SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No.

2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

THE MOTIVATION OF SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN IN

NORMALIZATION PROCESS: A STAG HUNT ANALYSIS

Muhammad Fachrie 1, Sigid Widyantoro 2, Yohanes Ivan Adi Kristianto 3

123
Public Administration, the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Tidar
[email protected]

Abstract
Saudi Arabia has shifted its relations with Iran. Since the death of Shia preacher Nimr al-Nimr in
2016, these two countries have cut their diplomatic ties and increased tension; however, up until
2023, Riyadh and Tehran had agreed to normalize their diplomatic ties. In regard to that dynamic,
this research will analyze why Riyadh and Tehran decided to normalize their relations. It aims to
understand the dilemmatic condition between these two countries. Using the qualitative method and
Stag Hunt, this research collects data from books, journal articles, mass media articles, and other
relevant sources, analyzes them, and results in the findings. Eventually, this research finds that the
reason why Saudi Arabia and Iran decided to normalize their relations is due to the essential need
for fostering economic development and ensuring socio-economic resilience in the face of external
challenges. For Saudi Arabia, its decision to cooperate with Iran is in its national interest to avoid
the cost of wars and to achieve its 2030 vision. Besides, for Iran, its conflict with Saudi Arabia has
bothered their national interest amid Western countries sanctions.

Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Stag Hunt, Rational Choice, Normalization Process

Abstrak
Arab Saudi telah mengubah hubungannya dengan Iran. Sejak wafatnya ulama Syiah Nimr al-Nimr
pada tahun 2016, kedua negara telah memutuskan hubungan diplomatik dan meningkatkan
ketegangan. Namun, pada tahun 2023, Riyadh dan Teheran telah sepakat untuk menormalisasi
hubungan diplomatik. Terkait dinamika tersebut, penelitian ini akan menganalisis mengapa Saudi
Arabia dan Iran memutuskan untuk menormalisasi hubungan mereka. Penelitian ini bertujuan
untuk memahami kondisi dilema yang dihadapi kedua negara. Dengan menggunakan metode
kualitatif dan Stag Hunt, penelitian ini mengumpulkan data dari buku, artikel jurnal, artikel media
massa, dan sumber relevan lainnya, menganalisisnya, dan menghasilkan temuan. Terakhir,
penelitian ini menemukan bahwa alasan mengapa Arab Saudi dan Iran memutuskan untuk
menormalisasi hubungan mereka adalah karena penting untuk mempromosikan pembangunan
ekonomi dan memastikan ketahanan sosial-ekonomi dalam menghadapi tantangan eksternal. Bagi
Arab Saudi, keputusannya untuk bekerja sama dengan Iran adalah cara untuk mencapai
kepentingan nasionalnya untuk menghindari biaya perang dan untuk mencapai visi 2030-nya.
Selain itu, bagi Iran, konfliknya dengan Arab Saudi telah mengganggu kepentingan nasional
mereka di tengah sanksi dari negara-negara barat.

Kata kunci: Arab Saudi, Iran, Stag Hunt, Pilihan Rasional, Proses Normalisasi

A. Introduction
The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is rooted in ideological, sectarian, and
geostrategic dynamics which go back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Post Iran’s Islamic

178 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

revolution, it pursued export of its Islamic model and confronted Sunni monarchies whom Saudi
Arabia, as an immediate rival, considered posing a threat to its regional hegemony and
legitimacy (Ezbidi, 2023). Iran and Saudi Arabia had and still maintain, a sectarian rift, due to
their long-lasting conflict solidarity between the two (since Iran was a main supporter of Shia
power and opposition, and Saudi Arabia was the leader of Sunni Islam and protector of their
holy places) (Adısönmez et al., 2023; Ardovini, 2022). The power struggle of the two became
the war for regional hegemony, through proxy conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq as well as
Bahrain. Saudi Arabia’s execution of the Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in January 2016 and the
subsequent attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran led to the full breakdown of diplomatic
relations and was the peak of the hostilities (Adısönmez et al., 2023).
However, in 2023, these two countries made headlines by reestablishing diplomatic ties,
with China playing a central role in facilitating the agreement—a decision driven more by
practical needs than political ideology. For Saudi Arabia, calming regional tensions is crucial
to the progress of Vision 2030, a national plan focused on reducing oil dependency and building
a more resilient, diverse economy. Iran, meanwhile, seized the opportunity to ease international
sanctions and reconnect with the global community (Ezbidi, 2023). This research examines the
rational choices behind this reconciliation by applying the Stag Hunt, which helps illuminate
how long-standing rivals can shift from conflict to cautious cooperation when the rewards of
working together begin to outweigh the cost of prolonged hostility.

B. Research Methodology
This research uses a qualitative method, which involves the study of documents,
archives, and literature reviews along with behavioral and contextual observations. Generally,
qualitative methods collect different types of data, such as observations, interviews, and
documents. It analyzes the entire dataset, interpreting it and categorizing it into themes or
patterns that span across all data sources (Creswell, 2013). The primary aim of this study is to
explain the change in the normalization between Riyadh and Tehran. The data is analyzed by
identifying commonalities across the literature, which are subsequently organized to establish
a coherent pattern. This article employs Stag Hunt game theory to analyze dilemmatic options
that have been faced by both countries. It begins by describing the background of the relations
between Riyadh and Tehran, which are well-known as conflictual, even though there is a little

179 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

piece of hope of normalization among them due to reopening diplomatic relations.

Subsequently, it analyzes some determinant factors that influence their consideration in the
normalization process by using Stag Hunt theory. This analysis is crucial to understanding the
rational choices that have been made by both countries during their normalization process.
Finally, this research will result in findings based on the analysis.

C. Discussion and Findings

The Root of Conflict Between Saudi Arabia and Iran
From the last revolution to the present, the ideological component has shaped the
relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Prior to 1979, the major source of tension between these
two countries had been worries about the regional order, which have become worse since the
Iranian Revolution because Riyadh has been wary of Tehran and its regional policies and
witnessed it start to extend its influence in the region after its rebirth as an Islamic republic with
different ideological views, which was then seen as a danger and countered by Saudi Arabia
with an anti-Shia agenda (Adısönmez et al., 2023; Alam, 2017, p. 148; Bazoobandi & Talebian,
2023, p. 15; Houghton, 2022, p. 126; Manjang, 2017, p. 46; Naqvi & Mansab, 2023, p. 3; Rab
et al., n.d., p. 88). Since Iran’s revolution, both governments have attempted to portray
themselves as leaders in order to ensure their security and surpass their adversary, capitalizing
on the numerous religious, political, and irreconcilable ideological divides in the area to obtain
the upper hand and then perceiving each other more as rivals than as friends (Adami et al., 2013,
p. 154; Cerioli, 2018, pp. 295–296; Ekhtiari Amiri et al., 2011, p. 679; Huwaidin, 2015, p. 72).
In the early years of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, Iranian leader, consistently advocated
for the fall of Gulf monarchies. As a result, fear of Iran motivated the Saudis to assist Iraq
throughout its protracted war against it, which intensified Iran's hostility against Saudi Arabia.
Furthermore, both countries claim leadership in the Muslim world. The supreme leader
of Iran is known as the Guardian of Muslims, while the Saudi King is known as the servant of
the two holy sanctuaries (Litvak, 2017, p. 50). The rivalry for regional hegemony, which is
essential to both nations' identities, foreign policies, and very existence, and religious-
ideological hostility and conflicting political and geostrategic goals have defined Riyadh and
Tehran's relations in recent years (Ardovini, 2022, p. 69; Berti & Guzansky, 2014, p. 25).
Briefly, it can be generally assumed that political and security concerns, together with
ideological rivalry between Sunni and Shia, are the fundamental sources of the struggle,

180 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

disparities, and conflict between the two nations (Alikhani & Zakerian, 2016, p. 178;
Moosavian & Zohreh, 2022, p. 20; Tzemprin et al., 2015).
Ideological differences between both of these countries have been worsened by
sectarians. This term is defined as a strict adherence to specific doctrines or disagreements or
divides within a religious organization that frequently result in violence or discrimination based
on opposing beliefs or practices, which includes several religious sects, such as Sunni and Shia
Muslims, or different Christian denominations (Majeed & Hashmi, 2014, p. 104). Historically,
sectarian enmity and violence have plagued the Middle East, Gulf, and South Asia since the
Islamic Revolution in 1979 and reached perilous and high levels as Iran embraced the plan of
Shia expansion while Saudi Arabia developed an anti-Shia agenda (Ahmadian, 2018, pp. 137–
144; Postel & Hashemi, 2018, p. 62; Rab et al., 2022, p. 88). Practically, the combination of
this long-standing ideological struggle with contemporary conflicting geostrategic and political
objectives helps to explain Saudi and Iranian aims and strategy in Syria, as well as their role in
fostering sectarianism in the area, which influences both sides' rhetoric and methods (Berti &
Guzansky, 2014, p. 26; Ezbidi, 2023, p. 14). As a result, these two countries' traditional
sectarian rivalry and indirect rivalry have served as an important area of disagreement and
tension, not only at the bilateral level but also to some degree throughout the region and, in a
sense, an entire Islamic community (Sadeghi & Ahmadian, 2011, p. 143). In fact, it effectively
described Iran as a 'Shia' force, contradicting Iran's past claims to regional leadership across the
Muslim world, including its relations with Hamas(Phillips, 2022, p. 153). Furthermore, the
existence of the Shi'a population domestically has been a continual concern for Riyadh, fueling
tensions between religious and ethnic minorities (Pasha et al., 2021, p. 500).
The third factor is geopolitics caused by the rivalry of Riyadh and Tehran, which
determines their behavior in the region. Nowadays, the approach of geopolitics is concentrated
on a state's conduct and relations within their geographical position, which might be used to a
great extent in order to influence international relations and be able to express the national
interests(Omelchenko et al., 2022). By maintaining the balance of power and regional
leadership in the region, these two countries have shaped geopolitical issues in the region where
they have their own national interests and deepened the Shia-Sunni divide and direct conflict
(Ahmadian, 2018, pp. 143–144; Ekşi, 2017, p. 151). Furthermore, by pursuing a more
expansive agenda in the region and beyond, Riyadh and Tehran have attempted to capitalize on

181 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

the increasing regional disintegration to increase their political image and also use the chaos in
the area to maintain political stagnation both domestically and internationally (Bahi, 2018, p.
26).
Despite the rivalry of both countries, which results in significant attention at regional
and international levels, the probability of de-escalation among them is not impossible. Even
though the conflict is really a geopolitical battle for religious legitimacy as well as political,
economic, and military dominance, especially Sheikh Nimr's death, it is hardly impossible that
the two powers would go to war directly because of the statement of Saudi Arabia Prime
Minister Mohammed Bin Salaman, who expressed his opinion that war on Iran is not a good
option for them (Heiden & Krijger, 2018, p. 11; Pasha et al., 2021, p. 495). Furthermore, proxy
wars are the factor discussed in influencing the relations between these two countries. They
occur when a benefactor, either a state or non-state entity, provides weapons, training, and cash
to proxies involved in an ongoing conflict in order to effectively achieve governments’ strategic
goals without participating in direct, expensive, and destructive warfare (Mumford, 2013, p.
40). In reality, Riyadh and Tehran have been involved in proxy conflicts in Yemen, Syria,
Bahrain, and Iraq, leading to the rise of terrorist groups such as ISIS. These conflicts could
significantly alter the dynamics of politics in the region, impacting the national security of the
region (Mohammed & Moorthy, 2020, p. 10).
The Diplomatic Break after the Murder of Nimr al-Nimr
Tensions between Riyadh and Tehran have increased since early 2016. Riyadh
confirmed the death of Shaykh Nimr al-Nimr (Shia religious leader) and 46 other detainees on
January 2, 2016, and then raised tensions between Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as
safeguarding Sunni Muslims, and Iran, which claims Shiite leadership (Teitelbaum, 2016).
Subsequently, protests and criticism of the death were widespread, especially from nations with
a Shia majority, like Iran. In the same day, hundreds of protestors in Tehran set fire to Riyadh’s
embassy, sparking a foreign policy crisis (Mamadkul, 2016, p. 75). On January 3, 2016, Riyadh
broke diplomatic relations with Tehran following the attack on its embassy (Pawlak, 2016, p.
2). As a retaliation from Saudi Arabia, the Iranian Muslim community was unable to perform
the worship Hajj in 2016 (Mustahyun, 2017, p. 108). Moreover, the Arab Spring, decades of
authoritarianism and instability, and state shortcomings in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria gave Saudi
Arabia and Iran an opportunity to wage proxy war, while Sunni and Shi'a groups exploited their

182 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

identities to obtain influence and power through sectarian military groups (Crepy, 2019, p. 33;
Maashi, 2017, p. 47; Manjang, 2017, p. 46). This incident has become a concern about the rising
tensions in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran and called for de-escalation of the
situation.
Up until 2023, all relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran were disturbing due to this
attack, which brought proxy wars and influences from outside. Saudi Arabia shot down a
ballistic missile over Riyadh International Airport just hours after Hariri stepped down, said to
be supplied by Iran and fired from Houthi rebel territory in Yemen (Voa News, 2017). In an
interview, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman also stated that his nation
would develop a nuclear weapon as soon as possible once Iran does so because Saudi Arabia
would feel threatened by Iran acquiring one and would lose its standing and power in the region
(Moosavian & Zohreh, 2022, p. 10; Reuters, 2018). In 2019, Saudi Arabia blamed Iran for a
spate of attacks on Saudi targets, including one against the kingdom's petroleum industry, which
briefly knocked petroleum production in half in the country, whereas Houthi rebel groups from
Yemen claimed responsibility for the attacks themselves (Aljazeera, 2019; Wong et al., 2019).
Moreover, Saudi officials applauded the murder of Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani
in 2020 (Farouk, 2020).
Previously, the negotiation between Riyadh and Tehran involved some countries.
During April 2021 to September 2022, four rounds of discussion between them have been
conducted, in which Iraq plays as a mediator (Reuters, 2023). In 2022, Tehran and Riyadh
participated in many rounds of discussions, mediated by Iraq and Oman, in an effort to
reestablish diplomatic relations(Shine et al., 2023, p. 2). Subsequently, in 2023, they decided
to re-establish ties and reopen embassies seven years after their relations were cut (Motamedi,
2023). They also decided to restart diplomatic ties (Wintour, 2023). Furthermore, Iran attended
an extraordinary joint Islamic-Arab summit in Saudi Arabia after a long-time rivalry (DW,
2023). They seemed to look back on what happened in the past among them, even though the
world sees it as a painful and bloody relations. Briefly, diplomatic efforts and open discussions
have proven that there are opportunities to improve relations between the two states, despite
several hurdles(Mabon, 2019, p. 79).
Stag Hunt Analysis

183 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

Saudi Arabia and Iran have faced a dilemmatic situation and fixed their relations in the
high-tension Middle East, so their rational consideration becomes interesting to discuss. By
using the Stag Hunt as a game theory, this research comprehensively understands and analyze
the motivation of Saudi Arabia and Iran in normalization process. First, at the beginning of the
discussion, this part describes Stag Hunt’s assumptions because it can be used as guidance in
understanding and analyzing the rational choice of Riyadh and Tehran in their normalization
process. Second, Stag Hunt’s assumption will explain and analyze their considerations in the
process of normalization based on the fundamental political orientation of both countries. At
last, this part will propose one main argument for answering the research's problem based on
the analysis.
Based on the Stag Hunt assumption, Riyadh and Tehran will be classified as hunters
because they have carefully considered some external and internal factors in the normalization
process. Both of them have different ideological and political perspectives which are known
from the competition between Sunni and Shia. The difference in their perspective on ideology
has resulted in propaganda, tension, conflict, and other disputes between both countries.
Besides, the great power such as the United States (US) and its allies significantly influences
them in politics, economy, and security. The appearance of China and Russia has made the
situation more complex. In 2023, China became a broker of both countries’ reconciliation,
which made a significant change since the cutting of their diplomatic ties in 2016. The conflict
escalation between Hamas and Israel has influenced the normalization process between Saudi
Arabia and Israel (Palik, 2023). Furthermore, proxy wars have become a determinant factor in
relations between them, and mostly Iran has influenced their proxies, such as Hezbollah,
Houthis, Hamas, and others, to achieve its interest in the region, so Saudi Arabia has been
concerned and considered its relations to Iran in regard to it. They have tried to normalize their
relations, even though the implementation of it is yet challenging due to uncertain external and
internal factors.
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s Cooperative Behaviors
Riyadh and Tehran have shifted their relations in these days and resulted (20, 20) as the
payoff. First, political and security conflict between two countries has been exhausted, so the
shifting is needed to rebalance the situation. Historically, Iran has backed opposing factions
throughout the Middle East, notably in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and most prominently in Yemen

184 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

(Steinberg, 2021). It has provided support to the Shia Houthi rebels, who ousted the Saudi-
supported government in 2014, while Saudi Arabia has conducted a relentless air campaign
against the Houthi since the following year, accusing Iran of assisting the Houthis in their
attacks against it. These factions have threatened Saudi Arabia’s security in the region if it
continues its opposing maneuver against Iran. On Houthi’s attack, Saudi Arabia successfully
intercepted a ballistic missile above Riyadh International Airport shortly after Hariri's
resignation, which is supplied by Iran(Voa News, 2017). Supported by Iran, Hezbollah also
becomes an enemy of Saudi Arabia, which threatens Saudi Arabia’s interests with its track
record of attacks(Levitt, 2016). These two countries conflicts have brought them into a hard
situation, which is expensive and bloody(Berg, 2023). In 2023, They have committed to
restoring their diplomatic relations after January 2016’s tension, which Riyadh’s embassy was
invaded in Tehran as a response to Riyadh's execution of a notable Shia cleric(Reuters, 2023).
They have built communication, exchanged envoys, and formally reopened their embassies,
even though the implementation is challenging, and the operation of the Saudi Embassy in Iran
is yet to resume while the Iranian Embassy is not open(France 24, 2023). Furthermore, in this
case, the external actor that influence Saudi Arabia’s politics are the US and Israel. In its relation
to Saudi Arabia, the US is considering its interest in Riyadh’s plans for a nuclear energy
program, while Riyadh refused to talk with Israel until the independence of Palestine and also
denounced Israel's attack on Iran as a violation of its sovereignty(Aaron, 2024; Palik, 2023).
Besides, the escalation of the Israel and Hamas-Palestine conflict has worsened the Iran-Israel
relations because of Iran’s support for Hamas-Palestine.
The second reason is related to economic aspects. The normalization of Riyadh and
Tehran is not only talking about two countries interests but also about China and Russia's
interests. In 2024, Saudi Arabia and Iran, among six nations, have been invited to become new
members in 2025 (Euronews, 2023). Even though Iran has officially joined BRICS, Saudi
Arabia is yet considering that option(Egypt, 2024; Reuters, 2024). Initiated by China, Brazil,
South Africa, Russia, and India, this group portrays itself as a counterbalance to Western
dominance, which constitutes almost 40 percent of the world population and results more than
a quarter of the global GDP (Gerald & Mogomotsi, 2023)). This group will account for 45
percent of the global population and 28 percent of the world's GDP, fostering significant
economic collaboration among its members while the core BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia,

185 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

India, China, and South Africa) contribute to around 40 percent of the trade activities of the
new member states(Battaloglu, Nesibe Hicret and Kozhanov, 2024). For Riyadh, potential
alignment with BRICS is primarily driven by economic factors, as it encompasses a substantial
market. Riyadh's pursuit of de-escalation with Tehran is strategically linked to its vision 2030,
as maintaining stability is crucial for securing the financial investments needed to achieve its
ambitious socio-economic goals, so it recognizes that conflict could hinder its aspirations to
become a leading regional and global hub in various sectors(Farouk, 2020).
Besides, Iran has formally joined BRICS in 2024, which is good for Iran’s economic
interests because it has been sanctioned by the US and its allies for many years due to political
and security actions, so BRICS will be crucial for balancing western dominances (Tehran
Times, 2024b). The Chinese government endorses Iran in its efforts to protect national
sovereignty, security, and dignity while also promoting its economic and social progress and
enhancing amicable relations with neighboring nations (MOFA China, 2024). In 2024, the
discussions between Riyadh and Tehran officials highlight a mutual interest in enhancing trade
and economic cooperation, particularly in the context of services for pilgrims in Mecca, and
also reflect a broader commitment to fostering stronger bilateral relations, as emphasized by
both nations' leadership (Tehran Times, 2024a). Based on stag hunt theory, these two countries
have mutual benefit if they continue their normalization after long-term conflict because they
are confident in that process and gradually building their relations for the highest payoff (20,
20). They have economic reasons that support Riyadh’s 2030 vision and provide an alternative
for Iran amid US and western sanctions. Furthermore, the external support from BRICS is
crucial for the normalization process because that is in line with these two countries behaviors.
Partial Non-cooperative Behavior between Saudi Arabia and Iran
The second scenario is when one player chooses stag and the other chooses hare, in
which one player gets 0 and the other gets 10. In this case, Saudi Arabia and Iran are not
doubtful about continuing the normalization process because they have been exhausted by long-
term conflicts that involve opposing factions such as Hezbollah and Houthi and cause
disadvantages for both countries. In conflict with Tehran, Riyadh broke diplomatic relations
following the attack on its embassy and restricted Iranian Muslims to worship Hajj in 2016
(Mustahyun, 2017, p. 108; Pawlak, 2016, p. 108). Previously, Riyadh executed Shia preacher
Nimr al-Nimr on January 2, 2016, and then increased tensions with Tehran (Teitelbaum, 2016).

186 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

This long conflict has caused causalities and victims among them, so each of them still supports
the normalization process amongst them. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has an ambitious 2030 vision
for which the region's stability is crucial because continuing conflict with Iran is contra-
productive to that plan (Farouk, 2020). For Iran, US and Western sanctions worsen its economy,
and Saudi Arabia is a potential partner, even though there is no significant economic
cooperation post-conflict. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia share a vested interest in regional security
to promote economic development because Saudi Arabia is currently undergoing significant
transformation, necessitating the maintenance of socio-economic stability and resilience
through the diversification of its oil-dependent economy and the exploration of new avenues
for regional collaboration, and Iran is grappling with a complex and precarious situation,
characterized by diminishing financial resources and fragile social cohesion (Custers & Mirjam,
2024). Thus, this scenario has not happened because both countries have progressively
implemented the normalization process, such as reopening Iran’s embassy in Saudi Arabia.
Besides, the normalization is beneficial for Riyadh and Iran's economies and national interests.
Saudi Arabia and Iran Non-Cooperative Behaviors
The uncertainty of other player’ option makes them both choose hunting hare (10, 10)
because choosing stag is risky if they are all not confident with the prospect of cooperation.
Even though the recent relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran is positive, the president-elect
Donald Trump may determine the situation in Middle East. In this research, there are several
reasons why they are not refusing the normalization or not hunting hare. First, the normalization
is a need for Riyadh and Tehran. For Riyadh, the 2030 vision is suitable to the process of
normalization with Iran because the conflict will worsen the realization of that (Farouk, 2020).
In facing complex precarious situation, the need to expand its partner due to US and western
sanctions is crucial for Tehran. Both of these two countries have shared a vested interest in
promoting economic development (Custers & Mirjam, 2024). Second, Saudi Arabia and Iran
have been many years in conflict which causes negative impact for both of them such as victims
and destructions. Third, they have built trust in re-opening their embassies which Iran’s
embassy is now available in Riyadh and Saudi Arabia’s embassy is on-going process. Briefly,
this option is far from Riyadh and Tehran behavior in these days because the normalization
comes from their needs and progressive actions from both parties to reconciliate their relations.

187 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

Based on the analysis above, the recent normalization of relations between Riyadh and
Tehran is driven by a combination of political necessity and economic strategy, as both nations
seek to stabilize their regional influence and enhance economic cooperation amidst external
pressures and sanctions and also overcome the detrimental effects of their prolonged conflict,
which both countries believe works for their national interests (see Figure 1). This shift towards
diplomatic relations is essential for fostering economic development and ensuring socio-
economic resilience in the face of external challenges. It does not only aim to reduce historical
tensions but also aligns with broader geopolitical interests, particularly in the context of their
potential roles within the BRICS framework. In these days, these two countries decided to re-
establish ties and reopen embassies seven years after their relations were cut and decided to
restart diplomatic ties (Motamedi, 2023; Wintour, 2023). Besides, Iran attended an
extraordinary joint Islamic-Arab summit in Saudi Arabia after a long-time rivalry (DW, 2023).
In fact, Riyadh’s 2030 vision is more significant than confrontation and conflict with Iran. For
Iran, the normalization process opens a new hope for economic interest amid US and allies’
sanctions. Thus, the first scenario, “Riyadh and Teheran’s cooperative behaviors,” is rational
scenario for these two countries.
However, this normalization process is dynamic under both the previous and recent
Trump administrations. During his four-year tenure, Trump developed a close relationship with
Saudi Arabia while opposing the Iranian regime by withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, or JCPOA (NBC News, 2020). During his first term, the US recognized
Jerusalem as Israel's capital, reversing over seventy years of American foreign policy and
launching a plan to transfer the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to that city (Landler, 2017). In these
days, the normalization of these two countries has faced challenges because the Trump
administration has made a deal with Saudi Arabia. Under that deal, Saudi Arabia committed to
invest $20 billion in the US artificial intelligence industry in exchange for Washington giving
Riyadh state-of-the-art warfighting equipment (Kieran, 2025). Furthermore, Trump has played
a crucial role in the Israel and Hamas-Palestine conflict by supporting Israel with his policy.
These conditions challenge the Saudi Arabia and Iran normalization process because Saudi
Arabia’s deal with the US will make this country controlled by the US, even though both
countries can play a hedging strategy in this dilemmatic position.

Figure 1. Stag-hunt Payoff

188 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

Iran
Stag Hare

Saudi Arabia

Hare
20, 20 0, 10

Stag
10, 0 10, 10

Source: Author

D. Conclusion
The conflict between Riyadh and Tehran is deep due to ideological differences,
geopolitical rivalries, and proxy conflicts. However, in these days, diplomatic efforts have
shown a probable shift towards improved relations. Brokered by China, Riyadh and Tehran
pledged in 2023 to restore their diplomatic ties after they had been severed in 2016. The new
in their relations is a correction or readjustment of the traditionally adversarial nature of their
relations, impelled by the exhaustion from perpetual political and security conflicts. The
communication and reopening of embassies seek to reduce regional tensions and begin to break
an argumentatively complex interplay of foreign influences, especially by the US and Israel.
This normalization is viewed as a breakthrough for Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 while
simultaneously providing Iran with a much-needed platform to circumvent Western sanctions.
In his second term, the progress of normalization has become more complicated. Moreover, in
his previous term, the US significantly made a clear support and policy for Saudi Arabia and
ignored Iran for negotiation (JCPOA). In fact, this research advances regional studies by
demonstrating the purposeful alignment between two regional powers as they adapt to changing
worldwide alliances, which shows how Middle Eastern states are able to develop independent
security control outside Western influence, even though challenges remain ahead. During
Trump’s administration, Riyadh and Tehran better play a hedging strategy because the conflict
between these two countries worsens their own interest. Furthermore, this research opens the
path for future researchers to explore the concrete strategy on how to strengthen the relations
between these two countries amid the influence of great powers. Overall, the process of
normalization between these two countries is driven by the trust of both countries in achieving

189 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

their security and economic interest, even though the upcoming progress of it is yet uncertain
after the 2024 US election.

REFERENCES
Aaron, S. (2024). Muslim-Americans favored Jill Stein in 2024.
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/muslim-americans-favored-stein/
Adami, A., Najmieh, ,& P. (2013). Saudi Arabia and Iran: the Islamic Awakening Case.
Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, 3(4), 153–178. www.SID.ir
Adısönmez, U. C., Onursal, R., & Öztığ, L. İ. (2023). Quest for Regional Hegemony: The
Politics of Ontological Insecurity in the Saudi–Iran Rivalry. Alternatives, 48(1), 91–107.
https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754221138186
Ahmadian, H. (2018). Iran and Saudi Arabia in the age of trump. Survival, 60(2), 133–150.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1448579
Alam, F. (2017). Saudi-Iran Rivalry and its Impact. European Journal of Social Sciences
Studies, 2(9), 140–149. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1092743
Alikhani, M., & Zakerian, M. (2016). Study of Factors Affecting Saudi-Iranian Relations and
Conflicts and Their Resulting Behavior Pattern. Journal of Politics and Law, 9(7), 178.
https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v9n7p178
Aljazeera. (2019). Oil attacks ‘unquestionably sponsored by Iran’: Saudi Arabia. Aljazeera.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/19/oil-attacks-unquestionably-sponsored-by-
iran-saudi-arabia.
Ardovini, L. (2022). Competing Islams: Religious legitimacy and the foreign policies of Saudi
Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle to Shape the Middle East, 55–73.
https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526150844.00008
Bahi, R. (2018). Iran-Saudi rivalry in Africa: Implications for regional stability. Middle East
Policy, 25(4), 26–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12374
Battaloglu, Nesibe Hicret and Kozhanov, N. (2024). 2024 Deep Dive: Saudi Arabia and
BRICS—a balancing act?. https://amwaj.media/article/deep-dive-saudi-arabia-and-brics-
a-balancing-act
Bazoobandi, S., & Talebian, H. (2023). The Evolvement of Iran–Israel’s Rivalry in the Red Sea
and Eastern Africa. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 17(4), 341–355.

190 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2023.2299076
Berg, R. (2023). Iran and Saudi Arabia to renew ties after seven-year rift. BBC News.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64906996
Berti, B., & Guzansky, Y. (2014). Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy on Iran and the Proxy War in
Syria: Toward a New Chapter? Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 8(3), 25–34.
https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2014.11446600
Cerioli, L. G. (2018). Roles and International Behaviour: Saudi–Iranian Rivalry in Bahrain’s
and Yemen’s Arab Spring. Contexto Internacional, 40(2), 295–316.
https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-8529.2018400200010
Crepy, P. (2019). Proxy Warfare’s Impact on Sectarianization: The Case of Saudi-Iranian
Rivalry. Flux: International Relations Review, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.26443/firr.v9i1.6
Creswell, J. W. (2013). Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among Five
Approaches (3rd ed.).
Custers, D., & Mirjam, S. (2024). Moving from Rapprochement to Economic Cooperation?
https://carpo-bonn.org/en/publications/carpo-briefs/moving-from-rapprochement-to-
economic-cooperation
DW. (2023). Iranian President Raisi in Saudi Arabia for Gaza summit.
https://www.dw.com/en/iranian-president-raisi-in-saudi-arabia-for-gaza-summit/a-
67374940
Egypt, D. N. (2024). Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ethiopia formally join BRICS.
https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2024/01/01/egypt-iran-saudi-arabia-uae-ethiopia-fo
Ekhtiari Amiri, R., Ku Samsu, K. H. B., & Fereidouni, H. G. (2011). The Hajj and Iran’s foreign
policy towards Saudi Arabia. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 46(6), 678–690.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909611417546
Ekşi, M. (2017). Regional Hegemony Quests in the Middle East from the Balance of Power
System to the Balance of Proxy Wars: Turkey as Balancing Power for the Iran - Saudi
Rivalry. Gazi Akademik Bakış, 133–156. https://doi.org/10.19060/gav.379597
Euronews. (2023). BRICS invites Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Emirates and
Iran to join the bloc. https://www.euronews.com/business/2023/08/24/brics-invites-
argentina-saudi-arabia-egypt-ethiopia-the-emirates-and-iran-to-join-the-bloc
Ezbidi, B. (2023). When Security Imperatives meet Sectarian Temptations: the Tehran-Riyadh

191 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

conflict. Cogent Social Sciences, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2222573

Farouk, Y. (2020). What Does the U . S . Killing of Soleimani Mean for Saudi Arabia ? Carnegie
Endowment. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/07/what-does-u.s.-killing-of-
soleimani-mean-for-saudi-arabia-pub-80722
France 24. (2023). Saudi embassy resumes operations in Iran after seven years, state media
reports. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20230809-saudi-embassy-
resumes-operations-in-iran-after-seven-years-state-media-reports
Gerald, I., & Mogomotsi, M. (2023). Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE all set to join BRICS bloc of
emerging economies. Times of Isreal.
Heiden, P. van der, & Krijger, A. (2018). The Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Atlantisch Perspectief,
42(2), 11–15.
Houghton, B. (2022). China’s Balancing Strategy Between Saudi Arabia and Iran: The View
from Riyadh. Asian Affairs, 53(1), 124–144.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2022.2029065
Huwaidin, M. Bin. (2015). The Security Dilemma in Saudi-Iranian Relations. Review of History
and Political Science, 3(2), 69–79. https://doi.org/10.15640/rhps.v3n2a8
Levitt, M. (2016). Iranian and Hezbollah Threats to Saudi Arabia : Past Precedents. Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, December 1988, 1989–1990.
Litvak, M. (2017). Iran and Saudi Arabia: Religious and Strategic Rivalry. Ational Security
Studies Center, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, 133, 49–54.
Maashi, H. A. Al. (2017). From Security Governance to Geopolitical Rivalry: Iran-GCC
Confrontation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and
Islamic Studies, 11(4), 46–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2017.12023317
Mabon, S. (2019). Saudi Arabia and Iran. Routledge Handbook of International Relations in
the Middle East, 20006(June), 138–152. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315229591-11
Majeed, G., & Hashmi, R. S. (2014). Sectarian Conflicts: A dominant threat to Pakistan’s
Internal Security. Journal of Political Studies, 21(1), 118.
http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol4-
Mamadkul, J. (2016). Saudi Arabia – Iran’s Foreign Policy Crisis: A Case Study of Execution
of Saudi Shia Cleric Shaikh Nimr al-Nimr. Rangsit Journal of Social Sciences Adn
Humanities (RSJH), 4(1), 75–82.

192 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

Manjang, A. (2017). Beyond the Middle East: Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in the Horn of Africa.
International Relations and Diplomacy, 5(1), 46–60.
MOFA China. (2024). Xi Jinping Meets with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Ministry
of Foreign Affairs The People’s Republic of China. www.fmprc.gov.cn
Mohammed, A. A., & Moorthy, R. (2020). Saudi-Iran rivalry in the Middle East: implication
to national security. Jurnal Sains Sosial Dan Kemanusiaan, 16(1), 1–13.
Moosavian, S. S., & Zohreh, G. M. J. (2022). The Impact of the Nuclear Program on Iran-
Saudi Arabia Relations. Research Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360264312
Motamedi, M. (2023). Five years after Trump’s exit, no return to the Iran nuclear deal.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/8/five-years-after-trumps-exit-no-return-to-the-
iran-nuclear-deal
Mumford, A. (2013). Proxy warfare and the future of conflict. RUSI Journal, 158(2), 40–46.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.787733
Mustahyun, M. (2017). Rivalitas Arab Saudi Dan Iran Di Timur Tengah Pada Arab Spring
Suriah Tahun 2011-2016. Journal of Islamic World and Politics, 1(1).
https://doi.org/10.18196/jiwp.1105
Naqvi, S. F. H., & Mansab, and M. (2023). Proposed Iran-Saudi Gulf Maritime Security
Cooperation: An Alternative to I2U2? Focus.
Omelchenko, O. A., Kononenko, O. V., Livinsky, V. M., Evminov, S. V., Olendiy, I. A., &
Ovramets, M. A. (2022). Тhe nature and characteristics of the evolution of the
phenomenon of geopolitics. Revista Amazonia Investiga, 11(51), 140–148.
https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2022.51.03.13
Palik, J. (2023). The Impact of the Israel-Hamas War on the Saudi-Israeli Normalization
Process. PRIO Middle East Centre.
Pasha, M. I., Aqeel, M., Muhammad Yasir Furqan, K., & Muhammad Yasir, K. (2021). Iran-
Saudi Rivalry and Its Implications on Geopolitics of Persian Gulf. Pjaee, 18(7), 493–503.
Pawlak, P. (2016). Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations: Figuring Out the Next Move. 4.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573913/EPRS_BRI(2016)5
73913_EN.pdf
Phillips, C. (2022). Capability and culpability: Iranian and Saudi rivalry in the Syrian conflict.

193 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

In Saudi Arabia and Iran: The struggle to shape the Middle East.
https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526150844.00012
Postel, D., & Hashemi, N. (2018). Playing with Fire : Trump , the Saudi- Iranian Rivalry , and
the Geopolitics of Sectarianization in the Middle East. January, 2011–2016.
Rab, A., Ahmed, M., Ramzan, M., Jan, A., Ahmed, M., & Ullah, S. (2022). The Politico-
Ideological Rivalry of Iran and Saudi Arabia Post Islamic Revolution : Impacts on
Pakistan. 8(2), 86–91. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5984959
Rab, A., Mansoor, A., Muhammad, R., Amir, J., Mobeen, A., & Sana, U. (n.d.). The Politico-
Ideological Rivalry of Iran and Saudi Arabia Post Islamic Revolution: Impacts on
Pakistan. Multicultural Education. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5984959
Reuters. (2018). Saudi crown prince: If Iran develops nuclear bomb, so will we. CBS This
Morning, 1–4. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-
salman-iran-nuclear-bomb-saudi-arabia/
Reuters. (2023). Saudi-Iranian ties: A history of ups and downs. Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-iranian-ties-history-ups-downs-2023-
06-06/
Reuters. (2024). Saudi Arabia has not yet joined BRICS - Saudi official source. Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/world/saudi-arabia-has-not-yet-joined-brics-saudi-official-
source-2024-02-01/
Sadeghi, H., & Ahmadian, H. (2011). Iran- Saudi Relations : Past Pattern ,. 1(4), 115–148.
Shine, S., Guzansky, Y., & Shavit, E. (2023). Iran and Saudi Arabia Renew Relations. Institute
for National Security Studies, 1–5. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep48440
Steinberg, G. (2021). The “Axis of Resistance” Iran’s Expansion in the Middle East Is Hitting
a Wall. SWP Research Paper, 6, 1–35.
Tehran Times. (2024a). Iran-Saudi Arabia Joint Economic Committee meeting to be held soon.
Tehran Times. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/504070/Iran-Saudi-Arabia-Joint-
Economic-Committee-meeting-to-be-held
Tehran Times. (2024b). Iran calls for anti-sanctions alliance at BRICS meeting in Russia.
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/503597/Iran-calls-for-anti-sanctions-alliance-at-
BRICS-meeting-in-Russia
Teitelbaum, P. J. (2016). Domestic and Regional Implications of Escalated Saudi-Iran Conflict.

194 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto

SPEKTRUM, Vol. 22 No. 2 Tahun 2025
p-ISSN: 1829 – 6580 , e-ISSN: 28095642
spektrumfisip@unwahas. ac.id The Motivation of Saudi...

324.
Tzemprin, A., Jozić, J., & Lambaré, H. (2015). The Middle East cold war: Iran-Saudi Arabia
and the way ahead. Politicka Misao, 52(4–5), 187–202.
Voa News. (2017). Saudi Arabia: Missile Intercepted Near International Airport. Voa News.
https://www.voanews.com/a/saudi-arabia-missile-intercepted-near-international-
airport/4100992.html
Wintour, P. (2023). Iran and Saudi Arabia agree to restore ties after China-brokered talks. The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/10/iran-saudi-arabia-agree-
restore-ties-china-talks
Wong, E., Megan, S., Eric, S., & Annie, K. (2019). Trump Says Iran Appears Responsible for
Saudi Attack but That He Wants to Avoid War – The New York Times. Nytimes.Com.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/16/world/middleeast/houthis-yemen-saudi-arabia-
warning.html

195 Fachrie, Widyantoro, Kristianto