Dr.

David Abrutat is a former academic and Royal Marines commando and has long maintained a pas-
sionate interest in Second World War military history. He is the secretary of the Royal Marines Historical
Society. His first published work was Vanguard: The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Missions Behind D-Day
printed in May 2019. His second book Radio War was published just six months later. Dr. Abrutat recently
completed the Official History of 42 Commando Royal Marines, which was published in October 2023. His
latest project is a biography of Bletchley Park’s wartime director, Sir Edward Travis. He is a fellow of the
Royal Geographic Society and the Royal Historical Society. Dr. Abrutat has worked at GCHQ since 2002
and was appointed the departmental historian in 2019.

Dr. David Hatch is the NSA Historian and technical director of the Center for Cryptologic His-
tory at the National Security Agency. He holds an MA in East Asian Studies from Indiana University in
Bloomington, Indiana, and a PhD in International Relations from American University in the District
of Columbia. After military service, Dr. Hatch came to NSA in 1973, working thereafter in a variety
of analytic, staff, and supervisory positions. In 1987 he won the congressional fellowship sponsored by
the American Political Science Association and served one year as a legislative assistant in the House of
Representatives; the fellowship was followed by an assignment in NSA’s Legislative Affairs Office. Dr.
Hatch joined the Center for Cryptologic History in 1990, and, thanks to a series of reorganizations and
retirements, became its director in 1993. In 2002 he became its technical director. Dr. Hatch is author of
several classified monographs and numerous unclassified articles dealing with NSA’s history. In addition,
he is an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University adult education program and at Catonsville
Community College, where he teaches history.

This publication presents a historical perspective for informational and educational purposes, is the
result of independent research, and does not necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any other
government entity.
This publication is distributed free by the National Security Agency. If you would like additional copies,
please email [email protected] or write to:
Center for Cryptologic History
National Security Agency
9800 Savage Road, Suite 6886
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755

CCH gratefully acknowledges the NSA ePrint Publishing Solutions team, which provided design,
formatting, and printing.

Front Cover: SLU mobile units being prepared in 1944 for the Normandy landings on D-Day (Operation
OVERLORD) at Whaddon Hall in Buckinghamshire, England. Provided to Dr. David Abrutat by
Geoffrey Pigeon.
Back Cover: SCU8 ZETA team attached to US Third Army near Black Forest May 17, 1945, including
RAF and Royal Corps of Signals members. Courtesy of Dr. David Abrutat.
 Contents

GCHQ Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
NSA Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Authors’ Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 1: UK-US Cooperation: Initial Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter 2: Establishing the Wartime System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
United Kingdom: Early Experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
United States: G-2 Special Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Chapter 3: Establishing a Shared System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
McCormack Visit to the UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Training and Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
American Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
British Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Training the Readers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The US Army’s SSO: The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The US Navy and ULTRA Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Chapter 4: Supporting the War Effort (Ground and Air) . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
The US Army Air Forces in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
The Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Southwest Pacific Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
CBI (known to British as Southeast Asia) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Chapter 5: Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Chapter 6: Notes on Sources and Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
 GCHQ Foreword

It is a privilege to be asked to write the foreword operated in harm’s way, whose true role was known
of this first-ever joint publication between the his- by very few, and whose vital contributions were
tory departments of GCHQ and NSA. As a soldier, known by even fewer. As I write this today, I note
I have seen firsthand the significant impact that has how little has changed.
been made by SIGINT in multiple operational the-
Finally, I note that the Anglo-American SIGINT
aters, and indeed without it I probably would not be
partnership is not just a matter of past history but pres-
here to tell the tale. In my current role as GCHQ’s
ent fact. The term “special relationship” might seem to
Deputy Director Military Support, I am fortunate
some a political cliché, but to those of us who know,
enough to be able to survey some of the contribu-
it fittingly describes the close bond between our
tions made by SIGINT operators across the world,
respective agencies. It is this bond that has helped
but recognize that all which I see is still only the tip
safeguard our mutual security for almost a century,
of the iceberg.
and I remain confident that it will do so for many
The story of how SIGINT enabled Allied suc- more years to come.
cess in World War II is increasingly well-known.
Deputy Director Military Support
However, whereas many will be aware of the work
at Bletchley Park, few will know of the role played
by the British Special Liaison Units and US Special
Security Officers in the transmission of the intelli-
gence deciphered there. Thanks to this publication,
their story can now be told more widely.
Too often we see SIGINT as an impersonal
object and lose sight of the remarkable courage and
ingenuity of the people charged with its collection
and dissemination. Both David Hatch and David
Abrutat bring these people to life, who all too often

i
SECRET MESSENGERS

ii
 NSA Foreword

In the nearly 80 years since the end of World It has been over a century since cryptologic
War II, Allied SIGINT success has become the cooperation began between the United States and
topic of many books and is at least touched on in Great Britain, and that relationship has indeed been
probably thousands more. Most historians agree special even before the American entry into World
that the war was shortened considerably by these War II. The closeness of that bond extends to our
achievements—perhaps by a year or more—thus respective history programs: the Center for Crypto-
saving an untold number of lives. Secret Messengers logic History at NSA and the Departmental His-
fills a gap in this seemingly well-known history. tory office at GCHQ. Secret Messengers represents a
Prior books generally include only a section on the key milestone. It is the first instance where we have
SIGINT distribution system but do not concentrate joined hands to formally publish any aspect of our
on it. combined history. I believe that it is the first of many
more to come.
SIGINT distribution in World War II is often
criticized as too restrictive. This new work describes John A. Tokar
how the United States and the United Kingdom Chief, Center for Cryptologic History
built—and changed on the fly—a system to ensure
that vital intelligence got to the proper decision-
makers in a timely and secure way. For historians and
practitioners alike, the book outlines the first steps in
developing the system that both countries would use
during the Cold War.
Additionally, Secret Messengers identifies previ-
ously unknown or little-known individuals whose
actions and contributions greatly affected the Allies’
victory in the intelligence war. Drs. Abrutat and
Hatch expertly weave together the technical with
the personal, and the result is a compelling and
important story.

iii
SECRET MESSENGERS

iv
 Timeline
August 15, 1939 Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS) moved into Bletchley Park (BP) in
Buckinghamshire, England.

Summer 1940 Mobile BQ unit that would act as a conduit for localized cryptanalysis and dissemination
formed at BP.

February 1941 First US delegation visited GC&CS at BP. This became known as the Sinkov mission.

April 1941 Special Signals Unit No.1 (SSU1) formed.

June 1941 SSU1 deployed to Cairo, Egypt.

September 1941 Special Communications Unit (SCU) and Special Liaison Unit (SLU) in Egypt delivered
Hut 3 ULTRA to service commands.

August 1942 SCU1 deployed to Portsdown Hill to support the August 19, 1942 attack on Dieppe
(Operation JUBILEE).
October 1942 SLU team under the command of Major Smith-Wright arrived in Gibraltar and was
located on the grounds of the governor’s palace. They directly fed ULTRA to General
Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had his headquarters in the Gibraltar tunnels.

April 1943 Colonel Alfred McCormack, accompanied by William Friedman and Lieutenant
Colonel Telford Taylor, visited Britain for a tour of various GC&CS sites. Formal
regulations for the handling of ULTRA were first issued to British military customers.

July 13, 1943 First SLU station landed with General Montgomery on Sicily’s southern tip and quickly
moved up to Syracuse in support of Operation HUSKY.

December 1943 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Gore-Browne, who had extensive experience with SLUs
in the Middle East and North Africa, was recalled back to Britain to build SLU8 for
Operation OVERLORD.

December 7, 1943 First senior SSO, Major Huddleson, arrived in the Pacific Theater.

April 1944 SCU and SLU teams’ trucks and vehicles prepared at Whaddon Hall for Normandy
campaign.

v
SECRET MESSENGERS

Timeline
April–May 1944 SCU9 established for 21st Army Group, Normandy campaign.

June 1944 SCU8 established for Normandy campaign.

August 12–19, 1944 During the invasion of southern France (Operation DRAGOON, formerly ANVIL),
a special SLU station was established to handle ULTRA traffic for Prime Minister
Winston Churchill and General Terence Airey, who were on the island of Corsica for
the invasion.

September 10, 1944 6th Army Group relocated to Saint-Tropez, moving from Corsica with a large Special
Liaison Unit Typex station and two SCU teams.

April 1945 Gore-Browne took control of all SLUs from Group Captain Frederick Winterbotham.

vi
 Glossary
BP: Bletchley Park. Secret processing site for SIS: Secret Intelligence Service, under which the
ULTRA reporting. British SLU teams were established.
CBB: Central Bureau Brisbane. Joint US-Australian SIS Section VIII: Clandestine communications
cryptanalytic unit for Southwest Pacific. component of MI6 (Britain’s foreign intelligence
service), which provided secure communications as
CBI: China Burma India. During World War II, the
well as personnel training and equipment for the
British referred to this theater as Southeast Asia.
SCU and SLU teams.
GC&CS: Government Code & Cypher School.
SLU: Special Liaison Unit (British). Responsible for
Forerunner to Government Communications
dissemination of ULTRA to operational command.
Headquarters (GCHQ).
This was the equivalent of the American SSO.
IWM: Imperial War Museums.
SSA: Signal Security Agency. The US Army’s
MAGIC: American codeword for diplomatic SIGINT organization began as the Signal
decrypts. It originally had been coined in the Intelligence Agency in 1930. In 1943 it was renamed
1930s to cover decrypts from the communications the Signal Security Agency. At the end of World
of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. During the war War II, it was reorganized and renamed the Army
itself, Japanese diplomatic decrypts still comprised Security Agency. This organization was a direct
the bulk of this report (issued at least weekly), predecessor to today’s NSA and INSCOM (US
but it also included decrypts from the diplomatic Army Intelligence and Security Command).
communications of other countries.
SSO: Special Security Officer (American), known
MIS: Military Intelligence Service (American), collectively as the General Liaison and Special
designated G-2. Since the origins of the General Reports Section of the intelligence staff. Responsible
Staff system, G-2 has been the designation both for for dissemination of ULTRA to operational
the intelligence function and the senior intelligence command. Sometimes called ULTRA officers or
officer in a command. representatives by indoctrinated personnel. This was
the equivalent of the British SLU.
OC: Officer Commanding.
Typex: British cipher device. Alternate spellings
Purple: American army’s codename for Japanese
include Type X or TypeX.
diplomatic encryption system.
ULTRA: All intelligence derived from cryptanalysis
RAF: Royal Air Force.
of high-grade cryptosystems used by the Axis powers.
SCU: Special Communications Unit (British). High-grade decrypted intelligence was referred to as
ULTRA reporting (British and American).
SHAEF: Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Forces. Wireless: British term. In this publication, radio is
the American equivalent.
SIGINT: Signals intelligence.

vii
SECRET MESSENGERS

viii
 Authors’ Introduction

Authors’ Introduction

Intelligence—information required both for eral headquarters via the services’ usual signals chan-
military and civilian decision-making—is neither nels: this resulted in an unreliable feed and a waste of
hocus-pocus nor guesswork. The successful practice valuable intelligence. Soon after, leadership decided
of intelligence is a deliberate process or cycle that future campaigns would form small, highly trained
begins with a specific requirement and concludes special cipher units responsible to and in direct con-
with the delivery of pertinent information to those tact with BP.
who need it. Between those two bookends is a series
The establishment of the British Special Liaison
of steps conducted rigorously and artfully to acquire,
Unit (SLU) teams was entrusted to the Secret Intelli-
analyze, and validate data.
gence Service (SIS) Controller of Special Communi-
This study is concerned with the bookend at cations, Brigadier Richard Gambier-Parry, who over-
the conclusion of the process, as observed in Great saw SIS Section VIII, which had quickly deployed
Britain’s famous ULTRA system of World War II. mobile units to France to fill the void left by the inad-
ULTRA was the designation for all intelligence equacies of the services’ feed of ULTRA intelligence.
derived from cryptanalysis of high-grade crypto- Section VIII was a clandestine communications com-
systems used by the Axis powers: Germany, Italy, ponent of MI6, which provided secure communica-
and Japan. tions for the Service as well as personnel training and
equipment for the Special Communications Units
In 1940 the secret processing site Bletchley Park
(SCU) and Special Liaison Units (SLU) teams. Their
(BP) began to issue high-grade decrypted intel-
organization would grow to such an extent that at the
ligence—ULTRA reporting—to various British
height of the battle for Europe, over forty separate
government ministries and departments. As the war
units were formed to cover the campaigns in Europe,
developed, there was a pressing need to make this
the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia.
information available to overseas commands. This
entailed a clear risk that the source might be exposed, ULTRA gave Great Britain and the United
so a measure of control over its use was necessary. A States access to a very wide range of enemy com-
significant lesson had been learned during the Battle munications, often including the enemy’s highest
of France in May–June 1940, when attempts had government and military levels. This exploitation
been made to disseminate ULTRA traffic to gen- of communications was conducted worldwide and

1
SECRET MESSENGERS

was sustained through a five-year time span. We controlled and highly sensitive intelligence prod-
now know ULTRA intelligence had an effect on uct. Their consistent success was a critical link in
almost every major battle, as well as many tactical ULTRA dissemination. Without this distribution
combat actions. Almost as amazing as the intelli- capability, ULTRA would not have been effective.
gence was the fact that the system was kept secret
Most books about the Second World War that
from the enemy for the entire war (and decades
include information about ULTRA, or focus on
beyond). Had the enemy found credible evidence
ULTRA itself, concentrate either on how the mate-
of the ULTRA system’s capabilities, it would have
rial was produced or the decisions it affected during
taken immediate steps to improve its communica-
combat operations. The authors of this study join
tions security and end the Allies’ significant intel-
previous writers in great admiration for the intercept
ligence insights.
operators, cryptanalysts, and linguists who made
But good intelligence is only effective when it ULTRA what it was. Our purpose is to give public
gets to the decision-maker in a secure and timely recognition to those who ensured the vital ULTRA
fashion, the last stage in the intelligence process. This product got to those who needed it.
was the purpose of the Anglo-American deployed
It was also critical to the success of the ULTRA
teams working in operational theaters commonly
system that distribution be made to the right officers
known as the SLUs (Special Liaison Units) to the
worldwide, be made quickly, and be shared in a way
British or the SSOs (Special Security Officers) to
that protected the secrecy of this vital tool—a deli-
the Americans. They were responsible for the dis-
cate balance of availability and security.
semination to operational commands of the tightly

SLU1 personnel at Whaddon Hall. IWM (HU 74817).

2
 Authors’ Introduction

ULTRA was typically made available to staff at in late 1938, when Lieutenant General Ōshima
the level of army or equivalent air force formations Hiroshi was appointed Japan’s ambassador to Berlin,
with the exceptions of lower formations if they were and his diplomatic reports included copious details
operating independently and with strict handling about the German military and its operations—from
controls. ULTRA was disseminated in a headquar- 1938 all the way to May 1945. The decrypts of Japa-
ters authorized to receive ULTRA—it was made nese diplomatic material were placed in a restricted
available to officers holding the following posts: distribution compartment and codenamed MAGIC.
(Allegedly, Friedman, the US Army’s senior cryp-
• Commander and his Deputy tologist, liked to joke to his superiors that the army
• Chief of Staff and his Deputy cryptanalysts were magicians.)
• Senior Intelligence Staff Officer
• Senior Operations Staff Officer Perhaps the major problems of the 1930s in
• Senior Planning Officer the US SIGINT systems were those of analysis and
(at army group or higher level) distribution. The number of decrypts was relatively
• Senior Signals Officer small and the number of cleared government offi-
(at army group or higher level) cials authorized to read them was also small (roughly
• Senior Signals Intelligence Officer just a dozen senior officials in Washington, DC).
(at army group or higher level)
Distribution was by officer courier at that stage.
The US Navy in the prewar period developed SIGINT readers did not retain reference copies of
invaluable information through signals intelligence SIGINT product. This meant prewar distribution
(SIGINT) on the Japanese Navy, primarily from for SIGINT was severely limited in scope. Because
monitoring Japanese training maneuvers. Japan’s there was no distribution outside the capital area, no
navy used special, more vulnerable, ciphers in train- US officials stationed overseas, military or civilian—
ing, but mainline Japanese Navy operational crypto- even those deployed in vulnerable areas like Hawaii,
systems remained unsolved until 1942, shortly after Panama, or the Philippines—were able to read it.
the United States entered the war. The distribution system also was for verba-
At this same time, the US Army had a major tim translation of decrypts. There was no analytic
success against a Japanese diplomatic cryptosystem, or background material to guide the officials who
one that would continue to have a significant effect had access to them. Each senior official had to be
on Allied operations in World War II. The American his own intelligence analyst. Thus, the MAGIC
army at that time used rainbow colors as codenames decrypts provided insights into Japanese diplomatic
for various plans and projects. Legendary cryptologist policy and actions at a time of major tensions across
William F. Friedman and his colleagues designated the the Pacific before 1941, but their effect was signifi-
Japanese diplomatic system Purple. To facilitate rapid cantly dissipated because of the inefficient process-
solution of actual messages on Purple, an engineer ing and distribution systems.
working with the cryptanalysts invented a machine From our perspective today, it is clear that
processor that greatly reduced analytic time; it was ULTRA had a significant role in Allied decision-
dubbed the “Purple analog.” Allies did not solve Japa- making in all theaters of war, and often was vital
nese Army mainline cryptosystems until 1942, due to to combat success in those theaters. But, for that to
limited access to Japanese Army communications. occur, commanders and decision-makers required
Exploitation of a diplomatic cryptosystem held access to the secret intelligence.
great importance for managing US-Japanese nego- The following is how that happened.
tiations. The system became truly priceless, however,

3
SECRET MESSENGERS

4
 Chapter 1: UK-US Cooperation: Initial Steps

Chapter 1

UK-US Cooperation: Initial Steps

In the buildup to the Second World War, Presi- sailed on a British convoy across the Atlantic. After
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt understood the United an encounter with a German bomber that made the
States would not be able to maintain its position of war more real for the Americans, this group was wel-
neutrality. However, he could not immediately join comed at Bletchley Park (BP).
the conflict against the Axis powers for a number
For the next few weeks, the British showed
of reasons.
their American guests much about their efforts
Foremost, the United States was unprepared for against German encrypted communications. The
modern warfare. The country had one of the smallest Americans toured intercept sites and visited work-
standing armies in the industrial world and was ill- spaces at BP. In turn, the Americans described in
equipped for any sustained struggle against a mod- detail the US effort against Japanese cryptosystems
ern land military power. The US Navy, primarily and presented their hosts with an invaluable gift: a
deployed in the Pacific, had inadequate forces for the copy of the American machine known as the Pur-
job it would be expected to do in a two-ocean war. ple analog, which facilitated decryption of Japanese
diplomatic communications.
The possibility of cooperating with Great Brit-
ain in cryptologic matters surfaced during a bina- As the visit went on, both sides recognized the
tional conference (one of a series) through which professionalism of the other; the Americans were
the Roosevelt administration sought to aid Britain especially impressed with British cryptanalytic prow-
in its war against Nazi Germany—short of joining ess. The British, who had at first feared the Ameri-
the war. Involving as it did an activity of the utmost cans would be unable to keep secrets, became con-
secrecy in both countries, this was an issue that could vinced that increased cooperation across the Atlantic
only be settled at the top, so the idea was presented was possible and would benefit both sides.
to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston
The British, with colonial interests, were hope-
Churchill. Both leaders authorized limited contacts
ful that American support against Japanese com-
that would enable them to evaluate the situation and
munications would bolster their efforts in areas of
consider concrete steps forward.
cryptologic endeavor for which they lacked person-
Thus, in February 1941, four American mili- nel and experience.
tary cryptologists, two each from the army and navy,

5
SECRET MESSENGERS

Toward the end of the visit, officials at BP, with The US Navy, which had nearly a decade’s expe-
agreement from their superiors, recommended steps rience distributing SIGINT product around the
to share Britain’s deepest cryptanalytic secret with Pacific, by and large maintained its own existing dis-
the Americans—the use of the special-purpose tribution system for SIGINT, with some modifica-
device, the bombe, to facilitate solutions of German tions to meet British standards.
messages enciphered on the Enigma machine. This
With the US entry into the war in December
reveal was authorized by Churchill.
1941, the US Army, which considered MAGIC
The four Americans returned home, again by decrypts as strategic intelligence and therefore dis-
British convoy, and recommended that deeper ties tributed them only to a limited group of readers
be established with the British. This would not in the Washington, DC, area, now had to create a
only augment Britain’s ability to stand up against worldwide distribution system virtually from scratch.
the Axis but would further American interests in Quite naturally, they followed the British model in
the long term.1 creating this system.
Over the succeeding months, senior intelligence Next is the story of how that system was estab-
officials from both countries held discussions on the lished and how it operated.
extent of future cooperation in signals intelligence
Notes
(SIGINT), and signed agreements containing spe-
cific commitments and mandating specific proce- 1. The American group’s visit to Bletchley Park is
dures for both nations. The British insisted, and the detailed in David Sherman, The First Americans
Americans agreed, on the strict British procedures (Center for Cryptologic History, 2016). This
for granting access to SIGINT and for the distribu- publication is available online at www.nsa.gov.
tion of decrypts.
The basic working principle of the US-UK
SIGINT agreement was a division of effort. Britain’s
Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS)
would take the lead on producing ULTRA reports
about the German military; the United States would
take the lead in production about Japan. Over the
course of the war, both countries produced decrypts
relating to all three of the major Axis powers, but the
agreement recognized that at the outset of the war,
the United States had the most experience against
Japanese communications, and the same was true for
the British vis-á-vis German communications.
The US Army and Navy, as traditionally sepa-
rate services, negotiated and signed individual
agreements with their British counterparts. As the
relationship unfolded, this did not greatly hamper
sharing in either direction, but it did require two
separate staffs for effective management—an expen-
sive organizational luxury in wartime.

6
 Chapter 2: Establishing the Wartime System

Chapter 2

Establishing the Wartime System

United Kingdom: Early Experiences tion carried British Army and Royal Air Force (RAF)
The Government Code & Cypher School communications, security, and cipher specialists. It
(GC&CS), the forerunner to Government Com- included Major J. K. MacFarlan as its officer com-
munications Headquarters (GCHQ), moved from manding (OC) communications and a small cipher
London to Bletchley Park (BP) in August 1939 just detachment of six personnel under Lieutenant Colo-
prior to the beginning of the Second World War. nel Robert Gore-Browne. SSU1 left Whaddon Hall
The first break into the German Enigma cipher sys- for the Middle East with its personnel, equipment,
tem was not achieved at the site until January 1940. and transportation. Alongside the senior officers were
These events marked the beginning of a significant four cipher non-commissioned officers (NCOs), four
evolution in the organization as the threat of a Ger- signals officers, twenty-eight signalers, and six driv-
man invasion of Britain loomed. ers. They deployed with four wireless telegraphy fitted
vans, one staff car, and two motorcycles.
The genesis of the Special Liaison Unit (SLU)
teams could be traced back to a mobile GC&CS The team was deployed to a base at Abbassia,
unit that was formed when the threat of a German Egypt, just outside Cairo. Two outstations were
invasion was at its highest in the summer of 1940. organized—one in Jerusalem under Flight Lieu-
BP established a mobile BQ1 unit that would act as tenant Crawshaw to cover the campaign in Syria.
a conduit for localized cryptanalysis and dissemina- The other was sent to Bagush (also in Egypt) in
tion. A precedent was found during the short 1940 the Western Desert under Gore-Browne serving
campaign in France to use the link into the French the Eighth Army and Army Headquarters (AHQ)
Grand Quartier-Général maintained by Secret Intel- Western Desert. The Jerusalem team’s arrival coin-
ligence Service (SIS) Section VIII at Whaddon Hall cided with the Syrian Armistice, and the team
and their mobile unit attached to general headquar- quickly returned to Egypt. The Western Desert
ters. It was an experience that marked the beginning team (first AHQ Western Desert then Desert Air
of a new initiative to provide timely intelligence Force) would quickly prove its value supporting the
where it was needed most. Eighth Army and its air counterpart. They would
never be without an SLU, which would accompany
The story of the SLU teams began in April 1941 the army through the African campaigns to Tuni-
with Special Signals Unit No.1 (SSU1). This designa- sia and then onward to the operations in Sicily and

7
SECRET MESSENGERS

Italy, ending the war in Udine in northern Italy in ly a major from the Intelligence Corps) referred to
May 1945. as the Special Liaison Officer who had the oversight
and responsibility for getting the ULTRA reports
This first detachment would see it grow to
to only the senior officers who were cleared to see
some hundred times its original strength. By
it. The SLU was fitted out to be mobile and move
September 1940 Special Communications Units
within an Army Corps operational theater.
(SCUs), with their associated SLUs charged with
local dissemination, were servicing ULTRA mate- But, in reality, the SLU teams varied widely in
rial from Hut 32 at BP to Cairo for all three ser- size and scope. One might have had one or more
vices: to Alexandria for the commander-in-chief 15-cwt (three-quarter ton) Guy wireless trucks and
of the Mediterranean, to Malta for AHQ, to the a cipher van, operating with an accompanying twelve
Western Desert for the Eighth Army, and to Jeru- jeeps and trailers, totaling anywhere between thir-
salem for the Air Officer Commanding. ty-five and fifty men. The units were organized to
be self-sufficient in terms of fuel, food, and equip-
There were essentially two components to an
ment—and even their individual pay.
SLU: the wireless service team from the SIS Section
VIII and a separate cipher section manned by RAF The team included a significant number of spe-
personnel. Each SLU was run by an officer (normal- cialists due to their role and function—for example,
cipher operators (who were versed in the use of
Typex—seen also as Type X or TypeX—the most
powerful British cipher device), German or Italian
translators, and wireless engineers (often from the
Royal Corps of Signals).

United States: G-2 Special Branch

The original mission of the Signal Security
Agency (SSA), which was subordinate to the US
Army Signal Corps, was to compile codes and
ciphers for the army’s use. In the mid- and late
1930s, SSA began producing SIGINT for distri-
bution to a very limited number of readers, one of
whom was the commanding officer of the army’s
Military Intelligence Service. (MIS is also desig-
nated G-2 on the general staff organization chart.
Since the origins of the General Staff system, G-2
has been the designation both for the intelligence
function and the senior intelligence officer in a
command.) MIS needed SIGINT more than ever
with the coming war, but, unsurprisingly, the Signal
Corps also needed secure communications more
than ever. Consequently, the Signal Corps did not
Group Captain Frederick Winterbotham, allow the SSA to be resubordinated to the army’s
Commanding Officer for the British SLU network. intelligence component.
Photograph from Royal Air Force.

8
 Chapter 2: Establishing the Wartime System

The MIS, in turn, sought to establish a unit to

liaise with the SSA concerning SIGINT require-
ments and distribution of SIGINT product. This
was not merely a turf fight between army branches;
it was a significant management issue affecting a
critical and sensitive resource, one that transcended
traditional lines of authority in the army. Moreover,
with the United States in a cooperative relationship
with Great Britain, this issue now had international
repercussions; it could not help but attract high-
level interest.
In January 1942 Secretary of War3 Henry Stim-
son, probably acting on a recommendation by Assis-
tant Secretary of War John McCloy, invited noted
New York lawyer Alfred McCormack to establish
this unit. After some months’ work, McCormack
decided he could do the job better if he were in uni-
form, so in June he was commissioned a colonel in
the US Army. His first task was to put together a
large staff of qualified personnel to perform the sen-
sitive tasks associated with SIGINT analysis and
distribution. This new organization was known as
Alfred McCormack. The inscription reads “To Bill
G-2 Special Branch. Friedman, to whom Military Intelligence owes a
Colonel McCormack recruited as many lawyers great debt.” CCH Collection.
as he possibly could to staff Special Branch. He rec- Joking aside, McCormack encountered many
ognized that lawyers were educated in information daunting hurdles. From a macro perspective, he was
analysis and that precision in writing was a must for building his military staff at a time when the charac-
good lawyers; members of the profession would be ter of the War Department itself was changing and all
well qualified to prepare SIGINT product for dis- army branches were competing for people. For civil-
tribution. In addition, the handling and distribution ian employees, he had to deal with the hidebound Civil
of SIGINT product was bound by a rather detailed Service system, which had no categories for jobs in
set of rules and regulations, and the Special Secu- intelligence. McCormack was recruiting talent in com-
rity Officers (SSOs) were likely to encounter situa- petition with virtually every other military and civilian
tions not covered in the written rules. McCormack government department, all of which were expanding
believed lawyers would be best qualified to reason just as rapidly to meet the needs of a global war.
out these challenges.
McCormack could not describe the exact nature
Although he did recruit qualified people from of the work or fully explain its critical importance
many backgrounds, McCormack brought so many to those who controlled the personnel resources he
lawyers into Special Branch over time that the in- needed as much of the job description was top secret.
joke in military intelligence was that he had, at gov-
ernment expense, put together the best law office McCormack did eventually get some assistance
in town. from the top levels of the War Department by send-

9
SECRET MESSENGERS

ing a memorandum to McCloy complaining about Special Branch eventually came to include a large
Civil Service obstacles. McCloy intervened with the headquarters staff, which turned raw decrypts into
Civil Service commissioners who controlled the sys- finished intelligence product ready for senior deci-
tem. This eased the job description situation some- sion-makers, and a wide-flung network of officers
what, but Civil Service hiring processes were still who distributed that product to high-level readers.
time consuming.
As the Americans began to design a distribu-
Because of the demanding hours and the large tion system for SIGINT, they recognized that Brit-
volume of work, McCormack sought personnel who ish SLUs were conducting distribution of ULTRA
were young and enthusiastic. Then, mid-war, the product to American forces in the North African
War Department issued an order prohibiting the Theater. Therefore, they concentrated their first
assignment of any officers under twenty-eight years efforts on a distribution system for the Pacific. The
old in Washington, DC. This was followed shortly program was in place when formal regulations were
by another order requiring that all officers under established in October 1943.
twenty-eight in Washington be sent to the field.
In early 1943, as American military forces were
Despite the obstacles, McCormack managed being deployed in large numbers around the Pacif-
to assemble an organization with first-class talent. ic, the US Army began a distribution system for
During the war they excelled at analysis and also SIGINT product. By and large, the American sys-
worked comfortably with senior commanders in the tem followed British rules, although the officers who
field to get them the intelligence information they conducted the distribution were designated SSOs,
needed. Many of the personnel that McCormack rather than SLU Special Liaison Officers.
recruited went on to successful, even stellar, careers
The American distribution system incorpo-
in law, business, and government after the war. One
rated British rules and practices: first, dissemination
became a Supreme Court justice.4
of this sensitive product was controlled by a central
As Special Branch evolved, Colonel (later Briga- organization, giving local commanders no say in the
dier General) Carter W. Clarke, an acerbic but effec- process. Second, ULTRA was disseminated only
tive manager who also served as a deputy chief of the through its own special communications channels,
Military Intelligence Service, became its chief with separate from general US Army communications, so
McCormack as his deputy. They made an effective the number of personnel cognizant of the material
team: Clarke wrestled with administrative matters was considerably limited. In addition, the number of
and the military bureaucracy, and McCormack man- officers authorized to read this sensitive intelligence
aged the analytic mission.5 was strictly limited and only as authorized by the
central system management.
It should be noted that Special Branch had to
provide ULTRA intelligence not only for ground One major point was that the ULTRA material
forces, but to the US Army Air Forces, as well.6 in the field would never be out of the SSO’s control.
No ULTRA product was made available to any indi-
As the war progressed, many leaders from the
vidual, from the commanding general to the clerks
army air forces felt that Special Branch concentrat-
who handled the product, without an indoctrination
ed on intelligence for ground warfare and did not
for them about the fragility of the source and the
devote enough attention to air operations. Thus, the
need for utmost security.8
air forces became less dependent on Special Branch
and sought to develop its own sources of intelligence At each command, the SSO had his own com-
that were more attuned to its needs.7 munications security device for receiving and send-

10
 Chapter 2: Establishing the Wartime System

ing messages related to ULTRA. All messages were Intelligence analysis is not merely a scientific
enciphered on the SIGABA, the American top-of- process; it involves less structured types of think-
the-line cipher machine. ing, arguably including intuition. Some technical
aspects of analysis may be taught, but much of the
The SIGABA was the most secure US commu-
skill comes to an individual through experience. A
nications security device. Its encryption was based
summary report about Special Branch analytic work
on rotating discs that had been wired internally to
admits that in the early period of its operation, much
scramble the alphabet. The SIGABA was similar to
of its analytic product was “scrappy.”12
many encryption devices of the day in using rotors;
however, the SIGABA had fifteen rotors, more than But training continued and the analysts picked
any other existing cryptographic device, and the up experience. Soon, analytic product from Special
rotor movement was in an innovative pattern. There Branch achieved and maintained a superior quality
is no evidence that the SIGABA was ever broken or through the end of the war.
that any messages enciphered on it ever solved.
Notes
The machine had been developed just before the 1. BQ was a cover term and not an acronym.
US entry into the war, with contributions from both
the US Army and Navy cryptologic organizations. 2. Hut 3 was the part of the Bletchley Park site that
Thus, both services used it during the war, although concentrated on the analysis of decrypted Ger-
they gave the device different nomenclature.9 man Army and Luftwaffe communications.
3. Both the War Department (the US Army) and
Where necessary, special arrangements were
the US Navy were separate cabinet-level depart-
made to courier top secret material that was not
ments through World War II. In 1947 the gov-
ULTRA. One example of material requiring pouch ernment reorganized the defense and intelligence
distribution was the weekly MAGIC Diplomatic establishments, and the individual services were
Summary, produced by Special Branch from Jap- subsumed to the new cabinet-level Department
anese Foreign Ministry decrypts and a few other of Defense.
sources. Military commanders in combat situations
generally did not need this information, although 4. The travails of founding Special Branch staff in
an inhospitable environment are best told by the
sometimes senior visitors to their theater did; when
man himself in The War Experiences of Colonel
this occurred, the summaries were handled sepa-
Alfred McCormack, SRH-185.
rately from ULTRA decrypts and usually distrib-
uted by pouch.10 5. Clarke was chief of MIS Special Branch from
May 1942 to June 1944. McCormack was dep-
To a considerable extent, the analytic work of uty chief of Special Branch for the same period;
Special Branch resembled, perhaps paralleled, that he then became chief of the MIS Directorate
of analysts in Military Intelligence. However, Spe- of Intelligence. In that reorganization, Clarke
cial Branch dealt only with ULTRA, material of became deputy chief of the MIS, as well as the
a higher classification that could not be accessed special security officer for the War Department.
by MI analysts. One summary report of Special 6. In the aftermath of the First World War, the US
Branch work called this situation “an overlay.” The Army had a small number of aircraft and pilots,
odd situation was necessitated by the need for which were known as the Army Air Corps. In
extreme secrecy and tight control of the extremely the Second World War, as American forces grew
fragile ULTRA source material.11 in numbers and conducted major combat opera-
tions, the Air arm also greatly expanded and was

11
SECRET MESSENGERS

re-designated the Army Air Forces. It remained

subordinate to the US Army chain of command
but conducted some operations, particularly long-
range bombing, more or less independently. The
US Air Force became a separate service, subordi-
nate to the new Department of Defense, in 1947.
7. Major James D. Fellers, “Report of Visit to Medi-
terranean Theater (25 March–10 May, 1944),”
Trip Reports Concerning the Use of ULTRA in the
Mediterranean Theater (1943–1944), SRH-031,
11.
8. History of the Operations of Special Security Offi-
cers Attached to Field Commands, 1943–1945,
SRH-033.
9. The US Navy called the device the ECM (Elec-
tric Coding Machine). The US Army called it
the SIGABA, which had no significance; all
army devices involved in communications had
designations beginning with the letters SIG, fol-
lowed by randomly assigned letters (that had to
be pronounceable).
10. History of the Operations, SRH-033, 4.
11. Use of CX/MSS ULTRA by the United States War
Department (1943–1945), SRH-005, 5.
12. Use of CX/MSS ULTRA, SRH-005, 9.

12
 ChapteR 3: Establishing a Shared System

Chapter 3

Establishing a Shared System

McCormack Visit to the UK Taylor had something of a reputation for sup-

porting liberal causes, enough so that McCormack
Colonel Alfred McCormack, accompanied by
worried that Taylor would run afoul of the Special
William Friedman, the US Army’s chief cryptolo-
Branch chief, Clarke, who was a conservative’s con-
gist, and Lieutenant Colonel Telford Taylor, an offi-
servative. However, Taylor and Clarke got along
cer in Special Branch, visited Britain in April 1943
quite well. As it happened, the two encountered each
on behalf of Special Branch; this was to be a famil-
other in a Pentagon washroom on Christmas Day;
iarization tour of the various GC&CS sites.
Clarke asked Taylor whether he expected to stay
Friedman had been involved in cryptology since in the Washington area or was open to an overseas
before the First World War and had been the US assignment. Taylor expressed interest in going over-
Army’s chief cryptologist since 1930. His insights seas. Thus, after an intensive period of tutelage in US
into traditional ciphers and modern machine- SIGINT production, he found himself accompany-
generated systems had revolutionized the field. He ing McCormack to London.2
could talk the same technical language the GC&CS
McCormack, Friedman, and Taylor met with
experts did. Friedman had been destined for the joint
Major General Sir Stewart Menzies, head of the
US Army-Navy visit to Bletchley Park in February
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), to which the Brit-
1941, but ill health prevented his travel.
ish SIGINT organization was subordinate, then vis-
Taylor had an impressive legal background; as ited GC&CS facilities at Berkeley Street in London,
the war began, he was a litigation attorney for the followed by several weeks at Bletchley Park (BP).
Federal Communications Commission. After the
As the tour of GC&CS facilities progressed,
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he sought a com-
McCormack soon perceived that the UK produced
mission in the US Navy but could not pass the eye
SIGINT on a much wider variety of topics than he
test. An old college friend with whom he played ten-
had previously realized. He also knew that this mate-
nis had recently transferred from the Office of Stra-
rial was not reaching US decision-makers—previous
tegic Services to Special Branch and mentioned to
American visitors had not picked up on the extent
Taylor that the work was quite interesting. Taylor
of British coverage and didn’t know what they didn’t
arranged an interview with Colonel McCormack
know. So, McCormack decided to ask for access to
and was accepted for a position. Once again, he didn’t
this broad range of intelligence. He also asked for
pass the eye test, but this time he was given a waiver.1

13
SECRET MESSENGERS

permission to station a Special Branch liaison offi- The SSOs were not intended to be simply cou-
cer in London to facilitate US access to all ULTRA riers passing on the material from the producers to
products American leaders needed. the consumers but were required to interpret the
material for their commanders. In addition to the
McCormack negotiated the idea of the posi-
need to recognize the importance of different items
tion and the conditions of its operation with Alastair
of SIGINT, SSOs were required to understand how
Denniston, commander of GC&CS, and Menzies,
the ULTRA information differed from intelligence
who was also director of GC&CS (retitled director
derived from other sources and to explain this differ-
general GC&CS in 1944).
ence to the commanding officer and his senior intel-
The negotiations were successful. When McCor- ligence staff.
mack returned to the United States in June, Taylor
Therefore, the SSOs in training received a
remained behind in London to serve as the new liai-
month’s study on traditional intelligence work and
son officer for ULTRA. Taylor worked out of an office
had lectures on the situation in each theater of war
in the US embassy. Later that year, Taylor left the
from returning officers who had served there.
London liaison office to become commanding officer
of the American operational party then assigned to The SSOs in training also spent at least a week
BP. For the rest of the war, he served as the senior in the US Army’s production areas for SIGINT, its
SIGINT officer in Europe for the US Army. SIGINT headquarters at Arlington Hall Station, or
the collection/processing base at Vint Hill Farms
The liaison officer’s primary mission was to
Station (the latter two sites in Virginia). Officers
see that the United States received a copy of all
who served in the European Theater received simi-
SIGINT items of value produced by GC&CS.
lar training at BP. Many SSO personnel destined for
Taylor and his staff read all decrypts produced by
other theaters of war were also diverted to Europe for
BP and forwarded those of immediate intelligence
study time at BP before deployment to the Pacific.
value by encrypted radio transmission to Washing-
ton on a daily basis. Additional material, important Major Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who had had exten-
but not considered quite as time sensitive, was for- sive experience as a non-ULTRA intelligence officer
warded by embassy pouch. in North Africa before Alfred McCormack selected
him to be an SSO, visited BP as part of his training.
The exchange went both ways. Since the Ameri-
He was still impressed with it decades later, as he
can army produced more SIGINT about Japan, the
recalled in an interview, “I did not understand the
liaison office also provided copies to the British of
full scope of ULTRA information until I went to
US decrypts of Japanese messages. In addition, the
Bletchley. I just could not believe the volume of traf-
liaison officer brokered queries between Special
fic that was being intercepted and deciphered.”4
Branch and its British counterpart.3
Powell continued, “… [T]he ULTRA officers
Training and Recruitment who had never been to Bletchley had no idea of the
full extent of the reading of the German codes. As I
American Efforts recall, there were fewer than 30 American officers,
ground and Air Force, trained at Bletchley for the
Special Branch established the concept of Spe- entire European and Mediterranean Theaters, and
cial Security Officers (SSOs), basing the system wherever you were, you are sent only messages that
heavily on British practices. Formal training began pertained to your responsibility.”5
in early 1944 for several groups of officers recruited
for this duty.

14
 ChapteR 3: Establishing a Shared System

One of the more unusual facets of the train- this intelligence, the strict control of ULTRA was
ing of Americans at BP was introducing them to paramount, and officers had to make do with what
the specific vocabulary used by British intelligence could be taught in a relatively short period of time.7
and British SIGINT producers. The US and British
militaries differed not only in traditions and orga- British Efforts
nization but had different vocabularies for many
Personnel for the British Special Liaison Unit
aspects of their operations, including intelligence.
(SLU) teams were recruited from all three branches
One example of the problems created by different
of the armed services and would be entirely inde-
British and American usage is a report from BP that
pendent of local control so far as their work was con-
stated a certain German fuel depot “disposed of ” a
cerned “although their members had to submit to
specific amount of fuel. The report meant that the
the discipline of the particular Service to which each
depot had that much fuel on hand, available for use,
belonged, to a greater or less degree.”8
but Americans interpreted the phrase to mean that
the depot “got rid of ” that much fuel.6 A senior SLU officer initially interviewed new
staff that were brought into the teams. The original
It was not only the Americans and British interview was always a challenge as no details could
who were separated by a common language, be given of the work for which the candidate was
as George Bernard Shaw put it; the same applying—so it was often difficult to gauge whether
problem occurred within American military a candidate was suitable for the role.
forces. The US Army and Navy cryptologic If this interview was satisfactory, the recruit’s
activities had grown up separately, and often details would be passed to MI5 for special vetting.
used different vocabulary for cryptographic If there were no issues with the candidate, they were
and cryptanalytic functions. Increased shar- instructed to report for duty and thoroughly initi-
ing between the two services in wartime ated by the senior SLU officer “who impressed on
began to regularize their terminology. them the vital necessity of keeping their mouths
shut.”9 Members of the units were not allowed to
leave until staff became redundant toward the end of
Although the briefing of ULTRA materials to the war in Europe; they then were permitted to leave
senior officers was effective in many, probably most, but were given a very severe security warning first.
cases, it was not universally so. A number of postwar
reports by SSOs mentioned all-too-frequent brief- Unlike the Americans who chose lawyers, the
ings in which the ULTRA information was present- British chose schoolmasters, who “having been
ed as a jumble of facts, without any attempt to draw accustomed to authority and having trained minds,
together a coherent narrative of the information or were not likely to have too great an awe for high
any explanation of its implications. rank and could be firm when they found it neces-
sary, without failing in respect to an officer of higher
After the war, as SSOs submitted summary rank.” They also found bank clerks and accountants
reports of their experiences, most emphasized that to be most suitable as they “were usually quick to
more training would have been desirable, particular- pick up book cypher work and, usually having some
ly in general intelligence and specific knowledge of knowledge of typing, took quickly to TypeX.”10
US Army operations and use of intelligence. How-
ever, the wartime situation necessitated shorter peri- The early entrants to the units were typically
ods of training for the SSOs—commanders needed from the Intelligence branches of the services, but
later in the war they were often drawn from those

15
SECRET MESSENGERS

in the Code & Cypher branches who were “usually Training the Readers
delighted to get out of a very monotonous branch A majority of American senior officers had little
of service life, and, by comparison, found [the] work or no experience with intelligence in general, and
very interesting.”11 most had little confidence in it. Certainly, no Ameri-
Initially, only a few women were employed, can general had had experience with ULTRA prior
but an establishment for the Women’s Auxiliary to rising to senior command, and many were slow
Air Force was created in the Mediterranean for to appreciate the value that ULTRA represented for
WAAFs replacing officers who were returning military decisions. Even General Dwight D. Eisen-
to Europe in preparation for Operation OVER- hower, who became Supreme Allied Commander in
LORD. They worked well but were only permit- Europe, used the Military Intelligence Service’s des-
ted in a few stations because authorities believed ignator (G-2) as a synonym for guessing in an article
they brought problems: “[T]heir tendency to get about officers’ education in a US Army professional
engaged and their consequent requests for postings journal, published before the Second World War.13
were somewhat disconcerting to a harassed OC Formal regulations for the handling of ULTRA
[officer in command] already struggling with the were first issued to British military customers in
problem of how to fulfil all his commitments with- April 1943 to protect this most valuable of sources.
out sufficient staff.”12 The main points were:
Security for the SLU teams had two aspects,
internal and external. The need for stringent inter- • No action could be taken on ULTRA infor-
nal security was more pressing abroad and in coun- mation (unless this could have been obtained
tries recently occupied by the enemy than in Eng- from another source or adequate cover man-
land. Station OCs were responsible for ensuring OC ufactured [e.g., arranging a reconnaissance
SLUs observed security and that familiarity did not overflight over an area containing a target
breed contempt. The issue of personnel having for- already exposed by ULTRA]).
eign contacts was covered by the names of all foreign
• No ULTRA records could be kept at a lower
friends being recorded—they were then confidentially
formation than an army group.
checked by Section V of MI5. One SLU officer work-
ing in Alexandria, Egypt, had become involved with • List of authorized recipients was available at
and then engaged to an Italian national—he was sub- each SLU, and ULTRA information could
sequently moved to Malta and prevented from seeing only be discussed with and by such persons.
his fiancée until after the war had ended (even then
• New readers could only be admitted if they
strict inquiries were made before he was allowed to
held positions authorized by the regulations
marry her). External security was covered by the secu-
to admission or if special permission had
rity regulations agreed to by the inter-Allied chiefs of
been granted.
staff. It was the duty of all SLU officers to know the
content of these regulations and to advise recipients • All new readers had to be guaranteed by their
of ULTRA intelligence at commands on their inter- commanders (they had to be briefed by the
pretation. It was also the duty of SLU personnel to Senior SLU officer or an officer of the rank
inform OC SLUs of any breaches that they may have of brigadier [or equivalent] already in the pic-
heard of—but the SLU was not responsible for obser- ture—and they had to sign a declaration that
vance of the regulations by ULTRA recipients. they had read and understood the regulations).
• Readers who left such positions had to sign a

16
 ChapteR 3: Establishing a Shared System

declaration that they realized that they were Intelligence Officer Colonel Oscar W. Koch—in
no longer entitled to see or discuss ULTRA or the early days after the command was established
divulge its existence. They were debarred from (shortly after D-Day). In the field, Majors Melvin
taking on any position which might involve C. Helfers and Warrack Wallace, Patton’s ULTRA
their capture by the enemy and were never to officers, lived and worked in a tent 300 yards from
take part in operational flights. the G-2 command intelligence officer. They had
no telephone or electric lights, and had to hitch-
• The use of the telephone was only permitted
hike with the G-2 transportation staff whenever the
in the UK (and even then, a scrambler had to
command moved.
be used). Occasionally it became vital during
operations in France for this rule to be relaxed, However, gradually, Patton recognized the
but a voice scrambler had to be used and con- worth of the ULTRA material he was getting. His
versation camouflaged to give no indication of awakening came when, among intelligence sources,
the sensitive source.14 ULTRA alone predicted a German ambush for Pat-
ton’s tanks at Avranches, France. Patton was able to
The senior officer responsible for the SLU had use the warning to turn a probable military disas-
to ensure that these regulations were implemented ter into a significant victory. Over time, additional
by the command they were attached to and by the insights that only ULTRA could provide prompted
senior intelligence officer within that formation. At Patton to allocate more resources to his ULTRA offi-
many locations the SLU teams had to employ cover cers and pay more attention to their briefings. There-
stories for their work. The fact they kept 24-hour after, Helfers’s principal complaint was that Patton’s
watches and some staff had been drawn from the pet dog Willie would lift his leg on the ULTRA map
Code & Cypher sections of the services gave the while Helfers was waiting to brief the general.
uninitiated the impression that the SLU staff were
involved with cipher work. In many sites the Spe- ULTRA representatives also maintained ene-
cial Communications Unit (SCU) radio aerials were my order of battle maps, sometimes keeping sup-
clearly visible. plementary maps as well. These maps frequently
included the locations of Allied units, since ULTRA
It was necessary to maintain and constantly keep briefing sessions sometimes turned into impromptu
up to date an accurate list of ULTRA recipients in planning conferences. At army group level, the rep-
each operational theater and it was the responsibil- resentatives maintained maps showing where the
ity of the senior officers in each of the SLU detach- Germans believed Allied units had been deployed, as
ments to indoctrinate new recipients in “sufficiently determined from their intelligence communications
impressive style.”15 Theater OCs (who were respon- (which Bletchley Park was exploiting thoroughly).16
sible for internal security) were directly accountable
for overall British ULTRA security and for security Wallace also commented in a postwar summary
contact with recipients. If a recipient from another that a command’s treatment of the ULTRA SSOs
theater or command visited a different command, it depended greatly on first winning the confidence
was necessary to advise the SLU stations concerned; of the command’s G-2. In the Third Army, Koch’s
otherwise, they were denied access to ULTRA. support and his practice of having the SSOs do the
briefings directly for the general was an important
General George Patton and the Third Army factor in gaining Patton’s favor.17
present a typical example. Patton had little regard for
the source, and the ULTRA officers in his command A postwar wrap-up report on the SSO system
generally languished—only briefing Command succinctly remarked that “skeptical commanders

17
SECRET MESSENGERS

usually like [sic] Communications Intelligence after mentary materials, including maps for briefings or
they have seen and heard a little of it.”18 reference that reflected the latest ULTRA informa-
tion. For many commands, these materials showed
The US Army’s SSO: The Model cleared decision-makers the stark difference between
what conventional intelligence sources versus what
The US Army used a straightforward model for
ULTRA said about the enemy.
distribution.
In many commands, it also fell to the SSO to
ULTRA decrypts, whether produced by the Sig-
help the non-cleared G-2 staff personnel gain correct
nal Security Agency (SSA) in the United States or BP
knowledge of the enemy situation—based on ULTRA,
in the UK, were sent to the Military Intelligence Ser-
but without revealing the existence of ULTRA.
vice’s Special Branch in the Pentagon. There, analysts
prepared composite reports from the decrypts that One recurring problem for the ULTRA repre-
consolidated information or helped clarify decrypts sentative was keeping his mission secret, even from
that were useful but not entirely straightforward. fellow officers in the G-2 staff not cleared for the
special source. This was not necessarily difficult in
Special Branch then communicated the ULTRA
commands when the SSO could occupy a separate
reports, and sometimes decrypts themselves, to
office or separate caravan; however, many commands
SSOs (sometimes known as ULTRA representatives
did not have the luxury of separate office space or
to cleared officers) at the major military commands
trucks for their ULTRA representative.
around the world. This information was encrypted
on the SIGABA, the most powerful cipher machine The ambiguous title and low amount of inter-
in the US military, using a cipher key exclusive to action with the formal G-2 staff gave the ULTRA
each SSO in the field. representative an air of mystery and attracted curi-
osity from other headquarters staff. In many cases,
Generally, only a handful of officers in each major
un-indoctrinated personnel believed the SSO to be
command were authorized access to ULTRA, so few
a liaison officer with intelligence agencies outside
that in most cases the ULTRA distribution officers
the theater, or a liaison officer between the senior
knew them by sight. Nevertheless, officers cleared for
commanders of the local theater with other the-
ULTRA were issued identification cards certifying
aters. However, in not a few cases, it was clear some
their privileged access; the card had to be returned if
G-2 staffers recognized that the SSO was privy to
the officer were transferred to a position in which he
a source of intelligence they could not see; given
was not authorized to see this sensitive material.
wartime strictures, however, the reaction usually was
At a field headquarters, the SSO decrypted the reticence rather than snooping.
reports received from Special Branch and tailored
After a suitable period, older ULTRA reports
them for presentation. This might mean adapting
were burned to ensure the security of the material,
the reports in light of the local situation and put-
both from potential enemy intervention and from
ting them into the general’s preferred mode: some
soldiers who did not understand the fragility of
officers preferred verbal briefings, while some want-
the source.
ed written versions. Usually, the SSO presented an
in-person briefing to the commanding officer and The normal practice was to send ULTRA mate-
his senior staff at a morning meeting (or prepared rials to the SSOs four times a day. This was intended
the G-2 to do so). The SSO also usually prepared to facilitate better security and handling of the sen-
written reports that cleared officers could read dur- sitive materials. Even though regular deliveries were
ing the day. In addition, the SSO prepared supple- scheduled, items of immediate importance were sent

18
 ChapteR 3: Establishing a Shared System

any time of day, as soon as a decrypt

was recognized as needed by the field
commands.19 It was said that the SSO
was the only junior officer on duty
24/7.
The G-2 assigned ULTRA offi-
cers extra duties in the non-ULTRA
sections of the staff. This was tough
on the ULTRA officer, but in prac-
tice it turned out to be a good idea.
Such work gave the ULTRA officer
a more comprehensive understand-
ing of the overall situation the com-
mander faced and enabled him to
better tailor the ULTRA information
to support the commander’s deci-
sions. Of course, in some commands,
where the G-2 did not have a good
relationship with the commanding
general, or where the intelligence
section was not well managed, giving
the ULTRA officer these extra duties
sometimes was merely a way to side-
track him.
The British SLUs were deployed
to American commands because
Americans had no trained person-
nel early in the war. Some continued
throughout to maintain continuity. WAAF operators using Typex Mark II cipher machines in the Codes and
In the initial deployment of SLUs Cyphers room at Rear Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces in
to American commands, the practice Algiers. IWM (CNA 4164).
was to have a single SLU accredited
able, almost all headquarters with officers cleared for
to both a ground unit and the US Army Air Forces
ULTRA got their own ULTRA representative.
headquarters associated with that command. This
soon proved impractical, due to the usual physical In the North Africa campaign, British SLUs
separation of the ground and air headquarters, which assigned to American units used one-time pads to
complicated the receipt and distribution of the intel- encrypt their communications, despite the fact that
ligence information from BP to the ULTRA repre- machine-encrypted communications was consider-
sentative. Upon analysis, the model greatly slowed ably faster for both encryption and decryption. Fluid
distribution of ULTRA product to the decision- battle lines in North Africa increased the possibility
makers due to the travel time necessary between that Typex machines, if deployed, would be captured
the units.20 As more trained SLUs became avail- by the enemy.

19
SECRET MESSENGERS

During the European campaign, there was less in the case of exceptionally urgent information an
danger of an army headquarters being overtaken by officer from the production center would drive to the
the enemy, so British SLUs and American SSOs submarine command and deliver the information in-
attached to various US headquarters in the field used person to the submarine force chief of staff.
their countries’ top-of-the-line cipher machines, not
Generally, there was little problem with security
one-time pads.21
aboard a ship or in a task force. Further distribution
A postwar summary about the experiences of of the actual intelligence was unnecessary, since it
ULTRA representatives noted that in most cases would be used by only a few individuals and ULTRA
they worked long hours every day of the week. Fur- could be camouflaged by incorporation into the task
ther, the representative “was practically the only man force commander’s orders for subordinate ships.
on the staff who had no one to relieve him.”22
However, there was a problem with secrecy in
This was the classic model for SSO activities. naval commands ashore. The author of a postwar
However, as an old American country song put it, wrap-up report cited the operation to shoot down
between the classic model and the realities of work Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku’s flight in 1943 as a good
in the field, there were “forty miles of bad road.” example. ULTRA information contained details of
the Japanese admiral’s itinerary for inspection of the
The US Navy and ULTRA Distribution front lines. This was transmitted securely to Gua-
dalcanal, where the operation to attack the admiral’s
US Navy distribution of ULTRA, in the words
airplane was to be launched. However, there were
of a postwar summary report, “lasted throughout the
no procedures for handling ULTRA information
war with surprisingly little change.” ULTRA reports
within the navy staff on Guadalcanal itself, and it
were delivered directly to the commander-in-chief
became common knowledge to the American forces
of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on a daily basis.
on the island that the operation was based on radio
When of special interest, this information was sent
intercept. The navy needed more careful control of
in a pre-delivery report by secure telephone to the
ULTRA dissemination and commented that the
fleet intelligence officer. For operational units, the
army’s Special Branch system was “a model for the
fleet intelligence officer sent a daily ULTRA sum-
Navy to follow.”23
mary via a special communications channel to
cleared intelligence officers at high command levels. Notes
When US Navy Intelligence began active coopera- 1. Telford Taylor, interview by Robert D. Farley,
tion with the US Army and Marines, this title was NSA-OH-01-85 ( January 22, 1985), 4–20.
changed to combat intelligence officer, Commander
in Chief, Pacific Command-Commander in Chief, 2. Taylor, interview, 30–39.
Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPAC-CINCPOA). 3. “Memorandum Describing American Liaison
[12 October 1945],” MIS, War Department Liai-
The navy had a special distribution system for the
son Activities in the U.K. (1943–1945), SRH-153,
American submarine fleet. The combat intelligence 8–10.
officer, recognizing that information important for
submarine operations was often perishable, gave the 4. “Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: An ULTRA Memoir,” in
ULTRA production organization the authority to ULTRA and the Army Air Forces in World War II,
release ULTRA information directly to the com- ed. Diane T. Putney (Office of Air Force History,
mander of the submarine force. While the produc- 1987), 19.
tion organization delivered written reports regularly, 5. “Powell: An ULTRA Memoir,” 54.

20
 ChapteR 3: Establishing a Shared System

6. Synthesis of Experiences in the Use of ULTRA by U.S.

Army Field Commands in the European Theater of
Operations, SRH-006, 21.
7. Problems of the SSO System in World War II,
SRH-107, 6–8.
8. The History of the Special Liaison Units, HW49/1,
1940 Jan 01–1945 Dec 31, The National Archives,
Kew, Great Britain.
9. The History of the Special Liaison Units, HW49/1.
10. The History of the Special Liaison Units, HW49/1.
11. The History of the Special Liaison Units, HW49/1.
12. The History of the Special Liaison Units, HW49/1.
13. A Young Graduate, “On the Command and
General Staff School,” in Eisenhower: The Pre-
war Diaries and Selected Papers, 1905–1941, ed.
Daniel D. Holt (The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1998), 43–58. Holt points out that a draft
of the article is in the Eisenhower Library; there
is no doubt Dwight Eisenhower was the “Young
Graduate.”
14. The History of the Special Liaison Units, HW49/1.
15. The History of the Special Liaison Units, HW49/1.
16. Synthesis of Experiences, SRH-006, 15.
17. Warrack Wallace, USA, Report on Assignment
with Third United States Army, 15 August [to] 18
September 1944, SRH-108, 2–3.
18. Problems of the SSO System in World War II,
SRH-107, 17.
19. Synthesis of Experiences, SRH-006, 13–14.
20. Synthesis of Experiences, SRH-006, 8.
21. Synthesis of Experiences, SRH-006, 9.
22. Synthesis of Experiences, SRH-006, 15.
23. Narrative [of the] Combat Intelligence Center, Joint
Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, SRH-020.

21
SECRET MESSENGERS

22
 Chapter 4: Supporting the War Effort (Ground and Air)

Chapter 4

Supporting the War Effort

(Ground and Air)

US Army Chief of Staff General George C. The Mediterranean

Marshall, the senior officer in the US Army, received Eisenhower was the first senior American offi-
daily intelligence briefings prepared by the Pen- cer to receive ULTRA intelligence. When British
tagon’s G-2, with significant ULTRA input from and American leaders agreed to form a joint force
Special Branch. Marshall and his senior staff got the to fight the Axis, Eisenhower was appointed the first
briefings every weekday at 0900 and on Sundays at commander for a joint Anglo-American command.
1030. (Marshall was well-known within the army for He traveled to Britain to take up his post, which
his weekly horseback rides on Sunday mornings.)1 required considerable organization before the Allied
On the several occasions when Special Branch
force could take the field. The trip also included a
issued specific rules for handling ULTRA in the
period to get acquainted with Prime Minister Win-
various theaters of war, Marshall signed a cover letter
ston Churchill. Apparently, during a weekend at Che-
endorsing the regulations and ensured that the the-
quers, the prime minister’s country retreat, Churchill
ater commander understood that it was his personal
briefed Eisenhower on the ULTRA secret.3
responsibility to ensure the rules were followed.
As commander of the first Anglo-American
It is unclear what influence ULTRA had on the combat force for Operation TORCH, the invasion
chief of staff ’s decisions since neither Marshall nor his of German-occupied North Africa, Eisenhower
staff left memoirs about this time. However, there are initially received ULTRA at Norfolk House in
known occasions when Marshall encouraged Presi- London, his initial headquarters; as the operation
dent Franklin Roosevelt to read ULTRA reports. In began, he was in Gibraltar and received ULTRA
addition, when Marshall accompanied Roosevelt to material directly from Bletchley Park (BP). This
the summit meeting at Yalta in February 1945, Mar- operation was one of the first tests of British-
shall was accompanied by an officer from the Special American interoperability.
Branch’s German Military Reports Office to provide
him with any ULTRA product he would need at the Generally, there was a harmonious work atmo-
conference.2 Marshall also had SIGINT support dur- sphere between the British and Americans within
ing his mission to China after the war. The senior the SLU. However, this was the early days of US-UK
general obviously knew the value of ULTRA. military cooperation, and there was some friction

23
SECRET MESSENGERS

Digraph DB PK TZ UG FI
Location Gibraltar Algiers Constantine Ain Beida Laverdure
(HQ SLU)
Serving Navy Navy Coastal NAAF 18th Army Originally served from
Air Force (Strategic and Group* UG, then via PK from
AFHQ Tactical) April in direct contact
with BP
*The 18th Army Group was an amalgamation of the First and Eighth Armies in North Africa. It was formed February
20, 1943, when the British Eighth Army advancing from the east and the British First Army advancing into Tunisia
from the west came close enough to require coordinated command during the Tunisia Campaign. Within Tunisia,
the First and Eighth Armies moved to Le Kef in March and then to Haidra in April.

between the senior operational officers of British pherment of a message. These stations used the
and American combat units. Thus, American visitors following digraphs, which seem to have been ran-
on inspection tours of North Africa and the Medi- domly generated: DB (Gibraltar), PK (Algiers), TZ
terranean Theater usually recommended increased (Constantine), FI (First Army), and UG (Algeria).
US participation in the ULTRA work to minimize In the early days of TORCH, all ULTRA traffic for
inter-Allied problems both in intelligence and deci- the theater was directed through to Gibraltar first
sion making. and vetted by Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman
and Wing Commander Humphries who assessed
Inspectors also found that the SLUs, though
what was transmitted forward to Algiers. If the traf-
welcomed by both British and American command-
fic needed forwarding to a further outstation, the
ers, often had not been fully integrated into the com-
messages would be enciphered again at Algiers. On
mand itself. There were instances, for example, when
November 25, the SLU HQ was moved to Algiers
the headquarters would relocate but fail to notify
and a small station remained in Gibraltar. By the
the SLU in advance, which meant the SLU was left
middle of March 1943, the setup in North Africa
behind and had to make special arrangements for
was as shown in the table above.
movement to the new headquarters.
In the North African Theater, and later in the
Early in November 1942, an SLU team, under
Mediterranean Theater, much of the ULTRA distri-
the command of Major Smith-Wright, arrived in
bution and interpretation was done by British offi-
Gibraltar and was located on the grounds of the gov-
cers, even when the commanding officer was Ameri-
ernor’s palace. They directly fed ULTRA to Eisen-
can. The general pattern was a SLU with a majority
hower who had his headquarters in the Gibraltar
of British personnel supplemented by one or two US
tunnels. Separate units were sent to the TORCH
Army officers. Some commands of the US Army Air
Theater under the command of Wing Commander
Forces had a higher proportion of US Special Secu-
Long. One party landed at Oran, Algeria, on D-Day
rity Officers (SSOs), particularly later in the war.
+1 (November 9, 1942), another at Algiers, Algeria,
and one at Casablanca, Morocco. Operation HUSKY was the next major test for
the Allied ULTRA teams. The invasion of Sicily
For distribution there was a system of address
began on July 11, 1943. Two days after the initial
groups (digraphs and trigraphs) often used togeth-
wave, one SLU station landed with General Mont-
er with serial numbers. These letter address groups
gomery on the island’s southern tip and quickly
(e.g., IND for SLU Delhi) helped reduce the enci-

24
 Chapter 4: Supporting the War Effort (Ground and Air)

moved up to Syracuse, where two days later a second units in the field often did not know how to notify
SLU team arrived. As US Army and Army Air Forc- them when targeting changed.4 For example, in ear-
es headquarters were collocated, the two SLU teams ly 1944, the US Army Air Forces altered bombing
were combined and followed the advance to Lentini, priorities in Italy, concentrating on railroad bridges
just south of Catania where stiff enemy resistance instead of railroad yards. At first the US SSO did
was encountered and the units became static. not share this change in targets with BP, as he did
not understand why they might be interested. BP
A third SLU landed with Patton’s Seventh
eventually learned about the new target, but this lack
Army on the northwest coast and advanced quickly
of communication delayed BP in providing specific,
along the northern coast, ending up in Palermo. Pat-
relevant SIGINT to the command.5
ton’s rapid advance in the north caused the enemy to
withdraw from its Catania area stronghold, pursued Both problems were addressed over time and
by Montgomery’s Eighth Army and its SLU. the situation improved, although neither was entire-
ly solved by the end of the war.
The armies ended up in Messina and by Septem-
ber began the assault on the Italian mainland. The
assigned SLU made sixteen moves in just thirty days, Western Europe
shifting locations quickly up the western coast of Italy, Eisenhower, the most senior Allied officer at
reaching Bari where it remained for ten days. A joint SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expedi-
US Army and Army Air Forces HQ was established tionary Forces), first in North Africa, then in West-
at Lucera, where the two SLUs combined. ern Europe, did not deal directly with an SLU or
SSO. This task was delegated to the SHAEF Assis-
While the US Eighth Army advanced north,
tant Chief of Staff (G-2) Major General Kenneth
preparations for the Salerno landings were made
Strong, a highly experienced British officer, who
in the west. On September 7, General Alexander
prepared an intelligence briefing every morning.
and the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean
Eisenhower insisted that Strong give him all-source
arrived at Bizerte, Tunisia, while Eisenhower and
intelligence briefings, in which ULTRA was meshed
Air Marshall Coningham went to La Marsa, also in
with information from other sources to provide him
Tunisia. The SLU teams provided an ULTRA ser-
with a single and comprehensive appreciation of the
vice to these senior officers for nearly a fortnight.
war situation.6
When General Mark Clark landed in com-
Eisenhower’s G-2 for the European Theater of
mand of the US Fifth Army he was oblivious to the
Operations was Colonel Ralph Hauenstein, a former
value ULTRA intelligence could provide as he had
journalist. While Strong was the G-2 for SHAEF
not been well briefed on its value. Once the SLU
(all Allied forces fighting in Western Europe)
began providing him with the intelligence feed,
Hauenstein was G-2 for the US Army component in
Clark changed his mind. The SLU station followed
the theater. Hauenstein was “astounded” by ULTRA,
the Allied advance and set itself up at the Palace of
and in later reminiscences he recalled it was “timely,
Caserta (near Naples, in southern Italy) within the
accurate, and relative to the current situation.”7
headquarters until the end of 1943.
The ULTRA officer at Eisenhower’s headquar-
US inspectors also found that the ULTRA sys-
ters distributed product to the various subordinate
tem needed improvement in its air intelligence. Pro-
staff officers cleared for it. One important aspect of
ducers—principally at BP—were ready to exploit
this job was keeping BP apprised of the changing
enemy sources and provide data, but US operational
requirements for information by this headquarters

25
SECRET MESSENGERS

command. In addition to
ULTRA reports, the SSO
at SHAEF distributed the
MAGIC Diplomatic Sum-
mary to officers who needed
it, particularly Robert Mur-
phy, a State Department
senior assigned as Eisen-
hower’s political advisor.8
In early 1944, as US
rules for ULTRA in the
European campaign were
promulgated, Marshall
sent a letter to Eisenhower,
Supreme Commander of
the Allied Expeditionary
Force that was preparing
to land in Nazi-occupied
France. He reminded
Eisenhower of the impor-
tance of ULTRA material Photo of Helfers briefing Patton. Citadel Archives.
and enclosed a summary of
The ULTRA experience at Patton’s Third Army
the regulations that the War Department had codified
probably was typical for American commanders in
since the US agreement with Britain. Most regula-
Europe. Helfers and Wallace worked closely with
tions likely were already well-known to Eisenhower
the command’s intelligence officer Koch. The two
and his senior staff, but Marshall had several points
ULTRA officers would collate all incoming ULTRA
in his summary that emphasized the importance of
messages—sent in an encryption system only they
strict security and handling of ULTRA. “It is vital,”
had access to—and plot out locations on maps to pre-
he said, “that the security regulations be meticulously
pare regular briefings for the commanding general.
observed, and that all personnel entitled to handle or
receive ULTRA intelligence take all possible precau- Helfers and Wallace alternated days briefing the
tions in connection with its handling and use.” 9
ULTRA material to the seven officers in the Third
Army who were cleared for it. Each morning, Pat-
Twenty-eight officers served as ULTRA rep-
ton would convene a general staff meeting open to
resentatives in the European Theater: Two of them
the senior operational and intelligence officers, who
were regular army, but the rest were reserve officers.
would present briefings on their areas of responsibil-
Each had been carefully selected by Special Branch
ity. At the conclusion of the general staff meeting, all
on the basis of personal interviews and background
officers were dismissed, except for those who needed
investigations. In accordance with the personal
to remain for a special briefing.
bias of McCormack in Special Branch, a major-
ity of these ULTRA representatives were lawyers, At that point, the ULTRA officer would brief
although there were also former teachers, reporters, Patton and his inner staff on the enemy situation as
and “an engineer and a corporate executive.”10 revealed by ULTRA decrypts, often with important

26
 Chapter 4: Supporting the War Effort (Ground and Air)

location data not known from conventional intelli- staff were recruited and trained for the Normandy
gence sources. This direct access to the command- campaign—beginning with instructions in the use
ing officer also let ULTRA officers provide ULTRA of Typex.
material of special importance or urgency.11
The table below shows units that were opened
As planning progressed at pace for the Norman- in 1944.
dy landings (Operation OVERLORD) in 1944, the
ULTRA traffic was originally passed to all seven
Whaddon Hall teams in England began fitting out
stations listed below by teleprinter direct from Hut
seven to eight smaller Guy 15-cwt standard army
3. But when Special Communications Unit (SCU)
trucks with the requisite wireless equipment. They
teams joined EF, TA, and FU in April 1944, test
were to be deployed with each Allied Army Group
traffic (known as Chocolate) was sent by wireless
or assigned to army level after D-Day. They were
telegraphy to train the new signalers. Live traffic
also responsible for teams in the US sector, fitting
continued to be sent via teleprinter.
out the standard US Dodge ambulances, using the
same equipment. The trucks typically had a dedicat- When the OVERLORD planning was com-
ed driver and two or three operators. The Royal Air plete, NH closed down and SHAEF was moved to
Force (RAF) Cypher staff worked in a separate truck Bushey Park, with the NH team relocating to Ports-
that, when combined with a staffed fitted truck, was mouth to serve the Allied Naval Combined Expedi-
designated as a complete SLU. tionary Force (ANCXF), the organization that was
responsible for the coordination of the whole inva-
A significant SLU team structure was need-
sion force.
ed for the invasion of Europe. In December 1943
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Gore-Browne, with his In May three further mobile stations were
extensive SLU experience in the Middle East and formed. One was at Portsmouth serving the Sec-
North Africa, was recalled back to Britain to build ond British Army and 83 Group. The second was at
SLU8 that was to be established for OVERLORD. Leatherhead serving the First Canadian Army and
He had his pick of personnel and was given an office 84 Group, and the third was at Knutsford serving the
in Hamilton Terrace in London to start planning. Third US Army.
Documentation for the unit was drafted at Allied
Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) at Stanmore, and

Digraph NH ST AG EF TA FU DL
Location Norfolk House Bushey Park St Pauls Stanmore Uxbridge Bryanston Wycombe
School, Square, Abbey
London London
Serving SHAEF planning USSTAF12 (mobile) AEAF TAF13 1st US 8th US
(Chief of Staff of 21st Army Air Force
Supreme Allied Army Group
Commander) Group (FUSAG)

27
SECRET MESSENGERS

On D-Day, June 6, 1944, Station Location Serving

these stations listed in the table
ST/SH Bushey Park USSTAF and SHAEF
were open.
EF/AD Stanmore AEAF and Air Defences Great Britain
Within six weeks of TA Uxbridge TAF
D-Day, the following stations
FU Bryanston Square 1st US Army Group
had crossed into France with
DL Wycombe Abbey 8th US Army Group
their customers: ON, YK, CR,
TA, AG, FU, and ZE. MI Wycombe Abbey Bomber Command
XF/SHA Portsmouth ANCXF and SHAEF Advanced
The Second British
AG Portsmouth 21st Army Group
Army and its Air compo-
nent, 83 Group RAF, crossed ON Portsmouth Second British Army and 83 Group
into France on D-Day with a CR Leatherhead First Canadian Army and 84 Group
subsection from the ON sta- ZE Knutsford Third US Army
tion (in Banville), as well as YK Bristol First US Army
a Ford utility truck and the
SCU wireless telegraphy van. moving from Corsica with a large Special Liaison
This contingency was reinforced on June 11 by the Unit Typex station and two SCU teams, opening at
remainder of the team and included a 30-cwt van Saint-Tropez on September 10, 1944.
and an SCU 3-tonner. For the first month of the
campaign this station served the advance party of The importance of ULTRA was apparent to
Montgomery, in command of this army group. Gen- Patch and his senior officers, and they arranged for
eral Dempsey personally selected relevant ULTRA the SLU to get an office in the command post adja-
messages, which were delivered by SLU officers at cent to the G-2 intelligence officers. The command
the general’s HQ. G-2 soon recognized that the volume of ULTRA
made it impossible for him to brief the command-
While the US First and Third Armies pushed er himself on this material, so he gave responsibil-
eastward from the Normandy beaches in August, the ity for the regular ULTRA briefings to the SLU.
US Seventh Army conducted an amphibious land- There were several formal briefings every day in the
ing (Operation ANVIL, renamed DRAGOON just Seventh Army, first thing in the morning, then at
before it was launched) on the southern coast of midday and evening. The SLUs would quickly notify
France and began moving inland. General Alexan- the G-2 about any SIGINT of importance when-
der Patch had been receiving ULTRA from an SLU ever it arrived during the day, and he would decide
in the Seventh Army staging area in Naples, Italy, whether to take them to the commander.14
prior to the landing in France, and continued to
receive ULTRA through the end of the war. A spe- Not all SSOs had positive experiences, such as
cial SLU station had been created at Ajaccio between had occurred at the US Third Army. In a postwar
August 12–19 to handle ULTRA traffic for the Brit- summary of his experiences, the US First Army SSO
ish prime minister and General Terence Airey who reported that intelligence in general and ULTRA
were on the island of Corsica to witness the invasion. intelligence in particular had not been well handled
The invasion took place on August 15 and the SLU at the senior levels. He complained that “many of
team landed the following day at Saint-Tropez. The my difficulties were caused by the personality of the
Allied forces moved quickly north, as resistance was G-2… and his relatively unimportant voice in the
weak. 6th Army Group relocated to southern France, Army’s cabinet.”15

28
 Chapter 4: Supporting the War Effort (Ground and Air)

SCU8 ZETA team attached to US Third Army near Black Forest, May 17, 1945, including RAF and Royal Corps of
Signals (RSigs) members. Left to right, back row: Flight Lieutenant J. G. McCombie (RAF), Sergeant Povey (RSigs),
Lieutenant L. Hull (US) or Flying Officer D. E. Tyrer (RAF). Front row: Signalman W. Neal, Corporal R. Chatfield
(RAF), Lance Corporal C. Britton (RSigs), Captain C. Hutchinson (RSigs), Lance Corporal A. Parsons (RSigs), Flight
Sergeant I. White (RAF), Driver J. Croucher (RSigs), Driver B. Bayley (RSigs). Courtesy of Dr. David Abrutat.

Initially, according to this report, the First dures led to insecurities with the ULTRA material.
Army command G-2 presented ULTRA material Since the G-2 did not explain the situation to his
to the commanding general himself and without staff adequately, this had led to high curiosity about
much analysis. Subordinates on the G-2 staff at first his role among the other intelligence officers, and
resented the ULTRA officer’s presence, as the G-2 somehow the ULTRA secret got out among them.
did not explain who he was or what his special duties There turned out to be no long-term consequences,
entailed, although over time they came to accept but that could not have been anticipated.16
his special role. The ULTRA officer was given no
Despite these complaints about problems at the
separate spaces for his work, even though much of
1st Army Group, another report on ULTRA at the
the staff was not cleared for the sensitive material.
First US Army—by the same author—listed many
Gradually, as the war continued, the G-2 accepted
occasions during the European campaign from Nor-
that he should do analysis of the ULTRA material
mandy to the Rhineland in which ULTRA provided
and allowed the ULTRA officer to do some briefings
key information about the Germans and factored
for the commanding general.
in the commanding general’s decisions. It is unclear
The ULTRA officer reported in his postwar today whether the later complaints about the 1st Army
retrospective that this disregard of ULTRA proce- Group use of ULTRA were venting and exaggerating

29
SECRET MESSENGERS

SCU8 ZETA vehicles attached to the US Third Army near the Black Forest en route Regensburg to Paris, May 17,
1945. (The team spent the night sleeping alongside.) Courtesy of Dr. David Abrutat.

personal grievances, or whether ULTRA fulfilled its ULTRA officer delivered a second ULTRA briefing
important role despite organizational adversity.17 daily to the cleared junior officers on the intelligence
and operations staffs.18
The first commander of the US First Army
was Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, who led the
unit through its initial training in Britain, the cross- The US Army Air Forces in Europe
channel invasion of France, and the initial breakout Lieutenant Colonel Edward Thompson,
from the Normandy beaches. However, in July 1944, assigned as the ULTRA representative for SHAEF
Bradley was promoted to command the 12th Army Air Intelligence in August 1943, found the Air Intel-
Group, and Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges ligence staff at this senior Allied headquarters to be
replaced him as the First Army commander. entirely British personnel. After his training with
Special Branch and some time at BP, Thompson
It seems unlikely the G-2 and ULTRA problems
was assigned to the 1st US Army Group, then to
occurred while Bradley was in command. A detailed
SHAEF. At headquarters, he spent time with the
postwar report by the ULTRA officer on the use of
chief of the Air Intelligence sub-division at SHAEF
ULTRA at 12th Army Group after Bradley’s pro-
G-2, Group Captain R. Harry Humphreys. At first,
motion describes a well-organized and harmonious
Thompson’s only staff was a Women’s Army Air
operation, as well as active use of ULTRA by Bradley
Forces corporal, whom he described as efficient, but
and his senior staff. They received an ULTRA brief-
who had had her first ULTRA briefing only the day
ing early each day, with updates as needed, and the
before they began working.

30
 Chapter 4: Supporting the War Effort (Ground and Air)

The ULTRA representative prepared a daily mary reports on a weekly basis. It was estimated that
digest of ULTRA air intelligence messages, which they would receive as many as 75 ULTRA reports
was used primarily by G-2 personnel. Thompson each day, out of which they prepared their briefings.
was proud that publication of this digest continued
The ULTRA officers were known to un-
every day until the end of the war, with no gaps even
indoctrinated personnel as the General Liaison and
when the headquarters moved or there were other
Special Reports Section of the intelligence staff.
problems. In fact, the digest soon became daily read-
ing material for the Deputy Supreme Commander Given its location, the US Eighth Air Force
(Air Vice Marshal Arthur Tedder) and senior offi- ULTRA officer was able to visit BP an average of
cers on the air staff. once a week. He also was able to frequently consult
with the Supreme Commander’s staff (SHAEF),
Thompson’s chief complaint was that members
where he could get data from tactical intercept.
of the air intelligence staff showed little interest in
ULTRA overall.19 Unfortunately, the efforts of the ULTRA staff
were hampered by inadequate working quarters. The
The US Eighth Air Force was one of the prin-
SLU was in the basement of an operations building
cipal commands for strategic bombing by the US
at High Wycombe, a location not at all convenient
Army Air Forces in Europe. It had been constituted
to the senior officers they would be briefing. In addi-
as the VII Bomber Command and transferred its
tion, the walls of the room were thin, prompting the
operations to Great Britain in February 1942; its
staff to have to constantly remind visitors to keep
headquarters were at RAF Daws Hill, near the RAF
their voices low when discussing ULTRA.
Bomber Command at Wycombe.
The ULTRA material generally centered on
As the US Eighth Air Force set up operations,
the principal strategic targets for the unit. One of
a small number of its officers were indoctrinated for
its main missions was destruction of the German oil
ULTRA information, and first received ULTRA
industry, so ULTRA reports concentrated on target
reports directly from the British Air Ministry, then
knowledge and after-operations damage reports. The
through the US Strategic Air Forces liaison unit at
Eighth Air Force also made good use of ULTRA that
the ministry. The senior American official in the
listed the deployment of German air defense fighter
liaison unit briefed the commanding officer, Lieuten-
aircraft, which helped them determine the number
ant General Ira Eaker. In December 1943, when the
of fighters needed to accompany each bombing raid.
US Strategic Air Forces was established and General
Eaker moved up, the legendary General James H. The ULTRA staff at US Eighth Air Force kept
“Jimmy” Doolittle was his eventual replacement at several reference files. They had a “hot message” file
the US Eighth Air Force. Doolittle requested that his of the most important ULTRA reports of the previ-
command be given a regular SLU, and this was done. ous ten days. In addition, the staff kept a card file on
every German Air Force unit and coordinated this
The organization and operation of the SLU
file with a large wall map of Germany. The cards
generally went according to regulations and recom-
were updated each time ULTRA revealed a new
mended practices. At any one time, there were 25
location for a unit. Another large chart, updated with
or 30 ULTRA officers assigned to the command.
wax pencils, allowed an officer to see at a glance each
They received ULTRA information according to
German Air Force unit’s subordination, location,
procedures and gave regular morning and afternoon
and strength.
briefings to the command’s senior officers, as well as
updates when needed. They produced several sum-

31
SECRET MESSENGERS

The senior American ULTRA representative at follow the Special Branch rules for distribution of
US Eighth Air Force was Major Ansel E. M. Tal- ULTRA, not the wishes of the local commander.22
bert, an aviation journalist in his prewar career. In
With the concepts and regulations in place, the
addition to being a skilled writer, he had interviewed
army recruited officers to become SSOs in Asia and
many of America’s pioneer aviators—several of
the Pacific and began a training program in early
whom were now the officers to whom he was giving
July 1944. The program started with several weeks
ULTRA briefings.20
of general intelligence training and included up to
The principal ULTRA briefing officer for the a month working on actual ULTRA material in the
USSTAF Commander, Major General Carl Spaatz, various areas of Special Branch.
was Lieutenant Colonel Julian Allen. He had served
As the war across the Pacific expanded, the need
as an ambulance driver in the American Field Service
for SSOs grew, and many had to be sent to opera-
in the First World War and then had been the senior
tional areas with reduced levels of training.23
official of Morgan Bank in Europe in the interwar
period. Allen worked in a trailer outside Spaatz’s The Pacific Ocean Area command was in an
home and headquarters and was available to brief anomalous position, with problems arising out of the
the general at any time. Allen shared the ULTRA long-standing US Army-US Navy rivalry. The most
briefing duties for the general with Major Lewis F. senior general was responsible for logistics support
Powell, Jr., although Spaatz often sat in on the intel- and training army units in the Pacific, but the actual
ligence briefings at Eisenhower’s headquarters. combat units were subordinate to the theater com-
mander, Admiral Chester Nimitz. Distribution of
Powell also served as chief of operational intelli-
ULTRA to army combat units was from navy sourc-
gence for the command, which involved supervising
es. The SSO at the army command headquarters
a staff and briefing non-ULTRA intelligence, but he
kept his senior officers informed about ULTRA and
considered his ULTRA duties his principal job.
had some supervisory responsibilities for the assign-
ULTRA material sent to USSTAF were gener- ments of SSOs around the Pacific.
ally summary reports or, occasionally, decrypts with
US Navy SIGINT was produced at the Joint
commentary added at BP. The ULTRA officers at
Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area ( JICPOA).
headquarters did not have the ability to maintain a
There was rivalry between JICPOA and the army’s
reference card file to help them make sense of raw
G-2. JICPOA consistently refused to provide navy
information in decrypts, so they very much appreci-
ULTRA to the army general in command. The
ated the interpretation by BP’s experts.21
army’s G-2 reciprocated, declining to share its
ULTRA product, and looking with suspicion on
The Pacific any army officer that got too friendly with JICPOA.
In the summer of 1943, Special Branch developed Over time, the army and navy established a modus
concepts to institute field dissemination of ULTRA vivendi (way of life) regarding ULTRA. The senior
in the Pacific. It was at this time that the personnel SSO would be a staff member on the commanding
who would distribute ULTRA were redesignated as general’s staff and would brief senior army officers
Special Security Officers (SSOs). Each officer would who were authorized to read ULTRA. The senior
be attached to a theater commander for adminis- army SSO would supervise the ULTRA representa-
tration and discipline, but would remain under the tives sent to operational commands, although distri-
operational control of the US Army assistant chief bution of ULTRA to those subordinate commands
of staff for intelligence. Of course, the SSO would would be from JICPOA. These procedures were

32
 Chapter 4: Supporting the War Effort (Ground and Air)

never codified by a formal agreement, but according ULTRA information better tailored to the needs of
to an SSO, “it worked.” the operational command.
The first senior SSO in the theater was Major Because of space problems and lack of SIGA-
Edwin E. Huddleson, who arrived on December 7, BA machines at the XXI Bomber Command head-
1943; he worked alone until August 1944, when four quarters, Kingston had to hitchhike to and from the
additional SSOs arrived. Huddleson assigned SSOs nearby US Army Air Forces Pacific Ocean Area
to subordinate commands as they were needed. headquarters on the island to obtain the ULTRA
material for briefing the air officers of his own com-
In January 1945 Nimitz moved his command to
mand. When the Bomber Command moved for-
Guam, which became the center of the war effort
ward on January 1, 1945, to Guam, the SSO was
across the Pacific, and the SSO for the US Army
no longer constricted in working space—but it took
was in the process of moving to Guam when the war
him 10 days to get a wall plug in his office so he
ended.24
could operate his own SIGABA machine.
The SSO for the US XXI Bomber Com-
The SSO took on additional responsibilities
mand in the Pacific had an exceptionally smooth
as the US Army Air Forces reorganized in August.
experience at the command’s headquarters. Major
The XXI Bomber Command became part of the US
Charles T. Kingston, Jr. was able to visit the com-
Twentieth Air Force, and the US Army Air Forces
mand while it was in training at Colorado Springs.
Pacific Ocean Area became the US Army Strategic
He met the senior general, as well as other senior
Air Forces (USASTAF). Kingston supported both
operational and staff officers, including the A-2
commands with ULTRA information. The reorga-
chief of Air Intelligence. Kingston already knew
nization plans provided for an additional ULTRA
many of the A-2 staff officers from their time at
officer for USASTAF, but the war ended before an
the US Army Air Forces Air Intelligence School
officer could be assigned to the position.
in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
Kingston pointed out that ULTRA information
Kingston had flown to Hawaii in November
was absolutely critical to the mining operations in
1944, where he met many senior navy SIGINT offi-
Japanese home waters by US aircraft, which began
cers and made arrangements for command to get
in late March. ULTRA was also critical during the
SIGINT from navy sources in the Pacific. This was
industrial/urban area attacks in June and July. Kings-
important because his unit was an army command
ton wrote, “the contribution of MIS to the success-
engaged in strategic bombing, but operating in a
ful bombing of the Japanese Empire by B-29s can-
theater of war that was under command of the navy.
not be overstated. As the agent through whom MIS
The navy had extensive SIGINT production facili-
products reached the Bomber Command, I was in
ties in the Pacific and could provide weather infor-
an excellent position to see that, except for MIS, the
mation from SIGINT and other intelligence data
A-2 section of the command would have been prac-
particularly crucial to successful bombing operations.
tically without intelligence.”25
He arrived at Bomber Command advanced
headquarters on Saipan in late November. Because Southwest Pacific Area
of transport problems, many of the intelligence staff
The Allies Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA)
officers had not yet arrived, so Kingston was required
was headquartered in Australia for much of the war,
to perform additional intelligence functions beyond
while combat against the Japanese occurred in the
his ULTRA duties. This experience turned out to be
mountains and jungles of New Guinea, then the
valuable in the long run, preparing him to provide

33
SECRET MESSENGERS

Dutch East Indies, and, finally, the Philippines. The fore were willing to accept an officer from outside
theater’s geography presented formidable challenges their command to distribute it, MacArthur bristled
to the distribution of ULTRA to start with, but the at the idea of an SSO. His motivation was unclear,
problems were compounded by staff actions. but we can postulate a few possible reasons. US mili-
tary commanders in general were leery of any offi-
The supreme commander in the Southwest
cer within their command who had the authority to
Pacific was General Douglas MacArthur, the lon-
write reports to an outside command. In addition,
gest serving officer in the US Army. He had been a
MacArthur had a long-standing grudge against
daring commander in the First World War, superin-
Marshall, stemming from their roles in the First
tendent of the Military Academy at West Point, and
World War, and on not a few occasions resisted what
then US Army chief of staff, the senior post in the
he considered interference from Washington.
service. He had been hired in 1935 to build a Philip-
pines army and then recalled to active service in the Edward Drea’s MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreak-
US Army when the United States entered the war. ing and the War against Japan, 1942-1945 makes an
For much of his career, he had resented the army’s interesting claim about the general’s resistance to the
entrenched establishment in Washington and dis- imposition of SSOs in his command. Granting that
liked most presidents. the Southwest Pacific Theater had no uniform dis-
tribution system for ULTRA through the summer
The Southwest Pacific Theater was unusual in
of 1944, “it is equally true that MacArthur did not
that its SIGINT product came from multiple sourc-
need one until the Leyte invasion in October 1944.”
es. In addition to distribution from the US Army’s
The argument is that until the landings in the Phil-
Signal Security Agency (SSA) in the United States,
ippines, there was little ULTRA available from Japa-
the Southwest Pacific had its own organic cryptana-
nese Army communications, and most combat in the
lytic organization, a joint US-Australian cryptana-
theater was localized in one area.27 This argument
lytic unit known as Central Bureau Brisbane (CBB).
ignores the need for extra security for ULTRA.
Moreover, the navy had a SIGINT production orga-
nization in Australia which also distributed ULTRA Whatever the truth of the matter, Colonel (later
to MacArthur’s headquarters. It should be noted Brigadier General) Carter Clarke, chief of Special
that the SWPA Theater was not unique in receiv- Branch, made the lengthy flight to Brisbane. Clarke
ing ULTRA from multiple distribution points. The was famous throughout the SSA for his profane
same situation occurred in the China Burma India vocabulary, but what was actually said and done in
Theater, CBI, which also had formidable problems his meeting with MacArthur has been left to the
in distance and terrain. imagination. The conclusion, though, was that even
as imperious a figure as MacArthur acceded to the
As he had with Eisenhower, Marshall sent a
Special Branch rules for ULTRA distribution.28
letter outlining the uses of ULTRA and the rules
regarding assignment of an ULTRA officer to Whether caused by Clarke’s remonstrance with
MacArthur on May 23, 1944. He stressed the neces- MacArthur about the status of the theater SSO or
sity of protecting the secrecy of ULTRA, which not, the ULTRA officer for the Southwest Pacific
made “uniform regulations and centralized control Theater reported good relations with MacArthur
over the handling of all Japanese ULTRA wherever for the rest of the war. The ULTRA representative
produced” essential.26 always accompanied MacArthur, who frequently
traveled to forward areas, to ensure that the com-
Although most commanders welcomed the
mander-in-chief had the most current operational
regular supply of ULTRA intelligence, and there-
intelligence from ULTRA.

34
SECRET MESSENGERS

addition, an SSO served at the Fifth, Seventh, and pushed the Japanese back, required modification of
Thirteenth US Air Forces. Since a significant por- the lack of cooperation between CBB and the SSOs.
tion of MacArthur’s intelligence, perhaps as much The CBB remained behind in Australia, which
as 40 percent, came from naval sources, the SSO resulted in frequent delays in passing their decrypts
maintained a liaison officer at the US Seventh Fleet to the forward headquarters. Thus, the ULTRA sys-
headquarters. tem, probably at the War Department level (although
this was not clear in the available source material),
Apparently, the G-2 did not provide adequately
arranged for a British SLU to be assigned to each
for the SSO during the movements of MacArthur’s
Australian command, while an SLU and American
headquarters from Australia northward. In his post-
SSO as his deputy would be attached to the CBB to
war report, the Special Security Representative (SSR)
provide a more effective channel for passing ULTRA
noted that headquarters did not get all the intelligence
to the forward headquarters.
it required during the move from Hollandia to Leyte,
and that the SSO system received criticism for this. It This arrangement, however, was quickly
appears that the G-2 itself was shorted on shipping destroyed by MacArthur’s staff. The theater chief of
space for the move, and just passed the inconvenience staff, again presumably Sutherland, along with the
along, hampering SSO activities. Eventually, as the chief signal officer, bluntly told the ULTRA repre-
command again moved, to Manila, the SSO received sentative on Leyte that this arrangement with CBB
adequate support in space and conducted operations was canceled. They cited as reason ULTRA regula-
that “worked to the best advantage, for the command.”29 tions that the SSO was to be an advisor on the secu-
rity of ULTRA and also said that the theater G-2
Even though the Southwest Pacific Theater
should make the decision about what intelligence
had its own organic SIGINT organization, CBB,
would be given to the theater’s senior officers.32
MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Gen-
eral Richard Kerens Sutherland, forbade sharing Thus, at times, perhaps even a majority of the
ULTRA information between CBB and the SSO. time, the SSOs in the Southwest Pacific Theater
Thus, the SSO and CBB officers knew each other were treated as nothing more than, as one of them
on a social level only, but there was no working liai- put it, a “quasi-administrative-signal-corps outfit.”33
son between them. This account is based on infer-
The SSO assigned to the US Eighth Army
ence. The author of the postwar report on SSOs in
reported positive experiences, including an excellent
the SWPA Theater diplomatically referred to offi-
working relationship with the command G-2. The
cers other than MacArthur by their staff titles rather
G-2 gave the SSO “a free hand in the handling of
than their personal names.30
information,” and almost without exception accept-
The US Navy had a SIGINT production orga- ed the SSO’s recommendations on briefings, other
nization in Brisbane, composed of experienced per- disseminations, and security measures.
sonnel evacuated from Corregidor in the Philippines.
Despite this, the commanding officer of the
Its commander, Lieutenant Commander Rudolph T.
Eighth Army, Lieutenant General Robert Eichel-
Fabian, briefed MacArthur directly and took great
berger, was the victim of organizational games played
pleasure in cutting out MacArthur’s intelligence
at theater headquarters. In April 1945 the Southwest
officer, Major General Charles Willoughby, as well
Pacific Theater headquarters discontinued publica-
as making rude remarks to him.31
tion of the daily Special Intelligence Bulletin, and
The movement of theater headquarters to Hol- declined to send its replacement to Eichelberger,
landia and then the Philippines, as Allied forces giving as reason that the Eighth Army had not been
selected yet for the impending invasion of the Japa-

36
 Chapter 4: Supporting the War Effort (Ground and Air)

nese home islands and had no need for intelligence added, “it is a matter of record that the same obser-
about the wider war situation. Theater headquarters vation cannot be made of a number of his immediate
policy changed to only send the individual armies subordinates.”36
specific ULTRA cables they thought applied to the
MacArthur himself could use ULTRA excep-
unit’s situation. The SSO at Eighth Army noted that
tionally well, but also would ignore it if the SIGINT
this resulted “in an almost complete lack of ULTRA
information interfered with his plans. ULTRA pro-
information being received at Eighth Army.”
vided key information that enabled MacArthur’s
Eichelberger sent a written appeal about this “leap to Hollandia,” a daring series of landings at
dire situation, without results. The SSO, Lieutenant Japanese rear-area bases that led to victory in New
Colonel Maurice J. Mountain, traveled to theater Guinea. However, during the Philippine campaign,
headquarters to make a personal appeal; he report- when ULTRA information about Japanese strength
ed “lots of sympathy” but no support for releasing in Manila warranted postponing an attack to wait
more information to the Eighth Army. Eichelberger for reinforcements, MacArthur insisted that his
still received some SIGINT from navy sources but operation proceed as scheduled, rather than hold up
groused that he was forced to depend on a separate his timetable.37
service for ULTRA.34
The one positive exception to the dismal status CBI (known to British
of ULTRA in the Southwest Pacific Theater was as Southeast Asia)
use of the material by MacArthur’s senior air offi- The most unusual theater of the Second World
cer, Major General George Kenney. Kenney used War was called the China Burma India (CBI) The-
ULTRA brilliantly, not only to plan bombing raids ater by the Americans and the Southeast Asia The-
on Japanese bases, but to isolate the battlefield and ater by the British. It was the largest theater of war
prevent the Japanese from sending reinforcements to in overall area, encompassed the two most populous
locations of ground combat. countries in the world, and had the most varied types
A lengthy postwar report on the ULTRA rep- of territory of any theater of war at the time: jungle,
resentatives at the Far East Air Force conveyed only mountains, and desert.
positive experiences in providing direct support to Because neither the British nor American home-
the individual air commands, as well as to Kenney. It lands were directly threatened, the two nations sent
should be noted that the Special Security Office in fewer military contingents and invested fewer supply
the Southwest Pacific Theater was the only such unit resources to this theater. The principal Allied aims
to have a significant presence of women. MacArthur in the theater were the defense of India, liberation
himself had encouraged the assignments of wom- of Burma from Japanese occupation, and support
en workers in SIGINT to his command, and they to China in regaining large areas of the mainland
served as SSOs as well as in other SIGINT disci- conquered by Japan. The principal US combat units
plines at the analytic level.35 were the US Fourteenth Air Force and an infantry
Major John H. Gunn was sent as an SSO to regiment that fought in Burma.
Leyte to support MacArthur in the Philippine The first SSO in the CBI Theater was Captain
campaign. He was introduced to MacArthur on his (later Major) John F. B. Runnalls, who arrived in
day of arrival, and as the SSO later recalled, Gunn New Delhi on December 19, 1943. He established
“found him at all times as cordial and cooperative an office with the US Signal Intelligence Service in
as possible.” However, in his postwar report, Gunn New Delhi, the principal American SIGINT pro-

37
SECRET MESSENGERS

duction organization in the theater, where he was compromise of the source through ignorance about
given special privileges in the code room and the its importance.
assistance of enlisted code clerks.
Runnalls indicated that there had been times
In March 1944 Runnalls sent a long report to when ULTRA information had been sent directly to
Special Branch at the War Department explain- subordinate commanders not cleared for the source.
ing the system for distributing ULTRA product to The normal procedure, as practiced in the Mediter-
senior commanders in CBI. Runnals had had expe- ranean, would be for subordinate commanders to
rience with ULTRA distribution in the Mediterra- receive ULTRA indirectly, embedded in their orders
nean Theater and was able to compare and contrast from the theater commander. However, there were
the practices in these two theaters. occasions when it was impossible to reach Stilwell
with the ULTRA decrypts and any delay would have
First of all, Runnalls pointed out that the CBI
rendered the information worthless.
Theater differed greatly from the Mediterranean.
Allied forces in the Mediterranean received their Runnalls reported that other senior personnel,
ULTRA product from a single source, GC&CS. including General Claire Chennault, command-
However, there were several ULTRA production cen- er of the US Fourteenth Air Force, were eager for
ters within CBI itself, plus pertinent ULTRA decrypts ULTRA intelligence and would make any accom-
forwarded from BP and the US cryptologic organi- modation necessary to get regular access. Colonel
zations in Washington. This multiplicity of sources Joseph Stilwell, the theater commander’s son, who
alone complicated the preparation and distribution to served as his father’s intelligence officer, also was
the recipients of ULTRA intelligence in the theater. eager for ULTRA.38
Second, the CBI Theater encompassed the wid- As the theater expanded and the need for
est and most geographically diverse territory of any ULTRA intelligence increased and was needed
theater of war. This necessitated the wide dispersal of over a wider area, several new SSOs were sent to
American units, which naturally meant that the CBI provide assistance. Generally, ULTRA produced in
senior officers (ULTRA recipients) were frequently Washington or at BP was sent by the special sys-
traveling among these remote locations, not situated tem to Runnalls, who further distributed it to his
at a fixed headquarters. The senior US commander, assistants by radio transmission or occasionally by
General Joseph Stilwell, was constantly on the move. officer courier.39
In addition to administrative offices in Chungking,
A later report in 1944 noted that six SSOs were
China, and New Delhi, Stilwell frequently traveled
already in the CBI Theater, and nine additional offi-
to several other important US bases, as well as loca-
cers were in training—expected in Asia by Septem-
tions near the combat zones.
ber 1. However, this was still considered insufficient
Runnalls also stated that, given the dispersed to cover all commands in theater. CBI needed a total
locations and smaller size of American bases, it of at least twenty.40
was difficult to find suitably isolated quarters for
For the last year of the war, the senior SSO in
the preparation of ULTRA product. In a number of
CBI was Major (later Colonel) Inzer Bass Wyatt, an
cases, it had been necessary to house some ULTRA
imposing figure. He was another noted lawyer from
representatives with military intelligence personnel
New York City and after the war was appointed a
not cleared for ULTRA. Runnalls also admitted
federal judge.
that occasionally it had been necessary to clear mil-
itary intelligence personnel for ULTRA to prevent

38
 Chapter 4: Supporting the War Effort (Ground and Air)

Notes 11. Warrack Wallace, USA, Report on Assignment

with Third United States Army, 15 August [to] 18
1. The War Experiences of Colonel McCormack, SRH-
September 1944, SRH-108, 3–5.
185, 33.
12. The breakout for USSTAF is US Strategic and
2. Use of CX/MSS ULTRA by the United States War
Tactical Air Forces.
Department (1943–1945), SRH-005, 26–27.
13. The breakout for TAF is Tactical Air Force.
3. The story of Eisenhower’s briefing by Churchill
is often retold, and is plausible, but the sourcing is 14. Major Ronald S. Bussey, memorandum for
tenuous. In Ike’s Spies (Doubleday and Company, Colonel Taylor, Ultra and the U.S. Seventh Army,
1981) Stephen Ambrose fills in many details about May 12, 1945, SRH-022.
this initial ULTRA briefing for Eisenhower, but
15. Bussey, Ultra and the U.S. Seventh Army,
he cites no sources. The story is said to have been
SRH-022.
told in Group Captain Winterbotham’s book The
ULTRA Secret (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1974) 16. Major William D. Hoetenthall, Jr., memoran-
but it actually does not appear there. dum for Colonel Taylor, “Notes on ULTRA
Traffic, First U.S. Army,” Reports by U.S. Army
4. Major James D. Fellers, “Report of Visit to Medi-
ULTRA Representatives with Army Field Com-
terranean Theater (25 March–10 May, 1944),”
mands in the European Theater of Operations [Part
Trip Reports Concerning the Use of ULTRA in the
I], May 27, 1945, SRH-023, 19–21.
Mediterranean Theater (1943–1944), SRH-031,
2–20; Major Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “Report on Visit 17. Lieutenant Colonel Adolph J. Rosengarten, Jr.,
to Operational Air Commands in Mediterranean memorandum for Colonel Taylor, “Report on
Theater (4 April–10 May 1944),” SRH-031, 21–47. ULTRA Intelligence at First U.S. Army,” Reports
by… Army Field Commands in the European The-
5. Fellers, “Report of Visit 25 March–10 May,
ater of Operations [Part I], May 21, 1945, SRH-
1944,” SRH-031, 12.
023, 11–18.
6. Major General Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelligence
18. Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Murmane and
at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Offi-
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel M. Orr, Jr., memoran-
cer (Doubleday and Company, 1969), 111–112.
dum for Colonel Taylor, “Report of Lt. Col. Mur-
7. Ralph W. Hauenstein and Donald E. Markle, mane and Lt. Col. Orr on Use of ULTRA at 12th
Intelligence Was My Line: Inside Eisenhower’s Oth- Army Group,” Reports by… Army Field Commands
er Command (Hippocrene Books, 2005), 93–95. in the European Theater of Operations [Part I], May
23, 1945, SRH-023, 6–10.
8. Captain Edmund H. Kellogg, memorandum for
Colonel Taylor, “Report of Paris Officer for Dis- 19. Lieutenant Colonel Edward K. Thompson,
semination of ULTRA,” Reports by U.S. Army memorandum for Colonel Taylor, “D.E. with
ULTRA Representatives with Army Field Com- SHAEF Air Intelligence,” Reports by… Army
mands in the European Theater of Operations [Part Field Commands in the European Theater of Oper-
II], SRH-023, 118–120; Hauenstein and Markle, ations [Part II], May 12, 1945, SRH-023, 3–6.
Intelligence Was My Line.
20. Major Ansel E. M. Talbert, memorandum, “The
9. Marshall Letter to Eisenhower on the Use of Handling of ULTRA Information at Hqrs,
“ULTRA” Intelligence, March 15, 1944, SRH-026. Eighth Air Force,” Reports by… Army Field Com-
mands in the European Theater of Operations [Part
10. Synthesis of Experiences in the Use of ULTRA by
II], SRH-023, 20–33.
U.S. Army Field Commands in the European The-
ater of Operations, SRH-006, 10.

39
SECRET MESSENGERS

21. “Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: An ULTRA Memoir,” in 32. Thompson, “Report of Major John R. Thomp-
ULTRA and the Army Air Forces in World War II, son, Deputy Special Security Representative,
ed. Diane T. Putney (Office of Air Force History, Southwest Pacific Area,” SRH-032, 5–9.
1987), 32–35.
33. Captain James C. Sargent, memorandum for
22. History of the Operations of Special Security Officers Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, “Report
Attached to Field Commands, 1943–1945, SRH- of Captain James C Sargent’s Activities as SSO
033, 3. in SWPA,” Reports by… Field Commands in the
Southwest Pacific, October 30, 1945, SRH-032, 34.
23. History of the Operations, SRH-033, 5–6.
34. Lieutenant Colonel Maurice J. Mountain, to
24. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Ervin, “His-
Colonel B. W. Heckemeyer, “Report on SSO
tory of Operations of Special Security Officers
System at Eighth U.S. Army,” Reports by… Field
in Pacific Ocean Areas,” Reports by U.S. Army
Commands in the Southwest Pacific, December 6,
ULTRA Representatives with Field Commands in
1945, SRH-032, 18–20.
the Southwest Pacific, Pacific Ocean[,] and China
Burma India Theaters of Operations, 1944-1945, 35. B. J. Miriam, “History: Special Security Officer
SRH-032, 36–39. with Far East Air Forces, 24 October 1944–2
September 1945,” Reports by… Field Commands
25. Major Charles T. Kingston, Jr., “Special Security
in the Southwest Pacific, February 26, 1946, SRH-
Office, XXI Bomber Command,” Reports by…
032, 10–17.
Field Commands in the Southwest Pacific, SRH-
032, 45–49. 36. Major John H. Gunn, memorandum for the
Special Security Officer, MIS, “Report of Major
26. Marshall Letter to MacArthur on the Use of
John H. Gunn, 0-388247,” Reports by… Field
“ULTRA” Intelligence, May 23, 1944, and Related
Commands in the Southwest Pacific, October 23,
Correspondence, SRH-034, 1–3.
1945, SRH-032, 25–28.
27. Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreak-
37. MacArthur’s ULTRA by Edward Drea cites
ing and the War against Japan, 1942–1945 (Uni-
many examples of both extremes in MacArthur’s
versity Press of Kansas, 1992), 29.
decisions.
28. History of the Operations, SRH-033, 3–4.
38. Captain John F. B. Runnalls, General Informa-
29. Colonel Benjamin W. Heckemeyer, “Report tion on the Local ULTRA Picture as Background
of Special Security Representative, Headquar- for Signal Intelligence Conference, 6 March 1944,
ters Armed Forces, Pacific (formerly SWPA),” SRH-148.
Reports by… Field Commands in the Southwest
39. “Special Security Operations in the China Bur-
Pacific, SRH-032, 1–4.
ma India Theater and the Two Theaters Cre-
30. Major John R. Thompson, memorandum, ated from It[—]India Burma Theater and China
“Report of Major John R. Thompson, Depu- Theater,” Reports by… Field Commands in the
ty Special Security Representative, Southwest Southwest Pacific, SRH-032, 81–87.
Pacific Area,” Reports by… Field Commands in the
40. Memorandum, “Justification of Requirements
Southwest Pacific, December 20, 1945, SRH-032,
for Increase in Field Quota for Officers,” Alloca-
5–9.
tion of Special Security Officers to Special Branch,
31. Captain Rudolph T. Fabian, US Navy (Ret), inter- Military Intelligence Service, War Department
view by Robert D. Farley, NSA-OH-1983-009, (1943–1945), SRH-61.
transcript, Center for Cryptologic History, Ft.
Meade, MD, 66–67.

40
 Chapter 5: Summary

Chapter 5

Summary

At the end of the war, almost all US Special The reactions of most US officers briefed on
Security Officers (SSOs) wrote a summary of their ULTRA was amazement. It is probable that more
experiences, and most of these have survived. For- training on ULTRA, beyond a simple indoctrination
tunately for historians, many of these summaries to the special source, should have been given to each
were quite frank. A majority of postwar summaries senior G-2. However, the pace of war did not allow
by SSOs about the organization and operation of time to do this; time was a luxury the Allied forces
the ULTRA sections at major commands reported could not afford.
overall positive experiences—at least once com-
The commanding general in a theater was
manders recognized what ULTRA meant to them.
responsible both for the selection of his staff and the
The few negative summaries suggested that the fault
smooth functioning of that group of officers. A gen-
for inadequate use of ULTRA lay with the senior
eral normally selected his G-2, not because of his
G-2 officer (who oversaw intelligence matters) on
specific expertise in intelligence, but because of their
a command staff. Either the G-2 did not recognize
personal relationship. In many, probably most, cases,
that ULTRA delivered to combat commands needed
neither the commanding generals nor their G-2s
further processing before presentation to the com-
had much experience with intelligence prior to the
manding general, or the G-2 wanted to do all the
war. They did not know what they did not know or
work (analysis and briefing) himself, without defer-
how to fix a problem in organizational procedures
ring to the ULTRA experts.
that was barely perceptible to them.
Experience showed that it was important for the
The American system of SSOs, also known as
SSO to have direct access to the commanding gen-
ULTRA officers, was modeled on the British sys-
eral, the chief of staff, and other senior officers in a
tem, and was often successful, but it had some nota-
command who used ULTRA in an operational sense.
ble weaknesses or failures. One important failure
In most cases, it was more effective for the SSO to
was in training the SSOs themselves. Surprisingly,
do briefings and evaluations personally, without the
this failure was a lack of training about the US
confusion that might result from using an interme-
Army itself, including its staff system and the kinds
diary. This also made them available for questions
of information a combat decision-maker needed
and any requests for additional information.1
to know. Most SSOs received a good grounding

41
SECRET MESSENGERS

in ULTRA, including a significant amount of time In many, probably most, cases, the problems were
spent in either the American or British production overcome and the system worked. There is a rich
center, sometimes both. treasury of stories in which ULTRA information
provided to decision-makers resulted in successful
A majority of SSOs had come from profes-
operations—sometimes in very dramatic victories.
sional life and were not career military officers. As
Also less dramatic ULTRA information, distributed
a whole, they were above average in intelligence and
on a regular basis, provided a solid background for
adaptability, but they were placed in a situation quite
military decisions that led to successful operations—
unlike their civilian lives. They had to learn basic
and helped save the lives of thousands of American
aspects of military life at the same time they were
and British soldiers.
performing their specialized duties.
The ULTRA system also raised the expectations
Where there were organizational issues many
of the officers who had access to it. Many senior
SSOs encountered problems from the command-
leaders from the Second World War continued to
ing general’s staff at their assigned unit. Often, the
serve after the war, and they recognized that ULTRA
G-2 did not understand ULTRA or the criticality of
remained essential to decision-making. Thus, they
the ULTRA officer’s role. In all too many cases, the
insisted on a postwar version—and got it.
G-2 simply saw the SSO as “free help” and assigned
him to regular staff intelligence duties on top of the The ULTRA production organizations of
ULTRA responsibilities that he had been assigned World War II eventually transitioned in the post-
to do by Special Branch. war to the Government Communications Head-
quarters (GCHQ) in Britain and the National
Many G-2 senior staff officers did learn the val-
Security Agency (NSA) in the United States. The
ue of ULTRA information as well as the importance
requirement for rapid dissemination and absolute
of the officer assigned to ensure that ULTRA was
secrecy continued, so the Special Liaison Unit
available in their sector. The G-2 from the US Third
(SLU) system was retained. The system was modi-
Army, under Patton, is a good example of this. In
fied in each military reorganization and with the
such instances, ULTRA became an important asset
development of computers and the revolution in
on a regular basis to the decisions made by the com-
communications technology; however, the need for
manding general.
speed and security remained constant.
Unfortunately, this was not the case at all com-
Without this important distribution process
mands. And in one or two, such as MacArthur’s
between producer and consumer, ULTRA would be
Southwest Pacific Theater, staff rivalries and, yes,
a curious footnote to the war—a hint of what might
malfeasance prevented effective use of ULTRA by
have been—instead of the highly important war-
the senior combat decision-makers.
winning factor that it is now known as.
Part of the reason for the problems was the need
The former SSO attached to the US Seventh
for haste in designing and implementing the SSO
Army noted that all ULTRA recipients were aware
system. US leadership recognized that ULTRA was
of the importance of the information and the advan-
needed, and needed quickly, as the American mili-
tages that ULTRA gave to American and British
tary confronted the two strongest military powers in
generals. He recalled that on one occasion the Sev-
the world; so they put the system to work with the
enth Army G-2 drolly remarked to him, “you know,
best compromise between training and implementa-
this just isn’t cricket.”2
tion that could be obtained.

42
 Chapter 5: Summary

A number of ULTRA officers concluded their on intelligence concerns in 1946. Afterward, he

reports with recommendations for the future. returned to his law practice in New York.
At the end of his summary of ULTRA in the US Carter Clarke at the end of the war became
Eighth Air Force, Ansel Talbert added some salient commander of the Army Security Agency, succes-
remarks. He said that most might assume that the sor to the wartime Signal Security Agency. He later
military inventions of the Second World War would served in Japan as an assistant to the director of the
depreciate the value of ULTRA in the future. He Central Intelligence Agency. Clarke retired in 1954.
disagreed with this attitude, saying that “ULTRA
Telford Taylor, the senior US signals intelligence
information, if gathered and evaluated in peacetime
officer in Europe during the Second World War,
with the same efficiency that has characterized it in
would go on to become the deputy chief prosecutor
this war, might well be the only means of knowing
and then the chief prosecutor of high-ranking Nazis
what actions were planned by an unfriendly nation.”
at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. He later became
In fact, he commented, “ULTRA may be the only
an eminent professor of law at Columbia University.
means in the future of foretelling and forestalling a
Pearl Harbor-type attack.”3 Lewis Powell, who had been an SSO with the
US Air Force, returned to a high-powered legal firm
For the future, Edward Thompson, who had been
in Richmond, Virginia. He was appointed an associ-
the ULTRA representative on the Supreme Head-
ate justice of the US Supreme Court by President
quarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) Air
Richard Nixon in 1972.
Intelligence staff, remarked that “if we are not going
to get caught short again, it is necessary to start At the end of the Second World War and
building up intelligence immediately. The average subsequent demobilization, the scale and size of
regular [officer] considers his best bet an operational GC&CS was significantly reduced. There ini-
job. It may be quite beyond the power of anyone who tially was no postwar requirement for SLU/Spe-
reads this report to make intelligence a profitable cial Communications Unit (SCU) teams, but this
military career, but it should be made a fully equal quickly changed. The abbreviation GCO was first
staff partner.”4 coined in 1947 when GCHQ implemented the
decision to create Government Communications
Most SSOs from the Second World War fol-
Officer (GCO) posts.
lowed the pattern of their fellow Americans who
had entered the military in response to the wartime By 1948, the Malayan Emergency reinforced
emergency. They mustered out of the service and the growing importance of Singapore as a political
returned to their prewar lives. Collectively they were and military center for the UK in Southeast Asia.
above average in education and professional status, The event also amplified the need for GCHQ on-
but most did not again come to the attention of his- the-spot representation. In November 1948 the
tory. A few did. first Singapore GCO—in fact, the first GCO any-
where—arrived at the Cathay Building in the ter-
Ansel Talbert, who predicted the continued
ritory. His office was later moved to a two-room
importance of ULTRA postwar, worked as an avia-
building in Phoenix Park, Singapore. The post was
tion reporter for the New York Herald Tribune, 1953–
firmly established and grew in prestige and impor-
1966, and then freelanced for aviation magazines
tance over the years.
after The Tribune folded.
The roles and functions of the GCO are an
After leaving the US Army in 1945, Alfred
important aspect of GCHQ SIGINT to get timely
McCormack worked with the Department of State

43
SECRET MESSENGERS

intelligence to where it is needed most. While tech-

nology has rapidly transformed the way we commu-
nicate, the role of a GCO has not changed signifi-
cantly from the early days of the Second World War.
They are a vital cog in the wheel.
Notes
1. Major James D. Fellers, “Report of Visit to Medi-
terranean Theater (25 March–10 May, 1944),”
Trip Reports Concerning the Use of ULTRA in the
Mediterranean Theater (1943–1944), SRH-031,
15.
2. Major Ronald S. Bussey, memorandum for Colo-
nel Taylor, Ultra and the U.S. Seventh Army, May
12, 1945, SRH-022, 2.
3. Major Ansel E. M. Talbert, memorandum, “The
Handling of ULTRA Information at Hqrs,
Eighth Air Force,” Reports by U.S. Army ULTRA
Representatives with Army Field Commands in the
European Theatre of Operations [Part II], SRH-
023, 32.
4. Lieutenant Colonel Edward K. Thompson, “D.E.
with SHAEF Air Intelligence,” Reports by…
Army Field Commands in the European Theater of
Operations [Part II], May 12, 1945, SRH-023, 4.

44
 Chapter 6: Notes on Sources and Endnotes

Chapter 6

Notes on Sources and Endnotes

The US War Department, following the war, sought to understand the workings of the Special Security Officer
(SSO) system in actual practice and had the senior SSO at each major command write a description and evaluation
of the system as they experienced it. Thus, the historian today, normally accustomed to scrambling to find sources,
has the rare pleasure of an abundance of information on this topic. The many reports sent in response to the War
Department’s requirement are available as part of the Special Research Histories (SRH) series.
SRHs were an early NSA format for declassified documents on cryptology, an attempt to speedily release for-
merly classified material in the wake of the excitement in the 1970s over revelation of the ULTRA secret. They still
constitute a handy resource for finding information on cryptology in the world wars. Hardcopies of the SRHs are
available in the library of the National Cryptologic Museum; most are available online in the library section at www.
nsa.gov. The following were most helpful to the authors:
SRH-005 Use of CX/MSS ULTRA by the United States War Department (1943–1945)
SRH-006 Synthesis of Experiences in the Use of ULTRA by U.S. Army Field Commands in the European
Theater of Operations
SRH-020 Narrative, Combat Intelligence Center, Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area
SRH-022 Ultra and the U.S. Seventh Army
SRH-023 Reports by U.S. Army ULTRA Representatives with Army Field Commands in the European The-
ater of Operations [Parts I and II]
SRH-026 Marshall Letter to Eisenhower on the Use of “ULTRA” Intelligence, March 15, 1944
SRH-031 Trip Reports Concerning the Use of ULTRA in the Mediterranean Theater (1943–1944)
SRH-032 Reports by U.S. Army ULTRA Representatives with Field Commands in the Southwest Pacific,
Pacific Ocean[,] and China Burma India Theaters of Operations, 1944–1945
SRH-033 History of the Operations of Special Security Officers Attached to Field Commands, 1943–1945

45
SECRET MESSENGERS

SRH-034 Marshall Letter to MacArthur on the Use of “ULTRA” Intelligence, May 23, 1944, and Related
Correspondence
SRH-061 Allocation of Special Security Officers to Special Branch, Military Intelligence Service, War Depart-
ment (1943–1945)
SRH-107 Problems of the SSO System in World War II
SRH-108 Report on Assignment with Third United States Army, 15 August [to] 18 September 1944 (Major
Warrack Wallace, USA)
SRH-148 General Information on the Local ULTRA Picture as Background for Signal Intelligence Confer-
ence, 6 March 1944
SRH-153 MIS, War Department Liaison Activities in the U.K. (1943–1945)
SRH-185 The War Experiences of Colonel Alfred McCormack

There are also a number of GCHQ/GC&CS files in the British National Archives at Kew, London, under the
HW49 series, that relate to the history of the British Special Liaison Unit (SLU) teams:
HW49/1 The History of the Special Liaison Units
HW49/2 History of Special Liaison Unit 5 (SLU5)
HW49/3 History of the Special Liaison Units (SLU) controlled by SLU9 in the South West Pacific
HW49/5 Outline history of Special Liaison Units (SLU)
HW49/6 Special Liaison Units: set up to provide a secure and speedy way for passing ULTRA messages from
Station X to Operational Commands

A final source of note is Pigeon, Geoffrey. The Secret Wireless War—The Story of MI6 Communications 1939–1945.
Arundel Books, 2008.

46