TABLE OF

CONTENTS
03 Executive Summary

04 Introduction

11 Literature Review

21 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)

23 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

25 The China Variable

28 Anti Corruption (and its linkage with China)

29 Trade Pillar

32 Climate Resilience

35 Climate Finance

39 Global Supply Chain and its Significance

46 Future of IPEF and the Way Forward

49 Conclusion

52 Recommendations
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A strong, secure, and sovereign Indian Ocean is critical to India’s

security landscape.

India has economically and strategically benefited from the Indian Ocean in multiple ways. In the
status quo, the Indian Ocean acts as a sensitive region where militarisation from the West to
counter China has only led to increased clashes to achieve deterrence. India, though gradually,
affects the multipolar world order by augmenting the Indian Ocean in two ways. Firstly, India
has normalised its role as a net security provider and contributor to collective peace in the
region. Secondly, India has also generated trust, a currency that stimulates development and
interdependence with its neighbours. Thus, by bringing interoperability to the region by
inclusivity, India can effectively counter the Chinese influence in the maritime theatre. This
sense of inter-reliability can be seen in the approach undertaken by the “Neighbourhood First''
Policy.

The Indian Ocean has always been and continues to remain an important theatre for global
trade. The Indian Ocean has provided immense benefits, both economic and security, and has
helped in preserving the sovereignty of India. Economically, the Indian Ocean Region (or IOR)
accounts for over one-third of the world’s population. More than half of the global seaborne
trade and commerce is witnessed through this region. The Indian Ocean also helps boost
multiple sectors, from fishing to agriculture. Strategically, India is at the pivotal point of the IOR,
which opens up numerous opportunities and threats. India’s growing ambition, as under
Security And Growth For All in the Region (SAGAR), to be a reliable leader coupled with the
desire to enhance security in the region has led to more significant obligations and expectations
by the West towards India.

IPEF is an important part of US President Joe Biden’s strategy to counter growing Chinese clout
in the Asian economic sphere. Regarding sovereignty, India will be navigating in the toughest
waters: an assertive China and an unpredictable Pakistan bring added threats. Therefore, the
response has been one of inclusivity, synergy and collaboration among nations.

3
Introduction
We chose IPEF because this framework will be One area that needs to be explored critically is
of supreme importance in the global economic the possibility that IPEF is not another scheme
sphere in the coming years. Recently, the benefiting developed nations like the US. This
Indian Ocean has received international media is important because, time and again, we have
coverage due to the intensity of the region's witnessed developed countries getting into
developments. Also, the Indian Ocean theatre international partnerships and then forcing
has become a showdown of power dominance, their developed standards down the throat of
so the region's sensitivity, along with the threat developing countries like India, which is not
faced, is a growing concern for policy-makers. sustainable for a country like India where
IPEF will be used as a tool not only to reinforce significant policies are still in the developing
the Indo-Pacific partnerships but also to phase, like digital trade. This framework will
strengthen the geo-economies across the play an important role in limiting China’s
Indo-Pacific expanse. influence on trade. So, it becomes essential to
look from India’s perspective of how it views
Fellow countries of IPEF constitute 40% of the IPEF and what it is that India is looking to get
world economy, putting this partnership at the out of this partnership.
forefront of global trade and climate
conservation. Furthermore, the scope of IPEF Regarding the domestic landscape, India has
is huge, constituting four pillars: trade, supply evolved and broken the image of being a
chains, clean economy and the fair economy, prisoner of the past. Today, India's ambitions
focusing primarily on trade, supply chains, are being met with increased military
clean energy, decarbonisation, infrastructure, engagements (capacity-building, joint
and tax and anti-corruption. exercises, weaponry procurement) and
economic ties (collaboration with neighbouring
India’s decision to join IPEF stands justified countries, incentivising businesses to invest in
because trade volume in the Indo-Pacific the Indian Ocean, trade agreements, and
region has increased tremendously. forums). Domestically, India needs to push
Furthermore, past commitments like forward in the race for clean energy. Security
Comprehensive Economic Partnership and Growth should be seen as a nexus instead
Agreements with Japan, South Korea and of mutually exclusive elements, as security
Singapore. Along with this, the countless brings sustained growth. To India, IPEF is of
negotiations on the Free Trade Agreements enormous relevance as it brings a plethora of
(FTAs) with the ASEAN countries. All of this opportunities on which India can capitalise.
under the ‘Act East’ policy reiterates the IPEF also lays the groundwork for increased
shared interests and values amongst the collaboration among the parties. As the IPEF
countries of the Indo-Pacific region. Another recognises threats in the Pacific and Indian
reason for analysing IPEF is its importance in Ocean theatres, the relevance and leadership
existing geo-political relations in the global role India will play can be reasonably expected
economic space. to rise.

5
Data protection, regulation, and India tactfully played up its theatrics—it
monopolisation globally are on the rise. Open boycotted instead of denying to sign the Osaka
data sharing and data collaboration remain Track. Japan, a member of IPEF, pushed for
significant opportunities for countries to boost more complex policies in October 2019 to
their trade. In its digital landscape, India has implement the Osaka Track. It challenged the
adopted a policy of technological self-reliance mandate of the WTO, focused on pluralistic
as well as sovereignty. As the current power negotiations, and undermined data
shift has been witnessed in Asia, India needs to localisation. To India, it severely seemed like a
transition from a mere customer to a leader in denial of “space” to discuss or take action on
digital markets.
policy-related areas.

Cross-border digital flows are essential to

To continue with the theatrics, the WTO
India as it has contributed significantly to the
director supported this move, though it overtly
Indian economy. According to one study,
undermined a “consensus-based” approach.
digital trade could account for 10% of India’s
India must have the space and requisite
GDP by 2030. Also, big conglomerates continue
sovereignty to evolve its data policy. The
to boost the economy. This is also why India
has been emphasised as a preferred location in current data localisation and privacy, and
the metric of “Ease of Doing Business”, thereby security harm India with international threats.
promoting “Startup-Culture”. However, in the
status quo, India faces a gloomy issue: open A consensus-based approach should be the
data. way forward, and IPEF should later evolve into
a document whereby the ideals of
India has the second-highest number of multilateralism can be overtly supported.
restrictions, after China, on digital services like
cloud computing or financing. Such an To actualise a robust economy, the digital
approach signals to the international economy should be strengthened. At the G20
community that India subscribes to its Presidency, the current Prime Minister of India
namesake political philosophy while operating has also emphasised the importance of
within protectionism. Expecting cross-border “reducing the digital divide.”
data flows should be met with caution. Since
this paper acknowledges that India has been an In India, economic development also comes
essential player in the G20, it also underscores from an important stakeholder: MSMEs. The
that India still has considerable work to do.
MSME sector has emerged as a strong driver of
India currently emphasises domestic issues
entrepreneurship and has led to progress in
and situations and therefore asserts its
multiple areas. It has led to significant
domestic policies in international forums.
industrial development in the county. Then,
where cashless payments have been
Osaka Track emerged from the idea that
recognised as the highest priority, it becomes
nations should adopt a common framework
essential to understand that India will face
whereby efforts are aligned towards bolstering
cross-border data transfer and championing lesser challenges regarding global digital trade
the cause of open data. agreements, mainly focused on SMEs.

6
This claim is supported by two reasons. Firstly,
India is reshaping herself as an economically
resilient partner and realising SMEs' role in
digital agreements. Secondly, India has the
necessary infrastructure and structure to
actualise this: grievance cells, an award
system, and special measures.

So, it has been established that Indian SMEs

are competent to operate in digital economic
agreements. However, further characterisation
of how these economic agreements look
becomes important.

India’s climate policy is to ensure “equal

scales." The emphasis has remained on public
finance flows, green finance, and the
collaboration of public and private enterprises
on green energy. Currently, there is no
universally accepted definition for climate
finance.

Achieving a consensus on a universal definition

is the first step towards sustained climate
finance. Many climate change projects can
leverage their resources if benchmarks are set
for putting climate finance in place. In the
status quo, the word "climate finance" is used
without giving a clear picture. A strong
emphasis on the general definition lies in
transitioning to cleaner energy alternatives
and uplifting developing nations. However, for
individual nations, an important demarcation
is needed. Climate finance should also include
funds allocated by national governments for
energy-related and/or climate-strengthening
activities.

Including allocations from the national

government brings two fundamental benefits.
Firstly, it assumes an added layer of
accountability and transparency with which
the international community can uphold the
government.

7
 For example, if India includes its allocation, it will be more cautious to ensure adequate steps have
been taken as it would need to defend its position. Secondly, it helps corporations and other
stakeholders collaborate efficiently with governments. With fund allocation, a government can
prioritise its interests in particular areas or energy alternatives for climate finance. This will lead to
increased attention paid by wider stakeholders as the already existing information has been
rebranded under the tag “climate finance." In the counter-factual narrative, when the tag of climate
finance was not associated, think tanks, NGOs, and corporations had less incentive to involve or
engage with the government; since the activity was not targeted towards climate finance, the
publicity or targeted media attention any such synergy would generate was less.

Today, the US is threatened by China's growing territorial assertions. The alliances China has
successfully built over the South China Sea cause a power balance in the international hegemony.
As China continues to seek “geo-political” advantages, it is leveraging itself to assert its
sovereignty. In such a showdown of power struggles, the US-led alliances will continue to oppose
the Chinese actions until there can be mutual strategic advantages, or in reality, neutral gain.

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific, according to the US National Security, champions noble causes
such as territorial integrity, freedom of navigation, and the rule of law. These principles are also
vested in the UN Charter, but its practice seems to be less noble and more controversial.
Implementing such a policy by the West almost gives China the wrong impression. In the short
term, China has locked horns with multiple nations, mostly QUAD partners, which has had
spillover effects on Western alliances.

8
While pursuing a free and open Indo-Pacific As these nations do not have the privilege of
is coherent with India’s long-term interests, exercising their sovereignty through security
it seems that India’s short-term interests measures, they often remain neutral on the
echo otherwise. China continues to be a geopolitical stage.
major trade partner for India. On the one
hand, economic vitality and growth appear to Secondly, Pacific island nations have different
clash with political symbolism and a nation's priorities and do not see conventional
core identity as aspires to be a true leader. security issues as perceived challenges.
Instead, climate change and short-term
In fact, China has a history of putting measures like economic output matter more
pressure on India to stymie any attempts at a to them.
free and open Indo-Pacific. From investing in
Pakistan to reducing infrastructure Lastly, the smaller nations will comply with
investments, China follows “wolf-warrior” the principles of a “free and open” trade
diplomacy. This time, however, India has strategy, as complying with the UN gives
evolved. She has understood the importance them unique benefits. Though it can be
of capacity building, infrastructure conceded that the UN needs reforms and has
improvement, and economic resilience. She grown inefficient, it is still an important
understands that smaller nations are the institution for these nations. There are two
“invisible players,” but they will be most reasons for these nations. Firstly, the UN
significantly affected. Therefore, her policies offers a level-playing field and still gives some
[such as “Act East”] have been fundamentally sort of leeway to voice out their concerns.
tailored to meet the needs of small nations. Secondly, the UN acts as a bridge between
international advisories and investors and
In the current context, Pacific Island aids in smaller nations' economic and overall
Countries are seen as symbols of social and development.
cultural diversity, as well as hubs for global
tourism, trade, and investment. It can be Across various summits, foreign ministers
argued that a free and open Indo-Pacific have consistently shed light on the non-
champions human resources and economic traditional issues that tend to be undermined
development. by immediate security lapses. Red-tapism
and bureaucracy continue to offset gradual
However, this narrative gains strength from a developments aimed at putting smaller
realised perspective for two reasons. Firstly, nations at the focal point.
many Pacific island countries are generally
indifferent to China’s growing assertions. FOIP could successfully work in an important
Instead, they see China as an emerging region by focusing on capacity building.
opportunity for investment. Therefore, by Nations focusing on conventional security can
focusing on key areas for growth, they will have two incentives to focus on capacity
emerge as strong players. building.

9
Firstly, by improving technology, efficiency in terms of operations is achieved. This will help in
executing more security-related provisions. For example, building up drones or newer air
weaponry in the Maldives will help improve bilateral relationships with India and incentivise India
to prioritise Maldives.

Secondly, the focus should be on illicit financing. The most significant area for mutual growth is
finding common ground. Nations that lose invisible money lose potential chances to care about
non-conventional spaces. Focusing on security as a core aspect, such as destabilizing financial
terrorism, can have the effect of increasing transparency of previous suspicious activities in the
economy.

10
A Literature
Review
 FREE AND OPEN INDO PACIFIC
The Indo-Pacific region was recently recognised as one of the most strategic locations in the world
by various governments, like Australia and the USA. However, before analyzing the “Free and Open
Indo-Pacific”, it is essential to understand what these words truly mean. Understanding the code
words in the phrase helps understand the embedded strategy around it.

Japan and the US collectively coined the term “Free and Open Indo Pacific” [FOIP], to make the
region “free from coercion” and promote freedom in navigation. Japan has continuously emphasised
that it does not, in any capacity whatsoever, wish to contest the strategic advancements of China. A
thorough review of the defence strategies of both nations gives an important insight: a gradual shift
from notions like “strategy” to phrases like “vision” is observed. While some argue that this is due to
a lack of agreement on clear strategies, this paper also advocates for highlighting the long-term
bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan, which may contain embedded symbolic
elements.

To contextualise this, the US used the word “free and open” during the Cold War to showcase
communists as evil, and champions of democratic values. However, other contexts also exist, but
the paper will take the most crucial pieces of the issue and provide recommendations therein.

Contextualisation becomes a traditional approach to how FOIP should be seen. The US has overtly
voiced its concerns about China and has almost invited it to close engagement. While still a close
ally of the United States, Japan is rebranding itself: it urges China not to clash and promotes
cooperation. There appears to be some inconsistency. While the US talked of strategic investments
and cooperation with China, such mentions looked tokenistic.

The US wishes for China to remain robust, so long as it helps to meet its strategic interests,
but wishes for China to grow no further.

Therefore, the FOIP can be seen as a mechanism that aims to cap China’s influence while also
providing some encouragement for the status quo to continue.

12
 CLIMATE CHANGE
iOne of humanity's most significant worldwide Since this stock causes global warming, the
environmental issues is climate change, which burden of reducing emissions should mainly
affects freshwater availability, health, natural fall on it. India has made a relatively small
ecosystems, and food production. According to contribution to the stock of GHGs; our
the most recent scientific assessment, the current per capita energy consumption is
earth's climate system has changed only one-third of the world average.
demonstrably from pre-industrial times on a
global and regional scale. A clean economy
combats climate change and is a low-carbon,
resource-efficient, and socially inclusive
economy.
Climate justice demands that we not be forced to

Two of the four pillars of IPEF focus on lower emissions at this time because doing so
transitioning to a clean economy, combating would interfere with our developmental goals.
climate change, and decarbonising supply
chains. It becomes pertinent to understand the
existing developments that have taken place in
the country to reduce the effect of carbon
emissions. We have had a long list of national and
international partnerships to mitigate climate
India has historically opposed the imposition change to bring forward the idea of a
of emissions reduction obligations on sustainable, clean economy. This literature
developing nations because the stock of GHGs review will cover some of the existing
in the atmosphere is primarily the result of the government's initiatives to curb these issues,
activities of the developed countries as they along with some partnerships at national and
industrialised. international levels.

13
 NET ZERO
One of India's most significant breakthroughs To maintain 1.5°C, nearly 200 nations joined
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions was forces to create the Glasgow Climate Pact.
committing to net zero emissions by 2070. India has pledged to achieve net-zero carbon
Though ambitious, it has garnered the world’s emissions by 2070 and plans to cover half of
attention with this decision. Multiple giant its energy needs with renewable sources by
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in India 2030.
have already pooled considerable sums of
money to help India facilitate this transition In this regard, 7-8 sector-specific groups
smoothly, with big names like Adani and have been formed to develop a targeted low-
emission growth trajectory, with adaptation
Ambani taking the lead.
and mitigation measures in areas such as
energy supply, transportation, agriculture,
The idea of net zero greenhouse gas emissions
industry, waste, and buildings, in addition to
was first brought to attention by the Paris
carbon capture technology, R&D, and
Agreement, a landmark deal that was agreed
finance, according to the Economic Times.
upon at the United Nations Climate Change
Conference (COP21) to reduce the impact of
The Union Cabinet recently approved the new
greenhouse gas emissions. According to the NDCs, under which India pledges to reduce
Paris Agreement, net zero requires states to the emission intensity of its GDP by 45% by
‘achieve a balance between anthropogenic 2030 (compared to the level in 2005) and to
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of attain around 50% of cumulative installed
greenhouse gasses in the second half of this capacity for non-fossil fuel-based energy
century.’ sources. According to a government release,
India's modified NDC will be implemented
The international climate conference, COP26, between 2021 and 2030. The announcement
which took place in Glasgow in November also stated that this exercise was a step
2021, was a significant accomplishment. towards India's "long-term aim of reaching
net zero by 2070."

14
 REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC
PARTNERSHIP

The Regional Comprehensive Economic intellectual property, and other areas. RCEP
Partnership (RCEP) led by ASEAN entered into intends to create an integrated market with 15
force on January 1, 2022. On May 23, 2022, the nations, making it easier for each nation's
United States officially launched the "Indo- goods and services to be available across this
Pacific Economic Framework." (IPEF). The two region. The negotiations are centred on trade
agreements, which include the major Asian in goods and services, investment, intellectual
economies, have emerged as the region's two property, dispute settlement, e-commerce,
most crucial opportunities for economic small and medium enterprises, and economic
cooperation. cooperation.

What is RCEP? How is IPEF different from RCEP?

The Regional Comprehensive Economic The IPEF comprises 13 economies across Asia-
Partnership (RCEP) is a proposed agreement Pacific: Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia,
between member countries of the Association Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
free trade agreement (FTA) partners. The deal Vietnam, and the United States. Fiji joined the
covers trade in goods and services, group shortly after it was formed.

15
In terms of interest, RCEP specifically The initial IPEF Member States are highly
mentioned that "priority will be given to the congruent with the RCEP. Biden's
needs of the least developed countries", administration did not join RCEP but instead
allowing some countries to have reservations wooed regional countries to create a new Indo-
about tariff concessions for some commodities. Pacific economic structure. To constrain
While IPEF emphasised the priority of the China's development, the United States
United States. The Statement from the White coerced provincial governments to choose
House pointed out that "the United States is an between China and the United States on the
economic power in the Indo-Pacific region. grounds of economic and trade cooperation.
Expanding the economic leadership of the
United States in the region will ensure that Difference in Approaches
American workers, small businesses and
farmers have the ability to compete in the The differences between the two agreements
Indo-Pacific region." are reflected in their core aspects. Under the
RCEP, trade liberalisation will be achieved with
RCEP’s Economic Significance gradual tariff reductions allowing for
significant exemptions in sensitive and
According to the estimates, RCEP will connect strategic sectors. RCEP tariff concessions are
about 30% of the world’s people and output projected to eliminate tariffs on over 90 per
and, in the right political context, will generate cent of goods traded.
significant profits. By 2030, if the
implementation is on track, we estimate that it
will increase members’ incomes by 0.6%,
IPEF has no plans to negotiate tariffs and relax
adding $245 billion annually to regional income
market access.
and 2.8 million jobs to regional employment.

According to estimates, the RCEP and TPP will

offset worldwide losses from the US-China Regarding economic structure, Member States
trade war, but not for China and the US. The of RCEP are mostly export-oriented with
new agreements will boost North and unbalanced production and consumption. In
Southeast Asia's economies by combining their IPEF, production and consumption can
strengths in technology, manufacturing, complement each other, which is a strong
agriculture, and natural resources. Even rationale for ASEAN countries to consider
though the deal is not as stringent as the joining IPEF. In the formulation of rules, RCEP
CPTPP, the consequences of RCEP are doesn't implement high standards on the part
considerable. It incentivises supply networks of intellectual property, making the
around the area while simultaneously catering participating members more accepting of the
to political concerns. Its intellectual property agreement. The focus of IPEF lies in
laws add little to what many members already establishing unified standards. It requires the
have in place, and it speaks nothing about Indo- Pacific states to achieve unity in the
workers, the environment, or state-owned digital economy, decarbonisation, clean
firms. However, ASEAN-centered trade deals energy, environmental protection and labour
tend to improve over time. rights protection.
16
According to the US, they would work within Southeast Asia will benefit significantly from
the IPEF framework to develop common rules RCEP ($19 billion annually by 2030) but less so
based on four pillars. Thus, the IPEF does not than Northeast Asia because it already has free
intend to operate in the conventional way of trade agreements with RCEP partners. But
free trade agreements (FTAs), exchanging RCEP could improve access to Chinese Belt
concession offers on tariffs and other trade and Road Initiative (BRI) funds, increasing
barriers. gains from market access by strengthening
transport, energy, and communications links.
Several IPEF members are also members of the The favourable rules of origin under RCEP will
Regional Comprehensive Economic
also attract foreign investment.
Partnership (RCEP), which has 15 members and
has been in operation since early this year. It
RCEP’s Geopolitical Significance
comprises all ASEAN economies (Brunei,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
The RCEP, frequently referred to incorrectly as
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
"China-led," is a triumph of ASEAN's middle-
and Vietnam) and five of ASEAN's FTA partners
power diplomacy. The significance of a major
(China, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the
ROK). This implies that all IPEF members, East Asian trade deal has long been recognised,
except the US, India and Fiji, are part of the but neither China nor Japan, the region's two
RCEP. Several other IPEF members, Australia, largest economies, were politically acceptable
Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, as project architects. The impasse was resolved
Singapore and Vietnam, are also members of in 2012 by an ASEAN-brokered deal that
another significant regional FTA: the included India, Australia, and New Zealand as
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for members and put ASEAN in charge of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership. Even though China negotiations. Without such "ASEAN centrality,"
is the largest member economy in the RCEP, the RCEP may never have been implemented.
the bloc's structure is similar to that of other RCEP enables the long-desired trilateral free
ASEAN FTAs. The RCEP is viewed as a China- trade agreement between Japan, China, and
dominated group, and the IPEF provides an South Korea. This is significant because Japan
option for many of its members outside and China have a tumultuous history, whereas
China's influence. Japan and Korea are natural US allies.

With the rise of the Asian economy in recent Implications

years, an endogenous need for forming Asian
regional integrated economic structures has
The official entry into force of RCEP means
evolved. After it went into force in January
forming a free trade agreement in the Asia-
2022, RECP became the world's largest free
Pacific region, which will play a significant role
trade zone. On the one hand, China's entry into
in promoting economic integration in the Asia-
RCEP can boost China's economic openness
Pacific region. However, after Biden took
and influence. RCEP, on the other hand, is
office, the U.S. government officially launched
critical for maintaining the multilateral trade
system, deepening regional economic the IPEF to restrain China's influence in the
integration, and stabilising the global economy. Asia-Pacific region.

17
Although the IPEF is an economic cooperation initiative, it has the potential to become a
geopolitical tool in the context of China-US competition. China's leadership role in RCEP has
gained much importance as the region's largest and fastest developing economy. The RCEP will
help China strengthen its connections with its neighbours, rewarding eight years of patient
discussions in the "ASEAN way," which participants typically describe, with varying degrees of
affection, as unusually slow, consensual, and flexible. The RCEP will also accelerate economic
integration in Northeast Asia.

A spokesman for Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated last year that negotiations on the long-
stalled trilateral China-South Korea-Japan free trade deal will resume "as soon as they can
conclude the negotiations on RCEP." As if on cue, President Xi Jinping promised in a high-profile
address in early November to "speed up discussions on a China-EU investment treaty and a China-
Japan-ROK [South Korea] free trade deal".

18
 INDIA-JAPAN CLEAN ENERGY PARTNERSHIP

India and Japan have joined hands yet again to business structures. The potential for
aid each other in the transition towards net improving bilateral collaboration in clean and
zero. Both countries have to fulfil their sustainable development is enormous. A
commitments of net zero, with Japan aiming to secure, efficient, robust, and sustainable
do it by 2050 and India by 2070. Cooperation energy system is successfully being
under this partnership will build on the work implemented in India and Japan. The guiding
already being covered by the two sides under concepts for both nations' energy policies are
the foundation of the ‘Japan-India Energy energy security, efficiency, environmental
Dialogue’ established in 2007 and will sustainability, clean energy transition, and
substantially expand the areas of collaboration safety.
for mutual benefit.
The partnership will promote investments,
Cooperation under this partnership will cover employment growth, and innovation, resulting
areas including, but not limited to: in clean growth. It will also demonstrate to the
Electric Vehicles (EV), world that India and Japan are at the forefront
storage systems, including batteries, of delivering ambitious climate and sustainable
electric vehicle charging infrastructure development goals.
(EVCI);
Energy Conservation in Buildings and The Reinforcers:
Industries,
Energy Efficient Appliances; UK
Development of Solar Energy, including India and UK have shared a robust historical
Solar PV cells; partnership in mitigating climate change
Wind Energy; spanning from climate resilience to knowledge
Clean, including Green Hydrogen; sharing and innovation in fields like electric
Clean, including Green Ammonia; mobility and power sector reform. This
Greater and purer use of LNG; partnership stands out because both these
Carbon Capture, Utilization & Storage countries are at different stages of
(CCUS)/Carbon Recycling; development, aiding them in the process.
Emerging fuels, including Biofuels, CBG Prime Ministers of member countries also
Strategic Petroleum Reserves etc. launched the ‘Green Grids Initiative – One Sun
Clean coal technology. One World One Grid’ and ‘Infrastructure for
Resilient Island States’ initiatives. India also
Both nations are utilising emerging low- committed to the Glasgow Breakthroughs and
carbon industries and reducing carbon the Zero Electric Vehicles Declaration under
emissions by utilizing new technologies and the emerging economies category.

19
In advance of COP26, the UK promised to Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030
invest $1 billion through British Investment Partnership announced by both countries at
International in green projects in India over the Leaders’ Summit on Climate held in 2021. It
the following five years and to guarantee a $1 was formed to facilitate stronger bilateral
billion World Bank loan to India. International cooperation on actions to meet the goals of the
Trade Secretary Anne-Marie Trevelyan Paris agreement in the current decade. The
introduced the Clean Growth initiative to partnership's two primary focuses are spread
entice more UK exporters to participate in a over five areas: Power and Energy Efficiency,
market anticipated to be worth £1.8 trillion by Responsible Oil and Gas, Renewable Energy,
2030. Sustainable Growth and Emerging Fuels.
Furthermore, it will support India in achieving
US-India Strategic Clean Energy Partnership its goal of installing 450GW renewable energy
The SCEP was established by the US - India capacity by 2030.

20
 QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE (QUAD)

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is an idea of the Quad being pitched three years
informal strategic security forum of four later. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan
countries. Commonly known as the Quad, its suggested forming this strategic dialogue in
member countries are India, the United States, 2007 when the four countries convened on the
Australia, and Japan. It was established in 2007, sidelines of ASEAN.
deceased in 2008, and then re-established in
2017.

The primary aim of the Quad is to work The Quad’s objectives include creating an Indo-
towards making the Indo-Pacific region that is Pacific region supported by the values of
more open, free, and secure. The member
democracy, the rule of law, and freedom of
countries have dialogues toward increasing
prosperity and inclusivity in the area. The navigation.
strategic grouping works towards creating
solutions for global issues, including
connectivity, maritime security, infrastructure, The four countries aim to come together to
emerging technologies, and education. It also increase economic growth. They also fight
works to reduce the effects of climate change climate change's effects and promote a cleaner
and the recent COVID-19 pandemic and economy. Along with this, they also offer
spearheads various disaster management alternative debt financing for the countries in
activities. this region.

The roots of the Quad relations can also go Increasing security in the Indo-Pacific region
back to 1992 when the Malabar Exercise was and safeguarding the sea routes are one of the
established between India and the US. It was a group's main objectives. By establishing a
bilateral war-gaming naval exercise taking global order that is rules-based, democratic,
place in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific and liberal, they protect the region from
Ocean, alternating every year. Later it became foreign invaders. The Quad works towards
a quadrilateral exercise with the addition of reducing China’s power in the Indo-Pacific
Japan and Australia. region by reducing Chinese trade. They hope
to abate the predatory policies promoted by
This partnership first began after the tsunami the Red Dragon. The group believes that the
of 2004. India started relief measures and strategic sea routes in this region should be
rescue operations for those affected by the free from any kind of influence, whether
tragic event, in India and its neighbouring military or political. They aim to decrease and
countries. Soon, Australia, Japan, and the US counter Chinese domination in the area. The
assisted India in its efforts. The coming country has been rising with respect to its
together of these four countries and economic and military power in the Indo-
coordinating these relief measures led to the Pacific region.

21
During the COVID-19 outbreak, the Quad assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific have
worked extensively towards improving implications for trade relations. With more
healthcare as well as increasing the efficient QUAD activities. Many scholars argue that
distribution of vaccines. By combining the four QUAD should increase its engagement with
countries' scientific resources, finances, and different nations and that IPEF can coordinate
manufacturing capacities, they were able to with multiple actors for economic dimensions.
create a significant impact during the Being part of the Quad has manifold benefits
pandemic. for India. It allows the country to perform
strategic explorations in the Indo-Pacific
region via an extension of its naval front.
The act of incorporation of IPEF in QUAD, and
Moreover, due to the alliance with the other
the stern response China has given, by calling
three countries that are part of this informal
it "Economic NATO '' to thwart the effects of
dialogue, they can provide aid to India if it
IPEF, seemed in vain. Moreover, it calls QUAD
faces any hostility from China at its borders.
an "Asian NATO''. Moreover, the theatrical
They can give military as well as economic
exercises performed by QUAD to increase their
assistance if ever required.

22
 TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP)
First conceived in 2003, the Trans-Pacific In 2017, the US withdrew from the partnership
Partnership (TPP) was a proposed free-trade under the Trump administration. It instead
agreement. Its members included twelve decided to pursue bilateral negotiations. The
Pacific-Rim countries: Australia, Brunei, partnership was opposed by several Democrats
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New as well as Republics. Donald Trump and Hillary
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, Clinton, the major-party presidential
and Vietnam. Drafted in 2015 and signed on 4th nominees after Obama’s end of office, had
February 2016, it was never ratified. been against the trade deal.

The TPP aimed to open up new industries, According to a 2016 study, the TPP would have
create more jobs, and lower tariffs and trade raised US annual real income by $131 billion in
barriers among the member economies. Its less than fifteen years. It would have expanded
objectives include developing robust supply annual exports by 9.1%, more than a $357 billion
chains, reducing unemployment, making trade increase. The world GDP would have increased
more inclusive, and increasing efficiency. by $492 billion had the US not pulled out and
Promoting economic growth and productivity had the partnership successfully seen through.
was one of its key goals.
After the US pulled out of the agreement, the
Since the TPP included twelve countries, many other countries involved began reconsidering
of which joined the partnership during the the way forward. Despite having negotiated the
talks, this would greatly expand the economic deal for seven years, they started discussing
footprint of the trade agreement. However, alternative options. The major possibilities
this would also complicate negotiations among discussed were continuing the TPP without the
the countries, creating the need for more US or formulating a revised agreement. Some
amendments before the deal's finalisation. countries refused to be involved in the TPP any
further following the departure of the US from

23
the deal. This was probably because the States It does not liberalise trade in services or
were the largest and the most powerful out of protect intellectual property. In fact, it does
all the economies that were currently part of not take any measures to enhance access to the
the partnership. They would no longer have markets of the member countries. Several
access to the US market if this deal went labours and environmental groups from the
through without the participation of the States. States that had objected to the TPP are also
Thus, a revised agreement was settled amongst apprehensive about the IPEF.
the countries of the TPP, excluding the US.
Some critics of the IPEF believe that shifting
Finally, these eleven remaining countries supply chains from China to other countries
signed the Comprehensive and Progressive that are allies of the US could be achieved more
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership effectively through a partnership more similar
(CPTPP) on 8th March 2018 in Santiago, Chile. to the TPP than to the IPEF. They say that
This adapted agreement came into force on market access in the US is important for many
30th December 2018. Other countries are countries, especially the poorer ones, and the
welcome to join the CPTPP, as long as they can IPEF does not provide this to them. They
uphold all its clauses. The CPTPP comprises believe that the TPP would have been a better
most of the provisions that were part of the option in this regard. However, the TPP was
TPP, save for a few suspended ones. never ratified, being opposed by the major
parties.
Out of the twelve countries that were forming
the TPP, seven are now part of the IPEF. Some Following the withdrawal of former US
countries, like Mexico and Canada, did not join President Donald Trump from the Trans-
the current framework because they already Pacific Partnership (TPP), the US's Indo-Pacific
have a free trade area with the US. Taking part strategy lacked geo-economic heft, making it
in the CPTPP would not provide them with any less appealing to many ASEAN countries such
significant additional benefits. as Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. The fact
that the US is working on an Indo-Pacific
Though it was meant to replace the TPP for the economic framework has been making the
US, the IPEF as an economic agreement is rounds since the Biden administration took
loosely structured. It aimed to increase office. The United States has repeatedly stated
connectivity among the economies in the Indo- that the IPEF is not a Free Trade Agreement
Pacific region, strengthen relations, increase (FTA) like the Regional Comprehensive
cooperation, and fill the gap left after Trump Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the
withdrew from the TPP four years ago. Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTP). It has not participated in,
Unlike the TPP and the CPTPP, the IPEF, as nor has it planned to join in, future tariff-
established by President Biden, is not a reduction or market-access negotiations. For
traditional free trade agreement. The proposed the time being, the IPEF looks to be the US's
TPP included clauses that would lower tariffs way of convincing countries that its Indo-
and other trade barriers and provide increased Pacific policy is very much a geo-economic
access to US markets. However, the IPEF does component and is not just security and geo-
not aim to offer such benefits to its signatories. strategy heavy.

24
 THE CHINA VARIABLE

Though not officially stated, it is evident that Another point of contention is that China
one of the unspoken objectives of the IPEF is to already has the RCEP, which includes several
counter the dominance of China in the Indo- countries that are now part of the IPEF. There
Pacific region. The influence of China has been is doubt about how effectively the IPEF will
increasing among the countries in South and reduce China's influence. Many countries are
Southeast Asia in recent times. It is a matter of involved in both partnerships, the IPEF and the
concern for several countries, especially the RCEP, and have friendly, cordial relations with
United States. According to the State of members of both associations.
Southeast Asia 2022 Survey Report, China has
been the most influential economic power Moreover, the credibility of the US amongst the
since 2019. Approximately 75% of respondents countries in this region is not very strong. The
reported favouring this, while less than 9% country has consistently shown deviation from
believed that the US deserved this title. China its goals when it comes to its objectives in the
accounts for more than 20% of Southeast Asian Indo-Pacific. One instance of the US displaying
trade, a number that is much more significant such digression was when it withdrew from
than what we can claim. The US hopes to the Trans-Pacific Partnership five years ago.
increase its credibility in the Indo-Pacific Following the withdrawal of former US
region and thereby reduce that of China. President Donald Trump from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), the US's Indo-Pacific
However, many critics are still determining strategy lacked geo-economic heft, making it
whether this framework will achieve this goal. less appealing to many ASEAN countries such
Since IPEF is not a traditional free trade as Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. The fact
agreement but rather a negotiation framework, that the US is working on an Indo-Pacific
its effectiveness in successfully countering economic framework has been making the
China’s dominance is a matter of contention rounds since the Biden administration took
according to some. One main proposition that office. The United States has repeatedly stated
this framework lacked was the reduction of that the IPEF is not a Free Trade Agreement
tariffs for countries. (FTA) like the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the
The IPEF allows its member countries to agree Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific
to only certain propositions under it, without Partnership (CPTP). It has not participated in,
enforcing all the clauses on them. This gives nor has it planned to join in, future tariff-
them a lot of leeway and prevents them from reduction or market-access negotiations. For
having to choose between China and the US. the time being, the IPEF looks to be the US's
This is beneficial, as various countries wish to way of convincing countries that its Indo-
maintain a neutral position and have peaceful Pacific policy is very much a geo-economic
trade and economic relations with both component and is not just security and geo-
powers. strategy heavy.

25
 Moreover, it is the largest economy in terms of
purchasing power parity. Wang Yi, the Chinese
The framework will help the US in practising Foreign Minister, asserted that any country
increased trade in the area and building trust that tries to alienate China will end up being
the one that is estranged. Several people from
amongst the nations in the Indo-Pacific the Chinese strategic community support this
view.

Some have opined that the IPEF is simply a

China responded strongly to the establishment ‘political tool’ against the country and does not
of the framework. The country believes it will provide any significant economic benefit to the
lead to regional divides and called it an countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
‘economic NATO." The Chinese Ministry of Therefore, they are of the firm belief that the
Commerce stated that IPEF should focus on framework is not going to be successful.
increasing prosperity, development, and
economic cooperation instead of hindering and Despite their confidence that the IPEF will fail
threatening the currently existing structure in in reducing China's economic influence, the
the region and creating rifts in it. Projects country took specific policy measures to
should be inclusive and not discriminatory. It protect itself against this framework, mainly in
also added that the country is ready and willing the domains of trade and cooperation.
to cooperate with relevant nations for the
purpose of increasing economic integration Chinese Foreign Minister Yi was quick to tour
and development in the Indo-Pacific, as long as various island countries in the Indo-Pacific
these activities do not create divisions or region and offer them cooperation in terms of
exclude certain parties. It stands for initiatives economy, infrastructure, and security. This
that will help preserve peace in the region. attempt to create a ‘comprehensive strategic
partnership’ also included his pledge to
Policy experts from China have reported that, provide them with more significant support.
according to their analysis, the IPEF will not be Some of his benefits to the island nations were
able to supersede the power of China in the humanitarian relief, food security, and
Indo-Pacific. Various countries' experts have measures towards the alleviation of climate
come to this conclusion after performing change. Wang Yi also promised better projects
analyses of the IPEF and Chinese initiatives under the BRI and higher investments. He also
like the RCEP and the BRI. Because of the re emphasised the country’s dedication
powerful influence of these cooperative towards the Comprehensive and Progressive
mechanisms, it points towards China having a Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
more substantial presence in the region. It is (CPTPP) and the Digital Economy Partnership
better integrated with other countries, which Agreement (DEPA).
has only been increasing recently. It is
reportedly the largest trading partner for most These efforts by China suggest that perhaps
Southeast Asian countries. Its significant this firm conviction of theirs is not as strong as
presence in the domestic market gives the has been portrayed by them.
government an upper hand in this domain.

26
27
 ANTI-CORRUPTION
AND ITS LINKAGE WITH CHINA
Corruption is one of the biggest problems that seeps into
India. According to {report}, significant economic and
governance damage is seen. As per the United Nations, the
impact of corruption is about XYZ.

The BRI is an initiative launched by the Chinese

Government. It is a symbolic, yet strategic move by the Xi
Jinping administration to re-assert its dominance in Asia by
providing economic resilience and support to countries-or,
it seemed. While much is known about how China
weaponised loans to debt-trap nations, less is known about
the structural inefficiencies of China.

One of the biggest things IPEF aims to target, which is

vulnerable to the Chinese modus operandi, is corruption.
Many partnering nations have come under the radar even in
the most extensive programs like BRI. The case of the
Malaysia Development Berhad scandal proves the best. In a
bid to receive financial assistance and strategic advantages,
Malaysia did not mind retaining its territorial integrity. As
per a report by the Foreign Policy, Malaysia provided
“extraordinary access” to China. Caution is needed when
dealing with corruption, as the impact of such acts, along
with the stakeholders affected, is magnified by the
occurrence of such actions. Evidence extracted from the
Wall Street Journal conforms to such findings.

While such acts could be rare, and China could be novel in

its approach, it still faces an impending problem. Most of its
target stakeholders are nations with no reputation for loan
repayment, and some part of it is linked to corruption.

The reason for such a detailed review of Asian nations is

because of India's growing importance towards its
neighbours, according to the “Act East Policy''. “ASEAN
Centrality'' has been heavily challenged in terms of
polarization from the Russia, Ukraine and the Beijing-
Washington tussle. Bajpaee (2022) explains that New Delhi’s
relations with Southeast Asia became further
institutionalised when India became a full dialogue partner
in 1996 with participation in the ASEAN ministerial meeting
and Post-Ministerial Conference. As per the “State of
Southeast Asia'', India is shown as a nation which still has
not been able to exercise influence over the Southeast in
terms of metrics in both hard power and soft power.
28
 TRADE PILLAR

What is the trade pillar all about? Opting Out: A wise decision?

The Trade pillar of IPEF primarily deals with Out of the four pillars of the IPEF, India has
all things related to international trade. The decided to join three pillars of the United
aim is to create high-standard, inclusive, free, States-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
fair, and open trade obligations that strengthen (IPEF)--supply chains, tax and anti-corruption
the multilateral trading system's rules-based and clean energy. For the time being, India
framework. To promote resilient, sustainable, chose not to opt for the trade pillar, stating a
and inclusive economic growth and few reasons we will cover in detail. Mainly,
development that benefits workers, India needed more time to be ready to meet
consumers, indigenous peoples, local the sky-high expectations of developed
communities, women, and micro, small, and countries and commit to agreements that were
medium-sized businesses, the member not in its best interests. This is just one of the
countries will work to develop new and many examples of India getting coerced into
innovative trade and technology policy unwanted partnerships.
approaches. These approaches will be used to
further a wide range of goals. For example, India has historically opposed the
imposition of emissions reduction obligations
Furthermore, to further shared interests, on developing nations because the stock of
intending to deliver tangible benefits for the GHGs in the atmosphere is primarily the result
people and advance resilient, broad-based of the activities of the developed countries as
economic connectivity and integration in the they are industrialized. Since this stock causes
Indo-Pacific region, the goal is to pursue global warming, the burden of reducing
provisions and initiatives related to: emissions should mainly fall on them. India has
made relatively little contribution to the stock
labour, of GHGs; our current per capita energy
environment, consumption is only one-third of the world
digital economy, average.
agriculture,
competition policy,
transparency and good regulatory
practices, Climate justice demands that we not be forced to
trade facilitation, lower emissions at this time because doing so
inclusivity, and would interfere with our developmental goals.
technical assistance and economic
cooperation.

IPEF was formed to foster an environment that So, it is not surprising that India withdrew
will increase possibilities for workers, from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
businesses, and consumers in our markets, trade pillar (IPEF). Most issues that the IPEF
increase investment and trade between our seeks to promote are in the interests of
economies, raise standards, and lower trade American industry while being entirely out of
barriers. sync with Indian trade policies.

29
 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXERCISING OPT OUT MECHANISM

Digital Trade is still in the Developing Phase

The ‘connected economy’ pillar, also known as the trade pillar, hugely relies on the digital economy
space, emphasising the harmonisation of digital trade and standards. It mainly revolves around the
digital economy, AI, and e-commerce sphere.

This makes matured digital space in a country a prerequisite to joining this pillar. But, India’s laws
and regulations in this regard are still in the developing phase, mainly regarding its protectionist
policies like data privacy and data regulation. For example, the data protection bill was withdrawn,
citing several reasons, and no development has been made concerning the new and updated
proposed frameworks. Despite the bill's shortcomings, it is not in our best interest to leave a void in
the privacy policy space as we consider our subsequent commitments in the global arena.

India needs to develop new frameworks or become a part of some existing frameworks to facilitate
its digital trade space on the international stage. This is of utmost importance and needs to be done
on a priority basis if India wants to partake in the trade pillar and reap maximum benefits
effectively. One of the effective models that India can work on developing is something along the
lines of the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). Under this, New Zealand, Chile, and
Singapore have crafted a new approach to trade policymaking focused on rules to govern cross-
border data flows, facilitate data-driven economic growth, and increase online trust. This is where
we as a country need to improve, and frameworks like these can help us guide us towards the right
direction in the digital trade space.

30
 Standardization: A Fair Approach

Making standardisation a must without taking into consideration the needs and capabilities of
everyone will not benefit everyone, and only a select few will be reaping the most of it.

The inherent problem is that most of the countries in IPEF are developed countries, and that is why
the frameworks that have been developed are something developing countries can only adapt to
gradually. The standards the United States have set regarding technology, labour, and the
environment are unacceptable in India.

For example, we saw the rapid transition to low carbon emissions in the Industrial sector, which
India was incapable of. It ultimately led to overburdening MSMEs of the country because they were
forced to transition into the new normal but were not provided equivalent support to aid the
process.

Distasteful for Western Partners?

India has always safeguarded the country’s interests regarding diplomatic relationships. Because of
this, we have witnessed threats from our western allies repeatedly, coercing us to give up on their
agreements.

One of the most recent examples is India’s neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine issue, which was
mainly due to the complex geopolitical relations we have at hand. India was just considering that all
parties have legitimate security interests; therefore, these should be fully taken into account before
choosing just any one side. Still, we saw India taking the heat from its allies with remarks like
“Fence-sitting is a bigger diplomatic gamble now than in the past, given that Russia's invasion of
Ukraine is one of the worst aggressions in decades and India's relations with the West have never
been stronger."

The US wishes for China to remain robust, so long as it helps to meet its strategic interests, but
wishes for China to grow no further.

Following our Traditions: A Midway

For strategic reasons, joining the IPEF makes sense for India as it is an attempt made by the US to
keep China's growing influence in the Asia Pacific region in check, which also suits New Delhi.

Therefore, Commerce & Industry Minister Piyush Goyal's declaration that he would not participate
in the trade pillar for the time being at the IPEF Ministerial Summit in Los Angeles earlier this
month is the most appropriate. By agreeing to talk on the other three pillars, India not only showed
its desire to stay a part of the group and challenge China, but it also sent a message that its
economic interests would not be neglected.

31
 CLIMATE RESILIENCE AND IPEF

IPEF’s Aim in this Regard associated trade, mitigation of climate change

through strengthening renewable energy,
IPEF aims to tackle the severe problem of energy efficiency, and zero- and low-carbon
climate change by meaningfully contributing to sourcing, as well as trade and investment
environmental protection and responses to our facilitation in relevant clean technologies;
common sustainability challenges, including supporting an environmentally sustainable
climate change, through effective enforcement digital economy; green investment and
of our respective environmental laws and finance; circular economy strategies;
strengthening environmental protection, responsible corporate behaviour, fulfilling our
preservation of the marine environment, commitments under global environmental
conservation of biodiversity, eradication of agreements, and improved ecological
wildlife trafficking, illegal logging, and collaboration.

Funding the Dream: A Constraint?

The ability of governments to raise sufficient amounts of money has been a recurring issue in the
fight against climate change again and again. Before we delve deeper into the budget constraints
present in pursuing the dream of IPEF, let's look at the historical commitments of developed
countries.

Developed countries agreed to provide funds to developing countries in 1992–1993 as part of the
UNFCCC to help them cover the expenses of upholding their environmental obligations. Developed
countries committed to sending $100 billion yearly to developing countries by 2020 as part of the
COP15 climate change conference in Copenhagen in 2009.

32
However, developed nations haven't succeeded in achieving this objective to date. Developed
countries sent $79.6 billion to developing countries in 2019, up from $78.3 billion in 2018, but this is
still less than the planned amount. The United States has fallen woefully short in terms of
financing.

This has been an inherent persistent problem for the longest time for developing countries who
want to partake in these international collaborations. First, the developed countries put forward
their uniform, standardised expectations, which they expect every participating country is
expected to follow. But they are nowhere to be seen when it comes to extending support in terms
of funding, technical know-how, etc. Furthermore, standards are always uniform for every
country, whether developed or developing. This makes the adoption difficult for countries like
India because most of these aspects are still in the maturity phase and thus need time to adjust to
western standards.

Moving on with our preliminary discussion of the lack of funding support for IPEF, let's dissect the
funding scene for IPEF. The USAID, managing international development initiatives, has a $27.7
billion budget for fully or partially managed funds in 2022. However, budget estimates for the IPEF
will rely on much smaller pools of money, primarily through other agencies, as it is unlikely that
USAID will play a significant role in the IPEF.

Other than USAID, agencies like DFC, EXIM Bank, and USTDA also have their commitments and
are highly unlikely to bet solely on IPEF countries. Other areas of funding look grim at this point.
So, the total amount of financing available for IPEF initiatives remains to be determined, mainly if
funding comes from multiple U.S. agencies and governments.

Allocating Funds: Doing the Right

After the funding has been secured, the next question that comes into the picture is regarding the
utilisation of these funds; that would include analysing the different sectors under the IPEF
architecture and then choosing the needy one.

The most appropriate choice here would be to select those developing countries that need funds
to maintain standard infrastructure levels, which will reduce pollution levels. For example,
countries that need to decarbonise sectors would be implicated by the European Union’s carbon
border adjustment mechanism (CBAM).

India and South Korea are some of the biggest steel exporters to the European Union, and their
total steel exports totalled nearly $5 billion. Vietnam is the third-largest cement exporter to the
European Union, and Malaysia is the eighth-largest, with total cement exports valued at roughly
$27 million. Targeting these CBAM sectors in these countries is an effective way to address
decarbonisation while promoting economic growth.

33
This would involve scanning the environment of all the member countries to find some promising
avenues for investment in the long run.

IPEF partners should work to promulgate standards through projects. These standards include
green procurement transparency and efforts to harmonise methodologies for measuring life-cycle
emissions.

The administration should maximise the use of trade tools to incentivise the growth of a
climate-friendly industry.

All in all, the Biden administration has a once-in-a-lifetime chance to create a robust regional
framework that is not duplicative but is a complementary framework that will reinforce existing
commitments while increasing ambition and follow-through on decarbonisation efforts. The
variety of IPEF partners highlights the exceptional potential that the Biden administration has
provided to establish new alliances, set new norms, and advance a positive agenda in a region of
crucial strategic significance to the world economy.

34
 CLIMATE FINANCE
Clean economy being the third pillar of the economic framework, the member countries of IPEF
strive to achieve several climate goals. Some of their objectives concerning this pillar are to
reduce as well as eliminate emissions of greenhouse gasses, improve energy security, develop
green technologies, and promote sustainable livelihoods.

The countries aim to promote goods and services that produce low or even zero emissions by
tackling the problem from the demand side. They are facilitating provisions that will help in
developing markets for such products. Moreover, they aim to help provide clean finance and
induce investment in order to promote these sustainable goods and services. This will involve
current assets being converted into futures that are low- or zero-emission.

Climate finance is finance which is provided for the purpose of implementing activities that aim
to reduce climate change and help countries adapt to its adverse effects. Different countries are
differently equipped to deal with climate change. Moreover, some countries are at greater risk
than others to the detrimental effects of the changing climate. Underdeveloped and developing
countries lack the resources, technological prowess, and funding to invest in climate projects and
create sustainable industries. Financial flows to these countries from the better-equipped ones
are essential to help them adapt to the changes brought forth by the climate crisis and become
more climate resilient. Climate finance can be provided by not only governments but also private
entities.

Global crises of recent years, such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, have
highlighted the need for developing and maintaining resilient economies and moving away from
dependency on carbon-based energy. Countries must actively shift to more sustainable and
renewable sources of energy.

Developed countries have been called upon to commit to their obligation to help emerging
economies become more climate resilient to achieve the common goal of the mitigation of climate
change.

However, there is some ambiguity about the exact definition of climate finance. Some definitions
of climate finance involve flows from developed nations to developing ones. Hence, the funds
allocated by a country for its decarbonisation and energy transition activities would not be
included in it.

35
 India’s Role in Global Climate Resilience
India’s goals with respect to climate change
More generally, climate finance is a loose term and the environment were modified in 2021 at
the 26th United Nations Climate Change
used to define any investment targeted towards
Conference, also known as COP26. At this
reducing climate change and conserving the summit held in Glasgow, Prime Minister
environment. Narendra Modi increased India’s targets and
announced that India would aim to create a
greater impact in this domain.

Climate finance can come from both private For India to meet its climate targets for the
and public sources, and it can be bilateral or year 2030, it will require a total of 1.01 trillion
multilateral. Bilateral funding can occur dollars in climate finance. This equates to an
directly from a developed country to a average investment of 112 billion dollars per
developing one, or it can be channelled year. This would be aimed towards increasing
through any certified institution that will the efficiency of energy generation,
collect the amount and commit it to the channelling renewable energy,
objective stated by the country. On the other decarbonisation, and the development of
hand is multilateral funding, which constitutes electric vehicles. Other objectives would
a larger part of climate finance. The Green include improving supply chains for
Climate Fund (GCF), the Adaptation Fund, the agriculture, making agricultural production
Climate Investment Funds (CIF) of the World more efficient, mitigating the emission of
Bank and the Global Environment Facility methane in such activities, and waste
(GEF) are some of the major multilateral management and disaster management.
institutions providing climate finance to Notably, solar and wind energy will see
various countries across the world. massive increases in investment.

In 2021, climate tech companies working

towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions
received more than 7 billion dollars in equity
funding, which was a 275% increase from the
previous year. Total investment in climate tech
is approximated to be almost 20 billion dollars.

Currently, a majority of the climate finance is

for renewables, and they constitute 64.6% of
the total equity funding in climate tech. This is
followed by electric vehicles, which amount to
23.3% of the total. Following this is the
agricultural supply chain, accounting for 8.8%
of all climate tech equity.

36
Big companies like Reliance and Adani have Climate bonds raise money for projects aimed
committed to providing large amounts of towards decarbonisation and reducing the
investment towards developing renewable harmful consequences of climate change.
energy in India. While climate bonds have a more specific
objective, green bonds are more extensive.
One issue that comes up concerning climate Green bonds support any activities that help
finance is cases of subtle overreporting. There conserve the environment. Despite the slight
are various large-scale projects which have difference, climate bonds and green bonds are
certain features that are pro-environment and often used interchangeably.
climate-oriented; however, the primary
objective of these projects is not focused A bond is considered a green bond only once it
towards the mitigation of climate change. In has been verified by an official body, for
many instances, the project may even end up example, the Climate Bond Standard Board.
contributing to climate change and global
warming. Investments in such initiatives The official body must ratify that the money
should not be included in climate finance, or raised by the bond will be used for financing
the statistics representing the total amount of projects that contribute to the conservation of
climate finance in any given period will be the environment. Since green bonds often
misleading. Only financing for initiatives for carry incentives such as tax exemption and tax
which fighting climate change is the main goal credits, this makes them more lucrative and
should be considered climate finance. appealing compared to other bonds that are
taxable.

The potential issuing of ‘sovereign green

bonds’ was suggested by the Finance Minister
This overreporting by countries is often hard to of India, Nirmala Sitharaman, in February
2022. Backed by the government, these
quantify but can be substantially reduced by
securities offer to the general public an
increasing transparency in these projects and investment opportunity while also contributing
establishing a concrete and globally accepted to the development of infrastructure, which
would help India achieve its climate goals.
definition of climate finance.
These bonds would finance climate-oriented
infrastructure initiatives undertaken by the
Indian public sector.

Green and climate bonds will play a major role The first few green bonds in India were issued
in helping India achieve its objective. Green in 2015 by financial institutions as well as
bonds are a fixed-income, asset-linked private entities, including banks like Yes Bank
instrument that finance projects related to Ltd and Exim Bank of India and the company
climate and the environment. These are CLP Wind Farms. More and more
generally backed by the balance sheet of the corporations, especially those in the renewable
issuer, and hence share the credit rating of the energy industry, have started issuing green
other debt obligations of the issuing entity. bonds since then.
37
 Reducing climate change will be a long process,
requiring major investments, strong
commitment, and several years.

Currently, a majority of the green bonds in greater transparency in the process

India are issued by non-financial corporate concerning the allocation of the funds, what
entities. These constituted approximately 32% they are being used for, and regular follow-ups
of all green bonds issued in the year 2021. on the progress made by the projects over the
Financial institutions like banks have been years. This will also lead to greater
slower in the green bonds business in recent accountability. All parties involved should be
years, but they have the potential to grow in held accountable for the results - the entities
the near future. providing the funds and the country receiving
them. It should be ensured that the funds are
While most green bonds in India have been being used for the purpose they were taken for
aimed towards the mitigation of climate and that these projects are seeing growth and
change, bonds aimed towards the adaptation to not stagnating.
climate change are also starting to be issued
now, and their number is sure to rise. The clean economy pillar will help channel
efforts to meet the climate and energy targets
While that is underway, countries will also set by the various member countries.
need to work alongside on adapting to the Increasing climate finance and making it more
changing climate. efficient and regulated will play an essential
role in directing the countries towards
Regardless of whether it is financial fulfilling this pillar of the Indo-Pacific
institutions or private entities that are framework.
providing climate finance, there should be

38
 GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN
AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
Global supply chain is the cross-border arrangement of
activities essential to produce goods or services and
transport them to their users via inputs and various
stages of development, production, and delivery. Global
supply chain management refers to ensuring the secure
and timely delivery of everything from raw materials to
finished consumer goods as they travel from
manufacturers to their end consumers. Over the last
three decades, the progressive liberalisation of cross-
border transactions, advances in production technology
and information services, and improvements in
transportation logistics and services have provided firms
with greater incentives to fragment and geographically
delocalised production processes. Global supply or
production chains (GSCs), in which cost-reduction efforts
result in commodities being produced with intermediate
inputs from multiple countries, are now common in many
industries and are spreading to an increasing number of
developing countries.

Economically, the formation of GSCs is linked to

comparative advantage. By shifting production processes
(i.e. R&D, concept, design, manufacture, packaging,
marketing, distribution, and retailing) in different
countries, transnational corporations (TNCs) can
maintain their competitiveness by increasing productivity
and decreasing costs.

Joining GSCs offer significant and potential opportunities

for developing countries and their business enterprises.
Indeed, integration into GSCs has been a crucial
component of their export-led development policies.
GSCs enable producers in the supply chain to gain
modern managerial know-how and hands-on experience
with quality standards and technology, allowing them to
become more competitive. Such producers also quickly
learn about demand patterns and consumer preferences
in high-income markets.

39
 Downturns in specific industries that are
important to local economic activity; and
Participation in GSCs could also offer economy- External factors include natural or man-
made disasters, military base closures or
wide externalities for developing nations,
the loss of a significant employer, climate
including job creation, technological and skill change, and so on.
advancement, capacity expansion, and export
A Resilient Economy is one which provides its
diversification into higher-value-added
citizens with sustainably-managed resources
products. and reliable infrastructure even at the time of
crisis. The state's resilience is judged by its
ability to combat natural and man-made
threats. Establishing economic resilience in a
local or regional economy requires the ability
In turn, those externalities would increase to anticipate risk, evaluate how that risk can
their attractiveness for more foreign direct impact key economic asset activities, and build
investment. These potential benefits explain a responsive capacity. The economic resilience
why many developing countries' policymakers of a country can be strengthened by
are eager to find ways to integrate their private implementing policies for mitigating both the
sectors into GSCs. risks and consequences of severe crises.

What is a Resilient Economy?

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the
State's economic prosperity is linked to its
ability to prevent, withstand, and quickly
recover from major disruptions (i.e., ‘shocks’)
to its economic base. In the context of
Economic Resiliency, the U.S. Economic
Development Administration’s (EDA)
Comprehensive Economic Development
Strategy (CEDS) Content Guidelines stated that
resiliency has three primary attributes:

The ability to quickly recover from a shock;

The ability to withstand a shock; and
The ability to avoid the shock altogether.

Shocks may include:

National or global economic downturns

that affect demand for local goods and
spending;

40
Supply Chain Resiliency A group of leading academics defined supply
chain resilience as:
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the
vulnerability of global supply chains and the
consequences for public health and national
security. Policy responses have centred on
restricting exports while supporting domestic "the ability of a supply chain to both resist
production. On the other hand, building supply
chain resilience will demand a more rigorous disruptions and recover operational capability
risk assessment and a strategic set of policy after disruptions occur."
initiatives.

A cyberattack shut down the operations of a

major gas pipeline along the United States East
Coast in May 2021. A month before, a Resistance is the ability of the supply chain to
combination of weather and fluid dynamic minimise the impact of disruption - such as a
forces stranded a massive super cargo ship
natural disaster - by either avoiding it entirely
sideways in the Suez Canal, clogging a critical
or minimising the time between the beginning
global trade route. A rare deep freeze and
and end of the effect of disruption on the
power outage in Texas in February damaged
some petrochemical plants, resulting in supply chain Resistance indicates how well a
shortages of essential plastics and resins for country's supply chain is prepared to predict
several industries. Meanwhile, due to a lack of and mitigate the impact of any disruption.
semiconductors, companies worldwide have Recovery is the economy’s ability to return to
had to cut production. full operations once a disruption has occurred.
The stabilisation phase of supply chain
These incidents represent not just a string of resilience is characterised by the ability to
bad luck but rather the latest reminders of the return to a steady state of performance. Firms
vulnerability of global supply chains, an issue
will frequently take time after recovery to
that the COVID-19 pandemic has catapulted to
learn from their experience to aid in future
the top of every state's policy agendas.
planning and supply chain risk management
strategy. Global supply chains are complex
beasts. They are multi-tiered, multi-
dimensional ecosystems made up of
inextricably linked parts that facilitate lean,
just-in-time manufacturing and delivery
models. This complexity creates supply chain
vulnerabilities as threats, such as natural
disasters, accidents, trade wars, and
cyberattacks, are becoming more common and
severe. Any supply chain resilience model will
necessarily combine both resistance and
recovery aspects.

41
What does IPEF entail for Supply Chain Australia, Canada, the Democratic Republic of
Resiliency? the Congo, Germany, Indonesia, India, Italy,
Due to increased US-China strategic Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, the Republic of
competition, the outbreak of the novel Korea, Singapore, Spain, and the United
coronavirus, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Kingdom joined together to discuss short-term
the world experienced shortages and price supply chain disruptions and paths to long-
spikes in critical goods such as term resilience.
semiconductors, medical supplies, energy, and
food, undermining the credibility of the
existing global supply chains, which were built
with economic efficiency as a priority. They recognised that secure, sustainable, and
Furthermore, increased attempts to exert
resilient global supply chains are foundational
diplomatic pressure on other countries
through economic coercion have compelled to economic prosperity, national security, and
governments to recognise the dangers of over- collective interests.
reliance on a single country, particularly an
unfriendly country, for critical goods.

Amidst this backdrop, ministers from 14 Countries expressed intention to work

countries in the Indo-Pacific region assembled together to strengthen the resilience of their
on September 9, 2022, in Los Angeles to declare supply chains—the global ecosystem of raw
the launch of negotiations for the Indo-Pacific materials, intermediate goods, manufacturing,
Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). logistics, research and development that
The IPEF consists of four pillars. The supply ensures the businesses and consumers get the
chain pillar, which aims to build resilient products they need. Secure, sustainable, and
supply chains among Indo-Pacific regions, is of resilient supply chains require that nations
particular interest to the members, and all 14 work in partnership, not only as governments
countries have pledged to participate in but with industry, unions and workers, and
negotiations on this pillar. In this direction, as civil society. Fundamentally, more resilient
part of the Summit on Global Supply Chain global supply chains are critical to the
Resilience on October 31, 2021, US president Joe sustainable economic development of all
Biden with 16 other world leaders, discussed economies.
action to make supply chains more resilient in
the face of any future health crises as well as Major initiatives in IPEF for supply chain
climate change and even planned attacks. resilience include establishing criteria for
Supply chain issues have emerged as the global critical sectors and goods, Increasing
economy emanates from a pandemic-induced resiliency and investment in critical sectors,
recession, threatening to slow recovery. They establishing a crisis response and information-
have already contributed substantially to sharing mechanism, strengthening supply
inflation. chain logistics, enhancing the role of workers,
and improvement in supply chain
The United States, the European Union, transparency.

42
The IPEF's most notable feature is establishing Sustainability: Under IPEF, governments,
an intergovernmental crisis response industry, and society will work together to
mechanism. This tries to lessen the impact of promote and accelerate global sustainability
external shocks that could disrupt supply goals, including the implementation of the
chains by facilitating timely information Paris Agreement on Climate Change and
sharing among members and the smooth international labour and worker conventions
movement of critical goods among them. In the where applicable.
long run, the IPEF aims to boost industrial
competitiveness in critical sectors, promote
and support investments in infrastructure and
logistics, and increase technical cooperation
and capacity building to diversify suppliers to
overcome the region's supply chain
vulnerabilities.

Countries joining IPEF also discussed

strengthening four key pillars of global supply
chain resilience:

Transparency: Improving transparency and

information exchange among nations will
assist all countries in mitigating and
responding to global supply chain shocks.
U.S. and its allies' strategy for Resilient
Diversity, Openness, and Predictability: Economy and reducing dependence on China
Countries intend to work together to ensure President Biden, like many other world
having multiple reliable sources of raw leaders, has prioritised supply-chain resilience
materials, intermediate goods, and finished on the US foreign policy agenda. Pandemic-
goods underpinned by resilient supply related disruptions, vulnerability to China-
channels. sourced inputs, China's use of economic
coercion against its allies and partners, and,
Security: Countries discussed how security most recently, Russia's invasion of Ukraine
needs to be recognised as a high priority for all have all pushed supply-chain risk forward in
supply chain players, in particular to the United States. As a result, in June 2021, the
technology supply chains, at critical administration released the findings of a 100-
infrastructure nodes. Addressing security day review of America's supply chains, which
problems can help prevent damage or called for the US to improve its efforts to work
disruptions to critical systems or with allies and partners to secure supply
infrastructure and prevent disturbances that chains, including by expanding multilateral
contribute to unnecessary costs, inefficient engagement. The IPEF's pillar, "resilient the
delivery schedules etc. economy", addresses this priority.

43
Unlike trade agreements, IPEF does not look to networks. IPEF still has relevance for India
provide greater market access. IPEF is because it will help boost India’s
expected to tackle the issue of supply chain manufacturing competitiveness and increase
disruption as witnessed during Covid due to its share in world trade. But in this pursuit,
over-dependence on one country - China. there is a need to create an infrastructure that
raises the competitiveness of India’s exports.
IPEF has put forward pillars and initiatives to
achieve the collective goal of resilient supply
chains that can anticipate, withstand, or
quickly recover from shocks and strengthen
While India appears an attractive option for
the competitiveness of the Indo-Pacific
region's economies. In all cases, IPEF intends potential investors both as a market and a
to work to reduce market distortions, manufacturing base, it needs to accelerate
safeguard confidential business information,
promote regulatory compliance, uphold
progress in ease of business and skill building
market principles, and act in accordance with
the relevant WTO obligations.

As per the statement of the US President, The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for
combating inflation is a top economic priority Prosperity facilitates economic cooperation at
of Indo Pacific Framework, and this framework the regional level according to internationally
will help in lowering costs by making the accepted standards. Including more than 60%
supply chains more resilient in the long run. of the world’s population and 40% of the
President Biden further stated that the world’s GDP, IPEF will encourage regional
framework would establish an early warning cooperation, development, and prosperity.
system, improve traceability in key sectors, This framework advocates for synergy and
map critical mineral supply chains and peace in the region. Strengthening economic
coordinate diversification efforts. partnerships among the participating
countries is “projected to be the largest
In Indian Context contributor to global growth” in the coming
Following the border tensions with China, few decades, according to the White House
partners such as Japan have sensed that India Fact Sheet on IPEF.
is ready to engage in discourse about
alternative supply chains. However, China It sets a rules-based order in which factors like
remains a large source of critical imports for economic growth, competitiveness, resilience,
India, from mobile phone components to fairness, sustainability, and inclusivity will be
pharmaceutical ingredients. An internal push developed and improved. Moreover, it will
to suddenly cut ties with China would be improve the economic advantage of the Quad.
impractical. Over time, if India increases its
self-reliance or works collaboratively with The framework will allow increased
exporting nations other than China, it could be interaction among member nations and open
able to strengthen the economy's supply up various avenues of trade. It could also

44
underpin the economic integration of By participating in this framework, India is
countries sharing similar goals. Long-term strongly committed to cooperation with the
supply chain resilience will significantly other member countries and Indo-Pacific
reduce costs for the various member countries goals. IPEF provides an opportunity for India
and create supply assurance. to expand its trading activities in the Indo-
Pacific region, which was previously limited by
The COVID-19 pandemic, instability due to the India’s non-membership to RCEP and CPTPP.
Russia-Ukraine crisis, and climate change have
caused insecurity in various nations' IPEF provides India with negotiating power
production and supply chains. Participating when it comes to collaborating with other
countries can work together to develop an nations. It creates healthy competitiveness in
inelastic supply chain that is resilient to the country. IPEF will strengthen India’s
shocks. IPEF strives to develop a stronger, security, ensure its economic and
adaptive era and to create a level playing field technological growth, and provide a platform
for all participating countries engaging in for partnership with other nations. As part of
exchange, built upon collaboration and IPEF, India can delve deeper into the digital
cooperation. economy and explore the massive economic
potential that could come with it.
Southeast Asian countries can benefit from the IPEF also includes being prepared for crises,
advanced technological processes available to economic or otherwise, such as the Covid-19
the US. Many ASEAN countries that are part of pandemic that took the world by storm. This
the IPEF have a lower per capita income than preparation will bolster the economy and help
other countries in this non-traditional trade develop crisis management skills in India. The
agreement framework. The IPEF opens up country will be better equipped to deal with
opportunities for economic growth and such crises in the future.
development in these countries.

45
 FUTURE OF IPEF AND THE WAY FORWARD

The SCRI aims to create a virtuous cycle of enhancing supply

chain resilience with a view to eventually attaining strong,
sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth in the region.

Supply chains are critical components of the The Supply Chain Resilience Initiative
global trading system. The COVID-19 The Covid-19 pandemic had an unprecedented
pandemic and the resulting global economic impact on lives lost, livelihoods and economies
disruption have highlighted major affected, and the pandemic revealed supply
vulnerabilities in our existing supply chains chain vulnerabilities globally and reliance on
and the importance of promoting supply chain china. In a move to counter China’s supply
resilience. Incorporating strong trade chain dominance in the Indo-Pacific region,
facilitation provisions into the IPEF will aid in trade ministers of India, Japan and Australia
the movement of goods across borders and formally launched on 26 April 2021 the Supply
promote resilience among IPEF countries. Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI).

Smooth cross-border movement of goods and The SCRI aims to create a virtuous cycle of
services required to build resilient supply enhancing supply chain resilience with a view
chains among IPEF countries requires to eventually attaining strong, sustainable,
increased transparency and widely accepted balanced and inclusive growth in the region.
good regulatory practices. Finally, a Initially, SCRI will focus on sharing best
foundational aspect of resilient supply chains practices on supply chain resilience and
is global market competition, which allows for holding investment promotion events and
access to a broader range of goods and services buyer-seller matching events to provide
at competitive prices. This is why the IPEF will opportunities for stakeholders to explore the
include competition policy commitments. possibility of diversification of their supply
chains.

46
 DEALING WITH FRANCE FOR
TRADE AND THE RELEVANCE
OF IPEF

France and India share a special relationship in matters of

trade. Acknowledging the national interests of a nation in
terms of trade is a precursor to fair trade and equitable
trading practices. Historically, France is one of the few
countries which has attested its support towards India: it was
one of the first nations which enter in a “strategic
partnership” in 1998. Since then, the two nations have shared
a deep interest in security, defence, strategy and synergy.

Since the IPEF is a strategic tool and not a “Free Trade

Agreement” (FTA), it becomes important to preserve the
strategic autonomy of member nations. France and India
have a shared vision of international relations which can help
India’s interest in being a leader in the Asia-Pacific. France
has shown “demonstrated interest” in the Indian Ocean by
being the “first country” to be a member of the India Ocean
Rim Association (IORA), whose mainland is not on the Indian
Ocean.

This amplifies the interest France shares with India.

Additionally, France has increased its funding capacity for
promoting activities in the Indian Ocean. “SAGAR”, or
Security and Growth for All in the Region, is an example of
one initiative which aims to put a “check” on China’s
influence and maintain the territorial sovereignty of India
while promoting the blue economy. Moreover, it indicates
that India is growing vocal and is operationalising itself to
undertake leadership roles and responsibilities to increase its
capacity.

The significance of such a deep relationship and its relevance

is simple: other European countries can follow the path of
France and help strengthen India in the Indian Ocean. By
taking the EU presidency in the first half of 2022, France can
pivot itself to bring more partners, whereby economic trade
and partnership can be discussed. Such multilateral trade
possibilities bring long-term investment and sustained
growth to all stakeholders. Even talks about “Free Trade
Agreements'' could be discussed. The vested interest of the
EU can be shown by one example: the maritime security area,
with the EU's ambition to raise its security profile in the
North-West of the Indian Ocean.

47
 DEALING WITH CHINA
Not all Chinese experts believe that the IPEF There almost seems to be an inverse
will only have a minimal adverse impact on relationship between high levels of corruption
China’s leading position. In fact, some are not and BRI investments. An informal and cost-
very optimistic and are concerned about the effective procedure, the effects of BRI are a lot.
effect of the IPEF on China’s future in this The impact of such investments can be
region. They believe that regional trade will fall evaluated through multiple matrices. The aim
for China and that there will be a shift in the for this is simple: with added systemic risks in
chain of production. China is also worried that BRI, added incentive to look for alternatives
the exclusive institutional balancing brought increases. IPEF, in that sense, will be seen as a
forth by the IPEF can reduce the country's promising alternative. An important topic to
dominance. The export controls, import discuss is analysing the effects of corruption to
screening, and shifting of supply chains will be acknowledge the measures taken by the BRI. It
unfavourable for China. is known that corruption is morally and
politically wrong, and China engages in it. It
The Chinese experts recommend that China to can also be inferred that the counterfactual is a
strengthen its regional partnerships, such as world where tackling corruption as a priority
RCEP. It should speed up negotiations with is not well known. The IPEF stands strong in
other countries. It should also take advantage terms of its principles of being "free and open",
of its geographical location. Its proximity to the but an analytical approach to improve its
Indo-Pacific nations can help China strengthen functioning remains.
trade with them and have greater cooperation.
Some systemic drawbacks of the BRI can be
However, it must be kept in mind that the main moulded into BRI. Accountability and
pillars of the framework are a connected transparency is a critical flaw of the BRI which
economy, resilient economy, clean economy, led to inefficiency in Malaysia. Second,
and fair economy. While countering China may indicators for measuring a country's growth
be an unspoken and implied goal of the IPEF, are important. Infrastructure, despite having
the primary objectives declared by the red-tapism and flaws, does seem to provide
countries should not be forgotten. governance. According to George Washington
University, Chinese influence and aid helped
Kazakhstan build regional stability. Therefore,
if the means are flawed, the ends can be
Relaxed measures, wherein based on openness
justified as it brings overall progress and
and priority of a nation, direct assistance along development. Then, it becomes difficult to
with extended coordination is given, appear to allege BRI as a Ponzi scheme simply, and the
IPEF should be strengthened to provide
be a strong area for cooperation.
relative benefits to a greater extent.

48
CONCLUSION
How the World is Reacting
After several years on the sidelines, regional partners unanimously welcomed the IPEF
announcement as a sign of renewed US economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.
Representatives from all countries have expressed their support for the framework's overall
content and their government's interest in most or all of the initial topics outlined. Many
countries, particularly members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), saw the IPEF as the second-best option to the US joining the CPT or
another comprehensive, high-standard regional trade agreement. While many countries
supported the IPEF as a stand-alone initiative, others hoped it would be the first step toward the
US rejoining such an agreement.

This report aimed to lay out specific objectives and policy actions in each of the six areas
identified in the White House statement, as well as to offer perspectives on the negotiating
process and target participants in the IPEF. This has been proved by showing arguments ranging
from climate change to data regulation. In each argument, real-world analysis, impact,
stakeholders' reaction and significance, among other things, are provided.

49
India
The main stakeholder identified in India, and we have provided extensive research on how India is
affected. As previously stated in this report, India did not join IPEF's trade pillar. Still, IPEF
provides an important platform for India after it declined to join mega trade agreements such as
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The US-led Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework (IPEF) is seen as a way to counter China in the region, providing an opportunity for
India to replace Asian supply chains and play a key role in the clean energy initiative, benefiting
both India and other Indo-Pacific nations.

Global Impact
Since the fourteen countries forming this economic framework constitute a majority of the
world’s population and more than 40% of the world’s GDP, economic growth for these nations will
contribute greatly to overall growth in the world economy. Igniting healthy competition, building
stronger supply chains, improving security, and promoting sustainability and inclusivity are some
of the significant impacts that can come out of this non-traditional agreement.

However, the IPEF could also contribute to the region's fragmentation with its new rules and
propositions. The framework may play a role in tilting the scales of power in the Indo-Pacific in
favour of the US and away from China. The effect of IPEF on the Indo-Pacific region and the rest
of the nations depends on how the occupied countries act out this agreement and with what
intentions. The framework has the potential to lead to great prosperity and development.

50
Future Aspect
IPEF has a promising future, but it will need to strike a balance between US commitment and
inclusivity, i.e. persuade a diverse range of regional partners that the initiative will provide
tangible benefits to them. To achieve that balance, the Biden administration will be required to
listen to the perspectives of Indo-Pacific allies and partners and to offer tangible benefits to
regional partners, especially less-developed ones.

General Concluding Remark

Thus, IPEF, in our opinion, has future-oriented prospects. Still, it will need to be well-engineered
and managed to advance US economic and strategic interests, become a credible alternative to
other regional initiatives, and be perceived as a long-term US commitment to the region by allies
and partners.

51
Recommendations
RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation 1: Dealing with China

China has been and will continue to be a partner that will lock horns with
India due to conflicting interests. The growing aspirations of both nations
will bring short-term fluctuations for cooperation in multiple arenas. An
emphasis should be built on thoroughly understanding China’s operating
system to deal successfully with China. In the status quo, India and China are
suspicious of how the other partner will operate. Without a common ground
to collaborate, accusations and assertions will continue. Currently, the
benefit of China is proactivity: China recognised the importance of the
Indian Ocean much before India did. Such an advancement provided China
with strategic advantages, especially with its neighbours.

The recommendation strongly echoes for development of multi-lateral and

alternative economic channels to mitigate the Chinese influence. The metric
used for this recommendation rests on “time-sensitivity and numeracy”. The
level of impact which India can bring by re-looking at its neighbours is huge.
This is already being manifested in the “Neighbourhood First'' Policy,
wherein a strong commitment of $1.79 billion led to a paradigm shift for
India.

Finally, the real merit of the BRI lies in the infrastructure support to
neighbouring nations. India understood the importance of infrastructure
after the pandemic and has paved the way for greater business and economic
linkages through its infrastructure. By focusing on infrastructure, India can
offset China.

53
RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation 2: Data Localisation Framework

Open-data transfer and cross-border data sharing in isolation are idealistic

ways of interoperability with partner nations. However, in realistic terms,
political risks, social contexts and business exploitations play a role in how
the government and citizens perceive data. The data protection bill in India
should be re-introduced. This will help India towards data localisation. India
is currently on this path and has supported the WTO norms on data
protection. Also, since India's foreign policy, after boycotting Osaka Track,
has not favoured free data transfer, it has to develop robust alternative
mechanisms.

The role of data localisation in India is huge. Data localisation does not
reciprocate to data access. Global data processing should be allowed, but
some restrictions tailor-made to national requirements should be in place.
In some sectors, the presence of data localisation can already be felt. The
financial and telecom sector have mandated storing data in India, with many
restrictions on the transfer of data overseas (telecom). The benefits of this
recommendation can be weighed on the metric of impact and likelihood.

With respect to regulation agencies, data localisation will be of immense

benefit. Currently, such agencies have constraints in getting timely access to
data. Due to this, both legal and economic consequences can arise. It is
widely said that “justice delayed is justice denied”, and without data
localisation, only delays could be expected.

Moreover, data localisation is also likely to occur due to the perceived

economic benefits. Data localisation would lead to a competitive edge for
Indian firms and make it likely for the government to implement it. Also, the
campaign “Vocal for Local'' will gain traction due to increased demand for
local goods and services due to this move.

54
RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation 3: Going Green

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s definition

of climate finance includes any funds that are provided to “support”
activities that address climate change by mitigating and adapting to it. These
funds come from public, private, and alternative sources and can be local,
national, or transnational. However, some projects for certain non-climate
purposes are also reported under climate projects. Funds acquired as
climate finance are often used in such projects, whose main goal is not
fighting climate change, simply because a minor aspect of the project
promotes sustainability. This leads to overreporting of climate finance. For
example, over 2019-20, India received a biennial average of 309 thousand
crore rupees. This was a 150% increase from the biennial average of the
previous two years. However, it cannot be said with certainty as to how
much of this financing went to projects with climate change as their primary
aim.

Therefore, it is essential to define the term ‘climate finance clearly’. This

should be done in the general global context as well as its interpretation
under the IPEF. It should be stated that all activities can be funded using
climate finance, and these should be restricted from those having other
primary goals.

Developmental, infrastructural, or other programs whose main objective is

not climate change mitigation should be declared to be part of only that
respective category of project. When recording projects, there should not be
double entry by the countries who wish to put their developmental initiatives
in the environment category to appear more environmentally responsible.
The initiative should be looked at as a whole and not just as that fraction
that is environmentally friendly. Green projects must be separated from
those whose primary goal is not climate-oriented. This will help paint a
more realistic picture of the current status of climate finance in India as well
as other countries and will assist in paving the road ahead.

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Recommendation 4: China: Trade Wise

Currently, China maintains its dominant position in the Indo-Pacific region.

However, the US is trying to replace China as the predominant power, and
the IPEF is one tool that could help them achieve this. It is improbable that
any other country will be able to rise enough to take over the powerful
presence of China and the US. These global superpowers are too influential
and are unlikely to be countered shortly. Thus the power struggle remains
between Beijing and Washington.

The IPEF does not require the member nations to adhere to all provisions of
the framework and allows them to choose only those propositions in their
interest. Countries should use this flexibility to their advantage. Further,
several of the countries of the Indo-Pacific would like to be on good
economic terms with both the US and China. Countries that wish to benefit
from trade with both of these nations and do not wish to support any one of
them may remain neutral in this respect.

China’s existing trade policies can be termed hegemonic and mercantilist

and have been subject to criticism. However, the US will not be able to win
over countries and gain credibility in the region unless it provides tangible
benefits to the Indo-Pacific nations. Only when it reduces tariffs and non-
tariff barriers and provides greater market access will the US be able to
increase its influence in the Indo-Pacific.

However, the effective tariff rate of the member countries on imports from
the US is already 47% higher than the tariff set by the US on their exports.
Countries of the Indo-Pacific want greater access to US markets but will
have to do the same for the States by providing access to their markets.

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Recommendation 5: Climate Finance

Climate finance typically involves the more vulnerable countries being

financed by less vulnerable ones due to their economic advantage. Instead of
relying on other more developed countries to be “saved” or bailed out when
faced with climate-related issues, the less developed countries should take it
upon themselves to work towards dealing with climate change and its
adverse effects. Green finance acquired from entities within the country can
be used more and more for climate projects. Governments should allocate a
part of the budget, especially for climate purposes, and ensure that it is used
for just that.

This will help countries stay free from international obligations and become
more independent and self-reliant. India, in particular, should also mobilise
domestic climate finance and thus gain higher autonomy toward achieving
its climate goals.

In 2019-20, the private sector accounted for almost 57% of all climate finance
in the country. It should be encouraged to finance an even greater number of
climate initiatives by providing incentives. It is essential to increase the pace
by which climate finance is mobilised. Overall, the amount of climate finance
in India must be increased by at least 3.5 times, and by 590% globally, by 2030
if the climate goals are to be met. India should increase green finance
investments in the sectors of sustainable food and resilient cities as well, to
approximately 27.7% and 18.8%, respectively, apart from renewable energy
and electric vehicles.

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Recommendation 6: Improving the IPEF response mechanism

The IPEF's most notable feature is the establishment of an

intergovernmental crisis response mechanism. This tries to lessen the
impact of external shocks that could disrupt supply chains by facilitating
timely information sharing among members and the smooth movement of
critical goods among them. However, this response mechanism proposed in
IPEF is not a panacea. In some cases, the negative effects of supply chain
disruptions cannot be mitigated. The IPEF coordination mechanism may not
function adequately if all IPEF members, including producing and
stockpiling members, face a shortage of critical goods, such as a lack of
personal protective equipment (PPE) during a pandemic. This is because it
would be difficult to create political incentives for members to produce or
stockpile critical goods in order to provide them to other members in an
emergency when they themselves are experiencing shortages. Consider
another scenario in which a non-member country offers to pay more for the
goods than any other country. As a result, it would be politically impossible
for every IPEF member to adopt such a system, as it would significantly limit
economic freedom. Furthermore, in order to maintain the principle of
prioritising exports to IPEF members in the event of global shortages, non-
member exports would have to be restricted in some way. However, because
the IPEF will not be a regional trade agreement under GATT Article 24, any
attempt to create rules that discriminately restrict exports to non-members
may face WTO challenges in terms of consistency.

The significance of reducing economic dependence on specific countries and

strengthening supply chains for critical goods has undoubtedly grown. The
IPEF's crisis response mechanism could play a significant role in achieving
these objectives. However, as discussed in the preceding section, we should
not expect the process to be a "cure-all" solution that works in every
situation. If properly designed, the IPEF's proposed response mechanism in
the ministerial statement can significantly strengthen the region's supply
chain resilience.

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RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation 7: Focus on Trade Liberalisation

There were no commitments made regarding trade liberalisation in the supply

chain or trade pillars. There has been no discussion to grant greater market
access to member countries. Tariff reductions that increase intra-regional
trade may help members reduce their economic dependence on China and
diversify their suppliers. However, as stated, the ministerial statement did not
include a commitment to begin trade negotiations, owing to political
considerations in the United States. Still, it is important to note that there is
more than one way to increase market access for trading partners.

Policies that make an economy open to trade and investment with the rest of
the world are needed for sustained economic growth. Even if the framework
doesn't include tariff reduction, it is recommended that some IPEF rules
should create new access to foreign markets for Indo-Pacific exporters
through more emphasis on eliminating technical or unscientific barriers to
trade. The supply chain pillar could also emphasise more on the importance of
encouraging and facilitating regional investment. If this results in increased
investment in emerging members such as some ASEAN countries and India,
the long-run economic benefits of tariff reductions may outweigh those of
tariff reductions.

Apart from this, IPEF should include provisions on Service trade liberalisation.
In the past two decades, trade in services has grown faster than the
merchandise trade. For instance, there is a strong argument to be made for
the liberalisation of services in ASEAN countries. ASEAN members generated
37% to 74% of GDP from services in 2016, far exceeding what was produced by
agriculture and industry. ASEAN services exports increased by 12.5% per year
from $113.6 billion in 2005 to $291.9 billion in 2013. During the same time
period, service imports increased 9.9% year on year, from $140.7 billion to
$298.6 billion. Liberalisation of service trade creates a multifaceted
opportunity for growth in terms of trade and employment. It has the potential
to boost output by $29.6 billion, exports by $14 billion, and imports by $368
billion. The gains are not limited to trade-related estimates but also include
potential welfare gains.

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RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation 8: Improving Trade Facilitation and ease of trade for
SMEs

According to a recent survey of emerging Indo-Pacific economies, trade

facilitation is one of the most important matters of interest in the IPEF
framework. To effectively incentivise developing economies' participation in
IPEF, the US should prioritise the framework's trade facilitation chapters
under the fair and resilient trade pillar. If the United States can facilitate a
successful agreement regarding the framework's trade facilitation
provisions, it will contribute to the development of a broader economic
partnership in the region. Gains from effective trade facilitation
arrangements, such as the World Trade Organization's (WTO) 2017 Trade
Facilitation Agreement (TFA), are equivalent to significant tariff line
reductions. The implementation of the WTO's TFA, for example, is expected
to reduce members’ trade costs by an average of 14.3%.

When constructing a resilient and transparent supply chain, care should be

taken to avoid imposing unnecessary regulatory costs on micro-, small-, and
medium-sized businesses (MSMEs). If the costs for building resilient supply
chains rise excessively for the private sector, MSMEs will be forced to leave
the supply chains, and the region's supply chains will lose their dynamism.
Improving and simplifying border import and export procedures is critical
for promoting job creation and growth, particularly for small and medium-
sized businesses (SMEs). SMEs account for 60-70 per cent of employment in
the Indo-Pacific region but only 35 per cent or less of direct exports,
indicating that there is plenty of room for growth. Economists estimate that
the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which entered into force among
World Trade Organization (WTO) members in 2017, could result in cost
reductions of more than 14 per cent and annual growth of up to $1 trillion in
international trade. Appropriate commitments to support SMEs could
include: encouraging greater SME participation in Indo-Pacific markets
through capacity building and technical assistance to fulfil TFA
commitments, as well as increasing access to broadband connectivity,
encouraging the exchange of information and best practices on SME
digitisation and access to capital, trade finance, trade missions, and training
programmes.

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RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation 9: Structural Reforms

Some nations are better equipped and have a stronger footing when dealing
with the changing climate than others. Such countries have more resources
and funds to allocate for this purpose, as well as greater technological
advancement. They can reduce the increasing damage caused by global
warming, as well as adapt to the changing environment. These are mainly
the rich and developed nations, such as the US and Singapore.

The countries in the Indo-Pacific that are more vulnerable to the detrimental
effects of climate change should take advantage of the IPEF as they will now
be able to acquire green finance more easily. There should be provisions
under the framework for these countries to receive climate finance.

Moreover, those financing them should keep checks on how the funds are
being used. Countries need to take greater accountability for the initiatives
undertaken using this type of finance. Increasing transparency in the
process of acquiring funds as well as in the development of the project is
necessary to ensure that the countries meet their set targets and there are
no hindrances.

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RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation 10: Better allocation of resources and funds (in terms of
lending technical know-how)

We have witnessed the burden that developing countries face when entering
international partnerships. These may vary from relatively low development
in technology to the policies still being in the maturing phase. This makes it
difficult for developing countries to derive the same benefits from these
partnerships as developed countries. Furthermore, it creates an uneven
advantage for the developed countries to reap the most benefits by ignoring
the needs of the developing countries and terming it as a “mutual benefit”
for everyone in the ministerial statements.

One of the best examples is India's recent transition to low carbon emissions
in a way that aligns with the motto of green energy. This was done mainly to
match the west's standards and fulfil the net zero's obligations. But to meet
these sky-high standards, the government forgot the challenges that the
domestic MSMEs would face due to this step. What was supposed to be a
gradual process turned into a nightmare for the Indian MSMEs. The
challenges included the demand for green finance in MSMEs, which is
relatively niche and aggravated by a critical lack of awareness of existing
financial mechanisms leading to hesitation among the stakeholders about
transitioning. Then there was limited hand-holding in terms of active
technical assistance to adopt new technologies.

Additionally, finance for R&D, demonstration, and standards must

adequately supplement the available financial provisions. There is an acute
data scarcity, particularly concerning emissions data with no mandate or cap
in place for emissions in MSMEs. The unorganised nature, scepticism about
green alternatives, and low awareness and capacity in MSMEs made it
challenging to implement regulatory and reporting frameworks and
compliance-based targets. This led to the shutting down of operations of
many MSMEs. All of this could have been averted if the west had extended its
funding support or technical know-how to ensure a smooth transition.

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RECOMMENDATION
This indicates the need to devise strategies to facilitate the smooth
participation of developing countries like India in these partnerships and
commitments. One of the best ways to make this happen would be to extend
the necessary funding support to these countries whilst also providing the
technical know-how to ensure the effective utilisation of funds. Though this
practice was adopted in the past, the implementation could have been much
better. For example, Developed countries agreed to provide funds to
developing countries in 1992–1993 as part of the UNFCCC to help them cover
the expenses of upholding their environmental obligations. They committed
to sending $100 billion yearly to developing countries by 2020 as part of the
COP15 climate change conference in Copenhagen in 2009. However,
developed nations haven't succeeded in achieving this objective to date.
Developed countries sent $79.6 billion to developing countries in 2019, up
from $78.3 billion in 2018, but this is still less than the planned amount. The
United States has fallen woefully short in terms of financing.

Talking specifically about IPEF, we saw India opting out of the trade pillar
because it saw an uneven playing field, which would not have been in the
best interests of a country like India. Reasons included various trade-centric
policies being still in the developing phase, and then there is also the
uniform standardisation approach. All of this would have added to the
burden of India to change had it not opted out of this pillar because there
was no help being extended by the fellow partner countries.

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RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation 11: Inclusivity and Standardisation

Countries like India have been losing out due to the standardisation of
measures implemented in these international partnerships. Standardisation
here refers to the standard measures that are to be compulsorily complied
with as part of these partnerships, with no consideration given to the
country’s development/

This standardisation strategy, though effective in some aspects, created an

undue advantage for developed countries due to their cutting-edge
technology and matured policies and procedures. It is because developed
countries can better leverage their existing level of technology.
Consequences include a burden on the domestic industries to compete and
adapt to western regulations. Along with this comes the uneven ground of
the judiciary, where the west has more progressive policies and procedures
concerning trade, environment etc.

Thus, there is an immediate need to provide relaxation to the countries with

these standardisations according to their development status. In IPEF, we
also saw India getting out of the trade pillar for this reason. Providing
relaxation will help create an even playing ground for everyone, helping
them “mutually benefit” from these partnerships.

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RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation 12: Aligning Decarbonisation Objectives

To prevent climate change, the U.S. government actively supports numerous

worldwide efforts. ASEAN partners made several commitments to combat
climate change at the ASEAN U.S. Special Summit in May 2022. It was decided
to continue advancing each nation's nationally determined contribution
(NDC) as outlined in the Paris Agreement, safeguard regional biodiversity,
and stop vital ecosystem degradation. It was also agreed to encourage
investment in low-carbon and climate-resilient infrastructure. The
participants also acknowledged the need to accelerate the development of
clean and renewable energy. They pointed to public-private collaboration
through blended finance as a tool to increase the amount of capital available,
particularly concerning the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation.
The Blue Dot Network, Build Back Better World, and First Movers Coalition
are a few such programmes.

To prevent climate change, the U.S. government actively supports numerous

worldwide efforts. ASEAN partners made several commitments to combat
climate change at the ASEAN U.S. Special Summit in May 2022. It was decided
to continue advancing each nation's nationally determined contribution
(NDC) as outlined in the Paris Agreement, safeguard regional biodiversity,
and stop vital ecosystem degradation. It was also agreed to encourage
investment in low-carbon and climate-resilient infrastructure. The
participants also acknowledged the need to accelerate the development of
clean and renewable energy. They pointed to public-private collaboration
through blended finance as a tool to increase the amount of capital available,
particularly concerning the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation.
The Blue Dot Network, Build Back Better World, and First Movers Coalition
are a few such programmes

Now that we understand that expanding existing financing within the IPEF
will be challenging, if not impossible, it becomes crucial to use existing green
finance methods to stretch the available funding. This will help create
multiple synergies benefiting the existing partnerships and the IPEF.

65
Testimonial
 TESTIMONIALS

The Indo-Pacific region is significant in the maritime geopolitics of

the 21st century. Several countries are trying to increase their
influence in the region owing to its geopolitical and geo-economical
importance. Recently, I had the pleasure of reading The Policy
Report titled “Indo Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity
(IPEF)” released by The Economic Society of Shri Ram College of
Commerce. I was really impressed by the quality of the research that
provided an in-depth analysis of an important topic.

The report's structure and presentation were excellent, making it

simple to read and comprehend. It gave a thorough review of the
IPEF, analysing the present opportunities, challenges as well as
possible remedies for India. Being a leader in South Asia and an
important stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific region, India has
benefitted immensely from the region. It becomes crucial to
understand India’s stand on the IPEF and its strategic interests in
the critical area of conflict. I found the policy report to be a valuable
resource for anyone interested in the Indo-Pacific region and I
would highly recommend it to anyone looking to gain a deeper
understanding of it. The report covers a wide range of topics from
China’s interest in the region to environmental concerns such as
climate finance and climate resilience. The authors are to be
commended for their excellent work, and I look forward to reading
more from them in the future.

Ms. Sheetal Arya,

Senior Research Fellow,
School of International Studies

68
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLIMATE FINANCE

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1. Standard, Business. “What Is Quad? - Objectives, Principles, Significance

and Summit.” Business Standard, 2017, www.business-
standard.com/about/what-is-quad#collapse. Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.
2. ‌Shankari Sundararaman. “Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework...” The New Indian Express, The New Indian Express, 31 May
2022, www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2022/jun/01/quad-and-the-
indo-pacific-economic-framework-2460369.html. Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.
3. ‌Luthra, Girish. “Forward from the Tokyo Quad Summit and IPEF.” ORF,
Observational Research Foundation, 27 May 2022,
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4. ‌The Pioneer. “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework under Quad- Potential
Booster for Blue Economy.” The Pioneer, June 2022,
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刘佳宁
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English.scio.gov.cn.”Scio.gov.cn,2022,english.scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2022-
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new,of%20Commerce%20said%20on%20Tuesday. Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.
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analysis/indo-pacific-economic-framework. Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.
7. ‌Raihan Ronodipuro. “The IPEF’s Impact on the Asia-Pacific Economy and
Regional Cooperation.” Modern Diplomacy, 25 June 2022,
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economy-and-regional-cooperation/. Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.
8. ‌“Biden to Begin New Asia-Pacific Economic Bloc with a Dozen Allies.” The
New York Times, 2023, www.nytimes.com/2022/05/23/world/asia/biden-
asian-pacific-bloc.html. Accessed 5 Jan. 2023

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 CITATIONS

CHINA

1. “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) for Prosperity Ministerial

Meet Was Inclusive and Fruitful: Shri Piyush Goyal.” Pib.gov.in, 2022,
pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1858243. Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.
2. ‌Mishra, Vivek. “IPEF: Geo-Politics, Geo-Economics Intersect.” ORF,
Observational Research Foundation, 15 June 2022,
www.orfonline.org/research/ipef-geo-politics-geo-economics-
intersect/. Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.
3. ‌China. “IPEF Is “Economic NATO”, Claims China in Counter to Quad.”
DeccanHerald, 24 May 2022,
www.deccanherald.com/international/world-news-politics/ipef-is-
economic-nato-claims-china-in-counter-to-quad-1112003.html.
Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.
4. ‌Wright, Tom, and Bradley Hope. “WSJ Investigation: China Offered to
Bail out Troubled Malaysian Fund in Return for Deals.” WSJ, The Wall
Street Journal, 7 Jan. 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-flexes-its-
political-muscle-to-expand-power-overseas-11546890449. Accessed 5
Jan. 2023.
5. ‌“Will IPEF Help the US Counter China?” Thediplomat.com, 15 June 2022,
thediplomat.com/2022/06/will-ipef-help-the-us-counter-china/.
Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.
6. ‌“Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Holds Value, but It’s Unclear If It
Will Counter China’s Influence Says Senior Economist David Dapice.”
Harvard.edu, 2018, ash.harvard.edu/indo-pacific-economic-framework-
holds-value-it%E2%80%99s-unclear-if-it-will-counter-
china%E2%80%99s-influence. Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.
7. ‌“China’s Response to Indo-Pacific Economic Framework | Manohar
Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.” Idsa.in, 2016,
www.idsa.in/idsacomments/China-Response-to-Indo-Pacific-M-
Banerjee-150622. Accessed 5 Jan. 2023.

75
 TEAM

RESEARCH AND POLICY DIRECTOR

Pratul Malthumkar

TEAM MEMBERS

Afrah Mundewadi Priyanshu Sanya Tiwari

The Economics Society, SRCC

WEBSITE
www.ecosocsrcc.com

EMAIL ADDRESS
[email protected]

CONTACT DETAILS
Pratul Malthumkar:
+91-63014-97329
Keshav Khemka:
+91-62893-66919