9- 6 2 1 - 103

APRIL 15, 2021

ANTONIO MORENO

SANTIAGO GALLINO

AMY KLOPFENSTEIN

Buy Online, Pickup in Store: Evaluating an

Omnichannel Intervention in Retail
In April 2019, Sylvia Coparella, founder and CEO of fashion, wellness, and beauty retailer
Sylvarella, prepared for a meeting with Charla Limont, vice president (VP) of e-commerce, and Axley
Vega, VP of store operations. Coparella had called the meeting to discuss the company’s Buy Online,
Pickup in Store (BOPS) program, which it implemented six months earlier after taking note of changes
in the retail landscape. However, both Limont and Vega had raised concerns about the program’s
potential impact on their respective units’ performances. The CEO now needed to evaluate the early
results of the BOPS program. How was BOPS affecting Sylvarella’s sales? Should the company continue
BOPS? What criteria did Coparella and her team need to consider as they approached this decision?

Sylvarella History and Culture

The daughter of a seamstress and single mother, Coparella grew up surrounded by beautiful clothes
that she could not afford. When she was in high school, she began helping her mother with alterations.
As a freshman at the University of Southern California (USC), she opened a part-time business
designing and tailoring clothes for her wealthy classmates. In 1995, she graduated from USC with a
business degree and a small but loyal client base.

Inspired by her lifelong dream to make every woman feel like a princess, Coparella opened the first
Sylvarella store in Los Angeles, California in 1996. Although most products were priced at a premium,
the store’s seasonal sales ensured that prices remained within the threshold of splurge purchases for
customers with less disposable income. Coparella also focused on the shopping experience itself,
installing chandeliers, whimsical decorations, and floor-to-ceiling mirrors throughout the store.

The company’s first store met immediate success, and Coparella soon expanded to new locations.
As sales grew, she broadened the company’s product offerings, launching a men’s clothing line,
wellness and beauty products, baby clothes, and a sportswear line. Stores also sold select offerings of
accessories, jewelry, and perfume. The company offered a full cash refund for items returned within
30 days of purchase and store credit for items returned up to 60 days after purchase. Return policies

HBS Professor Antonio Moreno, Professor Santiago Gallino (Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania), and Case Researcher Amy
Klopfenstein (Case Research & Writing Group) prepared this case. This case is not based on a single individual or company but is a composite
based on the author’s general knowledge and experience. This case draws from ideas presented in the unpublished case “Keg and Table: Evaluating
an Omnichannel Intervention in Retail,” by Santiago Gallino, Antonio Moreno, and Farah Mihoubi. Funding for the development of this case was
provided by Harvard Business School. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as
endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.

Copyright © 2021 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685,
write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied,
or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.

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 621-103 Buy Online, Pickup in Store: Evaluating an Omnichannel Intervention in Retail

were similar to those of rival stores such as Anthropologie and JCrew. 1 By 2018, Sylvarella had more
than 80 stores in the United States and Canada. Stores tended to be located in the heart of major cities.

Coparella mandated that Sylvarella employees treat customers like royalty. She and her leadership
team advised store associates to consider themselves fashion consultants and offer customers
personalized shopping guidance. Shoppers could drink complimentary lemon- or cucumber-flavored
water during their visits, and customers who joined Sylvarella’s rewards program received free tea,
sparkling water, or coffee. Store associates encouraged customers to take samples of beauty or wellness
products while they shopped, as they often purchased the items during their next visit. Store associates
earned commissions on sales and were eligible for a year-end bonus based on customer reviews.

In 2003, Sylvarella launched an e-commerce platform. The company’s e-commerce presence served
210 Designated Market Areas (DMAs) in the U.S. and Canada. Many of the DMAs represented regions
where Sylvarella did not have a brick-and-mortar store; thus, the e-commerce department was
responsible for outreach to a broader pool of potential customers than the store operations team. E-
commerce employees earned a yearly bonus based on the department’s overall sales, though the team
tracked sales by DMA to evaluate regional trends and determine which areas could benefit from
additional marketing outreach. While online sales showed promising signs of growth, by 2018 some
customers had expressed frustration with high shipping costs and frequent delays (see Exhibit 1).

Retail Industry Trends

In spite of Sylvarella’s success, the company faced an uncertain future. In the 2010s, the retail
industry experienced massive disruptions, particularly in response to the rising dominance of e-
commerce through platforms such as Amazon. 2 In 2016, there were approximately 1.07 million retail
stores in the U.S. 3 Many observers predicted that the rise of e-commerce would force many brick-and-
mortar locations to close, with some projecting the closure of approximately 75,000 stores by 2026.4
However, the majority of retail transactions continued to take place in-store. In 2019, e-commerce
transactions accounted for approximately 16% of retail purchases; analysts anticipated that the
proportion of online sales would increase to 25% by 2026. 5

Many retailers established both digital and physical sales channels to adapt to the changing
landscape. In 2016, Amazon opened its first physical store and ultimately expanded its brick-and-
mortar outlets to include bookstores, grocery stores, and Amazon 4-star, which curated a variety of its
best-selling e-commerce products, such as games, electronics, and household items. 6 Other sites that
originated as e-commerce-only platforms, such as makeup vendor Glossier and women’s clothing
retailer ModCloth, opened physical showrooms to allow customers to test their products before
purchasing. 7 On the other hand, home goods retailer Williams Sonoma, which originated as a brick-
and-mortar operation and opened an e-commerce channel in 1999, reported in 2018 that more than 50%
of the company’s revenues derived from e-commerce orders.8

Meanwhile, other businesses focused on “experiential retail,” which entailed creating features to
enhance the shopping experience in brick-and-mortar stores. For example, athleisure retailer
Lululemon offered in-store yoga sessions, while Whole Foods provided cooking classes in addition to
groceries. 9 Some observers attributed the rise of experiential retail to millennial customers’ tendency
to spend money on experiences rather than physical products. 10

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 Buy Online, Pickup in Store: Evaluating an Omnichannel Intervention in Retail 621-103

Changing Consumer Behavior

Amidst disruptions in the retail industry, companies also had to meet rising consumer standards.
Some observers called consumer expectations of a seamless shopping, purchase, and delivery
experience the “Amazon effect.” 11 A 2019 consumer insights report advised retailers to begin
measuring customers’ return on experience (ROX) alongside other key performance indicators. 12
Research suggested that retailers that provided high-level customer experiences had the potential to
price their merchandise at a 16% premium. 13

Customers increasingly demanded that retailers prioritize convenience, which could encompass
many different elements of a shopping, purchase, and delivery journey: fast service, a wide array of
product options, one-stop shopping, or customized products. 14 A 2019 survey found that more than
60% of consumers reported that they were willing to pay more for convenience, while more than 90%
expressed that convenience influenced their choice of retailer. 15

The rise of e-commerce allowed consumers to compare prices and products online when they
otherwise would have had to visit multiple stores. According to a 2019 study, “81% of shoppers do
online research before committing to a purchase.” 16 Consumers’ online research tended to focus on
comparing prices among different stores, as product price remained the top purchasing consideration
for a majority of online shoppers. 17 However, by 2018 the overall percentage of consumers who
prioritized price was declining, with an increasing number of people citing features such as multiple
fulfillment options or fast delivery as their top considerations. 18

Within e-commerce, consumers increasingly used digital technologies such as mobile phones,
tablets, and virtual assistants to shop. 19 In 2019, approximately 36% of consumers reported that they
purchased products online at least once a month and were more likely to make purchases on mobile
devices rather than personal computers. 20 Meanwhile, one source estimated that purchases completed
through virtual assistants and other voice-controlled devices would reach $40 billion by 2022. 21 The
proliferation of digital channels and technologies produced a high volume of user data, which retailers
used to create personalized recommendations and shopping experiences. 22

The Rise of Omnichannel Retail

Responding to changing consumer behavior, retailers increasingly shifted from multi-channel
retail, in which they operated online and physical units independently of one another, to omnichannel
retail, in which they integrated their digital and brick-and-mortar operations. 23 Omnichannel retail
required consumer data to flow continuously between all consumer touchpoints, including mobile
applications (apps), in-person interactions, and web-based orders. 24 For instance, a store associate at a
brick-and-mortar location could access order information that a customer entered online. 25 When
properly executed, omnichannel retail allowed consumers to begin their customer journey through one
channel and resume their journey through a different channel with minimal interruption. 26

Omnichannel retailing aimed to provide customers similar, if not the same, shopping and purchase
experiences across digital and physical channels. 27 This required companies to communicate in-store
product availability to customers on digital platforms, offer similar customer service features across all
channels, and enable customers to order and return merchandise through all channels. 28 Some retailers
even unveiled platforms to allow customers to virtually test makeup and clothing. 29

One industry expert noted that omnichannel “inventories and supply chains are managed as single
entities, which allows retailers to respond to customer needs anywhere and anytime.”30 While this

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 621-103 Buy Online, Pickup in Store: Evaluating an Omnichannel Intervention in Retail

required substantial effort, research suggested that omnichannel operations were necessary to meet
changing customer expectations: almost 80% of consumers considered product availability when
contemplating a purchase, while almost 70% of online shoppers reported that they were less inclined
to purchase from a retailer that did not disclose in-store availability. 31 Accordingly, by 2017 more than
90% of retail companies had either implemented an omnichannel program or were developing one. 32

However, omnichannel measures led to mixed financial outcomes. Customers who shopped
through multiple channels spent more on their overall purchases than single-channel customers. 33 Yet,
most retailers absorbed many of the increased operating costs associated with omnichannel measures,
including delivery costs and high volumes of returns from e-commerce purchases. 34 By 2017, 10% of
retailers reported that they were able to make a profit from omnichannel customers. 35

Click and Collect

Whilst shifting from multi-channel to omnichannel retail, many companies began to implement
“click and collect” programs that allowed customers to place orders online but collect or return
products in physical stores.

Buy Online, Pickup in Store (BOPS) programs sought to combine consumer demand for
convenience with the rise of online shopping. Under BOPS, consumers purchased a product from a
retailer’s website, then retrieved it from the physical store. 36 Customers could view a specific location’s
available inventory online, purchase a product, and pick it up from the store immediately. If a product
was not in stock, customers could purchase the product and have it shipped to the store, and the store
would then notify them when the product was available. 37 Typically, a store employee would retrieve
the purchased item and hold it at the customer service desk until the customer claimed their purchase. 38
Some retailers also offered curbside pickup within their BOPS programs, which required a store
representative to deliver pre-purchased products directly to customers’ cars. 39

BOPS guaranteed that a customer’s desired product would be available before they made a trip to
the store, allowing them to avoid shipping fees. 40 Assuming the item was available in-store, customers
could secure their purchase instantly rather than waiting for shipping.41 BOPS also eliminated the risk
that a delivered package could be stolen from outside an individual’s home. 42 Almost 85% of customers
who purchased an item through BOPS bought additional items when they retrieved their product from
the store. 43 BOPS also provided retailers potential savings throughout their supply chain, as delivering
to a store often cost less than shipping to a residential location. 44

Many BOPS programs also allowed customers to make in-store returns for e-commerce purchases. 45
Brick-and-mortar stores that accepted online returns had the potential to increase in-store visits;
however, stores also had to shift their inventory management programs to account for the rising
number of returns.46 By 2019, consumers returned up to 40% of online apparel and footwear orders,
while return rates for in-store purchases ranged from 5% to 10%. 47

Meanwhile, Buy Online, Pickup in Locker (BOPL) programs enabled customers to collect their
purchases from select locker locations in their city or neighborhood. BOPL programs sent customers
notifications with a personalized barcode or password to open the locker and retrieve their
merchandise when their item was ready for pickup. 48 Many BOPL locations provided 24-hour access,
giving customers increased flexibility regarding when they could pick up their purchases and
removing the need for an in-store customer service representative to manage the pickup process. 49

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 Buy Online, Pickup in Store: Evaluating an Omnichannel Intervention in Retail 621-103

Omnichannel Retail at Sylvarella

Sylvarella was slow to adopt omnichannel initiatives compared to rival apparel companies, as its
loyal customer base and strong brand insulated it from many of the pressures facing retail chains.
However, by 2018 sales had begun to decline (see Exhibit 2), prompting Coparella and her leadership
team to reevaluate the company’s strategy.

Coparella was convinced that Sylvarella needed to meet changing consumer expectations in order
to survive and considered the merits of adopting a BOPS program. However, her leadership team was
divided. Limont was strongly in favor of adopting a BOPS program, reasoning that consumer demand
was shifting toward e-commerce and that the majority of the company’s future sales growth would
stem from online sales. Therefore, she thought the company should focus on improving its online
offerings, pointing out that BOPS allowed shoppers to circumvent shipping fees and delays.

Vega, on the other hand, raised concerns that BOPS would simply shift brick-and-mortar sales
online rather than improving sales overall. She argued that BOPS would likely benefit Limont and her
e-commerce team, who would receive a higher bonus if online sales improved. However, she thought
the program might decrease the number of in-store purchases, resulting in store associates receiving
lower commissions and end-of-year bonuses. She suggested that Sylvarella instead invest in improved
shipping logistics to reduce delays and explore ways to reduce shipping costs to customers.

Although Coparella was sensitive to Vega’s objections, she ultimately concluded that Sylvarella
should begin offering BOPS. There was strong evidence in favor of consumer demand for BOPS: in
March 2018, roughly two-thirds of U.S. consumers reported using a BOPS program in the previous six
months. 50 The CEO assured her team that she would evaluate the results of the program after its first
six months. If there was not tangible evidence to support the benefits of the program, she would make
changes, and perhaps even discontinue it altogether.

BOPS Implementation
In October 2018, Sylvarella rolled out its BOPS pilot program. The implementation occurred on the
same day in every U.S. store. The chain’s Canadian locations did not adopt BOPS, as Coparella decided
that managing an international implementation would be too complicated during the pilot period.

Sylvarella’s BOPS program allowed in-store returns for e-commerce purchases, although it did not
offer curbside pickup. Nor did the company offer BOPL, although Coparella considered piloting a
BOPL system in a handful of major urban centers if she saw strong demand for click and collect
programs. Meanwhile, the BOPS implementation required significant effort from both the store
operations and e-commerce teams. Vega’s store operations team coordinated in-store pickups and
returns from BOPS orders, while Limont’s e-commerce team processed orders and payments. The e-
commerce team also oversaw the rollout of the new BOPS web platform. Both teams had to work
together closely to communicate updates regarding inventory.

Coparella reviewed her notes for her meeting with Limont and Vega. Both would have different
perspectives on the first six months of BOPS, as well as recommendations for what course the company
should pursue regarding its fulfillment programs. Which factors did the CEO need to consider when
analyzing the preliminary BOPS results? What impact was the program having on the different sales
channels and the company’s overall sales? Finally, should Sylvarella continue the BOPS program?

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 621-103 Buy Online, Pickup in Store: Evaluating an Omnichannel Intervention in Retail

Exhibit 1 Sylvarella Shipping Fees and Delays by Delivery Method, October 2018

Delivery Time
Method (Business Days) Fees (USD) % Delayed
Standard 8–10 $5.99 18.5
Expedited 5–7 $8.99 9.8
Express 2–4 $11.50 7.3
Overnight 1 $25.95 5.0

Source: Company documents.

Exhibit 2 Sylvarella Sales Figures, 1996-2018

$120,000,000

$100,000,000

$80,000,000

$60,000,000

$40,000,000

$20,000,000

$0
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Source: Company documents.

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 Buy Online, Pickup in Store: Evaluating an Omnichannel Intervention in Retail 621-103

Endnotes

1 Anthropologie, “Returns & Exchanges,” https://www.anthropologie.com/help/returns-exchanges; JCrew, “Returns &

Exchanges,” https://www.jcrew.com/help/returns-exchanges; both accessed April 2020.
2 Nick Statt, “Amazon and Walmart’s Rivalry Is Reshaping How We’ll Buy Everything in the Future,” The Verge, August 3,
2018, https://bit.ly/39tjDsa, accessed March 2020.
3 “The US retail industry: How is online retail affecting brick and mortar businesses?” USA Facts, October 3, 2019, updated
September 23, 2020, https://bit.ly/3jVqph5, accessed April 2020.
4 Abha Bhattarai, “‘Retail Apocalypse’ Now: Analysts Say 75,000 more U.S. Stores Could Be Doomed,” The Washington Post,
April 10, 2019, https://wapo.st/2JsABMs, accessed March 2020.
5 Fareeha Ali, “A Decade in Review: Ecommerce Sales vs. Retail Sales,” Digital Commerce 360, March 3, 2020,
https://bit.ly/2wFu7r7; Bhattarai, “‘Retail Apocalypse’ Now: [. . .],” both accessed March 2020.
6 Ben Fox Rubin, “Amazon Now Operates Seven Different Kinds of Physical Stores. Here’s Why,” Cnet.com, February 28, 2020,
https://cnet.co/2ylG3yC; Ben Fox Rubin, “Amazon Unveils yet Another Store Concept: Amazon 4-Star,” Cnet.com,
September 26, 2018, https://cnet.co/3auKmWD, both accessed March 2020.
7 Lauren Ufford, “10 Examples of Successful Retail Showrooms,” Shopify.com, May 31, 2018, https://bit.ly/3bA6lvh, accessed
March 2020.
8 “Williams-Sonoma, Inc. reports strong second quarter 2018 results,” press release, Business Wire, August 22, 2018,
https://bwnews.pr/2NrOaBc; Bob Tedeschi, “E-Commerce Report; All that some retailers want before Christmas is a
functional site,” New York Times, November 1, 1999, https://nyti.ms/2N4P6vE, both accessed April 2020.
9 The NPD Group, “Experiential Purchasing and the New Retail,” 2020, https://bit.ly/39pE4Gg, accessed March 2020.

10 KPMG, “Retail Trends 2019,” February 2019, p. 8, https://bit.ly/33VkT62, accessed March 2020.

11 Lin Grossman, “What the Amazon Effect Means for Retailers,” Forbes, February 22, 2018, https://bit.ly/349JVOT, accessed
March 2020.
12 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, “Global Consumer Insights Survey, 2019,” p. 2, https://pwc.to/33VJHuI, accessed March 2020.

13 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Global Consumer Insights Survey, 2019,” p. 12.

14 Deloitte, “2020 Retail Industry Outlook,” p. 4, https://bit.ly/3dNTac7., accessed March 2020.

15 National Retail Federation, “Convenience and the Consumer,” January 9, 2020, p. 6, https://bit.ly/2USpodw, accessed
March 2020.
16 KPMG, “Retail Trends 2019,” p. 7.

17 KIBO, “2018 Consumer Trends Report,” March 2018, p. 3, https://bit.ly/2JnSYCk, accessed March 2020.

18 KIBO, “2018 Consumer Trends Report.”

19 Price Waterhouse Coopers, “Global Consumer Insights Survey, 2019,” p. 4.

20 Price Waterhouse Coopers, “Global Consumer Insights Survey, 2019,” p. 4.

21 KPMG, “Retail Trends 2019,” p. 7.

22 KPMG, “Retail Trends 2019,” p. 5.

23 Square Guide, “Everything You Need to Know About Omnichannel Retail,” Square, https://squ.re/3qldGGR, accessed
April 2020.
24 Margaret Rouse, Karen Goulart, and Jason Sparapani, “Omnichannel,” May 2018, SearchCustomerExperience.com,
https://searchcustomerexperience.techtarget.com/definition/omnichannel, accessed April 2020.
25 Rouse, Goulart, and Sparapani, “Omnichannel.”

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 621-103 Buy Online, Pickup in Store: Evaluating an Omnichannel Intervention in Retail

26 Nikolina Maškarić, “Omnichannel Retailing: What Is it and why Is it Important?” Paldesk, January 30, 2020,
https://www.paldesk.com/omnichannel-retailing-what-is-it-and-why-is-it-important/, accessed April 2020.
27 Sophie Fraser, “The Future of Retail Part 2: The Importance of Becoming an Omnichannel Retailer,” Digital Works Group,
October 4, 2019, https://bit.ly/2URwgYN, accessed March 2020.
28 Alex Ullrich, “The Future of Retail: What is Omnichannel Retailing?” Warehouse Anywhere, June 6, 2019,
https://bit.ly/3k5BRHb; Sophie Fraser, “The Future of Retail Part 2: The Importance of Becoming an Omnichannel Retailer,”
Digital Works Group, October 4, 2019, https://bit.ly/3rZUKxG, accessed March 2020.
29 Jason Ankey, “Why Retailers Still Struggle with Omnichannel—and How They Can Conquer the Challenge,” Retail Dive,
July 25, 2016, https://www.retaildive.com/news/retailers-omnichannel-struggles/422963/, accessed March 2020.
30 Ullrich, “The Future of Retail: What is Omnichannel Retailing?”

31 KIBO, “2018 Consumer Trends Report,” p. 11.

32 “Study: 87% of Retailers Agree Omnichannel is Critical to their Business, Yet Only 8% Have ‘Mastered’ it,” press release,
December 13, 2017, PR Newswire, https://prn.to/3bLm9Lg, accessed May 2020.
33 Emma Sopadjieva, Utpal M. Dholakia, and Beth Benjamin, “A Study of 46,000 Shoppers Shows That Omnichannel Retailing
Works,” Harvard Business Review, January 3, 2017, https://bit.ly/2xwT5sL, accessed March 2020.
34 Business Insider Intelligence, “Logistics Costs Hinder Omnichannel Services,” Business Insider, February 24, 2017,
https://www.businessinsider.com/logistics-costs-hinder-omnichannel-services-2017-2, accessed March 2020.
35 “What Are the Biggest Challenges Omnichannel Poses to Retailers?” CBRE.com, https://bit.ly/3buYUpc, accessed March
2020.
36 John Pincott, “Retailers Must Embrace In-Store Pickup,” Retail Dive, 2017, https://bit.ly/2UsibBZ, accessed March 2020.

37 Pincott, “Retailers Must Embrace In-Store Pickup.”

38 “What is BOPIS in Retail?”, Parcel Pending, March 1, 2020, https://bit.ly/2xDCsLH, accessed March 2020.

39 Sarah Halzack, “Walmart Is Beating Amazon in a Business Worth $35 Billion,” Bloomberg, April 1, 2019,
https://bloom.bg/2UuTtAN, accessed March 2020.
40 Gregory Magana, “Almost 70% of US Consumers Use BOPIS,” Business Insider, February 22, 2019,
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-consumers-use-buy-online-pickup-in-store-2019-2, accessed March 2020.
41 Magana, “Almost 70% of US Consumers Use BOPIS.”

42 “What is BOPIS in Retail?”, Parcel Pending, March 1, 2020, https://bit.ly/2UtlatH, accessed March 2020.

43 Dan O’Shea, “Most BOPIS Shoppers Make Additional Purchases in Store,” Retail Dive, February 25, 2019,
https://www.retaildive.com/news/most-bopis-shoppers-make-additional-purchases-in-store/549068/, accessed March 2020.
44 O’Shea, “Most BOPIS Shoppers Make Additional Purchases in Store.”

45 Dan Leberman, “Buy Online Return in Store (BORIS) and Buy Online Pickup in Store (BOPIS): The Two Acronyms All Small
Businesses Should Know,” Inc., March 26, 2015, https://bit.ly/3arlTna, accessed March 2020.
46 Deloitte, “2020 Retail Industry Outlook,” p. 9, https://bit.ly/3aGFca9, accessed March 2020.

47 Courtney Reagan, “That Sweater You Don’t Like Is a Trillion-Dollar Problem for Retailers. These Companies Want To Fix
It,” CNBC, January 12, 2019, https://cnb.cx/3aqTA62, accessed March 2020.
48 Elliot Maras, “How BOPIS Lockers Enhance the Click-and-Collect Shopping Experience,” Kiosk Marketplace, August 7,
2019, https://bit.ly/39pRvpz, accessed March 2020.
49 Maras, “How BOPIS Lockers Enhance the Click-and-Collect Shopping Experience.”

50 KIBO, “2018 Consumer Trends Report,” p. 14.

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