Contention X: Counter-Terrorism

Terrorism has been on the decline because of executive orders and the creation of the
DHS.
Smith ‘17
The evidence suggests that the years since 9/11 have been different from those preceding them. Once the
prevalence of conflicts is accounted for, the post-9/11 era is a significantly less terror
prone period than the years before it. A country not suffering civil conflict was upwards
of 60 percent more likely to experience terrorism prior to or during the year 2001 than
since.
Lieberman ‘21
Twenty years after the terrorist attacks on September [9/]11, 2001, the establishment of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) looks like one of the most important and effective
government responses to the traumatic events of that day [9/11]. While DHS has faced its share of
challenges over the past two decades, the United States is much more secure today because [the DHS]
is there. We have not had another terrorist attack on our homeland as large and deadly
as 9/11, and most smaller attempts have been stopped.
Warrant: The precursor to the DHS was created by Executive Order 13228 and laid the
foundation for the DHS.
Roos ‘25
A month after the shocking terrorist attacks of September [9/]11, 2001, President
George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13228 creating the Office of Homeland Security
within the White House. The Office and its first director, Tom Ridge, were tasked with
developing and coordinating a national strategy for combating a new type of security
threat. It became clear that responsibility for the nation’s homeland security was spread across more than 100 different overlapping

departments and agencies, often with poor cross-communication. So, in 2002, Bush proposed the creation of a
unified Department of Homeland Security that combined 22 existing federal agencies. In
Bush’s words, it was “the most significant transformation of the U.S. government in over
a half-century.”
Judge, the creation of the Office of Homeland Security quickly after 9/11 was crucial
for counter-terrorism efforts, and ultimately laid the groundwork for the formation of
the DHS.
This executive order was especially important because Congress was hesitant to pass
anti-terrorism legislation.
McCullagh '01
Congress isn't going to rush to rewrite wiretapping and immigration laws [regarding
terrorism], insist Democratic and GOP legislators. They say they'll move quickly on President Bush's anti-terrorism
plan, while being careful to balance security with freedom. Declan McCullagh reports from Washington. WASHINGTON -- Few would
have predicted it in the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, but Congress is not
rushing to enact sweeping anti-terrorism laws.

Impacts
Impact: The DHS has likely saved thousands of lives and is essential to ensuring the
safety of our nation.
Dahl ‘21
This paper is based on an updated original data set that shows that [the] DHS and other security agencies have [has] effectively
thwarted 230 terrorist attacks and violent plots in the U.S. since 9/11.
Without the DHS, millions of people could have died.
Myhrvold ‘14
The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people [terrorists] with
much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain
access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than—those held by
any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill
millions or even billions. Indeed, it is possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The
gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming
silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any degree of
seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. The Power of the Stateless

For generations, the biggest menaces to our nation have been other nuclear-weapons states, especially the Soviet Union and China. Russia is on a much less confrontational path than the USSR was in its day, but China will soon rival the United States as an economic superpower. It will
outgrow us, but does China really pose a military threat? After all, launching an attack that might kill a million Americans would trigger a retaliatory attack that might kill 100 million Chinese. What’s more, most of those million Americans would be wearing clothes and digital watches, and
buying consumer items made in China. Killing your best customers just isn’t good business, and besides, they are already on a path to great wealth and success. A direct military attack from China seems very remote. Failing nation-states—like North Korea—which possess nuclear weapons
potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less understood danger arises from the increasing
likelihood that stateless groups, bent on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison. The ultimate response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear
counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result, they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield
much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists often hope to provoke reprisal attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in point. While it
seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S. would go so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the

organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived and adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually, the world will
recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists
can wield weapons and mount assaults that no nation-state would dare to attempt.