2025:BHC-OS:11538

Sumedh 32-oswpl-16615-2025-J.doc

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (L) NO.16615 OF 2025

1. Lovkesh Kumar Satyanarayan Mishra ]

S/o Satyanarayan Ramadhar Mishra, ]
Aged 47 years. ]

2. Saroja Lavkesh Mishra ]

W/o Lovkesh Satyanarayan Mishra, ]
Aged 38 years. ]
Both residing at 3D/2208, ]
New Hind Mill, ]
Mazgaon, Mumbai – 400 033. ] …Petitioners

Versus

1. Satyanarayan Ramadhar Mishra ]

S/o Ramadhar Mishra, aged 76 years, ]
Residing at room no 06, ]
Mauli Apartment, ]
Achole Road, Shankheshwar Nagar, ]
Nalasopara (E), Palghar, ]
Maharashtra – 401 209. ]

2. The State of Maharashtra ]

Through Government Pleader, ]
High Court, Bombay. ] …Respondents

Mr. Ashish Dubey for the Petitioner.

CORAM : KAMAL KHATA, J.

RESERVED ON : 16th May, 2025.
PRONOUNCED ON : 22nd July, 2025.

JUDGMENT:

1) By this Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

Digitally
signed by
SUMEDH
SUMEDH NAMDEO
NAMDEO SONAWANE
SONAWANE Date:
2025.07.22
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India, the petitioners seek to challenge and set aside the impugned

Order dated 8th May, 2025 passed by the Presiding Officer, Parents

and Senior Citizens Subsistence and Tribunal and Deputy Collector

Mumbai (S.P.) Mumbai City, in Case No. K.S.P./TE5/Parent

Order/2024/09/6946.

2) By the said impugned order, the Petitioners - husband

and his wife – have been directed to vacate the Room No. 2208, F-22

W-DPCS No 749, 8/216 3 D Mill Workers Building within 60 days of

the order.

3) Mr. Ashish Dubey, learned advocate for the Petitioners,

submits that the Petitioners are the son and daughter-in-law of Shri

Satyanarayan Ramadhar Mishra, a senior citizen, aged 76. He

further submits that, the Petitioners have been residing at Room

No.2-B, Raju Kamathi Chawl, Rambhau Bhogale Marg, Ghodapdev,

Mumbai 400 033, since its allotment in 2014.

4) He submits that the father of the Petitioner filed an

Application under Section 5(1) of the Maintenance and Welfare of

Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (‘Maintenance Act’) before the

Tribunal, seeking eviction of the Petitioners from the aforementioned

premises, along with a demand for maintenance. It was alleged by the

Respondents that the Petitioners had failed to maintain him and had

not extended any support for nearly ten years. It was further alleged

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that the Petitioners had threatened to implicate the senior citizen in

false cases. Additionally, the Respondents contended that the

Petitioners were in possession of another property at Nalasopara,

which they had let out on rent.

5) He contended that the Respondent has already

distributed his ancestral property—including agricultural land,

residential premises, bank deposits, and gold—among his other three

sons, while unjustly depriving Petitioner No. 1 of his rightful share.

6) Heard Mr. Dubey for the Petitioners and perused the

papers.

7) In my considered view, the order passed by the Tribunal

is just, equitable, and rendered with due application of mind. The

Petitioners have no legal right to occupy the premises of the senior

citizen, namely the father, especially when the said premises stand in

his sole name. The submission that the Petitioners were willing to

maintain the senior citizen is of no assistance to them. Such

willingness does not confer any entitlement to reside in the property

of the senior citizen against his expressed wishes.

8) The Tribunal has rightly considered all relevant aspects,

and there is no perversity in the impugned order. The contentions

raised by the Petitioners—namely, that the father has already

distributed his wealth among the other siblings; that the impugned

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premises constitute their only shelter; that Petitioner No. 1 is a taxi

driver with modest income; that the senior citizen owes reciprocal

obligations; and that the Petitioners have been residing at the said

premises along with their family since 1989—do not create any

enforceable right in favour of the Petitioners to continue to occupy

the premises of the senior citizen contrary to his will, especially

when the said premises are owned solely by him.

9) The judgment in Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of

India1—rendered under the Press Council Act, 1978—deals with the

interpretation of the expressions “retiring member” and

“renomination” and affirms the principle that grammatical and plain

meanings should be preferred, unless such interpretation leads to

absurdity, anomaly, or is displaced by compelling contextual

material warranting a different construction. However, the said

decision does not support the proposition that when proceedings are

pending before a competent court, parallel proceedings on the same

subject matter ought necessarily to be stayed to prevent conflicting

decisions.

10) In my considered view, the said judgment has no

application to the facts of the present case. Moreover, the proposition

advanced by the Petitioners—that parallel proceedings on the same

subject matter must be stayed—is not applicable in the context of

1
(2002) 3 SCC 722

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Writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The

Writ Court exercises wide and plenary powers, which are not fettered

by the existence of proceedings before another forum. In any event,

the suit instituted by the Petitioner before the City Civil Court,

seeking rights in the Respondent’s property, cannot operate as a bar

to the maintainability of proceedings initiated under the

Maintenance Act which stands on an altogether distinct and

independent statutory footing.

11) The judgment in Kale v. Deputy Director of

Consolidation2, relied upon by the Petitioners, pertains to the validity

of a family settlement and does not lay down the proposition that a

father is precluded from distributing his property in an arbitrary or

capricious manner so as to disinherit one of his sons without just

cause or reason. The reliance placed on the said judgment is

misconceived and, in the facts of the present case, is wholly

inapplicable and of no assistance to the Petitioners.

12) The judgment in Chameli Singh Versus State of Uttar

Pradesh3, which holds that the right to shelter forms an integral part

of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, is wholly

inapplicable to the present case. The Petitioners have themselves

admitted to having alternative accommodation at their native place

2
(1976) 3 SCC 119
3
(1996) 2 SCC 549

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in Uttar Pradesh. The right to shelter under Article 21 does not

extend to securing a shelter of one’s choice, nor does it entitle the

Petitioners to forcibly impose their residence upon a father who is

unwilling to offer accommodation to them and their family.

13) In the considered opinion of this Court, the Petitioner—

under the guise of expressing readiness and willingness to maintain

the parent—cannot compel his presence, along with that of his family,

upon a parent who is unwilling to accommodate them, for any reason

whatsoever.

14) The financial hardship faced by the Petitioner cannot be a

ground to foist upon the father the responsibility of housing the

Petitioner and his family. This Court is unable to accept the

contention that a father bears any reciprocal legal obligation to

maintain an adult son and his dependents.

15) The interpretation of Section 4(1) of the Maintenance

Act, as advanced by the Petitioner, is wholly misplaced. The phrase

“due regard to the means of the children” merely requires that the

financial capacity of the children—who must necessarily be adults—be

taken into account when determining the amount of maintenance

payable to a parent. The Section, or indeed the Act as a whole, does

not impose any reciprocal obligation upon parents to maintain their

adult children.

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16) The other grounds of failure to serve and be granted a fair

hearing are also falsely pleaded in as much as the impugned Order

records their presence and consideration of their written and oral

response.

17) Additionally, the Petitioners have failed to approach the

Appellate Tribunal under Section 16(a) of the Maintenance Act and

has directly filed a Writ instead thus even on the ground that an

alternate remedy was available to the Petitioners, the Petition is not

maintainable.

18) In view of the aforesaid findings, the Petition is dismissed

with no order as to costs.

(KAMAL KHATA, J.)

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