to be obstructed (pratibadhyajnane grahyasya the case that the knowledge of the absence of syntactic
yah abhavah tasya jhanam pratibandhakam). In verbal expectancy is the hindering factor for verbal knowledge.
knowledge akahksa is not the object; if it were the object, then
the knowledge of the absence of akahksa could be considered
as the hindering factor for verbal knowledge. Therefore, the
knowledge of that which is pervaded by the absence of
syntactic expectancy and the knowledge of the property
which determines the absence of syntactic expectancy cannot
be considered as hindering factors for verbal knowledge.
Therefore, the knowledge of the absence of syntactic
 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 497
Text11A
not a cause, then from such sentences as ‘bring saindhava' etc.,
there would not arise the verbal knowledge of horse in some
^r. <^fWi ^ ^R^Rfd^i places and of salt in other places. Nor could it be argued that
[Karika 84 cd) the context etc. which would bring about the knowledge of the
intention of the speaker is the cause of the verbal knowledge,
■5. clIrH^ P\ <fRt> I ^ cTtM^IH' because they lack a consecutive characteristic. If it is argued
that there is consecutive characteristic in as far as they produce
the knowledge of the intention of the speaker, then, for the
^ | "ff ^ qicH4>4H5cMuU -SI^TUTi^rt sake of logical simplicity, it would be better to accept the
+K«icq+iRrqId %qpH^HIdJ knowledge of the intention of the speaker as the cause of the
verbal knowledge. In the same manner even in the case of the
dk^n^nqu^H ^llh^ ^^1^4
Vedas, the existence of God is postulated in order that there
^N^^TWT^I ^T ^ m^- should be knowledge of the intention (of the speaker). Nor can
I ^ ^ ^I^N4k1Ich4?IM‘ it be argued that in those places the knowledge of the intention
of the teacher is the cause, because in the beginning of
'«t>k«iftft ^MUiiWHMktJ ^ ^ 3ferq-
creation, there is no teacher. Nor should it be argued that there
^ ‘&?l 'fHJiH^R.Ici | 3feRFIFT^ ^ffcT- is no dissolution and, therefore, there is also no beginning of
xri<^lcU ^ ^ creation, because dissolution is described in the Vedas. In the
same way, (in the case of verbal knowledge which is produced
cTTrqfef by) the words of a parrot also the knowledge of the intention
4ku|^ • ^ I -ihi^ «f^^c( wMdH1 wm of God is the cause. (In the case of the verbal knowledge which
^TT ^ t^'-fq c1kH4ViM’ Tl'K^I^: I is produced by) the words of a parrot which does not
correspond to reality, the cause is only the knowledge of the
rqiiR^+H^iHR^ill^da^^Fq^Kuifii^iiig; |
intention of the teacher. Others, however, hold tffat the
knowledge of the speaker is the cause (of the verbal knowledge)
Translation
only in some places where there are different meanings (for a
Intention of the Speaker (tatparya)
word). So, from the words of a parrot, there is verbal
Karikavati knowledge, even without the knowledge of the intention of the
It is stated that the desire of the speaker is intention.* speaker. They say that in the case of the Vedas, however, the
meaning is determined by means of arguments which are
Muktavali
guided by the principles of interpretation which are without
Now the author describes (the nature) of the intention (of beginning.
the speaker with the words the desire of the speaker (vaktur
iccheti): If the knowledge of the intention of the speaker were
498
Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 499
Text 1 IB
Translation
ft. Intention of the Speaker (tZLtparya)

The desire of the speaker (ivafctur icchetiti): In such

"<iliHlRic'Hiewtct» tyl^ixiir-iJVii'i Vn«tq|t| ‘t>KulPlr^*f: I rT3T sentences as ‘bring the jar’ etc., the intention of the speaker is
anf^TT *^Tt gW^iRnRiig; cl* the desire to produce the knowledge in which the-state-of-
being-the-object-of-action (denoted by the root) is the
qualificand, the-state-of-being-superstratum is the relation and
Pl^cqiqJ _cHRl<rciqui^R) I ^Rlri^^Rc^R' ^tsT^I jar is the qualifier. The knowledge of the intention of the
TMlRRl I ifcT Rnr% T ^|RriJ«f: I | speaker which the hearer has and whose form is that this
sentence is uttered with such a desire (by the speaker), is the
’srfcf^Rp^' xT ^IIK^lIl ^CfAil-otJK^i)
cause of verbal knowledge. This is the meaning. The reason
dlri^n' +K«f **c«\h iRr"omRlRriift %cm;i 3PKu|R!| i
for this is shown by the words saindhaveti. By the word ‘etc.’
3rT^T ^%Tf^I%RnF^rf^Tf TfRyg; | 5T<t><u||<fldf such sentences as Sveto dhavati and so on are also included.
cTP^^lRRi The knowledge of the intention of the speaker restricts the
^ I '^'l^ldlRRl | rHTT ^ WtTCvRTW®5«fti)‘ TU^K- verbal knowledge arising from the sentence Sveto dhavati
sometimes to the knowledge that awhite thingruns, sometimes
^nRui t ^*m iRr m-. i ^Rr i w^%^r- to the knowledge that a dog runs from here. Of salt in other
•StfcTdlr^n^ | WT^I 3feRW places (kvacid lavanasyeti): It should be understood that in
some places (there will be knowledge of) both. There would
not arise (iti na syaditi): the meaning is that there could be no
Tit T Tlf^f T such restriction. This is indicative also of the following: It is also
^mRc^|J||I)Rc|M: I ^c(|^Rl | ^faiR^HW- to be understood that since the verbal knowledge does not
vMqltbft | teftc^Rl I '^■R-c^iqf Mc||R^|- arise when there is the doubt of the intention of the speaker
and when there is the certainty of the absence (of the intention
^lq|I^R* I ^^)RqRl I f^cj<uf ^fpn^f- of the speaker) the knowledge of the intention of the speaker
^R> I ni^Ri'twRc^: I %T is the cause of verbal knowledge, according to the invariable
J|o\hni4‘ci<a>'ii^ ^IdRRlHI^lRbdtHmi^ rftfjra I concomitance enunciated in the principle beginning with the
STlf^TT Wf^rRTmi^T TO: I ^k%^TWFTIcW- words yatsamSaya. Context (prakaraneti): By the word etc.
existence in a near place, existence in a distant place and
I i | ^%TOri;i3n|Rfir- existence in one place etc. are included. The context etc. are
ascertained as invariably present before (the verbal knowledge)
and, therefore, they are only to be considered as not superfluous
on account of logical simplicity: This is the idea. Because they
lack a consecutive character [ananugamad iti): Thus in the
 500 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 507
verbal knowledge which is produced by the respective (causes),
there is mutual deviation and therefore, (context etc.) are not it is appropriate to consider the-state-of-being-the-experience-
to be considered as the cause of verbal knowledge. This is the produced-by-word as the determinant of the-state-of-being-
idea. In the same manner (ittham ceti): When the knowledge produced-by-the-knowledge of the intention of the speaker
of the intention of the speaker is considered as the cause of all rather than the-state-of-being-the-experience produced by
instances of verbal knowledge; such is the meaning; this is to words in which significatory functions are grasped in different
be understood in this way afterwards also (i.e. this is the meanings. Further (knowledge is to be gained) from other
(texts).
meaning of the expression itthamceti occurring again in the M.
text). Dissolution (pralayasya) means partial dissolution which
is in the form of a particular time which is the substratum of Commentary
effects (i.e merit or demerit), but not of substances which are Intention of the Speaker (t atp ary a)
effects. In the Vedas (agamesviti): In the sentences of the
Now the fourth cause of verbal knowledge, viz. the
Vedas such as ‘there was no day, no night, no sky, no earth,
knowledge of the intention of the speaker, is being discussed
no darkness, no light, nothing else’; this is the meaning. Even
by the authors. Kdrikdvti states that the intention the knowledge
in the words of a parrot (tukavakye’piti): Also in the
of which is the cause of verbal knowledge, is the desire of the
knowledge which is produced by the sentences uttered by a
speaker. This means that the knowledge of the intention of the
parrot, which corresponds with reality. Only of the teacher
speaker is the cause of all instances of verbal knowledge. As
(tiksayitur eveti): Since it is not the case that the will of God does
for instance, in order that such sentences as ghatam anaya
not correspond with reality; this is the idea. Others (anye tviti):
produce verbal knowledge, the hearer should have the
The explanation of the word kvacid is that where there are
knowledge of the intention of the speaker. From the expression
different meanings for one word, i.e. where the significatory
ghatam (which is already a sentence according to Nyaya), the
functions are grasped in different meanings for one word; this
hearer has the knowledge that the speaker has uttered this
is the meaning. By this, such words are also included in which
expression with the desire to produce the knowledge in which
different denotative functions are grasped in different meanings;
the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action (denoted by the root) is
and (also such words) in which implications are grasped in
the qualificand, the-state-of-being-superstratum is the relation
different meanings and (also such words) in which denotative
and jar is the qualifier. Such a knowledge of the intention of
functions and implications are grasped in different meanings. the speaker is the cause of verbal knowledge.
By the word etc., (word) in which implication which is grasped
Muktavallkara brings forward an argument to show that
in only one meaning is also included. Principles of the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is the cause of
interpretation (mimamsa) means the supportive argument in
verbal knowledge. If the knowledge of the intention of the
the form of knowledge of logical simplicity. Guided by
speaker is not accepted as the cause of verbal knowledge, then
(parUodhiteti): The meaning is ‘accompanied by’. Tarka
from such sentences as bring saindhavcC we would not have
means inference. By the word dhuh incongruity is indicated
verbal knowledge sometimes of horse and sometimes of salt.
and the reason for this is that on account of logical simplicity
When the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is
admitted as the cause of verbal knowledge, then we can have
 Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 503

502 Nyaya Philosophy of Language have only one samuhalambanatmakaJabdabodha in which

both salt and horse are objects. In this way, the rule mentioned
knowledge either of horse or of salt according to the intention
above (i.e sakrduccaritah iabdah sakrdeva artham gamayati) is
of the speaker. Therefore, it follows that the knowledge of the
intention of the speaker is that which determines the kind of also not violated.
Others, however, hold that the expression sakrdeva
verbal knowledge that will arise.
artham gamayati means ekapadaprayojya iabdavisayata ekaiva,
Now it may be noted that from the sentence ‘bring
i.e. the-state-of-being-the-object-of-verbal-knowledge which (i.e.
saindhava’, sometimes there could arise the verbal knowledge
of both horse and salt if the hearer knows that the intention of visayata) is caused by one word is only one, although the
hearer may have the remembrance of many meanings from
the speaker is to produce the verbal knowledge of both horse
the word which denotes many meanings. Therefore, from a
and salt. It may be objected against this position that it goes
word having many meanings, the hearer can have the verbal
against the accepted Nyaya rule that sakrd uccaritah fabdah
knowledge of only one meaning. And if the hearer has the
sakrdeva artham gamayati. Here, gamayati means smarayati,
verbal knowledge of more than one meaning, then the rule is
i.e. the word which is uttered once brings to the remembrance
indeed violated. Such is the opinion of other Naiyayikas.
of the hearer only one meaning. Therefore, the meaning of the
It was pointed out that from sentences like saindhavam
objection is that a word which is uttered only once cannot
anaya sometimes there could be the knowledge of both salt
bring to the remembrance of the hearer two meanings at the
and horse. If such is the case, how can we interpret the
same time. Hence, it is not correct as Dinakara asserts that
principle of the old Naiyayikas that it is impossible for one
there could be the verbal knowledge of both horse and salt at
word to have two significatory functions at the same time, i.e.
the same time from the sentence saindhavam anaya.
one word cannot bring about the verbal knowledge of two
Ramarudra answers this objection as follows: This
meanings at the same time by means of two significatory
particular rule of the Naiyayikas just mentioned need not be
functions? The answer is that it may be that the hearer has the
accepted. Therefore, the hearer from the word saindhava
knowledge of two significatory functions for a word at the
which is uttered only once can remember both salt and horse
same time; but if the hearer knows that the intention of the
and can have the verbal knowledge of both. Ramarudra
speaker is that a word should bring about the verbal knowledge
further points out that if, on the contrary, this rule is accepted,
of only one meaning, then the word would not bring about the
repeating the word saindhava, the hearer can have the
verbal knowledge of two meanings by means of two significatory
remembrance of both salt and horse one after the other.
functions at the same time. This is the meaning of the principle
Hence he can also have the verbal knowledge of both.
This rule sakrduccaritah iabdah sakrdeva artham gamayati, of the old Naiyayikas.
If, however, the hearer does not know simultaneously,
is interpreted by different Naiyayikas in different ways and
but only successively that the speaker intends to convey the
PariksitThampuran discusses some of these interpretations.21
knowledge of two meanings, then the hearer has the verbal
We now give a summary of these interpretations also. According
knowledge of two meanings. The hearer obtains the verbal
to some Naiyayikas, the word gamayati means bodhayati, i.e.
knowledge of the second meaning by repeating the same
bodham janayati. And therefore, sakrdeva artham gamayati
means ekam eva bodham janayati. Therefore, the hearer can
 504
Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 505
word, i.e. recollecting the word that was uttered since the in the context of eating. From the same sentence, however,
knowledge arising from the first utterance of the word is lost. one gets the verbal knowledge of horse if the sentence is
Similar also is the case when a word brings about the verbal uttered in the context of a journey. In like manner, in order to
knowledge of the denoted and implied meanings. As for know the intention of the speaker, one should know also other
instance, from the sentence gahgayam mtnaghosau, the hearer contextual factors such as existence in a near place, existance
has first the remembrance of the meaning of word gahgd and in a distant place and existence in one place etc. As for
then the consequent verbal knowledge that there is fish in the instance, when one utters the sentence ‘let the jar be removed’
Ganges. Then repeating the word gahgd the hearer has the the hearer naturally understands, that the jar which is near is
remembrance of the implied meaning of bank and the to be removed. Here, in order to know such an intention of the
verbal knowledge that there is a village on the bank of the speaker, the hearer should also know the pot’s proximity to the
Ganges.
speaker.
In order to show that the knowledge of the intention of Similarly, when the sentence ‘bring the jar’ is uttered, the
the speaker is the cause of verbal knowledge, Dinakara brings hearer naturally understands that the jar which is away from
another argument based on a principle enunciated in Tattva- the speaker is to be brought. Hence, in order to know such an
cintdmani according to which if the doubt of something or the intention of the speaker, the hearer should know also the
definite knowledge of the absence of the same thing prevents existence of the pot away from the speaker. Further, when the
the rise of a certain knowledge, then the definite knowledge sentence ‘bringjar and cloth’ is uttered, the hearer understands
of that thing is the cause of that certain knowledge {yatsamSaya- that the jar and cloth which exist in one place should be
vyatirekamscayauyadutpattipratibandhakau tannikayah tadhetuh brought. In order to know such an intention of the speaker the
anumitau vydptiriva)? As for instance, the doubt of the hearer should know the existence of both jar and cloth in one
invariable concomitance and the definite knowledge of the place. Therefore, before verbal knowledge, in order to know
absence of invariable concomitance prevent the rise of inference the intention of the speaker, the hearer should necessarily
and so we can conclude that the definite knowledge of know the various contextual factors as described above.
invariable concomitance is the cause of inference. Similarly, Hence, it could be objected that these contextual factors
if there is the doubt of the knowledge of the intention of the are to be considered as the cause of verbal knowledge rather
speaker or there is the definite knowledge of absence of the than the knowledge of the intention of the speaker. The reason
intention of the speaker verbal knowledge does not arise. is that causality consists of two elements; invariable antecedent
Therefore, we can conclude that the definite knowledge of the existence (niyatapurvavrttitvam) and absence of superfluity
intention of the speaker is the cause of verbal knowledge. [ananyathdsiddhatvam). Now the invariable antecedent
It has been stated that the knowledge of the intention of existence of contextual factors is accepted by both parties;
the speaker is the cause of verbal knowledge. But in order to hence, in order that contextual factors be considered as the
know the intention of the speaker one should know the cause of verbal knowledge, only the absence of superfluity is
context. As for instance, from the sentence ‘bring saindhava’ to be attributed to them. And this is logically simple. But if the
one gets the verbal knowledge of salt, if the sentence is uttered knowledge of the intention of the speaker is to be considered
 506 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 507

as the cause of verbal knowledge, both invariable antecedent tatparyajhanajanakatva as the determinant of the-state-of-
existence and absence of superfluity are to be attributed to it. being-the-cause. Therefore, the conclusion is that the knowledge
And this obviously is logically complex. Hence the former, i.e. of the intention of the speaker is the cause of verbal knowledge.
contextual factors rather than the knowledge of the intention Now it may be objected that if such is the case there
of the speaker, is to be considered as the cause of verbal cannot be any verbal knowledge from the Vedas since we do
knowledge. Such is the objection. not have knowledge of the intention of the speaker as there is
The answer to this is that contextual factors do not have no author for the Vedas. This objection is answered by
any consecutive character. If contextual factors which have no pointing out that God is to be postulated as the author of the
consecutive character are considered as cause of verbal Vedas. Therefore, we can have knowledge of the intention of
knowledge, then it is impossible to avoid negative deviation. the author of the Vedas and, in this way, there could also be
It is from the context that we have the verbal knowledge verbal knowledge from Vedic sentences. Nor can it be argued
arising from the sentence ‘bring saindhava>; and it is from that there could be verbal knowledge from Vedic sentences
sahacarya that we have the verbal knowledge from the after knowing the intention of the one who teaches the Vedas.
sentence ‘bring jar and cloth’, sahacarya means existence in This is because at the beginning of creation there is no teacher
one place, i.e. cloth and jar existing in one place are to be of the Vedas except God. Therefore, there can be verbal
brought. Now it should be noted that there arises verbal knowledge from the Vedas only after knowing the intention of
knowledge from the sentence, ‘bring saindhavcd without the their author, viz. God.
knowledge of sahacarya and there arises verbal knowledge It may further be objected that there is no dissolution
from the sentence, ‘bringjar and cloth’ without the knowledge and, therefore, there is no beginning of creation. This is not
of context (prakaraiia). Hence there is deviation. Therefore, correct because dissolution is described in Vedic passages
neither context nor sahacarya etc. can be considered as the such as ‘there was no day, no night, no sky, no earth, no
cause of verbal knowledge. And if such a deviation is avoided darkness, no light, nothing else’, where dissolution means
with the help of the qualification of avyavahitottaratva, there partial dissolution. Partial dissolution is a particular time which
would be cumbersomeness because of infinite number of is the substratum of effects like merit and demerit, but not the
cause and effect relations. substratum of a substance which is an effect.23
But it may be argued that there is consecutive character In this way, in the case of the verbal knowledge produced
in the form of the-state-of-being-the-cause-of-the-knowledge- by a true sentence uttered by a parrot, knowledge of the
of-the-intention-of-the-speaker (tatparyajhanajanakatva) in intention of God is to be considered as the cause. Now it may
context, sahacarya etc.. Such an argument however cannot be be objected as follows: Intention means the desire of the
admitted because in comparison with this, it is logically simple speaker. And God is never the speaker of a sentence uttered
to accept that the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is by a parrot. Therefore, the knowledge of the intention of God
the cause of verbal knowledge. The reason is that it is logically cannot be considered as cause for verbal knowledge produced
simple to accept tatparyajhanatva as the determinant of the- by a sentence uttered by a parrot. This objection is answered
state-of-being-the-cause of verbal knowledge rather than by pointing out that a speaker is one who has effort which
 508
Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Text, Translation and Commentary—Sabdakhanda 509
produces*6 sentence. The effort of God is the cause of all
same word is grasped in another meaning there only the
effects. Therefore, the effort of God is also the cause of the
sentence uttered by a parrot. Hence, the knowledge of the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is to be considered
as the cause of verbal knowledge.24
intention of God can be considered as the cause of the verbal
toowledge produced by a sentence uttered by a parrot. The meaning of Vedic texts is ascertained by means of
owevcr m the case of the verbal knowledge which is inference accompanied by tarka, viz. the knowledge of logical
produced by the words of a parrot which does not correspond simplicity etc. Such investigations (i.e. inferences accompanied
to reality the cause is the knowledge of the intention of the one by tarka) for determining the meaning of the Vedas are
who taught the parrot. Now since the speaker is the one who immemorial. An example for determining the true meaning
has effort which produces the sentence, the effort of the one of the Vedas in this way is given by Ramarudra: There is the
who teaches the parrot can also be considered as the indirect Vedic injunction kapinjalan dlabheta, one should kill kapinjala-
cause of the sentence uttered by the parrot. Therefore, the s (a kind of bird) for sacrifice. Since the word kapinjalan is in
knowledge of the intention of the one who teaches the parrot the accusative plural, any number of birds could be killed. But
can also be considered as the cause of the verbal knowledge this cannot be done. This is because by means of Inference
arising from a sentence uttered by a parrot which does not accompanied by the knowledge of logical simplicity, we can
correspond to reality. In this way, it can be concluded that the establish that only three birds should be killed. The form of the
knowledge of the intention of the speaker is the cause of all Inference is: The meaning of the plural number in the word
instances of verbal knowledge. kapinjalan is number three, because it is denoted by the plural
Other Naiyayikas, on the contrary, hold that the knowledge suffix. Although number four and so on could be denoted by
of the intention of the speaker is not the cause of verbal the plural suffix still here the plural suffix denotes only number
knowledge in general, but only for those instances of verbal three. This is because it is logically simple to consider number
owledge produced by words having many meanings. This three as plural rather than number four etc. Logical simplicity
means that the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is the here is the fact that number three is grasped as the first plural
cause of verbal knowledge only when it is produced by words number among many plural numbers. In this way, for the
the significatory functions of which are grasped by the hearer verbal knowledge arising from Vedic sentences, there is no
m many meanings. Significatory function, as pointed out need of considering the knowledge of the intention of the
earlier, is of two kinds: Denotative function and implication. speaker as a cause.
In this way, in such places where the denotative functions of In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the Muktavalikara
one word are grasped in many meanings, where the implications suggests incongruity by the words dhuh and so he does not
o one word are grasped in many meanings, where the seem to accept this position. The reason of this incongruity is
denotative functions of one word are grasped in many pointed out by Dinakara: It is logically simple to consider the-
meanings and implications of the same word are grasped in state-of-being-the-experience-produced-by-words (padajanya-
many meanings and where the denotative function of one nubhavaivam) as the determinant of the-state-of-being-produced-
word is grasped in one meaning and the implication of the by-the-toowledge of the intention of the speaker (tatparyajndna-
janyatavacchedakam) rather than the-state-of-being-the-
 510 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

experience-produced-by-words in which significatory functions Text, Translation and Commentary-Sabdakhanda 511

are grasped in many meanings [grhitananarthavrttika-
padajanyanubhavatvam). Therefore, by logical simplicity just 11. K.M.D.R. p. 419, 2nd line from bottom.
12. Cfr. K.M.D.R. p.418,1. 3 & 4.
mentioned, the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is to
13. anumitatvaviiistam prati tadabhavavattaniicayah pratibandhakah;
be considered as the cause of verbal knowledge in general. tabdatvaviiistam prati tadabhavavattaniicayah pratibandhakah and
Ramarudra concludes the section by pointing out another these two are simpler in comparison with pratyaksanyatvaviiisla’
argument in support of this position. The argument which was jndnatvavacchinnam prati tadabhavavattaniicayah pratibandhakah,
already given by Dinakara is as follows: When there is doubt jndnatvaviSistapratyaksdnyatvavacchinnam prati tadabhavavattanii-
cayah pratibandhakah.
or certainty of the absence of the intention of the speaker, there
14. As for instance, hrado vahniman ityanumitim pratijalavan vahnyabha-
arises no verbal knowledge. Hence also knowledge of the vavan jalavamica hradah itijnanam pratibandhakam. atra
intention of the speaker is to be considered as a cause of verbal vahnyabhavavacchedkatvena grhitajalavattdjnanam vahnyanumitim
knowledge in general. prati pratibandhakam.
15. E.g. kriyanvayi karakam tadbodhakapadam karakapadam. kriyd
dhatvarlhah. tadbodhakam padam dhalupadam kriyapadam.
16. Cfr. S., p. 216,11. 5-6.
Notes 17. It should be noted here that not only aparapadajfidnottaratvam is
akanksd, but also aparapadajnanapurvatvam is also akanksa.
1. The text referred to here seems to be tatparyagarbha casallih. But
18. Pariksit Thampuran points out instances of akanksa other than that
Parlksit Tampuran considers that the text referred to is the sentence
beginning with the word anvayapratiyogi....and ending with betweenprakrti andpratyaya. From the compound word nilaghata,
anapeksitatvat. when there is the verbal knowledge in which pot is qualificand blue
2. Here in the anupurvi ofpidhehi also there are two words the root and is qualifier, and non-difference is the relation, there syntactic
lot suffix. expectancy is nilapadavyavahitoltaraghatapadatvam,i.e. the-state-of-
3. It may be noted here that the M. text as accepted by Dinakara whom being-the-word-gtoa coming immediately after the word blue.
From the sentence niloghatah for the same iabdabodha, the syntactic
we also have followed is nilo ghato dravyam pata ityadau nasallih
expectancy is nilapadaghatapadayoh samanavibhaklikatvam, i.e. the-
bhramacchabdabodhah\ but M. text of Ramarudra is nilo ghato
state-of-having the same case-ending for the words nila and ghata.
dravyam pata ityadavasatlibhramacchabdabodhah.
4. Cfr.S. p.210,1.19. When verbal knowledge is produced by the genitive case denoting
kartrtva, i.e. agency etc., syntactic expectancy is mentioning of the
5. This is because of the nyayavaiesika principl eyogyavibhuviiesagunanam
svottaravrttivtfesagunanafyatvam.
genitive case together with the word endings with krt suffix,
6. Cfr.S. p.’ 212,113.’ [krdantapadasamabhivydhara). As for instance, in the sentence
caitrasya pakah, the genitive case means agency, i.e. the act of
7. Cfr the principle yogyavibuvisesagunanam svotlaravrttivtiesaguna-
nadyatvam. cooking has Caitra as agent In the same way, when the tense-suffix
is used in the sense of bhava or karmatva, then syntactic expectancy
8. caramavarnanubhavah caramavarnasamskaramjanayaii, purvavarna-
is the mentioning together of tense-suffix in the atmanepada with the
samskaran udbodhayati ca udbuddhaih purvapurvavarnasamskaraih
affix yak. Cfr. S., p.217,11. 20ff.
sahitah caramavarnasamskarahtavadvarnavisayakasamuhalambana-
smrtim janayali. 19. This is actually $abdadhydhara\ but when instead of supplying the
9. caturthi sampradane (2.3.13); sprhenpsitah (1.4.36).
word tvam, only the meaning of the word tvam is supplied, it is called
arlhadhyahara. iabdddhyahara is accepted by Naiyayikas while
10. krudhadruhersydsuyarthandmyam prati kopah (1.4.37).
arthadhyahara is accepted by Prabhakaras.
20. Cfr. S., p.217,11.7ff.
21. Cfr. S., p.218,11.6 and ff.
 512 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Appendix 513

22. Cfr. Tattvacintamani pp.118 & 119. Text A

23. Muktavalikara asserts that the Vedas speak about dissolution and he
thinks that dissolution means complete dissolution. This is not
correct because complete dissolution is not described in the Vedas. ^T. I l?Yo | |
By the Vedic sentence dhatd yathapurvam akalpayat (Le Brahma
created as before, i.e. Brahma created the present world as it was
before dissolution) partial dissolution is indicated. Therefore, there
is difference of opinion about the existence of complete dissolution;
if complete dissolution is described in the Vedas, then there would (Karika 140cd, 141)
have been no dispute about the existence of complete dissolution.
Therefore, Dinakara interprets thepralaya mentioned in Muktdvali
as khandapralaya, i.e. partial dissolution. This is how Ramarudra
interprets Dinakara.
But Pariksit Thampuran holds that (Cfr. S. p.218, 11. 20 ff.)
Ramarudra is not quite correct This is because by the M. text na
ca pralaya eva nasti etc. partial dissolution only is meant and it is on
this supposition that the objection is raised. This is because there is 3n*FTflft-
creation only after partial dissolution and nobody admits creation
after complete dissolution.
24. The example for word the denotative function of which is grasped
in many meanings {grhilandndrlhaiaktikampadam) is hari,, meaning
Visnu, horse, monkey etc; the example for a word the implications
of which are grasped in many meanings is the instrumental case
ir^ JM^cq^RiRiRmcr»
(trtiyavibhakti) whose denoted meaning is effort, and whose implied
meanings are karanatvam, sdhilyam etc. An example for a word the
denotative function of which is grasped in one meaning and the
implication of which is also grasped in another meaning (i.e.
ekdrthagrhilalaksandkam padam, i.e. ekarthagrhitaiaklikam ww t-
ekdrthagrhltalaksandkam ca padam), is the word ganga in the
sentencegangaydmghosah where the wxodganga means by denotative PlRfre? WPfcTReTT^Ic^-
function the flow of water, and by implication the bank of the
Ganges. H^RiPiRidcT>cq Ri&mR I d-Hd ^ulcl—

| oqitepf f^rrfR

*4iRuidiRiRr
 514 Appendix 515
Nyaya Philosophy of Language

Comparison and Verbal Testimony are a particular meaning indicates denoted meaning the
determinant of which is that (particular universal) just as the
Separate Means of Valid Knowledge
word ‘cow’ has the universal gotva as the determinant of the-
state-of-being-its-denoted-meaning. Or else the word gavaya
Translation
Karikavati indicates the determinant of the-state-of-being-its-denoted-
meaning because it is a correct word. By means of this
Verbal testimony and Comparison are not to be
Inference it is established, by the force of the reason existing
considered as separate means of valid knowledge, because
in the subject, that it (the word gavaya) indicates the denoted
their purpose is accomplished by Inference. Such is the
meaning the determinant of which is the universal gavayatva.
opinion of the Vaisesikas. This is not correct, since verbal
(The author) finds fault with such an opinion with the words
knowledge etc. arise without the knowledge of invariable
this is not correct (tanna samyak): This is because it is estab¬
concomitance.
lished by our experience that there arises verbal knowledge,
(Karika 140cd, 141)
even without the knowledge of invariable concomitance.
Muktavati There is no proof to show that everywhere after hearing the
Verbal testimony and Comparison [iabdopamanayor words the knowledge of invariable concomitance arises.
iti): In the opinion of the Vaisesikas, Perception and Inference Besides, it should be noted that, if in every instance of verbal
are means of valid knowledge. Verbal testimony and knowledge the knowledge of invariable concomitance is
Comparison are means of valid knowledge only as Inference. postulated, then in every instance of inferential knowledge
As for example, secular words as ‘bring the cow with a stick’ also assuming the knowledge of words, why is it that verbal
and so on or Vedic words are preceded by the valid knowledge knowledge alone is not admitted.
of the relation of recollected meanings which (i.e. relation) is
the object of the intention of the speaker, because they are Text B
group of words having syntactic expectancy etc. like the group
of words bring the jar’. Or else these meanings have mutual f^. TJ^'cf
relation because they are cognised by words having semantic
competency etc., like another meaning of similar nature; in the
example also the sadhya is to be established by means of wff&feftfcT I I 3^
another example. Similarly after the perception of an individual
gayal (it is possible to infer) that the word gavaya indicates the
denoted meaning the determinant of which is the universal
Mdcdlftdl T fttfe FTTftctfcT I
gavayatva because while it does not have any other significatory
function (i.e. implication) elders use that word with reference
to that (gayal). When there is no other significatory function T S#: I M TTW:

(i.e. implication) for a word, a word which is used by elders in

516 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Appendix 517

Plc41g: I ^ ^PlcURt WdNHl4>^<Kqx‘T>i1ui

wpbr «$ifi+MQd4q|p4d«i*KW ^rrqf^fcr fa<dF^v|fo$)iRdTq>: wwqlU: flq[^HqBi«d:
44dlc44F4Vfl dl+lfWI ^cRmt^fTO: I qf^TT ¥ WT#I cn^TT^feWHct^r cTIfTIW^W 3rfcT
RhdVsilRdbH) dtdfH4l^4>c4dMmBd <=4BMk4K>J||q^d) ^cdl^dlct I 3$)ft+lul( <J'2*F^ mcnRW Mcs^i'flt-
4lRdl44H, I VZ W^t %T: ^ '*c4lR'H|J) ^dqsqtdifWqiRcq^di'} d T crf^F: I TT5rf^RT ^‘rcdtM
'flciHc4l<.l‘T'IS-IMl^ai«T^1 B^T^I6r^RHK4KlJll4iyRl4<iMvl d4W4^4l'4MI^ I T R ■qsft^cq TTdt mcnRHi-
+4H44 RR>Tfl<F)df WT<MftA]!Pk4tfmi4 I 3FWWZTW ^q^cddlpM^Picqi dBi^S ifcT qi^H, I HtiBFWB^ul-
4U4<l4Mf^d^d ^rf^RWFT^I dP^ddM^*- 4IW3 441dl4^4^d4dc4l4Btfvld4l PuqF^sviB^^al-
M44<+4ffaBqqfa^^H*q wfeRT WffepT- '+dl^iyiK^yd4HI+K+c4<r4 dqiRpIdF^lBcqi^fcT f^ I
^Vdl^ftcHdl^ldqi M4cf+cd^l 3F^MwT-
W^M+K+cdPi^d W^?^T Translation

Ji<1dRf^!Jl>yj+<«ldc4l^4+K+dM^ ciW^fT^T^f In the opinion of Prabhakara secular wofd conveys the

tji^sii^i^^+k w 3nF ^itfcr i tawfRt Wff- meaning which is already known, only the Vedic word is the
means of valid knowledge. In order to refute his opinion, it is
f^WR?rarafer wf: | cfr dldl<r44ft'44*HdF-
stated Vedic words (vaidiketi). Here, Vedic word is the
■■HKwmf-d^i f^pvT wqfomFiTci;
subject (of the Inference) as the word beginning with the
um w ^&i-tM)R| i expression ‘one who is desirous of heaven should perform
Pl^¥q+Rf^^l^44W °4lf^l5lM’ WrMtar 3fT§--f^ sacrifice’; in this way, we arrive at the knowledge of a particular
semantic relation. Object of intention (tatparyavisayeti): In
^T I 44?l Id +<rM^R) | TOM Wlftc^f: I
the sadhya if the qualification of the-state-of-being-the-object-
d^lR^llSFdlft 4^lR44kHUKfH4l^ of-the-intention-of-the-speaker is not included, then there would
4Mc4lR4sfM+c4lRdVy<4ilft WT^rf^cT *TR: I be the fault of establishing something other than what is to be
^4cHHUHJ aU'+lflRdld'+^c^f^ | Tiftrjd^ established; for instance, when the speaker intending the
WTf: WTWSRfcRT: ^RdlB4c4<^4^lftdc4lBcq relation of the-state-of-being-the-substratum utters the sentence
brahmane vidya, there would be the inferential knowledge of
ten ^ M^twi; #rifw fa^qm^qr
the relation of the-state-of-being-the-object-of-knowledge. In
q)jqdl4l*q qn^tofqRcf: ^ ■HMPlfcl
order to avoid this fault, the qualification of the-state-of-being-
qqfcri w# th e-object-of-the-intention-of-the-speaker is given to the relation
^¥4%q^RcT: 4>4c44H4d' jRlRIcl *4<e4l4)Rfaft ^ of the meanings which are recollected. In the sadhya if the
3f^qpr^qq?niy ^Tcf I ^ qi+IfN^d^d'HMIdl%- expressionpadartha is included only aspadartha, there would
■qrR^i f^RRmr^
not arise the inferential knowledge of relation of the meaning
recollected as pot (from the expression ghatam). In order to
OTT: 44Mld, qis^Pi'Ft R ^TRRT dl^RK^q 4ly+c4-
 518 Appendix 519
Nyaya Philosophy of Language

avoid this fault the qualification of the-state-of-being-recollected which indicates syntactic expectancy the same word should
is given to thepadartha. It is to be understood that recollection also indicate semantic competency etc. Otherwise, there
(of meanings) is to be brought about by the significatory would be deviation because of the fact that the sadhya consists
function. Therefore, there is no harm even if there is no of meanings which are mutually connected. Now it may be
knowledge of semantic relation of ether recollected as ether objected that since the knowledge in which the object of
by means of inherence from a word denoting something activity is the qualificand and the determinant of the-state-of-
(other than ether). In the reason the qualification of syntactic being-desired is qualifier is the cause of activity, the inferential
expectancy is included, otherwise, in the sentence rajnah knowledge of the-state-of-being-preceded by knowledge of
purusah which is a part of the sentence, viz. ay am eti putro semantic relation cannot be the cause of activity because it has
rajnah puruso’pasaryatam, there is deviation. This is because no such form. There is a rule that inferential knowledge has
there is absence of sadhya (i.e. the-state-of-being-preceded by the determinant of the-state-of-being-pervader as qualifier.
valid knowledge of relation of recollected meanings which Hence we can establish the-state-of-being-preceded by valid
(i.e. relation) is the object of the intention of the speaker) since knowledge as the-state-of-being-preceded by valid knowledge.
there is the absence of intention of the speaker with regard to Still from that (Inference) the knowledge in which silverness
the relation of meanings of the words rajan and purusa which etc. is qualifier and the qualificand is that which is in front (of
have semantic competency. The qualification akahksa means the person concerned) cannot arise. In order to obtain such a
here the intention of the speaker with regard to a word in the knowledge one has to admit that Word is a separate means of
form that this word as connected with another (word) should valid knowledge. Therefore itis stated orelse [yadva). Mutual
produce the knowledge of its meaning as connected with the relation (mithahsamsargeti): The meaning is that they have

meaning of the other word by a certain relation. Therefore, it mutual relation which is the object of the intention of the
is not possible to object that it is useless (to add) the rest of the speaker. Therefore, there is no fault of establishing something
part (of the definition) of syntactic expectancy (in the other than what is to be established taking the semantic
enunciation of the reason). In order to avoid deviation relation which is not the intention of the speaker (as the
because of the absence of sadhya in the form of the-state-of- sadhya). Now it may be objected that the invariable

being-preceded by valid knowledge ofsemantic relation in the concomitance cannot be grasped because there is no sure
sentence such as ‘he waters with fire’, the word semantic knowledge of sadhya in the example; therefore it is stated in
competency is used in the reason. In order to avoid deviation the example also (drstante’piti). It may be objected that

arising from the fact that there is reason, because there is everywhere after the hearing of words the knowledge of
syntactic expectancy and the ability to convey meanings invariable concomitance is to be postulated; otherwise, it
which have semantic competency in the expression ‘blue would be impossible to have the effect in the form of
doth y which is a part of the sentence ‘blue pot substance inferential knowledge and so it is stated besides (kimceti).
cloth , the word asatti (contiguity) (is used in the enunciation Assuming the knowledge of words (padajhanam kalpayitveti).
of reason). The word kadamba (group) is used to show that Assuming the recollection of words; this is the meaning. This
syntactic expectancy etc. mutually indicate, i.e. the word is because just as by means of words like ‘fire’ etc. (there is the
 520 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Appendix 521

recollection) of meaning (viz. fire and so on) there is the knowledge such an expression (jar the-state-of-being-the-
recollection of words like ‘fire’ etc. by means also of the object-of-action act of bringing effort) will not produce
meaning in the form of fire and so on. The reason is that just knowledge by its very nature. Others, however, hold that it is
as the relation of the-state-of-being-denoted etc. is the cause of the experience of all that from the sentence ‘separate from jar’
recollection, so also the relation of the-state-of-being-that- and so on there is the verbal knowledge of the substratum of
which-denotes etc. is also the cause of recollection. This is the separateness in which (i.e. in verbal knowledge) the
idea. Further, it is to be understood also that (assuming the qualificandness is not determined (by any characteristic) and
knowledge of words) is indicative also of (assuming) the the qualifier is separateness which has jar as its limit. This
knowledge of syntactic expectancy etc. The author of verbal knowledge can be accounted for in our (i.e. Naiyayikas’)
Tattvacintamam holds that in the Inference viz. these meanings view, because this verbal knowledge is caused by the knowledge
have mutual relation because they have the-state-of-being- of words which have such a sequence. In the opinion of the
conveyed by words associated with semantic competency Vaisesikas such a knowledge (of substratum of separateness)
etc., semantic competency cannot be the qualifier of the cannot be brought about by the Inference that separateness
reason. This is because only the definite knowledge of reason has jar as its limit because it is recollected by the word
is the cause of inferential knowledge. But when there is also ‘seprxate’ which has syntactic expectancy with the word ‘jar’.
doubt about semantic competency verbal knowledge arises. This is because even though separateness is the object of
Therefore, Word is indeed a separate means of valid knowledge. inferential knowledge as subject (of Inference) its substratum
Misra, however, holds that if it is accepted that words convey is not the object of such a knowledge. Nor can it be argued that
the meanings in the capacity of Inference, then there would be having taken cloth as the subject of Inference, the substratum
no possibility (of a division) that the sentence ‘bring the jar’ is of separateness in known by the inferential knowledge that
capable of producing knowledge and the expression, ‘jar the- cloth is the substratum of separateness having jar as its limit.
state-of-being-the-object of action act of bringing effort’ is not Still this inferential knowledge does not have the-state-of-
capable of producing knowledge. This is because in both having-a-form which is similar to the form of such a verbal
expressions there could be Inference. Nor can it be objected knowledge in which the qualificandness is not determined (by
that because of the absence of the reason as connected with any characteristic) because in the inferential knowledge the
syntactic expectancy, there cannot be any inferential knowledge qualificandness residing in cloth and so on is determined by
there (i.e. in the expression, ‘jar the-state-of-being-object-of- clothness which is the determinant of the-state-of-being-the-
action act of bringing effort’). This is because there could be subject.
inferential knowledge even through the erroneous knowledge
of syntactic expectancy. (If it is objected that this inferential Commentary
knowledge would be erroneous because it is caused by According to the Vaisesikas, Perception and Inference
erroneous cognition of syntactic expectancy, the answer is are the only two means of valid knowledge. They hold that
that) since the object ofinferential knowledge is not contradicted Verbal testimony and Comparison are not to be considered
it is valid. If the Word is accepted as a separate means of valid as separate means of valid knowledge, rather both should be
 522 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Appendix 523
included in Inference. This is because the purpose of Verbal
the Inference is tatparyavisayasmaritapadarthasamsarga-
testimony (viz. knowledge of the intended mutual relation of
pramapurvakatvam. Here the qualification tatparyavisaya (the
meanings recollected by words) and the purpose of Comparison
object of the intention of the speaker) is given to samsarga
(viz. knowledge of denotative function of words like gavaya (relation) because, otherwise, there would be the following
and so on) are accomplished by Inference. K. rejects this difficulty. Someone utters the sentence brahmane vidya: this
opinion and establishes that both Verbal testimony and
sentence can be understood in two ways: the brahmin has
Comparison are to be accepted as separate means of valid
knowledge (literally, there is knowledge in brahmin, i.e.
knowledge. This is because knowledge of invariable concomi¬
adhikaranasaplarrii) or someone else has knowledge of which
tance is essential to inferential knowledge. And even without
the brahmin is the object [visayasaptamT). The speaker, however,
the knowledge of invariable concomitance after hearing
intends the first meaning. In order that the hearer also may
words, there arises verbal knowledge. Similarly after the
infer the semantic relation of adhikaranatva and not of
perceptual knowledge of the similarity of cow in gavaya, even
visayatva, the qualification of tatparyavisaya is given to samsarga.
without the knowledge of invariable concomitance, there
If the qualification of smarita (recollected) is not given to
arises the knowledge of the denotative function of the word
padartha in the enunciation of the sadhya, then from the
gavaya.
expression ghatam the inferential knowledge of the relation of
Now in order to establish that Verbal testimony is
meaning as meaning only would arise and not the relation of
included in Inference, M. presents the arguments of the
meaning as jar and so on. And the meaning should be
Vaisesikas to show how Verbal testimony is a means of valid
recollected by means of the significatory function of the word;
knowledge in the capacity of Inference (anumanavidhayaiva
otherwise, by the word ‘jar’, by means of the relation of
iabdasyapramanyam). This is done by means of an Inference
inherence, one can recollect also ether and infer the relation
as follows: Secular words such as ‘bring the cow with a stick’
of ether. Hence there would not be the inferential knowledge
or Vedic words like ‘one who is desirous of heaven should
of the relation ofjar with the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action.
perform sacrifice’ are preceded by the valid knowledge of the
In the enunciation of the reason the qualification of
relation of recollected meanings which (i.e. relation) is the
syntactic expectancy is to be added; otherwise, there would be
object of the intention of the speaker, because they are group
deviation in such ambiguous sentences as the following: ayam
of words having syntactic expectancy etc. like the group of
eti putro rajhah puruso ‘pasaryatam. Here in the part of the
words ‘bring the jar’. Now D. explains this Inference in detail.
sentence rajhah purusah, the speaker does not intend the
First of all, it should be noted that the subject of the Inference
relation of the meanings of words rajan andpurusa. Therefore,
is words or sentence. Such a sentence is not to be taken as
here in this part of the sentence there is no sadhya because the
sentence in general, but as particular sentences, ‘bring the jar’,
speaker has no intention to convey the knowledge of the
‘one who is desirous of heaven should perform sacrifice’ etc.;
relation of the meanings of the words rajan and purusa. But
therefore, the knowledge of a specific semantic relation is
here there is the reason in the form of padakadarnbatva (the-
obtained. Now Dinakara explains the purpose of the
state-of-being-a-group-of-words). Hence there is deviation. In
qualifications in the enunciation of the sadhya. The sadhya in
order to avoid this fault, the qualification of akahksa (syntactic
 524 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Appendix 525
expectancy) is given to the reason. According to the old expression ghatam with the intention of conveying the relation
Naiyayikas, syntactic expectancy is tatpade samabhivyahrtatat- of ghat a and karmatva. Here, if the reason is only
padavisistatvam. And samabhivyahara is padatatpaiya in the akahksadimatpadatvam in a general way, then there would be
form that this word as connected with another word should deviation. As for instance, in such expressions aspatam and so
produce the knowledge of its meaning as connected with the on, there is no sadhya in the form of ghatakarmatvayoh sam-
meaning of the other word by a particular relation. Only this sargapramapurvakatva, but there is the reason of akahksadimat¬
part of the definition of syntactic expectancy is given as a padatvam. When the word kadamba is also used in the
qualification to the reason of the present Inference since the enunciation of the reason such a deviation is avoided. This is
other part of the definition of syntactic expectancy does not because in the sadhya the meanings of certain words are
serve to prevent deviation. included. By the use of the word kadamba in the enunciation
Further the qualification ofyogyata (semantic competency) of the reason the syntactic expectancy of those very words is
is also to be given to the reason; otherwise, in such sentences intended. Here, therefore, in the instance ofpatam, there is no
as vahmna sihcati (he waters with fire), there is the absence of syntactic expectancy because these words, pata and am, do
the sadhya (i.e. tatparyavisayasmaritapadarthasamsargaprama- not convey the meanings which are included in the sadhya, viz.
purvakatva) but there is the reason (i.e. akahksadimatpada- ghat a and karmatva.
kadambatva). Hence there is deviation. Therefore, the qualifi¬ Similarly the use of the word kadamba shows also that the
cation ofyogyata is given to the reason and then in the sentence very word which indicates syntactic expectancy should indicate
vahmna sincati, there is no reason and so there is no deviation. also semantic competency etc. Otherwise, there would be
Further, the qualification of asatti (contiguity) is to be deviation in such sentences as ayam eti putro rajhah puruso
given to the reason; otherwise, there could be deviation in the ’pasaryatam, since there is the reason of syntactic expectancy
following way: Take the sentence ‘blue pot substance cloth’. and contiguity between the words rajan and putra and there
Here the part of the sentence ‘blue cloth’ has no sadhya, but is semantic competency between the words rajan andpurusa
it has the reason (i.e. akahksayogyataghatitapadakadambatvam). (through their meanings), but there is no sadhya in the form of
Therefore, there is deviation. In order to prevent this fault, the tatpryavisayasamsargapramapurvakatva in the part of the
qualification of asatti (contiguity) is given to the reason and sentence rajriah purusah. But when it is stated that the very
since there is no asatti between the words ‘blue’ and ‘cloth’, word which indicates syntactic expectancy should indicate
there is no reason in the part of the sentence ‘blue cloth’. also semantic competency etc. in the sentence mentioned
The last expression in the enunciation of the reason is ayam eti etc. although there is semantic competency in the
kadamba which means samudaya (group). Now it may be word rajan indicated by the word purusa there is no syntactic
objected that since the word kadainba does not help to prevent expectancy indicated by the word purusa in rajan. Therefore,
deviation, it is useless to include it in the enunciation of the in the part of the sentence rajiiah purusah there is no reason
reason. This objection is answered by pointing out that there and so there is no deviation. It should be noted here that the
would be deviation, if the word kadamba is not a part of the point of the argument is that syntactic expectancy etc. which
enunciation of the reason. As for example, someone utters the are included in the enunciation of the reason must mutually
indicate. (Cfr. S. pp. 309-310).
 526 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Appendix 527
However, such an Inference establishing just samsarga-
pramapurvakatvam does not lead to any activity. This is rajatatva (which is the istatavacchedaka) is the qualifier and
because, the cause of activity is the knowledge in which the activity necessarily follows.
qualificand is the object of activity and the qualifier is the Further the argument by which the Vaisesikas try to
determinant of the-state-of-being-desired (iistatavacchedakapra- establish that Comparison could be reduced to Inference is as
karakapravrttivisayaviiesjakajnanam eva pravartakam). As for follows: Elders use, without implication and without erroneous
example, in rajatam madistam, rajatatvam is istatavacchedakam knowledge of denotative function, words like gavaya in that
and rajata is istatavacchedakaprakarakapravrttivisaya. Further, which is determined by gavayatva etc. Therefore, the word
by means of the Inference mentioned earlier, we can establish gavaya indicates gavayatva as the determinant of its state-of-
only samsargapramapurvakatvam as samsargapurvakatvam since being-denoted-meaning.
in every Inference the qualifier is the determinant of the-state- Another Inference to show that Comparison is included
of-being-the-pervader. in Inference is as follows: The word gavaya indicates some
Therefore, such an Inference does not give rise to the characteristic as its pravrttinimitta (i.e. the reason for its
knowledge in which the qualificand is that which is in front of particular application to a particular meaning) because it is a
die person concerned and the qualifier is the determinant of correct word. Here, by means of the force of the reason
the-state-of-being-desired, viz. silverness etc. Hence the existing in the subject, it can be established that the word
proposed Inference does not lead to any activity. Therefore, gavaya indicates the universal gavayatva as the determinant of
to gain the knowledge that leads to activity one has to admit its state-of-being-denoted-meaning which is the same as its
Words as a separate means of valid knowledge. This objection pravrttinimitta.
of the Naiyayikas is answered by the Vaisesikas by proposing Such a view of the Vaisesikas cannot be admitted,
another Inference in the following manner to show that Words because it is our experience that there arises verbal knowledge
ore means of valid knowledge only as Inference. even without the knowledge of invariable concomitance
These meanings have mutual relation which is the object which is essential to Inference. And in fact, after hearing words
of the intention of the speaker, because they are recollected by we do not have the knowledge of invariable concomitance.
words having semantic competency etc. like another meaning Similarly, after perceiving similarity of cow in gayal, even
of a similar nature. Nor can it be objected against this without the knowledge of invariable concomitance, there
Inference that in the example there is no sure knowledge of arises the knowledge of the denotative function of the word
sadhya and so invariable concomitance cannot be grasped. gavaya. Hence both Words and Comparison have to be
This is because, in the example, the sadhya is to be established considered as separate means of valid knowledge.
by means of another example. Therefore, this Inference is It may now be objected that since there is the effect in the
valid and the knowledge which this Inference produces leads form of inferential knowledge after every instance of the
certainly to activity. As for example, someone utters the hearing of the word, its cause, viz. the knowledge of invariable
sentence tdam rajatam. Here the Inference produces the concomitance, is to be postulated. The answer to this objection
knowledge in which idampadartha is the qualificand and is that, by a similar argument, it could as well be shown that
every instance of inferential knowledge can be reduced to
 528 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Appendix 529

verbal knowledge in the following way. An instance of expressions like ‘jar the-state-of-being-object-of-action act of
inferential knowledge like mountain has fire has as object bringing effort’ etc. are not capable of producing knowledge.
certain meanings like fire etc. From such meanings one can If the opinion of the Vaisesikas that words produce knowledge
have the recollection of words like ‘fire’ etc., through the in the capacity of Inference is accepted, then even sentences
such as ‘jar the-state-of-being-object-of-action act of bringing
bandha). Further, one can postulate also such causes of verbal effort’ can produce knowledge because it is possible to have
knowledge as knowledge of syntactic expectancy etc. Now all Inference in the case of these sentences also. As for instance,
the causes of verbal knowledge are present and so the in the present case, we can have the Inference that the
inferential knowledge that mountain has fire can as well be meanings conveyed by the words ‘jar’ ‘the-state-of-being-
considered as verbal knowledge. object-of-action’ ‘act of bringing’ ‘effort’ have mutual relation
Gaiigesa, the author of Tattvacintamani, refutes the because they have the-state-of-being-conveyed by words
opinion of the Vaisesikas in another way. The Inference of the associated with semantic competency etc. Nor can it be
Vaisesikas to establish that Words are means of valid knowledge objected that the reason is not associated with syntactic
in the capacity of Inference is as follows: These meanings have expectancy and so there is no inferential knowledge. The
mutual relation because they have the-state-of-being-conveyed reason is that even through the erroneous knowledge of
by words associated with semantic competency etc. Here, syntactic expectancy there could be inferential knowledge.
semantic competency is a qualification to the reason. But in And the object of such an inferential knowledge is not
order to have an instance of inferential knowledge, there contradicted in our experience; hence, such an inferential
should be definite knowledge of the reason. Therefore, there knowledge is also valid.
should be the definite knowledge of the qualification of the Therefore, in order to avoid such a possibility of knowledge
reason also. Here, in the Inference of the Vaisesikas, yogyata from sentences like ‘jar the-state-of-being-the-object-of-action
(semantic competency) is a qualification of the reason, viz. act of bringing effort’ we have to admit that Word is a separate
yogyatadimatpadopasthapitatvam. Therefore, in order to have means of valid knowledge. And now from such sentences, no
the inferential knowledge, there should be definite knowledge verbal knowledge arises because of the absence of syntactic
of semantic competency which is a qualification of the hetu. expectancy between the words 'jar’, 'the-state-of-being-the-
And a doubt of the qualification leads to the doubt of the object-of-action’ etc. Hence also it is possible to have a division
qualified. But, on the contrary, even if there is doubtful that sentences like ' bring the jar’ etc. are capable of producing
knowledge of semantic competency, verbal knowledge arises. knowledge and sentences like ‘jar the-state-of-being-object-of-
Hence, Words have to be considered as a separate means of action act of bringing effort’ etc. are not capable of producing
valid knowledge. knowledge and such a division of sentences would be impossible
Jayadeva Misra (PaksadharaMisra), however, refutes the in the opinion of the Vaisesikas.
opinion of the Vaisesikas in still another way. According to There are some other Naiyayikas who refute the opinion
both Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas, sentences like ‘bring the jar’ of the Vaisesikas in another way. They point out that from the
and so on are capable of producing knowledge while sentence ‘separate from jar’ it is experienced by all that there
 530 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

is the verbal knowledge in the form of the substratum of Bibliography

separateness which has jar as its limit [ghatdvadhikaprthaktva-
prakarakairayavttesyakaJabdabodhah). In this verbal knowledge
Sources
the qualificandness resides in the substratum and it is not
determined by any characteristic. Separateness (ghatdvadhika-
Bhattoji Dlksita, Siddhdntakaumudi with the commentaiy
prthaktvam) is the qualifier. In the opinion of the Naiyayikas
Bdlamanoramd of Vasudeva Dlksita. Edited by Gopala
such a verbal knowledge can easily be explained from the fact
Sastri Nene, Varanasi, 1982-87: Kashi Sanskrit Series
that it is produced by the knowledge of words having such a
136.
sequence [ghatatprthak). Vaisesikas try to reduce this verbal
BhlmacaryaJhalaklkar, Nydyakota. Ed. V.S. Abhyankar, The
knowledge into an instance of inferential knowledge in the
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1978.
following way. Separateness has jar as its limit because it is
Garigesa Upadhyaya, Tattvacintdmani, Vol IV, parts 1 and 2,
recollected by the word ‘separate’ which has syntactic
Sabdakhanda with the commentaries of Mathuranatha
expectancy with the word ‘jar’. Such an Inference gives rise
Tarkavagisha and Jayadeva Mishra and Raghunatha
only to the knowledge that separateness has jar as its limit
Shiromani's Nanjvada and Akhydtavaada. Edited by Pt.
(ghatavadhikamprthaktvam) and not to the knowledge that the
Kamakhyanath Tarkavagish, Delhi, 1990: Vrajajivan
substratum of separateness which has jar as its limit [ghatava-
Prachyabharati Granthamala, 47.
dhikaprthaktvbSrayah). The reason for this is that although
Gautama, Nydyadrianam with Vatsyayana's Bhasya,
separateness is the object of inferential knowledge as the
Uddyotakara's Vdrttika, Vacaspati Misra's Tdtparyatikd
subject of Inference, the substratum of separateness becomes
and Visvanatha's Vrtti, Ed. by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarka-
in no way the object of the same inferential knowledge.
tirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, Munshiram
Now the Vaisesikas bring forward another inferential
Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1985.
knowledge to show that even the substratum of separateness
Jagadlsa Tarkalankara, £abdafaktiprakafika with Kriinakanti
can become its object, viz. cloth is the substratum of separateness
and Prabodhini. Ed. Dhundhiraj Sastri, Chowkhamba
having jar as its limit. Now it is true that the substratum of
Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1973: Kashi Sankrit
separateness becomes the object of inferential knowledge.
Series 109.
Still the form of this inferential knowledge is not the same as
Kaunda Bhatta, Vaiydkaranabhusanasdra with Prabhd and
the form of the verbal knowledge in question. This is because
Darpana commentaries. Edited by Sri Harivallabha Sastri,
in the verbal knowledge the qualificandness residing in the
Varanasi, 1969: Kashi Sanskrit Series, 188.
substratum is not determined by any characteristic, but in the
Panini, The Ashtadhydyi. Edited and Translated into English by
proposed inferential knowledge the qualificandness residing
Srisa Chandra Vasu, Delhi, 1962.
in the substratum is determined by clothness which is the
Rama Varma Pareekshith Thampuran, Subodhirii - a commen¬
determinant of subjectness. Therefore, the conclusion is that
tary on Bhashapancchheda, Muktavali, Dinakareeya and
verbal knowledge can in no way be reduced to inferential
Ramarudreeya. Sree Rama Varma Government Sanskrit
knowledge and that Verbal testimony is to be considered as
College, Tripunithura, Kerala, 1987.
a separate means of valid knowledge.
 532 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Bibliography 533

£alikanatha Mrira, Prakaranapahcika with the commentary VattankyJ, The Referent of Words: Universal or Individual—The
Nyayasiddhi. Edited by A. Subrahmanya Sastri, Benares, Controversies between Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas, Joumal
1961: Benaras Hindu University Dar$ana Series, 4. of Indian Philosophy, 21,51-78, 1993.
Subrahmanya Sastri V., SabdatarahginL The Sanskrit Education Visvanatha Nyayapancanana, Bhasapariccheda with Siddhanta-
Society, Mylapore, Madras, 1969. muktavali, Translated into English by Swami Madha-
Visvanatha Nyayapancanana Bhatta, Karikavali with vananda, Advaita Asrama, Culcutta, 1954.
Muktavali, Prabha, Manjusha, Dinakariya, Ramarudriya Visvanatha Pancanana Bhattacarya, Karikavali mit des
and Gangarama Jatiya commentaries. Edited by C. Verfassers eignen Kommentar Siddhantamuktavali
Sankara Rama Sastry, Sri Balamanorama Press, Mylapore, ubersetzt von Otto Strauss Abhandlungen fur die Kunde
Madras, 1923: Sri Balamanorama Series, 6. der Morgenlandes, Sechzehnter Band, Leipzig, 1922.
Viswanatha Nyayapanchanana Bhattacharya, Karikavali
with Muktavali, Dinakari and Ramarudri. Edited with
foot-notes etc. by Atmaram Narayan Jere, Varanasi,
1988: Krishnadas Sanskrit Series, 22.
Viswanatha Pancanam, Nyayasiddhantamuktavali with
commentary Kiranawali by Pt. Sri Krisnavallabhacarya.
Edited by &ri Narayanacarana Sastri and Swetavaikuntha
Sastri, Varanasi, 1983: Kashi Sanskrit Series 212.

Translations and Studies

Bhattoji Dlksita, Siddhantakaumudi. Edited and Translated

into English by Srisa Chandra Vasu, Delhi.
Goswami, Ashok Kumar, A Critque on Sabda (based on
Visvanatha's Bhasapariccheda), Sri Satguru Publications,
Delhi, 1991: Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series, 112.
Jha, V.N., Sabdakhanda of the Nyayasiddhantamuktavali.
Sambhasa, Vol 13, 1992.
Sivaramakrishna Sastri, The Word Gomandalam and Commen¬
tators, Raja Sir Annamalai Chettiar Commemoration
Volume, Edited by Dr. B.V. Narayanaswamy Naidu,
Annamalai University 1941.
 Glossary

akhandopadhi indivisible imposed property

ajahatsvartha (laksana) implication in which the word
does not give up its denoted
meaning
atidesavakya sentence conveying similarity
atyantabhava absolute absence
adrsta unseen (merit or demerit)
adhyahara supply of words or meanings
anupapattipratisandhana knowledge of incompatibility
anuyogin subjunct
anuvrtti connecting a word which exists in
another place which is far
anuvyavasaya reflective knowledge
anusanga connecting a word which exists in
another place which is near
anyonyabhava mutual absence
anvayanupapatti incompatibility of semantic
connection
apadanatva the state of being that from which
departure takes place
apeksabuddhi notion of addition
abhighdta conjunction which produces
sound
alaukikasannikarsa extraordinary sense contact
avacchinna determined, qualified
avayavaiakti denotative function of the part(s)
of a word
avayavasamyoga conjunction of parts (of the body),
form, shape, configuration
 Index 537
536 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
karmatvadyanavaruddha not being the object of intention
avasara occasion as the qualifier for another
akrti form, shape, configuration (grammatical) object
karman
akhyata verbal suffix (meaning effort) that which is to be accomplished
kdrya
adhunikasanketita (word) coined by modems to have (meaning) connected with some¬
karyanvita
a specific meaning thing to the accomplished
anubhavikaiakti power (of a word) to bring about limiting factor of time
kalopadhi
verbal knowledge effort, volitional effort
krti
aptavakya statement of a trustworthy person dictionary (one of the eight means
koia
(one of the eight means of knowing of knowing denotative function)
denotative function) khalekapotanyaya the maxim of the pigeons in the
avrtti repeating again a word which threshing floor
exists in its own place globe
gomandala
dsatti contiguity ( a cause of verbal variegated cow-pen
citravraja
knowledge) cause, producer, progenitor
jaiaka
itaretarayogadvandva a particular type of dvandva implication by which the word
jahatsvartha laksana
compound abandons its denoted meaning
ihiareccha will of God (as the denotative universal
jdti
function) jnanalaksanapratyasatti extraordinary sense contact in the
udbhid (1) that which shoots up (i.e. tree, form of knowledge
shrub etc.) (2) a particular kind of affix forming nouns
taddhita
sacrifice intention of the speaker
tatparya
upajivaka effect incompatibility of the intention of
tatparyanupapatti
upaftvya cause the speaker
upamana comparison verbal suffix
tin
upamiti knowledge arising from (1) two r’s (2) a bee
dvirepha
comparison dharmitavacchedakam determinant of the state of being
upamitikaranam instrumental cause of knowledge substratum
arising from comparison verbal root
dhatu
upalaksanam adventitious qualifier traditional implication
nirudhalaksana
ekadeianvaya connection of one meaning with indicated
nirupita
the part of another meaning a particular Naiyayika who holds
Naiyayikaikadeiin
karanam instrumental cause an opinion different from the one
karta agent accepted
kartrtvam the state of being an agent (=krti)
karmatva being the object of action
538 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Index 539

pahkajanikartr that which has origin from mud laksitalaksana indirect relation of denoted
prakarana context (as cause of verbal meaning
knowledge) lot tense suffix (meaning present time)
prakara qualifier lih optative suffix
prakrti stem, base (i.e. noun in its vaktrbuddhivisaya object of the knowledge of the
uninflected state) speaker
pratibadhyaprati- relation between the hindering vakyaiesa remainder of a sentence (one of
bandhakabhava factor and what is hindered the eight means of knowing
pratibandhaka hindering factor denotative function)
pratiyogita adjunctness vigrahavakya sentence in the form of analysis of
prathamantapadopasthapya that which is known by the word the compound
ending in the nominative case vinigamanaviraha absence of a clinching argument
pravrttinimitta reason for the application of a vivarana explanation (one of the eight
particularwordtohave aparticular means of knowing denotative
meaning function
prasiddhapada well known word viiesana qualifier
prdhcah old Naiyayikas vtiesja qualificand
pratipadika a noun in its uninflected state visayita state of having an object
prthivi (the element) earth vrtti significatory function
bhavana the state of being agent or the vyabhicara deviation
state of being the object of action vyavaccheda one of the three elements of the
mandapa (1) he who drinks the scum of meaning of eva
boiled rice or he who protects the vyakarana grammar (one of the eight means
scum of boiled rice (2) aparticular of knowing denotative function)
kind of house vyapara operation (of the instrumental
mimamsa principles of interpretation (of cause)
Vedic texts) vyavrtti distinction
yoga one of the three elements of the vyutpattivaicitrya peculiar expectancy
meaning of eva vraja cow-pen
yogarudha derivatively conventional word iaktam having denotative function
yaugika derivative word iakti denotative function
yaugikarudha derivative and conventional word iaktigraha knowledge of denotative function
rudha conventional word laktinirupakata the state of being that which
laksana implication indicates the denotative function
540 Nyaya Philosophy of Language

iakya denoted meaning

iakyalavacchedaka determinant of the state of being
denoted meaning
iabda word (a means of valid Index
knowledge)
iabdabodha verbal knowledge ajahatsvartha laksana (see Implication)
samsarga relation (of words) Akhyataiaktivada, 161
samsargapratiyogitavac- determinant of adjunctness akahksa (see Syntactic Expectancy)
chedaka indicated by the relation aptavakya (see Denotative Function)
samsarganuyogitavac- determinant of the subjunctness asatti (see Contiguity)
chedaka indicated by the relation Auxiliary Cause : of upamiti — according to old Naiyayikas
samsthana configuration perception of the individual qualified by similarity 2,
sahgati relevance (of the nature of 51, 92; of Sabda — knowledge of denotative function
relationship of cause and effect) 5-6, 53, 114; knowledge of significatory function 125-
samaniyata mutually pervaded and pervader 126
samuhalambanajnana conjunct will, conjunct verbal avyasajyavrtti, ill
knowledge Comparison : means of valid knowledge 1, 51, 89ff.; view of
sahakarin auxiliary cause modem Naiyayikas 1-2, 51, 90-91, 91-92; view of old
sannidhya proximity Naiyayikas 2,51,92; rejection of old Naiyayikas’ view
samagri causal complex 92-95; view of Naiyayikaikadesin and its rejection 2-3,
samanadhikaranya relation of coexistence 52,92-93,96-98; view that Comparison is not apramana
sahitya association different from Perception and its rejection 5, 52, 90,
siddha accomplished 107-110; opinion of the Vaisesikas that Comparison is
siddhapada well known word not a separate pramana but it is included in Inference
smarakaiakti power of a word to bring about and rejection of this view 49-50, 514-530
the recollection of its meaning. Compounds : no implication in Compounds but only in the
word constituting the compound (see also Implication);
bahuvrihi: there is implication for the second word 38-
39,75,337,338-342; ekadeianvaya not accepted 38-39,
76-77,338,339-340; tatpurusa : implication accepted in
the first word 3940, 75, 77, 342-343, 344-360;
itaretaradvandva : no implication 41ff., 75, 77, 361-62,
365-367, 371-385; rejection of the MImamsakas view
that implication is to be accepted for dvandva
 Index 543
542 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
rejection of this view 10-13, 54-56, 134-135, 138-143,
compounds in the substratum of association (sahitya) 144-162; view of Mimamsakas’ on the function of
4142, 77-78, 361, 366, 371-378; difference between verbal suffix and Naiyayikas’ rejection of this view 58-
dvandva and karmadharya 77, 362, 367, 378,381-383; 59, 135, 142-143,162-166; 2. Comparision (upamana):
samaharadvandva: 4243,76,79,362-363,368-370,385- 13,59,175 (see Comparison); 3. Dictionary (koia): 13-
388; virupaikaiesa : 76, 363, 370-371, 388-389; 14, 59, 175, 184-186; 4. Statement of a trustworthy
sarupaikaiesa : *75, 78, 361, 382-385, 389-390; person (aptavakya) : 14, 60, 175-176, 184; 5. Action
karmadharya : 43, 76, 80-81, 381, 390; the compound brought about by usage [vyavahara): 14-16, 60, 176-
nisadasthapti in the Vedas is karmadharaya and not 177; Prabhakaras’view and its refutation 14-16,60,176-
tatpurusa 390-392,393-397; avyayibhava: second word 177,180-183,187-196; Bhatta Mimamsakas’ view and
has implication 44, 76, 81, 398, 399404. its refutation : 197-199; 6. Remainder of a sentence
Contiguity (asatti): One of the four cause of verbal knowledge (vakyaiesa): 16,60, 177,183,199-200; 7. Explanation
4446,81,408410,414ff, 423; view of the old Naiyayikas (vivarana): 16-17,60,177,183-184,200-201; 8. Proximity
—juxtaposition of two words the semantic connection of a well known word (prasiddhapadasannidhya): 17,
of whose meanings is intended by the speaker and its 60, 178, 184, 201-202; Denotative Function is in the
knowledge is cause of verbal knowledge 44, 81, 408, individual qualified by universal and form but not in
424; view of the modem Naiyayikas —juxtaposition of universal only; controversy between the Mimamsakas
the instances of knowledge of two words connection of and the Naiyayikas 17-27, 61-66, 205-206, 209-214;
whose meanings is intended by the speaker and this Mimamsakas’ opinion 215-218; Naiyayikas’ rejection
juxtaposition is cause of verbal knowledge 45-46, of the view of the Mimamsakas 218-247; Denotative
84-85, 408-410, 424-444; rejection of old Naiyayikas’ Function of pronouns : 27-29, 66-67, 248-257
view : 4546, 82, 415419, 424444; Prabhakaras’ view Didhiti, 161
regarding supply of meanings of words and Naiyayikas’ DIdhitikara, 58
opinion that supply of words alone is necessary 83,410, Dissolution (pralaya) : according to Muktavallkara there is
421423; mere existence of contiguity is not cause of complete dissolution 497; according to Dinakara there
verbal knowledge 414415, 423-424. is only partial dissolution 500 note 23 (512)
Denotative Function [Sakti) : relation between word and Division of Words: four kinds 29-31,67,68,267-268; derivative
meaning 7,53,126; according to the old Naiyayikas it (yaugika) 29-30, 261; conventional [rudha) 30, 261;
is in the form of will of God 7,53,115,127; according derivatively conventional [yogarudha) 30-31, 68-70,
to the modern Naiyayikas it is in the form of only will 261-262,264-267,268-282; derivative and conventional
7-10, 115, 117-118, 127-128; Dinakara’s arguments (yaugikarudha) 31, 261, 282
against old Naiyayikas 53-54, 115-118; eight means of ekakriyanvayitva, 372-373
knowing Denotative Function : 10, 54, 134-144; 1. eva (its denotative function in anya, yoga and vyavaccheda), 27,
Grammar (vyakarana) : view of the Grammarians on 246, 261, note 6 (171-172)
the Denotative Function ofverbal suffix and Naiyayikas’
544 Nyaya Philosophy of Language Index 545

Garigesa (Upadhyaya), 69, note 10 (172), 278, 279, 528 of words by sense organ of hearing or knowledge of
gomandala, as a conventional word, 68 words which arises from seeing the written word 5,53,
gomandapa, as variant reading for gomandala is incorrect, 68 114; knowledge itself of words 6, 53, 113-114, 121-122
Implication (laksana): one of the significatory functions: 7,53, Intention of the Speaker [tatparya): knowledge of intention of
116; relation with that meaning which is conveyed by speaker as cause of verbal knowledge 48-49, 83, 88,
the denotative function 32, 70, 285; incompatibility of 496497, 499-501; context not the cause of verbal
semantic connection or incompatibility of speaker’s knowledge 86,497,499-500,504-506; knowledge of the
intention as the basis for laksana according to the old intention of God for the verbal knowledge arising
Naiyayikas 32,70, 298; incompatibility of intention of from Veda 497, 507-508
speaker alone is the basis of (laksana) according to the Knowledge of Vedic sentences arises from principles of
modem Naiyayikas 32, 70, 71, 285-288, 291, 292 297- interpretation 'mbnamsa) 497, 500, 509-510
300; two kinds of laksana : jahatsvartha and jahatsvarthalaksanu implication)
ajahatsvartha 32,71,290,298; jahatsvartha [laksana) — Jayadeva Misra (Paksadhara Misra), 528
that by which a word abandons its denoted meaning kalikasambandha, 376
33, 71, 290, 300; ajahatsvartha (laksana) — that by karyanvitaiakti and k a ry a t va n vitas a kti, 187ff
which the word does not give up its denoted Katyayanavarttikam, 186
meaning 33-35, 289-290, 300ff.; implied implication koia (see Denotative Function—Dictionary)
[laksitalaksana) — indirect relation of the denoted laksana (see Implication)
meaning 36, 70-71, 287, 292-293, 317-319; included in Knowledge arising from Comparison (upamiti) : in the form
jahatsvartha, 72,287,317-318; views of old and modem that a gayal is to be denoted by the word gayal and not
Naiyayikas whether the word which is said to have in the form that this individual is to be denoted by the
implication brings about verbal knowledge : 36, 71, word gayal 3-5, 51, 52, 89, 90, lOlff; view that
293, 319-320; rejection of implication in sentences : samsthanaviiistagavayapadavacya is upamiti and the
views of MImamsakas and Naiyayikas 37-38,71,74-75, rejection of this view 100-105.
287-288,294-297,320-335; no implication in Compounds Manikara, 265
as a whole but only in one of its constituent words: see Maxim that word uttered once conveys only one meaning,
Compounds. 281
Instrumental Cause [karana) : of upamiti — according to Maxim of pigeons and the threshing floor, 409, 439
modern Naiyayikas perceptual knowledge of similarity Naiyayikaikdesin (=Yajnapati Upadhyaya), note 1 (110)
2,51,89,95-97; according to the old Naiyayikas verbal nirupyanirupakabhava, note 10 (132)
knowledge arising from the sentence conveying nirudhalaksana see (Traditional Implication)
similarity 2,51,89,90,92,94-98; knowledge of similarity Operation (of the Instrumental Cause): in upamiti—recollection
alone according to particular Naiyayika and rejection of the meaning of the aiideivakya according to the
of this view 2-3,52,92-93,96-97; of Sabda — perception modem Naiyayikas 2,51,90 passim', recollection of the
546 Nyaya Philosophy of Language
Index 547
meaning of the atidelavakya after perception of the
thing similar to something according to old Naiyayikas of semantic competency as the cause of verbal
and rejection of this view 2,51,92-96; verbal knowledge knowledge 46, 83, 459, 462-464, 465478; Dinakara’s
of the meaning of the atidelavakya and the perceptual rejection of the modern Naiyayikas 84-85, 462-465
knowledge of the individual qualified by similarity Siddhantakaumudi, note 2 (203), note 8 (406), note 9 (406)
according to a particular Naiyayika 2, 52, 92, 96; in Significatory Function (vrtti) : relation between word and
labda — recollection of meaning of words 5, 6-7, 53, meaning 7, 112; two kinds : lakti and laksana 53, 114
113-114; knowledge of meaning of words 53,113-114, Sivaramakrishna Sastri, K.A., not 2 (283)
122-126. sphota, Grammarians’ view and its rejection, 83, 410, 445-449
Paksadhara Misra (see Jayadeva MiSra) Syntactic Expectancy (dkdriksd) : relation of a word with
prayapti relation, 372-373. 376 another word without which it cannot produce verbal
Prabha, note 1 (131) knowledge or the-state-of-being-qualified by one word
Prakaranapahcika, note 16 (203) in the other word by the relation of coming immediately
prakaratavada, 353ff. before or immediately after that word 47-48,83,84-85,
prakrtyarthanvitasvarthabodhakatvam, 401, note 16 (406) 479, 480, 485-486; exists only between stems and
pralaya (see Dissolution) suffixes and not between verbs and kdraka words 48,
prasiddhapadasannidhya (see Denotative Function) 83, 87, 479-180, 482483, 485489
Raghunatha Siromani, 161 TaUvacintdmani, note 10 (172), 504, 528
Relation of difference (bhedasambandha), 39, 40 tdtparya (see Intention of the Speaker)
Relation of non-difference [abhedasambandha), 39-40, 43 Traditional Implication (nirudhalaksand), 351-352, note 4
rudha (see Denotative Function) (405)
labda (see Word) upamana (see Comparison)
Sabdalaktiprakalika, 273 Vaisesikas : view that Comparison (upamana) and Word
Sabdatarahgini, note 9 (172), note 3 (203), note 16 (204) (tabda) are not independent pramanas but included in
lakti (see Denotative Function) Inference 49-50, 513-530
Salikanatha, note 16 (203) Vaiyakaranabhusana, note 3 (170)
sahitya (Implication in) (see Implication) Verbal Knowledge : nature of 5-7, 53-54, 113-128; causes of
Semantic Competency {yogyata) : relation of one meaning (see Contiguity, Semantic Competency, Syntactic
with another meaning and knowledge of such relation Expectancy and Intention of the Speaker)
is a cause of verbal knowledge 46, 83, 458, 459, 463; Verbal suffix: denotes effort 10-1 l,5(i; denotes the grammatical
view of old Naiyayikas — cause of verbal knowledge is number of the agent 10, 5(>; denotes action and
not only definite knowledge of semantic competency rejection of this view 5(>-57
but also its doubt 46, 83, 459, 461, 464-465; view of vivarana (see Denotative Function)
modem Naiyayikas — definite knowledge of absence vrtti (see Significatory Function)
vyapara (see Operation)
vyasajyavrtti, 377
 i

Nyaya Philosophy of Language

548

vyavahara (see Denotative Function)

Will of God (see Denotative Function)
Word Uabda): division into four kinds 29-31,66,67, 261-262
266; derivative (yaugika) 29-30,259-260; convention^
Irudha) 30,260; derivatively conventional (yogarudha)
30-31 68-70,262-263,264-267,267-282; derivative and
conventional (yaugikarudha) 31, 263, 282; Vaiseskas’
view that Word is not a separate pramana but is
included under Inference and rejection of this view 49-
50,514-515,517-530
Yajnapati Upadhyaya (Naiyayikadesin), note 1 (110)
yogarudha (see Word)
yaugikarudha (see Word)
yogarudha (see Word)
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