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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-19-0000704
02-SEP-2025
08:43 AM
Dkt. 133 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

---oOo---
________________________________________________________________

In the Matter of the Application of

PIONEER MILL COMPANY, LIMITED,
to register title and confirm its title to land situate at
Lāhainā, Island and County of Maui, State of Hawaiʻi,
and
KAHOMA LAND LLC,
Substituted Applicant as to Lots 1, 2 and 3A
________________________________________________________________

SCWC-19-0000704

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-19-0000704; LD. CT. APP. NO. 439 amended;
LD. CT. CASE NO. 09-0300)

SEPTEMBER 2, 2025

RECKTENWALD, C.J., McKENNA, EDDINS, AND DEVENS, JJ., AND

CIRCUIT JUDGE KAWASHIMA, IN PLACE OF GINOZA, J., RECUSED

OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.

I. Introduction

This appeal concerns a land court application filed in

1919, not prosecuted for decades at a time, then summarily

decided 100 years later.

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In 1919, Pioneer Mill Company, Limited (“Pioneer Mill”) 1

filed land court Application No. 439 (“land court application”)

to register fee simple title to land in Lāhainā, Maui. The land

was identified as Lots 1 (Puou), 2 (Kuholilea), and 3 (Kuhua,

Aki, Puʻuki). Pioneer Mill asserted it had title to the parcels

through deed or adverse possession. Decades later, Lot 3 was

divided into Lots 3A through 3E.

The adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A is the subject of

this certiorari proceeding.

A 1919 report by the Examiner concluded that Pioneer Mill

held paper title to Lots 1 and 2 but did not have good paper

title to Lot 3. The Examiner said Pioneer Mill may have

acquired Lot 3, which includes Lot 3A, by adverse possession,

indicating adverse possession was not clear.

Charles Kanaʻina (“Kanaʻina”)2 was identified as the last

owner holding title to Lot 3A. His heirs at his 1877 death

included Princess Ruth Keʻelikōlani and Princess Bernice Pauahi

1 Kahoma Land LLC (“Kahoma”) substituted for Pioneer Mill in 2009.

Pioneer Mill and Kahoma are sometimes collectively referred to as the
“Applicants.” It appears Pioneer Mill itself went through some business
organization changes that are immaterial to our disposition.

2 Kanaʻina was an aliʻi and was the father of William Charles Lunalilo,
who became the sixth and first elected monarch of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi. The
title documents referenced in this opinion do not include ʻokina and kahakō
and we do not include them when quoting the documents. But we attempt to
provide appropriate diacritical marks in the text of our opinion. We
apologize for any inadvertent errors.

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Bishop. The record does not reflect any attempt to personally

serve the land court application on his heirs or their

descendants. A great majority of interests held by his heirs’

descendants were defaulted by the land court after various

attempts to serve by publication. Some apparent descendants of

the heirs of Kanaʻina (“Kanaʻina descendants”) appeared at

various times during this 100-year saga to challenge Pioneer

Mill’s (and its successors’) claims.

The 1919 land court application was not prosecuted for

decades at a time. There was a trial in 1967, but this court

nullified Judge Samuel P. King’s decision in 1972, and the

matter was remanded for a new trial. No trial took place after

1972, with long periods of dormancy. The land court application

was decided in 2019 and 2020, when the land court filed three

documents. The first awarded fee simple title to Lots 1 and 2

to Pioneer Mill’s successor based on paper title. The second

and third awarded a 78.704% interest in Lot 3A based on adverse

possession, the remaining 21.296% representing interests of

Kanaʻina descendants who appeared in the case and contested the

claim. These three documents are:

1. Amended Decree No. 2016 of May 27, 2020 (awarding

Lots 1 and 2 to Kahoma based on paper title)(“Decree
2016”);
2. September 24, 2019 “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law regarding Orders Filed on February 13, 2018 and
May 2, 2018” (finding Kahoma has a 78.704% interest
in Lot 3A based on adverse possession)(“September 24,
2019 FOF/COL”); and

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3. Amended Decree No. 2017 of May 27, 2020 (awarding

Kahoma 78.704% of Lot 3-A) (“Decree 2017”)

On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”)

affirmed.

Petitioners on certiorari allege several errors.

We discern no genuine issues of material fact regarding

paper title to Lots 1 and 2, and we therefore affirm the ICA and

land court regarding Decree 2016.

With respect to Lot 3A, however, we address two dispositive

errors raised on certiorari.

First, contrary to the ICA, we hold that petitioners on

certiorari, as cotenants of Kanaʻina heirs, had standing to also

defend their cotenants’ title against the adverse possession

claim.

Second, we hold that, in any event, the adverse possession

claim as to Lot 3A should have been dismissed based on laches.

Laches requires two essential elements: (1) an unreasonable

delay by the plaintiff in bringing or advancing the claim, and

(2) resulting prejudice due to the delay.

We hold that the 100-year delay in deciding the Lot 3A

adverse possession claim was blatantly unreasonable. Also,

Kanaʻina descendants were prejudiced because witnesses, including

Kanaʻina descendants themselves, as well as their knowledge of

facts concerning the alleged adverse possession of Lot 3A before

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1919, were gone. Therefore, the land court abused its

discretion in denying the certiorari petitioners’ 2015 and 2016

motions to dismiss based on laches.

Hence, we vacate the ICA’s July 17, 2024, judgment on

appeal to the extent it affirmed the land court’s decisions as

to Lot 3A. In other words, we vacate the land court’s September

24, 2019, FOF/COL as well as its Decree 2017 awarding 78.704% of

Lot 3A to Kahoma. We affirm the ICA’s judgment on appeal to the

extent it affirmed the land court’s Decree 2016 regarding paper

title to Lots 1 and 2.

We remand to the land court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion, which is to include dismissal of

the land court application as to Lot 3A. Although this

dismissal is without prejudice, if a new application to quiet

title as to Lot 3A is filed, current Hawaiʻi law will govern.

II. Background

A. Factual background and filing of land court application

In June 1919, Pioneer Mill filed the instant land court

application to register and confirm fee simple title to the

following five land parcels in Lāhainā: (1) the whole of “Puou,”

a portion of Apana 2 of Land Commission Award 8520 to Josua

Kaʻeo, Lot 1 (104.5 acres); (2) three-eighths of “Kuholilea,” a

portion of Apana 26 of Land Commission Award 6559-B to W.C.

Lunalilo, Lot 2 (166.5 acres); (3) the whole of “Kuhua,” a

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portion of Land Commission Award 7582 to Eseta Kipa, now Lot 3A;

(4) “Aki,” a portion of Land Commission Award 11216 to

Kekauʻōnohi and Grant 3584 to P. Isenberg and C.F. Horner, now

Lots 3B and 3C; (5) “Puʻuki,” a portion of Land Commission Award

11292 to Mamaki, now Lots 3D and 3E.

Pioneer Mill asserted two bases for its claims to these

parcels: (1) via deed from P. Isenberg and C.F. Horner, recorded

June 29, 1895, in the Office of the Registrar of Conveyances of

the Territory of Hawaiʻi; and/or (2) via adverse possession.

At the time, Pioneer Mill sought to register and confirm

title to “Kuhua,” “Aki,” and “Puʻuki,” as one parcel identified

as Lot 3 which, altogether, totaled 1,529 acres. It was not

until decades later that Lot 3 was divided into Lots 3A through

3E. On certiorari, we focus on Lot 3A, Kuhua, a portion of Land

Commission Award 7582 to Eseta Kipa. The Kuhua parcel, Lot 3A,

consists of 240.90 acres.

With respect to the background of the Kuhua parcel, in An

Act Relating to the Crown Government and Fort Lands, June 7,

1848, King Kamehameha III reserved the ahupuaʻa of Kuhua I and

Kuhua II as private lands for the use of himself, his heirs, and

successors.3

3 Apparently, there were four different parcels known as Kuhua - the one
owned by Eseta Kipa, at issue here, one owned by Princess Ruth Keʻelikōlani,
and two known as Kuhua I and Kuhua II that were part of the Mahele and
reserved for King Kamehameha III. Again, the “Kuhua” addressed in this case

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In 1855 Eseta Kipa received Land Commission Award 7582

giving her title to Kuhua – Lot 3A and upon her death, title to

all her lands vested in her sole heir, Levi Haʻalelea. Levi

Haʻalelea deeded portions of Eseta Kipa’s estate to others and

devised the remainder to two devisees: (1) Charles Kanaʻina and

(2) Hazaleleponi K. Kapakuhaili, who subsequently deeded her

interest to Charles Kanaʻina.

In 1877, Charles Kanaʻina died intestate. His estate was

probated.4 His heirs and their interests were identified as:

2/9th Bernice Pauahi Bishop

1/9th Ruth Keelikolani
1/9th Hana Lilikalani, Edward Lilikalani, and Naihe
1/9th A.W. Halilio, Levi Haalelea and Kahuakaiola
1/9th Pahau
1/9th Kaaua
1/9th Heirs of Kilinahe
1/36th KAIAPOEPOE (=2.777%)
1/36th Nahuhuleua & Namilimili, wife and
husband
1/36th NAMAKALELE (=2.777%)
1/36th PUAHI (=2.777%)
1/9th Heirs of unidentified person
1/45th KAHONU (=2.222%)
1/45th Kukahiko
1/45th Heirs of Kaupae
1/135th PAMAHOA (=0.741%)
1/135th Kaneikolia
1/135th Maele
1/45th Heirs of Kaeakamahu: Kaupae,
Kalepa, Maihui
1/45th Kamakamohaha

is the whole of “Kuhua,” a portion of Land Commission Award 7582 to Eseta

Kipa, Lot 3A.

4 Probate No. 2426

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B. Land court proceedings before the 1972 remand

1. Before the 1967 trial [1919-1967]

On July 8, 1919, the land court appointed Arthur Smith as

Examiner of Titles5 to investigate records relating to Pioneer

Mill’s application and to file a report regarding title to the

subject parcels. Smith’s Report of Examiner, dated December 1,

1919, concluded that Pioneer Mill: (1) had paper title to all of

Lot 1 in fee simple absolute; (2) had paper title to three-

eighths of Lot 2 in fee simple absolute; (3) did not have good

paper title to “Kuhua” (Lot 3A), but it may have acquired it by

prescription; (4) did not have good paper title to “Aki” (Lots

3B and 3C); and (5) did not have good paper title to “Puʻuki”

(Lots 3D and 3E).

5 In 1919 Revised Laws of Hawaiʻi (“RLH”) Act 56, section 12 (1903)

provided:

Examiners of Title; appointment, removal. The Judge of

land registration may appoint one or more examiners of
title in the first judicial circuit, or when necessary in
any other judicial circuit, who shall be persons of good
moral character and shall have been declared by the supreme
court of the Territory to be qualified for said office
after examination in term or vacation. They shall be
subject to removal by the supreme court of the Territory.

Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 501-11 (2018) currently provides:

§501-11 Examiners of title; appointment, removal. The

[land court] judge may appoint one or more examiners of
title in the first judicial circuit, or when necessary in
any other judicial circuit, who shall be persons of good
moral character, and shall have been declared by the
supreme court to be qualified for the office after
examination. They shall be subject to removal by the
supreme court.

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On June 2, 1920, the land court ordered that notice of

Pioneer Mill’s application be provided by registered mail6 and

publication in the Wailuku Times. After publication, five

respondents appeared and filed answers: (1) Thomas Duncan, who

claimed ownership to a one-third undivided interest of all the

land in Pioneer Mill’s application; (2) the Territory of Hawaiʻi,

which claimed ownership of Lot 3; (3) Titus Napoliona (aka Titus

Napoleon), who claimed Pioneer Mill had no title to Lots 2 and

3; (4) J.H.S. Kaleo, who claimed Pioneer Mill had no title to

Lots 2 and 3; and (5) Kaneikolia (W) who claimed Pioneer Mill

had no title to Lots 2 and 3, to which she claimed an undivided

interest.

On September 23, 1920, the land court entered default

against all parties who had failed to respond to Pioneer Mill’s

application by July 3, 1920.

But then, for decades, nothing happened in the application.

In 1935 and 1941, ten respondents appeared and moved to re-open

6 The record shows that service by registered mail was effectuated, but
there are no receipt records.

HRS § 669-3 (2016) now provides:

Notice by publication or registered mail. In any action

brought under section 669-1(a) or (b)[adverse possession],
unknown persons and any known persons who do not reside
within the State or cannot after due diligence be served
with process within the State may be served as provided by
[other sections].

In other words, when possible, personal service would now be required.

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the September 23, 1920, default. These respondents included

Lucy Moeikauhane, et al., who filed an answer and claim on

August 9, 1935, and Hattie Chun Fook, et al., who also filed an

answer and claim on November 22, 1935. It is unclear what

happened to the motions to re-open,7 but aside from them being

filed, the case remained inactive from 1920 to 1965.8

On March 2, 1965, the State of Hawaiʻi (“State”), not

Pioneer Mill, moved for the matter to be set for trial. The

land court issued a publication notice, which appeared in the

Honolulu Advertiser and the Sunday Star-Bulletin and Advertiser,

setting trial for August 31, 1965. The notice said that all

those who failed to appear would have default entered against

them. Essentially, the land court re-opened the 1920 default

proceeding with the August 31, 1965, trial date serving as a new

return date.

Several respondents did appear on August 31, 1965, and the

land court later entered default against all those who failed to

appear. In May of 1966, the Estate of John Mamaki filed a

7 The record consists of least 85 volumes of a record on appeal that are

not necessarily filed in chronological order, consisting of thousands of
unpaginated pages, making it difficult to follow. This is another
consequence of the lengthy delay.

8 In 1961, American Factors, Ltd. (“Amfac”) apparently had the assets of

the original Pioneer Mill conveyed to a newly formed Pioneer Mill Company
Limited, and the latter was apparently merged into Amfac, but Amfac does not
appear to have been included as a party.

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motion to set aside the default. The land court set aside the

default against both the Estate of John Mamaki and the Estate of

Mary K. Sylva (aka Mary M. Brown), allowing them to appear as

respondents.

2. 1967 trial and its aftermath

On September 25, 1967, trial commenced.9 On that day, Judge

King dismissed the claims of Lucy Moeikauhane, et al., and Chun

Fook, et al., without prejudice, who had moved to set aside

defaults and filed claims in 1935, finding they did not claim

interest through any of Charles Kanaʻina’s heirs. This left

Titus Napoleon, the Estate of John Mamaki, and the Estate of

Mary M. Brown, aka Mary K. Sylva, as challengers of Pioneer

Mill’s application.

On November 15, 1967, Judge King orally ruled from the

bench. But he also stated that the decision would be effective

upon filing of the decision and order. No written decision was

filed at the time.

Then, on February 3, 1970, Judge King publicly declared his

candidacy for the position of governor. Application of Pioneer

Mill Co., 53 Haw. 496, 497-98, 497 P.2d 549, 550-51 (1972).

After this announcement, on March 13, 1970, Judge King

entered a written decision containing 107 findings of fact and

9 The Honorable Samuel P. King presiding.

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24 conclusions of law regarding the land court application. He

concluded that Pioneer Mill was the owner in fee simple of Lots

1, 2, 3A, 3B, 3C, but not 3D and 3E, and ordered amendments to

the maps to divide Lot 3 into those separate parcels. On April

16, 1970, the State Surveyor amended the map pursuant to this

order.

C. Initial appeal

In April of 1970, the State and the estates of Mary K.

Sylva (aka Mary K. Brown) and John Mamaki appealed.

Their appeal was based on the land court’s refusal to grant

their request to dismiss the application “because the issues had

not been framed within a certain time.” Application of Pioneer

Mill Co., 53 Haw. at 498, 497 P.2d at 551. In other words, even

more than fifty years ago, parties had sought dismissal based on

a failure to prosecute.

Instead of addressing the delay issue, this court requested

supplemental briefing regarding “a more basic issue . . . posed

by the Land Court judge’s announcement relating to his candidacy

for public office[.]” Id. At the time, Article V, Section 3 of

the Hawaiʻi Constitution provided that “[a]ny justice or judge

who shall become a candidate for elective office shall thereby

forfeit his office.” Haw. Const. art. V, § 3.

Based on this provision, after supplemental briefing, this

court went on to hold that Judge King lacked the power to

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execute decisions after he declared his intention to run for

public office and nullified his decision regarding this land

court application. Application of Pioneer Mill Co., 53 Haw. at

497-98, 497 P.2d at 550-51.

This court then remanded the case for a new trial.

Application of Pioneer Mill Co., 53 Haw. at 498, 497 P.2d at

551. A trial never took place.

D. Land court proceedings after 1972 remand

1. 1972 to 2008

After the remand, nothing happened in the case, this time

for another ten years. In 1982, the land court, not Pioneer

Mill, initiated a status conference with counsel, and set trial

for April 1983.

Between the setting of trial and March 1983, six motions to

set aside default and for leave to file answer were filed. On

April 22, 1983, disclaimers of interest were filed regarding

five of the six motions to set aside default. The last motion

to set aside default was resolved by a stipulation entered

between Myrtle N. Lee (“Lee”) and Pioneer Mill, which withdrew

the motion to set aside default and substituted Lee as a party.

But for reasons unknown, trial did not take place in April

1983. On September 29, 1983, the land court sent a letter to

Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright (“Cades”), which represented

Pioneer Mill, and another to Lee, regarding a new trial date of

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November 25, 1983. Then, on October 20, 1983, another letter was

filed by the land court, this time addressed only to Cades,

saying that the trial was again being rescheduled to January 13,

1984, per Pioneer Mill’s request.

And yet another decade elapsed without any action in the

case. In late 1993, the State filed a disclaimer and

stipulation between itself and Pioneer Mill; the State

disclaimed any interest in Lots 1, 2, 3A, 3B, and 3C, and

stipulated that Pioneer Mill had title suitable for registration

to these lots. Apparently as part of this stipulated

disclaimer, in 1994, Pioneer Mill quitclaimed Puʻuki, Lots 3D and

3E, to the State.

2. 2009 and Kahoma’s substitution motion

Once again, nothing happened in the case, this time for

more than fifteen years. Pioneer Mill had apparently

transferred Lots 1, 2, 3A, 3B, and 3C to Kahoma on August 28,

2000. And on December 21, 2006, Kahoma sold Lots 3B and 3C to

Frank Valenta.

But Kahoma waited nine years after it obtained title, until

July 14, 2009, to move for it be substituted for Pioneer Mill as

the applicant on the land court application as to Lots 1, 2, and

3A. On August 28, 2009, the land court granted the motion.

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3. Kahoma’s motions for default and summary judgment

Then, on November 2, 2009, Kahoma filed a motion for

default judgment as to Lots 1, 2, and 3A, Kuhua. On December

24, 2009, the land court ordered publication of notice of its

intent to grant the motion. The publication was advertised in

the Maui News and the Honolulu Star Advertiser with a return

date of March 29, 2010. The publication did not identify who

might be a claimant, i.e., whose descendants’ interests might be

at issue. It merely invited those with objections to either

file written objections or appear on that date to orally object.

Some objections were filed over the months leading up to

the hearing. On October 21, 2010, the court initially denied

the motion for default judgment and ordered that any interested

party now had until November 1, 2010, to file a claim of

interest. Additional claims of interest were filed.

Then, in April 2011, Kahoma filed a motion for entry of

default against all parties who failed to file a claim of

interest by the November 1, 2010, deadline. On November 15,

2011, the land court granted this motion and entered default for

those who had not met that deadline.

In the interim, on August 3, 2011, Kahoma filed a motion

for summary judgment requesting confirmation and allowing

registration of its title to Lot 1, outlining the chain of title

as to that lot. On October 26, 2011, the land court granted the

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motion, confirming Kahoma’s ownership in fee simple to Lot 1 and

ordered registration of Kahoma’s title, but denied Kahoma’s

request for Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (“HRCP”) Rule 54(b)

certification.

In July of 2012, Kahoma moved for summary judgment to

confirm its title to Lot 2. Kahoma asserted it had unbroken

title as to that lot also. On January 16, 2013, the land court

granted this motion.

4. Motions to dismiss based on laches/lack of prosecution

On November 19, 2015, self-represented certiorari

petitioner Edward Kakalia (“Kakalia”) filed a motion asserting

the case had been pending for too long.10 No order appears to

have entered regarding this motion, but it was implicitly denied

as the land court went ahead and later ruled on the merits.11

On July 29, 2016, some other Kanaʻina descendants, who are

also petitioners on certiorari (collectively referred to as

“Schneider descendants” based on Gladiola Aloha Schneider being

the first named), filed a motion to dismiss based on laches as

well as HRCP Rule 41(b). Schneider descendants argued that

laches bars stale claims, especially when material witnesses

10 “Taking to[o] Long; On the Brief; Allodial Title Undisputed;

Respondents Interest; No Adverse Claim; Conclusion; Summary Judgment.”

11 On August 16, 2017, Kakalia filed another motion, this one seeking
dismissal with prejudice based on the merits regarding the adverse possession
claim as to Lot 3A, which was denied.

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have passed away. They also argued that the case should be

dismissed based on HRCP Rule 41(b) based on the failure to

prosecute, arguing that the delay was deliberate and

contumacious. The land court denied this motion on December 13,

2016.

5. Kahoma’s motion to confirm undivided 78.704% interest

in Lot 3A

Then, on January 17, 2017, Kahoma filed a motion seeking

confirmation of a 78.704% interest in Lot 3A by adverse

possession. The motion asserted that by the November 1, 2010,

deadline set by the land court for filing claims of interest to

Lot 3A, claims totaling a 21.296% interest had been filed by

Kanaʻina descendants.

Kahoma requested that the land court enter a decree giving

Kahoma title to the remaining 78.04%. This percentage

represented the interests of defaulted Kanaʻina descendants.

Kahoma said if the motion was granted, it would stipulate to the

substitution of Kanaʻina descendants who had filed claims as

applicants to the remaining undivided 21.296% interest in Lot

3A. Kakalia opposed, raising various concerns, including that

he, as well as other descendants, were entitled to a fair trial

and reasserting that the case had been pending for more than 90

years. Various Kanaʻina descendants also opposed this motion.

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On May 17, 2017, the land court issued an order saying that

“default judgment against the non-appearing parties whose

defaults have been previously entered herein as to Lot 3-A is

granted, but subject to a determination of Substituted Applicant

Kahoma Land LLC’s interest, if any[.]” The order denied without

prejudice Kahoma’s request to register ownership to 78.04% of

Lot 3A.

Kahoma then moved for an interlocutory appeal of the May

17, 2017, order, which the land court denied. But in its

denial, the court indicated it would entertain a motion for

reconsideration. Kahoma then filed a motion for reconsideration

on July 18, 2017. The land court then granted Kahoma’s motion

for reconsideration and entered default judgment for Kahoma as

to 78.704% of Lot 3A. Motions for reconsideration were filed by

various descendants, but all were denied.

6. Land court’s findings and decrees

The land court then filed its September 24, 2019, FOF/COL

and its Decree 2017 granting Kahoma a 78.04% interest in Lot 3A

based on adverse possession, as well as its Decree 2016

confirming Kahoma’s paper title to Lots 1 and 2.

In its September 24, 2019, FOF/COL, the land court relied

heavily on transcripts of witness testimony from the 1967 trial.

The land court also concluded that the Kanaʻina descendants who

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had appeared and objected were precluded from defending the

title of Kanaʻina’s defaulted heirs.

E. ICA proceedings

A joint notice of appeal as well as cross-appeals were

filed by various Kanaʻina descendants, including the Schneider

descendants and Kakalia.

Relevant here, the errors alleged by the Schneider

descendants and Kakalia included the land court’s (1)

determination that Kahoma has a 78.04% interest in Lot 3A

representing the percentages allocable to the defaulted Kanaʻina

descendants, and determining that cotenants do not have standing

to defend commonly held property on behalf of all cotenants

against an adverse possession claim; and (2) denial of their

motions to dismiss based on the delays in prosecuting this case.

In response, Kahoma argued that (1) the appellants lacked

standing to defend the interests of the defaulted heirs of

Kanaʻina and (2) the land court properly exercised its discretion

in denying the motions to dismiss because the appellants failed

to establish deliberate delay, contumacious conduct, or actual

prejudice to the appellants.

The ICA agreed with Kahoma and ruled in a memorandum

opinion that appellants lacked standing to challenge title to

Lot 3A for the defaulted Kanaʻina descendants. In re Pioneer

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Mill Co. & Kahoma Land LLC, No. CAAP-19-0000704, 2024 WL

3085307, at *7-9 (Haw. App. June 21, 2024) (mem. op.). Citing

its opinion in Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Silva, 124 Hawaiʻi

476, 482, 248 P.3d 1207, 1213 (App. 2011), the ICA ruled “it is

well-established in Hawaiʻi that a respondent may not defeat a

petitioner’s [applicant’s] claim to title by showing that even

though they have no title, a third-party not in the action has

superior title to the petitioner [applicant].” In re Pioneer

Mill, 2024 WL 3085307, at *9. The ICA then determined it did

not need to reach the merits of appellants’ other allegations of

error. Id.

The ICA filed its judgment on appeal on July 17, 2024.

F. Certiorari proceedings

Kakalia and the Schneider descendants filed timely

certiorari applications.12

Kakalia raises various historical perspectives and issues,

including the ICA’s ruling that Kanaʻina descendants lack

standing to raise claims on behalf of other Kanaʻina descendants

as well as the fact that this case had been pending for 100

years. The Schneider descendants also raise various issues,

12 Various other Kanaʻina descendants appeared in the land court and ICA
but did not file timely certiorari petitions. Our holdings in this opinion
based on the Kakalia and the Schneider descendants’ certiorari petitions
will, however, also inure to their benefit.

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including those two, which are dispositive as to Kahoma’s

remaining claim for adverse possession of Lot 3A.

Kakalia and the Schneider descendants are sometimes jointly

referred to as “Petitioners.”

III. Standards of Review

A. Standing

The issue of standing is reviewed de novo on appeal. Tax

Found. of Haw. v. State, 144 Hawaiʻi 175, 185, 439 P.3d 127, 137

(2019).

Standing is that aspect of justiciability focusing on the

party seeking a forum rather than on the issues he wants
adjudicated. And the crucial inquiry in its determination
is whether the plaintiff has alleged such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to warrant their
invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify
exercise of the court’s remedial powers on their behalf.

Tax Found. of Haw., 144 Hawaiʻi at 196, 439 P.3d at 148 (cleaned

up).

B. Laches

A trial court’s application of the equitable doctrine of

laches is reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of

discretion occurs where the trial court has clearly exceeded the

bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or

practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.

Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of State of Hawaiʻi, 106

Hawaiʻi 416, 430, 106 P.3d 339, 353 (2005).

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IV. Discussion

A. Cotenants have standing to assert the interests of other

cotenants against a party claiming adverse possession

The ICA held that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge

Decree 2017 because “it is well established in Hawaiʻi that a

respondent may not defeat a petitioner’s [applicant’s] claim to

title by showing that even though they have no title, a third-

party not in the action has superior title to the petitioner

[applicant].” In re Pioneer Mill, 2024 WL 3085307 at *9

(emphasis added). In so ruling, the ICA cited to its 2011

opinion in Silva, 124 Hawaiʻi at 482, 248 P.3d at 1213.

But Silva is clearly inapplicable based on its own

language. It involved claims to title by defendants having no

title. Unless adverse possession is established, actual Kanaʻina

descendants are in the chain of title to Lot 3A. It is Kahoma

that is without title to Lot 3A without establishing adverse

possession. In any event, Silva did not involve plaintiffs

seeking to quiet title based on adverse possession; rather, it

involved competing claims to title based on paper title. Silva,

124 Hawaiʻi at 478, 248 P.3d at 1209.

This case, in contrast, involves a claim to quiet title

based on adverse possession, which requires proof of actual,

open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession

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for the statutory period. Wailuku Agribusiness Co. v. Ah Sam,

114 Hawaiʻi 24, 33, 155 P.3d 1125, 1134 (2007).

And in cases involving possessory interests to real estate,

co-tenants have the right to defend not only their individual

interests, but the interests of all their cotenants, with whom

they are tenants in common. Black’s Law Dictionary defines

tenancy in common as “[a] tenancy by two or more persons, in

equal or unequal undivided shares, each person having an equal

right to possess the whole property but no right of

survivorship.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

Thus, as each cotenant has an equal right to possess the

whole property, each cotenant is entitled to possession of the

commonly held property against everyone but their cotenants, and

one cotenant “may recover the entire property from a stranger.”

86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 162 (2024).

This concept of cotenants being able to assert the

interests of other cotenants has historically been recognized in

case law. For example, in 1875, the Supreme Court of California

stated in Chipman v. Hastings, 50 Cal. 310 (1875), as follows:

The court below found that the plaintiff Caroline is the

owner in fee of an undivided half of the premises as a
tenant in common with persons other than the defendant, and
held that, as such tenant in common, she was entitled to
the possession of the whole of the premises as against all
persons having no title, and that the defendant tortiously
entered upon the premises and ousted her. Upon these facts
the judgment was correctly entered below that she recover
the whole of the premises.

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Chipman, 50 Cal. at 314. Applying this passage from Chipman to

our facts, Petitioners here are “owners in fee” as “tenant[s] in

common with persons [other Kanaʻina descendants] other than the

defendant [here, Kahoma],” and are “entitled to the possession

of the whole of the premises as against all persons having no

title [Kahoma].”

Similarly, in 1891, the Supreme Court of Texas, in an

action for trespass, ruled that “one tenant in common may

recover the whole land as against a stranger, and that the

recovery will inure to the benefit of his cotenants.” Boon v.

Knox, 80 Tex. 642, 644, 16 S.W. 448, 450 (1891) (emphasis

added).13

Also, in 1941, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in an ejectment

action, held that “a tenant in common may maintain an action of

ejectment for recovery of possession of the property against the

strangers to title.” Nat’l Surety Corp. v. Smith, 168 Or. 265,

269-70, 114 P.2d 118, 119-120 (1941) (emphasis added).

13 Also, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, addressing an action over

mineral rights, stated that when “a cotenant seeking to recover the entire
tract of land proves title in himself and his cotenants, the burden is not
upon him to go further and make proof that his cotenants have not parted with
their title.” Freeman v. Southland Paper Mills, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 822, 824
(1978). Correlatively, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in an action for
conversion and trespass of property, stated “that in an action to recover
real property one tenant in common may recover possession of the entire tract
as against all persons except his cotenants.” Carlson v. McNeill, 114 Colo.
78, 83, 162 P.2d 226, 229 (1945).

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Thus, the common law has traditionally recognized that

cotenants have standing to assert possessory interests of other

cotenants against a stranger seeking possession.

And in Hawaiʻi, we have recognized that a tenant in common

shares a general fiduciary relationship with their cotenants.

City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. Bennett, 57 Haw. 195, 208, 552 P.2d

1380, 1390 (1976). Further, almost fifty years ago, we took

judicial notice of the critical attitude towards previous over-

generous rules of adverse possession. Bennett, 57 Haw. at 208,

552 P.2d at 1389. And although our holding today is not limited

to our indigenous peoples, we note that Native Hawaiian

descendants have a collective stake in the protection of their

ʻāina rights through being able to assert their non-appearing

cotenants’ interests against adverse possession claims.14

We therefore hold that cotenants have standing to assert

the interests of other cotenants against a party claiming

adverse possession.

B. The land court abused its discretion by denying the motions

to dismiss based on laches

The second issue we address on certiorari resolves the

adverse possession claim as to Lot 3A.

14 There are various reasons parties might not respond to a quiet title
action. In this case, it does not appear personal service on Kanaʻina
descendants was ever even attempted. Also, most people do not read notices
in newspapers. And here, the 2010 notice did not even say the notice was
directed to heirs of Charles Kanaʻina.

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After erroneously determining that Petitioners lacked

standing to assert their cotenants’ interests, the ICA did not

address Petitioners’ assertions of error based on the land

court’s denial of their motions to dismiss. As noted, in 2015

and 2016, Kakalia and the Schneider descendants filed motions to

dismiss based on the lengthy delay, which were expressly or

implicitly denied by the land court. The Schneider desendants’

motion explicity asserted both laches and HRCP Rule 41(b).

Although Kakalia did not specifically use the word “laches,” he

repeatedly objected to the lengthy delay, and submissions of

self-represented litigants are to be interpreted liberally.

Waltrip v. TS Enters., Inc., 140 Hawaiʻi 226, 239, 398 P.3d 815,

828 (2016).

We hold that the land court abused its discretion by

refusing to dismiss the Lot 3A adverse possession claim based on

laches.

The doctrine of laches reflects the equitable maxim that

equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights

and is a defense to cases brought in law and in equity.

Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Royal Aloha v. Certified Mgmt.,

Inc., 139 Hawaiʻi 229, 231, 234, 386 P.3d 866, 868, 871 (2016).

Laches requires two essential elements: (1) an unreasonable

delay by the plaintiff in bringing or advancing the claim, and

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(2) resulting prejudice due to the delay. Herrmann v. Herrmann,

138 Hawai‘i 144, 153, 378 P.3d 860, 869 (2016).

As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Johnston v.

Standard Mining Co., 148 U.S. 360, 370 (1893), “It has been

frequently held that the mere institution of a suit does not, of

itself, relieve a person from the charge of laches, and that if

[they] fail[] in the diligent prosecution of the action the

consequences are the same as though no action had been begun.”

Our court also recognizes that laches can be raised in response

to undue delays occurring during litigation, not just at the

commencement of an action. See Herrmann, 138 Hawai‘i at 155, 378

P.3d at 871; HawaiiUSA Fed. Credit Union v. Monalim, 147 Hawai‘i

33, 37-38, 464 P.3d 821, 825-26 (2020).15

15 In Monalim, this court considered a laches defense raised based on a

four-year delay in filing a motion for deficiency judgment after a
foreclosure judgment. 147 Hawaiʻi at 36, 464 P.3d at 824. The mortgagor
argued that this delay was both unreasonable and prejudicial, as they had
made financial adjustments based on the assumption that no further claims
would be pursued. See id. This court vacated the deficiency judgment and
remanded for consideration of laches, affirming that laches can apply to
delays occurring within litigation itself when those delays result in undue
prejudice to the opposing party. Monalim, 147 Hawaiʻi at 44, 464 P.3d at 832.

In Herrmann, this court addressed a laches defense raised in a post-

decree motion for reimbursement of child support overpayments. 138 Hawaiʻi at
153, 378 P.3d at 869. The father waited seven years before seeking
reimbursement for overpayment, and the mother argued that the delay was
unreasonable and had prejudiced her, as her financial situation had changed
during that time. Herrmann, 138 Hawaiʻi at 153-55, 378 P.3d at 869-71. We
remanded for the family court to assess whether the delay was unreasonable
and whether it caused prejudice to the mother. Herrmann, 138 Hawaiʻi at 157,
378 P.3d at 873.

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Here, the 100-year delay in prosecuting this case to

conclusion is unprecedented and is obviously unreasonable.

Kahoma stands in the shoes of Pioneer Mill, which did not pursue

the case for many decades at a time, as outlined above. Kahoma

itself waited another nine years after receiving its deeds from

Pioneer Mill before prosecuting the case. The delays in this

case were blatantly unreasonable, satisfying the first element.

With respect to the second element, prejudice, the adverse

possession claim as to Lot 3A was based on possession that

allegedly occurred before the 1919 filing of the land court

application. The Examiner was not able to make a determination

regarding adverse possession, indicating there were factual

issues. By the time Petitioners filed their motions to dismiss

in 2015 and 2016, witnesses, Kanaʻina descendants, oral

histories, and memories, were simply gone. Petitioners were

also unable to cross-examine the 1967 trial witnesses, upon

which the land court relied in its adverse possession ruling.

The prejudice is obvious.

Therefore, the land court abused its discretion by denying

Petitioners’ motions to dismiss based on laches.16

16 We therefore need not address HRCP Rule 41(b).

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V. Conclusion

For these reasons, we vacate the ICA’s July 17, 2024,

judgment on appeal to the extent it affirmed the land court’s

September 24, 2019, FOF/COL as well as the land court’s Decree

2017. We vacate the land court’s September 24, 2019, FOF/COL as

well as its Decree 2017 awarding 78.704% of Lot 3A to Kahoma.

We affirm the ICA’s judgment on appeal to the extent it affirmed

the land court’s Decree 2016 regarding title to Lots 1 and 2.

We remand to the land court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion, which is to include dismissal of

the land court application as to Lot 3A. Although this

dismissal is without prejudice, if a new application to quiet

title as to Lot 3A is filed, current Hawaiʻi law will govern.

Michael J. Matsukawa /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

for petitioners Gladiola
Aloha Schneider, et al. /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

Edward P. Kakalia /s/ Todd W. Eddins

pro se petitioner
/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
W. Keoni Shultz and
Calvert G. Chipchase /s/ James S. Kawashima
for respondent Kahoma
Land LLC

David B. Kaapu
for respondents Arlene
K. Kakalia, et al.

Lance D. Collins,
Bianca Isaki, Ryan D.
Hurley, and Diego A.
Rivera

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for amici curiae Kuleana

Kuʻikahi, Aha Moku O Maui,
Nā ʻAikāne O Maui, Kiaʻi
Kauaula, Ka Malu O
Kahālāwai, Nā Mamo Aloha
ʻAina O Honokōhau, and
West Maui Preservation
Association

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