A LOOK AT HEGEL:

CRITIQUE OF DIALECTICAL REASON BY JEAN PAUL SARTRE

A LOOK AT HEGEL:
CRITICISM OF REASON DIALECTICS OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

Leonardo da Silva Cezarini*

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SUMMARY: A dialectic é a view of ABSTRACT: The dialectic is a vision of thought

thought that is born alongside philosophy. In that comes along with the philosophy. In Hegel, in
Hegel, in his complex work Science of Logic, the his complex work Science of Logic, the dialectic
dialectics is developed and structured as is a developed and structured way of thinking as
thinking in an objective manner. It is then that the objective. It is then that the debate around the
debate surrounding the foundation of dialectics the grounds of the dialectic takes different directions
takes different paths alongside materialism, the with the materialism, the so-called 'dialectical'
so-called "dialectical materialism". Jean- materialism". Jean-Paul Sartre, to expose the
Paul Sartre, when presenting in the Critique of Dialectical Reason critical dialectic of Reason conforms with the
your agreement with the dialectic of determinations dialectic of determinations in substance and in
In substance and in historical reality, it refers not historical reality means not only a renewal of
just a renewal of dialectical materialism, but materialist dialectics, but also with new
also reiterates with new formulations the criticism of formulations reiterates criticism of the idealism
Hegelian idealism. This article aims to Hegelian. This article aims to redo the debate
redo the above-mentioned debate. above.

KEYWORDS: Dialectics. Hegel. Dialectics. Hegel. Sartre.

Sartre. Materialism. Idealism. Materialism. Idealism.

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1. Introduction

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born on August 27, 1770, launching his
Science of Logic in 1812 and soon after in 1816 the second part of his complex book. Jean
Paul Sartre was born in 1905 and seventy-five years later passed away with a life
markedly troubled where he traveled throughout much of the world. More than a century divides
these two prodigious thinkers, their fundamentally different eras, carry with them
the same attempt to philosophize towards the truth. However, one way or another, the subject

*
Master's in Philosophy-PUCRS/Capes. Contact: [email protected]

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The central part of this work was developed by both, not necessarily, of course, from the
same perspective. The dialectic, as we will demonstrate below, has its origin in
antiquity, is reformulated by Hegel, characterizing at the same time a critique of the
thought developed until then, and a true reformulation of philosophy. Seventeen
Years after the release of Being and Nothingness - a work of existential and ontological character, having the

man as unjustified in the world - in 1960, the Critique of Dialectical Reason is published
Sartre.
In this compelling work, man takes his historical and community place,
man is no longer "just" an unjustified being in the world. But Sartre goes further, in Questions of

Method, Sartre asserts that to expose his dialectical conception encompassing the analytical method-
synthetic and regressive-progressive, the mystery is to prove its agreement with Marx. In other words,

just like Marx, Sartre recognizes that a negation of a negation facilitates existence
of a statement. And that, therefore, the dialectical materialist method expresses that in
the determination of individual or group conflicts is the breath that 'moves history'.
This is the dialectic being debated, as Sartre wishes, through itself. The present article
assumes a renewal of the perspective on the dialectical debate, briefly exposing the
Hegelian dialectics and the vast perspective put forth by Sartre in The Critique of Dialectical Reason.

2. Hegelian Dialectics:

The dialectic elucidated by Hegel is, without a shadow of a doubt, a landmark for philosophy.
as well as for the analysis of previous philosophy. Every philosophical tradition has as
the obligation to study Hegelian concepts, whether they are considered positive or
negatively. Therefore, an analysis of Hegelian dialectical thought from the perspective of Critique
The Dialectical Reason can only be developed from the explanation - even if superficial -
of Hegel's dialectical method. The roots of his method emerge in ancient thought, but
your thinking is essentially unforced, that is, it seeks to follow a self-propelling motion
of the concepts.
As a consequence, Hegelian dialectics is independent of a designative transition of
outside the concept. At this point, we clearly see two peculiarities of thought
Hegelian: a critique of the positioning of ancient philosophy and, at the same time, a

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innovation in its own dialectic. On one hand, Hegel concludes that ancient philosophy was not
the removal of concrete plurality, and for this reason, its determinations are not elevated to
conceptual universality. Hegel refers to the 'objective dialectic' as the dialectic of the ancients

exactly for the reason mentioned above. Or as Gadamer cites in Hegelian terms,
that "substance is the concept only "in-itself" that is not yet known in its being-for-itself,
as subjectivity, and therefore, is still not aware that when conceiving what happens if
find yourself1”.
Hegel creates an enterprise of pure thought2, the questions that are beyond thinking
they are secondary, although not neglected. Plato, in the Hegelian view, errs in making
your theory is very negative, as in it scientific knowledge is not adaptable, as in Plato
there is, according to Hegel, no existence of a beginning for his thought. And it is here that:

enters Hegelian dialectics: it aims to systematically develop all

the fundamental concepts of our thinking, for they are all
determinations of the concept, that is, of the absolute.3

With this, it becomes clear that Hegel aims to energize all human thought.
including scientific knowledge, that is, there is a unitary articulation between being and the
to think. The contradictions, which the ancients saw as annulment, in Hegel have a character
positive. And this occurs because the contradiction itself is part of the essence of the 'spirit', thus
it is not invalidated. Obviously the suggested question would objectively be: what is the beginning of
Hegel's philosophical speculation? In Gadamer's words: "philosophical speculation begins,
therefore, with the decision to think purely4. That is, the idea of being in identity with the
nothing, which is becoming. Hegel designates this movement as 'plastic - immanent', for it
configure itself based on itself.
In simpler terms, for Gadamer, we find three elements in Hegel.
constitutive of its philosophy: pure thinking, about something in itself; which is necessarily
a thought composed of contradictions, and the unity of these contradictions while overcome,
It has its own nature of itself. And all these elements can be recognized in
dialectic of the ancients.

1
GADAMER, H. G. The Dialectic of Hegel: Five Hermeneutic Essays. ED: Cátedra, Madrid, 1988. p. 19.
2
HEGEL, G. W. F. Science of Logic. 6th ed. Buenos Aires: Solar, 1993.
3
UTZ, K. "The Dialectical Method of Hegel"
168.
4
GADAMER, H. G. The Dialectic of Hegel: Five Hermeneutical Essays. ED: Cátedra, Madrid, 1988. p. 51.

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The disciple of Parmenides, Zeno, demonstrates that if a 'multiple' existed it would have
to be constituted of infinite small things, which, consequently, would result in a
extremely large, as it consists of infinite smallness. The unity between smallness and the
multiplicity of the parts, both autonomously conceived, leads to the same result, the
multiple5In 'Parmenides', Hegel observes an antithesis in the Platonic proposition that
does not lead to annulment, but to a unity 'of being and in being6”.
Logic, the unity of all determinations of contradiction is the truth. And as such, the
Hegelian dialectics does not require constructions brought from outside that are empirically
demonstrable as, exactly, something external. What happens is the continuation of the idea to the idea7.
Conception occurs only in understanding, and for this reason, it is not a matter of perception.
sensitive. Therefore, to increase your consignments, 'pure thinking' must generate them from within and by itself

same. And this becomes clear precisely by the necessity that "pure thinking" can only have
as an object or thought itself. However, this movement is only elevated to the 'concept' in
representation of the 'spirit', which it can only achieve when freedom becomes its object
and your soul8This points out to us that the fundamental threshold of Hegelian dialectics is the
freedom. And personality is, for Hegel, the implication of freedom, inner freedom,
therefore, subjective. It is considered as the self-awareness of the subject, but if taken only
in this way, the subject becomes merely a moment of the Absolute Spirit that tends to
disappear9However, "by the principle of freedom, history settles in a
basic continuity and a vital intertwining that connects the various historical contexts between
yes, constituting the great objectivity of universal history10”.
Hegel elucidates that in the unfolding of its self-determination, the absolute idea is
externalizes in history to then return, dialectically, to itself. For otherwise, the facts
they would be loose, without meaning and common connection. And the individual is in himself and for himself when the other

also endowed with freedom distinguishes itself from it11And it is not precisely in opposition
to the other that results in self-awareness, but rather in the unity of the determinations of this

5
DURANT, W. History of Philosophy: Life and Ideas of Great Philosophers.
6
GADAMER, H. G. The Dialectic of Hegel: Five Hermeneutical Essays.
7
In this aspect, Hegel confronts mathematics as being the only possible form of being pure.
thought.
8
OLIVEIRA, M. A. Topics on Dialectics.
9
OLIVEIRA, M. A. Topics on Dialectics.
10
WOLFART, J. "The structure and the exposition of the dialectical method in Hegel" Filosofazer, Year XI, No: 20, 2002/I.
p.37.
11
According to Oliveira (1996), 'This is the absolute freedom of the spirit: that it, in determining itself, puts the other'
as long as free, that is, as autonomous while distinct from itself.

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differentiation12In other words, it is in the recognition of autonomy – therefore difference –

of the other, and in overcoming isolation, is where the individual is not merely an objectification
passenger of the Absolute. In the Philosophy of Law13, we find the various instances that
they are:

The first instance of mediation will be the interpersonal relationship whose

Recognition arises from friendship or another type of closeness. A
another mediating instance is the family, which is characterized by the condition of
a collective subjectivity, educating individuals for maturity and for
citizenship in a state.14

In a more schematic way, we saw that Hegelian dialectic occurs in and for the
thought, and that by elevating itself to the 'concept' and thus to the 'spirit' it becomes objective in

personality. This path only occurs thanks to the freedom, subjective freedom, of the subject. In
the principle of freedom the story intertwines and becomes cohesive, not just episodes
loose and meaningless. We cite the instances that connect the individual to humanity and thus
to the State. The State is defined by Hegel as: 'the reality in act of the Idea'
objective moral, the spirit as substantial will revealed, clear to itself, that
knows and thinks, and realizes what it knows and why it knows15”.
It is essential to conceive what Hegel communicates when he utters the 'spirit of the people' for

understand how the State should care for its people and "give back" its "spirit" through laws. For
Hegel "the principles of the spirits of peoples in a necessary series of stages are only
moments of the unique universal Spirit, which through them rises and integrates, along the
history in its entirety that apprehends itself16This Spirit "carries" certain
culture of a people, which is 'intuition and image in art, feeling and representation in religion,
pure and free thought in philosophy17It is in the instance of the State, where it is held for Hegel.
as "the reality of concrete freedom," as it fulfills the role of mediator between the
Spirit of the people and the individuals. And consequently, '... the ultimate end of the State is the

the realization of reason and freedom, which can only be achieved in ethicality18When we refer to the
State, by the obviousness, we refer to its institutions as well as the role played by

12
Remembering the previously mentioned phrase: 'The unity of all determinations of contradiction is the truth.'
13
Cf. HEGEL, G. W. F. Principles of the Philosophy of Right. São Paulo: Ícone, 1997. More specifically in the
third part: "Objective Morality".
14
WOLFART, J. 'The structure and the exposition of the dialectical method in Hegel.' Filosofazer, Year XI, No: 20, 2002/I
p. 42.
15
HEGEL, G. W. F. Principles of the Philosophy of Right. São Paulo: Ícone, 1997. § 257.
16
HEGEL, G. W. F. Principles of the Philosophy of Right.
17
HEGEL, G. W. F. Principles of the Philosophy of Right. São Paulo: Ícone, 1997. § 341.

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each of them, thus, in fact, Hegel assumes the differentiations of powers within the
State. But, this does not make the State lose its unitary character as a mediator, for it is in the unity

dialectic between powers, whose totalizing presupposition remains as mediated.

After this brief demonstration of Hegelian dialectics, we note that the complexity
the way Hegel deals with in his work is intense in that it addresses the totality of a
a shrewd way so that, with this, the opposition of the multiple reaches exactly in the annulment
total. Thus, according to Hegel, the dialectical process is also characterized as ontological "and
does not only concern the subjective spirit (soul, awareness of the individual subject), but
also "governs the movements of matter, organic formations, and spiritual creations19”.
To conclude this section, it is made explicit the assertion that Hegelian dialectics is for the more
abstract, moving towards the concrete, without either being regarded as completely
autonomous from each other, but rather as units in the dialectical process - thus in sense
positive.

2. Dialectics and Sartre: from criticism to renewal

In an incisive manner, at the beginning of the Brazilian presentation of the Critique of Reason

dialectic20Gerd Bornheim says: "If there is a word that defines Sartre's efforts, it
it is precisely this: freedom, the place par excellence of all contradictions, of all
meetings and mismatches synonymous with what is, without any adjective rhetoric, of the own
human existence." So, what is the difference between the dialectical idealization in Sartre and in
Hegel? To answer this question, we must first turn to the conception
Sartre's dialectic, as well as his critiques of Hegelian idealism.
In the work 'Being and Nothingness' from 1943, Sartre begins to develop a path towards
Critique of Dialectical Reason. In this first work, Sartre interprets reality from a
dichotomy. The For-itself and the In-itself, in the first case, the For-itself represents consciousness and in

second, the Em-si, is the very materiality 21The relationship between these two poles is effectively
dialectical, then, if the For-itself seeks meaning in the In-itself, it is essential to seek its intelligibility.

18
OLIVEIRA, M. A. Topics on Dialectics.
19
Introduction to Dialectical Thinking
20
SARTRE, J. P. Dialectical Reason Critique: Preceded by Methodological Questions. Translated by Ghilherme João de
Freitas Teixeira; presentation of the Brazilian edition, Gerd Bornheim. Rio de Janeiro: DP&A, 2002.

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in its own materiality. And by materiality, understand a socially speaking reality,

for Sartre criticizes Engels exactly for his critique of Hegel by mentioning a dialectic
which would be proven in nature through physical-chemical laws. Sartre neither denies nor affirms.
the existence of such a dialectic, but affirms,

However, in the historical and social world, as we will see, it is about

truly from a dialectical reason; transporting it to o
“natural” world, forcibly recording it there, Engels removes its rationality;
it is no longer about a dialectic that man creates by becoming and that, in
return, it does, but from a contingent law of which it is only possible to say the
next: it is this way and not otherwise.22

Thus, through criticism of Engels, we begin Sartre's first revision on

Hegel: ideas do not impose their thoughts on matter. And in fact, it is where lies what
Sartre effectively "charges" the Hegelian idealism, for in it, the dialectic "does not have
need to present your evidence23Hegel criticizes Plato for the lack of a beginning in
your thought - as previously mentioned - Sartre criticizes Hegelian dialectics
exactly for lacking evidential foundations of its idealism.
But Sartre goes much further than a possible dogmatic materialist determinism, for,
for the philosopher, we must conceive the 'object as it presents itself and let it develop'
freely before our eyes; it is he himself who dictates to us the method, the approach24”.
In this way, two crucial points in Sartrean philosophy are present. On one hand
Sartre reaffirms Marx's innovation, that is to preserve the dialectical movement both in Being and
in knowledge, and to demonstrate that history is in progress, and that, contrary to what
Hegel assumed that Being is irreducible to Knowledge. And on the other hand, the individual does not become

subtracted from the 'universal' laws of dialectics, but on the contrary, participates in and through history as

"totalization in progress." But without this negating the modeling conformation of

history and matter. In Sartre's words: "Such human objects deserve to be studied
in the human world: this is where they receive their practical-inert status, that is, that weigh upon our
destination by the contradiction that you oppose in them apraxia (the work that made them and uses them) and the

21
BORNHEIN, G. A. Sartre: metaphysics and existentialism.
22
Introduction to Dialectical Thought
23
SARTRE, J. P. Critique of Dialectical Reason: Preceded by Questions of Method. Translated by Ghilherme João de
Freitas Teixeira; presentation of the Brazilian edition, Gerd Bornheim. Rio de Janeiro: DP&A, 2002. p.142.
24
SARTRE, J. P. Critique of Dialectical Reason: preceded by questions of method. Translation by Ghilherme João de
Freitas Teixeira; presentation of the Brazilian edition, Gerd Bornheim. Rio de Janeiro: DP&A, 2002. p.138.

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inertia.25The individual is a 'work in progress' towards totality, which in turn

it is nothing more than a regulatory principle of the tallying and that 'is simultaneously reduced to

inert set of your provisional creations26it is not, therefore, about the objectification of the Spirit
Absolute and for this very reason is considered 'ready'.
Sartre moves from the relationship of the For-itself with the In-itself, or in other words, from the relationships of

interiority between man and man or as man and thing27starting from the individual, because
according to Sartre, the dialectic can only be the "totalization of conscious totalizations", which...
in turn are created by individuals28. Sartre interprets, just like Hegel, that knowledge
it is to distinguish oneself from the Other, or in Sartre's words, 'the Knowledge of the Other (object, world,'

nature) is a Knowledge of oneself and reciprocally29. However, for Sartre, the Hegelian dialectic
it was precisely in its idealistic sense. The difference that arises at this point is that, when
contrary to Hegel, Sartre believed that individuals were bound by 'necessity'. The
need "is the first totalizing relationship of this material being, a man, with the set
material of which it is a part. This relationship is univocal and of interiority. Indeed, by
necessity appears in the matter as the first negation of negation and the first totalization30”.
It is clear the intentionality of the connection between individuals, the matter, outside of individuals, reduces.

the same to the "inorganic statute insofar as it transforms it into totality." And
How is this possible? Exactly because need is a manifestation of the denial of
negation, that is, non-being is confronted in such a way that organic totality becomes a
tool to prevent the destruction of the For-itself.

25
SARTRE, J. P. Critique of Dialectical Reason: preceded by Methodological Questions. Translated by Ghilherme João de
Freitas Teixeira; presentation of the Brazilian edition, Gerd Bornheim. Rio de Janeiro: DP&A, 2002. p.164.
26
SARTRE, J. P. Critique of Dialectical Reason: Preceded by Questions of Method. Translated by Ghilherme João
Freitas Teixeira; presentation of the Brazilian edition, Gerd Bornheim. Rio de Janeiro: DP&A, 2002. p.164. And with
In this, the historical continuity is preserved exactly, history remains in progress. In this, one can
to advance, is where Sartre begins to establish his Progressive-Regressive movement, as this movement is
characterized, in an extremely reduced way, as a way of conceiving the individual – not to lose the
subject in the material context as the dogmatic Marxists did – in syntheses that range from totalizations to
singularities. This movement, thus, remains irreducible in both aspects, both the progressive and the
regressive.
27
RED, W. Modern Dialectical Philosophy. Brasília: UnB Publishing, 1984. p. 232.
28
RÖD, W. Modern Dialectical Philosophy. Brasília: UnB Press, 1984. p. 232.
29
SARTRE, J. P. Critique of Dialectical Reason: Preceded by Questions of Method. Translation by Ghilherme João de
Freitas Teixeira; presentation of the Brazilian edition, Gerd Bornheim. Rio de Janeiro: DP&A, 2002. p.143.
This principle will articulate perfectly within the context of the 'Scarcity' stated by Sartre, as
we will elucidate further.
30
SARTRE, J. P. Dialectical Reason Critique: preceded by methodological questions. Translation by Ghilherme João
Freitas Teixeira; presentation of the Brazilian edition, Gerd Bornheim. Rio de Janeiro: DP&A, 2002. p.196.

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This conception of totalization in dialectics is, for Sartre, accessible to thought that
constantly totals itself and converts itself into its object. And for this reason, "
essentially differs from Hegel's dialectic in that it starts from individuals who do not
they find themselves in mere external relationships, but are capable of internalizing these relationships and
31
reflect on them." But Sartre goes further in his critical conception of dialectics, for, as
we see, in Hegel there are several instances that connect the individual to humanity, the philosopher
uses much more an existential and social conception to fulfill this same task.
Sartre defines the following structure to fulfill the 'union' of the subject with the
humanity: in the practical-inert environment, the coexistence of multiple individuals due to the

the need to escape from non-being characterizes "seriality". But by the force of a praxis
in response, 'groups' emerge, which aim to deny the alienation that occurs in practice-
inert and return the individual's freedom of the subject. Sartre considers it impossible to circumvent this.

alienation, for the very praxis for the negation of non-being, seen from the perspective
holistic, makes this fact inevitable to the extent that groups tend to ignore each other. However, the
multiplicity found in the group, upon finding the unique end, forms a collective, which nothing
but it is that: "to the relationship with the double meaning of a material, inorganic object that is worked with

a multiplicity that finds its unity of exteriority in it32. And the collective reveals to us
that 'on the level of the practical-inert field, it reveals to us the class as a collective, and the being-of-class.

like a statute of seriality imposed on the multiplicity that composes it33. In other
words, Sartre sees the connection of the individual to humanity, no longer through institutions such as
Hegel, but in another light, in the light of social position.

After these clarifications about Sartrean philosophy, we reach the crucial point for the
understanding of her differentiated vision from Hegel's, and it revolves around something that goes beyond

of what was directly worked on by Marx - however not emerging as an antithesis of

same. That is, the lack, or in terms used by the author, the 'scarcity'. Maurice
Cranston34claims that "the words that Sartre shares with Marx are terms that both
they took from Hegel,” however “do not forget that here your subject is “anthropology,” in opposition

31
RÖD, W. Modern Dialectical Philosophy. Brasília: UnB Press, 1984. p. 361.
32
RÖD, W. Modern Dialectical Philosophy. Brasília: Ed. UnB, 1984. p. 374.
33
SARTRE, J. P. Critique of Dialectical Reason: preceded by Questions of Method. Translation by Ghilherme João de
Freitas Teixeira; presentation of the Brazilian edition, Gerd Bornheim. Rio de Janeiro: DP&A, 2002. p. 410. The
illustrative example used by Sartre - the bus at Saint-Germain Square - makes his concept easily
intelligible.
34
CRANSTON, M. "Jean-Paul Sartre: a lonely man in a hostile universe". In: CRESPIGNY, A.
Contemporary Politics. Brasília. Ed: UnB, 2nd ed. 1982. p. 218.

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to 'ontology', and that it is necessary to give a new and, so to speak, specific reason for what
has always considered the fundamental characteristic of human relationships - antagonism
"mutual"; and for this reason, "scarcity" arises as a material determination, but that,
at the same time, it takes into account a purely individual and existential dimension.
Men seek to deny non-being, and this is only possible by circumventing scarcity,
seizing means for the organism to survive - the for-itself surviving materially.
On the other hand, if a man connects with others out of necessity to achieve such an end, he does so
acts selfishly - refers to the material sense. The subject is in relation to others by
need, not by a complete free will. And the individual arises, who by more
intelligible though his reality is to him - as mentioned - he is still at war
doubly. The individual fights for survival against the practical-inert, and still has to ally
to their rivals, as they all live in scarcity.
After understanding the subject who is struggling against scarcity, we see the total
"inversion" that Sartre makes of what Hegel conceives as the State. For if the State for Hegel is the
the realization of reason and freedom
represents a group - composed of multiple individuals - in fusion that produces leaders, that
in turn, interacting with the group that launched it, over time, they perpetuate and establish
new institutions. For Sartre, the concept of sovereignty emerges. And through it, a
a certain group "dominates" the State and imposes its power through exactly the
making available the means to circumvent the scarcity. In other words, the subject outside the group ends up

to legitimize it not by the use of your freedom to accept such a group as it is, but by
precaution
And moreover, if Hegel conceives the State as a mediator of the spirit of the people and the

individuals, for Sartre it also represents a 'mediator between the classes of exploitation and'
the explored classes35This is a statement that fits finely with the whole definition.
of the State for Sartre, as it is the manifestation of a group in fusion. If in Hegel the State
it is the realization of reason and freedom, Sartre can see it as a realized freedom,
but the freedom of an institutionalized group - for, as we have seen, the group tends to return
the freedom of the individual through the denial of alienation in the practical-inert. The State is

manifestly repressive, by imposing its sovereignty through 'Terror' to ensure that the other
respect your role in the face of scarcity and, at the same time, uphold the State sanctified by

35
RED, W. Modern Dialectical Philosophy. Brasília: Ed. UnB, 1984. p. 716.

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group in fusion; what, on the contrary, Hegel elucidates as the guarantee of freedom by
maintenance of ethics.
We are heading towards the finalization of the exhibition, addressing the other disagreement that

it arises 'naturally' in Sartrean philosophy and also differs from Hegelian foundations.
History, for Sartre, much more than cementing - through the beginning of freedom - the
historical moments and becoming the objectification of universal history, has an engine that
move. It is not her, as an idea, that materializes in moments, but on the contrary, she is moved.
for a strictly material struggle, which is the struggle against scarcity. This last sentence can
it may seem contradictory to mention the fact that Sartre is a dialectical materialist, but of
In fact, Sartre develops the concepts presented by Marx. However, this does not mean he denies them.

The background of the class struggle rooted in Marx is a conflict for

survival that occurs in the practical-inert, which is the denial of non-being, in other words, the contour of

scarcity. Scarcity as a primary deficiency arises before the classes, and these, in turn
emerge from the previously mentioned factors, hence their struggle drives history. Sartre resolves
this poses a problem for Marxism, since if history is driven by class struggle, what
Would it move the history before the existence of classes to the point of their emergence?
Sartre formulates its individual/humanity structure aiming at the formation of the class, but this is
exactly a movement conceived in scarcity. For this reason, it is understandable that Cranston
Affirm: "Therefore, scarcity is the 'engine of history'"36E Sartre elucidates this point when
to mention that "it is evident that each class, in its social struggles, is the internalization and, to
at the same time, the overcoming of the material conditions that produced it, as well as of the

characters evoked in her by another37. The philosopher tries to establish what, for him, would be lacking in the
Hegelian dialectic, that is, the existence of rationally conceived proofs, but they are
empirically "verifiable".

36
CRANSTON, M. "Jean-Paul Sartre: a lonely man in a hostile universe". In: CRESPIGNY, A. Philosophy
Contemporary Politics. Brasília. Ed: UnB, 2nd ed. 1982. p. 213.

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A look at Hegel: Critique of Dialectical Reason by Jean Paul Sartre

4. Final considerations

After the checks raised above, two aspects of Sartrean philosophy are
made clear, as well as two aspects that break with the Hegelian structure. For one
On one hand, Hegelian philosophy is extremely influential on the entire Sartrean structure, isn't it?
only by your Marxist inspiration, for in very important points your agreement
with Hegel is total. Another assertion revolves around the fact that Sartre, by inaugurating thoughts

completely new, thus breaking with the dogmatic thinking of the time, the use of
the Hegelian thought is taken up with its real importance, not just as a
philosophy upside down.
If Sartre firmly rejects Hegelian idealism, as elucidated, his
the adoption of materialism does not occur without reservations. An example of this is the differentiation made

of analytical reasoning, which would be characterized as deterministic and influenced by positivism

exactly because it is based only on historical data - for this reason, materials
the dialectical reason demanded as a necessary renewal by Sartre, despite being
materialist, asserts that, when taking into account only a purely analytical reason,
it becomes extremely restrictive our considerations since the dialectical reason leads to
consideration of its application to consciousness. This is evident from the beginning of Sartre's philosophy,
So, if Hegel starts from the Idea and goes to the Idea, Sartre will start from the material, however, from the material.

linked to the individual, which leads him to make psychoanalytic contributions.

Marx can be seen by many followers of analytical reason as a prophet who
"reverted" the Hegelian dialectic in favor of a valid dialectical materialism. But Sartre goes
far beyond this conception, by reading his thoughts, the author presents us with advancements that
I take into account your materialistic stance, but one that subverts dogmatisms that
"they wrongly rejected" structured concepts by Hegel. Its premise, materiality,
it may differ from the Hegelian premise, the idea, but the development of its conceptions
maintains in many aspects the philosophy of its predecessor, whether through disagreements that
it leads them to create new formulas or even to maintain old formulas as is evident in their
Critique of Dialectical Reason.

37
SARTRE, J. P. Critique of Dialectical Reason: preceded by questions of method. Translated by Ghilherme João
Freitas Teixeira; presentation of the Brazilian edition, Gerd Bornheim. Rio de Janeiro: DP&A, 2002. p.302. Highlights
ours.

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A look at Hegel: Critique of Dialectical Reason by Jean Paul Sartre

Thus, the thought of both remains alive. Sartre fulfills his desire to
that dialectical reason would be 'critical' of itself, while at the same time, in discerning
Hegel values the thinker in his considerations. The foundation that goes from the most abstract
to the most concrete, which was criticized by Marx as going exactly from the most concrete to the more
abstract, it is developed by Sartre as going from the more concrete and individual to the more
abstract. The individual that was considered by Hegel, and who was 'swallowed' by the
Marxist dogmatists are valued in Sartre, who considers the subject as the revealer of the
human praxis, as it takes it as a starting point for a greater dialectic, the dialectic
historical.

References

BORNHEIN, Gerd A. Sartre: metaphysics and existentialism. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1984
CRANSTON, Maurice. "Jean-Paul Sartre: a lonely man in a hostile universe" In: CRESPIGNY, Anthony
Contemporary Political Philosophy. Brasília. Ed: UnB, 2nd ed. 1982.p.205-223.
History of Philosophy: Life and Ideas of Great Philosophers
SON, Eduardo S.Introduction to Dialectical Thinking. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Alfa - Omega, 1991.
GADAMER, Georg. The Dialectic of Hegel: Five Hermeneutical Essays. Publisher: Cátedra, Madrid, 1988.
HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Principles of the Philosophy of Right. São Paulo: Ícone, 1997.
___________________Science of Logic. 6th ed. Buenos Aires: Solar, 1993.
OLIVEIRA, Manfredo Araújo de. Topics on Dialectics. Porto Alegre: Edipucrs, 1996.
MODERN DIALECTICAL PHILOSOPHY
SARTRE, Jean-Paul. Critique of Dialectical Reason: preceded by questions of method. Translation by Ghilherme João
de Freitas Teixeira; presentation of the Brazilian edition, Gerd Bornheim. Rio de Janeiro: DP&A, 2002.
UTZ, Konrad. “The Dialectical Method of Hegel” In: Veritas, Vol: 50, No: 1, Porto Alegre: PUCRS, 2005. pp. 165-
185.
WOLFART, João. "The structure and the exposition of the dialectical method in Hegel"
p.35-67.

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