IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA
(MTWARA SUB REGISTRY)
AT MTWARA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 13819 OF 2025
CASE REFERENCE NO. 202506062000013819
(Arising from the decision of the Resident Magistrate Court, Lindi at Lindi dated 26th
May, 2024 in Criminal Case No. 31761 of 2024 before Hon. D. E. Kimathi, SRM)
ALLY ABDALLAH NGASHA……......................................................... APPELLANT
VERSUS
REPUBLIC .................................................................................... RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Date of Last Order: 28th July, 2025
Date of Judgment: 29th August, 2025
E. E. KAKOLAKI, J.
In this fisrt appeal the appellant is seeking to displace the decision of the
Resident Magistrates Court for Lindi Region at Lindi where he was charged
and convicted of Rape; contrary to section 130 (1) (2) (e) and 131 (1)(a) of
the Penal Code, [Cap 16 RE 2022] now [R.E 2023], and sentenced to thirty
(30) years imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were premised on the
prosecution's case that, on the 24th day of October, 2024, at Tulieni Village
within Lindi District and Region, he did have carnal knowledge with one NKA
(identity concealed), a girl of 13 years old.
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The prosecution relied on seven (7) witnesses and two exhibits, the PF3 and
scene of crime sketch map as exhibits P1 and P2, respectively, after the
appellant had returned a plea of guilty when the charge was placed before
him. The prosecution paraded in Court were the victim’s mother and aunt as
PW1 and PW2, the victim, who is of unsound mind (PW3) and failed to render
her testimony, the trained people’s militia who arrested the appellant (PW4),
the Ward Executive Officer or WEO (PW5), the doctor (PW6), and the
investigator (PW7). On his side, the appellant maintained his stance that he
never raped the victim, whom he admitted to be of unsound mind. Having
considered both parties’ evidence as hinted above, the trial Court found that
the charge against the appellant was proved to the hilt and proceeded to
convict him as charged, while sentencing him to suffer an imprisonment term
of 30 years, as mentioned above. Displeased, the appellant has preferred
this appeal, demonstrating his grievances in six grounds of appeal as quoted
in verbatim hereunder:
1. That, the trial court erred in law and fact by holding that the charge
against the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt while there are
serious doubts thereon.
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2. That, the trial court erred in law and fact after convicting the appellant
without considering that the PW6 failed to prove the penetration to the victim
which is a vital ingredient of the offence charged.
3. That the trial Court erred both on law and fact by wrongly evaluating the
evidence tendered before her by Pw1, Pw2, PW4, PW6 and Pw7 which
resulted in failure of justice be seen to be done.
4. That, the trial court erred on both law and facts by relying on the exhibit
P1 (PF3) which was improperly tendered and illegally admitted, by allowing
to be party of evidence.
5. That, the trial court erred on both law and fact by accepting the evidence
tendered to prove the charge which the same was very doubtful and
contradictory.
6. That, the court erred on both law and fact for failing to consider the
defense evidence.
Briefly stated, the prosecution's case was to the effect that the appellant,
victim (PW3), and victim’s mother (PW1) knew each other before, as the
appellant was married to PW1’s young sister, and the victim and her sibling
sometimes used to live with the couple. On 24/10/2024, at noon, PW1, who
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was at her home, stated that the appellant passed by and asked the victim
to accompany her to the shop to buy groundnuts, as they would return soon.
As PW3 was of unsound mind and it was sunny, PW1 became adamant about
releasing her, but upon the appellant's insistence that it would not take them
longer, PW1 allowed her to go. The two could not return until 2.00 PM when
PW1 became doubtful and started searching for them, only to find the two
in the appellant’s house, whose walls were made of mud. As it was afternoon
with sunlight passing in through the windows, and peeping through the
window, PW1 saw the appellant making love with the victim. She
immediately went to call the victim’s aunt (PW2), who also witnessed the
incident, before the latter went to call his brother (the victim’s father) out of
fear that the two women would not be able to arrest the appellant. While in
those efforts, which proved futile, behind the appellant who had his door
locked from outside by PW1 to preserve evidence, managed to climb the wall
and dropped outside and opened the door for the victim before PW1 took
the victim and reported the matter to the WEO who issued them with the
introduction letter to present to the police where PW3 was issued with the
PF3 (exhibit P1) and attended by the doctor (PW6) who after examination
established that she was penetrated. As alluded to above, the appellant
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denied the accusations levelled against him, but the trial Court was satisfied
that his case was proved beyond reasonable doubt, convicted and sentenced
him accordingly.
At the hearing, both parties were heard viva voce as the appellant appeared
remotely from Lilungu prison unrepresented, while the respondent enjoyed
the services of Mr. Denis Nguvu, learned State Attorney.
When invited to address the Court on the merits of his appeal, the appellant
opted to hear first from the Respondent as he reserved his right of rejoinder.
He, however, prayed the Court to consider all his grounds of appeal and find
merit in them, hence, proceed to acquit him of the charge he was convicted
of.
In his response, Mr. Nguvu opened his reply submission by resisting the
appeal. With leave of the Court, he opted to merge the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
grounds of appeal and argue them together for furthering the complaint that
his conviction was wrongly premised for want of proof of the charge facing
him beyond reasonable doubt, and that the rest of the grounds of appeal
were to be canvassed separately. I therefore intend to follow the same order
in this judgment when determining the raised grounds.
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Recanting the appellant’s assertion that his case was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution, Mr. Nguvu reminded the Court of the
charge of Rape facing the appellant under 130 (1) (2)(e) and section 131(1)
of the Penal Code Cap. 16 R.E 2022, for carnal knowledge of a child of 13
years, who, no doubt, is below the age of majority. Relying on the case of
Yustus Idan Vs. R, Criminal Appeal No. 454 of 2019 (2022) TZCA 622 at
page 7, he contended the prosecution was enjoined to prove three
ingredients under the circumstances of this case namely: one, penetration
of a male sexual organ into the victim's vagina, second, the victim’s age, and
third, identity of the person responsible for such unlawful act. According to
him, the trite law as stated in the case of Selemani Mkumba Vs. R, (2006)
TLR 379, is that the best evidence in sexual offences comes from the victim,
who, for the purposes of this matter, ought to be PW3. He, however, argued
that this witness was found by the trial Court to be of unsound mind and
therefore prevented from giving rational answers or incapable of testifying
after compliance with the provision of section 127(6) of the Evidence Act,
and the guidance provided in the case of Fadhili Makanga Vs. R, Criminal
Appeal No. 458 of 2017 (2020) TZCA 270, hence reliance on two eye
witnesses who are PW1 and PW2. He convincingly argued that, as it was
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held by the Court of Appeal in the case of Ismail Mnyawami Vs. R,
Criminal Appeal No. 337 of 2008 (2011) TZCA 91, where the victim is unable
to testify, then evidence of eyewitnesses suffices to ground a conviction.
Mr. Nguvu went on to submit that the two witnesses, PW1 and PW2, whom
the trial Court had an opportunity of observing their demeanour and believed
them, testified to have witnessed the appellant raping the victim (PW3) in
broad daylight, hence eliminating the chances of mistaken identification.
As regards the element of penetration, he contended that despite the
doctor’s oral testimony (PW6) and the findings made in the PF3 (exhibit P1)
indicating that the victim had no bruises or vaginal fluids in her vagina, the
conclusion was to the effect that she was penetrated with a blunt object as
she had no hymen, though found to be used to sexual intercourse. Since
what is important in rape cases is the presence of penetration, however
slight it is, the appellant didn't need to ejaculate to constitute the offence of
Rape, as it was held in the case of Ismail Mnyawami (supra) Mr. Nguvu
stressed. Regarding the ingredient of age, he submitted that, the same was
proved by the victim’s mother PW1, hence a proof beyond reasonable doubt
that, it is non but the appellant who perpetrated the offence as he even did
not dispute during preliminary hearing to have collected the victim from her
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mother’s custody on the fateful day as can be seen at pages 2-3 of the trial
court proceedings. In view of the above, he invited the Court to find the
grounds of appeal are devoid of merit, hence be dismissed as the case
against him was proved beyond reasonable doubt. In his rejoinder
submission, the appellant had nothing material to counter the respondent’s
submission apart from reiterating his earlier submission and prayers.
I have dispassionately considered the submissions by the parties regarding
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd grounds of appeal and took time to revisit the impugned
judgment as well as the evidence on record. The issue which this Court is
enjoined to determine is whether the charge of Rape was proved by the
prosecution against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The settled legal
stance as spelt in section 117(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, [Cap. 6 R.E
2023] is that he who alleges must prove, in which, in the present matter,
the onus of so proving lies on the prosecution. The standard of proof as per
section 3(2)(a) of the Evidence Act is that of beyond reasonable doubt, as
the accused bears no duty of proving his innocence, rather to raise doubt on
the prosecution's case since conviction must be premised on the strength of
the prosecution's case and not the weakness of the defence case. See also
the cases of Mohamed Said Matula Vs. R [1995] T.L.R. 3 (CA), Simon
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Edson @ Makundi Vs. R, Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 2017 [2020] TZCA 1730
andMohamed Haruna @ Mtupeni and Another Vs. R, Criminal Appeal
No. 259 of 2007 (2010) TZCA 250.
It is an undisputed fact in this matter that the charge of Rape preferred
against the appellant was under 130 (1) (2)(e) and section 131(1) of the
Penal Code, [Cap. 16 R.E 2022] now [Cap. 16 R.E 2023], calling for proof of
three ingredients: one, the victim’s age; second, penetration; and three,
identity of the accused person as the person who perpetrated the offence.
Starting with the element of age, I accede to the submission made by Mr.
Nguvu that the victim’s age was legally established by her mother, PW1, to
be 13 years when she said that PW3 was born on 06/03/2011, being a
competent person to establish the victim's age as held in a number of
decisions. See the cases of Mohamed Jumanne Vs. R, Criminal Appeal No.
569 of 2021 (2024) TZCA 526 and Barnaba Bazilia Honoli Vs. Republic
(Criminal Appeal No. 659 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 997 (28 October 2024). In
Barnaba Bazilia Honoli (supra) on the subject matter, the Court of Appeal
observed thus:
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“We reasoned that, such proof can also be made by the
parents, relative of the victim, medical practitioner or if
available, by production of the birth certificate”
Next is the identity of the accused person. It is evident from the record that,
after its inquiry regarding victim’s competence in testifying the trial Court
observed the provisions of section 127(5) and not subsection (6) of the
Evidence Act as submitted by Mr. Nguve, and came to findings that, the
victim (PW3) being person of unsound mind was unable to render her
testimony after having failed to give rational answers to the questions put to
her by the Court. Indeed, the law on treatment of a person of unsound mind
who is prevented by his condition from understanding the questions put to
him and giving rational answers was followed, thus a justification for the trial
Court to rely on evidence of other eyewitnesses, as it was also held in the
case of Ismail Mnyawami (supra). In the present case, the said
eyewitnesses, as mentioned by Mr. Nguvu, are PW1 and PW2, who testified
to the effect that, on the fateful date, they found the appellant in his house
and managed to identify him after peeping through the window, as it was
broad daylight, and the appellant was known to them before. Like the trial
Court, I entertain no doubt that the appellant was properly identified in his
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house after he had collected the victim from her home with the intent of
buying her ground nuts, but instead took her to his house, as stated by PW1.
The last ingredient for determination of the offence of Rape is penetration,
which Mr. Nguvu submitted to have been proved by both PW1 and PW2,
who witnessed the appellant raping the victim, corroborated by PW6’s
testimony and PF3 exhibit P1 proving the existence of penetration as the
victim PW3 was found to have no hymen and used to sexual intercourse
though she had no bruises nor vaginal fluids. Having glanced at the said
evidence as stated by PW6 and remarked in the PF3 (exhibit P1) it is evident
to this Cour that after examining her (PW3), the doctor (PW6) noted that
she had no hymen, no watering, nor had she had any bruises in her vagina
or anus. He thus concluded that she was experienced in sexual intercourse
and was penetrated with a blunt object like a penis. Now this Court, while
aware of the settled law under section 130(4)(a) of the Penal Code that
penetration, however slight, suffices to prove the sexual intercourse
necessary for the offence, the glaring question is whether PW3 was
penetrated on 24/10/2024 to the extent of being found experienced in sexual
intercourse. For this question to be properly answered, it was the
prosecution's duty and t h e Court to ensure that the witness gave the
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relevant evidence which specifically proved the offence. I so view as it is of
utmost importance for the prosecution to lead evidence establishing
penetration and not to simply give a general statement alleging that
rape was committed without elaborating i n d e t a i l what actually took
place. See the case of Mathayo Ngalya @ Shabani V R, C riminal
Appeal No. 170 of 2006, (2008) T Z C A 1 4 .
Applying the above principle to the facts of this case, it is not in dispute that
the eyewitnesses, PW1 and PW2, apart from merely stating that, they found
the appellant raping or having sex with the victim, no further details or
explanations were ever rendered by them elaborating on what actually took
place. To avoid putting words into their mouths, let's hear from the horses’
mouths. PW1 was recorded to inform the Court, thus:
’’Accused’s house has 2 windows and the house is made of mud.
I look inside through the window, and found accused person
naked with my child and he was making love with my child. I
could recognize him because there was light comes through the
windows.’’
And PW2 had this to tell the Court, too:
’’We arrived at the house of Ally Abdah @ Babu Ally. She told me
to go to the window and look inside the house and I did that. I
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found Babu Ally with victim who is the child of PW1 having sex
and I watch them for only three minutes. XX (victim) is my aunt
and she has only 13 years old. She is mentally unfit and she
didn’t speak well as she confusing matters.’’
From the two above excerpts of PW1 and PW2’s evidence, I find it was not
enough for PW1 to merely allege that she found the appellant making love
with the victim, or for PW2 to assert the appellant was found having sex with
the victim, as love or sex can be made orally through the tongue kiss or by
penetration penis or any other part of body or instrument inserted into
vagina, anus or orifice. Failure by PW1 and PW2 to describe how love or sex
was made, I find their evidence insufficient to prove the offence of Rape,
given the fact that the victim was found to have neither bruises nor fluids in
both vagina and anus. The mere fact that she was used to sexual intercourse
leaves this Court with doubt, as it does not necessarily mean that she was
penetrated on 24/10/2024, since she might have been penetrated before
that day by the unseen or mentioned perpetrator. In view of that deficiency
in evidence, I find the element of penetration of PW3 specifically on
24/10/2024, as alleged in the charge, was left unproven. Had the trial Court
appreciated this fact, I believe it would not have arrived to the findings
reached. The case against the appellant, therefore, I find was not proved
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beyond reasonable doubt, hence there is merit in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd grounds
of appeal. The three grounds, therefore, have the effect of disposing of this
appeal, and I see no point in venturing much effort to determine the rest of
the grounds of appeal, as that will amount to an academic exercise.
Consequently, the appeal is allowed as the appellant’s conviction is quashed
and the sentence meted out to him is set aside. It is hereby ordered that he
should be released from prison forthwith unless otherwise lawfully held.
Order accordingly.
Dated at Mtwara, this 29th day of August, 2025.
E. E. KAKOLAKI
JUGDE
29/08/2025.
Court: The Judgment has been delivered at Mtwara today on the 29th day
of August, 2025, through video conference in the presence of the appellant
appearing from Lilungu Prison, Mr. Edson Mwapili, State Attorney for the
Respondent, and Ms. Asha Mboga.
Right of appeal explained.
Sgd:
S. NSANA
DEPUTY REGISTRAR
29/08/2025.
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