No.

XX-XX

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.
V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

D. JOHN SAUER
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
BRETT A. SHUMATE
Assistant Attorney General
SARAH M. HARRIS
Deputy Solicitor General
SOPAN JOSHI
Assistant to the
Solicitor General
MARK R. FREEMAN
MICHAEL S. RAAB
BRAD HINSHELWOOD
DANIEL WINIK
SOPHIA SHAMS
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
[email protected]
(202) 514-2217
 QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat.
1626, authorizes the tariffs imposed by President Trump
pursuant to the national emergencies declared or con-
tinued in Proclamation 10,886 and Executive Orders
14,157, 14,193, 14,194, 14,195, and 14,257, as amended.
2. If IEEPA authorizes the tariffs, whether the stat-
ute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to
the President.

(I)
 PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners (defendants-appellants below) are Don-
ald J. Trump, President of the United States; the
United States of America; the Executive Office of the
President; the Department of Homeland Security;
Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security; U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Rodney S.
Scott, Commissioner for CBP; the Office of the United
States Trade Representative; Jamieson Greer, United
States Trade Representative; and Howard Lutnick,
Secretary of Commerce.*
Respondents are V.O.S. Selections, Inc.; Plastic Ser-
vices and Products, LLC d/b/a Genova Pipe; MicroKits,
LLC; FishUSA Inc.; and Terry Precision Cycling LLC
(plaintiffs-appellees in Nos. 25-cv-66 and 25-1812). Re-
spondents also include the States of Oregon; Arizona;
Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Illinois; Maine; Min-
nesota; Nevada; New Mexico; New York; and Vermont
(plaintiffs-appellees in Nos. 25-cv-77 and 25-1813).

* All individual petitioners were sued in their official capacities

and their successors, if any, have automatically been substituted in
their respective places. See Sup. Ct. R. 35.3; Fed. R. App. P.
43(c)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). The Court of International Trade
dismissed the President as a defendant, and respondents did not
cross-appeal that ruling. See App., infra, 22a n.10, 161a. Neverthe-
less, the court of appeals retained the President in the case caption
and we accordingly do the same here.

(II)
 RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States Court of International Trade:
V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, No. 25-cv-66
(May 28, 2025)
Oregon v. United States Department of Homeland
Security, No. 25-cv-77 (May 28, 2025)
United States Court of Appeals (Fed. Cir.):
V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-1812 (Aug.
29, 2025)
Oregon v. Trump, No. 25-1813 (Aug. 29, 2025)

(III)
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statutory provisions involved ...................................................... 1
Introduction................................................................................... 2
Statement:
A. Statutory background ....................................................... 6
B. The challenged actions.................................................... 10
1. Contraband drug tariffs ........................................... 11
2. Reciprocal tariffs ...................................................... 12
C. Proceedings below ........................................................... 15
Reasons for granting the petition ............................................. 18
A. IEEPA authorizes the challenged tariffs ..................... 19
B. IEEPA does not violate the nondelegation doctrine ... 29
C. The decision below warrants further review ................ 31
Conclusion ................................................................................... 34
Appendix A — Federal Circuit opinion (Aug. 29, 2025, as
amended on Sept. 2, 2025) ........................ 1a
Appendix B — Federal Circuit judgment
(Aug. 29, 2025) ....................................... 137a
Appendix C — Court of International Trade opinion
(May 28, 2025) ........................................ 139a
Appendix D — Court of International Trade judgment
(May 28, 2025) ........................................ 198a
Appendix E — Statutory provisions................................... 201a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477 (2023) ........................ 25, 33
Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States,
7 Cranch 382 (1813) ........................................................ 7, 30
Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981).............................................. 9, 23, 28, 31

(V)
 VI

Cases—Continued: Page
Department of Agriculture Rural Development
Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz,
601 U.S. 42 (2024) ......................................................... 22, 27
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) ...... 26
FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284 (2012) ..................................... 20
FCC v. Consumers’ Research,
145 S. Ct. 2482 (2025) ....................................... 25, 26, 29, 30
FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
426 U.S. 548 (1976).........................................5, 20, 21, 29, 30
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 590 U.S. 255 (2020) ........ 23
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) ......................... 5, 20, 22
Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128 (2019)...................... 29
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) .................................. 24, 28
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U. S. 394 (1928)................................................... 7, 29, 31
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649 (1892).................................................... 7, 30, 31
PrimeSource Building Products, Inc. v. United
States, 59 F.4th 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2023), cert. denied,
144 S. Ct. 345 (2023), and 144 S. Ct. 561 (2024) ............... 31
Public Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209
(D.C. Cir. 2004) ................................................................... 28
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) ..................... 9, 23, 24, 28
Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197 (2020) .................... 25
Soto v. United States, 605 U.S. 360 (2025) .......................... 20
Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025) ..................... 18
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667 (2018) ................................ 29
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936).............................................................. 29
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) ................... 29
United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077 (9th Cir. 2023),
cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 820 (2024) ..................................... 31
 VII

Cases—Continued: Page
United States v. Yoshida International, Inc.,
526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975) ................................... 8, 23, 31
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014).............................................................. 26
Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 (1825) .......................... 30
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) ..................................... 28
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022) ........................ 25
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952)........................................................ 26, 31
Constitution and statutes:
U.S. Const.:
Art. I, § 8 .......................................................................... 22
Art. II ................................................................................. 6
First War Powers Act,
ch. 593, 55 Stat. 838 .............................................................. 8
55 Stat. 839 ......................................................................... 8
International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) .......... 2-6, 9-11, 15, 17, 19-28, 31, 32
50 U.S.C. 1701(a) ............................................... 3, 5, 10, 30
50 U.S.C. 1701(b) ....................................................... 16, 30
50 U.S.C. 1702 .................................................................. 24
50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(A) ................................................... 10
50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(B) ............................10, 15, 19, 20, 30
50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(C) ................................................... 10
50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(2)(B) ..................................................... 3
50 U.S.C. 1702(b) ............................................................. 30
50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(1) ........................................................ 10
50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2) ........................................................ 10
50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3) ........................................................ 10
50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(4) ........................................................ 10
 VIII

Statutes—Continued: Page
50 U.S.C. 1703 ............................................................ 24, 30
50 U.S.C. 1703(a) ............................................................. 10
50 U.S.C. 1703(b) ............................................................. 10
50 U.S.C. 1703(c) ............................................................. 10
50 U.S.C. 1703(d) ............................................................. 10
National Emergencies Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 ........................................ 8
50 U.S.C. 1621(a) ............................................................... 9
50 U.S.C. 1622(a)(1)........................................................... 9
50 U.S.C. 1622(b) ............................................................... 9
50 U.S.C. 1622(d) ............................................................... 9
50 U.S.C. 1641(a) ............................................................... 9
50 U.S.C. 1641(b) ............................................................... 9
50 U.S.C. 1641(c) ............................................................... 9
Non-Intercourse Act of March 1, 1809, ch. 24,
2 Stat. 528 .............................................................................. 7
Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 ............................... 7
Tarriff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858................................ 7
Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 338, 46 Stat. 704
(19 U.S.C. 1338)..................................................................... 7
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978:
§ 122, 88 Stat. 1987 (19 U.S.C. 2132) ............. 8, 15, 25, 26
Tit., II, 88 Stat. 2011 (19 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.) ................. 8
Tit. III, 88 Stat. 2041 (19 U.S.C. 2411 et seq.) ................ 8
19 U.S.C. 2132(a) ....................................................... 16, 27
19 U.S.C. 2251 et seq. ........................................................ 8
19 U.S.C. 2411 et seq. ........................................................ 8
19 U.S.C. 3004(c)(1) ......................................................... 17
Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 877 (19 U.S.C. 1862).............. 7
 IX

Statutes—Continued: Page
Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917,
ch. 106, § 11, 40 Stat. 422-423 .......................................... 8, 9
15 U.S.C. 78i(h)(1).................................................................. 23
15 U.S.C. 78i(h)(2).................................................................. 23
28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(1)(B) .......................................................... 16
50 U.S.C. 4302 .......................................................................... 9
Miscellaneous:
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (1969) ................................................................. 28
Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) ............................... 19
Exec. Order No. 14,157,
90 Fed. Reg. 8439 (Jan. 29, 2025) ...................................... 11
Exec. Order No. 14,193,
90 Fed. Reg. 9113 (Feb. 7, 2025) ....................................... 11
Exec. Order No. 14,194,
90 Fed. Reg. 9117 (Feb. 7, 2025) ....................................... 11
Exec. Order No. 14,195,
90 Fed. Reg. 9121 (Feb. 7, 2025) ................................. 11, 12
Exec. Order No. 14,197,
90 Fed. Reg. 9183 (Feb. 10, 2025) ..................................... 11
Exec. Order No. 14,198,
90 Fed. Reg. 9185 (Feb. 10, 2025) ..................................... 11
Exec. Order No. 14,228,
90 Fed. Reg. 11,463 (Mar. 7, 2025) .................................... 12
Exec. Order No. 14,231,
90 Fed. Reg. 11,785 (Mar. 11, 2025) .................................. 11
Exec. Order No. 14,232,
90 Fed. Reg. 11,787 (Mar. 11, 2025) .................................. 11
Exec. Order No. 14,257,
90 Fed. Reg. 15,041 (Apr. 7, 2025) .............................. 12, 13
Exec. Order No. 14,266,
90 Fed. Reg. 15,625 (Apr. 15, 2025)................................... 13
 X

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page
Exec. Order No. 14,316,
90 Fed. Reg. 30,823 (July 7, 2025) ..................................... 14
Exec. Order No. 14,326,
90 Fed. Reg. 37,963 (Aug. 6, 2025) .................................... 14
H.R. Rep. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ....... 8, 10, 23
Proclamation No. 4074,
36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (Aug. 17, 1971) .................................... 8
Proclamation No. 10,886,
90 Fed. Reg. 8327 (Jan. 29, 2025) ...................................... 11
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. XX-XX
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.
V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General respectfully petitions for a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-
136a) is available at 2025 WL 2490634. The opinion of
the Court of International Trade (App., infra, 139a-197a)
is reported at 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
August 29, 2025. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Pertinent statutory provisions are reproduced in the
appendix to this brief (App., infra, 201a-206a).

(1)
 2
INTRODUCTION
This case addresses the validity of the Administra-
tion’s most significant economic and foreign-policy
initiative—the imposition of tariffs under the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub.
L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626 (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.), which President Trump has determined are nec-
essary to rectify America’s country-killing trade defi-
cits and to stem the flood of fentanyl across our borders.
In January 2025, the United States faced “enormous,
persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits”—$1.2 tril-
lion per year—that, the President perceived, “have hol-
lowed out our domestic manufacturing and defense-
industrial base and have resulted in a lack of advanced
domestic manufacturing capacity, a defense-industrial
base dependent on inputs from foreign adversaries,
[and] vulnerable domestic supply chains.” C.A. Doc.
158, at 6-7 (Aug. 29, 2025) (Lutnick).1 Those “cata-
strophic” deficits, id. at 5, arose from asymmetric tar-
iffs and trade barriers that virtually all our major trad-
ing partners had imposed on the United States for dec-
ades. Gov’t Mot. to Expedite 2a (Bessent).2
The President and his most senior advisors recog-
nized that those trade deficits had created “an ongoing
economic emergency of historic proportions,” C.A. Doc.
158, at 6 (Lutnick), and brought America to a “tipping
point,” i.e., “the brink of a major economic and national-
security catastrophe.” Gov’t Mot. to Expedite 2a (Bes-
sent). Exercising the President’s broad discretion un-

1
All record citations are to Federal Circuit case 25-1812 and
Court of International Trade case 25-cv-66.
2
The government is simultaneously filing a motion to expedite
consideration of the petition for a writ of certiorari and, if certiorari
is granted, to expedite merits briefing and argument.
 3

der IEEPA to “regulate * * * importation” of foreign

goods to “deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat”
to “national security, foreign policy, or [the U.S.] econ-
omy,” 50 U.S.C. 1701(a), 1702(a)(2)(B), President Trump
declared a national emergency and imposed tariffs. The
President has determined that those tariffs and the en-
suing trade negotiations with all our major trading part-
ners are pulling America back from the precipice of dis-
aster, restoring its respect and standing in the world,
eliminating decades of unfair and asymmetric trade pol-
icies that have gutted our manufacturing capacity and
military readiness, and inducing our trading partners to
invest trillions of dollars in the American economy. The
tariffs also address the separate national emergency
arising from mass importation of fentanyl and other il-
legal drugs that have taken hundreds of thousands of
American lives and helped fuel the rise of foreign car-
tels and traffickers. C.A. Doc. 158, at 25 (Rubio), 35-36
(Greer).
Due to IEEPA tariffs, six major trading partners
and the 27-nation European Union have already en-
tered into framework deals with the United States, ac-
cepting tariff arrangements heavily recalibrated in
America’s favor and agreeing to make approximately
$2 trillion of purchases and investment in the United
States’ economy, see C.A. Doc. 158, at 13-14 (Lutnick),
36 (Greer)—with trillions more under negotiation with
countries across the world.
In addition, the President recently authorized
IEEPA tariffs against India for purchasing Russian en-
ergy products, to deal with a preexisting national emer-
gency regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine, as a crucial
aspect of his push for peace in that war-torn country.
C.A. Doc. 158, at 26 (Rubio). And the Congressional
 4

Budget Office projected that tariffs will reduce federal

deficits by $4 trillion in the coming years. Id. at 19.
The stakes in this case could not be higher. The
President and his Cabinet officials have determined
that the tariffs are promoting peace and unprecedented
economic prosperity, and that the denial of tariff au-
thority would expose our nation to trade retaliation
without effective defenses and thrust America back to
the brink of economic catastrophe. C.A. Doc. 158, at
8-9 (Lutnick).
To the President and his most senior advisors, these
tariffs thus present a stark choice: With tariffs, we are
a rich nation; without tariffs, we are a poor nation. Ac-
cording to the President, “[o]ne year ago, the United
States was a dead country, and now, because of the tril-
lions of dollars being paid by countries that have so
badly abused us, America is a strong, financially viable,
and respected country again.” C.A. Doc. 154, at 1 (Aug.
11, 2025). The President predicts that “[i]f the United
States were forced to pay back the trillions of dollars
committed to us, America could go from strength to fail-
ure the moment such an incorrect decision took effect,”
and “the economic consequences would be ruinous, in-
stead of unprecedented success.” Id. at 1-2.
Nonetheless, in a fractured, 7-4 decision, the en banc
Federal Circuit declared that the President’s use of
IEEPA tariffs was unlawful. That decision casts a
pall of uncertainty upon ongoing foreign negotiations
that the President has been pursuing through tariffs
over the past five months, jeopardizing both already-
negotiated framework deals and ongoing negotiations.
C.A. Doc. 158, at 8-9 (Lutnick), 39 (Greer). Few cases
have so clearly called out for this Court’s swift resolu-
tion.
 5

The Federal Circuit did not question that those cri-

ses constitute “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” to
“national security, foreign policy, or [the U.S.] econ-
omy” sufficient to trigger the President’s emergency
powers under IEEPA. 50 U.S.C. 1701(a). And the Fed-
eral Circuit did not rule out that the President’s author-
ity under IEEPA to “regulate * * * importation” of for-
eign goods to “deal with” such threats might authorize
some tariffs. See App., infra 25a. That court simply
held that these particular tariffs are too significant and
enduring to fall within IEEPA’s bounds, reasoning that
Congress needed to authorize them more expressly.
See id. at 38a-39a.
As Judge Taranto’s dissent recognized, that reason-
ing is profoundly wrong. It contradicts IEEPA’s plain
text, the Court’s cases, statutory history, and longstand-
ing practice. App., infra, 64a-136a. Without further qual-
ification, IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate”
—i.e., to govern or control—foreign imports to address
national emergencies. Id. at 94a-103a. Imposing tariffs
is a quintessential method of governing or controlling
imports. The Court has long interpreted “regulation of
commerce” in this area to encompass tariffs or duties.
E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 202 (1824) (Marshall,
C.J.). And the Court has interpreted the phrase “adjust
imports” to encompass tariffs. FEA v. Algonquin SNG,
Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
By contrast, the Federal Circuit majority’s atextual,
some-but-not-others theory of IEEPA tariffs would
leave courts with no metrics for judging when tariffs
last too long, realize too much revenue, cover too many
countries, or become too effective for the court’s liking.
IEEPA does not empower federal judges to perversely
 6

declare tariffs unlawful at some judicially discerned

point when they achieve too much.
There is nothing new or suspect about IEEPA’s
broad delegation of tariff authority to address national
emergencies. Congress has long supplemented the
President’s Article II foreign-affairs powers by delegat-
ing capacious authority to impose tariffs that, in the
President’s judgment, will advance national security,
foster economic prosperity, or facilitate negotiations with
foreign counterparts. Likewise, the major-questions
doctrine on which the Federal Circuit relied is inappli-
cable. IEEPA quite naturally addresses the most
major of questions—the powers available to Presidents
to address extraordinary national emergencies in the
foreign-affairs context—by conferring major powers.
The decision below eviscerates a critical tool for ad-
dressing emergencies through fuzzy reasoning that im-
properly transforms judges into foreign-policy refer-
ees. Though the Federal Circuit has stayed its mandate
pending this Court’s review, its decision has jeopard-
ized ongoing foreign negotiations and threatens frame-
work deals. Gov’t Mot. to Expedite 1a-2a (Bessent).
Left undisturbed, the decision below would, in the Pres-
ident’s view, unilaterally disarm the United States and
allow other nations to hold America’s economy hostage
to their retaliatory trade policies. This Court should
grant certiorari, expedite consideration of the merits,
and reverse.
STATEMENT
A. Statutory Background
1. For over a century, Congress has supplemented
the President’s constitutional power over foreign affairs
and national security by delegating to him the authority
to manage tariffs or duties on foreign imports in re-
 7

sponse to international conditions. See Marshall Field

& Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892).
This Court has repeatedly upheld presidential exer-
cises of such authority. In 1813, this Court upheld an
1810 statute that authorized the President to reinstate
the terms of the Non-Intercourse Act of March 1, 1809,
ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528, and prohibit imports from either
Great Britain or France if either nation “violate[d] the
neutral commerce of the United States.” Cargo of Brig
Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch 382, 384 (citation
omitted); see id. at 388. In 1892, this Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26
Stat. 567, which authorized the President to suspend an
exemption for certain products from import duties “for
such time as he shall deem just” “whenever, and so of-
ten as [he] shall be satisfied,” that the exporting coun-
try “imposes duties or other exactions” on American
products that “he may deem to be reciprocally unequal
and unreasonable.” Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 680 (ci-
tation omitted). And in 1928, the Court upheld the Tar-
iff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858, which empowered
the President to raise import duties “whenever the
President * * * shall find” that existing tariffs do not
equalize the differences between foreign and domestic
production costs, and to modify the tariffs “when he de-
termines” that “the differences in costs of production
have changed.” J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 401-402 (citation omitted).
Congress has since enacted many other statutes au-
thorizing the Executive to impose or modify tariffs or
duties on imports, including Section 338 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 704 (19 U.S.C. 1338); Sec-
tion 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-794, 76 Stat. 877 (19 U.S.C. 1862); and Titles II and
 8

III of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat.

2011, 2041 (19 U.S.C. 2251 et seq., 2411 et seq.).
Most relevant here, the 1917 Trading With the En-
emy Act (TWEA), ch. 106, § 11, 40 Stat. 422-423, author-
ized the President to specify foreign goods that may not
be imported during wartime “except at such time or
times, and under such regulations or orders * * * as
the President shall prescribe.” In 1941, Congress ex-
panded that authority to apply during times of peace.
See First War Powers Act, ch. 593, 55 Stat. 838, 839 (au-
thorizing the President to “regulate * * * importa-
tion”).
In 1971, President Nixon imposed peacetime tariffs
that were upheld under those authorities. See Procla-
mation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (Aug. 17, 1971).
Because a “prolonged decline in the international mon-
etary reserves” of the United States over a number
of years had seriously threatened its “international
competitive position” and potentially impaired its abil-
ity to assure national security, ibid., President Nixon
“declared a national emergency with respect to the
balance-of-payments crisis and under that emergency
imposed a surcharge on imports,” H.R. Rep. No. 459,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) (IEEPA House Report);
see Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 15,724
(Aug. 17, 1971). In United States v. Yoshida Interna-
tional, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975), the Federal
Circuit’s predecessor upheld those tariffs under
TWEA, rejecting an argument that TWEA—which au-
thorized the President to “regulate * * * importation”
of foreign goods—did not authorize the President to im-
pose tariffs. Id. at 575-576.
2. In 1976 and 1977, Congress modified TWEA
through the National Emergencies Act of 1976, Pub. L.
 9

No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255, and IEEPA, respectively.

The National Emergencies Act “authorized” “the Pres-
ident” “to declare [a] national emergency” “[w]ith re-
spect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, dur-
ing the period of a national emergency, of any special or
extraordinary power.” 50 U.S.C. 1621(a). Congress
placed no substantive conditions on the President’s abil-
ity to declare a national emergency.
Congress gave itself oversight authority over
national-emergency declarations. National-emergency
declarations must be “immediately * * * transmitted
to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.”
50 U.S.C. 1621(a); see 50 U.S.C. 1641(a)-(c). Congress
may terminate a national emergency. 50 U.S.C.
1622(a)(1). And Congress must meet within six months
of the national-emergency declaration to consider ter-
minating it. 50 U.S.C. 1622(b). In addition, national-
emergency declarations automatically terminate after
one year unless the President notifies Congress that the
emergency “continue[s].” 50 U.S.C. 1622(d).
IEEPA, in turn, separated the President’s authority
to act in wartime and peacetime. Congress limited
TWEA to periods of declared wars. 50 U.S.C. 4302.
IEEPA then extended the President’s authority to pe-
riods of declared national emergencies during peace-
time. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 227-228 (1984).
The broad powers that IEEPA grants to the President
are “essentially the same as” those under its predeces-
sor TWEA. Id. at 228. Indeed, IEEPA’s operative lan-
guage was “directly drawn” from TWEA. Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671 (1981). IEEPA au-
thorizes the President to exercise those powers during
peacetime “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part
 10

outside the United States, to the national security, for-

eign policy, or economy of the United States.” 50 U.S.C.
1701(a).
Once the President declares a national emergency
relating to such a threat, IEEPA grants the President
deliberately broad powers, including to “regulate[] or
prohibit” certain foreign monetary transactions, 50
U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(A), and to “confiscate” certain prop-
erty during “armed hostilities,” 50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(C).
As relevant here, IEEPA also empowers the President
to “regulate * * * importation” of “any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest by any person, or with respect to any property,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 50
U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(B). Unlike TWEA, IEEPA contains
an enumerated list of exceptions to those broad grants
of authority. See 50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(1)-(4). None is at
issue here.
Congress also gave itself oversight authority over
exercises of IEEPA powers beyond that afforded by the
National Emergencies Act. 50 U.S.C. 1703(d). The
President “shall consult regularly with the Congress so
long as [IEEPA] authorities are exercised.” 50 U.S.C.
1703(a). The President also is directed to “immediately
transmit to the Congress a report” on the emergency,
with updates every six months. 50 U.S.C. 1703(b)-(c).
Nonetheless, Congress recognized that those “new au-
thorities should be sufficiently broad and flexible to en-
able the President to respond as appropriate and neces-
sary to unforeseen contingencies.” IEEPA House Re-
port 10.
B. The Challenged Actions
In early 2025, President Trump declared national
emergencies arising from the influx of contraband
 11

drugs into the United States from Mexico, Canada, and

the People’s Republic of China (PRC); and from the
United States’ exploding goods trade deficit.
1. Contraband drug tariffs
a. Mexico and Canada. In January 2025, the Presi-
dent declared the flow of contraband drugs like fentanyl
through illicit distribution networks, and the resulting
public-health crisis, to be a national emergency. Proc-
lamation No. 10,886, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327 (Jan. 29, 2025);
Executive Order No. 14,157, 90 Fed. Reg. 8439 (Jan. 29,
2025). On February 1, 2025, the President found that
the actions of Canada and Mexico contributed to that
crisis. Executive Order No. 14,193, § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113,
9114 (Feb. 7, 2025); Executive Order No. 14,194, § 1, 90
Fed. Reg. 9117, 9118 (Feb. 7, 2025).
Invoking his powers under IEEPA, the President
addressed that unusual and extraordinary threat to the
United States’ national security, foreign policy, and
economy, by ordering a 25 percent duty on most Cana-
dian and Mexican imports. 90 Fed. Reg. at 9114; 90
Fed. Reg. at 9118.
Since that time, the President has variously paused
and adjusted those duties following negotiations and in
response to international events. See, e.g., Executive
Order No. 14,197, 90 Fed. Reg. 9183 (Feb. 10, 2025); Ex-
ecutive Order No. 14,198, 90 Fed. Reg. 9185 (Feb. 10,
2025); Executive Order No. 14,231, 90 Fed. Reg. 11,785
(Mar. 11, 2025); Executive Order No. 14,232, 90 Fed.
Reg. 11,787 (Mar. 11, 2025).
b. PRC. On February 1, 2025, the President took ac-
tion under IEEPA to address the contraband-drug
threat from the PRC. Executive Order No. 14,195, 90
Fed. Reg. 9121 (Feb. 7, 2025). To address the national
emergency, the President imposed a 10 percent duty on
 12

most goods imported from the PRC. Id. at 9122-9123.

On March 3, 2025, the President increased the rate to
20 percent. Executive Order No. 14,228, 90 Fed. Reg.
11,463 (Mar. 7, 2025).
2. Reciprocal tariffs
On April 2, 2025, the President declared a separate
national emergency, finding that the United States’s ex-
ploding goods trade deficit—caused by foreign trading
partners’ asymmetrical “tariff ” and “non-tariff barri-
ers” that prevent fair and reciprocal trade—and the
consequences of that trade deficit “constitute an unu-
sual and extraordinary [foreign] threat to the national
security and economy of the United States.” Executive
Order No. 14,257, 90 Fed. Reg. 15,041 (Apr. 7, 2025).
In particular, the President found, “large and persis-
tent annual U.S. goods trade deficits” have “atrophied”
our nation’s “domestic production capacity,” and
“[i]ncreased reliance on foreign producers for goods
* * * has compromised U.S. economic security by ren-
dering U.S. supply chains vulnerable to geopolitical dis-
ruption and supply shocks.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,043.
Those deficits “and the concomitant loss of industrial
capacity, have compromised military readiness,” and
“this vulnerability can only be redressed through swift
corrective action to rebalance the flow of imports into
the United States.” Ibid. The President determined
that “[t]he future of American competitiveness depends
on reversing” the hemorrhage of manufacturing capa-
bilities to create “the industrial base” that the nation
“needs for national security.” Id. at 15,044. Using his
broad IEEPA powers, the President addressed that un-
usual and extraordinary threat by imposing an addi-
tional 10 percent duty on most imported goods. Id. at
15,045. Those duties took effect on April 5, 2025, with
 13

additional duties imposed on select countries on April 9.

Ibid.
Since then, the President has taken additional ac-
tions that he deemed necessary to address that national
emergency, both by using the tariffs to reduce the trade
deficit and to increase leverage on other countries to
eliminate barriers to fair, reciprocal trade. The Presi-
dent signaled that if “trading partner[s] take significant
steps to remedy non-reciprocal trade arrangements and
align sufficiently with the United States on economic
and national security matters,” that may prompt him to
“decrease or limit in scope the duties” imposed, while
the countries negotiated trade and security agreements
to deal with the emergency. 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,047. Al-
ternatively, if a “trading partner retaliate[d] against the
United States,” the President indicated that he would
“ensure the efficacy” of his action by “increas[ing] or
expand[ing] in scope the duties” he imposed. Ibid.
Soon after the President’s imposition of tariffs,
“more than 75 * * * trading partners * * * approached
the United States to address the lack of trade reciproc-
ity in our economic relationships and our resulting na-
tional and economic security concerns.” Executive Or-
der No. 14,266, 90 Fed. Reg. 15,625, 15,626 (Apr. 15,
2025). Given those “significant steps” by trading part-
ners to address the emergency, the President paused
the increased tariffs for 90 days for the cooperating
countries, facilitating the negotiation of trade deals. Id.
at 15,625. At the same time, the President maintained
a 10 percent tariff to encourage those countries to
swiftly negotiate agreements. The President also made
clear that if trading partners were not “sincere” in their
“intentions * * * to facilitate a resolution to the na-
tional emergency,” then he would increase tariffs. Id.
 14

at 15,626. As Secretary Bessent explained, “[t]he suc-

cess of the negotiations depends on the credible threat
of prompt imposition of tariffs.” C.A. Doc. 158, at 31.
Those negotiations have produced historic reciprocal
trade deals with the United Kingdom, the European
Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Vietnam, among others. C.A. Doc. 158,
at 9-10.3 For example, the framework deal with the Eu-
ropean Union will cause the EU to “buy $750 billion in
U.S. energy exports,” “invest $600 billion in the United
States by 2028,” and “eliminate certain non-tariff barri-
ers” on “industrial goods, digital, and agricultural prod-
ucts.” Id. at 37.
In contrast, after extensions of the 90-day pause to
give more time for negotiation, see Executive Order No.
14,316, 90 Fed. Reg. 30,823 (July 7, 2025); Executive Or-
der No. 14,326, 90 Fed. Reg. 37,963 (Aug. 6, 2025), the
President found that some trading partners “offered
terms” that “do not sufficiently address imbalances in
our trading relationship.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 37,963. The
President accordingly did not renew the pause for those
countries and instead increased tariffs on them. Id. at
37,963-37,964.
The President has now “set the tariff rates for all
foreign-trading partners” without triggering “retalia-
tion for this restructured and rebalanced tariff regime,”
save for one short-lived exception. C.A. Doc. 158, at 9.
Still, the United States remains in “delicate” high-
stakes negotiations with “dozens of countries.” Id. at
39-40. No agreements “would be possible without the

3
Those countries are still negotiating final trade and security
agreements based on the terms of framework deals. C.A. Doc. 15,
at 38 (Greer).
 15

imposition of tariffs to regulate imports,” and the tariffs

“br[ought] other countries to the table.” Id. at 38.
C. Proceedings Below
1. Respondents are plaintiffs in two consolidated
cases filed in the Court of International Trade (CIT).
Respondents in V.O.S. (No. 25-cv-66) are a group of im-
porters challenging the reciprocal tariffs. Respondents
in Oregon (No. 25-cv-77) are a group of States challeng-
ing both the reciprocal and contraband-drug tariffs.
The CIT denied a temporary restraining order in
V.O.S., and consolidated briefing on a preliminary in-
junction and for summary judgment in each of the
cases. See App., infra, 156a-158a (recounting the pro-
cedural history).
2. The CIT granted summary judgment to respond-
ents, vacated the tariff orders, and entered a universal
permanent injunction against the tariffs’ imposition, or-
dering the government to restore the pre-emergency
rates within 10 days. App., infra, 139a-197a.
The CIT held that IEEPA does not authorize the re-
ciprocal tariffs. App., infra, 169a-181a. The CIT ac-
knowledged (App., infra, 174a-175a) that IEEPA’s au-
thorization to “regulate * * * importation,” 50 U.S.C.
1702(a)(1)(B), authorizes the President to impose some
tariffs, but held that Section 122 of the Trade Act of
1974, 88 Stat. 1987, “removes the President’s power to
impose remedies in response to balance-of-payments
deficits, and specifically trade deficits, from the broader
powers granted to a president during a national emer-
gency under IEEPA,” App., infra, 178a. Section 122,
codified at 19 U.S.C. 2132, authorizes the President to,
among other things, impose “a temporary import sur-
charge, not to exceed 15 percent,” “for a period not ex-
ceeding 150 days,” whenever “fundamental interna-
 16

tional payments problems require special import mea-

sures to restrict imports * * * to deal with large and
serious United States balance-of-payments deficits.” 19
U.S.C. 2132(a). In the CIT’s view, any tariff that “re-
sponds to an imbalance in trade * * * must conform
with the limits of Section 122,” even if the tariff other-
wise complies with IEEPA. App., infra, 179a-180a.
The CIT further held that IEEPA does not authorize
the contraband-drug tariffs. App., infra, 181a-196a.
The CIT observed that IEEPA provides that the Pres-
ident may exercise his authorities only to “deal with” a
threat underlying a declared emergency. 50 U.S.C.
1701(b). In the CIT’s view, however, the contraband-
drug tariffs were “ ‘pressure’ or ‘leverage’ tactics,” and
thus insufficiently “direct” to satisfy IEEPA’s “ ‘deal
with’ ” requirement. App., infra, 193a.
The CIT declared the tariffs unlawful, issued a uni-
versal permanent injunction against the tariffs, and or-
dered the government to revert to prior tariff rates
within 10 days. App., infra, 199a-200a. The Federal
Circuit stayed the CIT’s order pending appeal. 2025
WL 1649290.
3. Sitting initially en banc, the Federal Circuit in a
7-4 decision affirmed the declaratory relief but vacated
the injunction in its entirety and remanded to the CIT
to reconsider the scope of injunctive relief, if any. App.,
infra, 1a-136a.
a. In a per curiam opinion, the en banc court of ap-
peals held that IEEPA did not authorize the challenged
tariffs. But that court relied on different grounds from
the CIT.4

4
Like the CIT, the court of appeals confirmed that the CIT had
subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(1)(B), which
grants the CIT “exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced
 17

The court of appeals purported not to address

“whether IEEPA authorizes any tariffs at all,” and (un-
like the CIT) the court did not categorically rule out
IEEPA tariffs to address balance-of-payments deficits.
App., infra, at 25a. Instead, the court held, IEEPA
does not authorize “tariffs of the magnitude of the” chal-
lenged tariffs here. Id. at 38a; see id. at 25a-42a. The
court stated that “whenever Congress intends to dele-
gate to the President the authority to impose tariffs, it
does so explicitly.” Id. at 30a. The court found it signif-
icant that unlike various tariff-specific statutes, IEEPA
uses the phrase “regulate * * * importation,” but does
“not use the term ‘tariff ’ or any of its synonyms, like
‘duty’ or ‘tax.’ ” Id. at 27a.
The court of appeals contemplated that IEEPA
might authorize some tariffs, but held that to interpret
IEEPA as authorizing “unlimited tariffs” would “run[]
afoul of the major questions doctrine.” Id. at 34a. The
court explained that although past Presidents had in-
voked IEEPA, they mostly did so “to freeze assets,
block financial transfers, place embargoes, or impose
targeted sanctions,” not to impose tariffs. Id. at 36a.
The court distinguished the tariffs imposed by Presi-
dent Nixon under IEEPA’s predecessor statute
(TWEA) as “ ‘limited’ ” in “time, scope, and amount.” Id.
at 40a (brackets and citation omitted). The court thus
affirmed the CIT’s holding that IEEPA does not au-
thorize the challenged tariffs.

against” the government “that arises out of any law of the United
States providing for * * * tariffs.” The court of appeals explained
that respondents’ suits arose out of modifications to the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States, which Congress has directed
“shall be considered to be statutory provisions of law for all pur-
poses,” 19 U.S.C. 3004(c)(1). App., infra, 22a-25a.
 18

As to remedies, the court of appeals affirmed declar-

atory relief, but vacated the CIT’s universal injunction
in its entirety in light of Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct.
2540 (2025), and remanded to the CIT for further con-
sideration of the scope of injunctive relief, if any. See
App., infra, 43a-45a.
b. Judge Cunningham, joined by Judges Lourie,
Reyna, and Stark, filed an opinion expressing additional
views. App., infra, 47a-62a. In her view, IEEPA does
not authorize any tariffs at all, and a contrary interpre-
tation would violate the nondelegation doctrine. Ibid.
c. Judge Taranto, joined by Chief Judge Moore and
Judges Prost and Chen, dissented. App., infra, 63a-
136a. He explained that the plain meaning of “regulate
importation” includes the authority to impose tariffs,
and that the omission of “additional limits” simply re-
flects that “IEEPA embodies an eyes-open congres-
sional grant of broad emergency authority in this
foreign-affairs realm, which unsurprisingly extends be-
yond authorities available under non-emergency laws.”
App., infra, 66a; see id. at 93a-113a, 121a-123a. Judge
Taranto also rebutted the CIT’s different rationales.
See 113a-121a, 124a-136a.
4. The Federal Circuit stayed its mandate pending
the completion of any further proceedings in this Court.
C.A. Doc. 161 (Aug. 29, 2025). Accordingly, its previ-
ously entered stay pending appeal remains in effect and
the challenged tariffs remain in force.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The decision below jeopardizes tariffs that the Pres-
ident has determined are essential to the country’s fu-
ture. Whether the President has authority to impose
those tariffs under IEEPA is a question of surpassing
importance—and a question that the court of appeals
 19

erroneously answered in the negative. IEEPA author-

izes the President to “regulate * * * importation” of
foreign goods—clearly encompassing the authority to
impose tariffs. IEEPA need not use the word “tariff ”
to delegate tariff authority; nor does IEEPA atextually
limit the President to not-too-big, not-too-enduring tar-
iffs. Given the obvious importance of the scope of the
President’s authority under IEEPA, and the legality of
the challenged tariffs in particular, this Court should
grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse the
judgment below.5
A. IEEPA Authorizes The Challenged Tariffs
1. a. IEEPA’s plain text authorizes the President to
impose the challenged tariffs. Under IEEPA, “[a]t the
times and to the extent specified in section 1701,” the
President may “regulate * * * importation” of “any
property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest” or “any property, subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States.” 50 U.S.C.
1702(a)(1)(B).
The power to “regulate importation” encompasses
the power to impose tariffs or duties on imports. The
ordinary meaning of “regulate” is to “fix, establish or
control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode;
to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to governing
principles or laws.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1156 (5th
ed. 1979). That self-evidently covers the imposition of
tariffs or duties. As Chief Justice Marshall observed,

5
The pending petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment in
Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287 (filed June 17,
2025), also involves a challenge to the tariffs. As the government
has explained in its brief in opposition, that case is not an appropri-
ate vehicle for review because the district court there lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction.
 20

the “right to regulate commerce, even by the imposition

of duties, was not controverted” by the Framers.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 202 (1824). Indeed, tar-
iffs and duties historically have been one of the most
common ways to “regulate” importation. See pp. 7-8,
supra. Given that IEEPA separately authorizes the
President to entirely “prohibit” importation, 50 U.S.C.
1702(a)(1)(B), it would be particularly anomalous to
read “regulate importation” as excluding the “less ex-
treme, more flexible tool for pursuing the same objec-
tive.” App., infra, 97a (Taranto, J., dissenting).
b. The court of appeals erroneously rejected that
plain meaning even as it disclaimed deciding whether
IEEPA “authorizes any tariffs at all.” App., infra, 25a.
The court emphasized that IEEPA “d[oes] not use the
term ‘tariff ’ or any of its synonyms, like ‘duty’ or ‘tax,’ ”
as evidence that IEEPA does not authorize the chal-
lenged tariffs. Id. at 27a. But this Court has repeatedly
rejected such “magic words” requirements in a variety
of statutory contexts. E.g., Soto v. United States, 605
U.S. 360, 371 (2025); FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291
(2012). The court of appeals also asserted that “when-
ever Congress intends to delegate to the President the
authority to impose tariffs, it does so explicitly.” App.,
infra, 30a. But “even if Congress ‘typically’ confers the
authority to” take certain actions using a particular
term, “that standard practice does not bind legislators
to specific words or formulations.” Soto, 605 U.S. at 371
(citation omitted).
In any event, the court of appeals mischaracterized
Congress’s practice. In FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
426 U.S. 548 (1976), this Court addressed a statutory
provision authorizing the President “to adjust the im-
ports” of a product—without mentioning “tariffs” or
 21

“duties” in that provision. Id. at 555 (citation omitted).

Nonetheless, this Court held, that phrase encompassed
not just “quantitative methods—i.e., quotas” to pre-
scribe import quantities, but also “monetary methods—
i.e., license fees” for “effecting such adjustments.” Id.
at 561. Like the license fees in Algonquin (imposed per
barrel of oil there), a tariff also is a “monetary method”
(imposed ad valorem). Cf. id. at 553. And because “reg-
ulate importation” is broader than “adjust imports,” the
authority to impose tariffs under IEEPA follows a for-
tiori from this Court’s decision in Algonquin.
The court of appeals attempted to distinguish Algon-
quin by noting that a neighboring provision in the stat-
ute at issue used the term “duty.” App., infra, 29a-30a.
But Algonquin did not rely on that neighboring provi-
sion; it simply analyzed the text, context, and history of
the “adjust the imports” provision. See 426 U.S. at 561-
562. Further, Algonquin rejected the argument that
“reading the statute to authorize the action taken by the
President ‘would be an anomalous departure’ from ‘the
consistently explicit, well-defined manner in which Con-
gress has delegated control over foreign trade and tar-
iffs.’ ” Id. at 557 (citation omitted). This Court thus has
already rejected the very reasoning that the court of ap-
peals embraced here.
The court of appeals also thought it significant that
the tariff statute in Algonquin “is within title 19 of the
U.S. Code, which is entitled ‘Customs Duties,’ ” whereas
IEEPA is “within title 50, which is entitled ‘War and
National Defense.’ ” App., infra, 29a. But Congress has
not enacted either Title 19 or Title 50 into positive law.
And that placement (presumably by a codifier in the
House Law Revision Counsel) signifies especially little
because it is natural for a tariff-specific statute to be
 22

placed in Title 19. But it would make little sense and

risk confusion to shoehorn IEEPA in that title when it
authorizes far more than just tariffs.
The court of appeals’ other rationales lack merit.
The court observed (App., infra, 31a) that the Constitu-
tion vests in Congress the power to “regulate” inter-
state and foreign commerce and the power to impose
“Taxes” and “Duties” in separate clauses of Article I,
Section 8. That is a non sequitur. The point is that the
plain meaning of “regulation” includes the imposition of
taxes or duties, as Gibbons recognized. 9 Wheat. at 202.
That the Constitution grants the federal government
an additional, broader power to tax domestic and non-
commercial activity does not constrict the power to reg-
ulate. Courts must “approach federal statutes touching
on the same topic with a ‘strong presumption’ they can
coexist harmoniously” by “giving effect to both,” De-
partment of Agriculture Rural Development Rural
Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 63 (2024) (cita-
tions omitted); the same goes for constitutional provi-
sions.
The court of appeals also thought that interpreting
“regulate importation” to include tariffs “would mean,
for example, that Congress delegated to the SEC power
to tax substantial swaths of the American economy by
granting the SEC the authority to regulate various ac-
tivities.” App., infra, 32a. That misconstrues the gov-
ernment’s argument: when the broad term “regulate”
is paired with “importation,” the term is best read to
include the power to impose duties because that is a tra-
ditional way to regulate importation. The grant of au-
thority to an agency to “regulate the trading” of certain
securities consistent with its mission to protect inves-
tors and maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,
 23

15 U.S.C. 78i(h)(1) and (2), does not naturally carry the

same inference.
The court of appeals further stated that “the history
of the enactment of IEEPA lacks any * * * legislative
lodestar” indicating Congress’s recognition that the
statute would encompass tariffs. App., infra, 29a. The
opposite is true. Shortly before IEEPA’s enactment,
President Nixon imposed tariffs that the Federal Cir-
cuit’s predecessor upheld under TWEA. United States
v. Yoshida International, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A.
1975). This Court has recognized that IEEPA’s lan-
guage was “directly drawn” from TWEA, Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671 (1981), and that the
“authorities granted to the President” under IEEPA
“are essentially the same as those” under TWEA, Re-
gan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 228 (1984); see id. at 228 n.8
(listing differences, all immaterial here). “[W]hen Con-
gress ‘adopts the language used in an earlier act,’
[courts] presume that Congress ‘adopted also the con-
struction given’ ” to that language. Georgia v. Public.-
Resource.Org, 590 U.S. 255, 270 (2020) (brackets and ci-
tation omitted). Congress indisputably was aware of
the “construction given” to TWEA by Yoshida. See
IEEPA House Report 5 (approvingly citing Yoshida’s
interpretation of TWEA as authorizing the “imposition
of duties”).
The court of appeals attempted to distinguish TWEA
and Yoshida on the ground that the Nixon tariffs were
supposedly more “ ‘limited’ ” in “time, scope, and amount.”
App., infra, 40a (citation omitted). But as Judge Ta-
ranto explained, those supposed limits either did not ac-
tually exist (such as a rate cap for “almost all countries”
or a “temporal constraint”) or were imposed pursuant
to separate statutory constraints that do not apply here.
 24

Id. at 104a n.9, 105a. IEEPA contains its own limits—

such as the default one-year time limit on emergencies,
congressional reporting requirements, and an enumer-
ated list of exceptions, see 50 U.S.C. 1702, 1703—that
differ from those under TWEA. The court of appeals
did not claim that the tariffs here violate any of IEEPA’s
unique constraints. And in any event, “[i]t is the obvious
role of emergency laws to confer authority that Con-
gress has not conferred in non-emergency laws.” App.,
infra, 109a (Taranto, J., dissenting).
2. Despite expressing skepticism that IEEPA au-
thorizes any tariffs, the court of appeals ultimately de-
clined to hold so broadly. Instead, the court contem-
plated that IEEPA might authorize some tariffs—just
not ones of the duration, scope, or amount of the tariffs
challenged here. But the court identified no such limi-
tations in IEEPA’s text, even as it held that IEEPA
does not authorize “tariffs of the magnitude of the” chal-
lenged tariffs here. App., infra, 38a.
That textually incoherent holding invites judges to
gauge the legality of tariffs based on their own policy
views of how much is too much, how long is too long, or
how many countries are too many. Such judicial second-
guessing of the President’s determinations would be im-
proper. See Wald, 468 U.S. at 242 (“Matters relating
‘to the conduct of foreign relations * * * are so exclu-
sively entrusted to the political branches of government
as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or inter-
ference.’ ”) (citation omitted); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 292 (1981) (“Matters intimately related to foreign
policy and national security are rarely proper subjects
for judicial intervention.”).
The court of appeals grounded its holding that these
tariffs go too far (App., infra, 34a-39a) on the major-
 25

questions doctrine. But that doctrine has no purchase

here for several reasons.
First, the statute unambiguously authorizes tariffs,
leaving no basis to apply the major-questions doctrine
to atextually limit the types of authorized tariffs.
Second, the major-questions doctrine addresses the
“particular and recurring problem” of “agencies assert-
ing highly consequential power beyond what Congress
could reasonably be understood to have granted.” West
Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 724 (2022) (emphasis
added). Those concerns dissipate when, as here, Con-
gress delegates authority directly to the President—
“the most democratic and politically accountable official
in Government,” Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197,
224 (2020).
Third, the major-questions doctrine applies where
there is an apparent “ ‘mismatch[]’ ” between the breadth
of the asserted power and the “narrow[ness]” of the
statute in which the agency claims to have discovered it.
Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 511, 517 (2023) (Bar-
rett, J., concurring) (citation omitted). No such mis-
match exists here. IEEPA addresses national emer-
gencies (the most important of circumstances) and au-
thorizes the President (the most important person in
government—and uniquely situated to react quickly) to
respond to those emergencies. In short, IEEPA is all
about major questions, and the more natural presump-
tion is that Congress intends broad language conferring
emergency powers to be construed broadly, not nar-
rowly.
Fourth, “the major questions canon has not been ap-
plied by this Court in the national security or foreign
policy contexts, because the canon does not reflect ordi-
nary congressional intent in those areas.” FCC v. Con-
 26

sumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. 2482, 2516 (2025) (Ka-

vanaugh, J., concurring). In those areas, Congress and
the President enjoy concurrent constitutional author-
ity, so the presumption flips: “Congress specifies limits
on the President when it wants to restrict Presidential
power.” Ibid. When Congress authorizes the President
to impose tariffs (as multiple overlapping statutes, in-
cluding IEEPA, do), that should eliminate, not create,
doubts about the President’s authority. Cf. Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Fifth, the major-questions doctrine counsels “skep-
ticism” where “an agency claims to discover in a long-
extant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a sig-
nificant portion of the American economy.’ ” Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (ci-
tation omitted). But Congress has long granted Presi-
dents capacious authority over tariffs, and IEEPA is a
particularly broad delegation in the domains of foreign
policy and national security—areas that implicate the
President’s expertise and independent constitutional
authority, see, e.g., Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 529-530 (1988); cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S.
at 635-637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. Nor can the judgment below be justified by the
CIT’s rationales, which the court of appeals tellingly did
not adopt.
a. Section 122. As to the reciprocal tariffs, the CIT
held that Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.
2132, “removes the President’s power to impose reme-
dies” that the plain text of IEEPA otherwise authorizes
as to balance-of-payments imbalances, App., infra,
178a. Section 122 provides that whenever “fundamental
international payments problems require special im-
 27

port measures to restrict imports,” including “to deal

with large and serious United States balance-of-payments
deficits,” “the President shall proclaim, for a period not
exceeding 150 days,” “a temporary import surcharge,
not to exceed 15 percent ad valorem, in the form of du-
ties (in addition to those already imposed, if any) on ar-
ticles imported into the United States.” 19 U.S.C.
2132(a). The CIT held that even if IEEPA’s text au-
thorizes tariffs to address balance-of-payments prob-
lems, that tariff must nevertheless satisfy the 150-day
and 15-percent limitations in Section 122. App., infra,
177a-181a.
That holding is incorrect. Section 122 and IEEPA
each provides an independent source of authority; the
President’s choice to exercise his authority under one
does not compel him to comply with the terms of the
other. Although both Section 122 and IEEPA address
tariffs, courts “approach federal statutes touching on
the same topic with a ‘strong presumption’ they can co-
exist harmoniously. Only by carrying a ‘heavy burden’
can a party convince us that one statute ‘displaces’ a
second.” Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 63 (citations omitted). And
here, the two statutes are “merely complementary.”
Ibid. Section 122 is available to address balance-of-
payments deficits whether or not they rise to the level
of a declared emergency. IEEPA is available to address
emergencies whether or not there exist balance-of-
payments deficits. That Section 122 contains scope and
duration limits that IEEPA omits is hardly surprising
given that Congress naturally gave the President
broader leeway in the narrower circumstance of an
emergency covered by IEEPA. See App., infra, 113a-
121a (Taranto, J., dissenting).
 28

b. “Deal with.” The CIT held that IEEPA does not

authorize the contraband-drug tariffs because the
phrase “deal with” in IEEPA requires “a direct link be-
tween an act and the problem it purports to address,”
and precludes actions that merely “aim to create lever-
age to ‘deal with’ th[e stated] objectives.” App., infra,
191a-192a; see id. at 190a-196a. But the intransitive
verb “deal,” when paired with “with,” is a broad term
that simply means “[t]o be occupied or concerned,” “[t]o
behave in a specified way toward another,” or “[t]o take
action.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the Eng-
lish Language 339 (1969); cf. Public Citizen v. FMCSA,
374 F.3d 1209, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“ ‘Deal with,’ in the
sense meant here, means ‘to take action with regard to
someone or something.’ ”) (brackets and citation omit-
ted). Nothing in that broad definition supports the
CIT’s proposition that one can “deal with” a problem
only directly, not indirectly through leverage. See App.,
infra, 134a-136a (Taranto, J., dissenting). History is lit-
tered with counterexamples, including this Court’s
recognition that IEEPA permits using property to
“serve as a ‘bargaining chip’ to be used by the President
when dealing with a hostile country.” Dames & Moore,
453 U.S. at 673.
Besides, whether a given action in fact “deal[s] with”
an identified threat or emergency in the areas of foreign
affairs and national security is a question on which
courts should give substantial deference to the Presi-
dent. See Wald, 468 U.S. at 242; Agee, 453 U.S. at 292.
Such determinations resist meaningful judicial review
because of their discretion-laden nature and the lack of
judicially manageable standards. See Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592, 599-601 (1988). In another national-security
and foreign-relations context, this Court stated that
 29

courts should not scrutinize “ ‘[w]hether the President’s

chosen method’ of addressing perceived risks is justi-
fied from a policy perspective.” Trump v. Hawaii, 585
U.S. 667, 686 (2018) (citation omitted). Such scrutiny is
“inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the def-
erence traditionally accorded the President in this
sphere.” Ibid. So too here.
B. IEEPA Does Not Violate The Nondelegation Doctrine
The CIT and Judge Cunningham reasoned that in-
terpreting IEEPA to authorize tariffs would amount to
“a functionally limitless delegation of Congressional
taxation authority.” App., infra, 58a; see id. at 169a-
172a. But “in the national security and foreign policy
realms, the nondelegation doctrine (whatever its scope
with respect to domestic legislation) appropriately has
played an even more limited role in light of the Presi-
dent’s constitutional responsibilities and independent
Article II authority.” Consumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct.
at 2516 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314-329
(1936). “Congress may assign the President broad au-
thority regarding the conduct of foreign affairs or other
matters where he enjoys his own inherent Article II
powers.” Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128, 170-171
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). “[L]imitations” on
Congress’s authority to delegate are “less stringent in
cases where the entity exercising the delegated author-
ity itself possesses independent authority over the sub-
ject matter.” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,
556-557 (1975).
This Court has long approved broad congressional
delegations to the President to regulate international
trade, including through tariffs. E.g., Algonquin, 426
U.S. at 558-560; J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
 30

States, 276 U. S. 394, 406, 409 (1928); Marshall Field &

Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892); Cargo of Brig Au-
rora v. United States, 7 Cranch 382, 384-388 (1813).
Even if the nondelegation doctrine were applicable,
IEEPA would easily pass muster. Congress at most
“commit[ted] something to the discretion” of the Exec-
utive, Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 46 (1825),
which is permissible so long as Congress sets forth “an
intelligible principle to which the person or body au-
thorized to [act] is directed to conform,” Hampton, 276
U.S. at 409. Congress must delineate both “ ‘the general
policy’ ” and “ ‘the boundaries of [the] delegated author-
ity,’ ” so that “both ‘the courts and the public’ ” can “ ‘as-
certain whether the agency’ has followed the law.” Con-
sumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. at 2497 (citations omitted).
IEEPA satisfies those standards. It prescribes a
general policy for Presidents to pursue: “to deal with
any unusual and extraordinary [foreign] threat * * * to
the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States” during a “national emergency” by “reg-
ulat[ing] * * * importation” of property, among other
options. 50 U.S.C. 1701(a), 1702(a)(1)(B).
IEEPA’s boundaries are likewise plain: the Presi-
dent may exercise his authorities only “to deal with an
unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which
a national emergency has been declared,” and may not
exercise those authorities to “regulate or prohibit, di-
rectly or indirectly,” an enumerated list of items. 50
U.S.C. 1701(b), 1702(b). Congress itself oversees the
President’s exercise of authority in this area. See 50
U.S.C. 1703 (describing reports to and consultation with
Congress). This Court has repeatedly upheld multiple
statutes granting the President broad authority to set
or change tariffs. See Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 558-560;
 31

Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409; Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at

683-689. Lower courts have uniformly rejected non-
delegation challenges to similar delegations of tariff au-
thority, e.g., Yoshida, 526 F.2d at 580-581; PrimeSource
Building Products, Inc. v. United States, 59 F.4th 1255,
1263 (Fed. Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 345 (2023),
and 144 S. Ct. 561 (2024); and to IEEPA more generally,
see United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077, 1092 (9th Cir.
2023) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 820
(2024).
C. The Decision Below Warrants Further Review
This case easily satisfies this Court’s criteria for re-
view. The Federal Circuit’s decision casts doubt upon
the President’s most significant economic and foreign-
affairs policy—a policy that implicates sensitive, ongo-
ing foreign negotiations and urgent national-security
concerns. This Court often grants review when lower
courts prevent the President’s exercise of asserted
foreign-affairs and economic powers, especially in times
of emergency. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, supra. If al-
lowed to take effect, the decision below would reflect an
intolerable judicial intrusion into the President’s re-
sponsibility to manage foreign relations and trade,
where he exercises both inherent and delegated author-
ity. Cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). And the Court’s ordinary preference to
grant review to resolve circuit conflicts is inapposite
given that the CIT and Federal Circuit have exclusive
jurisdiction to review tariff challenges.
Whether IEEPA authorizes the challenged tariffs
here also is of unquestionable importance, as the court
of appeals itself recognized (App., infra, 34a) and as ev-
idenced by its sua sponte decision to consider the case
initially en banc on an expedited basis. The scope of the
 32

President’s authority under IEEPA—a statute that

provides vital tools to protect the American economy
and national security—is itself important enough to
warrant review. And Cabinet members have submitted
declarations attesting to the surpassing importance of
tariffs in particular. To give just a few examples:
• The Treasury Secretary states that the tariffs
“have been one of the country’s top foreign policy
priorities for the last several months” and that al-
lowing the decision below to take effect “would
lead to dangerous diplomatic embarrassment,”
“expose the United States to the risk of retalia-
tion,” and “interrupt ongoing negotiations mid-
stream, undermining our ability to protect the na-
tional security and economic welfare of the Amer-
ican people.” C.A. Doc. 158, at 32.
• The Secretary of Commerce states that the deci-
sion below “would cause massive and irreparable
harm to the United States and its foreign policy
and national security both now and in the future”;
“would threaten broader U.S. strategic interests
at home and abroad”; would “likely lead to retali-
ation and the unwinding of agreed-upon deals by
foreign-trading partners”; and would “derail crit-
ical ongoing negotiations with foreign-trading
partners.” Id. at 8-9.
• The Secretary of State explains that if the deci-
sion below were to take effect, the President’s re-
cent exercise of his IEEPA authority “in connec-
tion with highly sensitive negotiations he is con-
ducting to end the conflict between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine” could be jeopardized,
 33

with “severe consequences for ongoing peace ne-

gotiations and human rights abuses.” Id. at 26.
• The U.S. Trade Representative describes frame-
work deals with the European Union and other
trading partners that “will reverse the crippling
effects of our exploding trade deficit,” among
other economic and national-security benefits,
and observes that “[n]one of these agreements
would be possible without the imposition of tariffs
to regulate imports and bring other countries to
the table.” Id. at 36, 38.
The Congressional Budget Office projection indicates
that tariffs will reduce federal deficits by $4 trillion in
the coming years. Id. at 19. In short, the tariffs rank
among the most consequential programs whose legality
the Court has been asked to review in recent years. Cf.
Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 502 (describing a $0.5 trillion pro-
gram as one of “staggering” significance).
 34
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
D. JOHN SAUER
Solicitor General
BRETT A. SHUMATE
Assistant Attorney General
SARAH M. HARRIS
Deputy Solicitor General
SOPAN JOSHI
Assistant to the
Solicitor General
MARK R. FREEMAN
MICHAEL S. RAAB
BRAD HINSHELWOOD
DANIEL WINIK
SOPHIA SHAMS
Attorneys
SEPTEMBER 2025
 APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Appendix A — Federal Circuit opinion (Aug. 29,
2025, as amended on Sept. 2, 2025) .... 1a
Appendix B — Federal Circuit judgment
(Aug. 29, 2025) ................................. 137a
Appendix C — Court of International Trade
opinion (May 28, 2025) .................... 139a
Appendix D — Court of International Trade
judgment (May 28, 2025) ................ 198a
Appendix E — Statutory provisions:
50 U.S.C. 1701 ................................. 201a
50 U.S.C. 1702 ................................. 201a
50 U.S.C. 1703 ................................. 205a

(I)
 APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

2025-1812, 2025-1813
V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES AND
PRODUCTS, LLC, DBA GENOVA PIPE, MICROKITS, LLC,
FISHUSA INC., TERRY PRECISION CYCLING LLC,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES, RODNEY
S. SCOTT, COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, JAMIESON
GREER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HOWARD LUTNICK,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, DEFENDANTS -APPELLANTS

STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF ARIZONA, STATE OF

COLORADO, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF
DELAWARE, STATE OF ILLINOIS, STATE OF MAINE,
STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE OF NEVADA, STATE OF
NEW MEXICO, STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE OF
VERMONT, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, KRISTI NOEM,
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HER OFFICIAL

(1a)
 2a
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION, RODNEY S. SCOTT,
COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER FOR U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, UNITED STATES,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Decided: Aug. 29, 2025

Appeals from the United States Court of

International Trade in Nos. 1:25-cv-00066-GSK-
TMR-JAR, 1:25-cv-00077-GSK-TMR-JAR, Senior
Judge Jane A. Restani, Judge Gary S. Katzmann,
Judge Timothy M. Reif.

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE, DYK, PROST,

REYNA, TARANTO, CHEN, HUGHES , STOLL, CUNNING-
1
HAM, and STARK , Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court joined by Circuit Judges LOURIE,

DYK, REYNA, HUGHES, STOLL, CUNNINGHAM, and
STARK.
Additional views filed by Circuit Judge CUNNINGHAM,
joined by Circuit Judges LOURIE, REYNA, and STARK.
Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge TARANTO, in
which Chief Judge MOORE, and Circuit Judges PROST
and CHEN, join.
PER CURIAM.

1
Circuit Judge Newman did not participate.
 3a
The Government appeals a decision of the Court of
International Trade setting aside five Executive Orders
that imposed tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all
goods from nearly every country in the world, holding
that the tariffs were not authorized by the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 et seq. Because we agree that IEEPA’s grant of
presidential authority to “regulate” imports does not au-
thorize the tariffs imposed by the Executive Orders, we
affirm.
I
A
This case involves the extent of the President’s au-
thority under IEEPA to “regulate” importation in re-
sponse to a national emergency declared by the Presi-
dent. For many years, Congress has carefully con-
structed tariff schedules which provide for, in great de-
tail, the tariffs to be imposed on particular goods.
Since taking office, President Donald J. Trump has de-
clared several national emergencies. In response to
these declared emergencies, the President has departed
from the established tariff schedules and imposed vary-
ing tariffs of unlimited duration on imports of nearly all
goods from nearly every country with which the United
States conducts trade. This appeal concerns Five Ex-
ecutive Orders imposing duties on foreign trading part-
ners to address these emergencies: Executive Orders
Nos. 14193, 14194, 14195, 14257, and 14266 (hereinafter
collectively referred to as the Challenged Executive Or-
ders). We summarize the history of the Challenged
Executive Orders by first discussing the national emer-
gencies in response to which they were issued and then
 4a
addressing the nature of the measures directed by the
Challenged Executive Orders. 2
On January 20, 2025, the President declared the ex-
istence of a national emergency at the United States’
southern border with Mexico under sections 201 and 301
of the National Emergencies Act (NEA), Pub. L. No. 94-
412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1651). See Proclamation No. 10886, Declaring
a National Emergency at the Southern Border of the
United States, 90 Fed. Reg. 8,327, 8,327 (Jan. 20, 2025).
In the Proclamation, he identified the presence of “car-
tels, criminal gangs, known terrorists, human traffickers,
smugglers, unvetted military-age males from foreign
adversaries, and illicit narcotics that harm Americans”
at and around the southern border as threats to the coun-
try’s territorial sovereignty. Id. Shortly thereafter,
the President faulted Mexico for “afford[ing] safe ha-
vens for the cartels to engage in the manufacturing and
transportation of illicit drugs” to the United States.
Executive Order No. 14194, Imposing Duties to Address
the Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 Fed. Reg.
9,117, 9,117 (Feb. 1. 2025).
The President also expanded the scope of the na-
tional emergency declared in Proclamation 10886 to in-
clude threats originating from Canada and the People’s
Republic of China. On February 1, 2025, he declared
that “the sustained influx of illicit opioids and other
drugs has profound consequences on our Nation” and

2
The President has continued to impose various tariffs targeting
imports from dozens of U.S. trading partners during the pendency
of this appeal. Because this appeal pertains only to the Chal-
lenged Executive Orders, we do not delve into the details of these
later Executive Orders here.
 5a
stated that “Canada has played a central role in these
challenges, including by failing to devote sufficient at-
tention and resources . . . to effectively stem the
tide of illicit drugs.” Executive Order No. 14193, Im-
posing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs
Across Our Northern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,113, 9,113
(Feb. 1, 2025). He similarly stated that this emergency
had been exacerbated by China’s failure “to arrest,
seize, detain, or otherwise intercept chemical precursor
suppliers, money launderers, other [transnational crim-
inal organizations], criminals at large, and drugs.” Ex-
ecutive Order No. 14195, Imposing Duties to Address
the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Re-
public of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,121, 9,122 (Feb. 1, 2025).
In response to the declared national emergency of
the trafficking of opioids into the country and the osten-
sible failure of Mexico, Canada, and China to meaning-
fully address this threat, the President imposed what
this opinion refers to as the “Trafficking Tariffs”: 25
percent ad valorem duties on “[a]ll articles that are
products of Canada,” Executive Order No. 14193, 90
Fed. Reg. at 9,114, 3 25 percent ad valorem duties on
“[a]ll articles that are products of Mexico,” Executive
Order No. 14194, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,118 (Feb. 1, 2025), 4

3
Canadian energy and energy resources were subjected to a
lower ad valorem rate of 10 percent. 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,114. En-
forcement of the tariffs on Canadian products was subsequently
delayed from the planned start date of February 4, 2025, to March
4, 2025. Executive Order No. 14197, Progress on the Situation at
Our Northern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,183, 9,183 (Feb. 3, 2025).
4
Enforcement of the tariffs on Mexican products was subse-
quently delayed from the planned start date of February 4, 2025,
to March 4, 2025. Executive Order No. 14198, Progress on the
 6a
and 10 percent ad valorem duties on “[a]ll articles that
are products of China,” Executive Order No. 14195, 90
Fed. Reg. at 9,122. In each of these Executive Orders,
the President stated that the circumstances “consti-
tute[d] an unusual and extraordinary threat, which ha[d]
its source in substantial part outside the United States,
to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of
the United States.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,114, 9,118, 9,122.
In imposing these tariffs, he claimed to be acting under
the authority of section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA and
“specifically [found] that action under other authority to
impose tariffs [was] inadequate to address this unusual
and extraordinary threat.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,114, 9,118,
9,122. Each of the Executive Orders providing for the
Trafficking Tariffs directed the Secretary of Homeland
Security to alter the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States (HTSUS) to effectuate the new, higher
Trafficking Tariffs. 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,115, 9,118, 9,123.
The President subsequently modified the Trafficking
Tariffs. First, after determining that China “ha[d] not
taken adequate steps to alleviate the illicit drug crisis
through cooperative enforcement actions, and that the
crisis described in Executive Order 14195 ha[d] not
abated,” he increased ad valorem duties on Chinese
products from 10 percent to 20 percent. Executive Or-
der No. 14228, Further Amendment to Duties Address-
ing the Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of
China, 90 Fed. Reg. 11,463, 11,463 (Mar. 3, 2025). The
President further implemented duty-free de minimis

Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,185, 9,185 (Feb.

3, 2025).
 7a
treatment5 for otherwise covered articles from Canada
and Mexico. See Executive Order No. 14231, Amend-
ment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs
Across Our Northern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 11,785, 11,785
(Mar. 6, 2025); Executive Order No. 14232, Amendment
to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across
Our Southern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 11,787, 11,787 (Mar.
6, 2025).6
On April 2, 2025, the President imposed what this
opinion refers to as the “Reciprocal Tariffs”: baseline
10 percent ad valorem duties on imports from nearly
every country with which the United States has any sig-
nificant trade relationship with additional ad valorem
duties ranging from 11 percent to as high as 50 percent
to be imposed “shortly thereafter” on a per-country ba-
sis. Executive Order No. 14257, Regulating Imports
With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices
That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United
States Goods Trade Deficits, 90 Fed. Reg. 15,041, 15,045,
15,049-50 (Apr. 2, 2025). Like the Trafficking Tariffs,
these Reciprocal Tariffs were to be implemented by mod-
ifying the HTSUS. Id. at 15,047.

5
Under Section 321(a)(2)(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, duty-free
de minimis treatment allows goods valued at $800 or less to enter
the country without customs duties. 19 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2)(C).
6
The President also originally implemented such duty-free de
minimis treatment for otherwise eligible articles from China, Ex-
ecutive Order No. 14200, Amendment to Duties Addressing the
Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China,
90 Fed. Reg. 9,277, 9,277 (Feb. 5, 2025), but he later rescinded this
de minimis treatment for Chinese products, Executive Order No.
14256, Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic
Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China as Applied
to Low-Value Imports, 90 Fed. Reg. 14,899, 14,899 (Apr. 2, 2025).
 8a
In imposing the Reciprocal Tariffs, the President
again invoked his claimed authority under IEEPA; the
NEA; section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2483); and 3 U.S.C. § 301. 7 Id.
at 15,041. He explained that the Reciprocal Tariffs ad-
dressed “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the na-
tional security and economy of the United States” posed
by “underlying conditions, including a lack of reciprocity
in our bilateral trade relationships, disparate tariff rates
and non-tariff barriers, and U.S. trading partners’ eco-
nomic policies that suppress domestic wages and con-
sumption.” Id. On April 9, 2025, the President sus-
pended the imposition of the additional country-specific
ad valorem duties for all countries except China until
July 9, 2025. Executive Order No. 14266, Modifying
Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Trading Partner Re-
taliation and Alignment, 90 Fed. Reg 15,625, 15,626
(Apr. 9, 2025).
The President repeatedly amended the China-
specific Reciprocal Tariff rate in response to China’s ad-
justments of its own tariff rates on U.S. goods: he first
increased the China-specific rate from 34 to 84 percent
effective April 8, 2025, Executive Order No. 14259,
Amendment to Reciprocal Tariffs and Updated Duties
as Applied to Low-Value Imports From the People’s Re-
public of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 15,509, 15,509 (Apr. 8,

7
The Government does not contend that any of the statutes be-
sides IEEPA grant the President the substantive authority to im-
pose these tariffs. The NEA governs procedures for declaring
and ending national emergencies; section 604 of the Trade Act of
1974 requires the President to update the HTSUS to reflect import
duties but does not provide the substantive authority to impose
such duties; and 3 U.S.C. § 301 simply allows the President to del-
egate powers within the Executive Branch.
 9a
2025), and then from 84 to 125 percent effective April 10,
2025, Executive Order No. 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,626.
These new rates were to be effectuated by modifying the
HTSUS to reflect the higher rates. Executive Order
No. 14259, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,509; Executive Order No.
14266, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,626. Following discussions
with Chinese officials, the President lowered the China-
specific Reciprocal Tariff rate to 10 percent, effective un-
til August 12, 2025, observing that these discussions were
“a significant step by [China] toward remedying non-
reciprocal trade arrangements and addressing the con-
cerns of the United States relating to economic and na-
tional security matters.” Executive Order No. 14298,
Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Discus-
sions With the People’s Republic of China, 90 Fed. Reg.
21,831, 21,831-32 (May 12, 2025).
On July 7, 2025, the President paused enforcement of
all Reciprocal Tariffs until August 1, 2025. Executive
Order No. 14316, Extending the Modification of the Re-
ciprocal Tariff Rates, 90 Fed. Reg. 30,823, 30,823 (July
7, 2025). On July 31, 2025, the President again paused
enforcement of the Reciprocal Tariffs for seven days.
Executive Order No. 14326, Further Modifying the Re-
ciprocal Tariff Rates, 90 Fed. Reg. 37,963, 37,963-64
(July 31, 2025). The Reciprocal Tariffs (other than for
China8) took effect on August 7, 2025.

8
On August 11, 2025, the President issued a new Executive Or-
der extending the suspension of the Reciprocal Tariffs against
China from the prior deadline of August 12, 2025 to November 10,
2025. Executive Order No. 14334, Further Modifying the Recip-
rocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Ongoing Discussions With the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 39,305, 39,305-06 (Aug. 11,
2025).
 10a
B
On April 14, 2025, five small businesses—V.O.S. Se-
lections, Inc.; Plastic Services and Products, LLC, dba
Genova Pipe; MicroKits, LLC; FishUSA, Inc.; and
Terry Precision Cycling, LLC (collectively, the “Private
Plaintiffs”)—brought suit before the Court of Interna-
tional Trade (CIT) against the United States and vari-
ous Government officials in their official capacities, chal-
lenging the President’s imposition of the Reciprocal
Tariffs. On April 23, 2025, Oregon and eleven other
states (collectively, the “State Plaintiffs”) brought suit
before the CIT against the United States and various
Government officials in their official capacities, chal-
lenging the President’s imposition of both the Recipro-
cal Tariffs and the Trafficking Tariffs.
On May 28, 2025, a three-judge panel of the CIT
granted summary judgment to the Private Plaintiffs and
State Plaintiffs in a consolidated order, holding that
both the Reciprocal Tariffs and the Trafficking Tariffs
exceeded the President’s authority under IEEPA and
permanently enjoining the Government from imposing
these tariffs. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States,
772 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1383 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2025). The
Government appealed both cases the same day and
moved to stay the injunction pending appeal. We consol-
idated the appeals, granted the Government’s motion to
stay pending their resolution, and expedited briefing
and oral argument. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump,
No. 2025-1812, 2025 WL 1527040, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May
29, 2025). We also sua sponte decided to assign the case
to the court en banc. ECF No. 51 at 3 (“[T]he court also
concludes that these cases present issues of exceptional
 11a
importance warranting expedited en banc consideration
of the merits in the first instance.”).
C
Before we reach the merits of this case, we briefly
discuss the history and legal authority concerning the
imposition of tariffs as relevant to this appeal.
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and to
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. Tariffs are a tax, and the Framers of
the Constitution expressly contemplated the exclusive
grant of taxing power to the legislative branch; when
Patrick Henry expressed concern that the President
“may easily become king,” 3 Debates in the Several State
Conventions 58 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836), James Mad-
ison replied that this would not occur because “[t]he
purse is in the hands of the representatives of the peo-
ple,” id. at 393.
At the time of the Founding, and for most of the early
history of the United States, tariffs were the primary
source of revenue for the federal government. See
Goldwater Inst. Br. 12 n.5 (citing Federalist No. 12 at 75
(J. Cooke, ed., 1961) (Alexander Hamilton) (“[W]e must
a long time depend for the means of revenue, chiefly on
such duties.”)). Setting tariff policy was thus consid-
ered a core Congressional function. See Michael W.
McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King:
Executive Power Under the Constitution 101 (2020); cf.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (limiting direct taxation by
tying it to a census for proper apportioning). In 1913,
the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified, granting Con-
gress the “power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived.” U.S. Const. amend.
 12a
XVI. This ability of Congress to impose a domestic in-
come tax reduced the importance of tariffs as a source
of revenue for the federal government.
For much of this early history, Congress set tariffs
without authorizing the President to adjust tariff rates
by entering into international agreements. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress be-
gan to delegate to the Executive limited authority to
“activate or suspend” tariff rates through international
agreements. Cato Inst. Amicus Br. 6-7 (citing Tariff
Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 488; Tariff Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 567).
Nonetheless, Congress continued to enact legislation es-
tablishing the basic tariff schedules. For example, in the
Tariff Act of 1930, Congress set forth tariff rates in
“ninety-five pages of schedules.” ClearCorrect Oper-
ating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1297
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
Through the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, Con-
gress adopted the Tariff Schedules of the United States.
Pub. L. 87-456, 76 Stat. 72, 72-75 (1962). In 1988, the
HTSUS was enacted by Congress. Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107, 1148-50. The HTSUS sets the United States’ cur-
rent tariff schedules. During this entire period, Con-
gress authorized the President to enter into agreements
reducing tariff rates, or, in some cases, increasing tariff
rates. That presidential authority to increase rates
was cabined in various respects, including limitations on
the President’s authority to increase rates by more than
a certain percentage of the established statutory rate.
See, e.g., Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-316, ch. 474, § 1, 48 Stat. 943, 943-45 (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-54 (2018)); Trade Act
 13a
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 101-02, 151, 88 Stat. 1978,
1982-84 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111-12). The
HTSUS rates reflect applicable governing tariffs that
have been set over time in part through international
negotiations and multilateral and bilateral trade agree-
ments like the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement.
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Revi-
sion 20 (Aug. 27, 2025), General Notes at 28; see gener-
ally 19 U.S.C. § 3004(b)(2) (directing the President to
“take such action as the President considers necessary
to bring trade agreements to which the United States is
a party into conformity with the Harmonized Tariff Sched-
ule”).
In 1916, Congress passed legislation that created the
United States Tariff Commission, which was later re-
named the United States International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC). Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271,
§§ 700-09, 39 Stat. 756, 795-98; 19 U.S.C. § 2231(a).
Later legislation provided that one of the ITC’s respon-
sibilities is to provide recommendations to the President
in making adjustments to the tariff schedule. 19 U.S.C.
§ 3005. The framework for tariff schedules is set forth
in the HTSUS. “The [HTSUS] is the United States’
implementation of the 1983 International Convention on
the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
(‘the Convention’), which created a single international
system of nomenclature to classify goods for customs
purposes.” Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United
States, 609 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “As peri-
odic changes are made to the international harmonized
tariff system, the HTSUS is correspondingly modified
pursuant to a statutory scheme established by the Om-
nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.” Id.
The HTSUS itself “is indeed a statute but is not pub-
 14a
lished physically in the United States Code.” Libas,
Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Congress’s enactment of the HTSUS provided that its
terms, including “[e]ach modification or change made to
the [HTSUS] by the President under authority of law,”
“shall be considered to be statutory provisions of law for
all purposes.” 19 U.S.C. § 3004(c)(1).
D
In 1917, Congress enacted the Trading with the
Enemy Act (TWEA), Pub. L. No. 65-91, §§ 1-19, 40 Stat.
411, 411-26 (1917) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 95a; 50 U.S.C. §§ 4305-41), to address threats to
the U.S. economy resulting from our entry into World
War I. Section 5(b) of TWEA empowered the Presi-
dent to “investigate, regulate, or prohibit[] any transac-
tions in foreign exchange” during wartime. 50 U.S.C.
§ 4305(b)(1)(A). In 1933, Congress expanded TWEA
by authorizing the President to deploy the power to “in-
vestigate, regulate, or prohibit” foreign transactions
during other national emergencies besides war. Emer-
gency Banking Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 73-1, § 2, 48 Stat.
1, 1 (1933). In 1941, just one week after the Pearl Har-
bor attack, Congress further broadened presidential au-
thority under TWEA by adding the phrase “importation
or exportation” to the list of transactions involving for-
eign property that the President may “investigate, reg-
ulate, or . . . prohibit.” First War Powers Act of
1941, Pub. L. No. 77-354, § 301, 55 Stat. 838, 839.
After World War II, presidents used TWEA to im-
pose economic sanctions on foreign adversaries, regu-
late foreign exchange, and control exports based on sev-
eral declarations of national emergencies. See, e.g.,
Proclamation 2914, Proclaiming the Existence of a Na-
 15a
tional Emergency, 15 Fed. Reg. 9,029, 9,029 (Dec. 16,
1950) (President Truman invoking TWEA to declare a
national emergency because of the outbreak of the Ko-
rean war and the threat of “communist imperialism”);
Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Pt. 500,
15 Fed. Reg. 9,040, reserved by Foreign Assets Control
Regulations; Transaction Control Regulations (Regula-
tions Prohibiting Transactions Involving the Shipment
of Certain Merchandise Between Foreign Countries), 76
Fed. Reg. 35,739, 35,739 (Department of the Treasury
forbidding any financial transactions involving, or on be-
half of, North Korea in response to Proclamation 2914);
Executive Order No. 11387, Governing Certain Capital
Transfers Abroad, 33 Fed. Reg. 47, 47 (Jan. 1, 1968)
(President Johnson placing controls on capital exports).
In 1971, to address a balance of payments deficit, 9 Pres-
ident Nixon asserted the authority to temporarily sus-
pend existing tariff agreements that reduced the statu-
tory rates so as to impose a temporary additional ten
percent ad valorem duty, which was not to exceed the
amounts set in the Congressionally-approved existing
Tariff Schedules of the United States, on all dutiable ar-
ticles imported into the United States. Proclamation
4074, Imposition of Supplemental Duty for Balance of
Payments Purposes, 85 Stat. 926, 926 (Aug. 15, 1971).
This surcharge lasted less than five months. Procla-

9
A country’s balance of payments is the difference between all
money flowing into the country and the amount of money flowing
out of the country to the rest of the world during a particular time
period. A severe and sudden disruption in a country’s ability to
finance its international transactions, often due to an inability to
cover essential imports or external debt repayments, is known as a
balance-of-payments crisis. See V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp.
3d at 1375.
 16a
mation 4098, Termination of Additional Duty for Bal-
ance of Payments Purposes, 86 Stat. 1,591, 1,592 (Dec.
20, 1971). Yoshida International, a zipper importer
subject to the surcharge, filed a lawsuit challenging the
legality of the temporary tariff surcharge imposed by
President Nixon’s Proclamation and sought a refund of
taxes paid. The United States Customs Court ruled in
favor of Yoshida, holding that the President had ex-
ceeded his statutory authority as delegated by the Tariff
Act of 1930, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and sec-
tion 5(b) of TWEA in assessing the surcharge; it accord-
ingly concluded that President Nixon’s imposition of a
temporary surcharge was not authorized. Yoshida
Int’l v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155, 1175-76 (Cust.
Ct. 1974) (Yoshida I), rev’d, 526 F.2d 560 (CCPA 1975)
(Yoshida II).
While Yoshida I was pending appeal, Congress en-
acted the Trade Act of 1974 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2497b). Section 122 of the Trade Act gave
the President the authority to impose, for up to 150 days,
im-port quotas and/or a temporary import surcharge of
up to 15 percent “to deal with large and serious United
States balance-of-payments deficits,” “to prevent an im-
minent and significant depreciation of the dollar in for-
eign exchange markets,” or “to cooperate with other coun-
tries in correcting an international balance-of-payments
disequilibrium.” 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a).
The next year, our predecessor court, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), reversed the Cus-
toms Court’s decision and upheld President Nixon’s ten
percent surcharge, determining that its imposition fell
within the authority delegated to the President by sec-
tion 5(b) of TWEA. Yoshida II, at 566. The court also
 17a
noted that a “surcharge imposed after Jan. 3, 1975[,] must,
of course, comply with [section 122 of the Trade Act].”
Id. at 582 n.33. As described in greater detail below,
the decision does not hold that TWEA created unlimited
authority in the President to revise the tariff schedule,
but only the limited temporary authority to impose tar-
iffs that would not exceed the Congressionally-approved
tariff rates.
In 1976, Congress pared back the scope of TWEA
and enacted the National Emergencies Act (NEA). Pub.
L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621-22, 1631, 1641, 1651). The
NEA limited presidential power and placed restrictions
on the use of authorities granted by TWEA. As rele-
vant to this appeal, the NEA ended within two years
“[a]ll powers and authorities possessed by the President
. . . as a result of the existence of any declaration of
national emergency in effect on September 14, 1976,” 50
U.S.C. § 1601(a), and placed new restrictions on the dec-
laration and termination of future national emergencies.
Id. §§ 1621-22.
The NEA did not explicitly address section 5(b) of
TWEA; however, the NEA’s legislative history indicates
Congress’s intent “to study section 5(b) [of TWEA] and
propose such revisions as might be found necessary” to
limit the President’s exercise of authority granted in
section 5(b) during peacetime. S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 2
(1977). IEEPA is the result of this legislative effort and
is consistent with Congress’s stated goal “to revise and de-
limit the President’s authority to regulate international
economic transactions during wars or national emergen-
cies.” Id. In drafting IEEPA, Congress adopted the
same list of authorities as in TWEA—including the
 18a
power to “regulate . . . importation”—but Congress
explicitly limited the President’s authority under IEEPA
by substituting authorities “which [we]re both more lim-
ited in scope than those of [TWEA] section 5(b) and sub-
ject to various procedural limitations.” H.R. Rep. No.
95-459, at 2, 19 (1977). The House Report also men-
tioned the Yoshida II decision in its background section,
stating:
[S]ection 5(b) came into play when, on August 15,
1971, President Nixon declared a national emergency
with respect to the balance-of-payments crisis and
under that emergency imposed a surcharge on im-
ports. In that case, section 5(b) was not among the
statutes cited in the President’s proclamation as au-
thority for the surcharge[] but was so cited later by
the Government in response to a suit brought in Cus-
toms Court by Yoshida International challenging the
surcharge. The court’s decision then rested on
whether section 5(b) authorized imposition of duties.
Although the lower court held that it did not, the Ap-
peals Court reversed on the grounds that the exist-
ence of the national emergency made section 5(b)
available for purposes which would not be contem-
plated in normal times.
Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted).
IEEPA provides that, after declaring a national
emergency pursuant to the NEA, the President may “in-
vestigate, block during the pendency of an investigation,
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or pro-
hibit, any . . . importation or exportation of . . .
any property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
Notably, IEEPA does not use the words “tariffs” or “du-
 19a
ties,” nor any similar terms like “customs,” “taxes,” or
“imposts.” IEEPA also does not have a residual clause
granting the President powers beyond those which are
explicitly listed.
E
In addition to the President’s authority to adjust tar-
iffs by international agreement and the limited author-
ity conferred by Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2132), Congress has passed nu-
merous other statutes that authorize the President and
the executive branch to impose or modify tariffs on im-
ports in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Tariff Act of
1930, Pub. L. No. 71- 361, § 338, 46 Stat. 590, 704 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1338); Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1991); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88
Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2497b). Notably, every Congressional delega-
tion to the President of the core legislative power to im-
pose tariffs includes well-defined procedural and sub-
stantive limitations. For example, Section 232 of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizes the President
to adjust the importation of certain articles if the Secre-
tary of Commerce finds that they pose a threat to na-
tional security. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A). The stat-
ute provides the President must, within ninety days, de-
termine whether he concurs with the Secretary’s report,
and if he does concur, “determine the nature and dura-
tion of the action that . . . must be taken . . . so
that such imports will not threaten to impair the na-
tional security.” Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii). The Presi-
dent must take any such action within fifteen days of his
determination. Id. § 1862(c)(1)(B). In all instances,
 20a
section 232 requires the President to “submit to the
Congress a written statement of the reasons why the
President has decided to take action, or refused to take
action.” Id. § 1862(c)(2).
Provisions of the Trade Act similarly authorize the
executive branch to impose tariffs on imports, but only
once certain conditions set forth by statute have been
met. Section 201 allows the President to “take all ap-
propriate and feasible action within his power,” includ-
ing imposing tariffs (often called “safeguard” tariffs) if
the ITC finds that imports are causing or threatening
“serious injury” to a domestic industry. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a). Under Section 301 of the Trade Act, the
President may specifically direct the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) to respond to unfair
trade practices which violate trade agreements, or bur-
den or restrict United States commerce, including by
“impos[ing] duties or other import restrictions” on for-
eign countries responsible for the harmful conduct. 19
U.S.C. § 2411(a), (c)(1)(B). While the USTR may take
any action “within the power of the President with re-
spect to trade in any goods or services, or with respect
to any other area of pertinent relations with the foreign
country,” id. § 2411(a), the USTR must complete various
steps before taking such action. For example, before
imposing duties pursuant to section 301, the USTR must
initiate an investigation, id. § 2412; consult with the for-
eign country regarding the practices being investigated,
id. § 2413; determine whether the requisite conditions
for action are met, and if so, publish its proposed action
and the factual findings on which it is based, id. § 2414;
and allow for public comment regarding both the pro-
posed investigation and the final action, id. § 2412(a)(4).
As interpreted by the Government, IEEPA, unlike
 21a
these other statutes, would impose no such limitations
on the President’s authority.
II
“We review a grant of summary judgment by the
[CIT] de novo.” Aspects Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. United
States, 42 F.4th 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “We re-
view the [CIT]’s grant of an injunction for abuse of dis-
cretion,” which “may be established by showing that the
[CIT] ‘made a clear error of judgment in weighing the
relevant factors or exercised its discretion based on an
error of law or clearly erroneous fact findings.’ ” Oman
Fasteners, LLC v. United States, 125 F.4th 1068, 1084
(Fed. Cir. 2025) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Wind
Tower Trade Coal. v. United States, 741 F.3d 89, 95
(Fed. Cir. 2014)) “To the extent the [CIT]’s decision to
grant or deny an injunction ‘hinges on questions of law,’
this court reviews those determinations without defer-
ence.” Id.
III
We first consider whether this case falls within our
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. “The objection
that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initia-
tive, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and
the entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (internal citation omitted). “If the
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Although no party here ques-
tions our jurisdiction, we are obligated to confirm
whether we have it.
 22a
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(5). We review de novo whether the CIT had
subject-matter jurisdiction. Int’l Custom Prods., Inc.
v. United States, 467 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
If the CIT lacked jurisdiction, we similarly lack jurisdic-
tion to reach the merits of this appeal. Glasstech, Inc.
v. AB Kyro OY, 769 F.2d 1574, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(“[A]n appellate court has no jurisdiction to decide the
merits of the case if the court from which the appeal was
taken was without jurisdiction.”).
Article III of the Constitution provides that “[t]he ju-
dicial Power of the United States, shall be vested . . .
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
Accordingly, the “[j]urisdiction of the lower federal
courts is . . . limited to those subjects encompassed
within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.” Ins. Corp. of
Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 701 (1982).
The statute conferring jurisdiction on the CIT pro-
vides, in relevant part, that “the [CIT] shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against
the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises
out of any law of the United States providing for . . .
tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the raising of reve-
nue.” 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1)(B). 10 By granting exclu-

10
While the President is a named party in this appeal, the CIT
noted that section 1581(i), which permits actions “against the
United States, its agencies, or its officers,” does not cover an action
naming the President. V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp. 3d at 1366-
67. The CIT therefore held that while the President “must be dis-
missed from the two cases before the court,” it “retain[ed] ‘juris-
 23a
sive jurisdiction to the CIT, “[s]ection 1581(i) removes
specific actions from the general federal-question juris-
diction of the district courts (under 28 U.S.C. § 1331) and
places them in the jurisdiction of the [CIT].” Orleans
Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2003). The question here is whether the action before
us arose from a law providing for tariffs such that the
CIT had exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance, and
we may properly maintain appellate jurisdiction.
A claim “arises out of ” a tariff law “for reasons other
than the raising of revenue,” 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1)(B), if
the law in question is invoked as the authority to impose
a tariff for such a non-revenue raising purpose. To de-
termine jurisdiction pursuant to an “arising out of” pro-
vision, we do not have to decide whether the statute does
in fact confer such authority. That question goes to the
merits of the claim. “Jurisdiction is [the court’s] au-
thority to decide the case either way.” The Fair v.
Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). It
does not depend on the claim’s success. See id.; see
also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946).
The CIT found it had exclusive jurisdiction to hear
the present case in part because the Challenged Execu-
tive Orders purport to “effect changes to the [HTSUS]”
to reflect the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariff rates.
J.A. 64. The statute establishing the HTSUS specifies
that “[t]he provisions of the [HTSUS] . . . enacted
by” Congress, as well as “[e]ach modification or change

diction to consider challenges to the President’s actions in suits

against subordinate officials who are charged with implementing
the presidential directives.” Id. at 1367 (quoting USP Holdings,
Inc. v. United States, 36 F.4th 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). The
parties before us have not challenged those rulings.
 24a
made to the [HTSUS] by the President under authority
of law,” “shall be considered to be statutory provisions
of law for all purposes.” 19 U.S.C. § 3004(c)(1)(A), (C).
The Challenged Executive Orders purport to modify the
HTSUS—for example, by “inserting . . . new head-
ings” providing for specific tariff rates applicable to
goods from each country, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,088, 15,090,
by allegedly “modifying the HTSUS to temporarily sus-
pend” certain tariffs, id. at 15,626, or by directing the
Secretary of Homeland Security to alter the HTSUS to
effectuate the orders, id. at 9,115, 9,118, 9,123. While
executive orders are not ordinarily “law within the
meaning of the Constitution,” Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t
of Energy, 134 F.4th 568, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted), the Challenged
Executive Orders, if authorized, would modify the
HTSUS. These modifications to HTSUS are thus pur-
ported laws of the United States, and a lawsuit challeng-
ing tariffs effectuated by such a modification “arises out
of [a] law of the United States providing for . . . tar-
iffs.” See California v. Trump, No. 25-cv-03372-JSC,
2025 WL 1569334, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2025) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)).
Finding that the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over
the present cases is consistent with the reason why Con-
gress established this exclusive jurisdiction in the first
place, as noted by three district court courts considering
challenges to the same tariffs now before us. K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 188 (1988) (“Con-
gress intended, first and foremost, to remedy the confu-
sion over the division of jurisdiction between the Cus-
toms Court (now the Court of International Trade) and
the district courts and to ensure uniformity in the judi-
cial decisionmaking process.” (internal citation and
 25a
quotation marks omitted)); Webber v. U.S. Dep’t of Home-
land Sec., No. CV-25-26-GF-DLC, 2025 WL 1207587, at
*7 (D. Mont. Apr. 25, 2025) (“Consolidating tariff mat-
ters with the [CIT] ensures a necessary ‘degree of uni-
formity and consistency’ throughout the United States.”
(quoting Conoco, Inc. v. U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Bd.,
18 F.3d 1581, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1994))); California v.
Trump, 2025 WL 1569334, at *5-6.11 The CIT had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over this case in the first in-
stance, and we accordingly have subject matter jurisdic-
tion over this appeal.
IV
We are not addressing whether the President’s ac-
tions should have been taken as a matter of policy. Nor
are we deciding whether IEEPA authorizes any tariffs
at all. Rather, the only issue we resolve on appeal is

11
One decision from the District Court for the District of the Dis-
trict of Columbia has held otherwise. See Learning Resources,
Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-1248 (RC), 2025 WL 1525376 (D.D.C. May
29, 2025), appeal pending, No. 25-5202 (D.C. Cir.), cert. before
judgment denied, No. 24-1287, 2025 WL 1717468 (June 20, 2025).
The district court in that case held that its jurisdiction was not pre-
cluded by § 1581’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CIT be-
cause IEEPA does not delegate to the President any authority to
impose tariffs. See id. at *8 (holding that IEEPA’s authorization
of the President to “regulate . . . importation or exportation”
does not encompass the power to tariff, because “[t]o regulate is to
establish rules governing conduct; to tariff is to raise revenue
through taxes on imports or exports.”). This decision appears to
erroneously conflate the merits question of whether IEEPA au-
thorizes tariffs with the jurisdictional issue. Regardless, we do
not agree with the jurisdictional analysis in Learning Resources
because, whether or not IEEPA itself is a “law providing for tar-
iffs,” the Challenged Executive Orders, which direct modifications
to the HTSUS, are such laws, for the reasons explained above.
 26a
whether the Trafficking Tariffs and Reciprocal Tariffs
imposed by the Challenged Executive Orders are au-
thorized by IEEPA. We conclude they are not.
A
We first consider the statutory text, including any
relevant canons of interpretation. See U.S. ex rel.
Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 598 U.S. 739, 749 (2023) (“We
start, as always, with the text.”). IEEPA authorizes
the President to take certain actions in response to a de-
clared national emergency arising from an “unusual and
extraordinary threat[] . . . to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” 50
U.S.C. § 1701(a). Upon the declaration of such an emer-
gency, IEEPA authorizes the President to:
investigate, block during the pendency of an investi-
gation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void,
prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, with-
holding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exer-
cising any right, power, or privilege with respect to,
or transactions involving, any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest
by any person, or with respect to any property, sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (emphases added).
The statute bestows significant authority on the
President to undertake a number of actions in response
to a declared national emergency, but none of these ac-
tions explicitly include the power to impose tariffs, du-
ties, or the like, or the power to tax. The Government
locates that authority within the term “regulate . . .
importation,” but it is far from plain that “regulate
 27a
. . . importation,” in this context, includes the power
to impose the tariffs at issue in this case.
Notably, when drafting IEEPA, Congress did not
use the term “tariff” or any of its synonyms, like “duty”
or “tax.” There are numerous statutes that do dele-
gate to the President the power to impose tariffs; in each
of these statutes that we have identified, Congress has
used clear and precise terms to delegate tariff power,
reciting the term “duties” or one of its synonyms. In
contrast, none of these statutes uses the broad term
“regulate” without also separately and explicitly grant-
ing the President the authority to impose tariffs. The
absence of any such tariff language in IEEPA contrasts
with statutes where Congress has affirmatively granted
such power and included clear limits on that power.
For example, section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930
permits the President to “specify and declare new or ad-
ditional duties.” 19 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (emphasis added).
Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the Pres-
ident to proclaim “a temporary import surcharge . . .
in the form of duties.” 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a)(A) (emphasis
added). Section 201 of the Trade Act authorizes the
President to “proclaim an increase in, or the imposition
of, any duty on the imported article” or to “proclaim a
tariff-rate quota.” 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3)(A)-(B) (em-
phases added). And section 301 of the Trade Act allows
the President to “impose duties or other import re-
strictions.” 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 12

12
See also 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (“[T]here shall be imposed upon
such merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other
duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net countervailable sub-
sidy.”); id. § 1673 (“[T]here shall be imposed upon such merchan-
 28a
The only statute the Government identifies that
might reasonably be viewed as inconsistent with this
analysis is section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962. Section 232 provides that:
[I]f the Secretary of the Treasury finds that an “arti-
cle is being imported into the United States in such
quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security,” the Presi-
dent is authorized to “take such action, and for such
time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of
(the) article and its derivatives so that . . . im-
ports (of the article) will not threaten to impair the
national security.”
Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S.
548, 550 (1976) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV) (emphasis added)).
In Algonquin, the Supreme Court interpreted the
phrase “adjust the imports” in section 232 to permit the
President to “control such imports of petroleum and pe-
troleum products . . . by imposing on them a system
of monetary exactions in the form of license fees.” Id.
at 551-52, 571. The Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that the authorization to “‘adjust’ imports should
be read to encompass only quantitative methods [i.e.],
quotas as opposed to monetary methods [i.e.]., license

dise an antidumping duty, in addition to any other duty imposed.”);

id. § 2465 (“No duty-free treatment provided under this subchapter
shall remain in effect after December 31, 2020.”); id. § 2252(d)(2)(D)
(“Such relief shall take the form of an increase in, or the imposition
of, a duty on imports.”); id. § 2411(c)(1)(B) (“[T]he Trade Repre-
sentative is authorized to . . . impose duties or other import re-
strictions on the goods of . . . foreign countr[ies] for such time
as the Trade Representative determines appropriate.”).
 29a
fees of effecting such adjustments,” based on the stat-
ute’s explicit statement that the circumstances that
threaten to impair national security are not related to
quantity of imports but rather “their use, their availa-
bility, [and] their character.” Id. at 561 (quoting 104
Cong. Rec. 10542-10543 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Mills)).
Even section 232 does not undermine our conclusion
regarding IEEPA’s use of “regulate . . . importa-
tion.” This is first because the use of the term “adjust,”
which the Government argues is synonymous with “reg-
ulate,” in section 232 is in the context of a provision deal-
ing with the imports and duties, making it far more plau-
sible that the adjustment referenced in subsection (b)
includes an adjustment to tariff rates. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1862(a) (explicitly referring to “the duty . . . on
any article”). Also, in construing the meaning of “ad-
just” in Algonquin, the Supreme Court also relied heav-
ily on the statutory history of the Trade Expansion Act.
Multiple members of the House and Senate had explic-
itly referenced the President’s authority to “increase
. . . duties” or “impose . . . fees” as contemplated
by proposed amendments that were “strikingly similar”
to the enacted law. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 563-66. In
contrast, here, neither the term “duties” nor any of its
synonyms appear anywhere in the text of IEEPA, and
the history of the enactment of IEEPA lacks any similar
legislative lodestar. Moreover, section 232 is within ti-
tle 19 of the U.S. Code, which is entitled “Customs Du-
ties.” See INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rts., Inc.,
502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991) (“[W]e have stated that the title
of a statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity
in the legislation’s text.”). In contrast, IEEPA’s provi-
sions are located within title 50, which is entitled “War
and National Defense.” And in enacting IEEPA, Con-
 30a
gress explicitly set out to cabin the President’s author-
ity, providing for authorities “which [we]re both more
limited in scope than those of [TWEA] and subject to
various procedural limitations.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-459,
at 2.13 Thus, even if Algonquin is viewed as supporting
the proposition that “adjust the imports” includes the
power to impose tariffs (as opposed to standing for
the narrower proposition that, in section 232, which ap-
pears in title 19, “adjust” simply is not limited to non-
monetary actions), it does not follow that IEEPA’s use
of “regulate . . . importation” also includes tariffs.
Further, as we previously discussed, see supra Sec-
tion I.E., in each statute delegating tariff power to the
President, Congress has provided specific substantive
limitations and procedural guidelines to be followed in
imposing any such tariffs. It seems unlikely that Con-
gress intended, in enacting IEEPA, to depart from its
past practice and grant the President unlimited author-
ity to impose tariffs. The statute neither mentions tar-
iffs (or any of its synonyms) nor has procedural safe-
guards that contain clear limits on the President’s power
to impose tariffs.
Taken together, these other statutes indicate that
whenever Congress intends to delegate to the President
the authority to impose tariffs, it does so explicitly, ei-
ther by using unequivocal terms like tariff and duty, or
via an overall structure which makes clear that Con-
gress is referring to tariffs. This is no surprise, as the
core Congressional power to impose taxes such as tariffs

13
To be clear, we cite legislative history as additional support for
the conclusion we reach based on the statutory text alone. Even
without this legislative history, we would reach the same conclu-
sion.
 31a
is vested exclusively in the legislative branch by the
Constitution; when Congress delegates this power in the
first instance, it does so clearly and unambiguously.
See Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, v. United States, 415
U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974) (“Taxation is a legislative func-
tion, and Congress . . . is the sole organ for levying
taxes. . . . It would be . . . a sharp break with
our traditions to conclude that Congress had bestowed
on [the executive branch] the taxing power.”).
Contrary to the Government’s assertion, the mere
authorization to “regulate” does not in and of itself im-
ply the authority to impose tariffs. The power to “reg-
ulate” has long been understood to be distinct from the
power to “tax.” In fact, the Constitution vests these
authorities in Congress separately. U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8 cl. 1, 3; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 201
(1824) (“It is, that all duties, imposts, and excises, shall
be uniform. In a separate clause of the enumeration,
the power to regulate commerce is given, as being en-
tirely distinct from the right to levy taxes and imposts,
and as being a new power, not before conferred. The
constitution, then, considers these powers as substan-
tive, and distinct from each other.”); Nat’l Fed’n. of In-
dep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552, 567 (2012) (hold-
ing that the individual mandate provision of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act was a permissible
exercise of Congress’s taxing power but exceeded Con-
gress’s power to regulate commerce). While Congress
may use its taxing power in a manner that has a regula-
tory effect, see Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at
537, the power to tax is not always incident to the power
to regulate.
 32a
Indeed, there are important examples where Con-
gress has granted the power to regulate to the executive
branch without delegating the power to impose tariffs.
See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Pub. L. No.
73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended by Pub. L. No.
97-303, 96 Stat. 1409, 1409 at 15 U.S.C. § 78i(h)(1)) (di-
recting the Securities and Exchange Commission “to
regulate the trading of [tradeable assets]”); Communi-
cations Act of 1934, § 303, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat.
1082, 1082 (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 303(e)) (directing the
Federal Communications Commission to “[r]egulate the
kind of apparatus to be used with respect to its external
effects and the purity and sharpness of the emissions
from each [radio] station and from the apparatus
therein”). The Government’s suggestion would mean,
for example, that Congress delegated to the SEC power
to tax substantial swaths of the American economy by
granting the SEC the authority to regulate various ac-
tivities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(h)(1) (“[T]he Commission
shall have the authority to regulate the trading of any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities.”);
id. § 78i(h)(2) (“[T]he Commission shall have the author-
ity to regulate the trading of any security futures prod-
uct to the extent provided in the securities laws.”).
Even in the context of international trade, apart from
the decision in Yoshida II, the Government has not
pointed to any statute or judicial decision that has con-
strued the power to regulate as including the authority
to impose tariffs without the statute also including a spe-
cific provision in the statute authorizing tariffs. That
was notably the case in J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States, where the statute authorized the Presi-
dent to act “to regulate the foreign commerce of the
 33a
United States” and then specifically authorized tariffs.
276 U.S. 394, 401 (1928) (quoting Tariff Act, ch. 356
§ 315, 42 Stat. 858, 941-42 (1922) (granting President au-
thority to proclaim certain “increases or decreases in
any rate of duty provided in th[e] act.”)).
Upon declaring an emergency under IEEPA, a Pres-
ident may, in relevant part, “investigate, block during
the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and
compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit” the “importa-
tion or exportation of . . . any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.”.
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). “Regulate” must be read in
the context of these other verbs, 14 none of which involve
monetary actions or suggest the power to tax or impose
tariffs.15

14
Instead, the other verbs implicate the common law doctrine
that trade with enemy nations or hostile actors is illegal. See, e.g.,
The Julia, 12 U.S. 181, 193 (1814) (“[I]n war all intercourse between
the subjects and citizens of the belligerent countries is illegal, un-
less sanctioned by the authority of the government.”); Hanger v.
Abbott, 73 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1867) (“All foreign writers on interna-
tional law concur in the opinion that the immediate and necessary
consequence of a declaration of war is to interdict all intercourse
or dealings between the subjects of the belligerent states.”); Cop-
pell v. Hall, 74 U.S. 542, 554 (1868) (“When international wars exist
all commerce between the countries of the belligerents, unless per-
mitted, is contrary to public policy, and all contracts growing out
of such commerce are illegal. Such wars are regarded not as wars
of the governments only, but of all the inhabitants of their respec-
tive countries.”). Congress has long enacted statutes on this
backdrop. See, e.g., Section 5 of the Act of July 13, 1861, 12 Stat.
255, 257.
15
An import of goods may trigger a host of other customs-related
procedures, such as acquisition of a Certificate of Origin under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) rules of origin,
 34a
The Government’s interpretation of IEEPA as
providing the President power to impose unlimited tar-
iffs also runs afoul of the major questions doctrine.
See, e.g., Oral Arg. 16 at 19:28-19:39 (the Government
stating “there is no limit on the cap of the tariff in
IEEPA itself ”). The Supreme Court has explained
that the doctrine applies in “cases in which the ‘history
and the breadth of the authority . . . asserted’ ” by
the Government entails vast “economic and political sig-
nificance.” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721
(2022) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.
120, 159 (2000)). In such cases, there may be a “‘reason
to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to
confer such authority.” Id. (quoting Brown & William-
son, 529 U.S. at 159-60). When the major questions
doctrine is implicated, the Government must point to
“clear congressional authorization” for that asserted
power. Id. at 732 (quoting Util. Air. Regul. Grp. v.
EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).
The tariffs at issue in this case implicate the concerns
animating the major questions doctrine as they are both
“unheralded” and “transformative.” Id. at 722, 724;
see also id. at 725 (“[J]ust as established practice may
shed light on the extent of power conveyed by general
statutory language, so the want of assertion of power by

see Xerox Corp. v. United States, 423 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2005), licenses, see Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 571 (1976), and creation
and management of foreign trade zones, see Nissan Motor Mfg.
Corp., U.S.A. v. United States, 884 F.2d 1375, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
These measures are more readily under-stood to fall under the au-
thorization to “regulate . . . importation” granted to the Presi-
dent by IEEPA.
16
Available at https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.
aspx?fl=25-1812_07312025.mp3.
 35a
those who presumably would be alert to exercise it, is
equally significant in determining whether such power
was actually conferred.” (quoting FTC v. Bunte Bros.,
Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 352 (1941)). 17 The Supreme Court
has explained that where the Government has “never
previously claimed powers of this magnitude,” the major
questions doctrine may be implicated. Biden v. Ne-
braska, 600 U.S. 477, 501-03 (2023).
Since IEEPA was promulgated almost fifty years
ago, past presidents have invoked IEEPA frequently.
But not once before has a President asserted his author-
ity under IEEPA to impose tariffs on imports or adjust
the rates thereof. Rather, presidents have typically in-
voked IEEPA to restrict financial transactions with spe-
cific countries or entities that the President has deter-
mined pose an acute threat to the country’s interests.

17
The Government argues as a threshold matter that the major
questions doctrine does not apply to the President because of the
President’s democratic and political accountability. See Govern-
ment’s Opening Br. 43-44. The Government fails to articulate
why it makes any difference whether the challenged action is the
result of presidential or agency action, since agency heads them-
selves are accountable to the President. See Trump v. Wilcox,
145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415 (2025). We accordingly join our sister cir-
cuits in concluding that delegations to the President are treated
the same as delegations to executive agencies under the major
questions doctrine. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Biden, 55 F.4th 1017,
1031 n.40 (5th Cir. 2022); Georgia v. President of the U.S., 46 F.4th
1283, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2022); Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585,
606-08 (6th Cir. 2022). The only circuit court decision to hold oth-
erwise was vacated as moot, see Mayes v. Biden, 67 F.4th 921, 933
(9th Cir. 2023), vacated as moot, 89 F.4th 1186 (9th Cir. 2023); see
also Nebraska v. Su, 121 F.4th 1, 9 n.2 (9th Cir. 2024) (acknowledg-
ing that “Mayes is no longer binding law”); id. at 20 (Nelson, J.,
concurring) (explaining why the major questions doctrine applies
to presidential actions).
 36a
For example, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
terror attacks, President George W. Bush invoked
IEEPA to establish a process for designating terrorist
organizations and affiliated individuals to prevent the de-
ployment of American resources for their advantage.
Executive Order No. 13224, Blocking Property and Pro-
hibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threa-
ten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079,
49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). In almost all other instances
where IEEPA has been invoked, presidents did so to
freeze assets, block financial transfers, place embar-
goes, or impose targeted sanctions on hostile regimes
and individuals. Even under IEEPA’s predecessor,
TWEA, a President has invoked his authority to impose
tariffs on only one occasion, and on that occasion, the
tariffs were of limited scope and duration. See Yoshida
II, 526 F.2d at 572. The invocation of IEEPA to im-
pose tariffs on nearly every country in the world is un-
doubtedly a significant departure from these previous
invocations. “ ‘This ‘lack of historical precedent,’ cou-
pled with the breadth of authority that the [Govern-
ment] now claims[] [may be] a ‘telling indication’ ” that
the Government’s reading of a statute is incorrect. See
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational
Safety & Health Admin., 595 U.S. 109, 119-20 (2022)
(per curiam) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct.
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)); Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669-74 (1981) (interpret-
ing IEEPA in light of past presidential action).
Additionally, as already discussed, tariffs are a core
Congressional power. The “basic and consequential
tradeoffs” that are inherent in the President’s decision
to impose the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs “are
ones that Congress would likely have intended for it-
 37a
self.” Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 506 (quoting West Virginia,
597 U.S. at 730). Moreover, the United States imports
more than $4 trillion of goods annually; these imports
account for 14 percent of the nation’s economy. J.A. 215.
The Government itself has claimed that the Reciprocal
Tariffs will “generate between $2.3 trillion and $3.3 tril-
lion over the budget window.” The White House, State-
ment from the Off. of Commc’ns, FACT: One, Big, Beau-
tiful Bill Cuts Spending, Fuels Growth, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/05/fact-one-big-beautiful-
bill-cuts-spending-fuels-growth/ (May 28, 2025). 18 The
Executive’s use of tariffs qualifies as a decision of vast
economic and political significance, so the Government
must “point to clear congressional authorization” for its
interpretation of IEEPA. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at
723 (quoting Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 324).

18
Indeed, the economic impact of the tariffs is predicted to be
many magnitudes greater than the two programs that the Supreme
Court has previously held to implicate major questions. In Ala-
bama Association of Realtors v. Department of Health & Human
Services, the Court held that the power to impose “$50 billion in
. . . economic impact” was “exactly the kind of power” “of vast
economic and political significance” for which it “expect[s] Con-
gress to speak clearly.” 594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021) (per curiam) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). In Nebraska, the Supreme Court
pointed to the “staggering” scope of impact of a program “between
$469 billion and $519 billion,” which was “ten times the ‘economic
impact’ ” in Alabama Association that it previously concluded “trig-
gered analysis under the major questions doctrine.” 600 U.S. at
502-03. As noted, the Government’s estimates of the Reciprocal
and Trafficking Tariff ’s impact are at least five times larger. And
given the President’s continued invocation of IEEPA to impose ad-
ditional expansive tariffs during the pendency of this appeal, the
overall economic impact of the tariffs imposed under the Govern-
ment’s reading of IEEPA is even larger still.
 38a
For the reasons discussed above, we discern no clear
congressional authorization by IEEPA for tariffs of the
magnitude of the Reciprocal Tariffs and Trafficking
Tariffs. Reading the phrase “regulate . . . impor-
tation” to include imposing these tariffs is “a wafer-thin
reed on which to rest such sweeping power.” Ala.
Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 594
U.S. 758, 765 (2021) (per curiam). In this respect, the
Government’s argument resembles the argument ex-
pressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Nebraska,
where the Court concluded that Congress’s authoriza-
tion to the Secretary of Education to “waive or modify”
laws and regulations governing student debt did not en-
compass student debt relief. 600 U.S. at 494-96. The
Court explained that “[h]owever broad the meaning of
‘waive or modify,’ that language cannot authorize the
kind of exhaustive rewriting of the statute that has
taken place here.” Id. at 500. The same is true of the
statutory language (“regulate . . . importation”) at
issue in this case.
We are unpersuaded by the Government’s argument
that it is “particularly inappropriate to construe nar-
rowly a delegation of power in the arena of foreign af-
fairs and national security.” Government’s Opening Br.
45. While the President of course has independent con-
stitutional authority in these spheres, the power of the
purse (including the power to tax) belongs to Congress.
See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 21
(2015) (“[I]t is essential the congressional role in foreign
affairs be understood and respected. . . . The Exec-
utive is not free from the ordinary controls and checks
of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at is-
sue.”); Fuld v. Pal. Liberation Org., 606 U.S. 1, 19 (2025)
(“The Federal Government’s inherent foreign affairs
 39a
power, like every other governmental power, must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions
of the Constitution.” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Absent a valid delegation by Congress, the Pres-
ident has no authority to impose taxes.
Given these considerations, we conclude Congress,
in enacting IEEPA, did not give the President wide-
ranging authority to impose tariffs of the nature of the
Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs simply by the use of
the term “regulate . . . importation.”
B
In urging us to reach a contrary conclusion, the Gov-
ernment relies heavily on Yoshida II, a decision of our
predecessor court, the CCPA. In the Government’s
view, we should discern that Congress intended to in-
clude in IEEPA the power to impose tariffs because it
enacted IEEPA with knowledge of existing judicial
precedent set by Yoshida II, which recognized the dele-
gation of tariff authority to the President under TWEA,
IEEPA’s predecessor statute, and contained the identi-
cal “regulate . . . importation” language. Thus, we
consider whether, even if Congress ratified Yoshida II’s
understanding of the term “regulate,” to what extent
that ratification authorizes the Trafficking and Recipro-
cal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Executive Orders
under IEEPA.
Yoshida II concerned President Nixon’s issuance of
Proclamation 4074 to address a balance-of-payments
deficit. 526 F.2d at 567. The CCPA reversed the Cus-
toms Court’s determination that TWEA section 5(b) did
not authorize President Nixon’s 10 percent import sur-
charge. 526 F.2d at 566. Section 5(b) of TWEA also
authorized the President to “regulate . . . importa-
 40a
tion.” Id. at 573; 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1)(B). The
CCPA held that TWEA “does in fact delegate to the
President, for use during war or during national emer-
gency only, the power to ‘regulate importation,’ ” and
that power also included the authority to “impos[e] an
import duty surcharge.” Yoshida II, 526 F.2d at 573,
577.19 Without foreclosing the possibility that TWEA
delegated authority to the President to impose some tar-
iffs, the CCPA also “agree[d] with the Customs Court
that the delegation could not constitutionally have been
of the full and all-inclusive power to regulate foreign
commerce.” Id. at 574. Thus, it determined that “[a]
question remain[ed] . . . as to how the President
may regulate importation in a national emergency, i.e.,
what means of execution of the delegated powers are
permissible.” Id. at 574.
The CCPA ultimately concluded that President
Nixon’s tariff was authorized given its “[l]imited
[n]ature” in time, scope, and amount, since it was a tem-
porary measure, “limited to articles which had been the
subject of prior tariff concessions, and, thus, to less than
all United States imports,” and subject to a maximum
rate that had been prescribed by Congress. Id. at 577-

19
We note that Yoshida II is not binding on the en banc court.
See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Indeed, ‘[t]he province and obligation of the en
banc court is to review the current validity of challenged prior de-
cisions.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Aguon,
851 F.2d 1158, 1167 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev’d on other
grounds, Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992))). But be-
cause Yoshida II approved narrowly circumscribed tariffs that did
not exceed Congressional caps, and the CCPA expressly declined
to approve unbounded tariffs, today’s case does not require us to
decide whether to overrule Yoshida II.
 41a
78. Thus, the CCPA held that “[f]ar from attempting
. . . to tear down or supplant the entire tariff scheme
of Congress, the President imposed a limited surcharge,
as a temporary measure . . . calculated to help meet
a particular national emergency, which is quite different
from imposing whatever tariff rates he deems desira-
ble.” Id. at 577-78 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Government argues that because Yoshida II was
existing precedent at the time IEEPA was enacted,
Congress intended to ratify Yoshida II’s understanding
of the term “regulate . . . importation” as used in
TWEA by using the same language in IEEPA. Even if
we assume, as the Government urges, that Congress in-
tended to ratify Yoshida II when it enacted IEEPA, we
still must consider what it is that Congress ratified.
Yoshida II does not broadly conclude that “regulate
. . . importation” must be read to include any type of
tariff imposition. In fact, it held the opposite. The
CCPA’s reasoning in Yoshida II was expressly prem-
ised on the limits of President Nixon’s Proclamation.
The court noted that “[t]he Executive does not here
seek, nor would it receive, judicial approval of a whole-
sale delegation of legislative power.” Id. at 583. And
the CCPA agreed with the Customs Court that to sanc-
tion “the exercise of an unlimited power . . . would
be to strike a blow to our Constitution.” Id. Thus, the
CCPA explicitly contrasted presidential conduct it found
permissible within the power granted by TWEA—“ ‘a
temporary measure’ . . . calculated to help meet a
particular national emergency” that is limited in scope
and amount—with conduct it found impermissible under
TWEA—“imposing whatever tariff rates [the Presi-
dent] deems desirable.” Id. at 578.
 42a
The Government would have us define “regulate
. . . importation” to include only the portion of Yo-
shida II authorizing tariffs and ignore the rest of its
holding. But if the ratification doctrine is to apply, and
we are to presume that Congress intended for the hold-
ing of Yoshida II to apply to the newly enacted IEEPA,
then we must presume that it intended for the court’s
entire holding to apply, not just the portion favorable to
the Government. And because Yoshida II was explicit
in its view that an unbounded tariff authority would not
be permitted, that understanding must be attributed to
Congress as well.
Accepting the Government’s argument as correct—
that Congress ratified Yoshida II’s conclusion that “reg-
ulate . . . importation” could include the power to
impose tariffs—we still must conclude that the Chal-
lenged Executive Orders in this case exceed the author-
ity provided by that interpretation of IEEPA. Both
the Trafficking Tariffs and the Reciprocal Tariffs are
unbounded in scope, amount, and duration. These tar-
iffs apply to nearly all articles imported into the United
States (and, in the case of the Reciprocal Tariffs, apply
to almost all countries), impose high rates which are
ever-changing and exceed those set out in the HTSUS,
and are not limited in duration. The Trafficking and
Reciprocal Tariffs assert an expansive authority that is
beyond the express limitations of Yoshida II’s holding
and, thus, beyond the authority delegated to the Presi-
dent by IEEPA.
* * *
V
The final issue raised by this appeal is whether the
CIT abused its discretion in vacating and permanently
 43a
enjoining the operation of the Challenged Executive Or-
ders. For the reasons explained below, we vacate the
CIT’s injunction and remand.
An injunction “does not follow from success on the
merits as a matter of course.” Winter v. NRDC, 555
U.S. 7, 32 (2008). Under “well-established principles of
equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must
satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such
relief.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 391 (2006). The four factors a plaintiff must estab-
lish to secure a permanent injunction are: “(1) that it
has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inade-
quate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, consider-
ing the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that
the public interest would not be disserved by a perma-
nent injunction.” Id. “The decision to grant or deny
permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discre-
tion by the [trial] court, reviewable on appeal for abuse
of discretion.” Id.
After invalidating both the Trafficking Tariffs and
the Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Exec-
utive Orders as contrary to law, the CIT ordered the
Government to issue the “necessary administrative or-
ders to effectuate the permanent injunction” “within 10
calendar days.” V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp. 3d. at
1384. The CIT did not address the eBay factors in its
original opinion. The following week, in an order re-
sponding to the Government’s motions to stay the CIT’s
enforcement of its judgment pending the Government’s
appeal to this Court, the CIT explained that “[t]he in-
junction issued on account of Plaintiffs’ success on the
 44a
merits and the unavailability under the Uniformity
Clause of a complete legal remedy in the form of piece-
meal duty refunds to specific plaintiffs,” and that “[i]ntrin-
sic to this exercise of equitable discretion was the com-
pelling public interest in ‘ensuring that governmental
bodies comply with the law’ . . . and the lack of any
cognizable hardship borne by the United States in the
form of its non-enforcement of orders issued ultra
vires.” J.A. 63 (quoting Am. Signature, Inc. v. United
States, 598 F.3d 816, 830 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
We need not decide whether the CIT abused its dis-
cretion by only articulating its analysis of the eBay fac-
tors some days after it issued its original opinion on the
merits, nor whether the Government has shown any
prejudice from the delay. Nor need we evaluate the
sufficiency of the CIT’s explanation. This is because
vacatur of the universal injunction is warranted based
on the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Trump
v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025).
In CASA, the Supreme Court considered the Govern-
ment’s challenge to three universal injunctions issued
by different district courts prohibiting enforcement of
the President’s policy with respect to birthright citizen-
ship. Id. at 2549. While the Court held that the uni-
versal injunctions at issue “likely exceed the equitable
authority Congress has granted to federal courts,” id. at
2548, it “decline[d] to take up . . . in the first in-
stance” arguments as to the permissible scope of injunc-
tive relief, id. at 2558. Instead, it instructed “[t]he lower
courts [to] move expeditiously to ensure that, with re-
spect to each plaintiff, the injunctions comport with this
rule and otherwise comply with principles of equity” as
outlined in the opinion. Id. at 2563; see also Doe v.
 45a
Trump, 142 F.4th 109, 112 (1st Cir. 2025) (remanding
“for the limited purpose of enabling the District Court
to consider the bearing, if any, of that guidance in CASA
on the scope of the preliminary injunction . . . and
to act accordingly”); United States v. Texas, No. 24-
50149, 2025 WL 1836640, at *38 (5th Cir. July 3, 2025)
(“Like the Supreme Court in Trump v. CASA, we ‘de-
cline to take up . . . in the first instance’ arguments
as to the permissible scope of injunctive relief in the pre-
sent case. ‘[W]e therefore leave it’ to the district court
to consider any arguments the parties may present in
this regard.” (alterations in original)).
We will follow this same practice. 20 On remand, the
CIT should consider in the first instance whether its
grant of a universal injunction comports with the stand-
ards outlined by the Supreme Court in CASA.
VI
We affirm the CIT’s holding that the Trafficking and
Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Executive
Orders exceed the authority delegated to the President
by IEEPA’s text. We also affirm the CIT’s grant of
declaratory relief that the orders are “invalid as con-
trary to law.” V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp. 3d at
1383-84. We vacate the CIT’s grant of a permanent in-
junction universally enjoining the enforcement of the
Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs and remand for the
CIT to reevaluate the propriety of granting injunctive
relief and the proper scope of such relief, after consid-

20
We are neither affirming nor reversing the CIT’s holding that
any relief short of a universal injunction would be unconstitutional
as violative of the Uniformity Clause. On remand, the CIT will
need to reconsider this holding in light of the guidance provided by
the Supreme Court in CASA.
 46a
ering all four eBay factors and the Supreme Court’s
holding in CASA.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND RE-
MANDED-IN-PART
COSTS
No costs.
 47a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

2025-1812, 2025-1813
V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES AND
PRODUCTS, LLC, DBA GENOVA PIPE, MICROKITS, LLC,
FISHUSA INC., TERRY PRECISION CYCLING LLC,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES, RODNEY
S. SCOTT, COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, JAMIESON
GREER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HOWARD LUTNICK,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, DEFENDANTS -APPELLANTS

STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF ARIZONA, STATE OF

COLORADO, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF
DELAWARE, STATE OF ILLINOIS, STATE OF MAINE,
STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE OF NEVADA, STATE OF
NEW MEXICO, STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE OF
VERMONT, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, KRISTI NOEM,
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS
 48a
AND BORDER PROTECTION, RODNEY S. SCOTT,
COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER FOR U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, UNITED STATES,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Filed: Aug. 29, 2025

Appeals from the United States Court of

International Trade in Nos. 1:25-cv-00066-GSK-
TMR-JAR, 1:25-cv-00077-GSK-TMR-JAR, Senior
Judge Jane A. Restani, Judge Gary S. Katzmann,
Judge Timothy M. Reif.

CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge, joined by Circuit Judges

LOURIE, REYNA, and STARK, additional views.
We join the majority opinion in full. While we agree
with the majority that the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 50 U.S.C. § 1701
et seq., does not grant the President authority to impose
the type of tariffs imposed by the Executive Orders,
Maj. Op. at 26-42, we write separately to state our view
that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose
any tariffs. In particular, we conclude that (1) the Gov-
ernment’s expansive interpretation of “regulate” is not
supported by the plain text of IEEPA; (2) the Govern-
ment’s reliance on the ratification of our predecessor
court’s opinion in United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc.,
526 F.2d 560 (CCPA 1975) (“Yoshida II”) does not over-
come this plain meaning; and (3) the Government’s un-
 49a
derstanding of the scope of authority granted by IEEPA
would render it an unconstitutional delegation.
A.
We start by addressing the statutory text of IEEPA.
IEEPA allows the President to declare a national emer-
gency to deal with “any unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States, to the national security, for-
eign policy, or economy of the United States.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701(a). Once the President declares such an emer-
gency, IEEPA grants the President the power to:
investigate, block during the pendency of an investi-
gation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, pre-
vent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withhold-
ing, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, impor-
tation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising
any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or trans-
actions involving, any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest by any
person, or with respect to any property, subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States[.]
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). The Government locates the
President’s purported tariff authority in the statute’s
grant of power to “regulate . . . importation.” Ap-
pellants’ Br. 32.
The plain meaning of “regulate” does not support the
Government’s argument. “Regulate” means “[t]o fix,
establish or control; to adjust by rule, method, or estab-
lished mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject
to governing principles or laws.” Regulate, Black’s
Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). “Regulate” also means
“to govern or direct according to rule,” “to bring under
 50a
the control of law or constituted authority,” or “make
regulations for or concerning.” Regulate, Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary (1961). As the
plain meaning of “regulate” does not include measures
for raising revenue, the Government is forced to rely on
a syllogism: it contends to “regulate” importation means
to “adjust” or “control” the quantity of imports, and tar-
iffs are ways to “adjust” or “control” the quantity of im-
ports. Appellants’ Br. 32-33; Am. First Leg. Found.
Br. 3-5; see Dissent at 29-33. The Government’s broad
interpretation of “regulate” as encompassing every pos-
sible method and mode of adjustment of the quantity of
importation, including taxation, faces three textual
problems in the specific context 1 of 50 U.S.C. § 1702:
(1) it is inconsistent with how “regulate” would be ap-
plied beyond its application to “importation;” (2) it ren-
ders the other listed powers in IEEPA surplusage; and
(3) it violates the proposition that Congress must speak
clearly when authorizing taxation.
First, the Government’s interpretation of “regulate”
would require “regulate” to have multiple meanings in
the very provision on which the Government relies.
The Supreme Court has “never engaged in such inter-
pretive contortion” to conclude that Congress intended

1
As the dissent notes, taxes can sometimes be a form of regula-
tion. Dissent at 29-33. However, “[s]tatutory language has mean-
ing only in context.” Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist.
v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 415 (2005). The examples the
dissent marshals all contain explicit grants of taxation authority
and thus stand for the uncontroversial principle that taxation can
sometimes have a regulatory purpose; they do not support the
broader proposition that “regulate,” in all contexts and most espe-
cially in the context of IEEPA, is interpreted to include the taxa-
tion power.
 51a
to “giv[e] the same word, in the same statutory provi-
sion, different meanings in different factual contexts.”
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 522 (2008) (em-
phasis omitted). IEEPA’s grant of the power to “reg-
ulate” applies not just to “importation,” but to
any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer,
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exporta-
tion of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power,
or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving,
any property in which any foreign country or a na-
tional thereof has any interest.
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (emphases added). If the
Government’s reading of “regulate” to include adjusting
quantity through taxation is adopted, then the President
would have the power to unilaterally tax bank withdraw-
als or to implement a wealth tax on any foreign property
holdings. Similarly, under the Government’s interpre-
tation, the President could “regulate . . . transpor-
tation” by taxing transportation to reduce it. Further,
reading IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate . . .
exportation” to include the ability to reduce exportation
by taxing it would render the provision unconstitutional.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. The Government’s sugges-
tion that “it is natural to read the President’s power to
‘regulate . . . importation’ as encompassing the
power to impose tariffs, while reading the power to ‘reg-
ulate . . . exportation’ as excluding that power,” Ap-
pellants’ Reply Br. 9, effectively concedes that its argu-
ment requires reading “regulate” to have different
meanings in different factual contexts of the same stat-
utory provision. We reject the Government’s proposal
that we adopt such a fluctuating construction of “regu-
late.”
 52a
Second, the Government’s interpretation of “regu-
late” would make the President’s other authorities in
IEEPA superfluous. It is a “‘cardinal principle of stat-
utory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the
whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.’ ” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31
(2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174
(2001)). If the Government’s expansive reading of
“regulate” were correct, there would have been little
need for Congress to separately list, for example, the
powers to “direct and compel,” or “prevent or prohibit”
in IEEPA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). Notably,
the power to “prevent or prohibit” any particular act of
importation (or acquisition, holding, or withdrawal) is
subsumed in a definition of “regulate” that includes no
limits on the scope of authorized restrictions. Thus, we
also reject the Government’s interpretation for allowing
the term “regulate” to render many of the remaining
listed powers superfluous.
Third, even if the Government’s reading were plausi-
ble, any delegation is far from clear. “Congress must in-
dicate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive
the discretionary authority to” impose “ ‘fees’ or ‘taxes.’ ”
Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 224
(1989) (quoting Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG,
Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 n.10 (1976)); see National Cable
Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341
(1974) (“It would be such a sharp break with our tradi-
tions to conclude that Congress had bestowed on a fed-
eral agency the taxing power.”). We reject the dis-
sent’s suggestion that because IEEPA involves foreign
affairs, it must be interpreted so broadly as to include
 53a
tariff authority. Dissent at 36.2 We are aware of no
Supreme Court case applying that proposition to read a
broad delegation of taxing authority into ambiguous
text. For a similar reason, we reject the dissent’s sug-
gestion that “[t]axing through tariffs is just a less ex-
treme, more flexible tool for pursuing the same objec-
tive of controlling the amount or price of imports that,
after all, could be barred altogether.” Dissent at 32.
The power of the purse 3 is “the most comple[te] and ef-

2
Indeed, the dissent’s key case for this proposition held that a
statute should be read to incorporate “the historical authority of
the President in the fields of foreign commerce and of importation
into the country,” which would not include taxation authority. B-
West Imports, Inc. v. United States, 75 F.3d 633, 636 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (quoting S.P.R. Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States,
334 F.2d 622, 634 (Ct. Cl. 1964)); compare id. (“Presidents acting
under broad statutory grants of authority have ‘imposed and lifted
embargoes, prohibited and allowed exports, suspended and re-
sumed commercial intercourse with foreign countries.’ ” (quoting
S.P.R. Sugar, 334 F.2d at 633)), with Maj. Op. at 33 n.14 (explaining
the difference between the President’s historical authority to ban
commerce with enemies and the tariff authority); cf. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-44 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (“Congress alone controls the raising of revenues
and their appropriation. . . . [T]he Constitution did not contem-
plate that the title Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy will
constitute him also Commander-in-Chief of the country, its indus-
tries and its inhabitants.”).
3
At the founding, the power to tariff and the power to tax were
synonymous. “[N]early all” government revenue came from tar-
iffs until 1862. Andrew Reamer, Chapter 2: Before the U.S. Tar-
iff Commission: Congressional Efforts to Obtain Statistics and
Analysis for Tariff-setting, 1789-1916, in A Centennial History of
the United States International Trade Commission 33, 35-37
(2017); see Adv. Am. Freedom Br. 18 (noting that at the founding,
“taxations levied on imports were not a special category of power
that Congress shared with, or could share with, the President”).
 54a
fectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the
immediate representatives of the people,” The Federal-
ist No. 58, at 394 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961),
not a mere lesser authority to the traditional executive
power that enables it to cut off trade with wartime ene-
mies. See Maj. Op. at 33 n.14.
Instead, we read “regulate” in its statutory context.
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468
(2001) (referring to statutory context and recognizing
that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes”).
It is natural to read “regulate . . . importation” to
include measures like supply chain validation, quaran-
tines, and known importer rules. See, e.g., Exec. Order
No. 13194, 66 Fed. Reg. 7389, 7389-90 (Jan. 18, 2001)
(authorizing “promulgation of rules and regulations” un-
der IEEPA to stop “indirect importation” of rough dia-
monds from Sierra Leone); see also Maj. Op. at 33 n.15
(collecting examples). Thus, a proper construction of
“regulate” would encompass measures enabling the
President “to direct by rule or restriction,” but would
not strain the term to cover every possible method or
mode of restriction, such as taxation.
B.
In urging a contrary result, the Government relies
heavily on the supposed ratification of Yoshida II. See
Appellants’ Reply Br. 4-6. The ratification doctrine
applies only when (1) Congress “simply reenact[s]” a
statute “without change” and (2) there is a “judicial con-
sensus so broad and unquestioned that we must pre-
sume Congress knew of and endorsed it.” JAMA v.
 55a
ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 349 (2005). 4 Neither requirement is
met here.
Congress did not reenact the Trading with the En-
emy Act (“TWEA”) without change; rather, it withdrew
some of the authority previously granted to the Presi-
dent, including the “authority to regulate purely domes-
tic transactions.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-459, at 11 (1977).
Tariffs may be less anomalous when domestic economic
regulation is also contemplated. Moreover, key por-
tions of Yoshida II’s reasoning are no longer applicable.
First, Yoshida II relied on the absence of “acts provid-
ing procedures prescribed by the Congress for the ac-
complishment of the very purpose sought to be ob-
tained.” 526 F.2d at 578. Here, there are numerous
other authorities that the President could have invoked.
See J.A. 475 (“Peter Navarro: . . . There’s 122,
there’s 301, there’s 232, there’s 338. There’s all sorts
of things we can do well within the law.”). Second, as
concerns the tariffs considered in Yoshida II, at least as
a practical matter, Congress had retroactively passed a
measure providing President Nixon the authority to en-
act balance-of-payment tariffs. See S. Rep. No. 93-
1298, at 88 (1974) (providing “explicit statutory author-
ity” for Nixon’s actions, without commenting on whether
TWEA was misconstrued). No such implicit or explicit

4
The substantive weakness of the Government’s position also
supports finding that Yoshida II was not ratified. It is inappro-
priate to rely on “language in a Committee Report” or “a few iso-
lated statements” when the invocation of ratification “would result
in a construction of the statute which not only is at odds with the
language of the section in question and the pattern of the statute
taken as a whole, but also is extremely far reaching in terms of the
virtually untrammeled and unreviewable power it would vest.”
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978).
 56a
approval exists here: instead, when the President in 2019
asked Congress to give him authority to impose reciprocal
tariffs, Congress demurred. President Donald J. Trump,
State of the Union (Feb. 5, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.
archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps
-state-union-address-2/ (“Tonight, I am also asking you
to pass the United States Reciprocal Trade Act, so that
if another country places an unfair tariff on an American
product, we can charge them the exact same tariff on the
same product that they sell to us.”); see United States
Reciprocal Trade Act, H.R. 764, 116th Cong. (2019) (pro-
posing granting the President a narrow power to impose
reciprocal tariffs); see also United States Reciprocal
Trade Act, H.R. 735, 119th Cong. (2025). Thus, the rel-
evant portion of IEEPA was not effectively reenacted
without change.
Nor was there a broad and unquestioned judicial con-
sensus from which we can presume that Congress en-
dorsed Yoshida II. Congress heard testimony explicitly
questioning Yoshida II as a “thin” opinion that should
not “define the scope of congressional delegation.”
Emergency Controls on International Economic Trans-
actions: Hearing on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382 Before
the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Pol’y & Trade of the H.
Comm. on Int’l Rels., 95th Cong. 8-9, 18 (1977) (state-
ment of Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, New York Univer-
sity Law School). 5 Indeed, Yoshida II explicitly indi-

5
The dissent cites this testimony for the proposition that Con-
gress knew of Yoshida II, without analyzing whether Congress en-
dorsed it. Dissent at 37. Congress recognized the importance of
Professor Lowenfeld’s opinions and adopted numerous of his pro-
posals, including modifying the statute to require “express renewal,”
to require “a new declaration of emergency” for new actions, and
to raise the standard for what counts as an “emergency.” Emer-
 57a
cated that future tariffs “must, of course, comply with
the statute now governing such action.” 526 F.2d at
582 n.33. Moreover, by its terms, Yoshida II did not
“approve in advance any future surcharge of a different
nature, or any surcharge differently applied or any sur-
charge not reasonably related to the emergency de-
clared.” Id. at 577. Thus, Yoshida II hardly set out
an unquestioned definition of the word “regulate.” At
most, it left the door slightly open as to whether its hold-
ing would apply prospectively. The legislative history
suggests that, while Congress knew about Yoshida II, it
did not endorse it or convert its retroactive holding into
a prospective one: the only mention of Yoshida II in the
key committee report is in a summary of past uses, H.R.
Rep. No. 95-459, at 5, which the same report also states
were “something quite different from what was envi-
sioned in 1917.” Id. at 8-9. Thus, there was no broad
and unquestioned judicial consensus surrounding Yo-
shida II, and Yoshida II’s interpretation of “regulate”
as encompassing tariffs was not ratified.
C.
The Government’s interpretation of IEEPA would
render it an unconstitutional delegation. Because tax-
ation authority constitutionally rests with Congress, any
delegation of that authority to the President must at
least set out an intelligible principle that includes “both
‘the general policy’ ” that the President “must pursue
and ‘the boundaries of [its] delegated authority.’ FCC

gency Controls on International Economic Transactions: Hear-

ing on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l
Econ. Pol’y & Trade of the H. Comm. on Int’l Rels., 95th Cong. 10-
11 (statement of Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, New York University
Law School); see 50 U.S.C. § 1701; 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d).
 58a
v. Consumers’ Rsch., 145 S. Ct. 2482, 2497 (2025) (alter-
ation in original) (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v.
SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)). Similarly, Congress must
“provide[ ] sufficient standards to enable both ‘the
courts and the public [to] ascertain’ ” whether the Pres-
ident “has followed the law.” Id. (second alteration in
original) (quoting OPP Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of
Wage & Hour Div., Dep’t of Lab., 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941)).
Because this is undoubtedly a case that “affect[s] the en-
tire national economy,” the “‘guidance’ needed is greater
. . . than when [Congress] addresses a narrow, tech-
nical issue.” Id. (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001)). For taxes, 6 both
“quantitative” and “qualitative limits on how much
money” the President can raise are permissible, but it
would “pose a constitutional problem” if the “statute
gives the [executive branch] power, all on its own, to
raise [a] hypothetical $5 trillion” with no “ceiling.” Id.
at 2501-02.
The Government’s interpretation of IEEPA would be
a functionally limitless delegation of Congressional tax-
ation authority. 7 Even if we assume that “to deal with

6
Justice Gorsuch has stated that tariffs “arguably raise[ ] dis-
tinct nondelegation questions from domestic taxes,” but did so in
arguing that domestic taxes should be subject to an even stricter
non-delegation standard; he did not suggest that tariffs are not
subject to the intelligible principle standard. Consumers’ Rsch.,
145 S. Ct. at 2533 n.15 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
7
Notably, the CCPA in Yoshida II relied on examining the “ac-
tions . . . judged in the light of what the President actually did,
not in the light of what he could have done.” 526 F.2d at 577.
Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that in
assessing whether a Congressional grant of authority violates the
non-delegation doctrine, courts cannot limit their analysis only to
 59a
any unusual and extraordinary threat” satisfies the re-
quirement to set out the “general policy,” the “bounda-
ries” the Government identifies, Appellants’ Br. 37-41,
are no boundaries at all. The Government and the dis-
sent contend that IEEPA has constitutionally satisfac-
tory limits because of a requirement that the threat be
“unusual and extraordinary,” and that it “has its source
in whole or substantial part outside the United States.”
Appellants’ Br. 37 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)); see Dis-
sent at 59-63 (rejecting solely procedural or judicially
unenforceable limits). Whether or not this limit pro-
vides an intelligible principle for the other authorities in
IEEPA, it provides no limit on the supposed power to
tax. As soon as the President sees an unusual and ex-
traordinary threat, the Government’s interpretation of
IEEPA would enable the President to set whatever tar-
iff rates he wishes. 8 The Government’s interpretation

how that authority has actually been exercised. In Whitman, the

Supreme Court explained that “[t]he very choice of which portion
of the power to exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the
standard that Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise
of the forbidden legislative authority.” 531 U.S. at 473. Thus,
Yoshida II’s analysis does not fully address how non-delegation is-
sues are litigated today. Accordingly, to the extent the Govern-
ment relies on ratification of Yoshida II without the limits in Yo-
shida II, its interpretation runs into substantial non-delegation
problems.
8
Indeed, at oral argument, the Government suggested that the
only limit preventing it from using tariffs to address a budget defi-
cit emergency is that the President must find that the emergency
has its source in “substantial part outside the United States.” Oral
Arg. 39:20-39:51, https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.
aspx?fl=25-1812_07312025.mp3; 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). Consider,
however, that under the Government’s view, the President could
make such a factual finding by merely pointing to a lack of taxes
paid on imports from outside the country. But if the President can
 60a
would leave neither quantitative nor qualitative restric-
tions on how much money the executive branch could
raise without Congressional authorization.
The historical distinction between the quantitative
limits implicated by the other listed powers in IEEPA
and taxes, see Maj. Op. at 33 n.14, distinguishes the pre-
sent circumstances from the cases cited by the dissent
for the proposition that the non-delegation doctrine is
weakened in the area of foreign affairs. See Dissent at
60-61 (citing Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Foreign
Affairs, Nondelegation, and the Major Questions Doc-
trine, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2024)). The cases cited
by the dissent either involved the traditionally executive
embargo power or involved the sort of executive calcu-
lation and fact-finding that do not implicate the non-
delegation doctrine. See Gundy v. United States, 588
U.S. 128, 158-163 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813) and J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), and explaining
how, in those cases, “Congress had made all the relevant
policy decisions,” leaving fact-finding for the executive).
Indeed, “IEEPA [is] not [an] authorization[ ] that obvi-
ously connect[s] to independent presidential power.”
Bradley & Goldsmith at 1796; see id. at 1788-89 (noting
that the narrower Section 232 is “close to the line of con-
stitutionality” under a more modern non-delegation doc-
trine, and that the proposition that national security as-
sessments can be “interlinked with Congress’s authority
over trade” is “highly debatable and would entail a very

declare an emergency to cut the deficit by raising taxes in whatever

way he wishes, not much remains of Congressional authority over
taxation.
 61a
relaxed approach to the independent powers idea.”).
Moreover, the idea that tariff delegations are subject to
a lower non-delegation standard is incompatible with
J.W. Hampton, which addressed a tariff statute while
creating the intelligible principle standard. 276 U.S. at
409, 413.
Even the broadest tariff-related statute upheld by
the Supreme Court imposed more meaningful limits than
those imposed by IEEPA. The Supreme Court upheld
the limits in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, noting that there needed to be a factual finding
“that an ‘article is being imported into the United States
in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security,’ ” that the Pres-
ident’s delegated taxation authority had a ceiling be-
cause he could “act only to the extent ‘he deems neces-
sary to adjust the imports . . . so that such imports
will not threaten to impair the national security,’ ” and
that there were “specific factors to be considered by the
President in exercising his authority under s 232(b).”
Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 559. Thus, the Supreme Court
understood Section 232 to contain a qualitative limit
similar to the limits at issue in Consumers’ Research.
The Government identifies no such quantitative or qual-
itative limits here. Accordingly, even if we thought the
Government’s reading of IEEPA were plausible, we
would “shun an interpretation that raises serious consti-
tutional doubts.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
286 (2018).
D.
Congress “alone has access to the pockets of the peo-
ple.” The Federalist No. 48, at 334 (James Madison)
(J. Cooke ed., 1961). Accordingly, we would also affirm
 62a
because Congress did not unambiguously delegate its
taxing power to the President in IEEPA.
 63a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

2025-1812, 2025-1813
V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES AND
PRODUCTS, LLC, DBA GENOVA PIPE, MICROKITS, LLC,
FISHUSA INC., TERRY PRECISION CYCLING LLC,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES, RODNEY
S. SCOTT, COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, JAMIESON
GREER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HOWARD LUTNICK,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, DEFENDANTS -APPELLANTS

STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF ARIZONA, STATE OF

COLORADO, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF
DELAWARE, STATE OF ILLINOIS, STATE OF MAINE,
STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE OF NEVADA, STATE OF
NEW MEXICO, STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE OF
VERMONT, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, KRISTI NOEM,
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS
 64a
AND BORDER PROTECTION, RODNEY S. SCOTT,
COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER FOR U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, UNITED STATES,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Filed: Aug. 29, 2025

Appeals from the United States Court of

International Trade in Nos. 1:25-cv-00066-GSK-
TMR-JAR, 1:25-cv-00077-GSK-TMR-JAR, Senior
Judge Jane A. Restani, Judge Gary S. Katzmann,
Judge Timothy M. Reif.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom Chief

Judge MOORE and Circuit Judges PROST and CHEN join.
Before us on appeal is the decision of the Court of
International Trade (CIT) in V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v.
United States, 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2025) (CIT Op.) in a pair of cases—one brought by five
private businesses and the other brought by twelve
States—in which all plaintiffs assert harm to their inter-
ests in imported goods. Id. at 1367, 1369. The CIT
ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case and that at
least one plaintiff in each group had constitutional stand-
ing. Id. at 1365-69. The CIT then granted summary
judgment to the plaintiffs, holding unlawful the asserted
cause of the harm—namely, tariffs on imports of goods
imposed by two groups of executive orders issued by the
President. Id. at 1383. For authority to impose the
tariffs in both the first group, which concerns what have
 65a
been called the reciprocal tariffs, and the second group,
which concerns what have been called the (drug-)traf-
ficking tariffs, the President relied on the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No.
95-223, §§ 201-207, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626-28 (1977) (codified
as slightly amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706). The
CIT set aside the tariffs on the ground that they were
not authorized by IEEPA, and it issued an injunction as
a remedy. CIT Op. at 1370-84.
This court today affirms the holdings on jurisdiction,
standing, and unlawfulness, while vacating the CIT’s in-
junction and remanding for reconsideration of the rem-
edy. Maj. Op. at 24-25, 42-44. We agree with the ma-
jority’s decision on jurisdiction and standing and on the
need for reconsideration of the remedy if the tariffs are
unlawful. But we disagree with the majority’s conclu-
sion on the issue of the tariffs’ legality. We conclude
that plaintiffs have not justified summary judgment in
their favor on either statutory or constitutional grounds.
Regarding statutory authority: Plaintiffs have not
shown on summary judgment that either group of tariffs
fails to meet the preconditions IEEPA sets for the exer-
cise of the presidential authorities that IEEPA grants—
requiring that measures adopted be imposed to deal
with an unusual and extraordinary threat, having for-
eign sources, to the national security or foreign policy or
economy of the United States, the threat declared as a
national emergency (lasting one year unless renewed).
The majority does not disagree. Rather, the majority
concludes that the particular tariffs at issue are not
among the tools IEEPA makes available through the au-
thorization to “regulate . . . importation” of goods,
IEEPA § 203(a)(1)(B) [50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)], even
 66a
when all the required preconditions are met. Maj. Op. at
37-38. We think otherwise. IEEPA’s language, as
confirmed by its history, authorizes tariffs to regulate
importation—a conclusion that the majority does not
squarely reject, but Judge Cunningham and those who
join her opinion do. And IEEPA’s language does not
contain the additional limits on which the majority opin-
ion today relies as the sole basis for its illegality holding.
Maj. Op. at 37-42. IEEPA embodies an eyes-open con-
gressional grant of broad emergency authority in this
foreign-affairs realm, which unsurprisingly extends be-
yond authorities available under non-emergency laws,
and Congress confirmed the understood breadth by ty-
ing IEEPA’s authority to particularly demanding pro-
cedural requirements for keeping Congress informed.
And, contrary to the CIT’s reason for invalidating the
reciprocal tariffs, such emergency authority is not dis-
placed by another statute (section 122 of the Trade Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 1987-88, (1974)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2132)); nor does IEEPA contain
the exclusion of using IEEPA authorities as leverage
that the CIT articulated as the sole basis for holding the
trafficking tariffs unlawful. Finally, the major ques-
tions doctrine does not call for a different statutory con-
clusion. Regarding constitutionality: We conclude
that IEEPA’s authorization of presidential action in this
realm is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority under the Supreme Court’s decisions, which
have upheld broad grants of authority, including tariff-
ing authority, in this foreign-affairs-related area.
For those reasons, on the present state of governing
law, we would reverse the CIT’s summary judgment and
remand for further proceedings on any issues concern-
 67a
ing unlawfulness that plaintiffs have preserved. We
therefore respectfully dissent.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Executive Orders
One group of executive orders at issue began with
Executive Order 14257, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041 (April 2,
2025) (EO ’257), titled Regulating Imports With a Re-
ciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Con-
tribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States
Goods Trade Deficits. That order announced a 10%
tariff on imports from all trading partners (subject to
certain exceptions) effective April 5, 2025, and country-
specific higher tariffs for 57 named countries effective a
few days later.1 EO ’257, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15045 (§§ 2-
3), 15049 (Annex I). That order was followed by sev-
eral orders that largely paused the country-specific por-
tions of the tariffs announced in EO ’257, while for a time
increasing tariffs for the People’s Republic of China.
See CIT Op. at 1363-64. EO ’257 calls the tariffs in this
first group “reciprocal tariffs.” Both the private plain-
tiffs and State plaintiffs challenge these reciprocal tar-
iffs.
The second group of executive orders at issue began
on February 1, 2025, with the issuance of executive or-

1
The private plaintiffs state how the “additional reciprocal tar-
iffs on specific countries” were calculated: They are “based on a
simple ratio of the trade deficit in goods (excluding services) as a
percentage of total U.S. import from the given country.” Private
Appellees’ Brief at 48. That is, for country X, the amount is based
on the difference between the value of U.S. goods entering X and
the value of X goods entering the U.S., divided by the value of X
goods entering the U.S. The government has not disputed that
assertion about the basis for the country-specific tariffs.
 68a
ders that raised tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China
based on the roles (such as deficient interdiction and co-
operation with U.S. law enforcement) those countries
assertedly play in exacerbating opioid and related crime
problems in the United States. Exec. Order No. 14193,
90 Fed. Reg. 9113 (Feb. 1, 2025) (EO ’193) (Canada);
Exec. Order No. 14194, 90 Fed. Reg. 9117 (Feb. 1, 2025)
(EO ’194) (Mexico); Exec. Order No. 14195, 90 Fed. Reg.
9121 (Feb. 1, 2025) (EO ’195) (China). Several follow-
on executive orders included pauses based on seemingly
positive responses from the governments of Canada and
Mexico, increases to the rates based on assertedly inad-
equate or negative responses from the government of
China, and some alterations of the rates and definitions
of the class of subject goods. See CIT Op. at 1362-63
(summarizing executive orders); Maj. Op. at 6-11. Fol-
lowing the CIT, we refer to this second group as in-volving
trafficking tariffs. Only the State plaintiffs challenge
these tariffs.
Both groups of executive orders rely on IEEPA for
authority to impose the tariffs. The executive orders
declare or cite declarations of national emergencies (a
requirement for action under IEEPA), in accordance
with the National Emergencies Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-412, 90 Stat. 1255, 1255-57, §§ 101, 201-202, 301, 401
(1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621-
22, 1631, 1641) (NEA). EO ’257, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15041,
15044; EO ’193, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9113-14; EO ’194, 90
Fed. Reg. at 9117; EO ’195, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9121. The
orders provide that the imposed tariffs will be embodied
in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTSUS), citing § 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2073 (1974) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2483), which directs the Presi-
 69a
dent to “embody in the [HTSUS] . . . Acts affecting
import treatment, and actions thereunder, including
. . . modification . . . or imposition of any rate of
duty or other import restriction.” (Emphases added.)
Congress has declared that the HTSUS, including “[e]ach
modification or change made . . . by the President un-
der authority of law (including section 604 of the Trade
Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2483]),” “shall be considered to
be statutory provisions of law for all purposes.” 19
U.S.C. § 3004(c)(1). Finally, the executive orders cite
3 U.S.C. § 301, which provides for presidential delega-
tion of authorities granted to the President.
The CIT in this case did not hold, and the parties
have not argued to us, that different conclusions regard-
ing lawfulness may apply to some executive orders but
not others within each of the two groups of tariffs. In
particular, all of the challenges to the tariffs presented
to us by the plaintiffs in support of the summary judg-
ment granted in their favor, including the challenges
deemed meritorious by the CIT, are put forth as invali-
dating the initial EO ’257 reciprocal tariffs and the ini-
tial trafficking tariffs (EOs ’193, ’194, and ’195). Like
the CIT, we therefore may and do evaluate the chal-
lenges now before us as they apply to those initial tariffs
(though what occurred in the follow-on orders may have
a bearing on that evaluation). If there are grounds for
separately challenging any of the follow-on orders, such
grounds are not currently presented to us.
B. IEEPA
Emergency declarations and powers, having a long
lineage, drew particular congressional attention in the
early 1970s. In 1972, the Senate created a Special Com-
mittee on the Termination of the National Emergency
 70a
to study such national emergencies, associated legisla-
tive authorities, and the impact of their termination. S.
Res. 9, 93d Cong. (1973); S. Res. 224, 93d Cong. (1973);
S. Res., 94th Cong. (1975); see S. Rep. No. 94-922, at 1-4
(1976). In November 1973, the Senate committee pub-
lished a report cataloguing emergency powers statutes,
S. Rep. No. 93-549 (1973), and in July 1974, the same
Senate committee (with the same makeup but slightly
renamed as the Special Committee on National Emer-
gencies and Delegated Emergency Powers to reflect an
expanded mandate) published a 140-page report after a
year-and-a-half-long study of national emergencies and
delegated emergency powers since the Founders’ era,
Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies
and Delegated Emergency Powers, A Brief History of
Emergency Powers in the United States, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (Comm. Print 1974) (1974 Emergency Powers
Report). See S. Rep. No. 94-922, at 4-5. In the Fore-
word to the 1974 Emergency Powers Report, at v,
Co-Chairs Senators Frank Church and Charles McC.
Mathias, Jr. observed that “[t]he United States has been
in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933,”
and that “especially since the days of the 1933 economic
emergency, it has been Congress’ habit to delegate ex-
tensive emergency authority—which continues even
when the emergency has passed—and not to set a ter-
minating date.” They added: “The United States thus
has on the books at least 470 significant emergency pow-
ers statutes without time limitations delegating to the
Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily
exercised by the Legislature, which affect the lives of
American citizens in a host of all-encompassing ways.”
Id.; see United States v. Yoshida International, Inc.,
526 F.2d 560, 581 n.32 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (Yoshida CCPA)
 71a
(reciting 470 figure and citing 1973 report, S. Rep. No.
93-549).
Among the emergency-power statutes then in place
was the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), Pub. L.
No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (current version at 50
U.S.C. §§ 4301-41), which initially applied only in times
of war but was “expanded to deal with peacetime na-
tional emergencies in 1933.” Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S.
222, 225-26 & n.2 (1984); see Emergency Banking Relief
Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1, 1-2 (1933);
War Powers Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-354, § 301, 55
Stat. 838, 839-40 (1941) (providing TWEA authorities
“[d]uring the time of war or during any other period of
national emergency declared by the President”). Be-
ginning in 1941, TWEA section 5(b)(1) acquired its pre-
sent language and paragraph structure (as relevant
here), authorizing the President, “by means of instruc-
tions, licenses, or otherwise,” to take a variety of related
actions in two categories—one focused on money or its
financial substitutes (subsection A) and the other on
property (subsection B). War Powers Act of 1941, § 301,
55 Stat. at 839-40 (amending section 5(b) of TWEA). Un-
der TWEA, the President may
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transac-
tions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit or pay-
ments between, by, through, or to any banking insti-
tution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melt-
ing, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion,
currency or securities, and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, with-
holding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, im-
portation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercis-
 72a
ing any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any for-
eign country or a national thereof has any interest.
. . .
TWEA § 5(b) [50 U.S.C.§ 4305(b)(1)]. That language
has been part of TWEA ever since. See Regan v. Wald,
468 U.S. at 226 n.2, 227 n.7; 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1976
ed.); 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1) (current version).
In 1976, Congress enacted the NEA. §§ 101, 201-202,
301, 401, 501-02, 90 Stat. at 1255-59, now codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621-22, 1631, 1641, 1651.
The NEA, where applicable, generally terminated
preexisting declarations of emergency, NEA § 101,
50 U.S.C. § 1601, and established new constraints on
new declarations, NEA §§ 201-202, 301, 401, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1621-22, 1631, 1641. One provision governing national
emergencies declared under the NEA requires auto-
matic termination of the declared emergency after one
year unless renewed by the President. NEA § 202(d),
50 U.S.C. § 1622(d). Another provision, as enacted, al-
lowed both for presidential termination by proclamation
and for congressional termination by concurrent resolu-
tion without presidential action or approval, NEA
§ 202(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a); see also NEA § 202(b)-(c),
50 U.S.C. § 1622(b)-(c); but in 1985, after the Supreme
Court held legislative vetoes to be unconstitutional in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983), Congress changed the provision to
refer instead to a joint resolution, which is subject to a
presidential veto, Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 801, 99 Stat. 405, 448 (1985) (amend-
ing 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a)-(c)). Significantly, the NEA ex-
pressly exempted TWEA from its provisions, leaving
 73a
congressional reconsideration of TWEA for another
day. NEA § 502(a)(1), 90 Stat. at 1258 (current version
at 50 U.S.C. § 1651); see S. Rep. No. 94-1168, at 7 (1976)
(explaining that TWEA and a few other emergency laws,
on which the government was relying, were exempted
from the NEA to allow for “further investigation” and
“careful consideration” and future “enactment of per-
manent law where appropriate”).
At the end of 1977, Congress addressed TWEA,
enacting Public Law No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626-29
(1977). In Title I, Congress deleted TWEA’s general
phrase covering any “period of national emergency de-
clared by the President,” thus returning TWEA to its
original more limited application—only to wartime situ-
ations. § 101, 91 Stat. at 1625. In Title II, Congress
enacted IEEPA to give the President what the Supreme
Court has since recognized to be “essentially the same”
set of authorities for peacetime that remained in TWEA
for wartime, Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. at 227-28, using
language “directly drawn” from TWEA, Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671 (1981). 91 Stat. at 1626-29.
We describe the current version of IEEPA, see 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-04, which is identical in all material re-
spects to the version of IEEPA enacted in 1977.
Congress in IEEPA first defined the “situations in
which authorities may be exercised,” 91 Stat. at 1626 (cap-
italization corrected), providing standards not found in
TWEA. Section 202 states as follows (emphases added
to the words chiefly at issue on appeal here):
(a) Any authority granted to the President by section
203 [§ 1702] may be exercised to deal with any unusual
and extraordinary threat, which has its source in
whole or substantial part outside the United States, to
 74a
the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States, if the President declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat.
(b) The authorities granted to the President by sec-
tion 203 [§ 1702] may only be exercised to deal with an
unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to
which a national emergency has been declared for pur-
poses of this chapter and may not be exercised for any
other purpose. Any exercise of such authorities to
deal with any new threat shall be based on a new dec-
laration of national emergency which must be with
respect to such threat.
IEEPA § 202, 91 Stat. at 1626 [50 U.S.C. § 1701] (em-
phases added).
Those provisions may be summarized as imposing
four requirements. For the President to exercise the
authorities set forth in the next section of IEEPA (§ 203,
50 U.S.C. § 1702), (i) there must be an unusual and ex-
traordinary threat to the national security, foreign pol-
icy, or economy of the United States, § 202(a); (ii) the
threat must wholly or substantially have a source out-
side the United States, § 202(a); (iii) the President must
declare a national emergency with respect to that threat
(an emergency that, under the NEA, expires after one
year unless renewed and that also may be terminated by
presidential proclamation or a congressional joint reso-
lution), § 202(a)-(b); and (iv) the authorities must be ex-
ercised to deal with that threat and not for any other
purpose, § 202(b).
Section 203, codified as slightly amended in 50 U.S.C.
§ 1702, contains the “grant of authorities,” 91 Stat. at
1626, referred to in section 202. Using TWEA’s bifur-
cation between (A) finance and (B) property and mate-
 75a
rially identical language, section 203(a)(1) states as fol-
lows (emphases added to the words chiefly at issue on
appeal here):
(a)(1) At the times and to the extent specified in sec-
tion 202 [§ 1701], the President may, under such reg-
ulations as he may prescribe, by means of instruc-
tions, licenses, or otherwise —
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit—
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by,
through, or to any banking institution, to the ex-
tent that such transfers or payments involve any
interest of any foreign country or a national
thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or se-
curities, . . . ;
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an in-
vestigation, 2 regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding,
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transporta-
tion, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or
exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect
to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any in-
terest. . . .

2
The “block during the pendency of an investigation” phrase was
added by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 106, 115 Stat. 272,
277-78 (2001).
 76a
IEEPA § 203, 91 Stat. at 1626 [50 U.S.C. § 1702] (em-
phases added). 3 Thus, of most pertinence here, the
President, by means of instructions, license, or other-
wise, not only may prevent or prohibit but also may reg-
ulate any importation of property of a foreign country
or national. § 203(a)(1)(B) [§ 1702(a)(1)(B)].
Finally, Congress wrote into IEEPA demanding re-
quirements for keeping Congress well informed about
the President’s exercise of IEEPA authority. § 204
[§ 1703]. “[I]n every possible instance,” the President
must consult with Congress before and during the exer-
cise of granted authority. § 204(a) [§ 1703(a)]. Upon
exercising an IEEPA authority, the President must “im-
mediately” transmit a report to Congress “specifying”:
(1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise
of authority;
(2) why the President believes those circumstances
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat,
which has its source in whole or substantial part out-
side the United States, to the national security, for-
eign policy, or economy of the United States;
(3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to
be taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal
with those circumstances;

3
Section 203 contains other provisions not specifically at issue
here: e.g., granting authority to require record-keeping, § 203(a)(2)
[§ 1702(a)(2)], and stating exceptions, including for personal com-
munications and humanitarian donations, § 203(b) [§ 1702(b)].
Section 203 also contains a provision (subparagraph (a)(1)(C)) add -
ed by the USA Patriot Act in 2001 to provide confiscation authority
when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been
attacked. Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 106, 115 Stat. 272, 277-78 (2001).
 77a
(4) why the President believes such actions are nec-
essary to deal with those circumstances; and
(5) any foreign countries with respect to which such
actions are to be taken and why such actions are to
be taken with respect to those countries.
IEEPA § 204(b) [50 U.S.C. § 1703(b)]. And the Presi-
dent must update such reports, detailing changes, every
six months. § 204(c) [§ 1703(c)]. Those requirements
are “supplemental to,” not a substitution for, the NEA’s
congressional-information requirements found in sec-
tion 401 of the NEA, 50 U.S.C. § 1641. IEEPA § 204(d)
[§ 1703(d)].
The majority today (at pp. 18-19, 30) quotes the key
congressional committee report explaining the bill en-
acted as Pub. L. No. 95-223. The pertinent passage of
the report states: “Title II of the bill, the [IEEPA],
confers upon the President a new set of authorities for
use in time of national emergency which are both more
limited in scope than those of section 5(b) [of TWEA]
and subject to various procedural limitations, including
those of the [NEA].” H. R. Rep. No. 95-459, at 2 (1977);
see also id. at 11 (referring to excluding purely domestic
problems). That statement does not refer to narrow-
ing of the set of actions the President may take under
IEEPA. Thus, the new limitation “in scope” (including
the foreign-source requirement) refers at most to the
set of substantive preconditions stated in IEEPA sec-
tion 202, which had no counterpart in TWEA, and to the
requirement of declaring a national emergency subject
to NEA requirements, including the one-year expiration
in the absence of renewal, which were not contained in
TWEA. See IEEPA § 202 [50 U.S.C. § 1701]; NEA
§§ 201-202, 301, 401 [50 U.S.C. §§ 1621-22, 1631, 1641].
 78a
The “procedural limitations” include the demanding
new requirements for close involvement of Congress,
IEEPA § 204 [50 U.S.C. § 1703], not matched by any re-
quirement or limitation found in TWEA. But the spec-
ified types of action that the President may take, set
forth in section 203 of IEEPA, as relevant here, are not
more limited than those specified in TWEA: They are
drawn from and essentially the same as those in TWEA,
as the Supreme Court has twice noted. See Regan v.
Wald, 468 U.S. at 228 (“The authorities granted to the
President by § 203 of IEEPA are essentially the same
as those in § 5(b) of TWEA, but the conditions and pro-
cedures for their exercise are different.” (footnote not-
ing a few differences immaterial to the present case));
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 671. In particular, they
contain the identical authorization of the President to
“regulate . . . importation.” Importantly, it is only
the scope of section 203’s grant of authorities that the
majority relies on today. The House Report language
quoted by the majority thus has no significance for the
only basis of the majority’s ruling.
C. CIT Decision
In the pair of cases now on appeal, the CIT had be-
fore it the private plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg-
ment of unlawfulness of the reciprocal tariffs along with
what it construed as the State plaintiffs’ motion for sum-
mary judgment of unlawfulness of the reciprocal and
trafficking tariffs. CIT Op. at 1364-65. The govern-
ment did not itself file a motion for summary judgment;
in opposing the grant of summary judgment for the plain-
tiffs, the government merely asserted without elabora-
tion in the conclusion of its response (and requested in
its proposed court order) that judgment should be en-
 79a
tered for it. Defs.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim.
Inj. and Summ. J. at 45, V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United
States (CIT No. 25-66), Dkt. No. 32 (Apr. 29, 2025);
Defs.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. and Prelim.
Inj. at 45 (CIT No. 25-77), Dkt. No. 41 (May 16, 2025).
The CIT granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.
Before reaching the merits, the CIT held that it had
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), which provides for
exclusive CIT jurisdiction over “any civil action com-
menced against the United States, its agencies or its of-
ficers, that arise out of any law of the United States
providing for—(A) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(B) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation
of merchandise for reasons other than the raising of rev-
enue. . . . ” CIT Op. at 1365-66. The CIT explained
that the executive orders “made amendments to the
HTSUS,” which (as noted above) has the status of a stat-
ute. CIT Op. at 1366.4 The CIT also held that at least
one private plaintiff and at least one State plaintiff had
constitutional standing, because, through declarations,
they had sufficiently stated that they would be harmed
by the challenged tariffs, whether by paying the in-
creased amounts as importers or, as purchasers of im-
ported goods covered by the tariffs, by paying higher
prices on or encountering difficulties in obtaining such
goods. Id. at 1367-69.

4
As the majority opinion notes (at 23 n.10), the CIT, in a ruling
not challenged on appeal, concluded that the President “must be
dismissed from the two cases before the court,” but the executive
orders are properly reviewed in this suit. CIT Op. at 1366-67 (ci-
tations omitted).
 80a
On the merits, the CIT first held that the reciprocal
tariffs are unauthorized by IEEPA, ultimately conclud-
ing that the IEEPA authority relevant to this case had
been displaced by another statute (section 122 of the
Trade Act of 1974). Id. at 1370-76. The court began
with an explanation that the constitutional nondelega-
tion doctrine would not permit a congressional delega-
tion of “unlimited” tariff authority to the President
and that IEEPA’s language authorizing the President
to “regulate . . . importation,” § 203(a)(1)(B)
[§ 1702(a)(1)(B)], does not authorize “unlimited tariffs.”
CIT Op. at 1371-73. But the CIT did not deny, and
could not have denied, that IEEPA by its terms, quoted
and summarized above, contains limits—including not
only a declaration of national emergency (expiring after
a year, unless renewed, and subject to legislative over-
ride) and the procedural limitations of section 204 of
IEEPA, but the substantive preconditions of section 202
of IEEPA, requiring that any authority is being exer-
cised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat,
from a foreign source, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States. See supra at
pp. 11-12. And the CIT did not hold that such limits
were insufficient to pass muster under the nondelega-
tion doctrine and did not ultimately hold that reciprocal
tariffs run afoul of these statutory limits.
Thus, the CIT did not hold that the reciprocal tariffs
fail to meet the conditions set in section 202 of IEEPA,
including the requirements of a national-emergency
declaration and the requirement that IEEPA authority
be “exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordi-
nary threat” to national security, foreign policy, or the
economy emanating in whole or substantial part from
abroad, and for no other purpose. § 202(a) [§ 1701(a)].
 81a
The CIT likewise did not hold, as plaintiffs contended,
that tariff-imposition authority is simply outside the
power to “regulate . . . importation” granted by sec-
tion 203 [§ 1702]. The CIT recognized that this court’s
predecessor, in Yoshida CCPA at 573, reached the op-
posite conclusion in holding that TWEA’s “regulate
. . . importation” language includes the power to im-
pose tariffs and upholding under that language the spe-
cific tariffs at issue in Yoshida CCPA—the tariff sur-
charge imposed, on August 14, 1971, by Presidential
Proclamation No. 4074, Imposition of Supplemental
Duty for Balance of Payments, 85 Stat. 926 (1971 Presi-
dential Proclamation). CIT Op. at 1372 (citing Yoshida
CCPA at 573, 576-78).
Instead, the CIT looked outside IEEPA to identify a
limit that the CIT concluded precluded the President’s
imposition of the reciprocal tariffs under IEEPA. Spe-
cifically, the CIT held that section 122 of the Trade Act
of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2132] concerning expressly specified
balance-of-payments problems, is the exclusive presi-
dential tariff authority for addressing the category of
problems to which the reciprocal tariffs are directed,
displacing any authority that would otherwise be found
in IEEPA. CIT Op. at 1374-76; see also id. at 1375
(“Section 122 removes the President’s power to impose
remedies in response to balance-of-payments deficits,
and specifically trade deficits, from the broader powers
granted to a president during a national emergency un-
der IEEPA by establishing an explicit non-emergency
statute with greater limitations.” (footnote and cita-
tions omitted)). The CIT seems to have categorically
concluded that IEEPA could not be used to impose any
tariffs responding to “balance-of-payments deficits.”
Id. at 1374 (“Congress cabined the President’s authority
 82a
to impose tariffs in response to balance-of-payments
deficits to non-emergency legislation[.]” (section head-
ing; capitalization generally deleted)). Although the
CIT noted that section 122 sets caps of 15% and 150 days
on certain surcharges, id., caps that EO ’257 exceeds,
the CIT held the reciprocal tariffs invalid in full, not just
insofar as they exceed 15% in amount or 150 days in du-
ration, id. at 1376.
The CIT next held that IEEPA does not authorize
the trafficking tariffs. In contrast to what it concluded
regarding the reciprocal tariffs, the CIT did not con-
clude that authority under IEEPA’s section 203 for the
trafficking tariffs had been displaced by another statute,
and it did not otherwise hold that the trafficking tariffs
were outside section 203’s grant of authority to “regu-
late . . . importation.” § 203 [§ 1702]. Rather, the
CIT reasoned that the trafficking tariffs fall outside sec-
tion 202’s requirement for presidential action (identified
supra at p. 12 as requirement (iv))—that the authority
be “exercised to deal with” the stated unusual and ex-
traordinary threat and not “for any other purpose,”
§ 202(b) [§ 1701(b)]. Id. at 1376-83. As an initial mat-
ter, the CIT held that the political question doctrine
does not preclude judicial review for compliance with
that condition, but the court recognized the principle re-
quiring “ ‘considerable deference’ ” in trade policy, as it
is an aspect of foreign affairs. CIT Op. at 1377-80 (quot-
ing Federal Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Here, the CIT then held, the
trafficking tariffs fail to meet section 202’s “exercised to
deal with” condition—not because the President failed
to issue an on-point declaration of a national emergency
(not in dispute here) or because the opioid and related
crime problems are not properly deemed to be an unu-
 83a
sual and extraordinary threat within IEEPA’s terms
(also not in dispute or questioned by the majority), but
because the tariffs do not “deal with” that threat. Id.
at 1380-82. In the CIT’s view, the “deal with” language
“connotes a direct link between an act and the problem
it purports to address.” Id. at 1381. The tariffs lack
such a direct link, the CIT ruled, because (1) the tariffs
are imposed on “all articles,” including many imported
articles far removed from the opioid and crime problems
that constitute the threat, and (2) actions that simply ex-
ercise leverage over the foreign government to solve
those problems cannot meet the CIT’s articulated
direct-link requirement. Id. at 1381-82. The CIT
therefore held the trafficking tariffs to be unlawful.
The government timely appealed to bring the CIT’s
judgment within our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(5).
II. DISCUSSION
Like the majority today, we take no issue with the
CIT’s holdings that it had jurisdiction and that enough
plaintiffs had constitutional standing in order for the
lawfulness of the reciprocal and trafficking tariffs to be
adjudicated. We also agree with the majority that, if
the tariffs are unlawful, a remand is needed regarding
remedy. But we disagree with the CIT’s holding, and
the majority’s conclusion today, that plaintiffs are enti-
tled to summary judgment that the tariffs are unlawful.
The CIT reasoned that IEEPA does not and consti-
tutionally could not grant “unlimited” tariff authority.
CIT Op. at 1370-74; see also Maj. Op. at 6, 18, 30, 33, 41
(“unlimited”); id. at 40-41 (“unbounded”). But that
reasoning, by its terms, does not identify why these par-
ticular tariffs constitute an exercise of “unlimited” tariff
 84a
authority or are otherwise unauthorized by IEEPA
given its statutory limits. It bears repeating that
IEEPA’s section 202 [§ 1701] requires that (i) there is
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national se-
curity, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;
(ii) the threat wholly or substantially has a source out-
side the United States; (iii) the President declares a na-
tional emergency with respect to that threat (a declara-
tion that expires after one year unless renewed and is
subject to legislative override); and (iv) the authorities
granted in section 203 [§ 1702] are exercised to deal with
that threat and not for any other purpose. See supra
at pp. 11-12. The section 203 authority invoked here is
the authority to regulate importation, by means of in-
structions, licenses, or otherwise, authority that Yo-
shida CCPA held, when considering the identical lan-
guage in TWEA, authorizes the imposition of tariffs.
See supra at pp. 17-18. We are thus presented with
statutory and constitutional questions: (1) whether the
reciprocal and trafficking tariffs are unauthorized by
sections 202 or 203, either because they exceed limits set
by those provisions or because those provisions have
been displaced by another statute in a respect that gov-
erns the present tariffs, and (2) if the tariffs are author-
ized by IEEPA, whether sections 202 and 203 are un-
constitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.
We follow the CIT in addressing the reciprocal tariffs
first and then the trafficking tariffs. We discuss all the
legal issues common to the groups of tariffs in discuss-
ing the reciprocal tariffs. Only one issue remains for
separate discussion—the “exercised to deal with” limi-
tation of section 202 [§ 1701]—when we turn to the traf-
ficking tariffs.
 85a
A. Reciprocal Tariffs
For the invalidity of the reciprocal tariffs, the private
and State plaintiffs mostly present statutory arguments.
Regarding non-compliance with IEEPA’s section 202,
they make only one argument: that the problem iden-
tified by EO ’257 is not unusual or extraordinary. They
do not dispute that the reciprocal tariffs otherwise sat-
isfy the other three requirements of section 202. Re-
garding section 203, plaintiffs argue that the “regulate
. . . importation” authority does not encompass tariffs
at all, an argument adopted by Judge Cunningham’s
separate opinion but not adopted by today’s majority
opinion. Plaintiffs may be suggesting—and in any event,
today’s court majority concludes—that the “regulate”
authority contains certain (undefined temporal and/or
duty amount and/or scope) limits that preclude the tar-
iffs here at issue. Turning away from IEEPA itself,
plaintiffs argue, as the CIT ruled, that any IEEPA au-
thority for the reciprocal tariffs is displaced by section
122 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2132]. They
also suggest that, even if ordinary statutory analysis
does not render the reciprocal tariffs unlawful, the ma-
jor questions doctrine supports such a holding. Fi-
nally, plaintiffs argue that, if IEEPA authorizes the re-
ciprocal tariffs and is not displaced here by section 122,
then IEEPA is unconstitutional under the nondelega-
tion doctrine.
1. IEEPA § 202: Unusual and Extraordinary Threat
We begin with IEEPA’s section 202 [§ 1701], about
which plaintiffs make just one argument concerning the
reciprocal tariffs—that there is no “unusual and ex-
traordinary threat” to the national security, foreign pol-
icy, or economy of the United States (and hence cannot
 86a
be an “emergency,” which adds nothing to this argu-
ment). Private Appellees Brief at 39-42; State Appel-
lees Brief at 25-29. They do not assert a failure to meet
section 202’s other requirements: They do not deny
that there is a qualifying foreign source of the threat or
a qualifying declaration of national emergency or that
the authorities are being exercised “to deal with” the
threat without an extraneous purpose. The CIT did
not adopt plaintiffs’ argument that the reciprocal tariffs
were unauthorized because there is no “unusual and ex-
traordinary threat”; nor does this court’s majority.
We readily conclude that plaintiffs have not shown on
summary judgment that the reciprocal tariffs are con-
trary to the “unusual and extraordinary threat” statu-
tory limit.
a. Judicial Review
As an initial matter, we note that the unusual-and-
extraordinary-threat requirement on its face involves
factual and policy judgments to which the courts are
obliged to give considerable deference. The President
is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, in-
cluding its various process and explanation require-
ments for agency decision-making. See Dalton v. Spec-
ter, 511 U.S. 462, 469 (1994); Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992); 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(b)(1), 704.
And when presidential determinations are reviewable,
the Supreme Court and our court have repeatedly
stressed that judicial review of the Presi-dent’s deci-
sions, at least in spheres of national security and foreign
affairs, is very tightly limited. See, e.g., Trump v. Ha-
waii, 585 U.S. 667, 686 (2018); Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010); Regan v. Wald, 468
U.S. at 242; Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981); Ha-
 87a
risiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1950);
United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 379-
80 (1940); see also, e.g., USP Holdings, Inc. v. United
States, 36 F.4th 1359, 1365-66, 1366 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2022);
Motions Systems Corp. v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356, 1359-62
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc); Maple Leaf Fish Co. v.
United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Flors-
heim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 796 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).5
Like the CIT, we are not prepared to say that com-
pliance with the unusual-and-extraordinary-threat re-
quirement is wholly unreviewable, as a political question
or otherwise. See CIT Op. at 1377-80. The well-
established deference standard just noted provides very
strong protection of presidential discretion. The prin-
ciple that “[h]ow the President chooses to exercise the
discretion Congress has granted him is not a matter for
[judicial] review,” Dalton, 511 U.S. at 476, however, does
not mean that there is no such thing as action identifia-
ble as outside the statutory or other bounds on presi-

5
The court in Maple Leaf said that a court may “interpose” when
there has been “a significant procedural violation, or action outside
delegated authority” and, also, when there has been “a clear mis-
construction of the governing statute.” 762 F.2d at 89. The
“clear misconstruction” formulation, to the extent it requires that
any actionable misconstruction of the governing statute be “clear,”
raises an issue of incompatibility with Loper Bright Enterprises v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). No such incompatibility exists if
the Maple Leaf formulation is understood as simply stating an in-
terpretive principle, favoring broad readings of statutes in the
area, see infra at pp. 36-37, for the courts to apply in making their
own determinations of the proper statutory interpretation. We
do not rely on any deference-in-interpretation requirement, so
need not explore the Loper Bright question about the Maple Leaf
formulation.
 88a
dential discretion. Thus, we are not prepared to say
that the strong protection of presidential discretion
wholly precludes a court from finding an abuse of dis-
cretion regarding the IEEPA substantive boundary.
In this context, such judicial review would mean judicial
identification of an action as crossing the statutory
boundary, after scrupulous and humble recognition of
all the predictive, evaluative, and other judgment-call-
based elements that, though people may passionately
hold contrary views, are not subject to objective proof of
error. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission
v. Consumers’ Research, 606 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 2482,
2515-16 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“To elabo-
rate: Although the nondelegation doctrine’s intelligi-
ble principle test has historically not packed much
punch in constricting Congress’s authority to delegate,
the President generally must act within the confines set
by Congress when he implements legislation. So the
President’s actions when implementing legislation are
constrained—namely, by the scope of Congress’s au-
thorization and by any restrictions set forth in that stat-
utory text. See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Rai-
mondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394-96, 404 (2024).”).
But we need not and should not undertake to elabo-
rate on how to identify such situations unless tackling
that task is necessary, and it is not necessary in this
case.
b. Executive Order 14257
Plaintiffs argue that the reciprocal tariffs violate the
unusual-and-extraordinary-threat requirement because
the goods trade deficit is not “unusual” or “extraordi-
nary.” In so arguing they necessarily presuppose that
the requirement embodies a principle that is intelligible,
 89a
at least to the extent that a violation of that principle is
ascertainable, and they do not ask that we depart from
the undeniably strong respect for presidential discre-
tion embodied in the case law. In the present matter,
plaintiffs’ challenge to the President’s unusual-and-
extraordinary-threat determination can and should be
rejected without further exploration of the scope of re-
view. Plaintiffs’ argument suffers from a decisive
defect that is independent of the deference issue:
Their challenge is misfocused as it does not address the
actual bases provided in EO ’257 for the unusual-and-
extraordinary threat determination and, thus, the pres-
idential action at issue.
Plaintiffs assert only that trade deficits cannot be an
“unusual and extraordinary threat” because they are old
rather than unusual. Private Appellees Brief at 39-42;
State Appellees Brief at 25-29. But that argument dis-
regards the President’s finding in EO ’257 of a recent
notable increase in aggregate goods trade deficits gen-
erally and for agricultural trade deficits in particular.
See 90 Fed. Reg. at 15042 (stating that “the trading re-
lationship between the United States and its trading
partners has become highly unbalanced, particularly in
recent years”); id. at 15044 (stating that agricultural
surplus as of January 2021 “has vanished” and “been re-
placed by a projected $49 billion annual agricultural
trade deficit” and that the annual U.S. goods trade defi-
cits “have grown by over 40 percent in the past 5 years
alone”). And that is not the only mismatch between
plaintiffs’ challenge and the actual premise of EO ’257.
A group of economists, appearing as amici in support
of plaintiffs, attempts to bolster the argument that large
and persistent trade deficits are not unusual or extraor-
 90a
dinary by making a fundamental point: “Both aggre-
gate and bilateral trade deficits are generally harm-
less.” Amended Brief Amici Curiae of Economists in
Support of Affirmance at 7; see also id. at 4 (noting
global prevalence of persistent national trade deficits).
It is critical, therefore, to identify the particular kinds
of harmful effects when asserting that a goods trade def-
icit is in fact harmful. EO ’257 does so. And plaintiffs’
argument does not address those effects.
EO ’257 does not rest on a premise that such goods
trade deficits (i.e., more imports than exports of goods,
suitably measured), whether in the aggregate with all
U.S. trading partners or bilaterally with specific coun-
tries, even when large and persistent, are inherently
(i.e., always, per se, or necessarily) threatening to na-
tional security or the economy. Instead, it targets the
“unusual and extraordinary threat” of particular goods
trade deficits (and foreign government’s policies that
lead to goods trade deficits) that cause a number of spec-
ified negative effects (consequences), such as domestic
manufacturing deficiencies, that EO ’257 asserts follow
from the recent and current goods trade deficits, even if
they would not follow from all goods trade deficits (or
even all prolonged ones). EO ’257 relies on those prob-
lems as making the “underlying conditions, including a
lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships,
disparate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers, and U.S.
trading partners’ economic policies”—“as indicated by
large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits”—
into “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the na-
tional security and economy of the United States.” 90
Fed. Reg. at 15041. About that group of negative ef-
fects, the ones actually detailed in and relied on by EO
’257, plaintiffs make no case at all: They say nothing to
 91a
indicate that those effects are usual or ordinary, much
less to allow such a determination on their motions for
summary judgment.
The particular problems recited in EO ’257 to estab-
lish the statutorily required unusual-and-extraordinary
threat are not focused on a “monetary crisis,” CIT Op.
at 1374, of the sort that lay behind the 1971 Presidential
Proclamation at issue in Yoshida CCPA and that gave
rise to Congress’s enactment of section 122 of the Trade
Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2132], see S. Rep. No. 93-1298,
at 87-89 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 27-31 (1973).
Rather, the problems identified in EO ’257 that the
present-day goods trade deficits “have led to” are fo-
cused on deficiencies in “domestic production” (includ-
ing deficiencies in “the U.S. manufacturing and defense-
industrial base” and to the nation’s making of agricul-
tural products) wholly or partly caused by the purchase
of imported goods made abroad in place of domestically
made goods, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15043. EO ’257 early on
states:
Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits
have led to the hollowing out of our manufacturing
base; inhibited our ability to scale advanced domestic
manufacturing capacity; undermined critical supply
chains; and rendered our defense-industrial base de-
pendent on foreign adversaries.
Id. at 15041. EO ’257 adds: “A nation’s ability to pro-
duce domestically is the bedrock of its national and eco-
nomic security.” Id. at 15043. And it elaborates fur-
ther:
Permitting [structural] asymmetries [between the
United States and its trading partners] to continue is
not sustainable in today’s economic and geopolitical
 92a
environment because of the effect they have on U.S.
domestic production. . . .
Both my first Administration in 2017, and the Biden
Administration in 2022, recognized that increasing
domestic manufacturing is critical to U.S. national se-
curity. . . .
U.S. production [particularly in certain advanced in-
dustrial sectors] could be permanently weakened.
. . .
[B]ecause the United States has supplied so much
military equipment to other countries, U.S. stock-
piles of military goods are too low to be compatible
with U.S. national defense interests. . . .
In recent years, the vulnerability of the U.S. economy
in this respect was exposed both during the COVID-
19 pandemic, when Americans had difficulty access-
ing essential products, as well as when the Houthi re-
bels later began attacking cargo ships in the Middle
East. . . .
The decline of U.S. manufacturing capacity threatens
the U.S. economy in other ways, including through
the loss of manufacturing jobs. . . .
Just as a nation that does not produce manufactured
products cannot maintain the industrial base it needs
for national security, neither can a nation long sur-
vive if it cannot produce its own food. . . .
Such impact upon military readiness and our national
security posture is especially acute with the recent
rise in armed conflicts abroad.
Id. at 15043-44 (Preamble); id. at 15045 (§ 1).
 93a
Plaintiffs do not assert that they are entitled to sum-
mary judgment because EO ’257 is wrong in its findings
about significant increases in the goods trade deficit in
recent years, generally and, in particular, e.g., for agri-
cultural products. Nor do they deny that long-stand-
ing trade-related conditions might, like conditions that
lead to bankruptcy, build gradually, but then suddenly
reach a crisis level. And they simply say nothing to
show, much less to support summary judgment in their
favor, that the litany of negative effects of present-day
trade deficits enumerated in EO ’257 are usual or ordi-
nary. Thus, they have made no case for entitlement to
summary judgment that there is no unusual and ex-
traordinary threat addressed by the reciprocal tariffs
or, accordingly, that the reciprocal tariffs are unauthor-
ized by section 202.
2. IEEPA § 203
Regarding IEEPA’s section 203 [50 U.S.C. § 1702],
plaintiffs argue that all the tariffs at issue (reciprocal
and trafficking) fall outside the set of authorities granted
to the President in that section. Private Appellees
Brief at 19-26; see, e.g., State Appellees Brief at 11-17,
20, 32-51. We reject the several arguments they pre-
sent for limiting the broad scope of section 203’s author-
ization to “regulate . . . importation.” The CIT did
not rely on such arguments or so hold. Instead, the
CIT held, for the reciprocal tariffs, that IEEPA is dis-
placed by another statute (section 122 of the Trade Act
of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2132]), as discussed further infra in
Section II.A.3. Today’s majority, however, holds that
“regulate . . . importation” does not authorize the
tariffs at issue here. The majority opinion does not
deny that some tariffs might be authorized, while Judge
 94a
Cunningham’s opinion does; the majority holds that sec-
tion 203 of IEEPA includes some temporal and/or duty
amount and/or scope limits that, in turn, the present tar-
iffs violate. We disagree with the no-tariffs and not-
these-tariffs positions concerning the scope of section
203 of IEEPA.
a. Coverage of Tariffs by “Regulate . . .
Importation”
Plaintiffs argue that “regulat[ing] . . . importa-
tion” does not include imposing tariffs. Private Appel-
lees Brief at 20-25; State Appellees Brief at 32-51. We
disagree.
Definitions of the term “regulate” provide broad un-
derstandings of the term’s ordinary meaning: to “fix, es-
tablish or control; to adjust by rule, method, or estab-
lished mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject
to governing principles or laws.” Black’s Law Diction-
ary 1156 (5th ed. 1979); see also Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 1913 (1976) (defining “regu-
late” as “to govern or direct according to rule” and “to
bring under the control of law or constituted authority”).
As the government states in its opening brief, “[i]mpos-
ing tariffs on imports is clearly a way of ‘control[ling]’
imports (Black’s); ‘govern[ing] or direct[ing]’ them ‘ac-
cording to rule’ (Webster’s); ‘adjust[ing]’ them ‘by rule,
method, or established mode’ (Black’s); or, more gener-
ally ‘subject[ing]’ them ‘to governing principles or laws’
(Black’s).” Government’s Opening Brief at 32 (first al-
teration added).
This straightforward result is supported by the
longstanding judicial recognition that taxes are often a
species of regulation—specifically aimed at altering con-
duct. See, e.g., CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue
 95a
Service, 593 U.S. 209, 224 (2021) (a “regulatory tax” is a
“tax designed mainly to influence private conduct”); Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 567 (2012) (NFIB) (explaining that “taxes
that seek to influence conduct are nothing new” and that
“[s]ome of our earliest federal taxes sought to deter the
purchase of imported manufactured goods in order to
foster the growth of domestic industry”); Sunshine An-
thracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940) (ex-
plaining that a tax can in “purpose and effect” be “pri-
marily a sanction to enforce . . . regulatory provi-
sions” of a statute and that “[t]he power of taxation,
granted to Congress by the Constitution, may be uti-
lized as a sanction for the exercise of another power
which is granted it”); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300
U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (explaining that “[e]very tax is in
some measure regulatory”). With respect to imports
particularly, the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden ex-
plained long ago that “duties may often be, and in fact
often are, imposed on tonnage, with a view to the regu-
lation of commerce” and that, indeed, “[t]he right to reg-
ulate commerce, even by the imposition of duties, was
not controverted” by the Framers. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
202 (1824). 6 And our predecessor court, in Yoshida

6
The Court made this observation in rejecting respondent Og-
den’s argument that New York could ban competing interstate-wa-
terway boat services even when offered by persons given a federal
license under a federal statute. Ogden argued that the commerce
power of Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, cl. 3, is not preemptive (to use modern lan-
guage) because the separately stated power to impose duties,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, was not generally preemptive. Gibbons, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) at 201-02. The premise as to import duties, the Court
agreed, was supported by the fact that the Framers saw fit to in-
clude a separate provision barring States from imposing import du-
ties. See id.; Art. I, § 10, cl. 2. But Ogden’s proposed conclusion
 96a
CCPA, observed: “Though the power to tax and to lay
duties upon imports and the power to regulate com-
merce are distinct, it is well established that the first
power can be employed in the exercise of the second.”
Yoshida CCPA, 526 F.2d at 575 n.20 (citing not only the
above-quoted page of Gibbons, but also McGoldrick v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414, 428 (1940); Board of Trus-
tees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 58 (1933); and J.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 411
(1928)).
Context is always relevant to interpretation, and in
the context of IEEPA’s section 203, the natural reading
of “regulate” in the phrase “regulate . . . importa-

did not follow, the Court held, because duties could be both regula-
tory and aimed to raising revenue, and the Framers banned all
such duties, as “a prudent precaution,” to avoid the need for sifting.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 202. The § 10, cl. 2 ban therefore
did not imply that, for all regulatory measures, action by Congress
under the Commerce Clause was not preemptive.
It is the Court’s recognition of the common understanding that
duties are often a form of “regulation” that is key for present pur-
poses, not that Article I states both a taxing power and the com-
merce power. The Court held in NFIB that the imposition at issue,
though plainly regulatory, was a valid exercise of the taxing power,
567 U.S. at 567, but was not a valid exercise of the commerce power
only because its subject was not commercial activity but inactivity,
id. at 549-58. Relatedly, that one object of “regulation” is “expor-
tation” in IEEPA § 203(a)(1)(B) [§ 1702(a)(1)(B)], and one type of
regulation may be independently unconstitutional for exported ar-
ticles, Art. I, § 9, cl. 5, does not in our view undermine the strong
reasons that “regulate” includes tariffs in IEEPA § 203(a)(1)(B) at
least where no independent constitutional bar exists. Cf. Depart-
ment of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v.
Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 61 (2024) (declining to “disregard the statute’s
clear terms” just because there may be “a valid constitutional de-
fense” to some applications).
 97a
tion” is one that embraces tariffs. The provision includes
authorization for the extreme tools of “prohibit[ing]”
and “prevent[ing]” importation (and a host of related
tools). § 203(a)(1)(B) [50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)]. Tax-
ing through tariffs is just a less extreme, more flexible
tool for pursuing the same objective of controlling the
amount or price of imports that, after all, could be
barred altogether. The context also includes IEEPA’s
positive emphasis on breadth when it gives the Presi-
dent authority to act by “means of instructions, licenses,
or otherwise.” § 203(a)(1) [§ 1702(a)(1)] (emphasis add-
ed); see also Yoshida CCPA, 526 F.2d at 576 (“The words
‘or otherwise,’ if they mean anything, must mean that
Congress authorized the use of means which, though not
identified, were different from, and additional to, ‘in-
structions’ and ‘licenses.’ ”).
We know of no persuasive basis for thinking that
Congress wanted to deny the President use of the tar-
iffing tool, a common regulatory tool, to address the
threats covered by IEEPA. Indeed, a contrary conclu-
sion about the IEEPA language, “regulate . . . im-
portation,” would seem to deny the President tariffing
authority even in a time of war, because the language of
TWEA is identical. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized “the broad authority of the Executive when acting
under th[e] congressional grant of power” provided in
section 203. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 672. Given
the surrounding terms and the evident goal, i.e., given
this linguistic and substantive context, there is every
reason to understand “regulate” to include, not exclude,
 98a
such an ordinary tool of import regulation as tariffing. 7
Although a similar conclusion presumably would not be
justified for some or many other uses of the word “reg-
ulate” in the United States Code, see Maj. Op. at 29-30,
that fact does not weaken the conclusion that “regulate”
as used in the IEEPA statute includes tariffs.
Congressional usage elsewhere is consistent with
this conclusion. For example, ever since 1934, when it
added section 350 to the Tariff Act of 1930, Congress has
expressly recognized that import duties are a form of
“regulation” of imports. Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, § 1, 48 Stat. 943, 943-44
(1934) (defining “duties and other import restrictions”
as including “(1) rate and form of import duties and clas-
sification of articles, and (2) limitations, prohibitions,
charges, and exactions other than duties, imposed on im-
portation or imposed for regulation of imports”) (cur-
rent version at 19 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(1)(A)-(B)). Similarly,
in section 122(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, Congress ex-
pressly used the phrase “restrict imports” to cover du-
ties. 88 Stat. at 1978 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a))
(emphasis added); see also, e.g., S. Rep. No. 93-1298, at
24 (referring to an “import surcharge” as a type of
“[i]mport restriction[]” and discussing “a temporary re-
duction in the rate of duty . . . or a temporary sus-
pension of other import restrictions”); id. at 69 (discuss-
ing “existing duties or other import restrictions”). These
usages confirm the natural meaning of “regulate” as in-
cluding tariffs when the object is to control imports.

7
IEEPA enumerates exceptions to the President’s authority un-
der section 203. IEEPA § 203(b) [§ 1702(b)]. Tariff authority is
not included in the enumerated exceptions.
 99a
The majority notes that a variety of statutes use “tar-
iff ” or “duty” or the like when conveying presidential
authority, whereas IEEPA does not. Maj. Op. at 27.
But as the Supreme Court recently reiterated, “Con-
gress need not state its intent in any particular way, or
use magic words,” even to waive sovereign immunity,
explaining that (on the particular issue presented) “even
if Congress typically confers the authority to settle
claims by use of the term ‘settle,’ that standard practice
does not bind legislators to specific words or formula-
tions.” Soto v. United States, 605 U.S. 360, 371 (2025)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Context can
establish the authorization without a particular word.
Id. at 368. Here, the usage in the other cited statutes
is hardly surprising, because Congress in those statutes
was overwhelmingly focused on tariff issues. In con-
trast, Congress in IEEPA (as in TWEA) was focused on
the subject of emergencies and giving plainly broad emer-
gency authority regarding foreign property. In this
context, breadth is the proper lesson, without need for a
listing of specific common tools for achieving the evident
legislative objective.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Energy Ad-
ministration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc. supports this in-
terpretation. 426 U.S. 548 (1976). The Court there
held that the language “adjust imports” in section 232(b)
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794,
76 Stat. 872, 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1862(b)-(c)), is not confined to “imposition of quotas”
but includes “imposition of monetary exactions—i.e., li-
cense fees and duties.” Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 561-62.
The Court readily deemed such exactions to be within
the natural scope of the language as a means of “ad-
just[ing] imports,” id. at 561, though section 232(b)
 100a
makes no reference to “duties.” And it did so without
any reliance on or even mention of the fact that section
232(a) [§ 1862(a)] refers to duties in preserving the ef-
fects of certain earlier laws. 8 The Court also explained
that “limiting the President to the use of quotas would
effectively and artificially prohibit him from directly
dealing with some of the very problems against which
§ 232(b) is directed.” 426 U.S. at 561-62. So too here:
An exclusion of tariffs, a common tool of import regula-
tion, would be an “artificial” prohibition not grounded in

8
Nor did the Court rely on any heading or title. Section 232 as
enacted and amended contains no heading except the section title
“Safeguarding National Security.” See Trade Expansion Act of
1962, 76 Stat. at 877; Trade Act of 1974, tit. 2, § 127, 88 Stat. at
1993; Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96 -
223, § 402, 94 Stat. 229, 301 (1980); Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1501, 102 Stat. 1107,
1257-60 (1988). Congress, while recognizing that the codifiers
placed section 232 in Title 19 of the United States Code, see, e.g.,
Trade Act of 1974, tit. 2, § 127, 88 Stat. at 1993, has not enacted
Title 19 into positive law.
The majority suggests that the Court in Algonquin found du-
ties to be within “adjust imports” because it found that the statute’s
concern with national security is related only to imports’ “use,”
“availability,” and “character” and is “not related to quantity of im-
ports.” Maj. Op. at 29 (citing 526 U.S. at 561 (quoting 104 Cong.
Rec. 10542-43 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Mills))). The cited passage
notes “Congress’ judgment that ‘not only the quantity of imports
. . . but also the circumstances under which they are coming in:
their use, their availability, their character’ could endanger the na-
tional security.” Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 561 (quoting 104 Cong.
Rec. 10542-43 (remarks of Rep. Mills)) (emphases added). This
statement of the breadth of congressional concern only reinforced
the natural meaning of “adjust imports” and confirmed that deny-
ing duty coverage would “artificially prohibit” the President from
dealing with the congressionally identified problem. Id. at 562.
 101a
the natural scope of the language of IEEPA’s section
203.
Such a limitation would be especially out of place in
an emergency statute like IEEPA, for which restricting
“flexibility required to meet problems” is particularly
unlikely. Yoshida CCPA, 526 F.2d at 573; id. at 578 &
n.28 (stating that “Congress necessarily intended a
grant of power adequate to deal with national emergen-
cies” and referring to “the flexibility imperative inher-
ent in the delegation of emergency powers”). And it
would be out of keeping with “the principle that statutes
granting the President authority to act in matters touch-
ing on foreign affairs are to be broadly construed,” B-
West Imports, Inc. v. United States, 75 F.3d 633, 636
(Fed. Cir. 1996), consistent with the history of, and rec-
ognized reasons for, broad delegations to the President
involving such matters, see, e.g., Chicago & Southern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109-
10 (1948) (citing Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States,
288 U.S. 294 (1933), and George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S.
371); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936); Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 73, 93 (1874).
The background of IEEPA powerfully supports this
straightforward conclusion from the text. The Su-
preme Court has explained that the “pertinent language
of [section] 1702[, IEEPA’s section 203,]” was “directly
drawn” from section 5(b) of TWEA. Dames & Moore,
453 U.S. at 671; see Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. at 228 (ex-
plaining that IEEPA granted the President authorities
that “are essentially the same as those in [section] 5(b)
of TWEA”). This is self-evident from a comparison of
the language of IEEPA and TWEA, set forth supra at
 102a
p. 9 (TWEA section 5(b)) and pp. 12-13 (IEEPA section
203). Importantly, in late 1975, our predecessor court,
with generally exclusive appeals-court-level jurisdiction
in the area, see North American Cement Corp. v. Ander-
son, 284 F.2d 591, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1960), held in Yoshida
CCPA that the TWEA “regulate” language does em-
brace the authority to impose tariffs as a tool of regula-
tion, 526 F.2d at 576 (concluding that “regulation impor-
tation” encompasses “imposing an import surcharge”).
The Yoshida CCPA decision was known to those in
Congress who were working on the emergency-law issue
and what to do about TWEA particularly. See, e.g.,
Emergency Controls on International Economic Trans-
actions, Hearings on H. R. 1560 and H. R. 2382 and
Markup of the Trading with the Enemy Reform Legis-
lation before the Subcommittee on International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on In-
ternational Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 9, 18, 223
n.6 (1977) (commenting on the Yoshida CCPA decision,
and its holding that TWEA includes the imposition of
duties, in hearings covering the markup of TWEA re-
form legislation). In late 1977, Congress enacted
IEEPA by borrowing the very language from TWEA
that Yoshida CCPA had construed to include tariffs.
Such an enactment after our predecessor court had so
ruled is itself significant confirmation of the tariff-in-
cluding interpretation of “regulate . . . importa-
tion,” which is the most natural meaning. Cf. Helsinn
Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,
586 U.S. 123, 131 (2019) (noting congressional reenact-
ment of pertinent statutory language after Federal Cir-
cuit confirmed the meaning of the language suggested
by Supreme Court authorities). Even more pointed
confirmation comes from the fact that the key commit-
 103a
tee report explaining the legislation that enacted
IEEPA discusses Yoshida CCPA and indicates no disa-
greement or disapproval, H. R. Rep. No. 95-459, at 5 (ac-
knowledging that Yoshida CCPA concluded that TWEA
“authorized imposition of duties”), and the Senate there-
after neither made any relevant change in the language
to preclude continued interpretation of “regulate . . .
importation” to include import duties nor registered any
disagreement with that decision, S. Rep. No. 95-466, at
2, 5 (1977).
In light of all the foregoing, we would hold, as our
predecessor court did in Yoshida CCPA, that tariffing is
within the language of “regulate . . . importation”
in this broad grant of emergency authorities.
b. Majority’s Narrowing Constraints
The majority today holds that, even if imposing tar-
iffs can be a form of “regulat[ing] . . . importation”
under section 203 of IEEPA, the President must act
within some set of limits that the majority sketches but
does not define. The majority suggests that the Presi-
dent must announce any such tariffs as temporary, limit
them to some subset of imported articles, and/or con-
strain them by some maximum rate prescribed else-
where by Congress. Maj. Op. at 17, 37-41. The ma-
jority mentions three features of the 1971 Presidential
Proclamation at issue in Yoshida CCPA as a source for
its suggestion: a statement in the proclamation that
the surcharge imposed there was “temporary”; a provi-
sion capping the proclamation-imposed tariff surcharge
for all imports at rates elsewhere set by Congress for
imports from just a small number of countries (so-called
“column 2” rates); and the imposition of the surcharge
only on non-duty-free imports and imports that were the
 104a
subject of concessions in trade agreements. Maj. Op.
at 39-40 (citing Yoshida CCPA, 526 F.2d at 577-78). 9
The majority relies on such constraints in the 1971 Pres-
idential Proclamation as invalidating the reciprocal
tariffs—and the trafficking tariffs as well. But there is
no textual support in section 203 of IEEPA for these
constraints or other sound basis for adopting such con-
straints. Nor do we read Yoshida CCPA’s interpreta-
tion of “regulate . . . importation”—as authorizing
the imposition of duties—to be confined to the facts of
the 1971 proclamation.
i
Regarding the temporal constraint, we first note that
the majority does not say that the presidential announce-
ment must set a specified end point. The 1971 Presi-
dential Proclamation did not set an end point. All it did
was use the word “temporary” in the heading (“Tempo-
rary Modifications for Balance of Payments Purposes”),
85 Stat. at 927—while also stating in the actual prescrib-
ing language that the surcharges “shall continue in ef-
fect until modified or terminated by the President or by
the Secretary of the Treasury,” id. (subpart C, para-

9
For almost all countries, the 10% surcharge imposed by the
1971 proclamation was not capped by the rate (even the non-
concession rate) Congress had otherwise prescribed for imports
from the particular country, which for almost all countries was the
rate specified in column 1. Rather, the 10% surcharge was
capped, for goods from all countries, only by the rate Congress had
set for specifically identified “Communist Countries” for the same
goods (in column 2), see U.S. Tariff Commission, Tariff Schedules
of the United States Annotated at 3-4 (1971). 85 Stat. at 927-28.
Today, HTSUS General Note 3(b) states that the column 2 rates
apply to Belarus, Cuba, North Korea, and the Russian Federation.
General Note 3(b), HTSUS (2025).
 105a
graph 2) (emphasis added), and declaring that the Sec-
retary may, among other things, “reimpose the rate of
additional duty herein . . . if he determines that
such action is consistent with safeguarding the balance
of payments position of the United States,” id. at 928
(subpart C, paragraph 4) (emphasis added).
But if mirroring the 1971 Presidential Proclamation
is what the majority means to require, what must count
is substance, not the mere use or non-use of the word
“temporary.” And in substance, there is no material
difference between the 1971 Presidential Proclamation
and the tariffs at issue here. For one thing, the execu-
tive orders here have a presumptive expiration date on
the tariffs: Under the NEA, the underlying emer-
gency expires after a year unless renewed. They could
be renewed, of course, but the 1971 Presidential Procla-
mation itself, which contains no presumptive expiration
date, is express that the surcharge imposed there might
be reimposed, and the President could in any event have
issued a new proclamation. Likewise, the executive or-
ders here indicate that the measures imposed will last
until changed or removed, and they contemplate down-
ward change if the problem being addressed is suffi-
ciently resolved. See EO ’257, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15047
(§ 4) (reciprocal tariffs); EO ’193, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9115
(§ 3) (Canada trafficking tariff); EO ’194, 90 Fed. Reg.
at 9119 (§ 3) (Mexico trafficking tariff); EO ’195, 90 Fed.
Reg. at 9123 (§ 3) (China trafficking tariff). 10 So, too,
the 1971 proclamation states that the surcharge lasts

10
For Canada and Mexico, the President quickly paused the im-
position of tariffs when it looked like those countries were taking
helpful steps. Exec. Order No. 14197, 90 Fed. Reg. 9183 (Feb. 3,
2025); Exec. Order No. 14198, 90 Fed. Reg. 9185 (Feb. 3, 2025).
 106a
until changed. The majority thus cannot find in a com-
parison to the 1971 proclamation upheld in Yoshida
CCPA, as recognized in the lead-up to the enactment of
IEEPA, a basis for finding a crucial temporal limitation
that is missing from the tariffs at issue here.
IEEPA itself supplies no basis for whatever affirma-
tive requirement of temporariness the majority has in
mind as a ground for invalidating the tariffs at issue.
Section 203 of IEEPA [50 U.S.C. § 1702], in reciting the
litany of presidential authorities, does not impose a re-
quirement that they be “temporary.” Nor does section
202 of IEEPA [§ 1701]. Section 202 does contain two
kinds of time limits. First, it ties the exercise of authority
to a declaration of emergency, and that emergency, un-
der the NEA, expires in a year unless renewed.
IEEPA § 202(a) [§ 1701(a)]. Second, it says that the
President is limited to exercising the section 203 author-
ities to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat
(to specified U.S. interests, from foreign sources, and
upon a declared national emergency). IEEPA § 202(b)
[§ 1701(b)]. But IEEPA does not prescribe a temporal
limit on how long the threat (or underlying national
emergency) lasts—which Congress cannot be understood
to have assumed was predictable at the time of presiden-
tial action. In fact, IEEPA has been used frequently
by Presidents since 1977, and “[o]n average, emergen-
cies invoking IEEPA last more than nine years,” with
“the length of emergencies invoking IEEPA . . . in-
creas[ing] each decade.” Congressional Research Ser-
vice, C. Casey, D. Rennack, & J. Elsea, The Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Power Act: Origins, Evo-
lution, and Use at 17 (Jan. 30, 2024) (CRS IEEPA
Study); id. at 58-63 tbl. A-1 (listing emergencies); id. at
66-86 tbl. A-3 (listing IEEPA-related executive or-
 107a
ders); see id. at 25 (“IEEPA has served as an integral
part of the postwar international sanctions regime”); id.
at 55 (“IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U.S.
sanction regime.”). Thus, textually and as implement-
ed for almost 50 years, the statute imposes no “tempo-
rariness” constraint that supplements what is inherent
in section 202 of IEEPA and in the present tariffs—the
status of the emergency declaration and the continua-
tion of the unusual and extraordinary threat. Here,
the CIT did not hold, the majority does not conclude,
and plaintiffs have not argued that the actual identified
threat has come to an end or that the courts can so de-
termine and order termination of the tariffs. Cf. Lu-
decke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 166-73 (1948) (explaining
that the termination of war is a political act left to treaty,
legislation, or presidential proclamation).
The suggested constraints of some kind of cap in duty
amount and some limitation of what products may be
covered fare no better. As to the former: The execu-
tive orders do state specific duty amounts. They indi-
cate that an increase might turn out to be warranted be-
cause of the threat, but such an increase would itself be
embodied in a specification of duty amounts. And the
duty amounts must reflect the requirement that section
203’s authorities be exercised only to deal with the
threat and for no other purpose. But nothing in
IEEPA’s text further restricts the rates of imposed tar-
iffs.
Similarly, nothing in IEEPA’s text requires mirror-
ing the 1971 proclamation’s limitation of the surcharge
to imports that previously had been the subject of duties
and concessions on trade agreements. That limitation
was a choice the President made in 1971 to suit the over-
 108a
all mix of circumstances then faced, requiring judgment
calls about the best way to proceed. Whatever con-
straints affected the President’s choice in 1971, nothing
in IEEPA suggests the necessity of such a scope-of-
imports limitation. And if there were such a limitation,
there is no apparent reason it would not equally apply to
all the non-tariff measures authorized by section 203,
such as “prohibit[ion].” Since IEEPA’s enactment in
1977, Presidents have regularly prohibited importation
of any articles from specified countries, and the major-
ity has not explained how its proposed scope-limiting ap-
proach could be squared with that historical practice.
See CRS IEEPA Study at 66-86 tbl. A-3 (listing IEEPA-
related executive orders that, e.g., order that the “im-
port” or “importation” of “any goods or services” or “any
products” of Iraqi, Iranian, Sudanese, or Nicaraguan
origin is “prohibited” (Exec. Order No. 12722, 55 Fed.
Reg. 31803 (1990) (Iraq); Exec. Order No. 13059, 62 Fed.
Reg. 44531 (1997) (Iran); Exec. Order No. 13067, 62 Fed.
Reg. 65989 (1997) (Sudan) Exec. Order No. 14088, 87
Fed. Reg. 64685 (2022) (Nicaragua))).
In short, the majority’s efforts at narrowing the sec-
tion 203 tariff authorization (beyond the limits pre-
scribed by section 202), besides being insufficiently de-
fined, have no proper foundation in the statute.
ii
We see no sound rationale for adopting the non-text-
based limitations suggested by the majority. In partic-
ular, the suggested limitations do not follow from the
fact that Congress adopted the “regulate . . . importa-
tion” language soon after, and with expressed awareness
of, the decision in Yoshida CCPA. That adoption does
not play the role of a ratification that overrides an
 109a
otherwise-clear contrary meaning. It merely confirms
that Congress must have understood the meaning of the
text that is already clear from ordinary textual analysis.
Moreover, the three features of the 1971 Presidential
Proclamation on which the majority focuses were mere-
ly among the sufficient conditions the CCPA cited for
holding the 1971 tariffs to be authorized by TWEA.
Our predecessor court in Yoshida CCPA did not say that
those facts were necessary or otherwise set an outer
boundary of TWEA’s authorization. Indeed, the CCPA
stressed that TWEA provided a “broad and express”
delegation to the President and that “presidential ac-
tions must be judged in the light of what the President
actually did, not in light of what he could have done” or
“what he might do.” 526 F.2d at 573, 577, 583-84 (em-
phases added) (citation omitted). There was, in short,
no ruling in Yoshida CCPA about conditions necessary
under TWEA that Congress could have ratified.
Nor can the majority’s suggestions be supported on
a rationale that section 203 of IEEPA must be given a
narrow enough scope—even in a non-textual way—to
avoid finding presidential authorization to impose tariffs
beyond the authorization provided by tariff laws gener-
ally. The CIT rightly refrained from any such conclu-
sion.
It is the obvious role of emergency laws to confer
authority that Congress has not conferred in non-
emergency laws. Otherwise, the President would hardly
need to rely on emergency laws, yet the President has
repeatedly done so during our history. Congress un-
derstood this practical reality in the lead-up to its pas-
sage in 1977 of IEEPA. See, e.g., 1974 Emergency
Powers Report, at 1 (explaining in the second sentence
 110a
of the report that John Locke “argued that occasions
may arise when the Executive must exert a broad dis-
cretion in meeting special exigencies or ‘emergencies’
for which the legislative power has no relief and/or ex-
isting law will not grant necessary remedy”); see gener-
ally id. And Congress has long enacted broad emer-
gency laws to play that role. See C. BRADLEY, HISTOR-
ICAL GLOSS AND F OREIGN A FFAIRS 174-78 (2024)
(BRADLEY); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677-78 (noting,
in an IEEPA case, that Congress has elsewhere shown
its “acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in
circumstances such as those presented” there and that
IEEPA “delegates broad authority to the President to
act in times of national emergency with respect to prop-
erty of a foreign country”).
Logically, we see no sound basis for insisting that
limits in non-emergency tariff authorizations be read
into emergency authorizations. Such an insistence
would run counter to the governing approach to inter-
preting “statutes touching on the same topic.” Kirtz,
601 U.S. at 63. Courts are to apply a “strong presump-
tion” that such statutes “coexist harmoniously” so as to
preserve both. Id. at 63-64 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). That presumption is overcome
only if there is an “actual inconsistency,” see id. at 64, or
a party otherwise carries the “heavy burden” of showing
a “clear and manifest” expression of congressional in-
tent that one statute displaces the other, Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 510 (2018) (internal quota-
tion marks, alterations, and citations omitted); see Kirtz,
601 U.S. at 63-64. See also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144
(2001) (explaining that “this Court has not hesitated to
give effect to two statutes that overlap, so long as each
 111a
reaches some distinct cases” (citing Connecticut Na-
tional Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992))).
To diminish the scope that IEEPA would otherwise
have, the inquiry required would be a focused consider-
ation of a particular non-IEEPA statute and a showing
that the identified statute clearly contradicts IEEPA or
otherwise expresses a clear intent to limit IEEPA. The
CIT recognized as much by choosing to rely only on sec-
tion 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2132] in-
stead of tariff laws collectively. See CIT Op. at 1374-
76. We address the specific section 122 issue next, and
we disagree with the CIT’s conclusion. But methodo-
logically, the CIT was right not to narrow IEEPA based
on a more general view that Congress has not conferred
in its tariff laws collectively a general authority as broad
as the “emergency economic powers” conferred by
IEEPA.
Precedent confirms the correctness of the CIT’s
avoidance of such a rationale. That rationale would be
much the same as the analysis rejected by the Supreme
Court in Algonquin. The Supreme Court in that case
was reviewing a holding of the D.C. Circuit that gave a
limited reading to section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, which grants (and then granted) the Presi-
dent special authority to “adjust the imports” of goods
whose importation “threaten[s] to impair the national
security.” Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232(b) [50
U.S.C. § 1862(b)-(c)]; see Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 550,
557-58 (citations omitted). The D.C. Circuit held that
the statute did not authorize the imposition of monetary
duties on oil imports in the form of per-barrel license
fees. See Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 557 (citations omit-
ted). The D.C. Circuit reasoned that “reading the stat-
 112a
ute to authorize” such duties “ ‘would be an anomalous
departure’ from ‘the consistently explicit, well-defined
manner in which Congress has delegated control over
foreign trade and tariffs.’ ” Id. (quoting Algonquin
SNG, Inc. v. Federal Energy Administration, 518 F.2d
1051, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). The Supreme Court re-
versed. It insisted on resolving the question simply by
analyzing the terms of section 232(b), which it readily
found broad enough to embrace the duties, 426 U.S. at
561-62, and confirming that the legislative history was
not to the contrary, id. at 562-71. There was no specific
statute contradicting the fair interpretation of section
232(b), and the Court gave no weight to the more gen-
eral idea of anomaly on which the D.C. Circuit had re-
lied.
Our predecessor court, in Yoshida CCPA, similarly
rejected a gestalt-anomaly approach. It said that the
Customs Court, in the decision under review, had treated
an assortment of tariff statutes—“[t]he Tariff Act of
1930[,] and its amendments, the Trade Agreements Act
of 1934, and its amendments, and the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962[,] all providing tariff-making authority to the
President, albeit with various limitations”—“as indicat-
ing a congressional intent that such limitations should
apply to any delegation of its tariff making authority.”
526 F.2d at 578. The CCPA rejected that approach,
stressing that “[t]he existence of limited authority un-
der certain trade acts does not preclude the execution of
other, broader authority under a national emergency
powers act.” Id.
In short, we find in IEEPA what must be considered
an eyes-open choice of a broad standard. Such breadth
is evident in the language and history of IEEPA. And
 113a
it is confirmed by the fact that Congress took pains to
impose exacting requirements for the President to in-
volve Congress in the exercise of IEEPA authorities,
from consultation at the outset to regular reporting af-
terward. IEEPA § 204 [50 U.S.C. § 1703]; see supra at
pp. 13-14. Those demands are a strong indication that
Congress knew it was giving broad powers to the Presi-
dent.
3. Displacement by 1974 Trade Act § 122
The CIT, not finding a limit within IEEPA that the
reciprocal tariffs violated, ultimately held the tariffs un-
lawful on the ground that, even if IEEPA itself would
support the reciprocal tariffs, section 122 of the Trade
Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2132] “removes” any presiden-
tial authority under IEEPA for these tariffs. CIT Op.
at 1375 (“Section 122 removes the President’s power to
impose remedies in response to balance-of-payments
deficits, and specifically trade deficits, from the broader
powers granted to a president during a national emer-
gency under IEEPA by establishing an explicit non-
emergency statute with greater limitations.” (footnote
omitted)). The CIT seems to have categorically con-
cluded that section 122 displaces all “emergency”-action
authority responding to a particular problem. Id. at
1374 (reasoning that Congress “cabined” the President’s
tariff authority to respond to the specified problem to
the exercise of authority under “to non-emergency leg-
islation”). The majority does not adopt this conclusion.
And we conclude that this is not the proper understand-
ing of the relationship between IEEPA and section 122,
at least as applied to the reciprocal tariffs here.
We have already recited the very demanding stand-
ard that must be met before a court, faced with two stat-
 114a
utes that overlap in subject matter, may declare one to
displace the other rather than give full effect to both as
complementary. A contradiction or expressions of
Congress’s clear, manifest intent to displace that statute
is required. See supra at p. 44. The plaintiffs do not
present arguments consistent with this demanding
standard. See, e.g., Private Appellees Brief at 25-37;
State Appellees Brief at 11-23. Applying that stand-
ard, we conclude that section 122 does not displace
IEEPA authority as relevant here.
As already noted, section 122 was part of the Trade
Act of 1974 and grew out of the 1971 Presidential Proc-
lamation that responded to a “monetary crisis.” CIT
Op. at 1374. Section 122(a) states:
Whenever fundamental international payments prob-
lems require special import measures to restrict im-
ports—
(1) to deal with large and serious United States
balance-of-payments deficits,
(2) to prevent an imminent and significant depre-
ciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets,
or
(3) to cooperate with other countries in correcting
an international balance-of-payments disequilib-
rium,
the President shall proclaim, for a period not exceed-
ing 150 days (unless such period is extended by Act
of Congress)—
(A) a temporary import surcharge, not to exceed
15 percent ad valorem, in the form of duties (in ad-
 115a
dition to those already imposed, if any) on articles
imported into the United States;
(B) temporary limitations through the use of quo-
tas on the importation of articles into the United
States; or
(C) both a temporary import surcharge described
in subparagraph (A) and temporary limitations
described in subparagraph (B).
Trade Act of 1974 § 122, 88 Stat. at 1987-88 [19 U.S.C.
§ 2132(a)]. Under this language, the necessary thresh-
old condition for application of this provision is the ex-
istence of “fundamental international payments prob-
lems.” Id. (emphasis added). When there are such
payments problems, and those problems in turn require
special measures “to restrict imports” for any of the
three enumerated purposes (e.g., to reduce the need for
foreign currency by reducing imports), the President
must take certain actions (presumptively, as the Presi-
dent may decline to impose “import restrictions” if such
impositions are contrary “to the national interest,”
Trade Act of 1974 § 122(b), 88 Stat. at 1988 [§ 2132(b]).
Among the presumptively mandatory actions are tariff
surcharges of up to 15% for up to 150 days.
Neither section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 nor
IEEPA completely overlaps the other: For example,
IEEPA applies to national security and foreign policy
threats well outside section 122, and section 122 applies
even where the relevant circumstances do not rise to the
level of a national emergency. In any event, (1) the two
statutes are not contradictory for the problem ad-
dressed by the reciprocal tariffs and (2) there is no clear
and manifest intent that this problem is to be addressed
by, and only by, the measures specified in section 122.
 116a
First, section 122 and IEEPA do not contradict each
other regarding the circumstances presented by the re-
ciprocal tariffs. Of course, for certain goods trade def-
icits, both statutes might apply—but a goods trade def-
icit alone is not enough for application of either IEEPA
or section 122. As already discussed, see supra at pp.
25-28, problems may or may not arise from goods trade
deficits at all, and different kinds of problems may arise
separately and at different times. Here, the problems
addressed by the reciprocal tariffs (imposed under
IEEPA) are not the problems addressed by the terms of
section 122, and that is reason enough to conclude that
section 122 does not displace IEEPA’s coverage to the
reciprocal tariffs.
More specifically, the reciprocal tariffs rest on the
finding that a goods trade deficit has given rise to a va-
riety of domestic problems centered on manufacturing
deficiencies. See supra at pp. 26-28. It is those prob-
lems which underlie the national emergency declared
with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat,
thus triggering application of IEEPA. EO ’257 con-
tains no finding that there even is an overall balance-of-
payments deficit, which considers not just transactions
in goods but also services, capital investments, and
other international transactions. 11 Moreover, and suf-

11
A textbook from the time explains balance-of-payments ac-
counting. P. KENEN & R. LUBITZ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS at
52-78 (3d ed. 1971). It breaks down the ledger of this “double-
entry bookkeeping” system into a “current” account showing “flows
of goods and services” and a “capital” account showing “lending and
investment” on one side and a “cash” account showing “how cash
balances and short-term claims have changed in response to cur-
rent and capital transactions” on the other, the two sides having to
balance because “[a]ll current and capital account transactions
 117a
ficient for our conclusion that the statutes do not contra-
dict each other as relevant here, the reciprocal tariffs do
not in any way focus on “fundamental international pay-
ments problems.” Trade Act of 1974 § 122(a) [§ 2132]
(emphasis added); see generally EO ’257. Such problems
concern the payments (financial, cash) side of the ac-
counting statement, which involves the reserves of cur-
rencies (or their substitutes like gold) and the operation
of foreign-exchange markets that determine the ability
of persons from one country to acquire another coun-
try’s currency needed to make the foreign purchases or
investments reflected in the current and capital ac-
counts.12 That is the nature of the problem underlying

must have cash or credit counterparts.” Id. at 53-55; see also CIT
Op. at 1375. Trade in goods is therefore just one part of the set of
transactions covered by the overall balance of payments, which also
includes services and capital investments (on the transactions side
of the ledger) and payments (on the payments side). Compare
§ 122(a) (referring to “balance-of-payments”) with § 122(c) (referring
to “balance-of-trade”); see S. Rep. No. 93-1298, at 87-89 (explaining
change of terminology); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1644, at 27 (1974) (ac-
knowledging and receding to Senate’s change of terminology).
12
See KENEN & LUBITZ at 57-58 (noting that a “gap between
gross payments from the United States and gross payments to the
United States” (the “gross payments deficit”) “is not necessarily a
‘bad thing,’ ” but can become “dangerous” by “cut[ting] so deeply
into cash holdings that a country can no longer cope with unplanned
deficits arising from cyclical and other disturbances”); id. at 58
(noting variety of “chain[s] of events” needed to “decrease the
American demand for foreign currencies and increase the foreign
demand for U.S. dollars” so as to “reduce the gross payments def-
icit and restore equilibrium in the foreign-exchange market by
forestalling further changes in the banks’ working balances,” de-
pending on “the extent to which exchange rates are free to fluctu-
ate” and “the way each country’s money supply is connected to its
gold and foreign-exchange holdings”); id. (identifying “excess de-
mand for foreign currency (an excess supply of dollars) in the
 118a
the 1971 Presidential Proclamation on which section 122
was based, see CIT Op. at 1374; Yoshida CCPA, 526 F.2d
at 567 & n.3, 580, and section 122 is limited to some sub-
set of such “fundamental international payments prob-
lems,” Trade Act of 1974 § 122(a) [§ 2132] (emphasis
added).13
Thus, section 122 does not apply to the problems un-
derlying the reciprocal tariffs, which are not the pay-
ments problems that are the precondition to section
122’s application. Even if section 122 is the exclusive
authority for presidential action to address some prob-
lems, it is not exclusive for the problem at issue here—
and certainly not clearly so. 14 For this reason alone,
applying IEEPA here does not contradict section 122,
and section 122, which is readily read as not prescribing
anything for the problem addressed in the reciprocal

foreign-exchange market,” which is the “net payments deficit,” as

“the best available measure of payments disequilibrium because
. . . it corresponds to the actual excess supply of dollars in the
foreign exchange market” that “must be either eliminated or fi-
nanced”).
13
The original Administration proposal for what be-came section
122 did not contain that language. See H. R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (Apr. 10, 1973) (§ 401). The House Committee on Ways and
Means added the language, after hearings, when it introduced and
soon reported out the bill that became law, H. R. 10710, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (Oct. 3, 1973). See H. R. Rep. No. 93-571, at 27-28, 97-
98, 199-200.
14
The Yoshida CCPA court stated, in dictum, that future presiden-
tial actions “must . . . comply” with section 122. 526 F.2d at 582
n.33. That point must be understood as limited to the particular “bal-
ance of payments problems” actually covered by section 122, namely,
a subset of “fundamental international payments problems”—
which do not include the problems identified in the reciprocal tar-
iffs.
 119a
tariffs, does not express a clear, manifest intent to dis-
place the emergency authority of IEEPA.
Second, even aside from the foregoing, there is no
clear, manifest intent to displace emergency authority,
which resided in TWEA at the time of section 122’s en-
actment and would come to reside in IEEPA in 1977.
Section 122 does not contain any “notwithstanding any
other provision of law,” displacement-of-other-author-
ity, or exclusivity language at all. The statutory lan-
guage provides no indication that Congress intended
section 122 to be the exclusive authority for the Presi-
dent to impose tariffs to address all balance-of-payments
problems, let alone all possible effects of trade deficits.
All it says is that whenever there is the identified pre-
condition, there is a presumptive mandate for presiden-
tial action, and all the language does is set a percent and
time limit on that presumptively mandatory measure.
It says nothing to negate otherwise-available presidential
authority.
Third, and independently sufficient, the CIT recog-
nized that section 122 addresses “non-emergency” situ-
ations. CIT Op. at 1374 (emphasis added). It is im-
plausible to suggest that Congress, in acting to supply
special presidential authority (indeed, presumptive du-
ties) for certain surcharges even when the given prob-
lem was not an emergency, was implicitly denying the
President otherwise-available authority to address the
given problem when it rose to the level of an emergency.
It is far more plausible that Congress was leaving
any emergency authority unimpaired but adding non-
emergency authority.
 120a
Legislative history indicates that this is just what the
key Senate committee understood. That committee
recognized that other statutes, including TWEA, might
well provide overlapping authority in the balance-of-
payments context. In its November 1974 report, the
committee mentioned the Customs Court’s July 8, 1974
decision in Yoshida International, Inc. v. United States,
378 F. Supp. 1155, 1168-76 (Cust. Ct. 1974), which held
that TWEA did not authorize import-duty surcharges
(such as the surcharge imposed by the 1971 Presidential
Proclamation, based on a payments crisis). S. Rep. No.
93-1298, at 88. The Committee referred to the decision
and recognized that it might be reversed on appeal:
The importance of providing such authority [under
section 122] is manifest in the light of the recent de-
cision by the United States Customs Court which
held that the 10 percent import surcharge imposed
temporarily in August of 1971 was without advance
authority. If that position is upheld on appeal it
could involve a substantial loss of revenue to the U.S.
Treasury and windfall gains to those importers who
passed on the import surcharge to consumers.
While the Committee does not wish to take a position
one way or the other on the validity of the 1971 sur-
charge, it does feel the Executive ought to have ex-
plicit statutory authority to impose certain restric-
tions on imports for balance of payments reasons.
Id. Despite recognizing that TWEA might authorize
import-duty surcharges to address balance-of-payments
problems, and despite making other changes in the
House bill that had come to it, the Senate committee did
not include any “notwithstanding any other authority,”
displacement-of-other-authority, or exclusivity language.
 121a
The committee, instead, simply added an express au-
thority applicable even when there was no emergency,
indeed made the President’s exercise of that authority
presumptively mandatory, and set limits on that author-
ity.
Finally, when Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977—
after section 122 was enacted—it did not adopt any lan-
guage narrowing presidential authority wherever it
would touch on topics addressed in section 122. And
the key committee report does not indicate any (unen-
acted) intent to do so. See generally S. Rep. No. 95-466.
The relationship between IEEPA and section 122 is
therefore subject to the general principle governing ju-
dicial handling of overlapping statutes. Under that
principle, section 122 does not displace IEEPA, at least
for purposes of the reciprocal tariffs.
4. Major Questions Doctrine
Moving past ordinary statutory analysis, plaintiffs
(and the majority) invoke the “major questions doctrine”
(or canon) to argue that we should reach a statutory re-
sult contrary to the conclusions we have drawn about
IEEPA (including that it is not displaced by section 122
of the Trade Act of 1974). Private Appellees Brief at
46-54; State Appellees Brief at 12-18. Under that doc-
trine (or canon), in “certain extraordinary cases,” circum-
stances give “reason to hesitate before concluding that
Congress meant to confer” the authority needed to up-
hold a challenged government action. West Virginia v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 597 U.S. 697, 723,
721 (2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). The doctrine has supported rejection of the stat-
utory claim when, in light of several contextual features
such as narrowness of the statutory words at issue,
 122a
“common sense as to the manner in which Congress
would have been likely to delegate such power . . .
made it very unlikely that Congress had actually done
so.” Id. at 722-23 (cleaned up) (internal quotation
mark and citation omitted); see id. at 724 (determination
is whether authority claimed is “beyond what Congress
could reasonably be understood to have granted”); see
Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 518-19 (2023) (Barrett,
J., concurring) (explaining that it is relevant whether
the asserted power is within the delegatee’s “wheel-
house”). We see no convincing basis in that doctrine
for altering the statutory conclusion we have reached.
The language of IEEPA is undeniably broad on its
face. It lists a host of powers—some (such as prohibi-
tion and prevention) even more restrictive than tariff-
ing. There is no suggestion that the IEEPA-specified
authority must be exercised only for specified types of
products or only for a narrow set of countries. See su-
pra at pp. 41-42. The facially evident intent is to pro-
vide flexibility in the tools available to the President to
address the unusual and extraordinary threats specified
in a declared national emergency. This is not an “an-
cillary,” “little used backwater” provision, West Vir-
ginia, 597 U.S. at 710, 730, or a delegation outside the
recipient’s wheelhouse.
The breadth is anything but surprising in the context
here. As Justice Kavanaugh recently reiterated in ex-
plaining why the canon has not been applied “in the na-
tional security or foreign policy contexts,” “the canon
does not reflect ordinary congressional intent” in these
contexts because “the usual understanding is that Con-
gress intends to give the President substantial authority
and flexibility to protect America and the American peo-
 123a
ple.” Consumers’ Research, 145 S Ct. at 2516 (Ka-
vanaugh, J., concurring); see id. (describing major ques-
tions doctrine as having been applied “in the domestic
sphere,” and citing authorities, none of which involve
foreign affairs). There is simply no “common sense”
expectation in the present context, involving emergen-
cies touching foreign affairs, that Congress was unlikely
to be granting the authority at issue. The facial breadth
in an emergency context makes the straightforward ap-
plication of the statute’s words hardly “ ‘unheralded,’ ”
West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 722 (quoting Utility Air Reg-
ulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency,
573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)), and if a more specific herald is
needed, see Biden, 600 U.S. at 506 (requiring “clear con-
gressional authorization” for certain agency actions), it
is present in the 1971 proclamation, Yoshida CCPA, and
subsequent congressional adoption of the relevant lan-
guage in 1977.
For those reasons, we conclude that the essential
premise for using the major questions doctrine to reject
the claimed authority for the challenged action is miss-
ing here. Congress very clearly made a broad delega-
tion here, as in other emergency-authority delegations.
Whether to provide such delegations is certainly open to
policy debate, as it carries obvious risks, see Yoshida
CCPA, 526 F.2d at 583-84, and such debate has occurred
over the decades, but the policy debate is not for us to
resolve. We do not see IEEPA as anything but an
eyes-open congressional choice to confer on the Presi-
dent “broad authority” to choose tools to restrict impor-
tation when the IEEPA section 202 standards are met.
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677. We therefore see no
reason to pull back from the statutory conclusions we
have reached above.
 124a
5. Constitutional Nondelegation Doctrine
Plaintiffs argue that IEEPA is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to the President, i.e.,
violates the nondelegation doctrine. Private Appellees
Brief at 54-62; State Appellees Brief at 18-20. The Su-
preme Court has not ruled on the issue, though it has
upheld action under the statute. E.g., Dames & Moore,
453 U.S. at 672, 677-78. All the courts of appeals to
have considered the question have rejected such chal-
lenges. United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077, 1092 (9th
Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 820 (2024); United States
v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 577 (3d Cir. 2011); United
States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 215-17 (2d Cir. 2006);
United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1092-
94 (4th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Mirza, 454
F. App’x 249, 255-56 (5th Cir. 2011) (non-precedential).
On the state of the longstanding case law on the subject,
we too reject the non-delegation-doctrine challenge.
The general standard for determining whether Con-
gress had unconstitutionally delegated the legislative
power assigned to it by Article I of the Constitution re-
quires two elements to be supplied by Congress—an un-
derstandable statement of “the general policy that the
agency must pursue” and understandable “boundaries,”
i.e., “sufficient standards to enable both the courts and
the public [to] ascertain whether the agency has fol-
lowed the law.” Consumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. at
2497 (cleaned up) (quoting American Power & Light Co.
v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946); OPP Cotton Mills, Inc.
v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division, Depart-
ment of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941)); id. at 2501,
2504, 2507, 2511. That standard, not a different one,
the Supreme Court held a few months ago, applies to
 125a
statutes that authorize monetary impositions such as
taxes. Id. at 2497-501. And, as applied to such impo-
sitions, the Court specifically rejected the argument
that “Congress must set a ‘definite’ or ‘objective limit’
on how much money an agency can collect—a numeric
cap, a fixed rate, or the equivalent.” Id. at 2497.
What applies, the Court held, is the “usual nondelega-
tion standard,” and that standard is “trained on intelli-
gible principles, not on numeric caps and ‘mathematical
formula[s].’ ” Id. at 2498 (quoting United States v.
Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577 (1939));
see also id. at 2498 n.3 (rejecting dissent’s “rate-or-cap
test”).
The government suggests that the Consumers’ Re-
search standard is inapplicable when the delegation is to
the President rather than to a non-elected executive of-
ficial. Government’s Reply Brief at 18-20. The gov-
ernment has not persuasively justified that suggestion.
No question is presented here about whether a tougher
standard than the one confirmed in Consumers’ Re-
search might apply to a delegation to a board protected
against discretionary removal by the President (i.e., “an
independent agency”). Consumers’ Research, 145 S.
Ct. at 2517 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The govern-
ment’s suggestion is that a laxer standard than the Con-
sumers’ Research standard should apply whenever the
delegatee is the President. That contention presents two
difficulties.
First, the nondelegation doctrine polices what Con-
gress has delegated to another branch, not to whom it
has delegated the authority. See Gundy v. United
States, 588 U.S. 128, 132 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“The
nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transfer-
 126a
ring its legislative power to another branch of Govern-
ment.”). Indeed, “[t]o distinguish between the permis-
sible and the impermissible in this sphere,” the Supreme
Court has “long asked whether Congress has set out an
‘intelligible principle’ to guide what it has given the
agency to do.” Consumers Research, 145 S. Ct. at 2497
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). Whether Congress has provided
an intelligible principle depends on the text of the stat-
ute Congress created, not on the character of the receiv-
ing party.
Second, the Supreme Court has observed that, when-
ever an executive officer is exercising executive power,
the officer is exercising power that belongs to the Pres-
ident. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 203 (2020) (“Under our Con-
stitution, the ‘executive power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a
President’. . . . ”). Although we need not draw a
definitive conclusion on the matter, it is not apparent to
us why the Consumers’ Research standard should be
categorically lowered for delegations to the President.
See Consumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. at 2512 n.1 (Ka-
vanaugh, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (stating his
view that delegations to “executive officers or agencies
. . . are not analytically distinct for present purposes
from delegations to the President because the Presi-
dent controls, supervises, and directs those executive of-
ficers and agencies”).
Relatedly, we are not prepared to rely on the merely
procedural requirements, such as declaring a national
emergency and complying with the requirements of
keeping Congress informed, as themselves sufficient to
meet the understandable-boundaries element of that
 127a
standard even if the substantive requirements were not
sufficient. The Supreme Court suggested that proce-
dural requirements could not suffice in that way when it
stated in Rock Royal that “procedural safeguards can-
not validate an unconstitutional delegation” while noting
that such safeguards “do furnish protection against an
arbitrary use of properly delegated authority.” 307
U.S. at 576 (citing with “cf.” signal A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 533 (1935)).
Application of the nondelegation doctrine must at least
focus on, perhaps even be limited to, substantive con-
straints on the exercise of the delegated power. Re-
garding the national emergency, the NEA provides no
substantive standards for what may be declared a na-
tional emergency, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1641, and con-
sistent with that absence of standards, such a declara-
tion itself is likely unreviewable, see Haig, 453 U.S. at
292; Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 896 n.3 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Yoshida CCPA, 526 F.2d at 581 n.32; cf. Shih,
73 F.4th at 1092. The focus therefore must be on the sub-
stantive requirement that the presidential action be ex-
ercised, upon declaration of a national emergency, to
deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat to the na-
tional security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States, emanating in relevant part from abroad, and for
no other reason. See, e.g., supra at pp. 11-12.
One feature of the present case that clearly is rele-
vant to how demanding the nondelegation doctrine is
here is the fact, not meaningfully disputed by plaintiffs,
that the tariffs involve the President’s role and respon-
sibilities in foreign affairs (including national security),
which has constitutional foundations (in Article II) and
which Congress may help the President more effectively
perform by furnishing the President with tools, such as
 128a
criminal prohibitions or tariff impositions, that can be
created only by Congress exercising its Article I pow-
ers. See Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312, 2327
(2024) (explaining that the President “has important for-
eign relations responsibilities: making treaties, ap-
pointing ambassadors, recognizing foreign govern-
ments, meeting foreign leaders, overseeing interna-
tional diplomacy and intelligence gathering, and manag-
ing matters related to terrorism, trade, and immigra-
tion”); C. Bradley & J. Goldsmith, Foreign Affairs, Non-
delegation, and the Major Questions Doctrine, 172 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2024); BRADLEY at 168-90. The tar-
iffs involve goods crossing into the United States from
foreign countries, foreign governments’ policies re-
specting both those goods and U.S. exports for entry
into those governments’ countries, and the possibility of
presidential negotiation of agreements with foreign gov-
ernments. The Supreme Court has recognized that the
congressional grant to the President of tariffing and
other import-control authority dates back to the found-
ing era and has treated such actions as involving foreign
affairs. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 413; Butt-
field v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904); Marshall
Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 695-97 (1892); Cargo
of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
382, 387-89 (1813); see Bradley & Goldsmith at 1757 (ex-
plaining that “Congress in the early post-Founding pe-
riod authorized the President to make broad discretion-
ary policy determinations” and “many of the broadest
delegations came in contexts related to foreign affairs,”
noting specifically a 1794 authorization to the President,
while Congress was in session, to “impose a shipping
embargo ‘whenever, in his opinion, the public safety
shall so require’”); B RADLEY at 168-73. Opinions by
 129a
and from within the Court suggest that Congress has
especially great leeway to delegate authority to the
President in foreign-affairs matters, based on the view
that realities in that area frequently support “paint[ing]
with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in
domestic areas,” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965),
and the notion that “the same limitations on delegation
do not apply ‘where the entity exercising the delegated
authority itself possesses independent authority over
the subject matter,” Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.
748, 772-73 (1996) (quoting United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 554, 556-57 (1975)). See United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1950);
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 312-22; see
also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (reading
Curtiss-Wright to hold that “the strict limitation upon
congressional delegations of power to the President
over internal affairs does not apply with respect to del-
egations of power in external affairs”). Several Justices
have in recent years noted the distinctive character of
foreign-affairs matters under the nondelegation doc-
trine. See Consumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. at 2516
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (raising question); id. at
2539 n.20 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (same); Department
of Transportation v. Association of American Rail-
roads, 575 U.S. 43, 79-80 & n.5 (2015) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in the judgment).
The Court’s formulation requiring the ability of
courts to ascertain whether substantive boundaries have
been crossed suggests at least a presumption of judicial
enforceability of those boundaries—at least the bound-
aries without which the policy leeway would be too great.
Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (ask-
 130a
ing if legislation makes it possible for courts to ascertain
compliance); Gundy, 588 U.S. at 158 n.39 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting). In the present context, the strong princi-
ples of deference in the foreign-affairs area (including
the emergency authority at issue here) and broad inter-
pretation and permissible greater leeway of delegation
all have constitutional foundations. Over statutory
matters, Congress has abilities to adjust grants of au-
thority (over the long term anyway) and to exercise pow-
ers over matters for which the President needs congres-
sional action (in the shorter term). We do not see how
it would make sense to say that broad delegations, sub-
ject to particularly deferential review, both of which are
permitted for constitutional reasons, together lead to a
conclusion of unconstitutionality.
The IEEPA standard might well pass constitutional
muster even under ordinary delegation standards, i.e.,
outside the foreign-affairs and related contexts where
especially great leeway is allowed, even recognizing that
“[t]he degree of agency discretion that is acceptable var-
ies according to the scope of the power congressionally
conferred.” Whitman v. American Trucking Associa-
tions, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001); see Consumers’ Re-
search, 145 S. Ct. at 2497 (repeating Whitman point).
The Court recently explained that it has found a viola-
tion in only two cases (the same year): Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935), where Con-
gress established “no cr[i]terion” and declared “no pol-
icy”; and Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 521-22; 541-42,
where Congress authorized creation of codes of “fair
competition” nationwide with “no standards” except to
“rehabilitat[e], correct[], and expan[d]” the economy.
Consumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. at 2502-03. The
Court explained:
 131a
At the same time, we have found intelligible princi-
ples in a host of statutes giving agencies significant
discretion. So, for example, we upheld a provision
enabling an agency to set air quality standards at lev-
els “requisite to protect the public health.” We sus-
tained a delegation to an agency to ensure that cor-
porate structures did not “unfairly or inequitably dis-
tribute voting power” among security holders. And
we affirmed authorizations to regulate in the “public
interest” and to set “just and reasonable” rates, be-
cause we thought the discretion given was not unbri-
dled.
Id. at 2503 (quoting Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472; then
American Power & Light, 329 U.S. at 104; citing Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
225-226 (1943); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 600 (1944)); see also New York Central Securities
Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932); Federal
Communications Commission v. Radio Corporation of
America Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953); Fed-
eral Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond &
Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933).
The leeway allowed by those precedents makes it
challenging to distinguish the substantive requirements
that we have focused on here—namely, that there is a
qualifying “unusual and extraordinary threat,” see su-
pra at pp. 22-28, and that the President must be exercis-
ing the IEEPA-specified authorities “to deal with” that
threat and for no other purpose, see infra at pp. 64-67.
Those standards are on their face intelligible, as even
plaintiffs have presupposed in arguing that they are vi-
olated. But we need not decide whether IEEPA would
pass muster under standards other than those which ap-
 132a
ply in the context of this case, involving emergency au-
thority addressing foreign-source conduct threatening
the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States. Under the applicable standards, we see
no basis for finding a constitutional violation under cur-
rent doctrine.
The Court’s decision in Algonquin is significant for
the present case. There, the Court held that section
232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1862, “easily fulfills” the “intelligible principle” test ar-
ticulated in the J.W. Hampton case. 426 U.S. at 559.
The Court explained that the statute authorizes presi-
dential action (which the Court held included imposition
of duties) to the extent the President deems necessary
where imports “threaten to impair the national secu-
rity,” based on consideration of, e.g., what goods are
needed, domestic industry’s ability to supply them, and
other obviously pertinent facts. § 232(b), (c) [§ 1862(b),
(c)]; see 426 U.S. at 559. The Court held that the stat-
ute presented not even a “looming problem of improper
delegation” that would call for a narrowing statutory
construction to avoid the problem. 426 U.S. at 560. We
note that, while section 232 requires that the President
receive certain findings of threatened impairment of the
national security from the Secretary of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, we have held that those findings are
no more reviewable than if they were the President’s
own findings, as they are part of a single process. USP
Holdings, 36 F.4th at 1369-70 (relying on George S.
Bush & Co., 310 U.S. at 379-80). The Supreme Court
readily upheld section 232(b)—with what this court’s
majority today calls the provision’s “well-defined proce-
dural and substantive limitations,” Maj. Op. at 20—
against a nondelegation challenge. Although some fea-
 133a
tures of IEEPA differ from the features of section 232,
we do not see a basis for a different result in this case
under current nondelegation law.
B. Trafficking Tariffs
We finally turn to the trafficking tariffs (applicable
to Canada, Mexico, and China), which are challenged
only by the State plaintiffs (not the private plaintiffs),
for which only one issue not already discussed—a statu-
tory issue—remains for consideration. The essential
characteristics that frame the issue raised are simply
described. The majority does not doubt, and the State
plaintiffs do not dispute, that the problem the traffick-
ing tariffs target—introduction of opioids or precursors
and other criminal activity—rises to the level of an “un-
usual and extraordinary threat” to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States (and has
been properly declared to be a national emergency).
IEEPA § 202(a) [§ 1701(a)]. Nor is there any conten-
tion that the President’s actions have another purpose
than addressing that threat. IEEPA § 202(b) [§ 1701(b)].
Instead, the challenge focuses on the fact that the tariff
measures adopted (then paused and modified) apply to
a large variety of imports that themselves are not the
source of the problem, i.e., are not illegal drugs or pre-
cursors and do not involve criminal activity. The CIT
held that fact to place the trafficking tariffs outside the
power of the President to exercise the section 203-
specified authorities “to deal with” the threat, IEEPA
§ 202(a), (b) [§ 1701(a), (b)], even though, as the CIT did
not dispute, the trafficking tariffs seek indirectly to in-
duce the foreign governments’ action in alleviating that
threat. CIT Op. at 1381-82. That holding, we conclude,
is contrary to the statute.
 134a
IEEPA does not say that the imports covered by sec-
tion 203 authorities must be the source of the “threat”
required by section 202. The section 203 authorities
may be “exercised to deal with any unusual and extraor-
dinary threat” meeting the specified conditions (the threat
must be to our national security, foreign policy, or econ-
omy, it must be declared to be a national emergency,
and, under section 202(b) [§ 1701(b)], the authorities
must be exercised to deal with that threat and for no
other reason). IEEPA § 202(a) [§ 1701(a)] (emphasis
added). Nor does IEEPA use the language of “direct
link” (or the word “direct”) at all, much less in a sense
that precludes a measure reasonably designed to work
as leverage. CIT Op. at 1381-82.
IEEPA says only that the President’s exercise of au-
thority must be “to deal with” the identified threat, and
not “for any other purpose.” IEEPA § 202(b) [§ 1701(b)]
(emphasis added). That language addresses the in-
tended effect of the measures on the threat, not the con-
tent of the measure adopted. The measure must aim to
achieve that effect and not be so overbroad that it can
reliably be inferred to be really for a different purpose.
IEEPA § 202(b) [§ 1701(b)]. But that does not require
that the imports taxed themselves be responsible for the
threat. A measure that reaches imports, property, or
other interests of foreign actors can be an obvious and
effective tool for dealing with the threat by inducing the
foreign country to take action to redress the harm iden-
tified as a threat.
We see no persuasive basis for a contrary reading in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dames &
Moore. There, the Court held that IEEPA authorized
the President to take action involving Iranian assets as
 135a
leverage to solve a problem based on Iran’s holding of
American hostages, not to solve a problem with the spe-
cific assets frozen. The Supreme Court blessed the
measure as a “‘bargaining chip’ to be used by the Presi-
dent when dealing with a hostile country.” Dames &
Moore, 453 U.S. at 673.
Similarly, here, the tariffs are to be a “bargaining
chip” to get Canada, Mexico, and China to take more ac-
tion regarding the criminal trafficking identified in the
executive orders. The President found that Canada
and Mexico had “played a central role” in the challenge
posed by “[g]ang members, smugglers, human traffick-
ers, and illicit drugs of all kinds” that “have poured across
our borders and into our communities,” including by
“failing to devote sufficient attention and resources or
meaningfully coordinate with the United States law en-
forcement partners to effectively stem the tide of,” for
Canada, “illicit drugs,” and, for Mexico, “unlawful mi-
gration and illicit drugs.” EO ’193, 90 Fed. Reg. at
9113; EO ’194, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9117. Similarly, he
found that China had “subsidized and otherwise incen-
tivized PRC chemical companies to export fentanyl and
related precursor chemicals that are used to produce
synthetic opioids sold illicitly in the United States,” and
“plays a central role” in the challenge posed by “[t]he
influx of these drugs,” “not merely by failing to stem the
ultimate source of many illicit drugs distributed in the
United States, but by actively sustaining and expanding
the business of poisoning our citizens.” EO ’195, 90
Fed. Reg. at 9121.
The trafficking tariffs make clear that the President
contemplated eliminating or lowering the tariffs if the
country subject to the tariff took adequate steps con-
 136a
cerning the specific identified threat. And the actions
immediately following issuance of the tariffs confirm the
proper focus of the tariffs on the underlying drug/crime
problem (thus, no “other purpose,” IEEPA § 202 [§ 1701])
and the utility of tariffs as a bargaining chip. Both
Canada and Mexico’s “immediate steps designed to alle-
viate the illegal migration and illicit drug crisis through
cooperative action” (resulting in the President pausing
the tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico), and
China’s failure to take such steps (resulting in the Pres-
ident increasing tariffs), evince their utility as such a
bargaining chip. Exec. Order No. 14197, 90 Fed. Reg.
9183 (Feb. 3, 2025); Exec Order No. 14198, 90 Fed. Reg.
9185 (Feb. 3, 2025); Exec. Order No. 14228, 90 Fed. Reg.
11463 (Mar. 3, 2025). The States make no real argu-
ment to the contrary.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully dissent
from the majority’s affirmance of the CIT’s summary
judgment that the reciprocal and trafficking tariffs are
unlawful.
 137a
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

2025-1812, 2025-1813
V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES AND
PRODUCTS, LLC, DBA GENOVA PIPE, MICROKITS, LLC,
FISHUSA INC., TERRY PRECISION CYCLING LLC,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES, RODNEY
S. SCOTT, COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, JAMIESON
GREER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HOWARD LUTNICK,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, DEFENDANTS -APPELLANTS

STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF ARIZONA, STATE OF

COLORADO, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF
DELAWARE, STATE OF ILLINOIS, STATE OF MAINE,
STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE OF NEVADA, STATE OF
NEW MEXICO, STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE OF
VERMONT, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, KRISTI NOEM,
 138a
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION, RODNEY S. SCOTT,
COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER FOR U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, UNITED STATES,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Filed: Aug. 29, 2025

Appeals from the United States Court of

International Trade in Nos. 1:25-cv-00066-GSK-
TMR-JAR, 1:25-cv-00077-GSK-TMR-JAR, Senior
Judge Jane A. Restani, Judge Gary S. Katzmann,
Judge Timothy M. Reif.

JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE having been considered, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, and RE-
MANDED-IN-PART
FOR THE COURT

August 29, 2025

Date
 139a
APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Court No. 25-00066

V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES AND
PRODUCTS, LLC, D/B/A GENOVA PIPE, MICROKITS,
LLC, FISHUSA INC., TERRY PRECISION CYCLING LLC,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; PETE R. FLORES
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING COMMISSIONER
FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION; JAMIESON GREER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CA-
PACITY AS UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE;
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE; AND HOWARD LUTNICK, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF COMMERCE;
DEFENDANTS

Court No. 2500077

THE STATE OF OREGON, THE STATE OF ARIZONA, THE
STATE OF COLORADO, THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
THE STATE OF DELAWARE, THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
THE STATE OF MAINE, THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, THE
STATE OF NEVADA, THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, THE STATE OF VERMONT,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; KRISTI NOEM, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
 140a
SECURITY; U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION;
PETE R. FLORES IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING
COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION; AND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA; DEFENDANTS

[Filed: May 28, 2025]

OPINION

Before: GARY S. KATZMANN, Judge, TIMOTHY M.

REIF, Judge, JANE A. RESTANI, Judge
[The court grants Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary
Judgment and denies Plaintiffs’ Motions for Prelimi-
nary Injunction as moot.]
Dated: May 28, 2025
Jeffrey M. Schwab, Liberty Justice Center, of Austin,
Tex., argued for Plaintiffs V.O.S. Selections, Inc; Plastic
Services and Products, LLC d/b/a Genova Pipe; Mi-
croKits, LLC; FishUSA Inc.; and Terry Precision Cy-
cling LLC. With him on the briefs were Reilly Stephens,
James McQuaid, Bridget F. Conlan, and Ilya Somin, An-
tonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, of
Arlington, Vir.
Brian Simmonds Marshall, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Oregon Department of Justice, of Portland,
Or., argued for Plaintiffs The State of Oregon, The State
of Arizona, The State of Colorado, The State of Connect-
icut, The State of Delaware, The State of Illinois, The
State of Maine, The State of Minnesota, The State of
Nevada, The State of New Mexico, The State of New
 141a
York, and The State of Vermont. With him on the
briefs were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General of State of
Oregon, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, Dustin
Buehler, Special Counsel, Christopher A. Perdue, Leigh
Salmon, and Nina R. Englander, Senior Assistant Attor-
neys General, YoungWoo Joh and Alexander C. Jones,
Assistant Attorneys General, of the State of Oregon;
Kristin K. Mayes, Attorney General of the State of Ari-
zona, Joshua D. Bendor, Solicitor General, Syreeta A.
Tyrell, Senior Litigation Counsel, of the State of Ari-
zona; Keith Ellison, Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota and Peter J. Farrell, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral of the State of Minnesota; Philip J. Weiser, Attor-
ney General of the State of Colorado and Sarah H.
Weiss, Senior Assistant Attorney General of the State
of Colorado; William Tong, Attorney General of the
State of Connecticut, and Michael K. Skold, Solicitor
General of the State of Connecticut; Kathleen Jennings,
Attorney General of the State of Delaware, and Ian R.
Liston, Director of Impact Litigation, Vanessa L.
Kassab, Deputy Attorney General of the Delaware De-
partment of Justice; Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General
of the State of Nevada, and Heidi Parry Stern, Solicitor
General of the Office of the Nevada Attorney General;
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General of the State of New Mex-
ico, James W. Grayson, Chief Deputy Attorney General,
and Amy Senier, of the New Mexico Department of Jus-
tice; Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of
New York, Rabia Muqaddam, Special Counsel for Fed-
eral Initiatives, and Mark Ladov, Special Counsel, of the
State of New York; Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of
the State of Illinois, Cara Hendrickson, Assistant Chief
Deputy Attorney General, and Gretchen Helfrich, Dep-
uty Chief, Special Litigation Bureau of the Office of the
 142a
Illinois Attorney General; Aaron M. Frey, Attorney
General of the State of Maine, and Vivian A. Mikhail,
Deputy Attorney General, of the State of Maine; and
Charity R. Clark, Attorney General of the State of Ver-
mont, and Ryan P. Kane, Deputy Solicitor General of the
State of Vermont.
Eric J. Hamilton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
U.S. Department of State, of Washington, D.C., argued
for Defendants The United States Of America; U.S.
Customs and Border Protection; Pete R. Flores in his
official capacity as Acting Commissioner for U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection; Jamieson Greer, in his of-
ficial capacity as United States Trade Representative;
Office of the United States Trade Representative; and
Howard Lutnick, in his official capacity as Secretary of
Commerce. With him on the briefs were Yaakov M.
Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M.
McCarthy, Director, Claudia Burke, Deputy Director,
Justin R. Miller, Attorney-in-Charge, International
Trade Office, and Sosun Bae, Senior Trial Counsel. Of
counsel, Alexander K. Haas, Director, and Stephen M.
Elliott, Assistant Director, U.S. Department of Justice,
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch, of Washing-
ton D.C; and Luke Mathers and Blake W. Cowman,
Trial Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Divi-
sion, Commercial Litigation Branch, of Washington,
D.C.
Brett A. Shumate, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washing-
ton, D.C., argued for Defendants U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Kristi Noem, in her official capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security;
U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Pete R. Flores in
 143a
his official capacity as Acting Commissioner for U.S.
Customs and Border Protection; and the United States.
With him on the briefs were Yaakov M. Roth, Acting As-
sistant Attorney General, Eric J. Hamilton, Deputy As-
sistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy, Direc-
tor, Claudia Burke, Deputy Director, Justin R. Miller,
Attorney-in-Charge, International Trade Office, Sosun
Bae, Senior Trial Counsel, Luke Mathers, Catherine M.
Yang, Blake W. Cowman, and Collin T. Mathias, trial at-
torneys. Of counsel, Alexander K. Haas, Director, and
Stephen M. Elliott, Assistant Director, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs
Branch, of Washington D.C.
Per Curiam: The Constitution assigns Congress
the exclusive powers to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises,” and to “regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3. The
question in the two cases before the court is whether the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
(“IEEPA”) delegates these powers to the President in
the form of authority to impose unlimited tariffs on goods
from nearly every country in the world. The court does
not read IEEPA to confer such unbounded authority
and sets aside the challenged tariffs imposed thereun-
der.
BACKGROUND
I. Legal Background
A. The Constitution
While “Congress . . . may not transfer to an-
other branch powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative . . . Congress . . . may confer sub-
stantial discretion . . . to implement and enforce the
 144a
laws.” Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128, 135 (2019)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus,
courts have consistently upheld statutory delegations as
long as Congress “lay[s] down by legislative act an intel-
ligible principle to which the person or body authorized
to [exercise that authority] is directed to conform.”
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). This reflects the idea that in
modern government, “[t]he legislative process would
frequently bog down if Congress were constitutionally
required to appraise before-hand the myriad situations
to which it wishes a particular policy to be applied and
to formulate specific rules for each situation.” Ameri-
can Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
B. Tariffs
Early in the nation’s history, tariffs were a key means
by which the federal government raised money to pay
wages and to fund the national debt. See John M. Dob-
son, Two Centuries of Tariffs: The Background and
Emergence of the U.S. International Trade Commission
6 (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n 1976). The revenue-raising
purpose of tariffs has declined significantly since the
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 permit-
ted the imposition of income taxes. See id. at 1, 70.
Since then, and with the increasing complexity and in-
terconnectedness of the global economic landscape, tar-
iffs have served more diverse purposes including re-
stricting the importation of certain goods, protecting
American industry, and leveraging negotiations with
foreign counterparts. See, e.g., id. at 80 (describing
the use of tariffs to restrict Japanese textile imports).
 145a
As global economic relations grew in volume and
complexity, Congress saw a need for specialized, non-
partisan assistance in administering tariffs. See id. at
87. Congress accordingly passed legislation creating
the United States Tariff Commission, later renamed the
United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”).
See id.; Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. 64-271, §§ 700-09,
39 Stat. 756, 795-98. To provide this assistance, the
Commission “shall have the power to investigate the tar-
iff relations between the United States and foreign
countries, commercial treaties, . . . the volume of im-
portations compared with domestic production and con-
sumption, and conditions, causes, and effects relating to
competition of foreign industries with those of the
United States.” 19 U.S.C. § 1332. The ITC is respon-
sible for maintaining the United States Harmonized
Tariff Schedule (“HTSUS”), which sets tariff rates for
all merchandise imported into the United States. See
id. § 1202. The HTSUS itself “is indeed a statute but is
not published physically in the United States Code.”
Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 1999). Congress’s enactment of the HTSUS pro-
vided that its terms “shall be considered to be statutory
provisions of law for all purposes.” Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 1204(c)(1), 102 Stat. 1107, 1149.
In addition to forming the ITC, Congress has re-
sponded to the growing complexity of global economic
relations by delegating trade authority to the President.
These delegations have included clear limitations that
retain legislative power over the imposition of duties
and over foreign commerce. See, e.g., Norwegian Ni-
trogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 305
(1933) (“What is done by the Tariff Commission and the
 146a
President in changing the tariff rates to conform to new
conditions is in substance a delegation, though a permis-
sible one, of the legislative process.”).
For example, in 1962, Congress delegated to the
President the power to take action to adjust imports
when the Secretary of Commerce finds that an “article
is being imported into the United States in such quanti-
ties or under such circumstances as to threaten to im-
pair the national security.” Trade Expansion Act of
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232(b), 76 Stat. 872, 877 (cod-
ified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)). This
delegation is conditioned upon an investigation and find-
ings by the Secretary of Commerce, and agreement by
the President. See id. Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, as amended, requires that the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative (“USTR”) take action, which may include im-
posing tariffs, where “the rights of the United States un-
der any trade agreement are being denied” or “an act,
policy, or practice of a foreign country” is “unjustifiable
and burdens or restricts United States commerce.” 19
U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(A)-(B). The USTR may impose du-
ties also where the USTR determines that “an act, pol-
icy, or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or
discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States
commerce.” Id. § 2411(b)(1). This power is condi-
tioned on extensive procedural requirements including
an investigation that culminates in an affirmative find-
ing that another country imposed unfair trade barriers
under § 2411(a)(1)(A) or (B) or § 2411(b), and a public
notice and comment period. See id. § 2414(b).
 147a
C. Presidential Authority to Regulate Importa-
tion During National Emergencies
In 1917, Congress passed the Trading with the En-
emy Act (“TWEA”) to grant the President powers to
regulate international transactions with enemy powers
following the entry of the United States into World War
I. See Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-91,
§ 2, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 4301 to 4341); see also Christopher A. Casey & Jen-
nifer K. Elsea, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45168, The Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins,
Evolution, and Use 2-3 (2024). The Great Depression
then led Congress to expand the President’s authority
under TWEA to declare states of emergency and exer-
cise authority over international trade even outside
times of war. See Emergency Banking Relief Act,
Pub. L. No. 73-1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1, 1-2 (1933) (amending
TWEA). TWEA, as amended, grants the President
the broad authority to “regulate . . . importation or
exportation of . . . any property in which any for-
eign country or a national thereof has any interest.” 50
U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1)(B).
In 1974, the United States Customs Court, the pre-
decessor to the United States Court of International
Trade, heard a challenge to President Nixon’s imposi-
tion of a supplemental duty on all dutiable merchandise
imported into the United States. See Yoshida Int’l,
Inc. v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (1974) (“Yoshida
I”); see also Proclamation No. 4074, Imposition of Sup-
plemental Duty for Balance of Payments Purpose, 85
Stat. 926 (Aug. 15, 1971). The Government argued that
President Nixon’s actions were lawfully authorized by
TWEA. Yoshida I, 378 F. Supp. at 1157. The U.S.
 148a
Customs Court construed TWEA “so as to preserve its
constitutionality” and held that TWEA “precludes the
President from laying the supplemental duties provided
by [President Nixon].” Id. at 1173. The United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the prede-
cessor to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”), reversed the lower
court’s decision, holding that President Nixon’s duties
were “within the power constitutionally delegated to
him.” United States v. Yoshida Int’l. Inc., 526 F.2d
560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“Yoshida II”). The court rea-
soned that “Congress, in enacting [TWEA], authorized
the President, during an emergency, to exercise the del-
egated substantive power, i.e., to ‘regulate importation,’
by imposing an import duty surcharge or by other
means appropriately and reasonably related . . . to
the particular nature of the emergency declared.” Id.
at 576.
Shortly after this decision and following a review by
a Senate bipartisan special committee, Congress re-
formed the President’s emergency powers. As part of
this reform, Congress cabined the President’s powers
under TWEA to wartime. See Amendments to the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101-03, 91
Stat. 1625, 1625-26 (1977) (“[TWEA] is amended by
striking out ‘or during any other period of national
emergency declared by the President’ in the text pre-
ceding subparagraph (A).”). Congress also enacted a
new statute, IEEPA, to confer “upon the President a
new set of authorities for use in time of national emer-
gency which are both more limited in scope than those
of [TWEA] and subject to more procedural limitations,
including those of the National Emergencies Act.”
Comm. on Int’l Rels., Trading with the Enemy Act Re-
 149a
form Legislation, H.R. Rep. No. 95-459, at 2 (1977); see
also International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 201-08, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626-29
(1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-10).
Congress drew much of the relevant language in IEEPA
from TWEA, including language authorizing the Presi-
dent to “regulate . . . importation . . . of . . .
any property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest by any person . . . subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States. . . . ” 50
U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). In full, the relevant provision
of IEEPA provides that the President may:
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit—
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by,
through, or to any banking institution, to the ex-
tent that such transfers or payments involve any
interest of any foreign country or a national
thereof,
(ii) the importing or exporting of currency or se-
curities, by any person, or with respect to any
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States;
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an in-
vestigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void,
prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, with-
holding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exer-
cising any right, power, or privilege with respect to,
or transactions involving, any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest
 150a
by any person, or with respect to any property, sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States. . . .
Id. § 1702. IEEPA further provides that these authori-
ties “may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and
extraordinary threat with respect to which a national
emergency has been declared for purposes of this chap-
ter and may not be exercised for any other purpose.”
Id. § 1701(b).
D. The National Emergencies Act
As part of Congress’s reform of the President’s emer-
gency powers and in addition to amending TWEA and
enacting IEEPA, Congress enacted the National Emer-
gencies Act (“NEA”) in 1976. See National Emergen-
cies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 201, 90 Stat. 1255, 1255-
56 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1622).
That act provided for the termination of all existing
emergencies in 1978, except those making use of TWEA,
and placed new restrictions on the declaration of emer-
gencies. Id. First, the NEA requires the President
to transmit to Congress a notification of the declaration
of a national emergency. Id. Second, the act requires
a biannual review whereby “each House of Congress
shall meet to consider a vote on a . . . resolution to
determine whether that emergency shall be termi-
nated.” Id. At the time of its enactment in 1976, the
NEA afforded Congress the means to terminate a na-
tional emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in
each chamber. See id. However, the Supreme Court
later found Congress’s use of unicameral legislative ve-
toes, which terminated executive determinations with-
out presentment, to be unconstitutional. See INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Congress subsequently
amended the NEA to require a joint resolution rather
 151a
than a concurrent resolution to align the statutory scheme
with the implicit logic of Chadha. See Foreign Rela-
tions Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987,
Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 801, 98 Stat. 405, 448 (1985) (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1622). Following Chadha,
congressional action terminating a national emergency
is still subject to presidential veto, making congres-
sional review no more than the ordinary power to legis-
late.
II. Factual Background
Since taking office on January 20, 2025, the President
has declared several national emergencies and imposed
various tariffs in response. The President has subse-
quently issued a number of pauses and modifications to
those tariffs, as outlined in detail below.
A. Trafficking Tariffs
On the date of his inauguration, the President issued
Executive Order 14157, declaring a national emergency
under IEEPA to deal with the threats posed by interna-
tional cartels that “have engaged in a campaign of vio-
lence and terror throughout the Western Hemisphere
that has not only destabilized countries with significant
importance for our national interests but also flooded
the United States with deadly drugs, violent criminals,
and vicious gangs.” Executive Order 14157, Designat-
ing Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terror-
ist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Ter-
rorists, 90 Fed. Reg. 8439, 8439 (Jan. 20, 2025). The
President issued Proclamation 10886 on the same day,
declaring a national emergency at the southern border
caused by “cartels, criminal gangs, known terrorists, hu-
man traffickers, smugglers, unvetted military-age males
from foreign adversaries, and illicit narcotics that harm
 152a
Americans.” Proclamation 10886, Declaring a Na-
tional Emergency at the Southern Border of the United
States, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327, 8327 (Jan. 20, 2025).
Shortly thereafter, the President expanded the na-
tional emergency “to cover the threat to the safety and
security of Americans, including the public health crisis
of deaths due to the use of fentanyl and other illicit
drugs, and the failure of Canada to do more to arrest,
seize, detain, or otherwise intercept [drug trafficking or-
ganizations], other drug and human traffickers, crimi-
nals at large, and drugs.” Executive Order 14193, Im-
posing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs
Across Our Northern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113, 9114
(Feb. 1, 2025) (“Canada Tariff Order”). Similarly, the
President expanded the national emergency “to cover
the failure of the [People’s Republic of China] govern-
ment to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise intercept
chemical precursor suppliers, money launderers, other
[transnational criminal organizations], criminals at large,
and drugs.” Executive Order 14195, Imposing Duties
to Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the
People’s Republic of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 9121, 9122
(Feb. 1, 2025) (“China Tariff Order”).
In response to these emergencies, the President im-
posed 25 percent ad valorem duties on articles that are
products of Canada and Mexico, see Executive Order
14193, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9114; Executive Order 14194, Im-
posing Duties to Address the Situation at Our Southern
Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9117, 9118 (Feb. 1, 2025) (“Mexico
Tariff Order”), and a 10 percent ad valorem duty on ar-
ticles that are the products of China, see Executive Or-
der 14195, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9122. The President im-
posed a lower 10 percent ad valorem rate on energy and
 153a
energy resources from Canada. See Executive Order
14193, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9114. These duties were to take
effect on February 4, 2025. See id. The President
later raised the trafficking tariffs on Chinese products
from 10 percent to 20 percent. See Executive Order
14228, Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the
Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic
of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 11463, 11463 (Mar. 3, 2025).
On February 3, shortly after imposing the trafficking
tariffs, the President issued two additional executive or-
ders, finding that the governments of Mexico and Can-
ada “ha[ve] taken immediate steps designed to alleviate
the illegal migration and illicit drug crisis through coop-
erative actions.” Executive Order 14198, Progress on
the Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 Fed. Reg.
9185, 9185 (Feb. 3, 2025); Executive Order 14197, Pro-
gress on the Situation at Our Northern Border, 90 Fed.
Reg. 9183, 9183 (Feb. 3, 2025). As a result, the Presi-
dent imposed a pause on the 25 percent duties on Mexi-
can and Canadian products and on the 10 percent duties
on Canadian energy and energy resources, moving the
effective date of those duties to March 4, 2025. See id.
Since the trafficking tariffs took effect on February
4 for China and March 4 for Canada and Mexico, the
President has modified the rates further. The President
lowered the duty rate for potash 1 from Canada and
Mexico to 10 percent. See Executive Order 14231,
Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit

1
Potash is a soluble source of potassium and is primarily used as
an agricultural fertilizer. See National Minerals Information Cen-
ter, Potash Statistics and Information, U.S. Geological Service,
https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/
potash-statistics-and- information (last visited May 28, 2025).
 154a
Drugs Across Our Northern Border, 90 Fed. Reg.
11785, 11785 (Mar. 6, 2025); Executive Order 14232,
Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit
Drugs Across Our Southern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 11787,
11787 (Mar. 6, 2025). Additionally, the President im-
plemented duty-free de minimis treatment for other-
wise eligible covered articles. See Executive Order
14226, Amendment to Duties to Address the Flow of Il-
licit Drugs Across Our Northern Border, 90 Fed. Reg.
11369, 11369 (Mar. 2, 2025); Executive Order 14227,
Amendment to Duties to Address the Situation at Our
Southern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 11371, 11371 (Mar. 2,
2025); Executive Order 14200, Amendment to Duties
Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the
People’s Republic of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 9277, 9277
(Feb. 5, 2025). The President later removed this duty-
free de minimis treatment for Chinese products. See
Executive Order 14256, Further Amendment to Duties
Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the
People’s Republic of China as Applied to Low-Value Im-
ports, 90 Fed. Reg. 14899, 14899 (Apr. 2, 2025).
Currently, the trafficking tariffs all remain in place,
set at 25 percent for Mexican and Canadian products
and at 20 percent for Chinese products. The tariffs on
Canadian energy and energy resources remain at the
lower 10 percent rate. All of these tariffs, including the
modifications listed here, are hereafter referred to as
the “Trafficking Tariffs.”
B. Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs
On April 2, 2025, the President issued Executive Or-
der 14257, invoking IEEPA to impose a general 10 per-
cent ad valorem duty on “all imports from all trading
partners,” which “shall increase for” a list of 57 coun-
 155a
tries to higher rates ranging from 11 percent to as high
as 50 percent ad valorem. Executive Order 14257, Reg-
ulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify
Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persis-
tent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits, 90 Fed.
Reg. 15041, 15045 (Apr. 2, 2025). The President im-
posed these tariffs in response to a national emergency
with respect to “underlying conditions, including a lack
of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships, dis-
parate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers, and U.S. trad-
ing partners’ economic policies that suppress domestic
wages and consumption, as indicated by large and per-
sistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits.” Id. at 15041.
The President stated that these “large and persistent
annual U.S. goods trade deficits” constitute an “unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security and
economy of the United States,” having “its source in
whole or substantial part outside the United States in
the domestic economic policies of key trading partners
and structural imbalances in the global trading system.”
Id. On April 9, 2025, the President issued another Ex-
ecutive Order that paused, for all countries but China,
the implementation of the higher country-specific tariffs
for 90 days, moving their effective date to July 9, 2025.
See Executive Order 14266, Modifying Reciprocal Tariff
Rates to Reflect Trading Partner Retaliation and Align-
ment, 90 Fed. Reg. 15625, 15626 (Apr. 9, 2025).
As China responded to the various country-specific
tariff adjustments by adjusting its own tariff rates on
U.S. goods, the President has amended the duty rate on
Chinese goods several times in retaliation. The Presi-
dent first increased the China-specific duty rate from 34
to 84 percent effective April 8, see Executive Order
14259, Amendment to Reciprocal Tariffs and Updated
 156a
Duties as Applied to Low-Value Imports From the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 15509, 15509 (Apr.
8, 2025), and then from 84 to 125 percent effective April
10, 2025, see Executive Order 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. at
15626.
Currently, the worldwide tariffs remain in place at 10
percent for all countries, while the country-specific
higher rates are set to take effect on July 9, 2025. The
China-specific rate is now also at 10 percent2 after Pres-
ident Trump lowered the 125 percent retaliatory tariffs
in response to China, taking “a significant step . . .
toward remedying non-reciprocal trade arrangements
and addressing the concerns of the United States relat-
ing to economic and national security matters.” Exec-
utive Order 14298, Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates
To Reflect Discussions With the People’s Republic of
China, 90 Fed. Reg. 21831, 21831 (May 12, 2025). This
lower rate is effective until August 12, 2025. See id.
All of these tariffs, including the modifications listed
here, are hereafter referred to as the “Worldwide and
Retaliatory Tariffs.”
III. Procedural Background
The V.O.S. Plaintiffs brought an action against De-
fendants the United States, the President, and certain
agencies and officials (collectively, “the Government”)
on April 14, 2025, challenging the President’s imposition
of the Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs in Executive
Orders 14257 and 14266. See Compl., V.O.S. v. United

2
This 10 percent rate is in addition to the 20 percent Trafficking
Tariff addressed above. The total rate on Chinese goods is thus
currently set at 30 percent (subject to various exemptions not dis-
cussed here).
 157a
States, No. 25-00066, Apr. 14, 2025, ECF No. 2 (“V.O.S.
Compl.”), and subsequently filed an application for a
temporary restraining order alongside motions for pre-
liminary injunction and summary judgment. See Ap-
plication for TRO & Mot. for Prelim. Inj., and or Summ.
J., V.O.S. v. United States, No. 25-00066, Apr. 18, 2025,
ECF No. 10 (“Pls.’ V.O.S. Mots.”). After the court de-
nied the motion for a temporary restraining order, see
Order Denying TRO, V.O.S. v. United States, No. 25-
00066, Apr. 22, 2025, ECF No. 13, the Government filed
its combined response, see Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for
Summ. J. and Prelim. Inj., V.O.S. v. United States, No.
25-00066, Apr. 29, 2025, ECF No. 32 (“Gov’t Resp. to
V.O.S. Mots.”), and the V.O.S. Plaintiffs replied on May
6, 2025, see Reply in Supp. of Mots. for Prelim. Inj. and
Summ. J., V.O.S. v. United States, No. 25-00066, May 6,
2025, ECF No. 35 (“Pls.’ V.O.S. Reply”).3
After the V.O.S. Plaintiffs filed their motions and
during briefing in that case, the State Plaintiffs brought
a similar action against the Government on April 23,
2025, challenging the President’s Worldwide and Retal-
iatory Tariffs along with the President’s imposition of
Trafficking Tariffs in Executive Orders 14193, 14194,
and 14195. See Compl., Oregon v. United States, No.
25-00077, Apr. 23, 2025, ECF No. 2 (“Oregon Compl.”).
The plaintiffs in Oregon (“State Plaintiffs”) filed their
own motion for preliminary injunction on May 7, 2025,

3
Several entities filed amicus briefs in support of the Plaintiffs
in V.O.S. See Amici Curiae Br., V.O.S. v. United States, No. 25-
00066, Apr. 28, 2025, ECF No. 31 (“Legal Scholars Amicus Br.”);
Mot. for Leave to File an Amici Curiae Br., V.O.S. v. United States,
No. 25-00066, May 12, 2025, ECF No. 49 (“Princess Awesome Ami-
cus Br.”); Amicus Curiae Br., V.O.S. v. United States, No. 25-00066,
May 9, 2025, ECF No. 44 (“Inst. for Pol. Integrity Amicus Br.”).
 158a
see Or. Pls.’ Mot., Oregon v. United States, No. 25-
00077, May 7, 2025, ECF No. 14 (“Pls.’ Oregon Mot.”).
The court construed the State Plaintiffs’ motion for pre-
liminary injunction as a motion for summary judgment,
see Order Construing Mot. for Prelim. Inj. as Mot. for
Summ. J., Oregon v. United States, No. 25-00077, May
8, 2025, ECF No. 18, the State Plaintiffs filed a supple-
mental brief, see Supp’l Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., Or-
egon v. United States, No. 25-00077, May 13, 2025, ECF
No. 32 (“Pls.’ Oregon Supp’l Br.”), the Government re-
sponded, see Gov’t Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J.,
Oregon v. United States, No. 25-00077, May 16, 2025,
ECF No. 41, and the State Plaintiffs replied, see Reply
in Supp. of Summ. J., Oregon v. United States, No. 25-
00077, May 20, 2025, ECF No. 47 (“Pls.’ Oregon Reply”).
The Government filed an amended response shortly
thereafter. See Order for Amended Resp., May 17, 2025,
Oregon v. United States, No. 25-00077, ECF No. 42;
Amended Resp., Oregon v. United States, No. 25-00077,
May 19, 2025, ECF No. 46 (“Gov’t Resp. to Oregon
Mots.”). 4 The court held oral argument in V.O.S. on
Tuesday, May 13, 2025, and in Oregon on Wednesday,
May 21, 2025.

4
Several entities filed amicus briefs in support of the Plaintiffs
in Oregon. See Amicus Curiae Br., Oregon v. United States, No.
25-00077, May 16, 2025, ECF No. 40 (“Members of Congress Ami-
cus Br.”); Amicus Curiae Br., Oregon v. United States, No. 25-
00077, May 15, 2025, ECF No. 38 (“Cal. Amicus Br.”); Amicus Cu-
riae Br., Oregon v. United States, No. 25-00077, May 20, 2025, ECF
No. 53 (“Wash. Amicus Br.”). One party filed an amicus brief in
support of the Government in Oregon. See Amicus Curiae Br.,
Oregon v. United States, No. 25-00077, May 20, 2025, ECF No. 51
(“America First Legal Found. Amicus Br.”).
 159a
JURISDICTION
The Court of International Trade has exclusive juris-
diction to hear this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i),
which gives the court:
exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced
against the United States, its agencies, or its officers,
that arises out of any law of the United States provid-
ing for—
(A) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(B) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the im-
portation of merchandise for reasons other than
the raising of revenue;
(C) embargoes or other quantitative re-
strictions on the importation of merchandise for
reasons other than the protection of the public
health or safety; or
(D) administration and enforcement with re-
spect to the matters referred to in subparagraphs
(A) through (C) of this paragraph and subsections
(a)-(h) of this section.
Id. § 1581(i)(1); see also id. § 1337(c) (“The district
courts shall not have jurisdiction under this section of
any matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of International Trade. . . . ”). Here, the plaintiffs
in both cases (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) challenge tariffs
imposed by the President under IEEPA, which provides
that the President, under certain conditions and with
some elsewhere-enumerated exceptions, may:
investigate, block during the pendency of an investi-
gation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, pre-
vent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withhold-
 160a
ing, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, impor-
tation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising
any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any for-
eign country or a national thereof has any interest by
any person, or with respect to any property, subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States.
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). The challenged Executive
Orders, in turn, invoke this statute to impose tariffs (al-
ternatively referred to as “duties”) on merchandise from
both specific countries and a list that includes “all trad-
ing partners” of the United States. See, e.g., Execu-
tive Order 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15645. The Executive
Orders made amendments to the HTSUS, which are set
forth in subheading 9903.01. The HTSUS is the law of
the United States setting tariffs. 5
For the purpose of locating jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i), an action involving a challenge to a
presidential action that imposes tariffs, duties, or other
import restrictions is one that arises from a “law provid-
ing for” those measures. See Luggage & Leather
Goods Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 258,

5
This does not mean that Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claims must in-
stead route through 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which provides for “any
civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest” to “the
... amount of duties chargeable” on an entry, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1514(a)(2). As the Supreme Court has explained, “protests are
not pivotal” in circumstances where Customs operates under a
binding external directive—as where “Customs performs no active
role, it undertakes no analysis or adjudication, issues no directives,
imposes no liabilities; instead, Customs merely passively collects
. . . payments.” United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360,
365 (1998) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omit-
ted).
 161a
267, 588 F. Supp. 1413, 1419-21 (1984); U.S. Cane Sugar
Refiners’ Ass’n v. Block, 3 CIT 196, 200-01, 544 F. Supp.
883, 886 (1982), aff’d, 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 255 (contemplating “civil action[s]” fall-
ing under this court’s jurisdiction that “raise[] . . .
issue[s] of the constitutionality of . . . a proclama-
tion of the President or an Executive order”). The
Federal Circuit has confirmed that presidential action
creates an appropriate basis for (i) jurisdiction, noting
without disapproval that there are “numerous cases in
which the Court of International Trade has . . . con-
sidered challenges to the actions of the President pur-
suant to the grant of jurisdiction in § 1581(i).” Humane
Soc’y of United States v. Clinton, 236 F.3d 1320, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing, inter alia, Luggage & Leather
Goods, 7 CIT 258, 588 F. Supp. 1413 and U.S. Cane
Sugar Refiners’ Ass’n, 3 CIT 196, 544 F. Supp. 883).
This means that Plaintiffs’ various challenges to the
presidential actions here, successful or not, fall under
this court’s exclusive jurisdiction. And while “section
1581(i) does not authorize proceedings directly against
the President,” meaning the President must be dis-
missed from the two cases before the court, Corus Grp.
PLC. v. ITC, 352 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the
court retains “jurisdiction to consider challenges to the
President’s actions in suits against subordinate officials
who are charged with implementing the presidential di-
rectives,” USP Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 36 F.4th
1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2022). That group covers the rest
of the named Defendants in both cases. All relief will
run against the United States and its “officers,” a cate-
gory which for jurisdictional purposes does not include
the President. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
 162a
STANDING
Article III of the Constitution requires plaintiffs in
federal court to have standing to sue. 6 “[T]he plaintiff
must have suffered an injury in fact—a concrete and im-
minent harm to a legally protected interest, like prop-
erty or money—that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct and likely to be redressed by the lawsuit.”
Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 489 (2023) (citing
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
“A plaintiff may establish its injury-in-fact ‘in the same
way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof.’ ” Canadian Lumber Trade All. v.
United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
I. Article III Standing of V.O.S. Plaintiffs
A non-importer plaintiff may “fairly employ eco-
nomic logic” to establish a concrete and particularized
injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to a challenged tar-
iff. Id. at 1333. A plaintiff that takes that route must
show that the challenged tariff is “likely to cause [the
plaintiff] an economic injury,” and that “this injury
would be prevented by a declaratory judgment and in-
junction” setting that tariff aside. Id. at 1334. The
V.O.S. Plaintiffs have done so here.
The businesses that bring the V.O.S. action—V.O.S.
Selections, Genova Pipe, MicroKits, FishUSA, and

6
The Government does not appear to contest statutory or “pru-
dential” standing, which unlike Article III standing can be waived.
See Brooklyn Brewery Corp. v. Brooklyn Brew Shop, 17 F.4th 129,
140 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
 163a
Terry Cycling—allege and aver 7 that they have suf-
fered (and will continue to suffer) economic injuries as a
result of the Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs. See
V.O.S. Compl. ¶¶ 52-56. V.O.S. alleges that the World-
wide and Retaliatory Tariffs have occasioned difficulties
with sourcing and pricing, and also that “[t]he reduction
in cash flow caused by increased tariffs also necessarily
reduces the company’s inventory and the level of busi-
ness that V.O.S. can conduct, leading to an overall re-
duction in purchase orders placed with both foreign and
domestic suppliers.” Id. ¶ 52. Its CEO avers in a dec-
laration that “[t]ariffs must be paid by V.O.S. upon arri-
val at the Port of New York, putting a large, immediate,
strain on its cash flow.” Schwartz Decl. ¶ 25. Genova
Pipe alleges major sourcing problems stemming from
the Worldwide Tariffs, and also that “[t]he tariffs will
directly increase the cost of raw materials, manufactur-
ing equipment, and resale goods imported from abroad
by Genova Pipe.” V.O.S. Compl. ¶ 53; see generally
Reese Decl. MicroKits alleges that “[a]t the current
rates” of the Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs it “can-
not order parts from China and will have to pause oper-
ations when it runs out of parts,” and also that as a result
it “will likely be unable to pay its employees, will lose
money, and as a result may go out of business.” V.O.S.
Compl. ¶ 54; see also Levi Decl. ¶ 13. FishUSA alleges

7
To establish standing at the summary judgment stage, a plain-
tiff “must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts,
which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken
to be true.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Executives of the various V.O.S. Plaintiffs have
submitted declarations with their companies’ motions. See Pls.’
V.O.S. Mots. at Exs. A-E (Decls. of Victor Schwartz, Andrew
Reese, David Levi, Dan Pastore, & Nikolaus Holm).
 164a
that “[t]he tariffs have caused [it] to delay shipment of
finished goods from China due to the unpredictability of
the tariff rate that will be imposed when the product ar-
rives, and [that] it has also paused production of some
products,” and states that these conditions inhibit its
business growth. V.O.S. Compl. ¶ 55; see generally
Pastore Decl. Terry Cycling alleges that it “has already
paid $25,000 in unplanned tariffs this year for goods for
which Terry was the importer of record,” and “projects
that the tariffs will cost the company approximately
$250,000 by the end of 2025.” V.O.S. Compl. ¶ 56; see
generally Holm Decl.
These allegations and declarations establish the Ar-
ticle III standing of all V.O.S. Plaintiffs. While the
Government objects that “no plaintiff has offered evi-
dence that it has actually paid tariffs pursuant to the Ex-
ecutive Orders,” Gov’t Resp. to V.O.S. TRO Applica-
tion at 17, Apr. 21, 2025, ECF No. 12, the Government
does not meaningfully contest the “economic logic” trac-
ing the Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs to the V.O.S.
Plaintiffs’ showings of downstream harm. See Cana-
dian Lumber, 517 F.3d at 1333.
While the Government further objects that “[a]t the
very least, the Court should hold that FishUSA and
MicroKits lack standing, given that they do not even al-
lege that they intend to import articles subject to the
tariffs within any particular period of time,” Gov’t Resp.
to V.O.S. TRO Application at 18, this point rests on an
unsupported import-only rule of standing. 8 To suffer

8
Responding to the State Plaintiffs’ Motions, the Government
argues that “[w]hile importers have standing to challenge tariffs,
purchasers of imported goods do not.” Gov’t Resp. to Oregon
Mots. at 11. For that proposition the Government quotes Totes-
 165a
an economic injury from a tariff it is not necessary to
incur direct liability to Customs, or even to directly im-
port an article of dutiable merchandise. Fair traceabil-
ity is more flexible than that. See Invenergy Renewa-
bles LLC v. United States, 43 CIT , , 422 F. Supp.
3d 1255, 1273 (2019) (“The court determines that this
‘economic logic’ applies here: the duty on bifacial panels
will increase—and, with it, likely Plaintiffs’ costs—if the
Withdrawal goes into effect.”). Here, injuries like (1)
the prohibitively high price of operationally necessary
components, see Levi Decl., and (2) the stoppage of or-
ders and product production, see Pastore Decl., are
“concrete and imminent harm[s] to a legally protected
interest, like property or money—that [are] fairly trace-
able to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed
by the lawsuit.” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 489.
II. Article III Standing of State Plaintiffs
The standing inquiry is even simpler for the State
Plaintiffs. The State Plaintiffs allege “direct financial
harm” from the challenged tariffs’ impact on the cost of
imported goods that are “essential” to the states’ provi-
sion of public services, see Oregon Compl. ¶¶ 94-112, and
also from their impact on “Plaintiff States’ ability to pro-
cure goods and services and to budget for and audit
price adjustments,” id. ¶ 114.

Isotoner Corp. v. United States, where the Federal Circuit held

that “purchasers have no remedy to challenge the tariff classifica-
tion.” 594 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010). This reference to a
lack of a remedy, however, had nothing to do with the purchasers’
Article III standing. It instead had to do with the fact that a pur-
chaser could not have “sought a refund of duties” that it never paid
to Customs, a fact that in turn supported an importer’s claim of
third-party standing on the purchaser’s behalf. See id. at 1350.
 166a
The Government implicitly concedes that Oregon,
Arizona, Colorado, and Connecticut are “importers who
have personally paid tariffs” who thus “have standing to
challenge tariffs.” Gov’t Resp. to Oregon Mots. at 11.
The Government is right to make this concession:
challenged conduct that “directly injures” a state can
also “confer[] standing on that State.” Biden v. Ne-
braska, 600 U.S. at 489. And an importer’s allegation
that it pays unlawful U.S. duties “typically would satisfy
constitutional standing requirements.” Totes-Iso-
toner, 594 F.3d at 1351.
Since “[i]f at least one plaintiff has standing, the suit
may proceed,” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 489 (cita-
tion omitted), there is no need to go further. The State
Plaintiffs seek only broad injunctive and declaratory re-
lief. That means that even if the non-importer states
among them were to hypothetically lack standing, the
contours of available relief would not change. See Or-
egon Compl. at 35-36.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the mo-
vant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” USCIT R. 56(a).
28 U.S.C. § 2640(e) provides that “[i]n any civil action
not specified in this section,” which includes actions un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), “the Court of International
Trade shall review the matter as provided in section 706
of title 5.” This references the “[s]cope of review” sec-
tion of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), cod-
ified at 5 U.S.C. § 706, which provides that “[t]he review-
ing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be
 167a
. . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law” or “in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2640(e) does not address what happens
when an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) challenges ac-
tions by the President, which unlike agency actions “are
not subject to [the APA’s] requirements.” Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992). But the
court “presume[s] that review is available when a stat-
ute is silent,” Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 346 (2022).
Also, “claims that the President’s actions violated the
statutory authority delegated to him . . . are re-
viewable.” USP Holdings, 36 F.4th at 1365. The Fed-
eral Circuit has observed that “[i]t is enough to say that
some non-APA review remains available for constitu-
tional issues, questions about the scope of statutory au-
thority, and compliance with procedural requirements.”
Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 806
F. App’x 982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential); see
also Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787,
795 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he Executive’s decisions in the
sphere of international trade are reviewable only to de-
termine whether the President’s action falls within his
delegated authority, whether the statutory language
has been properly construed, and whether the Presi-
dent’s action conforms with the relevant procedural re-
quirements.”); Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States,
762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“For a court to inter-
pose, there has to be a clear misconstruction of the gov-
erning statute, a significant procedural violation, or ac-
tion outside delegated authority.”); United States v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 20 C.C.P.A. 295, 305 (1932) (re-
viewing the President’s issuance of a proclamation “for
 168a
the purpose of determining whether he has exceeded the
powers delegated to him.”).
As it undertakes this review function, “[t]he Court of
International Trade shall possess all the powers in law
and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district
court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1585.
DISCUSSION
Underlying the issues in this case is the notion that
“the powers properly belonging to one of the depart-
ments ought not to be directly and completely adminis-
tered by either of the other departments.” Federalist
No. 48 (James Madison). Because of the Constitution’s
express allocation of the tariff power to Congress, see
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, we do not read IEEPA to
delegate an unbounded tariff authority to the President.
We instead read IEEPA’s provisions to impose mean-
ingful limits on any such authority it confers. Two are
relevant here. First, § 1702’s delegation of a power to
“regulate . . . importation,” read in light of its legis-
lative history and Congress’s enactment of more nar-
row, non-emergency legislation, at the very least does
not authorize the President to impose unbounded tar-
iffs. The Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs lack any
identifiable limits and thus fall outside the scope of
§ 1702. Second, IEEPA’s limited authorities may be
exercised only to “deal with an unusual and extraordi-
nary threat with respect to which a national emergency
has been declared . . . and may not be exercised for
any other purpose.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (emphasis
added). As the Trafficking Tariffs do not meet that
condition, they fall outside the scope of § 1701.
 169a
I. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 Does Not Authorize the Worldwide
and Retaliatory Tariffs
Plaintiffs in both cases argue that the words “regu-
late . . . importation” do not confer the power to im-
pose tariffs. See Pls.’ V.O.S. Reply at 3; Pls.’ Oregon
Mot. at 15. Any other interpretation, according to
Plaintiffs, would run afoul of both the nondelegation
doctrine and the major questions doctrine. See Pls.’
V.O.S. Mot at 15; Pls.’ Oregon Mot. at 18-19. The Gov-
ernment counters that the words “regulate . . . im-
portation” have the same meaning that they did in
TWEA, an older statute that was found to delegate a
power to impose tariffs. See Gov’t Resp. to V.O.S.
Mots. at 17-19; Gov’t Resp. to Oregon Mots. at 17-18.
Plaintiffs are correct in the narrow sense that the im-
precise term “regulate . . . importation,” under any
construction that would comport with the separation-of-
powers underpinnings of the nondelegation and major
questions doctrines, does not authorize anything as un-
bounded as the Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs.
See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 286 (2018)
(“[W]hen statutory language is susceptible of multiple
interpretations, a court may shun an interpretation that
raises serious constitutional doubts and instead . . .
adopt an alternative that avoids those problems.”).
The court in Yoshida II recognized that a case involving
a claim to such unlimited authority might arise, observ-
ing that “[w]hether a delegation of such breadth as to
have authorized [the tariffs here] would be constitution-
ally embraced, is determined . . . by the nature of
the particular surcharge herein and its relationship to
other statutes, as well as by its relationship to the par-
ticular emergency confronted.” 526 F.2d at 576-77; see
 170a
also Proclamation No. 4074, 85 Stat. 926. That case has
arisen here.
A. An Unlimited Delegation of Tariff Authority
Would Be Unconstitutional
The Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Pow-
ers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States.” U.S. Const. art. 1, § 1. Congress is
empowered “[t]o make all Laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution” its general
powers. Id. § 8, cl. 18. The Constitution thus estab-
lishes a separation of powers between the legislative and
executive branches that the Framers viewed as essential
to the preservation of individual liberty. See, e.g., The
Federalist No. 48 (James Madison). To maintain this
separation of powers, “[t]he Congress manifestly is not
permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essen-
tial legislative functions with which it is thus vested.”
Pan. Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); see
also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692
(1892).
The parties cite two doctrines—the nondelegation
doctrine and the major questions doctrine—that the ju-
diciary has developed to ensure that the branches do not
impermissibly abdicate their respective constitutionally
vested powers. Under the nondelegation doctrine,
Congress must “lay down by legislative act an intelligi-
ble principle to which the person or body authorized to
fix such [tariff] rates is directed to conform.” J.W.
Hampton, Jr., 276 U.S. at 409 (1928); see also Pan. Re-
fining, 293 U.S. at 429-30. A statute lays down an in-
telligible principle when it “meaningfully constrains”
the President’s authority. Touby v. United States, 500
U.S. 160, 166 (1991); see also Fed. Energy Admin. v. Al-
 171a
gonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559-60 (1976). Under
the major questions doctrine, when Congress delegates
powers of “‘vast economic and political significance,’” it
must “speak clearly.” Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS,
594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021) (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v.
EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)); Indus. Union Dep’t,
AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980).
The doctrine applies in “‘extraordinary cases’ . . . in
which the ‘history and the breadth of the authority that
[the executive branch] has asserted,’ and the ‘economic
and political significance’ of that assertion, provide ‘a
reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress
meant to confer such authority.’ ” West Virginia v.
EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022) (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000));
see also Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 501.
Plaintiffs and some Amici argue that the Govern-
ment’s interpretation transforms IEEPA into an imper-
missible delegation of power because “[t]he President’s
assertion of authority here has no meaningful limiting
standards, essentially enabling him to impose any tariff
rate he wants on any country at any time, for virtually
any reason.” Pls.’ V.O.S. Mots. at 25; see also Pls.’ Or-
egon Mots. at 19; Pls.’ V.O.S. Reply at 22. Similarly,
Plaintiffs suggest that Congress’s use of the words “reg-
ulate . . . importation” does not indicate the clear
mandate necessary to delegate “such unbounded au-
thority to the President to make such decisions of ‘vast
economic and political significance,’ ” as the wide-scale
imposition of tariffs. Pls.’ Oregon Mot. at 18; see also
Pls.’ V.O.S. Reply at 17; Inst. for Pol. Integrity’s Amicus
Br. at 16-18. The Government counters that IEEPA
contains sufficient limitations: the President must de-
clare a national emergency, the emergency expires after
 172a
one year unless renewed, the emergency must be de-
clared with respect to an “unusual and extraordinary
threat,” and the powers must extend only to property in
which a foreign country or foreign national has an inter-
est. Gov’t Resp. to V.O.S. Mots. at 28-29.
The separation of powers is always relevant to dele-
gations of power between the branches. Both the non-
delegation and the major questions doctrines, even if not
directly applied to strike down a statute as unconstitu-
tional, provide useful tools for the court to interpret
statutes so as to avoid constitutional problems. These
tools indicate that an unlimited delegation of tariff au-
thority would constitute an improper abdication of leg-
islative power to another branch of government. Re-
gardless of whether the court views the President’s ac-
tions through the nondelegation doctrine, through the
major questions doctrine, or simply with separation of
powers in mind, any interpretation of IEEPA that dele-
gates unlimited tariff authority is unconstitutional.
1. The Words “Regulate . . . Importation”
Do Not Authorize the President to Impose
Unlimited Tariffs
With these principles in place, the court turns to the
interpretive question at hand. Recall that both TWEA
and IEEPA authorize the President to “regulate . . .
importation.” See 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1)(B); id.
§ 1702(a)(1)(B). The court in Yoshida II noted that
“[t]he express delegation in [TWEA] is broad” and in-
cludes the power to “impos[e] an import duty sur-
charge.” Yoshida II, 526 F.2d at 573, 576. While the
words “regulate . . . importation” may exist in iden-
tical form in IEEPA, those words do not confer unlim-
ited tariff authority.
 173a
In interpreting TWEA, the appellate court in Yo-
shida II recognized the importance of the separation of
powers, noting the lower court’s warning that “a finding
that the President has the power under [TWEA] to im-
pose whatever tariff rates he deems desirable simply by
declaring a national emergency would not only render
our trade agreements program nugatory, it would sub-
vert the manifest Congressional intent to maintain
control over its Constitutional powers to levy tariffs.”
Yoshida II, 526 F.2d at 577 (quoting Yoshida I, 378
F. Supp. at 1182 (Maletz, J., concurring)). Though the
appellate court in Yoshida II interpreted TWEA so as to
include tariff authority, the court also repeatedly noted
the constitutional concerns that would arise if the Pres-
ident exercised unlimited tariff authority based on the
words “regulate . . . importation.” For example,
the court stated that “[t]he mere incantation of ‘national
emergency’ cannot, of course, sound the death-knell of
the Constitution.” Id. at 583. Indeed, according to
the court, “[t]he declaration of a national emergency is
not a talisman enabling the President to rewrite the tar-
iff schedules.” Id.9 While the court in Yoshida II ul-
timately reversed the lower court’s decision and upheld
President Nixon’s tariffs, it upheld the tariffs on the ba-

9
This concern is even more significant today given the limited
nature of Congress’s review over national emergencies. Recall
that the NEA originally provided Congress with the means to ter-
minate a national emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution.
See National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 201, 90 Stat.
1255, 1255-56 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1622).
Today the NEA is much less restricted, requiring Congress to act
with a veto-proof majority of both houses. See Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93,
§ 801, 98 Stat. 405, 448 (1985) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1622).
 174a
sis that they were limited, “which is quite different from
imposing whatever tariff rates he deems desirable.”
Id. at 578 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The limitations of President Nixon’s tariffs were es-
sential to the court’s determination that “regulate . . .
importation” permitted the President’s actions in Yo-
shida II. For example, the court noted that President
Nixon did not “fix[] rates in disregard of congressional
will.” Id. at 577. The court emphasized that Presi-
dent Nixon “imposed a limited surcharge, as a tempo-
rary measure calculated to help meet a particular na-
tional emergency, which is quite different from impos-
ing whatever tariff rates he deems desirable.” Id. at
578 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (em-
phasis added). The court emphasized further that it
was not deciding a case in which the President exerted
unlimited tariff authority, and that “presidential actions
must be judged in the light of what the President actu-
ally did, not in the light of what he could have done.”
Id. at 577. The court also explicitly stated that its de-
cision did not “approve in advance any future surcharge
of a different nature,” id., and its decision did “not here
sanction the exercise of an unlimited power, which, we
agree with the Customs Court, would be to strike a blow
to our Constitution,” id. at 583.
Like the court in Yoshida II, this court does not read
the words “regulate . . . importation” in IEEPA as
authorizing the President to impose whatever tariff
rates he deems desirable. Indeed, such a reading
would create an unconstitutional delegation of power.
See id. Importantly, President Trump’s tariffs do not
include the limitations that the court in Yoshida II relied
upon in upholding President Nixon’s actions under
 175a
TWEA. Where President Nixon’s tariffs were ex-
pressly limited by the rates established in the HTSUS,
see Proclamation No. 4074, 85 Stat. at 927, the tariffs
here contain no such limit . Absent these limitations, this
is exactly the scenario that the lower court warned of in
Yoshida I—and that the appellate court acknowledged
in Yoshida II.
In sum, just as the court recognized in Yoshida II, the
words “regulate . . . importation” cannot grant the
President unlimited tariff authority. Thus, this court
reads “regulate . . . importation” to provide more
limited authority so as to avoid constitutional infirmities
and maintain the “separate and distinct exercise of the
different powers of government” that is “essential to the
preservation of liberty.” The Federalist No. 51 (Alex-
ander Hamilton or James Madison).
B. Congress Delegated Narrower Authority to
the President Through IEEPA than It Dele-
gated Through TWEA
While TWEA and IEEPA both grant the President
the power to “regulate . . . importation,” see 50
U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1)(B); id. § 1702(a)(1)(B), Congress en-
acted IEEPA with the intent of limiting presidential
power. The legislative history surrounding IEEPA
confirms that the words “regulate . . . importation”
have a narrower meaning than the power to impose any
tariffs whatsoever. Id. § 1702(a)(1)(B). Congress’s
enactment of Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, see
Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 122, 88 Stat. 1978, 1987 (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 2132), and Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, see Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411), grants the President au-
thority to impose restricted tariffs in response to “fun-
 176a
damental international payment problems,” including
“large and serious balance-of-payments deficits,” and
unfair trading practices, thereby limiting any such au-
thority in the broader emergency powers under IEEPA.
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 122, 88 Stat.
1978, 1987 (1974).
In enacting reform legislation including IEEPA,
Representative John Bingham, Chair of the House In-
ternational Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on
Economic Policy, described TWEA as conferring “on
the president what could have been dictatorial powers
that he could have used without any restraint by the
Congress.” House Committee on International Rela-
tions, 95th Cong., Revision of the Trading with the En-
emy Act: Markup before the Committee on Interna-
tional Relations 5 (Comm. Print 1977). Similarly, the
House report on the reform legislation called TWEA
“essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the Pres-
ident to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both
the domestic and international economic arena, without
congressional review.” Comm. on Int’l Rels., Trading
with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, H.R. Rep. No.
95-459, at 7 (1977).
Congress reformed the President’s emergency pow-
ers in part by enacting IEEPA to provide “the President
a new set of authorities for use in time of national emer-
gency which are both more limited in scope than those
of [TWEA] and subject to various procedural limita-
tions, including those of the [NEA].” Id. at 2; see also
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub.
L. No. 95-223, §§ 201-08, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626-29 (1977)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-10). Thus,
Congress enacted IEEPA to limit executive authority
 177a
over international economic transactions, not merely to
continue the executive authority granted by TWEA.
1. Congress Cabined the President’s Author-
ity to Impose Tariffs in Response to Bal-
ance-of-Payments Deficits to Non-Emer-
gency Legislation
When President Nixon imposed in 1971 the tariffs
challenged in Yoshida II, he was responding to a mone-
tary crisis—brought on by the peg of the U.S. dollar to
a fixed price of 35 dollars per ounce of gold—as reflected
in part in growing balance-of-payments deficits. See The
Office of the Historian, Nixon and the End of the Bretton
Woods System, 1971-1973, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://
history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/nixon-shock (last
visited May 28, 2025). External values of foreign cur-
rencies were fixed in relation to the U.S. dollar, whose
value was in turn expressed in gold at a congressionally
set price. See id. A surplus of U.S. dollars threat-
ened the ability of the United States to meet its obliga-
tions and, thereby, the entire Bretton Woods system, as
the United States did not have enough gold to cover the
volume of dollars in worldwide circulation. See id.
Accordingly, on August 15, 1971, President Nixon imme-
diately cancelled the direct international convertibility
of the U.S. dollar to gold, took a series of other actions
such as the imposition of wage and price controls, and
issued Proclamation 4074 in which he declared a na-
tional emergency and introduced a ten percent import
surcharge.10 See Christopher A. Casey & Jennifer K.
Elsea, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45168, The International

10
Notably, Proclamation 4074 did not mention TWEA. See gen-
erally 85 Stat. 926.
 178a
Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution,
and Use 2 (2024).
In 1974, Congress enacted the Trade Act, including
Section 122 dealing with remedies for balance-of-
payments deficits. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-618, § 122, 88 Stat. 1978, 1987-89 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2132). Section 122 is titled “[b]alance-of-
payments authority” and specifically addresses Presi-
dential proclamations of “temporary import sur-
charge[s]” and “temporary limitations through the use
of quotas” in situations of “fundamental international
payments problems.” Id. Section 122 sets specific lim-
its on the President’s authority to respond to balance-of-
payments problems, such as a 15 percent cap on tariffs
and a maximum duration of 150 days. See id. Con-
gress’s enactment of Section 122 indicates that even
“large and serious United States balance-of-payments
deficits” do not necessitate the use of emergency powers
and justify only the President’s imposition of limited
remedies subject to enumerated procedural constraints.
See id.; see also Yoshida II, 526 F.2d at 578 (“Congress
has said what may be done with respect to foreseeable
events in the Tariff Act, the [Trade Expansion Act], and
in the Trade Act of 1974 (all of which are in force) and
has said what may be done with respect to unforeseeable
events in the TWEA.”). In these ways, Section 122 re-
moves the President’s power to impose remedies in re-
sponse to balance-of-payments deficits, and specifically
trade deficits, from the broader powers granted to a
president during a national emergency under IEEPA by
 179a
establishing an explicit non-emergency statute with
greater limitations. 11
The President’s imposition of the Worldwide and Re-
taliatory Tariffs responds to an imbalance in trade—a
type of balance-of-payments deficit—and thus falls un-
der the narrower, non-emergency authorities in Section
122. The balance-of-payments is the “[r]ecord of trans-
actions between U.S. residents and foreign residents
during a given time period . . . includ[ing] transac-
tions in goods, services, income, assets, and liabilities,”
and always balances to zero. Balance of Payments,

11
The court in Yoshida II recognized that before Section 122 was
in effect, the Nixon surcharge “did not run counter to any explicit
legislation” and there existed no statute “other than the TWEA,
providing procedures for dealing with a national emergency involv-
ing a balance of payments problem such as that which existed in
1971.” United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 578
(C.C.P.A. 1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court in
Yoshida II recognized further that after Section 122 was in effect,
Section 122’s limits would apply regardless of whether an emer-
gency declared was extant. Id. at 582 n.33. The court noted that
the balance-of-payments emergency declared by President Nixon
had not been terminated, in contradiction with the expectation that
“emergencies are expected to be shortlived.” Id. at 582. How-
ever, the court found that “the failure to terminate the emergency
has been rendered moot by Congressional enactment of [Section
122], specifically requiring the President, within certain parame-
ters, to impose a surcharge or quotas in response to balance of pay-
ments problems.” Id. at 582 n.33. The court concluded that “[a]
surcharge imposed after Jan. 3, 1975 must, of course, comply with
the statute now governing such action.” Id. Thus, the court rea-
soned that any tariffs imposed in response to the balance-of-pay-
ments problem after the enactment of Section 122, including any
imposed in response to the balance-of-payments emergency de-
clared by President Nixon, must comply not with a broad emer-
gency statute, but with Section 122.
 180a
Bureau of Econ. Analysis (last modified Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.bea.gov/help/glossary/balance-payments.
The term “balance-of-payments deficits” within Section
122 refers, necessarily, to deficits within the various ac-
counts comprising the balance-of-payments (including
the trade of goods) rather than to an overall summary
deficit, because there cannot be a balance-of-payments
deficit per se. Trade deficits are one of the key bal-
ance-of-payment deficits and can be directly impacted
by mechanisms such as import quotas and tariffs, as au-
thorized by Section 122. As a result, tariffs responding
to a trade deficit fit under Section 122 because they
“deal with [a] large and serious United States balance-
of-payments deficit[].” 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a)(1). Thus,
the President’s Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs, im-
posed in response to a balance-of-payments deficit, must
conform with the limits of Section 122.
The legislative history surrounding IEEPA confirms
that Congress cabined any presidential authority to im-
pose tariffs in response to balance-of-payments deficits
to a narrower, non-emergency statute. To prevent
IEEPA from becoming another “essentially . . . un-
limited grant of authority,” the House International Re-
lations Committee suggested that “whenever possible,
authority for routine, non[-]emergency regulation of in-
ternational economic transactions which has heretofore
been conducted under [TWEA] should be transferred to
other legislation,” and further stated that IEEPA “does
not include authorities more appropriately lodged in
other legislation. . . . ” H.R. Rep. No. 95-459 at 7,
10-11. This reflects that in enacting Section 122, Con-
gress narrowed the President’s emergency authority to
impose tariffs in response to balance-of-payments defi-
cits. The words “regulate . . . importation” within
 181a
IEEPA do not, therefore, permit the President to im-
pose tariffs in response to balance-of-payments deficits.
Because the Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs deal
with “large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade def-
icits,” Executive Order 14257, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15041,
these actions address a balance-of-payments deficit and
therefore must comply with the limitations in Sections
122. The Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs do not
comply with the limitations Congress imposed upon the
President’s power to respond to balance-of-payments
deficits. The President’s assertion of tariff-making au-
thority in the instant case, unbounded as it is by any lim-
itation in duration or scope, exceeds any tariff authority
delegated to the President under IEEPA. The World-
wide and Retaliatory tariffs are thus ultra vires and con-
trary to law.
II. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 Does Not Authorize the Traffick-
ing Tariffs
IEEPA does not authorize the Trafficking Tariffs for
the separate reason that they do not satisfy the condi-
tions that Congress imposed in 50 U.S.C. § 1701:
(a) Any authority granted to the President by section
1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any
unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United
States, to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States, if the President de-
clares a national emergency with respect to such
threat.
(b) The authorities granted to the President by sec-
tion 1702 of this title may only be exercised to deal
with an unusual and extraordinary threat with re-
 182a
spect to which a national emergency has been de-
clared for purposes of this chapter and may not be
exercised for any other purpose. Any exercise of
such authorities to deal with any new threat shall be
based on a new declaration of national emergency
which must be with respect to such threat.
This provision limits the President’s exercise of IEEPA
powers to a limited set of situations. Cf. Silfab Solar,
Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (identifying a statutory “condition necessary for
the President to take action”). Under it, IEEPA pow-
ers are available only where all of the following condi-
tions pertain: First, there must be a “threat . . .
which has its source in whole or substantial part outside
the United States, to the national security, foreign pol-
icy, or economy of the United States.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701(a). Second, this threat must be “unusual and ex-
traordinary.” Id. § 1701(b). Third, a national emer-
gency must be declared with respect to the threat. Id.
And fourth, the President’s exercise of IEEPA author-
ity must “deal with” the threat. Id.
Both sets of Plaintiffs assert that the orders imple-
menting the Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs (“World-
wide and Retaliatory Tariff Orders”) do not meet the
“unusual and extraordinary” condition 12 imposed by
this section, see Pls.’ V.O.S. Mots. at 18; Pls.’ Oregon
Mot. at 20, and the State Plaintiffs argue that the orders
implementing the Trafficking Tariffs (“Trafficking Tar-

12
As the court holds that the Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs
are unlawful for the reasons set forth in Section I of this opinion,
the court does not reach the argument that their implementing Or-
ders separately fail to invoke an “unusual and extraordinary
threat.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701.
 183a
iff Orders”) do not meet the “deal with” condition, see
Pls.’ Oregon Mot. at 25.
By the Government’s telling, the court cannot ever
question the President’s assertion that his IEEPA au-
thority “deal[s] with an unusual and extraordinary
threat.” See Gov’t Resp. to Oregon Mots. at 33. The
Government invokes the “political question doctrine,”
under which “a controversy is nonjusticiable . . .
where there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and managea-
ble standards for resolving it.’ ” Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (alteration omitted)
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). The
court concludes, however, that the question of the scope
of § 1701 is (1) a justiciable question of statutory con-
struction that (2) resolves in favor of Plaintiffs’ conten-
tion that the Trafficking Tariff Orders do not “deal with
an unusual and extraordinary threat.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701(b). Those Orders thus lie outside the bounds of
Congress’s delegation of authority to the executive
branch.
A. The Political Question Doctrine Does Not Pre-
clude Judicial Review of the Trafficking Or-
ders’ Compliance with 50 U.S.C. § 1701
The political question doctrine bars judicial review in
a number of different scenarios. The Supreme Court
has listed them as follows:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve
a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; or a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
 184a
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial pol-
icy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial dis-
cretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government;
or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivo-
tofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195, (2012) (explaining
that “a court lacks the authority to decide the dispute
before it” when one of the Baker factors pertains). The
Court clarified, however, that this is not a “doctrine
. . . of ‘political cases,’ ” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, and
that “it is error to suppose that every case or contro-
versy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judi-
cial cognizance,” id. at 211.
The Government argues that two Baker factors pre-
clude the court’s review of whether the challenged Tariff
Orders are permissible under § 1701’s “deal with an un-
usual and extraordinary threat” standard. The Gov-
ernment asserts “a profound ‘lack of judicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving’ the valid-
ity of the President’s threat assessment,” and also the
“impossibility of deciding [the question] without an ini-
tial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion.” Gov’t Resp. to Oregon Mots. at 30-31 (quo-
ting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
This reliance on the political question doctrine is mis-
placed. The court can “manage” the standards for ap-
plying 50 U.S.C. § 1701’s “deal with an unusual and ex-
traordinary threat” language just as it “manages” the
 185a
standards for any other statutory enactment that con-
strains independent executive action. See Feliciano v.
Dep’t of Transp., 605 U.S. , , 145 S. Ct. 1284, 1291
(2025) (listing instances of substantive conditions that
federal statutes impose on the exercise of executive au-
thority). “[U]nder the Constitution, one of the Judici-
ary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we
cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our de-
cision may have significant political overtones.” Japan
Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986).
Even when it goes unmentioned, this principle is a
common feature of statutory construction. In the
trade context, for example, the antidumping statute per-
mits the imposition of duties only where “the Commis-
sion determines that . . . an industry in the United States
. . . is threatened with material injury.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673. The court does not automatically uphold every
material injury determination of the ITC on lack-of-
manageable-standards grounds simply because “threat-
ened with material injury” is an imprecise term that
sounds in foreign affairs. Instead, the court consults
“the traditional tools of statutory construction” to ascer-
tain the term’s meaning and applies that meaning to spe-
cific cases. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603
U.S. 369, 403 (2024); see, e.g., Rhone Poulenc, S.A. v.
United States, 8 CIT 47, 50-54, 592 F. Supp. 1318, 1322-
25 (1984) (citing legislative history for the proposition
that while “[i]t is true that threat of material injury may
not be based on supposition or conjecture . . . [t]he
threat must be real and imminent”). As the Supreme
Court explained in Zivotofsky, “[r]esolution of Zivo-
tofsky’s claim demands careful examination of the tex-
tual, structural, and historical evidence put forward by
 186a
the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of
the passport and recognition powers. This is what
courts do. The political question doctrine poses no bar
to judicial review of this case.” 566 U.S. at 201.
Indeed, that “[t]rade policy is an increasingly im-
portant aspect of foreign policy, an area in which the ex-
ecutive branch is traditionally accorded considerable
deference . . . is not to say . . . that courts will
unthinkingly defer to the Government’s view of Con-
gressional enactments.” Fed.-Mogul Corp. v. United
States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995). This is es-
pecially so where the relevant congressional enactment
is exactly what determines how much deference the
President is entitled to in the first place. See U.S.
Cane Sugar Refiners’ Ass’n, 3 CIT at 212, 544 F. Supp.
at 895 (“[I]f the President’s action is authorized by the
statutes relied upon, the judiciary may not properly in-
quire or probe into the President’s reasoning or into the
existence of the facts calling for the action taken.”
(emphasis added)). Either § 1701 entails that the Pres-
ident invokes IEEPA “pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress,” which would mean that “his
authority is at its maximum,” or § 1701 entails that he
invokes it “incompatibl[y] with the expressed or implied
will of Congress,” which would mean that “his power is
at its lowest ebb.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). If a court could never question the President’s
interpretation of statutory language to place himself in
Justice Jackson’s first zone, there would only be one
zone. “[T]he issue here . . . involves the appor-
tionment of power between the executive and legislative
branches,” and “[t]he duty of courts to decide such ques-
tions has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme
 187a
Court.” Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898
(D.D.C. 1982), aff ’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
The Government’s position on the unreviewability of
§ 1701 is also at odds with IEEPA’s text. Section 1701
is not the particular type of “statute [that] gives a dis-
cretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him
upon his own opinion of certain facts,” such that “it is a
sound rule of construction, that the statute constitutes
him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those
facts.” Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 31-32 (1827). That
may be true of the NEA, whose operation requires only
that the President “specifically declare[] a national
emergency.” 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b); see also Yoshida II,
526 F.2d at 581 n.32. 13 But IEEPA requires more than
just the fact of a presidential finding or declaration:
“The authorities granted to the President by section
1702 of this title may only be exercised to deal with an
unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which
a national emergency has been declared for purposes of
this chapter and may not be exercised for any other pur-
pose.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (emphasis added). This
language, importantly, does not commit the question of
whether IEEPA authority “deal[s] with an unusual and
extraordinary threat” to the President’s judgment. It
does not grant IEEPA authority to the President simply
when he “finds” or “determines” that an unusual and ex-
traordinary threat exists. Cf., e.g., Silfab Solar, 892
F.3d at 1349 (collecting cases involving “statute[s] au-
thoriz[ing] a Presidential ‘determination’ ”); United

13
The State Plaintiffs confirm that they “are not challenging the
President’s declaration of an emergency under the National Emer-
gencies Act.” Pls.’ Oregon Mot. at 21.
 188a
States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 376-77
(1940).
Section 1701 is not a symbolic festoon; it is a “mean-
ingful[] constrain[t] [on] the President’s discretion,”
United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omit-
ted). It sets out “the happening of the contingency on
which [IEEPA powers] depend,” and the court will give
it its due effect. The Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382,
386 (1813).
Congress enacted § 1701, after all, as a substantive
addition to TWEA’s basic framework. And “[w]hen
Congress amends legislation,” courts must “presume it
intends the change to have real and substantial effect.”
Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 641-42 (2016) (internal quo-
tation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). Thus,
although “[w]here a statute . . . commits deci-
sionmaking to the discretion of the President, judicial
review of the President’s decision is not available,” Dal-
ton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1994), § 1701 is a stat-
ute that conditions this commitment on factors that the
court retains the power to review.
In doing so, the court does not ask whether a threat
is worth “deal[ing]” with, or venture to “review the bona
fides of a declaration of an emergency by the President.”
Yoshida II, 526 F.2d at 581 n.32; see also United States
v. Am. Bitumuls & Asphalt Co., 246 F.2d 270, 276-77
(C.C.P.A. 1957) (“No doubt the courts cannot substitute
their discretion for that of the President in proclaiming
trade agreements, but where, as here, the President ba-
ses his action on an incorrect interpretation of the effect
of a law or proclamation, the courts are not bound to ac-
cept that interpretation as correct.”).
 189a
Indeed, “[t]he question here is not whether some-
thing should be done; it is who has the authority to do
it.” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 501. The court
simply asks whether the President’s action “deal[s] with
an unusual and extraordinary threat.” Congress pro-
vided the necessary standards for resolving this inquiry
when it enacted IEEPA, and the court’s task is to apply
them. “This duty requires one body of public servants,
the judges, to construe the meaning of what another
body, the legislators, has said.” United States v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940). The duty
does not abate when foreign economic conduct forms
part of the issue. See Totes-Isotoner, 594 F.3d at 1352-
53.
According to the Government, there are two ways
that the “deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat”
provision retains its meaning despite its unreviewabil-
ity. The first is that “it . . . binds the President.”
V.O.S. Oral Arg. Tr. at 47:11-12 (statement of E. Hamil-
ton), May 27, 2025, ECF No. 54. This means, the Gov-
ernment states, that “[t]he President still has to look at
and faithfully apply that statute. . . . ” V.O.S. Oral
Arg. Tr. at 47:11-13 (statement of E. Hamilton). But
what happens if the President does not do so? Does the
court still have no role? Even if Congress could hypo-
thetically undo the President’s invocation of IEEPA
powers by passing a law to that effect (over the Presi-
dent’s likely veto, see generally Chadha, 462 U.S. 919),
Congress’s inherent power to legislate is no substitute
for the “judicial function” of “determining the limits of
statutory grants of authority.” Stark v. Wickard, 321
U.S. 288, 310 (1944). “The supremacy of law,” moreo-
ver, “demands that there shall be opportunity to have
some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was
 190a
applied.” St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
The Government also argues that § 1701 “informs
legislative review of any national emergency declared
under IEEPA.” V.O.S. Oral Arg. Tr. at 47:16-18
(statement of E. Hamilton). But Congress has already
legislated on the relevant question by enacting IEEPA
“to limit the President’s emergency power in peace-
time.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 672-73
(1981). Congress should not have to enact new statutes
to enforce the statutory constraints it has already en-
acted.
B. The Trafficking Orders Fall Outside 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701’s Delegation of Authority
The court proceeds to adjudicate the justiciable ques-
tion of whether the Trafficking Orders satisfy the stat-
utory requirement that IEEPA powers be exercised
only to “deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat.”
50 U.S.C. § 1701.
The State Plaintiffs14 do not argue that the Traffick-
ing Orders fail to invoke “unusual and extraordinary
threat[s],” as they do regarding the Worldwide and Re-
taliatory Tariffs (an argument that the court does not
reach). Instead, the State Plaintiffs argue that the
Trafficking Tariffs do not “deal with” the specific
threats15 they invoke. See Pls.’ Oregon Mot. at 25-26;

14
The V.O.S. Plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin the operation of the
Trafficking Tariff Orders. See V.O.S. Compl. at 24.
15
The Canada Tariff Order purports to “address” an “unusual
and extraordinary threat” in the form of “the failure of Canada to
do more to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise intercept [drug traf-
ficking organizations], other drug and human traffickers, criminals
 191a
Pls.’ Oregon Supp’l Br. at 4. The Government re-
sponds that “the President’s actions are reasonably re-
lated to the desired change in behavior the President
seeks from Mexico, Canada, and China because the
President’s actions pressure those countries to address
the crisis.” Gov’t Resp. to Oregon Mots. at 39.16
By this description, and by their own language, the
Trafficking Tariff Orders rest on a construction of “deal
with” that is at odds with the ordinary meaning of the
phrase.
“Deal with” connotes a direct link between an act and
the problem it purports to address. A tax deals with a
budget deficit by raising revenue. A dam deals with
flooding by holding back a river. But there is no such
association between the act of imposing a tariff and the
“unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” that the Traffick-
ing Orders purport to combat. Customs’s collection of
tariffs on lawful imports does not evidently relate to for-
eign governments’ efforts “to arrest, seize, detain, or

at large, and drugs.” Executive Order 14193, 90 Fed. Reg. at

9113. The Mexico Tariff Order identifies a threat in the form of
“the failure of Mexico to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise inter-
cept [drug trafficking organizations], other drug and human traf-
fickers, criminals at large, and illicit drugs.” Executive Order
14194, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9118. And the China Tariff Order refers to
the “failure of the PRC government to arrest, seize, detain, or oth-
erwise intercept chemical precursor suppliers, money launderers,
other TCOs, criminals at large, and drugs.” Executive Order
14195, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9122.
16
Counsel for the Government stated at oral argument that
“[t]he purpose of these tariffs is to create pressure, to tariff -
pressure other countries to change bad behaviors that the Presi-
dent believes are hurting Americans and our national security.”
Oregon Oral Arg. Tr. at 31:19-22 (statement of B. Shumate), May
27, 2025, ECF No. 64.
 192a
otherwise intercept” bad actors within their respective
jurisdictions. The Government’s only suggested con-
nection between these two activities—that “[t]he Presi-
dent’s action . . . deters importation of illicit drugs
concealed within seemingly lawful imports,” Gov’t Resp.
to Oregon Mots. at 40—has no apparent basis in the
Trafficking Orders themselves. The Orders cite the
general problem of a failure to thwart trafficking and
other crime as their target “unusual and extraordinary
threat[s],” not the specific problem of drugs smuggled
within shipments of dutiable merchandise. 17 And if this
specific problem were really what the Trafficking Tariff
Orders aimed to “deal with,” the Orders would have to
“deal with” that specific problem, not create “leverage”
ostensibly to do so. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(b).
The Trafficking Orders do not “deal with” their stated
objectives. Rather, as the Government acknowledges,
the Orders aim to create leverage to “deal with” those
objectives. See Oregon Oral Arg. Tr. at 31:19-25, 33:7-
16 (statements of B. Shumate). That approach differs
from what the Yoshida II court identified was Proclama-
tion 4074’s “direct effect on our nation’s balance of trade
and, in turn, on its balance of payments deficit and its
international monetary reserves.” 526 F.2d at 580.
The approach also differs from the relationship identi-
fied in Regan v. Wald, where the Supreme Court sus-
tained on constitutional grounds “the President’s deci-
sion to curtail the flow of hard currency to Cuba—
currency that could then be used in support of Cuban
adventurism—by restricting travel.” 468 U.S. at 243.

17
The Trafficking Tariffs, of course, do not change the effective
rate of duty (zero percent ad valorem) for smuggled drugs them-
selves.
 193a
The Government’s “pressure” argument effectively
concedes that the direct effect of the country-specific
tariffs is simply to burden the countries they target. It
is the prospect of mitigating this burden, the Govern-
ment explains, that will induce the target countries to
crack down on trafficking within their jurisdictions.
See Gov’t Resp. to Oregon Mots. at 39. But however
sound this might be as a diplomatic strategy, it does not
comfortably meet the statutory definition of “deal[ing]
with” the cited emergency. It is hard to conceive of
any IEEPA power that could not be justified on the
same ground of “pressure.”
The Government’s reading would cause the meaning
of “deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat” to
permit any infliction of a burden on a counterparty to
exact concessions, regardless of the relationship be-
tween the burden inflicted and the concessions exacted.
If “deal with” can mean “impose a burden until someone
else deals with,” then everything is permitted. It
means a President may use IEEPA to take whatever ac-
tions he chooses simply by declaring them “pressure” or
“leverage” tactics that will elicit a third party’s response
to an unconnected “threat.” Surely this is not what
Congress meant when it clarified that IEEPA powers
“may not be exercised for any other purpose” than to
“deal with” a threat.
The court in Yoshida II explained that “[w]hether a
delegation of such breadth as to have authorized Proc-
lamation 4074 would be constitutionally embraced” was
a function of the surcharge’s “relationship to the partic-
ular emergency confronted.” 526 F.2d at 576-77. The
court further explained that “[a] standard inherently ap-
plicable to the exercise of delegated emergency powers
 194a
is the extent to which the action taken bears a reasona-
ble relation . . . to the emergency giving rise to the
action,” and that “the nature of the emergency restricts
the how of its doing, i.e., the means of execution.” Id.
at 578-79.
The Government’s concept of “leverage” would sap
these words of their meaning. The President’s chosen
“means of execution” here are tariffs on “[a]rticles that
are products of Canada,” Executive Order 14193, 90
Fed. Reg. at 9114, “[a]ll articles that are products of
Mexico,” Executive Order 14194, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9118,
and “[a]ll articles that are products of the PRC,” Exec-
utive Order 14195, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9122. If leverage
were all it took to establish a “reasonable relation” be-
tween these means and the “particular emergency” of
trafficking, Yoshida II’s means-end test would be trivi-
ally easy to pass. See 526 F.2d at 578-79.
In so holding, the court does not pass upon the wis-
dom or likely effectiveness of the President’s use of tar-
iffs as leverage. 18 That use is impermissible not be-

18
Another three-judge panel of this court made a similar point in
Tembec, Inc. v. United States:
Consideration of the USTR’s authority to order implementa-
tion of affirmative section 129(a) determinations does not de-
pend on the court’s evaluation of the wisdom of a given imple-
mentation. The court is neither called upon to make trade pol-
icy, nor to direct the USTR as to whether any section 129 de-
termination should be implemented. Rather, the court is
merely asked to determine the bounds of the USTR’s authority
to order implementation.
30 CIT 958, 982-83, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1326-27 (2006), judgment
vacated as moot by 31 CIT 241, 251, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1393, 1401-02
(leaving prior decision in place for precedential purposes despite
vacatur of judgment).
 195a
cause it is unwise or ineffective, but because § 1701 does
not allow it. Rather, the Trafficking Orders’ “clear
misconstruction” of § 1701’s “deal with” condition ren-
ders them “action[s] outside delegated authority.”
Maple Leaf Fish, 762 F.2d at 89.
Soon after joining the Supreme Court, Justice Story
declared invalid a proclamation by President Madison
that revived an embargo on trade with Britain and
France in the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809. The proc-
lamation lacked statutory authority because it relied on
an expired embargo provision in the Act. The young
Justice’s account of the judicial role in that case applies
undiminished today:
I take it to be an incontestable principle, that the
president has no common law prerogative to interdict
commercial intercourse with any nation; or revive
any act, whose operation has expired. His authority
for this purpose must be derived from some positive
law. . . . For the executive department of the
government, this court entertain the most entire re-
spect; and amidst the multiplicity of cares in that de-
partment, it may, without any violation of decorum,
be presumed, that sometimes there may be an inac-
curate construction of a law. It is our duty to ex-
pound the laws as we find them in the records of
state; and we cannot, when called upon by the citizens
of the country, refuse our opinion, however it may dif-
fer from that of very great authorities. I do not per-
ceive any reasonable ground to imply an authority in
the president to revive this act, and I must therefore,
with whatever reluctance, pronounce it to have been,
as to this purpose, invalid.
 196a
The Orono, 18 F. Cas. 830, 830-31 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)
(No. 10,585).
CONCLUSION
The court holds for the foregoing reasons that
IEEPA does not authorize any of the Worldwide, Retal-
iatory, or Trafficking Tariff Orders. The Worldwide
and Retaliatory Tariff Orders exceed any authority
granted to the President by IEEPA to regulate impor-
tation by means of tariffs. The Trafficking Tariffs fail
because they do not deal with the threats set forth in
those orders. This conclusion entitles Plaintiffs to
judgment as a matter of law; as the court further finds
no genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary
judgment will enter against the United States. See
USCIT R. 56. The challenged Tariff Orders will be va-
cated and their operation permanently enjoined.
There is no question here of narrowly tailored relief;
if the challenged Tariff Orders are unlawful as to Plain-
tiffs they are unlawful as to all. “[A]ll Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and “[t]he tax is
uniform when it operates with the same force and effect
in every place where the subject of it is found.” Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884); see also Siemens
Am., Inc. v. United States, 692 F.2d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
1982); Nat’l Corn Growers Ass’n v. Baker, 10 CIT 517,
521, 643 F. Supp. 626, 630-31 (1986) (noting “the statu-
tory and constitutional mandate of uniformity in the in-
terpretation of the international trade laws”).
Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment are
granted, and their Motions for Preliminary Injunction
are denied as moot. Judgment will enter accordingly.
 197a
By the panel.
Dated: May 28, 2025
New York, New York
 198a
APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Court No. 25-00066

V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. PLASTIC SERVICES AND
PRODUCTS, LLC, D/B/A GENOVA PIPE, MICROKITS,
LLC, FISHUSA INC., TERRY PRECISION CYCLING LLC,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; PETE R. FLORES
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING COMMISSIONER
FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION; JAMIESON GREER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CA-
PACITY AS UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE;
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE; AND HOWARD LUTNICK, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF COMMERCE;
DEFENDANTS

Court No. 2500077

THE STATE OF OREGON, THE STATE OF ARIZONA, THE
STATE OF COLORADO, THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
THE STATE OF DELAWARE, THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
THE STATE OF MAINE, THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, THE
STATE OF NEVADA, THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, THE STATE OF VERMONT,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; KRISTI NOEM, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
 199a
SECURITY; U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION;
PETE R. FLORES IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING
COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION; AND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA; DEFENDANTS

[Filed: May 28, 2025]

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the court’s opinion of this date, it

is hereby
ORDERED that Executive Order 14193, Imposing
Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our
Northern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113 (Feb. 1, 2025); Ex-
ecutive Order 14194, Imposing Duties To Address the
Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9117
(Feb. 1, 2025); Executive Order 14195, Imposing Duties
To Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the
People’s Republic of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 9121 (Feb. 1,
2025); Executive Order 14257, Regulating Imports with
a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Con-
tribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States
Goods Trade Deficits, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041 (Apr. 2, 2025)
(collectively, the “Challenged Tariff Orders”); and all
modifications and amendments thereto; be, and hereby
are, declared to be invalid as contrary to law; it is fur-
ther
ORDERED that the operation of the Challenged Tar-
iff Orders and all modifications and amendments thereto
be, and hereby is, permanently enjoined; it is further
 200a
ORDERED that within 10 calendar days necessary
administrative orders to effectuate the permanent in-
junction shall issue; and it is further
ORDERED that each party shall bear its own costs.
By the panel.
Dated: May 28, 2025
New York, New York
 201a
APPENDIX E
1. 50 U.S.C. 1701 provides:
Unusual and extraordinary threat; declaration of na-
tional emergency; exercise of Presidential authorities
(a) Any authority granted to the President by sec-
tion 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any
unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source
in whole or substantial part outside the United States,
to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of
the United States, if the President declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat.
(b) The authorities granted to the President by sec-
tion 1702 of this title may only be exercised to deal with
an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to
which a national emergency has been declared for pur-
poses of this chapter and may not be exercised for any
other purpose. Any exercise of such authorities to deal
with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration
of national emergency which must be with respect to
such threat.

2. 50 U.S.C. 1702 provides:

Presidential authorities
(a) In general
(1) At the times and to the extent specified in sec-
tion 1701 of this title, the President may, under such
regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instruc-
tions, licenses, or otherwise—
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit—
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
 202a
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between,
by, through, or to any banking institution, to the
extent that such transfers or payments involve
any interest of any foreign country or a national
thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or
securities,
by any person, or with respect to any property, sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an
investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding,
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transporta-
tion, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or
exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect
to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any in-
terest by any person, or with respect to any property,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and.
(C) when the United States is engaged in armed
hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country
or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign
person, foreign organization, or foreign country that
he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or en-
gaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United
States; and all right, title, and interest in any prop-
erty so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the
terms directed by the President, in such agency or
person as the President may designate from time to
time, and upon such terms and conditions as the Presi-
dent may prescribe, such interest or property shall
be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or oth-
 203a
erwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit
of the United States, and such designated agency or
person may perform any and all acts incident to the
accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.
(2) In exercising the authorities granted by para-
graph (1), the President may require any person to keep
a full record of, and to furnish under oath, in the form of
reports or otherwise, complete information relative to
any act or transaction referred to in paragraph (1) either
before, during, or after the completion thereof, or rela-
tive to any interest in foreign property, or relative to any
property in which any foreign country or any national
thereof has or has had any interest, or as may be other-
wise necessary to enforce the provisions of such para-
graph. In any case in which a report by a person could
be required under this paragraph, the President may re-
quire the production of any books of account, records,
contracts, letters, memoranda, or other papers, in the
custody or control of such person.
(3) Compliance with any regulation, instruction, or
direction issued under this chapter shall to the extent
thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all pur-
poses of the obligation of the person making the same.
No person shall be held liable in any court for or with
respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in con-
nection with the administration of, or pursuant to and in
reliance on, this chapter, or any regulation, instruction,
or direction issued under this chapter.
(b) Exceptions to grant of authority
The authority granted to the President by this sec-
tion does not include the authority to regulate or pro-
hibit, directly or indirectly—
 204a
(1) any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other
personal communication, which does not involve a
transfer of anything of value;
(2) donations, by persons subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, of articles, such as food,
clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve
human suffering, except to the extent that the Presi-
dent determines that such donations (A) would seri-
ously impair his ability to deal with any national
emergency declared under section 1701 of this title,
(B) are in response to coercion against the proposed
recipient or donor, or (C) would endanger Armed
Forces of the United States which are engaged in
hostilities or are in a situation where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances; or
(3) the importation from any country, or the ex-
portation to any country, whether commercial or oth-
erwise, regardless of format or medium of transmis-
sion, of any information or informational materials,
including but not limited to, publications, films, post-
ers, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms,
microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, art-
works, and news wire feeds. The exports exempted
from regulation or prohibition by this paragraph do
not include those which are otherwise controlled for
export under section 46043 of this title, or under sec-
tion 46053 of this title to the extent that such controls
promote the nonproliferation or antiterrorism poli-
cies of the United States, or with respect to which
acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of title 18; or
(4) any transactions ordinarily incident to travel
to or from any country, including importation of ac-
 205a
companied baggage for personal use, maintenance
within any country including payment of living ex-
penses and acquisition of goods or services for per-
sonal use, and arrangement or facilitation of such
travel including nonscheduled air, sea, or land voy-
ages.
(c) Classified information
In any judicial review of a determination made under
this section, if the determination was based on classified
information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified
Information Procedures Act) such information may be
submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera.
This subsection does not confer or imply any right to ju-
dicial review.

3. 50 U.S.C. 1703 provides:

Consultation and reports
(a) Consultation with Congress
The President, in every possible instance, shall con-
sult with the Congress before exercising any of the au-
thorities granted by this chapter and shall consult regu-
larly with the Congress so long as such authorities are
exercised.
(b) Report to Congress upon exercise of Presidential au-
thorities
Whenever the President exercises any of the author-
ities granted by this chapter, he shall immediately trans-
mit to the Congress a report specifying—
(1) the circumstances which necessitate such ex-
ercise of authority;
 206a
(2) why the President believes those circum-
stances constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial
part outside the United States, to the national secu-
rity, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;
(3) the authorities to be exercised and the ac-
tions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities
to deal with those circumstances;
(4) why the President believes such actions are
necessary to deal with those circumstances; and
(5) any foreign countries with respect to which
such actions are to be taken and why such actions are
to be taken with respect to those countries.
(c) Periodic follow-up reports
At least once during each succeeding six-month pe-
riod after transmitting a report pursuant to subsection
(b) with respect to an exercise of authorities under this
chapter, the President shall report to the Congress with
respect to the actions taken, since the last such report,
in the exercise of such authorities, and with respect to
any changes which have occurred concerning any infor-
mation previously furnished pursuant to paragraphs (1)
through (5) of subsection (b).
(d) Supplemental requirements
The requirements of this section are supplemental to
those contained in title IV of the National Emergencies
Act [50 U.S.C. 1641].