LEO ABUYO Y SAGRIT,
PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. D E C
ISION
The law of nature — the "foundation of the privilege to use all
reasonable means to repel an aggression that endangers one's own life
and the lives of others" — does not require the accused to use unerring
judgment when they had the reasonable grounds to believe that they
were in apparent danger of losing their lives or suffering great bodily
injury.[1] We observe this doctrine in the Petition for Review on
Certiorari[2] before this Court assailing the Decision[3] dated June 28,
2019 and the Resolution[4] dated November 12, 2019 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 41325.
ANTECEDENTS
On August 16, 2011, at around 7:30 p.m., petitioner Leo Abuyo y Sagrit
(Leo) and his wife were heading home on board their motorcycle.
Suddenly, Leo saw Cesar Tapel (Cesar) and his son, Charles Tapel
(Charles), who were armed with a fan knife (balisong) and a gun,
respectively. Thereafter, Cesar and Charles blocked Leo's way.
However, Leo swerved the motorcycle to the left and sped towards the
house of his father, Leonardo Abuyo (Leonardo). Charles followed and
went outside Leonardo's house which is just beside that of Leo's
house. Furious, Charles kicked the bamboo fence of Leonardo's house,
pointed his gun to people, and yelled for Leo to come out. Leonardo
tried to pacify Charles, but Cesar arrived and stabbed Leonardo in the
:
lower left part of his chest. Leonardo ran towards Leo's house, but
Cesar still pursued him with the fan knife. At that instance, Leo went
outside and chased Cesar to the former's house. In their confrontation,
Cesar tried to stab Leo. As a defense, Leo got hold of a bolo on top of
the table and hacked Cesar's right hand. Consequently, Cesar dropped
the fan knife. Cesar managed to pick up the fan knife but Leo stabbed
him again in the lower part of his stomach. Later, Cesar died due to
stab injury on his left abdomen and multiple lacerated wounds on his
right hand.[5] Leo voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities
after the incident.[6] Accordingly, Leo was charged with Homicide
before the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 38
(RTC), thus:
That on or about 7:30 o'clock (sic) in the evening of August 16, 2011
at Purok 1, Brgy. Dogongan, [M]unicipality of Daet, [P]rovince of
Camarines Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
while armed with stones and bladed weapon (bolo), did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one CESAR TAPEL y BACERDO, hitting the latter on his left
abdomen and other parts of his body that resulted to his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Leo pleaded not guilty.[8] At the trial, Leo contended that he merely
acted in self-defense and defense of a relative.[9] In a Judgment[10]
dated December 8, 2017, the RTC convicted Leo of Homicide and ruled
that he failed to prove all the elements of self-defense. The RTC found
that Leo employed means that was not reasonably necessary to repel
the unlawful aggression. However, the RTC appreciated the privileged
:
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,[11] to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused Leo Abuyo y
Sagrit GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
and he is sentenced to suffer indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months[,] and one (1) day prision correccional[,] as
minimum[,] to eight (8) years of prision mayor[,] as maximum.
The accused is further adjudged to pay the heirs of Cesar Tapel y
Bacerdo civil indemnity of [P]50,000.00, moral damages of
[P]50,000.00[,] and temperate damages of [P]30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Leo elevated the case to the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 41325. In
a Decision[13] dated June 28, 2019, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings
with modification as to the award of damages, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED.
The assailed Judgment dated December 8, 2017 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38 of Daet, Camarines Norte finding the
accused-appellant Leo Abuyo y Sagrit guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Leo Abuyo y Sagrit is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years,
two (2) months[,] and one (1) day of prision correccional[,] as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
pay the heirs of Cesar Tapel the amounts of [P]75,000.00 as moral
damages, [P]75,000.00 as civil indemnity[,] and [P]50,000.00 as
temperate damages.
:
SO ORDERED.[14]
Leo sought reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution[15] dated
November 12, 2019. Hence, this petition.[16] Leo maintains that the
means he employed was reasonably necessary to repel the unlawful
aggression from Cesar and Charles, who were both armed and had
clear intent to kill him.[17]
RULING
The petition is meritorious.
The admission of self-defense or defense of a relative frees the
prosecution from the burden of proving that the accused committed
the crime. The burden is shifted to the accused to prove that their act
was justified. These justifying circumstances must be clearly
established through convincing evidence. They cannot be appreciated
if uncorroborated by competent evidence or is patently doubtful. Here,
Leo admitted to be the author of Cesar's death but invoked the
justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a relative.[18]
As such, the burden of evidence shifts to Leo to prove these defenses.
[19]
In self-defense, the following elements must concur: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
defense.[20] In defense of a relative, the accused likewise needs to
establish the first two requisites of self-defense. In lieu of the third
requirement, however, the accused must prove that "in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the
defense had no part therein."[21]
:
The first requisite of "unlawful aggression on the part of the victim" is
the indispensable element of both self-defense and defense of a
relative.[22] If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim was
established, the defenses are unavailing for there is nothing to prevent
or repel.[23] For unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a real
danger to life or personal safety.[24] Anent the second requisite,
"reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression" envisions a rational equivalence between the perceived
danger and the means employed to repel the attack. Yet, the Court
recognized that in self-defense or defense of a relative, the instinct for
self-preservation will outweigh rational thinking. Thus, "when it is
apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the
duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in
law for the consequences."[25] The third requisite of "lack of sufficient
provocation" requires the person invoking self-defense to not have
antagonized the attacker. A provocation is deemed sufficient if it is
"adequate to excite the person to commit the wrong and must
accordingly be proportionate to its gravity."[26]
Here, it is undisputed that the first and third requisites of self-defense
and defense of a relative are present. There was unlawful aggression
when Cesar attacked and pursued Leonardo, and turned and
attempted to stab Leo. In these circumstances, Leo had the right to
repel the unlawful aggression in order to protect himself and his father.
Also, there was no provocation on the part of Leo since the attack
originated from Cesar and Charles. Leo and his wife were peacefully
traversing their way home when Cesar and Charles blocked their way
and chased them. Similarly, Leo was already in his father's house when
Cesar and Charles started the commotion.
:
Nonetheless, the CA and the RTC held that Leo failed to prove the
second requisite of reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression.[27] Notably, this requisite
does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack
and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence which
presupposes the consideration not only of the nature and quality of the
weapons used by the defender and the assailant – but of the totality of
circumstances surrounding the defense vis-à-vis the unlawful
aggression.[28] Moreover, the law requires rational necessity, not
indispensable need. In each particular case, it is necessary to judge the
relative necessity, whether more or less imperative, in accordance with
the rules of rational logic. The accused may be given the benefit of any
reasonable doubt as to whether or not they employed rational means to
repel the aggression.[29]
Corollarily, the courts should not demand that the accused conduct
themselves with the poise of a person not under imminent threat of
fatal harm. It must be assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have
sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate, and make comparisons
that can easily be made in the calmness of reason. The accused had no
time to reflect and to reason out their responses. The test is whether
the accused's subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness of
the danger was reasonable or not,[30] and the reasonableness of the
accused's belief must be viewed from their standpoint at the time they
acted.[31] The right of a person to take life in self-defense and defense
of a relative or a stranger arises from their belief in the necessity for
doing so; and such belief and reasonableness thereof are to be judged
in light of the circumstances as they then appeared to the accused, not
in light of circumstances as they would appear to others or based on
the belief that others may or might entertain as to the nature arid
:
imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill.[32]
In this case, the Court finds that Leo used reasonable means to defend
himself and his father. The facts show that even after Leo hacked
Cesar's right hand, Cesar's unlawful aggression did not cease when he
regained possession of the knife. At that point, Cesar's determination
to kill Leo and Leonardo was aggravated — more imminent and more
dangerously real — into a fixed mindset to subdue Leo's opposition.
The CA and the RTC's reasoning that Leo could have grabbed Cesar's
knife when it fell off, and that Leo could have escaped and run away[33]
is unfathomable to a person juxtaposed in the same pressing situation.
For one, there is no indication that the knife was remotely displaced
from Cesar's location. In fact, Cesar immediately regained possession
of his knife. The weapon did not fall far from Cesar's control. Cesar only
lost grip of the knife momentarily. Yet, the CA and the RTC are still
baffled why Leo did not strike another less fatal blow, enough to disable
or disarm Cesar from pursuing further attacks, thus:
RTC Judgment
[Leo] testified that after [Cesar] stabbed his father, the latter ran
towards [Leo's] house. Cesar, however, pursued and followed his
father. When [Leo] tried to stop Cesar, the latter turned to him and
tried to stab him with a knife. [Leo], however, was able to get hold of
a bolo and, with it, struck Cesar's right hand such that Cesar lost
hold of his knife (TSN, July 10, 2012, p. 11). At this juncture, [Leo]
had opportunity to secure Cesar's knife, or run away, or strike
Cesar in order to – and merely to – disable him from further
attack. However, [Leo] did not, and instead stabbed Cesar at the
stomach after seeing that the latter was able to get back the knife.
He could have struck Cesar's hand again, but this did not come to
:
his mind allegedly because of fear (TSN, July 10, 2012, p. 13). Be
that as it may, stabbing Cesar at the stomach with a bolo is far from
being a reasonable means to carry out [Leo's] intention to repel or
parry Cesar's thrusts.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
CA Decision
[Leo] argues that stabbing Cesar on the stomach was reasonable,
considering that Cesar was again in possession of the knife and was
attempting to stab him. Further, [Leo] was afraid of Charles shooting
him with his gun. OSG parries his arguments by stating that after
Cesar bad again picked up the knife, [Leo] could have just disarmed
him again. Further, stabbing Cesar would not have prevented a gun
attack on him by Charles. Thus, stabbing Cesar on the stomach was
not necessary nor reasonable.
We agree with the OSG. As found by the trial court, [Leo] admitted
that he had successfully disarmed Cesar. Although Cesar was able
to regain possession of the knife, stabbing Cesar on the stomach
was an extreme measure if the intention was truly to simply repel or
parry the latter's thrusts. As compared to Cesar, [Leo] had the
upper hand. He had a bolo, which could readily cause more damage
than a fan knife. To escape, [Leo] could have simply disarmed
Cesar again, or even caused him injury to prevent him from
further pursuit. Instead, [Leo] dealt him a fatal wound, which was
not warranted by the circumstances. Thus, the second requisite is
lacking in this case.[35] (Emphasis supplied)
However, the CA and the RTC's identical reasoning is a product of
tranquil minds basking in the comfort of judicial chambers. Unlike
magistrates, Leo, at the narrow crossroads of survival and death, had
:
no equanimity to think, calculate, and make comparisons that can
easily be made in the calmness of reason. Confronted with immediate
threat and danger to his life and his father's life, and terrorized by a
looming vicious attack, he had no choice but to defend himself and his
father against their wounded yet more angered assailant. Moreover,
Leo's father was already wounded at that time. Leo's fear was
compounded by such sight. The unavailability of any help from
Leonardo doubly impelled Leo to adopt whatever means available to
him to defend their lives against Cesar and Charles. Fear of death, and
not criminal intent, is the powerful cause that moved Leo to struck
wildly at their would be killer. Leo stabbed blindly, thinking only to save
his life and his father's. If it appeared later that Leo had wounded Cesar
in a vulnerable body part, it was not because he was a cruel and
bloodthirsty killer. The only reason was that Leo was fighting
desperately for his very life and the life of his father. Leo was animated
only by his mortal fear of the unyielding aggressor. Leo moved like a
wild beast by the elemental instinct of survival, obviously but
understandably undiscerning of the situs of his strikes.[36]
In People v. Olarbe,[37] the accused and his wife were awakened by the
sound of a gunshot and shouting from the deceased, who was holding
a rifle and a bolo. The deceased forcibly entered the accused's house.
When the deceased aimed the gun at the accused, the latter grabbed
the gun and grappled for its possession. When the accused managed
to wrestle the gun from the deceased, he shot the latter. However, the
deceased still managed to get his bolo from his waist and turned his
assault to the accused's common-law wife. The accused once again
grabbed the bolo and hacked the deceased causing his death. In that
case, the Court explained that all the elements of self-defense are
present, viz.:
:
The courts ought to remember that a person who is assaulted has
neither the time nor the sufficient tranquility of mind to think,
calculate and choose the weapon to be used. For, in emergencies
of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of
formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-
preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has
reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts
to hold the actor not responsible in law for the consequences.
Verily, the law requires rational equivalence, not material
commensurability[.][38] (Emphasis supplied)
In Ganal, Jr. v. People,[39] the deceased went to the house of accused
armed with a knife and started throwing stones. When the father of the
accused tried to calmly ask the deceased to go home, he pushed open
the gate of the house and hit the accused's father in the chest, causing
the latter to fall and lose consciousness. Seeing this, the accused
rushed inside the house, got his gun, and fired a warning shot in the air.
When the deceased continued moving closer to the accused, the
accused shot him once. When the deceased did not retreat and instead
continued moving forward, accused shot him four more times. The
deceased died instantly. The Court ruled that the accused's killing of
the deceased was justified. The Court stressed that the instinct of self-
preservation prevailed upon the accused during the fateful incident.[40]
Similarly, the particular circumstances which confronted Leo at the time
of the incident condoned the means he employed to protect his father
and himself. To reiterate, the measure of rational necessity is to be
found in the situation as it appeared to Leo at the time of the incident.
The law does not require that Leo should mete out his blows in such
manner that, upon a calm and deliberate review of the incident, it will
:
not appear that he exceeded the precise limits of what was absolutely
necessary to put his antagonist hors de combat, or that he struck one
blow more than what was absolutely necessary to save his own life, or
that he failed to hold his hand so as to avoid inflicting a fatal wound
where a less severe stroke might have served the purpose.[41] Under
such conditions, Leo cannot be expected to reflect coolly nor wait after
each blow to determine its effects.
More importantly, three crucial facts reveal that Leo was impelled by
the instinct of self-preservation rather than the homicidal urge of one
bent on killing. First, Leo never took advantage of the opportunity to
race off an attack against the disarmed Cesar who lost grip of the knife.
Leo could have preempted Cesar's repossession of the knife with swift,
successive, and injurious blows. Rather, Leo held his ground and was
forced to act only when Cesar repossessed the fan knife. Second, there
was a threatening presence of Charles who was holding a gun that
could be fired at any given moment during the incident. If Leo was
actuated by homicidal intentions, he would have persisted in his attack
against Cesar and thereafter, he would have also raced off an attack
against Charles to preempt a possible gunfire. Leo would have
attempted to kill Charles as well, but he did nothing of that sort. Leo
only acted reactively and retaliated blows only against the striking
aggressor. Third, Leo voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities
after the incident. As the Court repeatedly observed, unexplained flight
is an indication of guilt.[42] The guilty flee when no man pursueth but
the innocent are as bold as a lion.[43]
In sum, the rule is that the reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel or prevent the attack depends upon the imminent
danger of injury.[44] Cesar's act of attacking Leo and Leonardo with a
:
fan knife was a very real danger to their lives. Charles' possession of a
gun, which could be fired anytime during the stabbing commotion,
exacerbates the danger that lurks on Leo and Leonardo's mortality. Leo
had to repel the best way he can especially that Leonardo, who was
already injured, cannot be expected to aid in his defense. Lastly, that
the stomach wound which Leo inflicted upon Cesar proved to be fatal
does not make the means he employed any less reasonable under the
circumstances. Taken together, Leo is entitled to an acquittal on the
grounds of self-defense and defense of relative.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June
28, 2019 and the Resolution dated November 12, 2019 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41325 are REVERSED. Petitioner Leo
Abuyo y Sagrit is ACQUITTED of the crime of Homicide and ORDERED
to be RELEASED IMMEDIATELY from detention, unless he is being
lawfully held for another cause. Let entry of judgment be issued
immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The
Director is directed to report to this Court the action taken within five
(5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
[1]
People v. Olarbe, 836 Phil. 1015, 1028-1029 (2018).
[2] Rollo, pp. 12-21.
:
[3]
Id. 27-36. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo,
with the concurrence of Associate Justices Danton Q. Bueser and
Rafael Antonio M. Santos.
[4]
Id. at 39-40.
[5]
Id. at 28-29 and 51-53. See also TSN, June 14, 2012, pp. 4-14; and
TSN, July 10, 2012, pp. 6-12.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 29 and 52. See also TSN, September 10, 2014, p. 7; and
TSN, June 9, 2015, pp. 3-4.
[7]
Records, p. 1.
[8]
Id. at 24.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 29 and 51-52.
[10] Id. at 51-57. Penned by Presiding Judge Roberto A. Escaro.
[11]
Id. at 54-57.
[12]
Id. at 56-57.
[13]
Id. at 27-36.
[14]
Id. at 36.
[15]
Id. at 39-40.
[16]
Id. at 12-21.
[17]
Id. at 17-19.
:
[18]
Id. at 29 and 51-52.
[19]
Labosta v. People, G.R. No. 243926, June 23, 2020,
<https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/14874/>.
[20]
People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 229349, January 29, 2020,
<https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/13073/>.
[21]
People v. Eduarte, 265 Phil. 304, 309 (1990).
[22]
People v. Fontanilla, 680 Phil. 155, 165 (2012).
[23]
Calim v. CA, 404 Phil. 391, 402 (2001).
[24]
Andal v. Sandiganbayan, 258-A Phil. 591, 596 (1989).
[25] People v. Encomienda, 150-B Phil. 419, 434 (2003).
[26]
People v. Nabora, 73 Phil. 434, 435 (1941).
[27]
Rollo, pp. 34 and 55-56.
[28]
Espinosa v. People, 629 Phil. 432, 438 (2010); and People v.
Gutual, 324 Phil. 244, 259-260 (1996).
[29]
People v. Olarbe, 836 Phil. 1015, 1029 (2018), citing Jayme v.
People, 372 Phil. 796, 803-804 (1999).
[30]
People v. Olarbe, id., citing Baker v. Commonwealth, 677 S. W.
2d 876.
[31]
People v. Olarbe, id., citing State v. Leidholm, 334 N. W. 2d 811;
and Tanguma v. State, App. -Corpus Christi, 721 S. W. 2d 408.
:
[32]
People v. Olarbe, id., citing 40 CJS Sec. 131.
[33]
Rollo, pp. 34 and 55-56.
[34]
Id. at 55-56.
[35]
Id. at 34.
[36]
People v. Agripa, 284-A Phil. 93, 99-100 (1992).
[37]
836 Phil. 1015 (2018).
[38]
Id. at 1030.
[39]G.R. No. 248130, December 2, 2020,
<https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/16790/>.
[40]
Id.
[41]
Cano v. People, 459 Phil. 416, 436 (2003).
[42]
People v. Dejucos, 240 Phil. 425, 430 (1987); People v. Hecto,
219 Phil. 625, 635 (1985); and People v. Millarpe, 219 Phil. 508, 512-
513 (1985).
[43]
People v. Espinosa, 259 Phil. 884, 890 (1989).
[44]
Masipequiña v. CA, 257 Phil. 710, 717 (1989), citing U.S. v. Paras,
9 Phil. 367, 370 (1907).
:
