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HOOVER WAR LIBRARY PUBLICATIONS — NO. 13

Allied Propaganda and the Collapse

of the German Empire
in 1918
PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE
DIRECTORS OF THE HOOVER WAR LIBRARY
HOOVER WAR LIBRARY PUBLICATIONS— No. 13

ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE

COLLAPSE OF THE GERMAN
EMPIRE IN 1918

By

GEORGE G. BRUNTZ

1938
STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CALIFORNIA
LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CALIFORNIA
LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
THE BAKER AND TAYLOR COMPANY
55 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK

MARTINUS NIJHOFF
9 LANGE VOORHOUT, THE HAGUE

THE MARUZEN COMPANY

TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, SENDAI

COPYRIGHT I 938 BY THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

OF THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY

PRINTED AND BOUND IN THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA BY STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

L
 FOREWORD
here is little exaggeration in saying that the World
War led to the discovery of propaganda by both the
man in the street and the man in the study. The
discovery was far more startling to the former than to the latter,

because the man in the study had predecessors who had laid

firm foundations for his efforts to understand propaganda. The

layman had previously world where there was no
lived in a
common name for the deliberate forming of attitudes by the
manipulation of words (and word substitutes). The scholar
had a scientific inheritance which included the recognition of
the place of propaganda in society.
If we cannot say that the scholars were taken by surprise,
however, we can at least admit that they were not entirely pre-
pared. It is had neglected to give the subject that
true that they
sustained, comparative, and critical attention which leads to the
production of an abundant literature under unified intellectual
control. The specialists on abstract words about social processes
were cut off from writers who described specific and limited
aspects of propaganda. Political scientists and sociologists
wrote about propaganda, but they wrote for one another. Stu-
dents of advertising wrote for students of advertising. Revo-
lutionary tacticians wrote for revolutionary tacticians. Mis-
sionaries wrote for missionaries. There was no common body
of concepts, propositions, and procedures which unified the dis-
parate efforts of isolated observers.
In the years before the World War there were several
factors which combined to retard the candid, comprehensive
analysis of the place of propaganda in public life. The study of
propaganda (the manipulation of symbols) requires some fa-
miliarity with the significance of symbols, and at the beginning
of the nineteenth century the intellectuals who were most inter-
ested in symbolic factors in social development were impressed
vi ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
by the comparative permanence of “racial” or “national” atti-
tudes. They were prepared to minimize what could be done by
the deliberate manipulation of symbols, since they were busy
emphasizing the tenacity with which the distinctive “soul” of
the people sought and found expression from age to age. They
collected the folk-lore of the common people for the sake of
exhibiting the mystic unity of the nation and the permanence
of the “soul” which transcended the superficial accidents of a
single historical epoch.
These intellectuals of the “conservative reaction” wrote
during the early decades of the nineteenth century when an em-
phasis on predestination could be used to deflate the hopes of
those who sought to accomplish revolutionary ends. Those who
participated in the French revolutionary epoch relied on pre-
meditation; they had every confidence in the power of the mind
to shear through the accumulated error of the ages and to guide
men toward happiness and truth. The intellectuals of the con-
servative reaction discovered predestination, and this they ex-
alted at the expense of premeditation. Hence propaganda, as a
form of premeditated activity, came in for scant consideration.
The social revolutionists who rose to challenge the “con-
servative reaction” turned the weapon of predestinarianism
against its formulators. Seeking revolution instead of conser-
vation, they agreed that the social process was determined in
advance, but insisted that its predestined path lay toward revo-
lution. New forms were said to be adumbrating in the
social
inner recesses of the predominating pattern of society. New
subjective attitudes were treated as if they were largely pre-
destined by the material forms of production. With so much
emphasis upon predestination, the theoreticians of revolution
put more emphasis upon “material factors” than upon “propa-
ganda.” They relied chiefly upon propaganda; but they de-
emphasized the role of propaganda in the revolutionary process
itself.

We are not surprised to find that the established rulers of

society were reluctant to attach very much importance to propa-
 FOREWORD vii

ganda. The proponents (propagandists) of the established

symbols, like “monarchy,” did not have much to offer about
the nature of the propaganda which they believed would defend
monarchy. The apologists for “democracy” invoked the “will
of the people,” and were rather loath to describe how it was
possible to manipulate the popular will.
The World War drastically changed the relationship of the
established order of society to propaganda. The principal gov-
ernments saw at once that psychological war must accompany
economic war and military war. They took seriously the task
of psychological mobilization, and they felt the impact of the
psychological campaigns of their rivals.
The governments began to talk freely about propaganda.
They could impute “propaganda” or “lying propaganda” not
to themselves, but to the enemy and they could refer to their
;

own psychological manipulations as “information” or “truth-

ful propaganda.”
When the war came to an end, the Russian, German, and
Italian revolutions kept the subject alive before the world pub-
lic. It became perfectly propaganda
clear that the practice of
and the practice of talking about propaganda were dominating
characteristics of this historical period.
Official emphasis upon propaganda during the postwar
years has been connected with the hope of using “propaganda
to end propaganda.” Rulers cherish the hope of using propa-
ganda to unify national faith; hence the monopolization of
propaganda instrumentalities in states like Russia, Italy, and
Germany. The ruling groups seek exclusive control of the
focus of attention of the young, confident that when attitudes
are once thoroughly crystallized around the symbols of the
nation such attitudes will transmit themselves spontaneously,
thus ending the necessity for relying on propaganda.
In view of the pivotal position of the World War in rela-
tion to propaganda, studies of the role of propaganda during
the war are especially welcome. Exaggerations of many kinds
have grown up around the function of propaganda during the
viii ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
struggle, and there is continual need for critical studies which
view the act of propaganda in correct relationship to other
political acts. Dr. Bruntz has written a volume which is dis-

tinguished alike by diligent research and discriminating judg-

ment. Scholars everywhere will recognize that it is an admir-
able contribution to the history of the war and the knowledge
of propaganda.
This is the book of a disciplined historian who has con-
ducted his studies in the way best calculated to aid the advance-
ment of knowledge. Dr. Bruntz is a specialist on the period he;

is saturated in the records of modern history. He is also a

specialist in comparative history (“social science”) ;
he has
sought to organize his knowledge of the period so clearly that
his results would be directly available for comparative purposes.
He has used general terms like “propaganda” in an understand-
able sense, and he has described the phenomena which he calls
propaganda in a definitely circumscribed time and place. It is
easy to compare what he has so carefully brought together with
the work of other students who have described acts of propa-
ganda in the same general setting or in quite different settings.
Dr. Bruntz has written the kind of history which is most
helpful in advancing the common intellectual enterprise of all
who concern themselves with the understanding of man and
his acts.
Harold D. Lasswell
The University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
January 31, 1938
 PREFACE
ntil the appearance, in 1927, of Harold Dwight Lass-
1
well’s Propaganda Technique in the World War,
writers on the World War period had paid no particu-
lar attention to the subject of wartime propaganda. Lasswell’s
study was the first to describe the general use made of propa-
ganda by belligerent nations in an effort to influence the popu-
lace in the country of an enemy.
The present study of the use that the Allied Powers made
of propaganda as an instrument for the destruction of German
morale was begun in 1928. Since that time Dr. Hans Thimme’s
Weltkrieg ohne Waffen 2 has made its appearance. Much of the
research and practically the entire plan of organization of this
study were completed before the appearance of Dr. Thimme’s
work.
To Mr. Philip McLean, the Reference Librarian of the
Hoover War Library, and to Dr. Russell Buchanan, the writer
is grateful for their willing co-operation in assembling material
for this study. Professor Ralph H. Lutz, under whose direc-
tion this study was made, and Professor H. H. Fisher gave
helpful suggestions of which the writer is deeply appreciative.
Of the illustrations provided, the Chart of German Civilian
Morale from a photostat of the original furnished by the
is

United States War Department General Staff, and the rest are
from originals in the Hoover War Library of Stanford Uni-
versity.

Los Gatos, California George G. Bruntz

February 1, 1938

1 Harold Dwight Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War

(New York, 1927).
2 Dr. Hans Thimme, Weltkrieg ohne Waffen, die Propaganda der West-

mdchte gegen Deutschland, ihre Wirkung und ihr Aufbau (Stuttgart and
Berlin, 1932).

IX
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Foreword By Harold D. Lasswell v
Introduction 3
Chapter I. Propaganda Organization 8
France 8
England 18
The United States 30
Attempt at Co-ordination 39
Chapter II. Propaganda Methods and Tactics . . 41
France 41
England 50
The United States 59
Chapter III. Neutral Countries as Bases of Attack 68
Switzerland 69
Holland 76
Chapter IV. Analysis of Propaganda 85
Propaganda of Enlightenment 85
Propaganda of Despair 102
Propaganda of Hope 106
Particularist Propaganda 113
Chapter V. Revolutionary Propaganda
Bolshevik Propaganda
.... 130
144
Chapter VI. Internal Conditions of Germany an
Aid to Propaganda 156
The Dolchstoss Question 156
The Food Situation 161
The Political Situation 169
Chapter VII. Measuring the Effect of Propaganda 188
Reports of the Psychological Subsection of the United States
Army 189
German Efforts at Counter-Propaganda 194
Desertion among the Troops 203
Letters of German Soldiers 206
Army Orders Dealing with Propaganda 209
Conclusion 217
Bibliography 223
Appendices 233
XI
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
PAGE

German Emigres Attack the Fatherland 49

Letter of a German Prisoner 61
A Bit of Enlightenment 88
The Victories of the Allies 90
America Is Coming! 92
Propaganda of Despair 101
Gratitude ! 105
A Bit of French Propaganda 108
Examples of American Propaganda 117
A Call to the People of Alsace-Lorraine 121
An Appeal to the Bavarians 124
An Attack upon the Kaiser 133
“Why Do They Murmur?” 136
An Invitation from Russia 140
Sections of the Chart of German Civilian Morale following 192
German Counter-Propaganda 202
A Message from Hindenburg 215

xiii
Allied Propaganda and the Collapse
of the German Empire
 INTRODUCTION
Ein geistreich aufgeschlossenes Wort wirkt auf
die Ewigkeit. Goethe
Worte sind heute Schlachten: Richtige Worte
gewonnene Schlachten, falsche Worte verlo-
rene Schlachten. Ludendorff

In no other war in history have “words” been so important

as in the world conflict of 1914-1918. Along with the develop-
ment of and other marvels of
airplanes, tanks, poison gases,
military technique, a propaganda system for purposes of war-
fare was then set up which for scientific perfection rivaled the
military system. Organized on a large scale and supplied with
government funds, the propaganda instrumentalities of the war-
ring nations carried on an intensive warfare by word of mouth,
in the press, and through leaflets, books, and pamphlets.
This modern emphasis upon words and pictures resulted
from the changes in the nature of war in recent times. In time
of war today the co-operation of the people with the govern-
ment is more necessary than it was a century or even half a
century ago. In earlier times the result of the combat on the
field of battle decided the fate of nations; but conditions of
modem warfare have so enormously increased the value of the
moral factors that war of late is less a question of armies pitted
against armies than of nations against nations. The entire men-
tal and moral forces, as well as the physical forces, of nations
are hurled against the enemy. What Lincoln said about public
sentiment is particularly true in time of war: “Public opinion
is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail, without
it nothing can succeed.” And John W. Dafoe quotes Hume as
having said

As forcealways on the side of the governed, the governors have

is

nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore on opinion only

3
4 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
that government is founded and this maxim extends to the most des-
;

potic and most military government as well as to the most popular. 1

Propaganda may be defined as the presentation of a case in

such a way as to influence in a desired direction the opinions
and actions of others. This is best accomplished by continually
repeating expressions of a dominant fact, idea, or principle.
The ultimate objects of propaganda in war are threefold:
( 1 ) overcome opposition to the war within the propagan-
to
dizing nation and to bolster the spirit of its people; (2) to win
favorable action or support from neutral states; and (3) to
promote opposition to the conflict within the enemy state and
thus to destroy the enemy’s will to fight.
Every warring nation set up machinery, soon after it en-
tered the World War, to create a favorable state of mind at
home and to kill opposition to the war. Soon a great deal of
attention was paid to propaganda in neutral countries, especially
2
Switzerland, Holland, and the United States. In the last years
of the war the governments and finally also the military leaders
came to the realization that it was necessary to attack the enemy
with “word bullets’’ as well as with steel bullets. The destruc-
tion of the enemy morale by the dissemination of defeatist, dis-
heartening, and, finally, revolutionary leaflets, pamphlets, books,
etc., was undertaken in a vast and well-organized manner dur-
ing the war’s last years.
Thus to the main business in war of actual physical maim-
ing was added the more subtle business of slaughtering enemy
morale. The author of the verse:

Nicht mit dem Riistzeug der Barbaren,

Mit Spiess und Schwert man nicht mehr haut;

1
Quincy Wright (ed.), Public Opinion and World Affairs (Chicago,
1933), p. 4.
2
England conducted aterrific campaign of propaganda in the United
States through Wellington House before we entered the war. For the work
of Wellington House, see James Duane Squires, British Propaganda at Home
and in the United States from 1914 to 1917 (Cambridge, 1935).
 INTRODUCTION 5

Nein ! Motorbattieren fahren,

Und Bomben wirft der Aeronaut 3

might well have added a second verse as follows

Mit Gas Kanonen und Grenaten,
Die siegen am jeden Ortf
Mit Flugblattern fur die Kameraden
Tut jetzt man ein schrecklicher Mord.

Although propaganda as an instrument of warfare had been

developed on a large scale only in the World War, it had been
used as such before. There is a striking parallel between the
propaganda of the American Revolution and that of the World
War. In the Revolution the Tories pointed out that the Revo-
lution “flew in the face of experience, history, and divine sanc-
tion.” The spirit of rebellion, argued the Tory propaganda,
was stirred up by a few crafty men who had played upon the
ignorance and passions of the mob. These conspirators were
an “infernal, dark-designing group of men, bankrupt shop-
keepers, outlawed smugglers, wretched banditti, the refuse of
4
the dregs of mankind .”
When the Hessians came over to fight the Colonists for
George the Third, it was proposed to win them over to the side
of the Colonists with resolutions of Congress translated into
German and floated over into the hands of their sentinels. A
little tobacco, it was thought, would increase the allurement of
5
their bait Occasionally, matters favorable to the American
.

cause were published in the papers. To gain the friendship of

the French in Canada the expenses of a French printer were
ordered paid to remove his “family and type” to Montreal and
6
there set up a “free press .”

3 Introductory remarks to the Air Post collection of propaganda leaflets,

Hoover War Library.
4 Charles and Mary Beard, Rise of American Civilization (New York,
1927), I, 269.
5 Claude van Tyne,
The War of Independence (Boston, 1930), II, 318.
See also Letters of Continental Congress (Burnet, ed.), Vol. I, Nos. 235,
237, 238; Vol. II, Nos. 59 and 63. 6 Claude van Tyne,
op. cit., p. 319.
6

ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE

Nor was that all. Shipwrights in England were tempted
with “bags of gold” to demand higher wages or to desert their
work and migrate to America where they could be “happy as
7
doves.” In order to get the British to desert to the Americans
the Colonists circulated handbills among the British troops on
Bunker Hill, offering them seven dollars a month, fresh provi-
sions in plenty, health, freedom, ease, and a good farm should
they desert and join the American Army. The British on their
part gave promises of forgiveness, land, and money to all
Americans who would come over to the British side.
But if propaganda was in this elementary stage at the time
of the American Revolution, it reached the postgraduate stage
in the World War. During the first two years of the war the

governments were busy with the task of bringing public opinion

at home to a war pitch and with the more strictly military side
of the war. But by 1917, when the war had reached the en-
trenchment stage and fewer military movements were made,
the attack of “word bullets” began. Organizations, official and
unofficial, were set up in every warring nation to combat the

enemy with words. These organizations soon made their efforts

felt, and from the beginning of 1918 this battle of words grew

more intense each month until it reached its point of greatest

activity in September. This “geistliche Schlacht” did not cease
until the collapse of the German Empire, with its Prussian mili-
tary system and Junkerism, was complete. Never was it more
clearly demonstrated that “Ein geistreiches Wort wirkt auf die
Ewigkeit.”
Thus, the World War
was a struggle of arms and ideas, of
words as well as of explosives and steel. When Lord Northcliffe
took over the direction of propaganda in enemy countries for
England in February 1918, he said that he hoped propaganda
would be the means of appreciably shortening the duration of
8
the war. And again, in the spring of the same year, E. E.

7
Van Tyne, op. cit., p. 161.
8 The Times, London, February 18, 1918.
 INTRODUCTION 7

Slosson said: “The war has resolved itself to a question of

morale. Which people will lose heart first?” 9 While Hinden-
burg is quoted as having prophesied, “He who keeps his nerve
the longest wins the war.”
Just how the Allies organized this attack upon the morale
of Germany, how they bombarded the German lines with leaf-
lets, pamphlets, books, and newspapers, and what success they
had in achieving their purpose the pages that follow will nar-
rate.

9 Independent Magazine, March 30, 1918.

 CHAPTER I

PROPAGANDA ORGANIZATION
The conditions of modern warfare have
now so enormously increased the value of the
moral factor that it is less a question of armies
being arrayed against armies than of nations
against nations —so that the civilian front is

scarcely, if any, less important than the fight'

ing front. —T. L. Gilmour, Nineteenth Century
and After, LXXXV, 148

FRANCE
Immediately upon the outbreak of the war the civil govern-
ment of France was overshadowed by the military, which at
once gained control of the press and other agencies of public
opinion. At the gathering of Paris journalists and the Council
of Ministers on August 5, 1914, it was announced that no news
concerning mobilization and movements of the army or even
of diplomatic operations that would react unfavorably upon the
spirit of the army was to be published in the French press. 1

1 Le Petit Journal, August 6, 1914. Practically the same was true in Ger-
many. The following order from the chief of police in Hamburg is illustra-
tive of the manner in which the military tried to control public opinion there.
For a fine collection of documents on German censorship during the war, see
R. H. Lutz, The Fall of the German Empire (Stanford University, 1932);
the following document is from this collection (I, 176) :

“Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg

(Police Department)
“Secret ....
Hamburg, March 20, 1915. J.Nr. 2437/15. IV.M.
“Your attention is called to the order making the publication of all accounts of our
military operations subject to the permission of the Chief of Staff of our Field Army.
This order applies not only to detailed reports of our operations that are still going on
but also to operations that have already been brought to an end.
“The permission of the Chief of the General Staff may be obtained by applying
to the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff, Berlin.
“Dr. Roscher, Chief of Police.”

8
 ORGANIZATION 9

Only the news sent out by the War

Department was to be pub-
lished. The General Headquarters of the French Army set up
2

an information section under the Military Intelligence Division,

which issued bulletins and stories to the press. At first this
bureau was under the leadership of Colonel Carence. M. Andre
Tardieu also took a great interest in it and assumed the task of
3
editing the daily communiques and the official reports.
No one at that time believed that the war would last long;
hence a psychological attack upon the enemy was not considered
at the outset of the war. The immediate need was a concentra-
tion upon the military phase, for an invading enemy had to be
checked. The French government was consequently late in en-
tering the field of propaganda activity against the enemy. To
be sure, three days after the outbreak of the war the Foreign
Minister, Viviani, had received an appropriation of 25 million
4
francs for propaganda purposes. But it was not until Briand
came into power in 1916 that steps were taken by the Foreign
Office to make use of this original appropriation. The War
Department seemed equally neglectful of the psychological side
of the war. Early in the war, however, a group of men in the
Military Intelligence Section of the General Headquarters con-
ducted unorganized and spasmodic attacks upon the enemy with
leaflets. Out of the efforts of these men there gradually evolved
the “Service de propagande,” which became the propaganda
agency of the General Headquarters. Under the direction of
Etienne Fournol it remained the only official agency for the at-
tack upon the enemy morale until 1916, when the French gov-
ernment established the “Maison de la presse” in Paris.

2 France, Assemblee Nationale, Annales de la Chambre des Deputes, Ses-

sions ordinaires et extraordinaires de 1914. Tome II (Paris, 1915), p. 915.
3
Jean de Pierrefeu, French Headquarters 1915-1918, tr. from the French
by Major C. J. C. Street, O.B.E., M.C. (London, 1927), p. 85.
4 France, Assemblee Nationale, Annales de la Chambre des Deputes,
Documents parlementaires, Tome LXXXXI, Session ordinaire de 1917,
Deuxieme partie (Paris, 1918), p. 1712, Annexe 3982, and p. 2030, An-
nexe 4084.
10 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
However, despite the fact that an official organization was
slow in developing, propaganda was not entirely neglected.
France was in a fortunate position at the outbreak of the war
in that she had many existing organizations all over Europe

designed to spread French culture. These could easily be con-

verted into agencies for the dissemination of war propaganda.
The most outstanding of these was the Alliance Franqaise
which had been founded in July 1883 by Pierre Foncin. 5 Three
years later it had received the official approbation of the
French government. Until the outbreak of the war it had
steadily increased its membership, and by 1914 it comprised
6
over 60,000 members. During the war its chief efforts were
devoted to war propaganda. Among its members were almost
all of the high French officials, ministers, and generals. Jules

Gautier, a member of the Cabinet Council, was its president

during the war period.
The Alliance Franqaise published a Bulletin regularly on
the first and the fifteenth of each month, the first appearing in
7
November 1914. This was a news sheet intended to give war
information to people all over Europe. Published first in Span-
ish and French, it came out in seven different languages in
March 1915, and by April 1916 it appeared in French, German,
English, Danish, Dutch, Swedish, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian,
and Greek. 8 With agents in all of the neutral countries, the
Alliance was in a position to get information of all kinds and
to use it to good advantage in its Bulletin. It published many
atrocity stories, and in some numbers the propaganda is directed

5 Edgar Stern- Rubarth, “Methods of

Political Propaganda,” in Quincy
Wright (ed.), Public Opinion and World Politics (Chicago, 1933), p. 102.
6
Dr. George Huber, Die fransdsische Propaganda irn Weltkrieg gegen
Deutschland 1914 bis 1918 (Munich, 1928), p. 35. Dr. Huber has made the
most thorough study of all phases of French wartime propaganda that has
appeared thus far. Hereafter cited Fransdsische Propaganda.
7
Bulletin de L’ Alliance frangaise, No. 1, November 1, 1914.
8 A fairly complete file of the Bulletin can be found in the Hoover War
Library at Stanford University.
 ORGA> UZATION 11

at the Alsatians and Lorraine- s in the German Army, calling

on them to desert to the French and thus help free their prov-
inces from the yoke of the Prussian militarists.
As war progressed, the organization of the Alliance
the
Fran^aise expanded into a number of different bureaus or de-
partments. There were eight of these, of which only one con-
cerns us in this study. This was the one for the dissemination
of propaganda among various religious groups. The Roman
Catholics, for instance, were organized to propagandize among
the Catholics in neutral and enemy countries, the Protestants
among Protestants, and the Jews among Jews. Each of these
9
three religious faiths had an active propaganda committee.
The most active and the largest of these three committees
was that of the Catholic faith, the “Comite catholique de propa-
gande fran^aise a l’etranger.” Organized in 1915, the Comite
catholique soon had over 50 members, including the Arch-
bishops of Rheims and of Paris and Denys Cochin, member
of the French Academy and Minister of State. The head of
this committee was M. A. Baudrillart, rector of the Catholic
10
Institute of Paris.
The Comite catholique entered into a publication agreement
with Bloud et Gay in Paris. The most notable publication of
this committee was La Guerre allemande et le catholicisme. This
collection of essays by persons of high estate appeared in six
different languages — French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian,
English, and German. Over 65,000
it were distributed
copies of
gratis by April 1916. Many of the essays were published singly
in pamphlet form also and given wide circulation.
Branches of the Comite catholique were organized in most
of the neutral countries, and on March 7, 1917, a general or-
ganization, “L’union sacree de la propaganda,” was effected,
which had charge of propaganda work of the committee.
all

The principal duties of the central committee were to edit and

9 Huber, op. cit., p. 40.
10 M.
Baudrillart tells the story of his campaign in his Une campagne
francaise (Paris, 1917).
12 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AN 3 THE GERMAN EMPIRE
distribute propaganda, send mis dons and
to foreign countries,
11
take action through the press. The burden of the propaganda
was that the war was a religious war, a war by Prussia against
Catholicism ; and an appeal was made not only to Catholics
generally but specifically to Catholics in southern Germany.
Similar activities were carried on by the “Comite protestant
de la propagande frangaise a l’etranger,” which sprang up in

September 1915. Less is known of this body, since it was

almost completely eclipsed by the very active Catholic organiza-
tion. It sought especially to influence the Protestants in neutral
countries by acquainting them with the cause of the conflict and
with Germany’s imperialist designs. 12 It tried also to show that
Germany’s struggle was not only against Catholicism but
against religion in general. Examples of this type of propa-
ganda are Doumergue’s L’Allemagne religieuse, and Monnier’s
Le Dien allemand et la reformed 3
Andre Weiss, professor of the faculty of law at Paris, was
the head of this committee. At first the Comite protestant
frangaise worked in co-operation with the Protestant publica-
tion, Foi et vie; but by December 1915 it had its own monthly
1*
publication, the Bulletin protestant frangaise.
The last of this trio of religious propaganda committees
was the “Comite d’action aupres des juifs des pays neutres,”
more commonly known as Comite Israelite. M. Leygues was
the president of this group, and M. Sylvain Levi the vice-
15
president. The Jews of Switzerland, Holland, the Scandina-
vian and the Balkan countries were especially friendly with
France, and this fact made it easy to propagandize there. The
aim of the propaganda of the Jewish committee was to declare
that, whereas Germany was the land of anti-Semitism, the

11 Jean Vic, La Litterature de guerre, manuel methodique et critique des

publications de langue frangaise (5 vols, Paris, 1923), III, 344; also Almanack
catholique pour 1920, p. 431.
12 Huber, op. cit., p. 41.
13 Baudrillart, Une campagne frangaise, p. 37.

14 Ibid., 15 Ibid., 39 also Huber, op.

p. 38. p. ;
cit., p. 43.
 ORGANIZATION 13

Jews France and England had nothing to fear; further, that,

in
not only had the Jews nothing to fear from the Allied countries
but they could actually expect protection there, and hence a vic-
16
tory for the Allies meant a victory for the Jews.
-During the first two years of the war, French unofficial
propaganda organizations seemed to spring up spontaneously.
However, since their work for the most part was to arouse
enthusiasm among the French people and to destroy opposition
to the war at home t we need not go into detail regarding them.
Suffice it to say that on March 7, 1917, some 30,000 societies,
with more than eleven million members, banded themselves
together in a“Union des grandes associations contre la propa-
gande ennemie.” 17 At the head of this vast organization were
Paul Deschanel and the historian, Ernest Lavisse. 18
The French government, though depending a great deal
upon private organizations to carry on the psychological war-
fare, likewise set up in 1914 a propaganda agency known as
the “Bureau de la presse et de l’information,” under the direc-
tion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the first two
years of the war, however, no systematic plan of organization
or attack was adopted by the government. Propaganda agen-
cies in this or that official bureau also sprang up, the largest of
which was the “Service de propaganda” under Etienne Four-
19
nol. When Briand, who of all the French statesmen was most
convinced of the value of propaganda, became Prime Minister
of Foreign Affairs in October 1915, he laid plans for a central
propaganda organization and in January 1916 set up the
16 Other propaganda organizations in France were
the Comite Franco-
Amerique, the Bibliotheque France- Amerique, and the Ligue Franqaise de
propagande (working in South America).
17 Jean Vic, La Litterature de guerre, III, 344.
18 Ibid.
; also G. Demartial, La Guerre de 1914: comment on mobilisa les
consciences (Rome, Paris, etc., 1922), p. 186 n.
19 Hans Thimme, Weltkrieg ohne JVaffen (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1932),
p. 7. Dr. Thimme’s study is one of the most authoritative works yet to ap-
pear on the subject. He had access to the official archives in Germany while
preparing his work.
14 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Maison de la presse in a six-story building of some two
hundred rooms in Rue Francois Premier in Paris 20 Under the .

direct control of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as it was,

this became the French agency for the conduct of
official

propaganda. Gradually all of the propaganda agencies were

merged with the Maison de la presse. The Paris Chamber
of Commerce bulletins, the Bulletin de l’ Alliance frangaise,
the Bulletin de I’Asie, the Bulletin de
Afrique frangaise, as l’

well as the productions of the Comite catholique, Comite

protestant, and the Comite Israelite, were issued by the Maison
21
de la presse .

Beginning its activities under the leadership of M. Berthe-

lot, this official organization was at first divided into four
main sections. The first was the Section diplomatique, which
had four subdivisions: (a) an agency for the receipt of
French and foreign journals; (b) an agency which conducted
a daily two-hour telephone service with Switzerland, England,
Italy, and Spain and which had telegraphic connections with
the United States, Russia, Roumania, Greece, Denmark, and
Holland; (c) the Bureau d’etudes, which supplied informa-
tion, with proper comments, on the happenings of the day;

and (d) the radio division, which sent out dispatches eight
times daily from the Eiffel Tower, from Lyons, and from
Carnarvon, Wales.
The second main division was the Section militaire, which
was directly connected with General Headquarters. This sec-
tion had the same duties in the military field which the diplo-
matic section had in the diplomatic field. It kept the French
and foreign journals informed concerning the war situation.
It also gave to the press diaries and letters which were found

on German soldiers, and other materials having propaganda

value.
The Section de traduction et d’analyse de presse etrangere

20 Baudrillart, op. cit.,

p. 35. It was on the top floor of this building that
Belgium atrocity pictures were made from wooden or wax figures.
21 Baudrillart, op. cit., 36 also Huber, op. cit., p. 32.
p. ;
 ORGANIZATION 15

was the third main division. It concerned .'itself 'tvith the

translation and analysis of reports from the most repre-
sentative papers of Europe. This section was subdivided ac-
cording to countries and languages, and counted among its
workers university professors and specialists. Each of the
divisions —
for German, English, Spanish, Portuguese, Ital-
ian, Greek, Roumanian, Scandinavian, Slavic, etc. gave —
weekly or fortnightly reviews of the press of the country with
which was concerned.
it

Finally, there was a section of the Maison de la presse

called the Service de propagande, which was connected with
the Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff. This
section followed the trend of opinions in the most important
countries. It contained a section for the neutral countries
bordering on Germany or Austria, so that information could
be secured from the enemy countries from the
as well as
22
neutrals. It took charge of the distribution of propaganda

leaflets, books, photographs, and films in the neutral and

enemy countries. It had agents in all the neutral countries,

receiving instructions and information from headquarters in
Paris.
For its financing the Maison de la presse was dependent
upon government appropriations. It had at its disposal the
major portion of the twenty-five million francs which, three
days after war was declared in 1914, had been voted for prop-
aganda purposes by the Chamber and the Senate. 23
Despite this organization there was still no unity in the
propaganda activity of France, for the various ministries
—
Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and War were still doing inde-
pendent work. When Clemenceau came into power in Octo-

22
Huber, op. cit., pp. 30 ff. also Hintcr der Kulissen des franzosischen
;

Journalismus, von einem Pariser Chefredakteur (Berlin, 1925), pp. 266 ff. It
is regrettable that one has to rely somuch on German sources for informa-
tion on the Maison de la presse. Though many French writers refer to it,
there is no official report of its work available.
23 Vide supra, p. 9.
16 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
ber 191 7\the .Section, militaire was handed over to the Minister
of War. The remaining were put under M. Haguenin,
sections
who was later replaced by M. Klobukowski. 24
Within the War Ministry there grew up the propaganda
agency which was to become the center of the moral offensive
against Germany —
the Service de la propagande aerienne,
often cited as “Service aerienne,” established by agreement
between the General Headquarters and the War Ministry in
25
August 191 5. Its duties were to get leaflets into the hands

of the Germans.
At first it was under the direction of M. Tonnelat, an
assistant interpreting officer. In November 1915 Hansi was
attached to the service. Hansi, or Jean Jacques Waitz, his
realname, was an Alsatian who had fled to France in the
summer of 1914 to escape punishment at the hands of the
German authorities for seditious propaganda. He was as
enthusiastic a propagandist as Lord Northcliffe and had an
advantage over the English journalist in that he wrote very
German. His work as an inter-
beautiful and highly idiomatic
preter at Epinal gave him opportunities for conversations
with German war prisoners and thus he gained a thorough
26
understanding of the psychology of the German soldier.
was while he was engaged in the work as interpreter at
It

war prison camps that he became convinced that something

should be done to shatter the belief among the Germans that
the Fatherland was on the defensive. When the book, J’accuse,
by Grelling, came into his hands, the idea occurred to him to
27
distribute the contents of this book over the German lines.
This part of his technique Hansi had learned from the Ger-

24
Vira B. Whitehouse, A Year as Government Agent (New York and
London, 1920), p. 65.
25 Hansi et Tonnelat, A Travers les lignes ennemies, Trois annees d’ offen-
sive contre le moral allemand (Paris, 1922), p. 13. The entire story of the
work of the Service aerienne is well described here.
26 Huber, op. cit., p. 57.
27 Hansi et Tonnelat, A Travers les lignes ennemies, p. 10.
 ORGANIZATION 17

mans themselves, who, in September 1914, had dropped leaf-

lets over Nancy in an effort to overawe its civilian population.

The difficulty of presenting the material of a 400-page

book Germans seemed almost too great for even Hansi’s
to the
enthusiastic mind. But he invented a letter, supposedly found
in the diary of a prisoner of war; in this letter the German
soldier, writing to a friend, marvels at the good treatment
he is receiving and tells about the book, J’accnse, which he
had found and in which the German war guilt is clearly
shown. 28 These letters were distributed along the entire
Western Front. When the Propaganda Bureau was set up
under the control of the War Ministry, all leaflets had to be
approved by that ministry and in this way Hansi’s Brief e
;

eines Kriegsgefangenen was brought to the War Ministry,

where his talent was recognized. It was then in August —
—
1915 that he was appointed to assist Tonnelat in the organ-
propagande aerienne. 29
ization of the Service de la
This propaganda bureau was a small but enthusiastic
organization, never having more than ten people on its staff at
one time. A
committee composed of Dupuis, the Abbe Wet-
terle, and Fournol met once a week to decide upon policies,
and the Imprimerie nationale (the national printing office)
was at the disposal of the Bureau.
This was the situation of the French propaganda activities
when Lord Northcliffe became the head of the British propa-
ganda organization in 1918. The English and French until
then had been working independently. Realizing the need for
greater co-operation between the French and the English
propagandists, Northcliffe called a conference at London in
March 191j8j The French delegate, appointed by the Minister
30
of Foreign Affairs, was M. Moysset. But the Service de
la propagande aerienne 31 was under, not the Ministry of

28 Ibid.,
p. 11. w Ibid.
30 Hansi Tonnelat, op.
et cit., p. 160.
31 Hereafter referred to as Service aerienne.
18 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Foreign Affairs, but the War Ministry; hence no representa-
tive from this division was present at the conference at first.
However, when the matter of air propaganda came up, a
delegate from the Service aerienne was requested. Tonnelat
was now sent to London, where Hansi’s work was openly
32
praised.
The result of the conference was the reorganization of
the propaganda agencies in France and the creation of the
Centre d’action de propagande contre l’ennemie, which en-
veloped Hansi’s organization. Thus, to the end of the war
France had two official propaganda organizations: the Maison
de la presse,which concerned itself particularly with atrocity
propaganda, propaganda in neutral countries, and propaganda
among the Catholics, Jews, and Protestants in all Europe,
Germany included and the Centre d’action de propagande
;

contre l’ennemie, which concerned itself with the tasks of

tearing down the morale of the enemy, inducing German sol-
diers to desert, and weakening the power of resistance both at
33
the front and among the German people behind the lines.

ENGLAND
The British were not so quick to recognize the value of
propaganda as an instrument of warfare as were the French.
This was perhaps due to the geographical location of the
British Isles, for it must be remembered that no enemy terri-
tory bordered upon England. Hence, for her the immediate
task was not so much the dissemination of offensive propa-
ganda abroad as the distribution of patriotic propaganda within
England. Opposition to the war at home had to be conquered
before propaganda against the enemy could be attempted. The
chief agency for carrying on a patriotic campaign in England
was the Central Committee for National Patriotic Associations,
which was formed in the latter part of August 1914. This or-

32 Hansi et Tonnelat, op. cit., p. 161.

a 3 Ibid., 170.
p.
 ORGANIZATION 19

ganization induced certain people to lecture and write upon the

causes of the war and to “justify both historically and morally,
England’s position in the struggle.” It also took steps to inform
the neutral countries of the reasonswhich “inevitably compelled
34
this country to intervene swiftly and with all her strength.”
The honorary president of the Central Committee was Prime
Minister Asquith, the vice-presidents were the Earl of Rosebery
and the Rt. Honorable Arthur Balfour, and the headquarters
35
were at 8 Carlton House Terrace.
By organizing lectures, patriotic clubs, and rallies in the

cities and in country districts throughout the Empire the

Central Committee did everything possible to overcome oppo-
sition to the war among the subjects of the British king. Sub-
committees for each of the different parts of the Empire were
formed. There was also a Neutral Countries Subcommittee,
which, though begun on a private basis in August 1914, was
36
taken over by the Central Committee the following month.
The method of this subcommittee was as far as possible one
of direct personal approach. Material was sent out, not in
the name of the committee, but in the name of various distin-
guished Britishers, whose acquaintances, colleagues, fellow
workers, or business associates in neutral lands received
oftentimes unwillingly —propaganda material prepared and
sent by the Neutral Countries Subcommittee. By this means
every possible variety of interests in the neutral countries
philosophical, educational, religious, scientific, philanthropic,
artistic, legal, medical, agricultural, mining, banking, and
commercial —was reached. 37 Some 250,000 pamphlets, book-
lets,and other publications were thus distributed between
August 1914 and January 1, 191 6. 38
The Central Committee was also in close connection with
34
Report of the Central Committee for National Patriotic Organisations
(London, 1916), p. 3; hereafter cited as C.C.N.P.O.
33 C.C.N.P.O., p. 26.

36 Ibid., p. 17.

37 C.C.N.P.O., 38 Ibid.,
p. 18. p. 22.
20 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
English universities, which helped to produce literature. Ox-
39
ford, for instance, printed the “Oxford Leaflets.”However,
the most influential piece of literature published by the com-
mittee was J’accuse, which was distributed in the original
German as well as in the French and English translations. 40
Another organization which devoted its energies to arous-
ing the patriotic spirit of the British people was the War
Aims Committee, founded in June 1917. Lloyd George, the
Prime Minister at that time, and Asquith were the heads of
41
this committee. It sought especially to combat pacifism.

Late in 1917 it was taken over by the War Cabinet, and sub-
sequently it worked in close connection with the Ministry of
Information. 42 From March 1918, when the final co-ordination
of the various phases of British propaganda was completed,
to the end of the war, this committee had charge of all propa-
ganda within Great Britain. 43
The first official propaganda organization in England for
activity elsewhere was the War Propaganda Bureau, estab-
lished by the Foreign Office in the latter part of 1914. It con-
cerned itself with the distribution of leaflets, pamphlets, and
other material in Allied and neutral countries. The director of
this bureau was the Rt. Hon. C. F. Masterman, and its head-
quarters were at Wellington House, the office of the National
Health Insurance Company. The existence of this committee
was unknown to the general public, as it was thought best

39 This was a collection of essays including' eighty-seven titles, most of

which gave a strong patriotic tinge to their otherwise authentic information.
The complete list of titles is given in G. W. Prothero, A Select List of Books
Concerning the Great War (London, 1923), pp. 344—48.
40 C.C.N.P.O., p. 24.
41 It was committee that published Lichnowsky’s Memoirs in Eng-
this
land, over a million copies of which were distributed by May 1918 ( The
Times [London], May 9, 1918).
42 Dearie, Dictionary of Official War-Time Organisations (London,
1928), p. 128.

43 The War Cabinet Report of the Year 1918, found in Reports: Com-
missions , XXX (1919), 35.
 ORGANIZATION 21

to attach as little publicity as possible to its operations at home

44
and in Allied and neutral countries.
Although Wellington House directed most of its efforts
toward winning the sympathy of the neutrals, especially Hol-
land, Switzerland, and the United States, it also concerned
itself somewhat with the task of sending propaganda into

Germany. This it did by delivering material to people in

Holland who were known to be sympathetic with the Allied
cause. These people relayed the propaganda to their friends
in Germany. Dr. Hans Thimme tells how a letter from Wei-
lington House to the British Consul-General in Holland fell
into German hands in October 1917. The letter stated in part:

Wehave prepared lists of all protestant clerics in Holland, so that

the examples can be sent directly from here. We have printed 15,000
pieces. About 4,000 will be needed here for our list and the other 1 1,000
we are sending you. We should be very happy if you could pass them
on to people who are interested in them. 45

Although the German postal inspection agencies did all

they could to prevent the influx of propaganda from Holland

into Germany, leaflets and pamphlets addressed to private
individuals in Germany continued to cross the border. A Frei-
burg University professor, Dr. Krebs, complained in Novem-
ber 1917 that one of his overindustrious Dutch friends had
sent him another heavy packet of British anti-German propa-
ganda. 46 Then, too, smuggling of leaflets into Germany was an
active business. S. A. Guest, who was connected with Wel-
lington House, undertook on his own initiative to establish
smuggling agencies in Holland, Switzerland, and the Scan-
dinavian countries. 47

44 Rear-Admiral Sir Douglas Brownrigg, Bt., Indiscretions

of a Naval
Censor (New York, 1920), p. 52 n.; also Times History of the War (Lon-
don, 1920), XXI, 328.
45 Hans Thimme, Weltkrieg ohne Waffen, p. 16.
46 Ibid.,
p. 16.
47 Times History of the War, XXI, 330; also Northcliffe, die Geschichte
des Englische propaganda Feldzuges, p. 10.
22 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Although Wellington House was very active in its particu-
lar field, the need for an expansion of the work was soon
realized. With the elevation of Lloyd George to the Prime
Ministry in December 1916 there came a reorganization of
official British propaganda activity. A Department of In-
48
formation was created which gathered together the various
organizations which had sprung up in England since the be-
ginning of the war J This department was first under the
direction of Mr. C. H. Montgomery, of the Foreign Office,
who was responsible for getting facilities for government
guests and for Allied journalists who were invited to visit
places of interest in England. Working with Mr. Montgomery
was Mr. G. H. Mair, who had especially to do with the visits
of Allied and neutral journalists to the fleet which he arranged
with the Naval Censors. 49 Presently the whole department
was placed under Colonel John Buchan and was organized
into four subdivisions as follows: (1) Wellington House,
which was now to continue producing and distributing mate-
rial for neutral and domestic consumption; (2) the Cinema

Division, under the direction of Mr. Mair, who, as stated

above, also concerned himself with the entertainment of
foreign visitors; (3) the Political Intelligence Division, which

48 It is difficult to say exactly when this was founded. No two authori-

ties agree. N. B. Dearie, Dictionary of Official War-Time Organisations,
p. 128, floor of the House of Commons on
gives February 1917, while on the
August 5, was stated that the Department was begun in January
1918, it

1917. In the Reports from the Select Committee on National Expenditure,

H.C., No. 132, 1918, pp. 36-37, the date is given as December 1916. The
exact date is not important. It is sufficient to say that at the beginning of
1917 the English government officially entered the field of propaganda
against the German morale.
49
Rear-Admiral Brownrigg, Indiscretions of a Naval Censor, p. 94. One
member of Parliament, Mr. Lief Jones, speaks with sarcasm about the loose
way in which the work was organized and the money spent by the depart-
ment. He characterized the department as “the imaginative department, the
fiction department, the body which dresses up the facts for presentment to
the public, a most important function and one leaving scope for individual
imagination.” Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Sth ser., CIX, 949, August 5,

1918.
 ORGANIZATION 23

was to gather information on the state of public opinion

throughout the world; and (4) the News Division, which
50
gave war news to the general public.
To assist Colonel Buchan an Advisory Committee consist-
ing of Lord Northcliffe, Lord Burnham, Mr. Robert Donald,
and Mr. C. P. Scott was appointed. When Lord Northcliffe
went on his mission to America, Lord Beaverbrook was ap-
pointed to the committee, and later Sir George Riddell was
added to it. Shortly afterward the committee and the depart-
ment were placed under the supervision of Sir Edward
Carson. 51
This plan of organization was never satisfactory for there
was a great deal of friction between the committee and Colonel
Buchan. Northcliffe attacked in his editorials the whole plan
of organization in general and Buchan in particular. Com-
menting on the need for a more efficient publicity bureau he
said

There are too many governmental departments dealing with “pub-

licity,” but there is no central authority with full responsibility. The
first essential is to call such an authority into being. We were in high

hopes when Mr. Buchan was created “Director of Information,” a suf-

ficiently comprehensive title. But Mr. Buchan turns out to be virtually
a subordinate of the Foreign Office where he works His
work, we are sure, is of greatest national importance. The point is that
it ismerely that of an addition to the existing “publicity” departments,
not that of a supreme co-ordinating agency What is needed
issome authority, working for choice as head of a reconstructed Press
Bureau which will supervise and control the activities of all the various
departments, including Mr. Buchan’s present office, which deals with
the Press at home and abroad. 62

These differences between the department and the Advisory

Committee resulted in another attempt at reorganization. On

6°
Ibid., CIX, 951, August 5, 1918.
51
Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., CIII, 917 also Reports ;

from Committees, Vol. IV, 1918, Sixth Report of the Select Committee on
National Expenditure.
52 The Tunes (London), August 1917.
7,
24 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
February 13, 1918, the Foreign Office asked certain members
of the Advisory Committee of the Department of Information
to undertake the direction of the various branches of the depart-
ment. Lord Northcliffe was now made Director of Propaganda
in Enemy was made Director of
Countries, Mr. Robert Donald
Propaganda in Neutral Countries, Mr. John Buchan became
Director of Intelligence, General A. D. MacRae became Direc-
tor of Administration, Sir William Jury was put in charge
of Cinematograph Propaganda, and Sir Roderick Jones was
made Deputy Director of Allied and Foreign Propaganda. 53
Thus the Department of Information as such was abolished,
and in March 1918 the branches named were brought under
one head with the creation of the Ministry of Information
under the direction of Lord Beaverbrook. This new Ministry
concerned itself entirely with publicity in Allied, neutral, and
enemy countries, and was responsible not to the Foreign Of-
fice but directly to the War Cabinet.
6<

Thus England had, from March 1918 to the end of the

war, two chief propaganda agencies the Ministry of Infor- :

mation, which dealt with publicity in countries outside of

England; and the National War Aims Committee, which
concerned itself with patriotic propaganda within England
and was independent of the Ministry of Information. 55
One division only of the Ministry of Information con-
cerns us in this study, J^ord Northcliffe’s Division of Propa-
ganda in Enemy Countries. That genius of propaganda took
over his duties as Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries
immediately and gathered around him a staff of able journal-

ists and political writers,. Sir Campbell Stuart was made

deputy director of the department and deputy chairman of
the Advisory Committee. The other members of thecom-
mittee were: Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O. ;
Mr. Rob-
63 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., CIII, 917.
54 The Times (London), March 19, 1918.
BB The War Cabinet Report of the Year 1918, in Reports: Commissions,
. . . ., XXX (1919), p. 35.
 ORGANIZATION 25

ert Donald (then editor of the Daily Chronicle ) Sir Roderick ;

Jones, K.B.E. (managing director of Reuter’s agency) Sir ;

Sidney Low; Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., M.P. Mr. James ;

O’Grady, M.P. Mr. H. Wickham Steed; Mr. H. G. Wells;

;

Mr. H. K. Hudson, C.B.E., who acted as secretary; and Mr.

C. S. Kent, who acted as financial controller and accounting
56
officer .

The headquarters of the department, first established at

Adastral House, after July was at Crewe House, the town
mansion of the Marquis of Crewe, who had placed it at the
57
disposal of the government for war purposes .

The department was divided into two main branches, one

for the production and the other for the distribution of propa-
ganda materials^' The production branch was subdivided into
German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian sections 58 Mr. .

Wickham Steed and Mr. R. W. Seton-Watson, who knew the

historyand psychology of the people of Austria-Hungary,
were made co-directors of that subdivision, while Mr. H. G.
Wells became the first chairman of the German section. The
propaganda in the Near East was left to the Near East sec-
tion of the Ministry of Information.
These men immediately set up a program of attack. It
was decided that since Austria-Hungary was the weakest, the
propaganda campaign should start there. H. Wickham Steed
aimed to convince the different races of the Hapsburg mon-
archy that the Allies were determined to secure democratic
freedom for them. The subject nationalities were to be en-
couraged to break away from the Hapsburg empire. Such
statements as “self-government” and “autonomous develop-
ment” were to be avoided because they had unpleasant associa-
tions in Austria-Hungary and tended to discourage the friends

56 Sir Campbell Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House (London and New York,
1920), p. 10. The story of Northcliffe’s propaganda campaign is graphi-
cally told in this book.
57 Ibid.,
p. 11 ;
also Times History of the War, XXI, 344.
58 Ibid.
 26 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
of the Allies. Instead, the expression “government by con-
sent of the governed”was to be used extensively. 59
Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson went to Italy, where
they helped to organize the Rome Congress of the Subject
Nationalities of Austria-Hungary. This congress itself was a
propaganda move, for Wickham Steed not only worked among
the delegates while the congress was in session but also de-
livered a speech to the congress in which he outlined the plan
of the Allies to free the subject races from the Iiapsburg
60
yoke. In addition, a Central Inter-Allied Commission was
set up at Italian Headquarters, from which
campaign the
among the Austro-Hungarian troops against the Hapsburgs
was launched in the field.
Concerning the attack upon the German morale, about
which he was getting anxious, Lloyd George wrote to North-
cliffe in May 1918:
seems to me that you have organized admirable work in your
It

Austrian propaganda I trust that you will soon turn your at-

ifts tention towards German propaganda along the British and French
fronts. I feel sure that much can be done to disintegrate the morale of
the German Army along the same lines as we appear to have adopted
with great success in the Austro-Hungarian Army. 61

The problem of influencing the minds of the German sol-

diers, however, was quite different from that so easily solved
on the Austrian front.While the Austrian armies contained
large numbers of men who were already disloyal, who were
anxious for the war to end, and who hoped to see the Haps-
burg monarchy collapse, the German troops were practically
all of the same nationality and the same racial stock and were

proud to be Germans. 82 Northcliffe realized that an entirely

different appeal would have to be framed for the Germans.
“Our biggest asset,” he said, “is the fact that the American
69 H. Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years (Garden City, New York,
II, 188-89. 60 Ibid.,
1924) , p. 210.
61 Hamilton Fyfe, Northcliffe, An Intimate Biography (London, 1930),
62 Ibid.,
p. 241. p. 242.
 ORGANIZATION 27

troops are arriving. ‘You are almost at the end of your re-
sources in man-power. The Allies have only just begun to
pump men out of an enormous new reservoir of inexhaustible
.’’ 63
depth.’ That is what we shall tell the German soldiers
Thus, the German soldiers were to be bombarded with
propaganda intended to make them feel that their task was
hopeless. Leaflets were sent out to show the advance the
English manufacturers had made in lines such as lenses, sci-

entific instruments, dyes, which Germany had been

etc., in
supreme before the war. Wells’s aim, as outlined by his
famous “Memorandum,” which he submitted to Northcliffe,
was to set up an organization of free nations against Germany
and then bring home to the German people the fact that a
world organization existed which was pledged to seek the
overthrow of the German militarists. He proposed that this
organization should control the raw materials and the ship-
ping, and that it should have power to exclude for an indefi-
nite period the enemy, or even neutrals, until they should sub-
scribe to and give pledges of their acceptance of the principles
of the “League of Nations.” He aimed further to empha-
size: “that nothing stands between the enemy peoples and
lasting peace except the predatory designs of their ruling
dynasties and military and economic castes; that the design
of the Allies not to crush any people but to assure them the
is

freedom of on the basis of self-determination .” 84 Though

all

he did not mention the overthrow of the German government

as one of his aims, he implied as much. “The fact has to be
faced,” he said, “that while the present German Government
65
remains, no such economic resumption is possible .” And
further:

And since it is impossible to hope for any such help or cooperation

from the Germany of the Belgian outrage, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty,

63 Hamilton Fyfe, op. ext., p. 242.

64 Sir Campbell Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, pp. 65-86, gives a com-
plete text of the Wells Memorandum. 65 Ibid.,
p. 78.
28 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
the betrayal of Ukrania, the changing of Germany 68 becomes a pri-
67
mary aim, the primary war aim for the Allies.

Mr. Wells, however, severed his relations with Crewe

House before he could put his ideas into practice. Differences
arose between him and Northcliffe over the discrepancy be-
tween the views which the Director of Propaganda was sup-
posed to hold as to the right method of making the Germans
dissatisfied and the tone adopted toward them by the North-
cliffe press. The Northcliffe newspapers were full of threat-

enings. Nothing would serve but the extermination of the

German race. These denunciations formed a great contrast
with the lofty reasoned arguments of the propagandists, who
told the German people that the Allies were fighting not against
the people of Germany but only against the militarists and
the Junkers, and that the Allies would make a friendly peace
with the German people after the fall of the Hohenzollern
dynasty. Mr. Wells, feeling that this supposed propaganda
policy and the actual policy of the Northcliffe press were too
contradictory, resigned on July 17, 191 8.
68
On the 23d of
69
July his place was taken by Mr. Hamilton Fyfe.
At the same time that Mr. Fyfe took over the work of
Mr. Wells the organization moved into its large headquarters
at Crewe House. At this time also, Captain Chalmers Mitchell
and the enthusiastic Mr. S. A. Guest, who had carried on a
propaganda campaign of his own in the early part of the war,
became attached to Crewe House. Furthermore, closer co-
operation between Crewe House and the Military Intelligence

66 Mr. Wells’s capitals.

67 Stuart, op. cit.,
p. 79.

68 Because of Northcliffe’s activities in stirring up hatred against the

Germans some people considered him the wrong person for the propaganda
against the German morale. Mr. Denman said in the House of Commons on
May 16, 1918, that Northcliffe was despised by the Germans as much as
Reventlow was despised by the English. “Northcliffe is unsuited for this
peculiar form of activity,” said the speaker.
69 Fyfe, op. cit., p. 243; also Times History of the War, XXI, 344.
 ORGANIZATION 29

was now established by the appointment of Major the Earl of

Kerry as liaison officer between Crewe House and the Mili-
tary Intelligence, which had been doing effective work since
the early part of 1916.
Thus we have an outline of the organization set up by
the civil government of England to combat the enemy with
words. But it must not be supposed that the military leaders
neglected the “war of words” entirely. The War Office began
an independent propaganda campaign in the early part of 1916
when Major General Sir George MacDonogh was made Di-
rector of Military Intelligence. As a result of his efforts and
those of Brigadier General G. R. Cockerill, a special branch
of the Military Intelligence Department for propaganda pur-
poses was created. This was known as M. 1. 7b
70
An army .

order was issued inviting those officers and men who had
had previous literary experience to communicate with the
new organization. As a result there was enrolled a more or
less regular staff of some thousands of writers who consented

to contribute “the produce of their pens during such times as

they could spare from their more active military duties.” 71
From these were selected two or three who were unfit for
service overseas —
a number subsequently raised to twenty.
They were attached to the staff of M.I.7b and gave their whole
time to the production of propaganda.
One of the early functions of M.I.7b was the establish-
ment of Le Courier de I’cdr. 72 The purpose of this paper
—
some eight inches by six in size was to keep up the morale
of the French and Belgian peoples in the enemy-occupied ter-
73
ritory. In the spring of 1916, subsections of this branch of
the War Office began the preparation of leaflets for distribu-
74
tion among the enemy troops. During 1917 reports obtained

70 Stuart, op. cit.,

p. 52.
71 Major C. J. C. Street, “Behind the Enemy Lines,” Cornhill Magazine,
XLVII (1919), p. 490. ™Ibid.
73 This little newspaper, except for one short break, was distributed regu-
larly by air until November 1918. 74 Stuart, op. cit.
30 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
by the examination of prisoners, and information derived
from secret sources, convinced the officials that results were
being achieved by this propaganda. The Directory of Military
Intelligence, in co-operation with the G.H.Q. in France, made
arrangements for the work to be extended, so that by spring
of 1918 about a million leaflets were being issued monthly/ 5
When NorthclifFe’s organization moved
Crewe House
into
it took over part of the work of M.I.7b. Crewe House was
now responsible for the preparation of propaganda material
76
and M.I.7b concerned itself entirely with its distribution.
Thus Northcliffe’s propaganda machinery was at last
complete and active. His office might have been called the
“Ministry for the Destruction of German Confidence.’’ It

continued its activities until the Armistice, when Northcliffe,

feeling that his task had been accomplished, handed Lloyd
George his resignation. This was accepted in a letter in which
the Prime Minister expressed his gratitude for the “great
services you have rendered to the Allied cause while holding
this important post.” 77
The details of Northcliffe’s “great services” will be de-
scribed in another chapter.

THE UNITED STATES

Shortly after the outbreak of the World War, America
became the focal point of European propaganda. Both the
Central and the Entente Powers competed for American
friendship. In this competition it is now generally conceded
that because of Britain’s control of the cables and news agen-
cies the Entente Powers had the advantage. As a result of
this propaganda there had developed, long before we broke
diplomatic relations with Germany, a pro-Entente and anti-
German feeling in America.
German militarism, German Junkerism, and the Hohen-
zollern dynasty were hated as much in certain circles in
America as they were in France or England. Those who felt

75 Stuart, op. 76 Ibid., 77 Ibid.,

cit., p. 54. p. 16. p. 235.
 ORGANIZATION 31

this way England and France were fighting in

believed that
the defense of democracy and that unless the Kaiser and his
militarists were checked American democracy would be en-
dangered. Hence from the very day of our declaration of
—
war we had a definite war aim to crush German militarism
and to defend democratic institutions.
President Wilson’s War Message of April 2, 1917, de-
scribed our war aims in such statements as “It is a war :

against all nations The challenge is to all mankind”

and “our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principle of
peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish
and autocratic power, and to set up amongst really free and
self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose
and action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those
principles.” And, finally: “we have no quarrel with the Ger-
man people. We have no feeling towards them but one of
sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that
78
their government acted in entering this war.”
The American war aims became the material for the
American propagandists at home and on the fighting front.
Always it was a war for the liberation of humanity German —
—
humanity included from the clutches of unprincipaled autoc-
racy. The end of the war was to see the establishment of a
democratic government in Germany, and with this democratic
government the Allies would make a just and lasting peace.
These were Wilson’s ideals and his speeches, expressing these
;

ideals, were considered by the Allied propagandists the most

effective material for propaganda purposes.

From the outset President Wilson recognized the neces-
sity for a central propaganda agency in this country. On
April 14, 1917, just eight days after war was declared, he
created, by executive order, the Committee on Public Informa-
79
tion. The members of the Committee were the Secretary of
War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. George Creel, civilian
78 Woodrozv Wilson’s State Papers and Addresses (New York, 1918),
pp. 273 ff. 79 Hereafter referred to as the C.P.I.
32 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
80
chairman . Mr. Creel gathered around him a large staff of

writers, and enlisted the help of thousands of other people in

America. Not only did the C.P.I. reach into every community
in the United States, but it carried to other lands the aims
and objects of America in the war. Said Mr. Creel
There was no part of the great war machinery we did not touch, no
medium of appeal that we did not employ. The printed word, the
spoken word, the signboard — all these were used in our campaign to
make our people and all other people understand the cause that com-
pelled America to take arms in defense of its liberties and free insti-
tutions. 81

In order to advertise America with the greatest possible

efficiency, the C.P.I. had to disseminate news abroad by other
means than through the foreign press. In close co-operation
with the Navy a wireless went out from Tucker-
news service
ton to Eiffel Tower for use in France. From here it was
relayed to Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. News was
also flashed from Tuckerton to England, from where it was
82
relayed to Holland and the Scandinavian countries Thus the .

C.P.I. made a fight for public opinion in neutral and Allied

countries, and “by balloons, mortars, and aeroplanes we car-
83
ried the truth across the firing line into the Central Powers .”
Foreign commissioners of the C.P.I. were stationed in
every foreign neutral and friendly belligerent nation of the
world. Mrs. Vira B. Whitehouse was the Commissioner in
Switzerland 84 Here she organized her work into several de-
.

partments. The daily news service was under the direction

of Mr. George B. Fife. This department dealt with the prob-
lem of getting news into the Swiss press. As the news arrived
each morning it was translated into French and German and
delivered to the (official) Agence Telegraphique Suisse, which

80 Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Infor-

mation (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 1; here-

after cited as Report, C.P.I.
81 Report, C.P.I., 82 Ibid., 83 Ibid.
p. 1. p. 5.
84 Mrs. Whitehouse tells the story of her work in Switzerland in her
book, A Year as Government Agent (New York and London, 1920).
 ORGANIZATION 33

distributed it to the Swiss press. 85

By August 1917 Mr. Fife
was able to report to Washington that an estimated minimum
of 20,000 paragraphs of news of American origin was being
86
published weekly in the Swiss papers.
There was also a motion-picture-films department in Switz-
erland which was under the direction of Mr. Valentine. In
order to get propaganda films into Switzerland the C.P.I.
induced the American distributors to agree not to send any
pictures to Switzerland unless the Swiss theaters agreed to
87
use a certain amount of American propaganda film. Since
the war made it impossible for the European producers to
supply the demands of the Swiss picture houses, the Swiss
had to agree American terms.
to the
The work in Denmark, under the direction of Mr. Ed-
ward V. Riis, followed the same principles as that of Mrs.
Whitehouse in Switzerland. In Holland Mr. Henry Suydam
not only strove to place American news with the Dutch press
but he also aimed to use Holland, as far as possible without
violating her neutrality, as a means of approach to the
Germans. 88
Mr. James Kerney was the C.P.I. Commissioner for
France. In addition to employing all possible agencies for
sustaining the morale of the French people, the headquarters
of Mr. Kerney in Paris was the clearing house for the dif-
fusion of full information on American naval and military
preparations. In June 1918 this Commission was given of-
fices in the ,Maison de la presse. 89 It co-operated with the
French Bureau which had charge of distributing, in Germany
and among the German troops, facts regarding American
preparations.The Intelligence Section of the A.E.F. assigned
Lieutenant Harry A. Franck, the famous author and traveler,
who was familiar with the German language and conditions,
85 Vira B. Whitehouse, op. cit., p. 125.
86 Ibid., Report, C.P.I.,
p. 152; also p. 185.
87 This same method was used to get propaganda films into other
countries. 88 Report, C.P.I., p. 175. Ibid., p. 166.
34 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
to the service of the Kerney Commission. Lieutenant Franck
kept in close touch with the enemy propaganda section of the
90
Maison de la presse.

This French Commission saw to it that full and complete

reports of President Wilson’s speeches were printed in the
neutral press, and that accurate, if not complete, summaries of
them were printed in the enemy press. Whenever the com-
mission found that the German newspapers misrepresented
Wilson’s speeches, tracts and pamphlets correcting these mis-
representations were sent over the German lines by airplanes
and balloons and dropped over the cities. Usually these leaflets
gave in parallel columns the German version and the correct
version. Emphasis was given to those portions that had been
91
left out.

When, early in July 1918, some of the German papers

began which gave indications of war-weari-
to publish stories
ness, this material was immediately put into pamphlet or
leaflet form and distributed among the German troops.

Certain changes in the organization of the French divi-

sion of the C.P.I. were effected at the Inter-Allied Conference
of Propaganda Agencies which met on July 18, 1918. Gen-
eral Dennis E. Nolan, Major Henry James, and Captain Mark
Watson of the Intelligence Section A.E.F. attended the con-
ference. Soon after that a group of experts, under the imme-
diate direction of Major James, took over the American phase
92
of the propaganda work.
The C.P.I. also had various nationality bureaus working
among the different racial groups in America. There were,
for instance, a Lithuanian bureau, a Czechoslovak bureau, a
Polish bureau, and an Italian bureau. Each of these had a
director who was responsible for keeping his particular racial
group informed concerning the war activities of the United
States and of keeping them loyal to America. The foreign-
language press helped greatly in this “loyalty drive.”

90 Report, C.P.I., p. 173.

91 Ibid. 92 Ibid.,
p. 174.
 ORGANIZATION 35

Of the various nationality groups in America working

for the maintenance of loyalty among the foreign-language
elements, the most active was the Friends of German Democ-
racy. This was organized by a group of loyal German-born
Americans in October 1917, and because of its activity among
the German-Americans the C.P.I. asked it to function as the
German bureau. 93 Mr. Julius Koettgen, executive secretary
of the Friends of German Democracy from the first, also
acted as manager of the German Bureau of the C.P.I. There
were twelve branches of the Friends of German Democracy
in as many German- American centers in the United States.
Four organizers were in the field continually until 1919, vis-
iting German-American colonies and arranging and address-
ing public patriotic meetings.
This organization did not, however, limit its activities to
the United States. As its name implies, its purpose was to
encourage and aid as much as possible the establishment of
a democracy in Germany. The members sent letters and ap-
peals to certain groups in Switzerland, who saw to it that
these letters got into Germany. It also helped to support the
Freie Zeitung, a German newspaper in Berne working for a
German Republic. 94
At the beginning of 1918, when theAmerican troops
came to the Western Front, the Friends of German Democracy
started their front propaganda. The Intelligence Division of
the A.E.F., as well as the French Service aerienne, distributed
the material produced by this group. Many little cards were
dropped over the German lines which contained graphs and

93 Ibid.,
p. 89.
94 Report, C.P.I.,
p. 90; see also Werk des Untersuckungsaussc busses der
Deutsche verfassungsgebenden N
dtionalversamntlung und des deutschen
Reichstages 1919— 1928 ; Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruchs im
Jahre 1918, Series 4, edited by Dr. Albrecht Philipp, Deutsche Verlagsgesell-
schaft, fur Politik und Geschichte (Berlin, 1925-1928), 8 vols. The entire
fourth series of this report deals with the collapse of the morale of Germany.
Hereafter the work will be cited as U.D.Z. and, unless otherwise stated, the
fourth series will be meant.
36 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
statistics to show the rapid increase in the number of Amer-
ican soldiers coming to the aid of the Allies. For example

More than one million Americans are on the West front

One million five hundred thousand American troops are now in France.
More than twice this number are being trained in America. 95

Others of these pointed out that the Americans were fighting

not theGerman people, but the German rulers, militarists, and
Junkers who had brought on the war. Leaflets called upon the
German soldiers to desert to the Americans and assured them
of good treatment and plenty of food. All of this propaganda
stated that the Friends of German Democracy wanted to help
Germany, that theywere working for the best interests of
Germany — the overthrow of the German militarists
96
One .

of their appeals ran as follows

BROTHERS !

The world is in great need. You and you alone can end this need
rapidly. We are American citizens of German descent. We know you
and trust you. We beg you to trust us.
The great German nation is the barbarian and the breaker of trust
in the eyes of the world. You can recover your good reputation only if
you overthrow this government, which has made German intelligence
and German industry a danger to the world. Take the determination of
your destiny into your own hands
If you will do this the world war will end. In the name of America
we give you our word, that the new Germany will be taken up as an
honorable member of the society of nations. Your intelligence and in-
dustry will again be a blessing to humanity, instead of a curse
Arise for a struggle for a free Germany !

In the name of Americans of German descent.

Union of Friends of German Democracy.
New York, March 1918 97

95 Friedrich Felger, ed., Was wir vom Weltkrieg nicht wissen (Berlin
and Leipzig, 1929), p. 510.
98 Ibid.; see also any of their propaganda material.
97 Miscellaneous leaflet collection, propaganda material ( Fliegerabwurf
Schriften), in the Hoover War Library. For want of a better name the
leaflets in this collection will hereafter be cited as Fliegerabwurf-Schriften.
 ORGANIZATION 37

These German-Americans were very active. They issued

a weekly bulletin, and sent articles to the 200 most important
German-language newspapers in America and to 400 Amer-
98
were read by persons of German descent.
ican newspapers that
They sent out over one million copies of twenty different
pamphlets. Among these were German Militarism and Its
:

German Accusers ; The Spirit of America; The German Poi-

son Growth of Prussianism; Lichnowsky’s Memoirs; and edi-
tions of the Freie Zeitung of Berne. 99
Thus did Americans of German descent aid the C.P.I.
the
in fighting “indifferenceand disaffection in the United States,”
and militarism, Prussianism, and Junkerism in Germany.
The United States Army recognized the value of propa-
ganda and set up a propaganda subsection of the Military
Intelligence Division. The purpose of this subdivision was to
study enemy propaganda and to take steps for the dissemina-
100
tion among the enemy of positive American propaganda.
From the very first this military agency co-operated with the
101
C.P.I. Memoranda concerning the foreign situation, to-

98 The Germans repeatedly accused Otto H. Kahn, the New York finan-
cier of German birth, of having contributed large sums of money and articles
to the Friends of German Democracy and the Freie Zeitung. In the discus-
sion before the Untersuchungsausschusses on Otto H. Kahn’s connection with
the Friends of German Democracy, Dr. Herz says that, in response to his in-
quiry, Mr. Kahn replied “I never financed means nor
: means of
established
getting propaganda leaflets or propaganda material into Germany.” He also
denied having heard of the propaganda leaflet, Amerika und der Weltkrieg
which appeared under his name. As for the Friends of German Democracy,
his connection with it, he insisted, was never an active one and he never
took it seriously. He again denied any connection with the Freie Zeitung.
On the other hand, the Freie Zeitung itself insisted that Mr. Kahn was defi-
nitely connected with the Friends of German Democracy. U.D.Z., V, 64.
99
Report, C.P.I., p. 90. In a personal letter to the writer Mr. Otto H.
Kahn, shortly before his death, again denied any connection with the Freie
Zeitung or that he had given money to the Friends of German Democracy.
100 Major E. Alexander Powell, The Army Behind the Army (New
York, 1919), p. 347.
101 The military people state, however, that Creel’s organization did not
co-operate fully with the Military Intelligence (Powell, op. cit., p. 348).
38 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
gether with comments and suggestions, were sent almost daily
to the C.P.I., thus giving that civilian organization the military
point of view and bringing to the attention of the committee
urgent American propaganda.
calls for

In February 1918, Major Charles H. Mason, of the Gen-

eral Staff at Washington, strongly recommended the “utiliza-
tion of the psychological factor of the strategic situation,” and
entrusted to Heber Blankenhorn the task of organizing a
102
psychological subdivision of the Military Intelligence. This
subsection took over the work of the former propaganda sub-
section and became known as the Psychological Subsection of
the Military Intelligence Division. It established liaisons with
and the “Inquiry,” the body
the State Department, the C.P.I.,
of experts under Colonel House which was preparing Amer-
103
ica’s data for the peace conference.
104
When Blankenhorn and his staff reported to General
Dennis E. Nolan, G2, of the G.H.Q. on July 18, 1918, he or-
dered them to study Allied propaganda methods before at-
tempting to commence work. At the end of August there was
set up at General Headquarters, A.E.F., in France, an organi-
zation within the General Staff for propaganda against the
enemy. 105
The center of this intensive propaganda activity was Room
65 on the floor above General Pershing’s offices in Damremont
Caserne, the seat of the G.H.Q. at Chaumont, Haute-Marne.
This room was connected by telephone with editors and print-
ers in Paris and Langres, with propaganda field units at Bar-
le-duc and Toul, with army and corps headquarters from the
Argonne to Vosges, and with aviation fields toward Verdun. 106

102 Heber Blankenhorn, “War on Morale,” Harper’s Magazine, CXXXIX

(1919), p. 512.
k> 3 Ibid.

104 His staff consisted of Lieutenants Ludlow, Griscom, and Ifft of the
M.I.D., also Captain Walter Lippmann and Lieutenants Charles Merz, Wil-
liam F. Miltengerger, and E. M. Wooley (ibid.).
108 Ibid., 106 Ibid.,
p. 510. p. 510.
 ORGANIZATION 39

In order to keep a close check on the advance of the “propa-

ganda campaign” Blankenhorn put “propaganda maps” on
the walls of his room at headquarters with little flags pinned
to them. These little flags were moved forward as the truck-
loads of leaflets reached the front and penetrated into Germany
by means of balloons and airplanes.
With such close observation of conditions at the front and
with such a systematic organization, it is no wonder that the
M.I. alone had sent more than three million leaflets over the
107
German lines when the Armistice was signed.

ATTEMPTS AT CO-ORDINATION
The Allies found that it was just as necessary to co-ordinate
their various propaganda activities as it was to centralize their
economic and military forces. A preliminary inter-Allied prop-
aganda conference was held in London in March 1918 to
consider ways and means. The French government delegated
M. Franklin-Bouillon; Italy sent Gallenga-Stuart, the head
of her propaganda department; and the United States was rep-
resented by Mr. American commissioner for
Robinette, an
propaganda in Northern Europe. Upon the insistence of Mr.
Wickham Steed the French government allowed M. Henri
Moysset, chief secretary to the French Minister of Marine,
who knew Germans and German psychology well, to attend
the conference. He brought Tonnelat of the Service aerienne
with him. 108
On July 18, 1918, another conference of heads of the
British, Belgian, French, and American services was held in
the Paris office of the American C.P.I. 109 Here it was de-
cided to concentrate the work upon the American lines, which
were shortly to be greatly extended. Mr. James Keeley, editor
of the Chicago Herald, was the American representative at

107 Ibid.,
p. 523. '

108 H. Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years, II, 191.

109 George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York and Lon-
don, 1920), p. 287.
40 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
those which were attended by all the Allied
conferences,
110
Powers .Before the end of August there was created an
Inter-Allied Board for Propaganda against the Enemy. This
met at regular intervals at Crewe House in London, under the
111
presidency of Lord Northcliffe .

We now have the propaganda machinery Each of

set up.
the Allied countries has a working organization and their
efforts are, to some extent at least, co-ordinated by the Inter-
Allied Board. Let us now consider the methods and tactics
used by the propagandists in their effort to tear down the
morale of the enemy peoples.

110 Creel, op. cit.,

p. 284.
111 Blankenhorn, op. cit., p. 513.
 CHAPTER II

PROPAGANDA METHODS AND TACTICS

It may be said that, while the artillery was
pounding the German troops with shells and the
infantry was shooting and slashing at closer
range, the unsung propaganda section was si-
lently bombarding them with arguments busily ;

unsettling them by suggestions.

—Stars and Stripes, A.E.F. official

newspaper, January 3, 1919

FRANCE
The tactics of the propagandists and the methods of dis-
tribution were practically the same in all of the Allied coun-
tries. As has been shown in the previous chapter, the govern-
ments built up special departments composed of individuals
who were acquainted with the political and psychological
conditions of the various countries in which the propaganda
was made. Every government issued a regular wireless
to be
service; and large sums of money were spent on cables, the
1
press agencies, and neutral newspapers However, there are .

certain features by which one can distinguish the technique

of the various countries.
The French themselves were not effective producers of
the type of propaganda needed for an attack upon the morale
of the enemy. It was difficult for them to get away from

1 The anonymous booklet, Hinter den Kulissen des Franzosischen Jour-

nalismus von einem Pariser Chefredakteur states (page 234) that the French
set aside 20 million francs for use in gaining the favor of the neutral press.
The Journal de Geneve, it says, was given 30,000 francs and the Gazette de
laiusanne 25,000 francs to carry stories of a propaganda nature. No sub-
stantiation of these accusations has been found by the present writer.

41
42 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
the propaganda of hate — the atrocity-story type of material.
Hence they made great use of the German emigres in Switz-
2
erland .

There were many people in Germany who felt that the

war had been planned by the German militarists and that it
was being waged for imperialistic ends. Many of these people
desired the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment
of a German republic. Because of their convictions many of
them emigrated Here they formed an organi-
to Switzerland.
zation known as the German Democrats in Switzerland with
the purpose of working for the overthrow of the existing Ger-
man government. They founded the Freie Zeitung in Berne,
and with this, which appeared every Wednesday and Saturday,
they made known in many
Germany included, their
lands,
Germany 3
hopes for a free and democratic .

Among the most prominent German Democrats in Switz-

erland were Richard Grelling, Hermann Fernau-Latt, Her-
mann Rosemeier, Hans Huber, and Dr. Hans Schlieben 4 .

These men were willing to co-operate with the Allies to ac-

complish the democratization of Germany. Some of them
wrote propaganda pamphlets which were bought by the French
propaganda bureau. Siegfried Balder wrote many poems and
a number of pamphlets which were distributed by the French
among the German troops at the front. One of his contribu-
tions to this cause pictured the food situation in Germany
and the concern which the Kaiser is supposed to have felt

over it — in the following manner

2 Friedrich Felger, ed., Was wir vom Weltkrieg nicht wissen (Berlin and
Leipzig, 1929), p. 504.

3 Dr. Hans Thimme, Weltkrieg ohne Waffen, devotes an excellent chap-

ter to the part played by the German emigres in the propaganda against their
Fatherland.
4See Dr. George Huber, Die Franzdsische Propaganda im Weltkrieg
p. 69; also Dr. Julius Wernsdorff, Dies Buck gehdrt dem Bnndesrat: eine
Studie die “Deutschen Republikaner in der Schweiz” wdhrend des Welt-
krieges (Zurich, 1918), in which the author devotes a chapter to each of
these men.
 METHODS AND TACTICS 43

Die Kinder darben, frieren, jammern

Nicht Milch, nicht Mehl, nicht Brot noch Brei
Die Schwindsucht schleicht sich in die Kammern,
Die Mutter reisst das Herz entzwei.

Kein Kaiser fragt nach euren Tranen

Kein General nach eurer Not.
6 Doch wird man loben es erwahnen,
Stirbt euer man den Heldentod. 5

Another German emigre in the service of France was

Hermann Rosemeier. This propagandist had written two
pamphlets in 1916, Die Schuld am Weltkrieg and Deutsches
Volk wach auf, which the French publishers, Payot & Co.,
printed. More than 100,000 copies of the Rosemeier pam-
phlets were used by the French propagandists. Dr. Rosemeier
was considered so valuable to the French that he was called
to Paris, where he wrote a great many leaflets and pam-
phlets. Returning to Switzerland in April 1917, he became
associated with the Freie Zeitung.
A third German French was Her-
in the service of the
mann Fernau-Latt. In Paris he contributed to the Zeitung
fiir die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen (No. 8, Vol. 20, III,

1915). In May 1915 he was in Switzerland again, providing

the Allies with welcome propaganda materials. Among these
contributions were Gerade weil ich ein Deutscher bin Durch ,

zur Demokratie! and Das Konigtum ist der Kriegd

The Germans realized the effectiveness of the propaganda
written by the emigres in Switzerland. Walter Nicolai, chief
of the German secret service, states, regarding the activities
of Grelling, Balder, Rosemeier, etc.

It is one of the most melancholy sides of the enemy propaganda

5 Liste I, propaganda collection, Hoover War Library.

6 Dr. Julius Wernsdorff, Dies Buck gehort dem Bundesrat, p. 18; also
Wilhelm Ernst, Die antideutsche Propaganda durch das Schweizer Gebiet
im Weltkrieg, speziell die Propaganda in Bayern (Munich, 1933), p. 5.
7
Wilhelm Ernst, Die antideutsche Propaganda durch das Schweizer
Gebiet, p. 6.
44 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
that the Germans worked for it or at least provided material for it. It

increased the effectiveness of the propaganda when it could quote

German sources and point to the support of representatives of
Germany. 8

The French also used, for propaganda purposes, the let-

ters and declarations from German prisoners, describing the

conditions in the French prison camps. Many examples of
such propaganda can be found among the materials sent out by
the Service aerienne. The most interesting of these examples
is the group called Griisse an die Heimat, Brief e deutscher
Kriegsgefangener. These were not issued regularly, but
letters

eleven of them had appeared by May 1918. They were eight-

page papers, profusely illustrated, and containing facsimiles
of the letters written by the prisoners telling of the fine food
and wonderful treatment they were receiving from the French.
The pictures usually showed the prisoners work in
at play, at
the gardens, in the social hall opening packages from home,
9
or at meals, with plenty of food on the tables.
Another effective piece of propaganda literature emanating
from Hansi’s Service aerienne was Die Feldpost. This was
a newspaper modeled after the English “trench newspaper.”
The chief purpose of Die Feldpost was to intensify the war-
weariness of the German soldiers. The joys of home life,

the quiet peace of the country, and the busy prosperous exist-
ence of the city during times of peace were played up. As
early as Christmas 1915 the editors celebrated the Christmas
season by recalling all of the simple pleasures of Christmas at
10
home with one’s family. The amusements of civilian life

8
Walter Nicolai, The German Secret Service, translated with an addi-
tional chapter by George Renwick (London, 1924), p. 163.
9 Griisse an die Heimat propaganda
collection, Hoover War Library.
Nicolai ( op cit., p. 161) believes these letters to be forged: “Forged letters
from German war prisoners in France and England and illustrations of the
alleged enviable treatment of German prisoners .... were designed to
persuade the German soldiers to desert or to depress their spirit.”
10 Hansi et Tonnelat, A Travers les lignes ennemies; Figure 4, opposite
page 24,is an illustration of Die Feldpost. A few of these are in the Hoover

War Library.
 METHODS AND TACTICS 45

were especially featured and those pleasures which the Ger-

11
mans love most were invitingly portrayed in word and picture.
Perhaps the most individualistic French method of getting
propaganda Germans was the “sausage method.” The
to the
much-ridiculed German sausage was made to play an impor-
tant part in disintegrating the Kaiser’s army. The French
message to the German troops, stating that they would do well
to surrender and give the password, “Camarade Republique,”
was carried to them in “sausage meat.” Small vials, contain-
ing the message on oil paper, were prepared so that they looked
like a German sausage, and these were dropped behind the
12
lines. The French hoped that the families of the soldiers,
once having discovered that the messages were meant for their
sons or husbands at the front, would send these “sausages”
to the troops. To make certain that the messages would be
put into the hands of the German soldiers, the French prom-
ised safety, food, and comfort to all who would desert to
13
France.
The methods of delivering French propaganda to the Ger-
mans varied. At first the hand grenade was used extensively.
Instead of being dangerously explosive, these hand grenades
were stuffed with propaganda leaflets which would fly out
when the grenade landed. This method was not satisfactory,
however, since it was dangerous work to throw “paper gre-
nades” at the enemy from the trenches only to receive bullets
in return.
The next method of delivering the leaflets to the enemy
was by Although the French and Germans had on
airplanes.
several occasions dropped leaflets from the air in 1914, it

11 After No. 13 the name was changed to Kriegsblatter fiir das deutsche
Volk. Later became known as Das freie deutsche Wort in this last stage
it

it is more revolutionary in tone. See Hansi et Tonnelat, op. cit., p. 18.

12 At one time the French, wishing
to taunt the Germans because of the
food shortage in Germany, dropped actual loaves of bread into the trenches
of the Germans; the Germans sliced these, buttered them, and sent them
back to the French (incident told to the writer by a former German soldier).
13 New York Times, February
16, 1918.
46 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
was not until the beginning of 1915 that the airplane came
into general use for propaganda purposes. 14 So important
did the French consider the matter of leaflet delivery that,
after the G.Q.G. “Bureau of Enemy Psy-
had established its

chology” the crack Lafayette Flying Squadron was used for

15
the purpose. J. Norman Hall gives a graphic account of this
work when he says
Then they started to swamp us with clever ideas. Pamphlets began
to arrive, bundles at a time ;
paper ammunition intended to be rained
down upon the heads of the benighted Boche until he broke beneath the
weight, and they were weighty too. German and I
I could read a bit of
appreciated their appeal more than did French Comrades. There my
was, for example, a fake news-sheet purporting to emanate from Berne.
This gave all the latest news of the Allied victories, coupled with the
most pessimistic statements of certain German Socialists. 16

Other material among the propaganda cargo included a

“dainty little card printed in tri-colors that touched the heart
by its human appeal.” This was a friendly letter, written by
one soldier to the rest of his comrades under arms. The sol-
dier was a prisoner in France so kindly treated by his captors
that he wanted to pass the word along: If there were any

14 The French August 1914 had dropped leaflets in Alsace-Lorraine

in
telling the people thatFrance was fighting for the liberation of these “lost
provinces” from the German yoke. The Germans, in September of the same
year, had used airplanes to drop leaflets over Nancy (Hansi et Tonnelat,
op. cit., p. 10).
15
J. Norman Hall and Charles B. Nordhoff, The Lafayette Flying Corps
(Boston and New York, 1920), 2 vcls. In the chapter on propaganda these
two Americans describe ina most interesting manner how they delivered
propaganda leaflets to the Germans.
16 Hall and Nordhoff, op. 138. At first the members of the Lafa-
cit., II,

yette Flying Corps considered the propaganda a joke. Whenever the big guns
made unusual noises at night the boys would say, “That’s the propaganda
you’ve got the Boches aroused to their danger.” And when the nights were
quiet they would remark “They scarcely resist at all these days, since Wil-
:

son’s speech got among them.” And then Mr. Hall concludes, “Perhaps this
bit of propaganda did as much to bring about the happy ending as I myself
did to bring down my plane safely in the middle of the woods. In any case,
it’s a good story for a man’s grandchildren.”
 METHODS AND TACTICS 47

who found themselves ground down under the heel of the

German oppressors, they could easily come over to the land
of liberty and democracy. “The charming picture,” says Mr.
Hall, “of the deserter’s reception in France, made me feel
17
France myself.”
like deserting to On another occasion Mr.
Hall carried with him “40 pounds of eloquence printed in
German.” The leaflets were all done up in half-pound rolls.
It was warfare in the ultimate degree. Instead of killing our enemy
with sudden dismemberment, we rained down upon him the power of
the printed word, to unjoint his moral strength and dislocate his will
18
to resist. It was a triumph of reason over matter.

The Armees was another famous flying

Escadrilles des
unit used for the delivery of propaganda. Twice a week this
19
corps delivered faked German newspapers to the enemy.
These had been produced, for the most part, by the Friends
of German Democracy and were intended to carry the gospel
of democracy to the German troops. Of this work Mr. B. A.
Molter says
Literally, the French fliers are the paper carriers for the Boche.
.... Each plane takes about 1,000 “tracts” aboard and goes sailing
off on missionary errand. The objective of each is some barracks
its

where it is known that considerable number of soldiers are quartered.

The tracts give the news of the conditions in America, the nations that
have severed diplomatic relations with Germany, and the aims of the
Allies. The entry of America into the war on the side of the Allies with
the promise of active support, the news of the great war preparations
in this country —
all were told in tracts which we showered on the

Huns. 20

The French airmen also were engaged in delivering Wil-

son’s messages. The American President’s message of Febru-
17 Hall and Nordhoff, op. cit., II, 138.
18 Ibid.

19
These newspapers were supposedly the Neue Deutscher Freie Zeitung
and the Frankfurter Zeitung of July 31, 1917. Actually they were editions
of the Freie Zeitung.
20 Bennet A. Molter, Knights of the Air (New York and London, 1918),
p. 190.
48 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
ary 1918, to Congress, was considered of special impor-
8,

tance, and the delivery of it to the Germans was regarded as a

“special task.” On February 11, 1918, two American airmen
in the French service, W. A. Wellman and “Tommy” Hitch-
cock, were ordered by their captain to deliver this speech to the
Germans. “It was really a message addressed to the German
people,” said the captain, “and today, Americans from the
different Escadrilles along the front are to have the unique
privilege of flying over the enemy’s country and dropping
21
copies of it, printed in German.” Of the actual delivery of
these packets of leaflets Mr. Wellman says:

My delivery route took me twenty-five miles into German territory

over the towns of Saarburg and Mittersheim
It was great sport. When it came to delivering the mail, however,

I found out very shortly that it was quite a trick to get my notes off
successfully and intact. Simply tossed overboard when I was going 130
miles an hour, they developed a habit of getting mixed up with my
wings, or caught in the fuselage ; but I finally found a solution to the
problem. It was by doing a vertical virage, tossing the bundles over
when I was flying perpendicularly, and at the same instant kicking my
machine around violently so that the tail would not strike them. 22

And then, perhaps a little too enthusiastically, Mr. Wellman

completes his picture with : “It was amusing to look back and
see the men below and behind us dropping their rifles and
scrambling for such of our messages as fell square in the
23
trenches.”
,
Before the close of the war the whole French Army be-
lieved campaign of ideas, and company commanders
in the
regarded the spread of propaganda as part of their day’s work. 24
New means of distribution were being discovered continually.
When the British perfected the free balloon, this was used
extensively by the French. In 1918 the French developed a plan

21 W. A. Wellman, Go Get ’Em (Boston, 1918), p. 191.

22 Ibid., p. 192. 22 Ibid.,
p. 195.
24 Heber Blankenhorn, “War of Morale,” Harper’s Magazine, CXXXIX
(1919), p. 513.
 Die Zahl der deutschen Repub llkaner, Demokraten und Sozialdemokraten,
die vor der drohenden Schutzhaft In das neutrale Ausland fliichten mussten,
mehrt sich tSglich. Andere, die wagen ihrer politlschen Oberzeugung trotz
Alter und Gebrechen in die feldgraue Uniform gesteckt wurden, sind zum
Feinde ubergegangen sie haben dort eine gute Auinahme und die Freiheit
;

gefunden. Sie alle haben nur einen Wunsch dem deutschen Volke die :

Wahrheit zu verkiinden, ihm die Binde von den Augen zu reissen, ihm den
Abgrund zu zeigen, in den es von seiner Regierung, von seinen Ausbeutern
gefuhrt wird. Diese Deutschen haben uns gebeten, auf dem einzigen noch
moglichen Wege ihre Worte unter dem deutschen Volke zu verbreiten.

Preussischer Militarismus und sondern die erhabenste Betatigung menschlicher Schopfer-

Aufgabe gottbegnadeter Herrscher ist.
kraft, die edelste
preussisches Junkertum*T
Vom Viriasser des Buch.es aJ’acoase-. Wie' man einem Fremden, das heisst einem Nicht
deutschen oder auch nur einem Nichtpreus^en niemals ,
Wie Kinder lasst Ihr Euch betrugen ,
wird beibringen konnen, was ein preussischer Junker sei,
Bis Ihr zu spat erkannt, o weh.
so wird man ihm auch niemals einen deutlichen Begi ilT von
DieWacbt am Rhein wird nicht genugen.
Der wahre Feind steht an der Spree. dem Wesen des preussischen Militarismus geben konnen.
Georg Herwegb. Junker und Militarismus sind so speziell preussische, ja
Europa —
und die Welt —
haben ganz richtig erkannt, innerhalb Preussens noch so speziell ostelbische Begrifie,
dass nur der, der diese Menschen und ihre Geitesverlassung
wo der Sitz des Kriegsubels, welches der Bazillus ist, der
die Kriegsseucbe erzeugt hat. In der Tat, die Diagnose ist
von Jugend an gesehen, gefuhlt, unter ihnen gelebt und
gelitten hat, sich einen klaren BegrifT von ihrem VVesen
nicht allzuschwer. Jener Preussengeist, der K riegsgeist
heisst, ist ein ganz spezielles Gewachs preussischen Bodens.
machen kann. Nirgends in der Welt findet sich diese
Er ist ein Rest mittelalterlichfeudaler Anschauungen, der eigenartige Mischung von Slandeshochmut, ProGlgier,
sich nur in den ostlichen, etwas abseits von der Kulturent- Herrschsucht, Borniertheit, brutalem Draufgangertum
wicklung liegenden Provinzen Preussens konserviert hat gegen oben und gegen unten, wenn es sich um die eigenen
und unter der sorgsamen Pflege der Hohenzollern , unter Interessen und Vorteile handelt, —
von rafliniertem Intri-
genspiel gegen missliebige Regierungsmanner, die nicht
dem raachtvollen Aufstieg des preussi'chcn Konigtiims zur
deutschen Kaiserwurde, zu neuer Blute und Entfaltung ganz nach der Pfeife der Junker tanzen wollen, —
von bru-
gelangt Dieses mililarisch-preussisch-hohenzollernsche
ist.
talem Missbrauch derZoll-, Steu^r- und Finanzgesetzgebung
Draufgangertum Gndet seine vollkommenste und «sympa- zu dem Zwecke, sich selbst moglichst zu enllasten und alle
Verkorperung heute in dem Erben des preus-
anderen Klassen, sogar die armsten, moglichst zu belasten,
tischste*
sischen Konigs- und deutschen Ka iserthrones. — von rucksichtsloser Ausnutzung der Corps- und Familien-
Seine Schriften, seine Reden, seine Handlungen, seine beziehungen zur Beherrschung der Staatsverwaltung, zur
Armeeaufrufe, ja seine in alien illustrierlen Blattern pran-
Erlangung der lettesten Posten, zur Vorwartsschiebung dor
genden Kriegsphotographien mit dem strahlend-befriedigten
Vettern und Gesinnungsgenossen. Dabei verstehen diese
Antlitz, beweisen, dass er in dem jetzigen «Immer feste Leute es meisterhaft — und haben es stets verstanden
- —
druflf! • sich so re* ht in seincm FJemente fuhlt, dass fdr ihn ihren Klassen Egoismus hinter den tonenden Phrasen von
der Krieg nicht die schlimmste Geissel der Menschheit, Tliron und Altar, voa Zucht und Sitte, von Gott, Konig und
Vaterland zu verstecken.
So lan, e die Junker in Preussen und durch Vermittlung
r

Aus No. Her von Grumbach berausgegebenen « Republikanischen

I

Biblinthek*. Diese Stutlie wird in <lem eweiten, 'emnachst erschei-

Preussens im d utschen Reiche die herrschende Klasse
nenden Band des Werkes : a Das Verbrechen* entbalten sein. das der bilden, ist jeder Gedanke an eine Besserung der proussiscb-
Verfasser von J’acciue als weitausgreifend© und tiefschilrfende Forl- deutschen Zustande und damit an eine daucrnde Friedens-
seitung seines erslen Bucbes herausgibt. organisation Europas ausgeschlossen. Der preussische

German Emigres Attack the Fatherland

The writings of German emigres inSwitzerland and Allied countries were used
extensively for propaganda purposes. Here the author of J’accuse attacks Prussian
militarism and junkerism. This leaflet was distributed by the Service de propagande
aerienne.
50 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
of mass distribution of leaflets at short range. They con-
structed “propaganda bullets” of tinfoil similar to the “de-
fense” grenades, which could be shot to a distance of 200
meters. They exploded in the air and could be counted on to
float 100 meters before they reached the ground.
another
Each portetract, as the French called these, carried about 150
25
leaflets, or from five to ten newspapers. The first use made
of these was in the battle of Champagne in the night of May
12-13, 1918. It was estimated and two mil-
that between one
lion leaflets were shot over to the Germans in one quarter of
an hour. That many of these reached the hands of the enemy
troops is shown by the fact that in the First Army alone over
14,000 were turned in. 26
leaflets

The one handicap of this propaganda bullet was that it

would not go far enough. Hence by March 1918 the French
perfected a propaganda shell for use in the 75 mm. field guns.
These had a range of from 4 to 5 kilometers. 27 The burst of
these could be regulated and enemy positions could be flooded
with leaflets with great accuracy. 28

ENGLAND
As has been stated, the British from the very beginning
put the distribution of their propaganda into the hands of the
military authorities. In order to get the right kind of leaflets

25 Blankenhorn, op. cit., p. 513; also Hansi et Tonnelat, op. cit., p. 155.
26 Hans Thimme, op. cit., p. 47. Dr. Thimme’s source for this is Akten
der O.H.L., abt. Ill b.
27
Blankenhorn, op. cit.; also George Creel, “America’s Fight for World
Opinion,” Everybody’s Magazine, XL, 10.
28 Walter Nicolai gives some further information on the supposed tactics
of the Allies in general. He
about discovering countless secret printing
tells

plants that “were concealed in the cleverest ways. These establishments,” he

states, “concerned themselves, too, with the production of false passes and
leave papers for German soldiers. With the help of these, efforts were made
to persuade them to desert and to make desertions easy” (Nicolai, op. cit.,

p. 167). The present writer has been unable to find verification of Mr. Nico-
lai’s statements.
 METHODS AND TACTICS 51

to the front at the proper psychological moment, the British

divided their propaganda material into two classes “priority” :

29
leaflets and “stock” leaflets. The priority leaflets were those
of a news character with which the English proposed to “edu-
cate” the Germans; the stock leaflets were those with matter
of a less urgent nature.
For the priority leaflets a time table was prepared in
which the time allotted for the different processes of compo-
sition, translation, printing, transport to France, and dis-

tribution was cut down to the absolute minimum. In this way

the British were able to put new bulletins into the hands of
the Germans within 48 hours after being written in England.
Three times a week a consignment of not less than 100,000
leaflets of the priority type was rushed over to France for

immediate delivery to the Germans. 30

As the spring and summer of 1918 came on, these priority
leaflets became more and more important. One of Northcliffe’s

aims was to inform the German people of the great odds

against them. The American troops were arriving in greater
and greater numbers the submarine warfare of Germany had
;

failed; the Allied industries were increasing their output,

while the German industries were almost at a standstill be-
cause of the lack of raw materials and men. All of these
facts were good material for propaganda, and many a pam-
phlet of “education,” with its statistics of American troops in
France and its picture of the vast industrial activities of the
Allies, found its way across the lines and into the hands of the
weary German soldiers. These pamphlets stressed British
progress in those fields of industry in which Germany had
excelled before the war. The British propagandists also took
advantage of the Scientific Exhibition which was held in
London to get certain facts before the enemy. Catalogues of
the Exhibition were printed in great numbers and smuggled
into Germany. Scientific articles were written and sent to the

29 Sir Campbell Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, 30 Ibid.,

p. 92. p. 93.
52 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Dutch and Swiss press with the hope that they would some-
how find their way into Germany. 31
Another British propaganda enterprise was the publication
of the “Trench Newspaper.” 32 This was written especially for
the German soldiers, the general make-up of the paper re-
sembling that of a German publication. 33 In order that it

might appear to be genuinely German, the head of the Kaiser

decorated the title page. The propagandists
filled this “news-

paper” with stories and were interesting to read.

articles that
Here and there harmless-looking paragraphs gave the German
soldier information which he received from no other source.
In the middle of an article otherwise highly patriotic would be
“slipped a sentence or two intended to startle the reader and
34
to make him reflect.” As many as 250,000 copies of this
propaganda sheet were distributed to the Germans each week. 35
Says one of the co-workers of Northcliffe
We worked on, editing our trench paper, making our leaflets more
and more pointed, sending “London Correspondence” to neutral news-
papers [Swedish, Dutch, Swiss] which sent copies into Germany; put-
ting slips into books which were going to German buyers through neu-
tral lands announcing daily the figures of the American divisions
;

which were taking the field. 36

The British tried also to take advantage of the religious

strain in the German character. which
Leaflets were printed in
it was pointed out that the German military defeats were a

just retribution for the crimes of the German government.

Various sermons were sent out which had in them a touch of
propaganda. The text of one of these sermons was “Be :

37
sure your sins will find you out.”
Another ingenious method was the publication of the War
Pictorial. This was a monthly picture album which contained
pictures of the wonderful factories in the Allied countries, the
thousands of American troops that were coming to France,
31 Stuart, op. cit., 32 Hamilton Fyfe, Northcliffe, 248.
p. 98. p.

33 Stuart, op. cit., p. 100. 34 Hamilton Fyfe, op. cit., p. 249.

35 Stuart, op. cit. 38 Fyfe, op. cit., p. 250. 37 Stuart, op. cit., p. 100.
 METHODS AND TACTICS 53

and the great food supplies and the immense war activities of
the Allies at home and at the front. Copies of this album were
38
smuggled into Germany in great numbers.
Later, when the people at home wrote to the soldiers about
their troubles, the English made use of these letters by pub-
lishing them with some letters of English mothers to their
3®
sons, to show the contrast in conditions in the two countries.
Another type of “comparative” leaflets was the “comparative
menu” group. Thewho were ever alert for new
English,
methods, got their idea when certain German newspapers
complained of the high cost of living in Germany. The V os-
sische Zeitung for November 18, 1915, had published a price
40
list of the various articles of food. jAnd later the propa-
gandists obtained information as to the food rations in Ger-
many and Im-
the cost of foodstuffs in Berlin restaurants.
mediately leaflets were sent out which compared the food
41
rations in England with those in Germany and which con-
42
trasted the prices of food in London and Berlin restaurants.
Like the French, the British also made use of the writings
of Germans of note. Over a million copies of Prince Lich-
nowsky’s My London Mission, 1912-1914 were distributed
by the War Aims Committee. 43 Muehlon’s Vandal of Europe

38 Generalleutnant Altrock, Deutschlands Niederbruch (Berlin, 1919),

p. 19.
39 Eugene Neter, Der Seelische Zusammenbruch der Kamp {front, Be-
trachtungen eines Frontarztes (Munich, 1925), p. 10. Reprint from Sud-
deutsche Monatshefte, 22 Jahrgang, Hefte 10, Miinchen, 1925.
40 Vossische Zeitung, November 18, 1915.

Great Britain, Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, A.P.

41

[Air Post] 75, Hoover War Library collection, gives the comparison of food
rations in England and Germany. The “Air Post” leaflets will be cited
hereafter as A.P. with the proper number. Those cited are all in the Hoover
War Library.
42 London
Leaflet A.P. 80 gives a comparison of the cost of food in the
and Berlin restaurants.
43 The Times (London), May Lichnowsky’s memorandum was
9, 1918.

one of the most popular bits of propaganda of the Allies. It was never in-
tended for publication. It was written in 1916 for private circulation and
54 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
was also given wide circulation in the Allied and enemy coun-
44
tries. In order that these propaganda materials by German
Germany more readily, the covers
writers could be thrust into
were decorated in the manner of German publications and in
many cases the names of revered German authors appeared on
the covers, thus making sale on the German market more
45
probable.
Keeping in close touch with the military events at the fronts,
the propagandists aimed to inform the Germans promptly of
those happenings which would have propaganda value. After
the downfall of Bulgaria the British succeeded in getting pub-
lished in German newspapers reports of the occurrence, to-
gether with reports of the kindly way the Allies intended to
treat the fallen foe. On October 5, 1918, for instance, we find
a dispatch in the Kolnische Zeitung, printed on the front page,
quoting the London Daily Mail as follows
The Associated Powers intend neither to disturb nor overthrow
Bulgaria. They merely desire to bring justice between the individual
races. They cannot forget the past deeds of the king; but that is a
question which concerns the Bulgarian peoples themselves. If they take

intended only for the family archives. Prince Lichnowsky showed these to a
few political friends, in whom he had the utmost confidence. Without his
knowledge one of these men gave the memorandum to an officer in the politi-
cal department of the General Staff. This officer made copies of the memo-
randum and sent them to persons unknown to Prince Lichnowsky. “When I
heard of the mischief done,” says the Prince, in a letter to the German Chan-
cellor in March 1918, “it was unfortunately too late to be able to call in all
the copies sent out. I therefore placed myself at the disposal of the then Im-
perial Chancellor, Dr. Michaelis, and intimated to him my most sincere re-
grets for the whole painful affair. I have since endeavored to prevent the
my opinions, unfortunately without the desired effects”
further publication of
(N orddeutscheAllgemeine Zeitung, March 19, 1918) also cited by R. H.
;

Lutz, The Fall of the German Empire, 1914—1918 (Stanford University,

1932), I, 58.
44Muehlon was a former director of the Krupp Works and he, like
Lichnowsky, was convinced that Germany was guilty of starting the war.
Both men blamed the blundering, underhanded diplomacy and the selfishness
of the pan-Germans.
45 Stuart, op. cit.,
p. 104.
 METHODS AND TACTICS 55

steps to keep the ruler that brought them to misfortune it is their own
48
business.

The English also made use of the German prisoners by

encouraging them to write home describing conditions in the
47
English prison camps . In those war prisons from which the
English needed propaganda, the German prisoners were espe-
cially well fed. The Germans, and grateful for their fine food
good treatment, would write home describing in glowing
terms their life in British camps. These letters were repro-
duced with great accuracy and sent over to the German
48
trenches Postcards from German soldiers in prison labor
.

camps were used in a like manner. These prisoners were asked

if they would like to send a postcard home to say they were

in good health and well treated. The prisoners would write

their postcards and address them, after which multiple copies
were made from a jelly pad. These were then sorted into
bundles of a dozen selected cards and each bundle was wrapped
in a fly-sheet with a notice in German printed on it in bold
type. This notice, which was stereotyped, read

Soldaten ! In dem Schiitzengraben erfriert man. Heraus aus dem

Schiitzengraben ! Hinein ins warme Bett ! Taglich drei Mahlzeiten
Wo? Warme Kleidung ! Wo?
Wo? Bei den Eng-
bezahlte Arbeit!
landern ! Darum ergebt Euch
Die Englander toten keine Ge-
ihnen.
fangenen. In Lager der Englander durft Ihr Euren Civilberuf aufneh-
men. Fur Eure Arbeit werdet Ihr gut bezalt. Im Lager der Englander

46 Kolnische Zeitung, October Morgen Ausgabe; Lon-

5, 1918, see also
don Daily Mflil (editorial), October 1, 1918.
47 Toward
the end of 1916 the German prisoners upon arriving at the
British camps were handed letter sheets, with instructions on them, for their
use. Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in Feindesland, Amtliches Material, England
(Berlin, 1919), p. 66.
48
Another way the English worked on the German troops in prison
camps was to tell them that after they were exchanged for English prisoners
and returned to Germany they dare not go to the front and fight against the
English again, for if recaptured they would be shot by the English. “As a
result,” says von Stein, “it was difficult to persuade them to go back to the
front.” General der Artillerie z.D. von Stein, Erlebnisse und Betrachtungen
aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges (Berlin und Leipzig, 1919), p. 153.
56 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
diirft Ihran eure Freunde und Verwandte schreiben und Ihr erhaltet
sammtliche Briefe und Postpackete welche sie Euch zusenden. Es ist
nicht unpatriotisch Sich ehrenhaft dem Feinde zu ergeben um spater
in die Heimat zuriickkehren zu konnen. Darum ergebt Euch und er-
friert nicht in dem Schiitzengraben. 49

The speeches of leading British and American statesmen

were considered valuable for propaganda purposes, and were
promptly put into leaflet form and dropped over the lines. An-
other way of getting these speeches to the enemy was to ar-
range for interviews on important subjects between neutral
newspapermen and British public men. 60 In these the altruism
of the Allies was always stressed. The British war aims
especially the destruction of German militarism and autocracy,
which were enslaving the German people and threatening the
entire world —
were points which the British statesmen and
high public officials emphasized. Reports of these were printed
in the neutral press and often quoted by the enemy news-
papers.
Reaching the German people with propaganda through
the neutral press was not such a difficult task. The big prob-
lem came in finding means of delivering the thousands of
leaflets to the German troops and to the German people be-

hind the lines. The method of delivery went through different

stages of development, and it was not until the summer of
1918 that a suitable method was developed.
The first method employed the trench mortar. The idea
was to construct a sort of a bomb with a small bursting charge
which would, upon its arrival over the opposing lines, release
a shower of leaflets upon the enemy. This, however, proved
ineffective; it was poor psychology to hurl a shower of leaflets
at a German in so direct a manner, for “even the most suscep-
51
tible of the enemy troops might resent it.’’

49 F. M. Cutlack, The Australian Flying Corps in the Western and East-

ern Theatres of War, 1914-1918 (Sidney, 1923), p. 208.
50 Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, p. 98.
51 Major C. J. C. Street, “Behind the Enemy Lines,” Cornhill Magazine,
XLVII (1919), p. 494.
 METHODS AND TACTICS 57

It was not long, therefore, before the trench mortar gave

way This plan seemed well chosen, for the
to the airplane.
planes would scatter leaflets from a convenient height. Fur-
thermore, owing to the length of time taken by the leaflets
in falling, would have no apparent connection
their arrival
with the flight of the airplane. It was known to the propa-
gandists that greater effect could be produced by a leaflet
blowing into the trenches apparendy from nowhere in par-
ticular than by one obviously hurled directly at the enemy.
The airplanes could penetrate deeply into the enemy territory
and scatter leaflets over rest billets as well as over trenches,
permitting the Germans behind the lines, who had more leisure,
52
to ponder the contents of the leaflets.

However, opposition to the use of the airplane developed.

It was pointed out by the military leaders that while fliers

were risking their lives dropping leaflets of unknown value

over the trenches they could very profitably be dropping bombs
instead.
New devices were experimented with, and soon the obser-
vation balloon was put to use. This proved unsatisfactory,
since the occupants of the balloons were too busy with their
regular observations work to be bothered with leaflets. 53 Late
in 1916 the free balloon was considered a possible vehicle of
propaganda. 54 This seemed a very simple method, and easy to
put into practice. All that was necessary was to fill the bal-
loons with hydrogen, tie them up with
the leaflets to them, send
a favorable wind, and let the wind and the balloons do the
rest. The difficulty, however, was in predicting within miles

where the balloons would come down. The science of meteor-

ology helped out the propagandists in this matter. The me-
teorologists were able to gauge the velocity and the direction
of the wind at practically any height in any given locality. 55
Now the work of the propagandist was simple:

52 Ibid., 53 Street, op. cit.,

p. 494. p. 494.
54 Ibid., 55 Ibid., also
p. 495. Stuart, op. cit., p. 55.
58
ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
You took your balloon to a given spot, say ten miles behind the
56
lines you knew your balloon would rise say six thousand feet and
:

travel at that height until its burden was released. The “meteor” gave

the velocity of the wind at twenty-five miles an hour southwest at that

height and place. Forty miles from the balloon position, and bearing
northeast was an enemy camp. Load balloon with propaganda, set re-
lease to act in rather less than two hours to allow for drift of the leaf-
67
lets, and there you are.

The Air Inventions Committee, the Munitions Inventions

Department, the Inspectorate of H. M. Stores, and the Army
Intelligence Officers experienced in the use of silk balloons for
other military purposes all assisted the War Office in over-
coming the various difficulties. Designs and apparatus were
tested in workshops and laboratories and at experimental sta-
tions near London and on Salisbury Plain. They were then
taken to France and tried out under actual conditions of war,
and gradually each difficulty was overcome. 58
Once perfected, this balloon was manufactured at the rate
of nearly 2,000 per week. 09 It was made of paper, cut in ten
longitudinal panels, with a neck of oiled silk about twelve
inches long. The circumference was about twenty feet, and
the height, when inflated, over eight feet. Inflated with ninety
or ninety-five cubic feet of hydrogen, the lifting power of each
60
balloon was about five and one-half pounds. The weight of

56 The British had various “balloon release” stations at the front. One of
these was near Lozingham, about midway between Bethune and Choques, a
convenient point in a bold salient of the British lines. Street, op. cit., p. 487.
57 Ibid. Nature worked in favor of the Allies in this matter, for “above
an altitude of 10,000 feet 95 per cent of the winds over Western Europe blow
from west to east.” Robert Mearns Yerkes, ed., The New World of Science;
Its Development during the War (New York, 1920), p. 55.
58 The Times (London), January 1919; also Stuart, op. cit.
2,

59 The Times (London), January 1932; also Stuart, op. cit.

2,

60 Filling the balloonswith hydrogen presented another problem. Since

hydrogen readily passes through paper, some suitable varnish had to be found
to make the paper gas-tight. After many disappointments a formula was ar-
rived at, the application of which prevented the evaporation of the gas for
two hours or more (Stuart, op. cit., p. 55).
 METHODS AND TACTICS 59

the balloon itself was a little over one pound. The head of the
German secret service gives a picture of these propaganda
distributors as they appeared to the Germans
and were made of tissue paper of light-bluish color difficult
.

to see in the air. They could be filled with an ordinary gas-jet. The
packets which were thrown down contained one, two or three balloons,
folded and with complete instructions how to make use of them. Often
chemicals were included in the packets, so that the finder could make
gas on the spot to fill the balloon. 61
A
For releasing the leaflets several devices were tried. One
method was to affix a fuse of suitable length set to burn five
minutes to the inch. The leaflets were attached on a wire
neck of the balloon, the fuse wrapped around the wire. Each
packet of leaflets was released in turn by the burning fuse,
thus dropping propaganda packet by packet. Another method
was to attach a time-clock combination to the release. 62 Thus,
without risking a man, and without much effort, the British
propagandist could flood the German lines and the hinterland
with propaganda of every sort.

THE UNITED STATES

“Make the world safe for democracy,” was the cry that
aroused the American people to war against Germany. The
psychology of this was so successful at home that the Amer-
ican propagandistsmade upon Ger-
use of it in their attack
many. The American pamphlet, “Number 5,” for instance,
which was distributed over the German lines in November

61 Walter Nicolai, The German Secret Service, 159. Colonel Nicolai

p.
also tells how the Allies fitted out the German population behind the lines
with wireless telegraphic apparatuses.“These were senders of the newest
construction from the Marconi Works, with four accumulators, 400-volt dry
batteries and 30-meter antennae by means of them message could be sent
;

about 50 kilometers. The packet with these apparatuses contained, in addi-

tion to the usual material, instructions for ciphering Though a
number of wireless sets were found, we never discovered one at work”
(Ibid., p. 159).
62 Street, op. cit.; also Stuart, op. cit.,
p. 58.
60 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE

1917, pointed out that America was fighting the German auto-
63
crats and not the German people. “America wishes merely
to protect democracy and the people against the Kaiser and
his militarists,” ran the appeal. “The only hindrance to peace
is the autocratic government of Germany. Once that govern-
ment is removed then peace will come.” 64 Another appeal ran
as follows
German Soldiers
As you know the United States of America has entered the war.
Not against the German people, has this Republic declared war, but
against your Junkers. The United States has declared itself prepared
to throw its entire force against military powers; it is giving the Allies
her navy, her unlimited number of troops, her incalculable riches. Do
you still believe that your government can bring the world to her feet?
.... Do you want to continue to offer yourselves up for the war-
65
mongers and the exploiters ?

The most important producer of propagandafor America

and the was President Wilson. He had a knack of tim-
Allies
ing his speeches properly and of saying just the right thing.
One American propagandist comments thus upon a speech of
the President:
No words could have been better timed, better put, than the speech
of September 27, to vitalize German despair. It meant action that there ;

could be no peace with the German government. It meant peace “The :

League of Nations must be ... . the most essential part of the peace
settlement No discrimination between those to whom we wish
and those
to be just to whom we do not wish to be just.” Stronger than
a from Lenin, this speech would really stir the hardened soldier of
call

the Western Front. For him the essential part went into a leaflet entitled
“The Way to Peace and Justice.” 66
63 See also Wilson’s War Message of April
2, 1917, and Charles Sey-
mour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, III, 127.
64 Leaflet No. 5, Hoover War Library collection.
65 Fliegerabzmirf-Schriften (no number), Hoover War Library.
60 Heber Blankenhorn, “War of Morale,” Harper’s Magazine, CXXXIX
(1919), p. 520. Wilson’s persistent distinction between the German people and
the German government was possibly inspired by Colonel House. On June 3,

1915, in the midst of the “Lusitania” affair, House wrote to Wilson that, in
case of war with Germany, Wilson might well, in his speeches, “exonerate
 METHODS AND TACTICS 61

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Letter of a German Prisoner

Here are two views of one of the letters that the German prisoners in English
prisoncamps are supposed to have written home. Written on printed forms, they were
distributed to the German troops via free balloon.
62 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
And in the New York Times for November 9, 1918, we find
another tribute to Wilson’s propaganda value: “Our propa-
ganda outfit,” says the report, “claims Wilson as its favorite
author; his speeches and notes are included extensively.” 67
To facilitate speedy delivery of these speeches and other
propaganda materials Germans, the Americans had a
to the
large printing establishment in Paris under the command of
Captain Arthur Page of Doubleday, Page & Co. The edi-
torial work was under the direction of Captain Walter Lipp-

mann, while Colonel House acted as an unofficial adviser be-

68
cause of his knowledge of German psychology.
It was Colonel House who, after reading a letter from

Bernard Ridder, suggested that the American propaganda

should advertise American war-preparation and play up the
inexhaustible resources of this country. On August 9, 1917,
the Colonel wrote to President Wilson
The letter from Bernard Ridder is interesting. I believe he is right
when he says, “There is no adequate realization in Germany today of
the enormous preparations being made in our country.”
I believe furthermore, that where the Allies have fallen down is in

their lack of publicity work in neutral countries and in the Central

Powers. 69

the great body of German citizenship, stating that we were fighting for their
deliverance as well as the deliverance of Europe” (Seymour, The Intimate
Papers of Colonel House, II, 466).
House and Northcliffe had talked over this strategy when the English
propagandist was in America with the British War Mission. It was then
that Northcliffe decided that American preparations, resources, etc., should
be played up by the British propagandists.
67 New York Times, November 9, The New York World, in a
1918.
front-page article on April 15, how Wilson’s War Message was
1917, told
to be delivered to the Germans : “The ignorance of the German people as to
why War against them is to be dis-
the United States entered the World’s
pelled by The World, acting in conjunction with the French authorities,
through the medium of the French Aviation Corps. Swarms of aeroplanes
will drop hundreds of thousands of copies of President Wilson’s address to
Congress, printed in Paris in the German language by The World under the
direction of its correspondent.” 68 New York Times, November
9, 1918.
69 Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, III, 140.
 METHODS AND TACTICS 63

To this “educative program’’ the C.P.I. and the Military

Intelligence set themselves with great vigor.

Unemotional diagrams of the ever mounting American troop ship-

ments; the unsentimental war map; a few plain questions: “Will you
ever be as strong again as you were in July 1918? Will your opponents
grow stronger or weaker?’’ Ahead of the boys, in the picture and
type went our snow-storm of icy meaning. 70

They hammered at the fact that the odds were against Ger-
many, that American resources were unlimited 71 and that the ,

Germans could never hope for victory. They also emphasized

the German casualties and tonnage losses and the shortage of
food in the Fatherland.
One of the ways by which the C.P.I. hoped to advertise
America was by entertaining foreign journalists in America.
Mrs. Vira B. Whitehouse, head of the Swiss Commission of
the C.P.I., tells how she succeeded in getting six distinguished
72
Swiss journalists to go on a tour of the United States . These

70 Stars and Stripes, January 3, 1919. This was the official newspaper of
the A.E.F. in France. See also Blankenhorn, op. cit., p. 519.
71 This campaign got Mr. Creel and his C.P.I into a little difficulty. His

enthusiasm carried him away from the truth at times. The Daily Bulletin of
March 28, 1918, had four photographs illustrating the building and shipment
of airplanes to France. Said the Bulletin: “These aeroplane bodies, the acme
of engineering art, are ready for shipment to France. Though hundreds have
already been shipped, our factories have reached quantity production and
thousands and thousands will soon follow.” The truth of the matter was
that these pictures had been taken in the airplane factories, the parts not yet
ready for shipment, and that only one airplane had been shipped to France
at that time. Mr. Rubel, head of the division of pictures of the C.P.I., was
brought before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and, together with
George Creel, was severely criticized for making these false statements after
the committee had warned them not to ( Congressional Record, Vol. 56, pt. 5,
65th Congress, 2d Session, March 29, 1918, pp. 4253-55).
72Since neither Mrs. Vira B. Whitehouse in her book A Year as Gov-
ernment Agent, nor George Creel in his official report of the work of the
—
C.P.I. gave the names of the Swiss journalists though both mention that
—
they came the present writer wrote to Mr. Creel asking if those names
were available. Mr. Creel replied that he could not give me the information,
since he did not have it, but referred me to Mrs. Whitehouse. A letter to
64 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
visitors were taken New York Shipbuilding Company
to the
in New Jersey, the Squantum & Quincy plants of the Fore
River Shipbuilding Company outside of Boston, the Brooklyn
Navy Yard, and the Newark plant of the Submarine Boat
Corporation. 73 The correspondents were allowed to write any-
thing that they desired, the only restriction being that certain
secrets of construction were not to be discussed. These men
wrote home a number of enthusiastic articles concerning
America’s war preparations. 74 However, the Armistice came
before they had returned to Switzerland and their stories had
no significant part in hastening the end of the war.
In the matter of direct propaganda the Americans, though
late in the field, soon became proficient. At first, they too,
like the Britishand the French, used airplanes for the purpose
of delivering leaflets. The 104th Squadron of the 5th Army
was especially active in this work. This squadron made twelve
trips over the German lines in the Argonne district and north
of Verdun. 75 The 99th Aero Squadron was also used exten-

Mrs. Whitehouse elicited the reply that she had forgotten the names and
that the records were destroyed. She mentioned, however, M. Martin, of the
Journal de Geneve, and Herr Oeuri, of the Basler Nachrichten, who could
perhaps enlighten me. Finding that M. Martin was dead and that the other
name was Oeri and not Oeuri, I proceeded to write to Herr Oeri. He re-
plied very promptly with a most courteous letter, in which he gave me the
names of the six journalists, told which are still living, and promised to send
me copies of the articles written by these men. The journalists were: Dr. Ed.
Fuster, Neue Ziiricher Zeitung; Dr. William Martin, Journal de Geneve
(both are now dead) J. Elie David, Gazette de Lausanne; Ernst Schiirch,
;

Bund of Berne Dr. Edwin Strub, National- Zeitung, Basel and Dr. Albert
; ;

Oeri, Basler Nachrichten. The four pamphlets Dr. Oeri sent me are the col-
lected articles written by Dr. Oeri, Dr. Edwin Strub, and Ernst Schiirch.
These have been placed in the Hoover War Library.
73 For the rest of the itinerary of these journalists, see Report, C.P.I.,

pp. 106 ff.

See Dr. Albert Oeri, Aus Amcrika (Basel, 1919) Ernst Schiirch, Aus
74
;

der Neuen Welt, mit der Schweiserischen Presssemission in Amerika (Berne,

1919) and Dr. Edwin Strub, hn Weltkriege nach Amerika (Basel, 1919)
;

for reprints of articles these journalists wrote.

75 New York Times, July 20, 1919, Section 7, p. 4.
 METHODS AND TACTICS 65

sively. Lieutenant C. H. Ball, who was attached to the 104th

Aero Squadron of the 5th Army Observation group, says
We carried large packets of circulars and folders written in Ger-
man, which had been prepared at a printing press behind our lines.

The first of these folders distributed among the Germans was a

map of the St. Mihiel salient, which showed the great gains of the Al-
76
lies during a short period of time .

This same folder gave the figures of the number of Ger-

man prisoners taken during that and previous offensives.
This was to correct the misinformation that had been given
the German troops by their commanders. Other pamphlets dis-
tributed contained photographs showing the large body of
American troops concentrated on the French and British fronts.
“These pictures,” says Lieutenant Ball, “in hundreds of thou-
sands of instances, gave the German soldiers their first correct
information as to the odds against them, and were more potent
than H.E. shells.”
Another of the methods of the American propagandists
was to distribute thousands of postcards along the German
trenches. Each had blanks for the finder to fill out in case
he was taken prisoner and could then be mailed to his rela-
tives. They were an invitation not only to stop fighting and

surrender but also to send a like request to the folks behind

77
the lines.
In order to distribute propaganda with the greatest pos-
sible effectiveness the Military Intelligence ascertained the
actual state of the enemy morale. This was done, for the
most part, by questioning the prisoners. The officer in charge
of this would first study the daily intelligence reports at Gen-
eral Headquarters, then visit the prison camps near Toul and
Souilly and hold long interviews with prisoners of all ranks
and from all parts of the Empire. Arguments which had
suggested themselves as suitable for propaganda use were
tried out on the prisoners and their effects noted. Specimens
of Allied propaganda were discussed with these prisoners and
76 Ibid. 77 Ibid.
66 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
they were asked to give their opinions on them. A sufficient
knowledge was thus gained of the German mental process to
give the officers of the Propaganda Subsection a fairly accu-
rate idea of the sort of arguments which would make the
strongest appeal. 78 The text of the proposed propaganda was
then prepared, and after being approved by G.H.Q. was
printed in Paris. The leaflets were then sent to the field stations
which the Propaganda Subsection had established at Bar-le-
Duc and Toul. A close liaison was maintained with the Air
Service and leaflets were sent to the various flying fields for
79
distribution by airplanes.
In addition to the airplanes many varieties of balloons
were used for spreading American ideas among the German
soldiers. The largest rubber company in the United States,
for instance, made 12,000 small rubber balloons at the order
of the Army and Navy authorities. These balloons could be
inflated to a diameter of 3p2 feet and could carry \y2 pounds.
At first used as targets in airplane practice, these little balloons
80
were soon used to deliver propaganda.
The advantage of these was that they could travel several
hundred miles with their “eloquence,” thus penetrating deeper
81
into the enemy territory than was possible for the airplanes.
The Americans also used a larger balloon with a tin con-
tainer that would hold ten thousand leaflets. The balloon had a
sailing range of from 600 to 800 miles. Its climb was governed
by a clock attachment, and a rather ingenious mechanism al-
lowed the leaflets to drop all together or packet by packet at
regular intervals. After the last printed “bullet” had broken
82
loose, the balloon would blow up.

78 Major E. Alexander Powell, The Army Behind the Army, p. 350.

79 Ibid. 80 New York Times, July 20, 1919, Section 7, p. 4.

81 It was found that one of these actually traveled 740 miles from the
place where it was let loose (ibid.).
82 George Creel, “America’s Fight for World Opinion,” Everybody’s

Magazine, XL, 10. The Americans also put a chemical on the leaflets so that
they would not spoil if they lay out in the rain.
 METHODS AND TACTICS 67

Our propagandists also attempted to fly kites over the

trenches and to drop leaflets from traveling containers that
were run up the kite wire. But this method could be used only
on the fronts where airplanes were not active, since the kite
83
wires were a menace to the planes.
Thus the problem of penetrating the enemy’s lines and the
enemy’s country with propaganda material was solved by de-
vices and schemes of various kinds. No one method was
used all the time. Nor was it always possible to distinguish
between the propaganda tactics of the various countries. After
July 1918, when the Allies had worked out a system of co-
ordination, it is almost impossible to say that a certain piece
of propaganda emanated from this or that country. All pro-
duced propaganda as the need arose, and those methods of
delivery were used that would best meet the needs of a particu-
lar campaign at a particular time or place. The significant fact
is that the Allies seemed as busy discovering new ways to send
paper “bullets” over the lines as they were at inventing new
implements of warfare with which to fire bullets of steel at
the enemy. Bullets are important, but so is a strong morale —
will to victory.

83 Ibid.
 CHAPTER III
NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AS
BASES OF ATTACK
The important thing was to get the propa-
ganda into Germany to the German people.
.... Its publication and dissemination through
the neutral paperswas especially sought, since
from these it went into the German news-
papers. Northcliffe, Die Geschichte Eng-
lischen Propaganda Feldsuges (p. 17).

No stone was left unturned by any of the warring nations

win the sympathy or the favor of the neutral
in their effort to
countries The press was influenced. Films of a propaganda
:

nature competed with each other in the neutral countries’

theaters. In those nations still at peace, agents and commis-
sioners were established to devise ways and means of winning
favorable sentiment for the Allies or for the Central Powers,
as the case might be. No was slighted. As
neutral country
much attention was paid to Mexico and the South American
countries as to Norway, Sweden, or Denmark. One has only
to read the report of the activities of the American Commit-
tee on Public Information to grasp the importance attached
to this influencing of world opinion. Mr. Robertson summed
it up well when he said in the British House of Commons on

August 5, 1918
It has been a battle of propaganda. In the neutral nations the Ger-
mans put their case and we put ours, and if, as I believe, in Europe as a
whole the balance of that battle of propaganda has gone to the side of
the Allies it is because they put forward the best literature, the best
arguments, the most truthful and dispassionate statements. 1

But the warring nations did not feel that it was enough
to win favorable public opinion in the neutral countries they ;

1 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, CIX, 778.

68

/
 NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AS BASES OF ATTACK 69

sought to make, through certain of these states, a direct attack

upon their enemy. Switzerland and Holland, two neutrals

which bordered upon Germany, and where many German
2
emigres resided, formed the logical bases for this attack.

SWITZERLAND
Because of its geographical position, bordering upon
France, Italy, and Germany, Switzerland was an important
center for the attack upon the German home front, especially
in the period from 1914 to 1917. Here the German emigres
in Switzerland attacked the German government with their
newspaper, the Freie Zeitung. The aims of this publication
were stated in the issue of September 1, 1917:
We will be friendly to the Entente as long as it offers us a better
guarantee of achieving the democratic ideals than the Central Powers.
.... Our struggle against the regime of the Hohenzollerns and
Junkers is not a struggle against the German people. On the contrary
it is a struggle for the liberation of the German people from an un-
worthy situation. 3

The was Dr. Hans Schlieben,

chief editor of this newspaper
and associated with him were Richard Grelling, Hermann
Femau-Latt, Hermann Rosemeier, Hans Suttner, Claire
Studer, Jacob Feldner, Solomon Grumbach, Edward Stilge-
hauer, Hugo Ball, and Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster. 4 All
of these were men whose value as propagandists was recog-
nized by the Allies. They maintained close relations with the

2 From
Sweden the attack was made through a new telegraph bureau,
“Dordiska Presszentralen.” However, because of its geographical location
Sweden was never an important center for attacks upon the enemy morale.
3 Almanack der Freien Zeitung 1917-1918, herausgegeben und eingeleiten
von Hugo Ball (Berne, 1918).
4
Wilhelm Ernst, Die antideutsche Propaganda durch das Schweizer
Gebiet im Weltkrieg, speziell die Propaganda in Bayern (Munich, 1933) p. 8.
Dr. Ernst based his study on the materials in the Archives in Munich and
cites the original sources for his material. Since extensive use was made of
Dr. Ernst’s work in this study, the writer had certain citations verified by
Dr. Riedner, chief of the Bavarian Archives at Munich. Dr. Riedner’s letter
to the present writer
is given in the appendix.
70 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
French propagandists in particular. British and American
writers also were given space in the columns of the paper. 5
The Freie Zeitung first made its appearance in April 1917
as a semiweekly. This four-page publication was not a news-
paper in the true sense of the word. was for the most part a It

collection of articles hostile to Germany.

6
When the editors
wanted to expand the paper they found that they were unable
to do so because they were already using their quota of paper.
Hence they purchased, in May 1918, the Tessiner Zeitung,
which was to be discontinued, so that its allotment of paper
could be taken over by the Freie Zeitung. The latter was then
7
made a daily instead of a semiweekly publication.
The center of the French propaganda in Switzerland was
at Berne under the direction of the French attache, Frouville.

According to Thimme ( Weltkrieg ohne Waffen, p. 83), money was re-

5

ceived by the Freie Zeitung from the American pacifist Herron, and from
Tobler, a director in the Swiss Chocolate Factory. The articles that appeared
in the Freie Zeitung were varied.
George D. Herron, American “traveling
diplomat” and close friend of Woodrow Wilson, wrote a series of articles
entitled “Woodrow Wilson und der Frieden,” which appeared in issues from
August 15 to September 5, 1917. Otto H. Kahn, despite his denial of any
connection with the Freie Zeitung, wrote an article “Ein Amerikaner
deutscher Geburt und der Krieg,” which appeared in the issue of March 2,
1918. Almanack der Freien Zeitung 1917-1918, passim.
6
Examples of these are: extracts from /' accuse which appeared in the
issues of September 8 to 12, 1917 Muehlon’s Die Verheerung Europas
;

(“The Vandal of Europe”), which appeared in part in the May 1918 issues;
and Fernau’s Die Junker, appearing in the issues of April 14 to 16, 1917.
The July 1917 issues advocated the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine by Ger-
many, stating that these provinces never were happy under Prussian rule.
Almanack der Freien Zeitung 1917-1918 has many other examples.
7
Wilhelm Ernst, op. cit., p. 8. In the summer of 1918 the Swiss authori-
tiestook legal measures against the publication for violating the act restrict-
ing the use of paper. It had used more paper during the first seven months of
1918 than it was allowed for the entire year. However, undaunted by re-
strictions placed upon their publication, the editors of the Freie Zeitung
printed only a few copies of each edition in Switzerland and sent these to
various foreign countries, where many copies were printed and distributed.
Ernst, op. cit., giving as his source Bayer. Kriegsarchiv, “Akten des stellv.
Generalkommandos,” lb. AK, Bund 343 ;
“Einfuhr von Druckschriften
Freie Zeitung.”
 NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AS BASES OF ATTACK 71

He kept in close touch with the central agency in Paris and

8
also with the English Legation in Berne. The French worked
hand in hand with their Military Intelligence and their Secret
Service. The military attache in Berne and the consul-general
at Geneva acted as intermediaries between the agents actually
in Germany and the intelligence bureaus which had been estab-
lished along the Swiss frontier at Annemasse, Evian, and Pon-
9
tarlier. Between the propaganda headquarters and the agents
in Germany, there was a regular information service. The
extent of this propaganda in Switzerland and the importance
it had in the eyes of the participants is clearly shown in a

report of the military attache of the German Legation in Berne.

According to this report, 31 XI 1917, the French attache,
Frouville, brought from Paris money and signed agreements
with certain publishers in Berne to help in a campaign of
propaganda against the Hohenzollern dynasty. The French
also proposed to send into Germany about four hundred per-
sons of all walks of life to form a net over Germany and to
pour out propaganda against the ruling house. Their efforts
were to be directed, not against the Hohenzollern dynasty
alone, but against all ruling houses in the German principal-
ities. The report states

The center of this movement is in Stuttgart. There four or five

bureaus have already been erected by private individuals where the
propagandists appear for instructions and where they are given leaflets,
pamphlets, etc., to disseminate. 10

Then the report lists the instructions which were given to the
propagandists and which tell how best to avoid the suspicion

8 Ernst, op. cit., p. 4.

9 Ibid.,
p. 5; also Walter Nicolai, The German Secret Service, p. 88.
Foreign agents in Switzerland became so numerous that the Swiss govern-
ment was moved to warn them of the fact that Switzerland was a neutral
country. Neue Zuricher Zeitung, August 16, 1918.
10 Band
U.D.Z., 10, I, p. 267 ; see also Ernst, op. cit., p. 26 ;
Ewald Beck-
mann, Der Dolchstoss Prozess in Miinchen vom 19 Oktober bis 20 Novem-
ber 1925 (Munich, 1925), p. 208.
72 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
of the police and how to do the work in the most effective
manner. It continues

The pay — plus certain expense allowances — is according to the follow-

ing scale:
Francs
per month

Writers, journalists, editors 4000

Architects, language teachers 3000
Technicians, engineers 2000
Banktellers, commercial men and Department heads. .1500
Merchants, bureau chiefs 1000
Waiters, cooks and porters 800
Factory workers of all sorts 500
Agricultural laborers 500

Each person designated to go to Germany was to estab-

lish affiliate groups so that all of Germany would be covered
with anti-Hohenzollern groups. The
were to be sup- affiliates

plied with the necessary printed matter from Stuttgart and

Berlin. The individual propagandists were to give their reports
to the affiliates, and from these they were to receive their
instructions, new assignments, their pay, and, when necessary,
new personal papers.
For the most part the printed matter was produced in
Berne. Before a publisher was given a contract to print this
matter he had to attest before a notary that he had no relations
with Germany, had no German capital invested in his busi-

ness, employed no deserters of the Allies, and would bind him-

11
self to work for the Allies for a period of three years.
Instructions on how to disseminate propaganda, for the
use of German women, were also given out. In the spring of
1918 during the search of a house in Zurich an invitation to
spread Flugbldtter was found. Among other things the finder
of the leaflet was told

1. To use the leaflets as wrapping paper for bread and other foodstuffs
which were sent to the soldiers.

11 Ernst, op. cit., 27 facts verified by Dr. Riedner, head of the Ar-
p. ;

chives in Munich.
 NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AS BASES OF ATTACK 73

2. To look up the addresses of workers in different towns, friends, and

acquaintances, and send the leaflets to them through the mail.

3. To widows of fallen workers and give them

learn the whereabouts of
printed matter.[Such women were thought a great help in the
spread of propaganda material.]
4. To find out the attitude of the workers in the war industries toward
the war. If there were any who were of an opposition mind,
leaflets were to be given them for study and distribution.
5. To give to soldiers home on furlough gifts of cigars, tobacco, paper,
etc. These were to be wrapped in propaganda leaflets.

6. To leave leaflets in the restaurants and in all places where workers

and soldiers congregated. 12

Evidence that the Allied propagandists were working with

the liberals in Germany is found in Instruction Number 7,
which asked the individual to keep in close touch with the
German Vertrauensmdnner ) of the Allies and to
confidants (

talk things over with them first. “If there is no confidante, go

to the confidante of the U.S.P.D.”
The Allies had numerous agents in Germany who were
working for the overthrow of the German government, 13 or
who were assisting the Independent Socialists in stirring up
labor troubles, especially in the munitions plants. Major Gen-
eral Wrisberg, Director of the National War Department,
records in his book that incoming reports to the War Ministry
stated

It is almost certain that there is in Germany a secret committee of

central activity, which works under English authority and unlimited

English financial aid in conjunction with the radical elements of the
Social Democrats for a revolution among the German working class. 14

12 Germany, Reichstag, Verhandlungen dcs Reichstags, Band 313, 173

Sitzung, June 12, 1918, p. 5447 ;
also Ernst, op. cit., p. 28, quoting from
Bayer Kriegsarchiv, “Akten des Kriegsministeriums,” “Verbreitung revolu-
—
tionarer Propagandaschriften Abwehr,” Vol. J, 1917 mit 1918.
13 House wrote in his diary, May 19, 1917: “My thought is to
Colonel
give theGerman liberals every possible encouragement’’ (Charles Seymour,
The Intimate Papers of Colonel House [New York, 1926-1928], III, 125).
14 Ernst Wrisberg, Der W eg zur Revolution 1914-1918 (Leipzig, 1921),
p. 50.
74 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
In regard to the labor disturbances in the early part of
1918 the Norddeutsche Zeitung for February 8, 1918, re-
ported from Munich:

The Civil Court has issued an order for the arrest of a mechanic named
Lorenz Winkler for participation in the strike. Before the war Winkler
was abroad, and after his return to Germany kept up his relations with
foreign countries. That foreign influences were at work during the
strike may also be shown by the fact that on each of the men arrested a
pamphlet was found which was certainly written by a foreigner. In this
pamphlet an endeavor is made to prevent the people from subscribing
to the Eighth War Loan, and stir up the German people. 15

The methods used to smuggle propaganda into Germany

were numerous. One method was to give the leaflets to Ger-
mans who worked in Switzerland and crossed the border
every morning and every evening. The same method was
employed among school children who had to cross the border
to go to school. One of the most interesting methods was to
fill leather sacks with propaganda leaflets, put cork on the
ends of them, and throw them into the Rhine to be carried
18
into Germany. Sailboats which had balls of propaganda
literature attached to them under water often floated on Lake
Constance across to Germany. 17
The English, though more active in Holland, had propa-
ganda headquarters in Switzerland also. The British Consulate
in Zurich was the center of propaganda activity in Switzerland.
In the service of the English was a Swiss by the name of Wolf-
sohn, alias Mendelbaum, born in Prussia. He had under him
a staff of subagents and V ertrauensleuten. His chief agent was
Fraulein Claire von der Miihle, in Basle. An American, John F.
Kern, in Zurich, was also in the British propaganda service.
When, in June 1917, the British prepared to get 60,000 copies
of a leaflet entitled Bayern! Landeslente from Rorschach to

15 Norddeutsche Zeitung, February 1918; also British Daily Review

8,

of the Foreign Press, Vol. 6, p. 972.

16 Huber, op. cit., p. 65.
17 Ibid.
 NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AS BASES OF ATTACK 75

Germany by way of Lake Constance, 18 Kern expressed this

opinion
It is right that the authors of the printed materials should be mostly
Germans who are seeking to democratize their country. In Germany
we possessmany confidantes (Vertrauensleute) namely, under the So-
cialists and among the working class, who are working hand in hand

with us. The circle is getting larger. We hope for success soon and
19
then for peace !

False editions of German newspapers also were published

and sent into Germany. The Service aerienne sent an “edition”
of the Frankfurter Zeitnng of July 31, 1917, and two false
20
editions of the Strassbnrger Post into Germany. Hansi also
bought up the entire edition of the Berner Tageblatt of March
29, 1917, which contained good propaganda material, and sent
21
it across the border to Germany. Hiding propaganda among
freight shipments from Switzerland to Germany became so
prevalent that the General Staff complained to the War Minis-
try that a more careful inspection system should be established.
But, despite closer inspection, leaflets and books continued to
cross the Swiss border into Germany. 22 In Lindau, for in-
stance, a crate of books, supposedly coming from the firm of
Heheber of Geneva, was taken by the German authorities. This
contained, besides a few harmless works, more than 8,000
pieces of propaganda material. 23
Revolutionary material began to find its way into Germany
from Switzerland during the latter part of the war. 24 In July
1917 the following leaflet crossed the German-Swiss border.

18 The delivery was made on the night of June 2-3, 1917. For his part
of the work Kern received 1,000 francs, while a Swiss, a Mr. Fischer, who
had been engaged by Kern for translating purposes, got 600 francs. Thimme,
op. cit., p. 60. 10 Wilhelm Ernst,
op. cit., p. 3.
20 Hansi et Tonnelat, A Travers les lignes ennemies, p. 65.
21 Ibid., 22
p. 144. Thimme, op. cit., p. 59.
23
Thimme, Weltkrieg ohne Waffen, p. 59. Hansi admits that these were
not sent by the Geneva firm but by Raymond Schule, Hansi’s arch-smuggler.
Hansi et Tonnelat, op. cit., p. 145.
24 Generalleutnant W. F. K. Altrock, Deutschlands Niederbruch, p. 24.
76 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Germany Awake and send away those who are most responsible for
this whole madness.
All princes and diplomats who are responsible for this world-dis-
rupting war have to sink before one can think of peace
Who needs a Kaiser and King? Man is born free and does not
need a Divine Right master, who can be, by the Grace of God, the
greatest criminal and dumbhead.
We have preached for four years already, a Republic as the only
form of state and the only thing that will guarantee the peace
No one should reign, for Lordship means Lords, servants, freemen
and slaves But man is free and if the situation will not allow
it, we are here to change the situation

We are the state Each one of us 25

! !

By January 1918 the smuggling of revolutionary propa-

ganda into Germany from Switzerland began in earnest. Berne
was the center of the Zimmerwald propaganda from 1915 on.
The Swiss Left Social Democrats took part in this propaganda
and they also helped the Allies in their campaign against the
Hohenzollerns. Withand that of the German exiles
this help
in Switzerland, the Allied propagandists were able to flood

Germany with well-written propaganda literature of a revolu-

tionary character.

HOLLAND
Holland offered a convenient field for the propagandists
because of its long frontier bordering upon Germany over

which propaganda could be smuggled easily, and because the

sympathies of the Dutch were from the first favorable to the
Allies. A glance at the map will show that the whole of the

Netherlands eastern frontier, from Groningen on the north to

the southern extremity of Limburg in the south, lies open to
Germany. As soon as Belgium was invaded by the Germans,
26
the Dutch viewed their situation with consternation. If Ger-

25 Ernst, op. cit.,

p. 13.
26 It was part of the Schlieffen plan to violate the neutrality of Holland;
make an enemy of Hol-
but Moltke, Schlieffen’s successor, did not want to
land : we make Holland our enemy we shall stop the last air-hole through
“If
which we can breathe” (C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great
War 1914-1918 [Oxford, 1934], p. 8).
 NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AS BASES OF ATTACK 77

many went so far as to invade Belgium, what would prevent

her from invading Holland should she feel the need of such
action? By August 5 some parts of Holland had already been
placed in a “state of war,” and on when the Ger-
August 10,
mans made progress in Belgium, mobilization was rushed in
the southern provinces of Limburg, North Brabant, and Zee-
land, as well as in part of Gelderland. On August 29 various
frontier communities near Belgium were placed in a “state of
siege,” and on September 8 the mouths of rivers were declared
27
to be in a “state of siege.”
Thus the Allies had one great advantage from the very
beginning. We have already seen how the Entente propagan-
dists worked through the neutral press ;
how news dispatches
of Allied origin were sent to the neutral papers and how, ;

through these, Allied news leaked into Germany. From Hol-

land, however, the great attack upon Germany was not through
the press. In the Netherlands there existed a revolutionary
agitation, quietly encouraged by the Allies and at times openly
assisted by them. Besides deserters from the German Army
there were in Holland who desired
political refugees, people

the overthrow of the German government. Chief among the

refugees was Carl Minster, who had spent fourteen years in
America as a journalist. While in America he had edited the
Neu Yorker Volkszeitung and had acted as correspondent for
German Social Democratic newspapers. Returning to
various
Germany in 1912 he became editor of the Bergischen Arbeit-
erstimme and later managing editor of the Niederrheinischen
28
Arbeiterzeitung in Duisburg. He was
expelled from the So-
cial Democratic party early
1916, and in July he founded
in
his own radical weekly, Der Kanipf, which was published at
Duisburg. To avoid military service he fled to Holland on
March 31, 1917.

27 Times History of the War, XIII, 182. Various naval measures were
also adopted. The channels between Wadden Eslands, north of the Zuider
Zee, were barred by mines ;
mines were placed also in the Scheldt.
28 U.D.Z., Band 10, I, p. 236; also Thimme, of. cit., p. 107.
78 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
From Holland, Minster corresponded regularly with mem-
bers of the Independent Socialist party in Germany such as
Hugo Haase, Rosi Wolfstein, and Else Beck. His relations
were not limited to the U.S.P.D., however, for he was in close
29
touch with the Left radicals and the Spartacists . In Holland,
also, Minster found friends among the Socialists — the Dutch
Social Democratic party —who supported him 30
in the establish-
ment of Der Kampf Amsterdam This weekly had as its
in .

purpose the overthrow of the German government and its slo-

gan was, “Our enemy is Germany.”
To make his work more effective Minster enlisted the help
of the various deserters’ organizations in Holland. He soon
converted Der Freie Arbeiter and Arbeiter Verbildungsverein
Deutscher Zunge —two of the deserters’ organizations in Hol-
land — into political associations, with the overthrow of the
31
Hohenzollerns as their aim . Besides these, the followers of
Minster founded Die Freien Leser des Kampfes, which spread
to nearly all cities in Holland. He also founded a German sec-
32
tion of the Dutch Social Democratic party Thus Minster, .

through these various organizations and through Der Kampf

was in a position to attack the German government very ef-
fectively.
Minster directed his attention especially to the radicals and
to the young workers Germany. He called on these people to
in
refuse military service and to desert from the trenches. Helped
by like-minded friends in Germany, Minster was able to get
large numbers of leaflets over the German borders each week 33 .

One of his co-workers summed up their activities when he said,

in a speech before the Social Democratic party in Rotterdam,

29 Thimme, op. cit., 237 also Suddeutsche Monatshefte, April 1924,

p. ;

p. 9.
30This was not necessarily a continuation of Der Kampf of Duisburg.
He merely called it by the same name.
31 U.D.Z., Band 32 Ibid.
10, I, p. 238.
33 “Die Vermittlungsstellen im neutralen Ausland,” “Auf Grund unverdf-
fentlichter Akten” (Suddeutsche Monatshefte, April 1924, p. 10).
 NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AS BASES OF ATTACK 79

We went to the borders daily to bring Germany. our leaflets to

. . . .We went secretly through the brush, no one could see so that
us, to the border, and there we were met by friends who took our ma-
terial from us. Not only we, but various Social Revolutionary Parties
34
in Holland sent their people to the borders to distribute their leaflets.

Grohmann, in
Minster also obtained the services of a tailor,

Hambom and two deserters, Rohbach and Simon, for smug-

35

gling Der Kampf into Germany. Dutch workers also took

copies of this publication across the border.
The Allied propagandists made use of this Minster organi-
36
zation to get propaganda into Germany. Although it cannot
be definitely established that the British provided Minster with
money, as charged by the Germans, it has been established that
the English worked with Minster in getting leaflets and pam-
phlets into Germany. Captain Tinsley, one of the British
agents in Holland, was especially close to Minster and his or-
ganization. Minster’s list of peoplewho were pledged to dis-
tribute propaganda material in Germany was at the disposal of
37
Tinsley. Furthermore, according to Minster, the English
subscribed for 9,000 copies of Der Kampf, after it was estab-
38
lished in Amsterdam.
In the use of the German deserters for propaganda purposes
Minster was a great help to the Allies. When the deserters
39
into Holland became too numerous, the Dutch government

34 U.D.Z., op. cit., p. 239.

35 As a reward for his services he was to get rubber to smuggle into Ger-
many. Ibid.
36 Rohbach himself stated that he had been engaged by the French agent
in Holland, de Corte, to distribute Der Kampf. Ibid., p. 240.
37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 An number of deserters who went to Holland is given

estimate of the
in a letter of April 2, 1917, from Antwerp to Sheffield. It states in part:
“Holland is full of Boches, and there are now 90,000 Boche deserters. The
exact number has been discovered from their bread cards, for which they
have to enter their names” ( Confidential Supplement to the Daily Review of
the Foreign Press, No. 142, April 28, 1917).
80 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
40
established institutions for them
These deserters were ac-
.

cessible to the Allied propagandists, and especially to Minster.

He examined them regarding their place of service, the spirit
of the troops and the people, the facts regarding the food situa-
tion, and other matters. This information was given to the
anti-German paper, De Telegraaf, in Amsterdam, from which
it went directly to Mr. Brain, the correspondent of The Times

(London ). 41 Furthermore, through his many associates and

confidants in Germany, Minster was able to supply the Allies
with news regarding the economic and political situation behind
42
the front, facts of particular interest to the propagandists .

Besides thiswork with Minster, the Allies had organizations

of their own in Holland. The French had established, through
their Intelligence Service, nine sections located at The Hague,
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Arnheim, S’Hertogenbosch, Maast-
43
richt, Zwolle, Assen, and Groningen . From these sections
propaganda was sent into Germany. A fairly active
literature
organization was also set up under the French agent, Javaux.
Under him were such men as Dejong and Blens, who sought
means for getting propaganda into the enemy country 44 These .

men enlisted the support of longshoremen at Deljzyl, who

smuggled leaflets into boats destined for Germany. They also
got the help of railroad-station agents, who put leaflets into
cars headed for Germany, while German deserters got material
into the Fatherland through their friends. One of these desert-
ers in Holland, Herr Ruhr, gives the following account of this
activity

40 Times History of the War, XIII, 198.

41 Siiddeutsche Monatshefte May 1924, p. 81.
42
In December 1917, Minster himself crossed the Dutch border at Lim-
burg to receive the mail brought from Cologne.
43 U.D.Z., Band 10, I, p. 261. The French had Joseph Crozier on a special
mission in Holland, and he penetrated into Germany as an agent. Mr. Cro-
zier gives a rather melodramatic account of his activities in Holland and
Germany in his book, In the Enemy's Country, translated from the French
by Forest Wilson (New York, 1931).
44 U.D.Z., Band 10, I, p. 263.
 NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AS BASES OF ATTACK 81

I discovered in the meantime, that two deserters came over to Ger-

many with propaganda books which called on the soldiers to desert.
.... In Arnheim I gave one of these away myself. In the first page
it said in the book, Kaiser —Republik, Krieg und Frieden.
On the back
side is the call to desert. It says there, “He who
Deutschland calls out

— Republik will not be treated as an enemy.” These books ....

were brought in packages, across the border in great numbers. The
chief aim is to cause discontent at the front. The organization is in the
hands of Asselt. The leaflets are brought to the border by Dutch con-
fidantes and from here they are taken over the border by German
deserters.
The names two deserters who went to Germany with the
of the
propaganda books were Friedrich Grasshoff and Gerhart Breuer. Both
returned to Holland. 45

In the latter part of the war the Northcliffe organization

became active in Holland also. In June 1918 the Intelligence
Section of the German Foreign Office sent out the following
communication

Foreign Office
Intelligence Section A.N.
Secret 667 Berlin, June 25
1918.
To the Military Representative at the Foreign Office.
According to a report received here, the newly established propa-
ganda bureau of Lord Northcliffe in Holland, which is in close connec-
tion with the English Legation at The Hague, is henceforth to direct
political propaganda against the Central Powers. This Bureau plans to
purchase various restaurants and hotels on the Dutch-German border,
particularly on the line from Nijmegen to Maastricht, in order to be
able to expedite their propaganda literature from these points to Ger-
many without hindrances. According to one estimate, this Bureau has

45 U.D.Z., Band 10, I, p. 263. A German how he

ship captain relates
almost helped the English get propaganda into Germany from Sweden:
“During my stay at Gothenburg an unknown man came aboard my ship and
asked me if I could take a box of glass with me to Germany. I told him I
could, and the man left number. He spoke Swedish rather
me his telephone
brokenly and it is my opinion that he was a Britisher. It became known to
me in Gothenburg that the British attempted to smuggle leaflets into Ger-
many in glass boxes. Glass was chosen because there was no restriction on
its exportation from Sweden” (ibid., p. 266).
82 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
been organized with a fund of about two million dollars which will be
exclusively used for political propaganda. 46

Whether or not the English purchased or even planned to

purchase hotels and restaurants along the Dutch-German bor-
der it is impossible to prove. But they did use these places for
depositing propaganda material which could be picked up and
read, and if were not taken across the
the leaflets themselves
border, at least their contents might make an impression upon
those people who went over the border into Germany.
Of the use made of the Dutch workers, Northcliffe’s chief
colleague says

There crossed the Dutch frontier every morning a large number of

Dutch workers who were employed on German soil. Every evening
they returned to their homes in Holland. An envoy from Crewe House
mixed with them, won over a certain trustworthy few and these found
means of disseminating either by word of mouth or by printed matter,
information designed to prove to German minds that their interests
were being betrayed. 47

The American Committee on Public Information also was

active in Holland. Mr. Henry Suydam was the commissioner
for Holland. Realizing the value of “personal tours,” he es-
corted,on June 5, 1918, Dr. Peter Geyl, of the Nieuwe Rotter-
damsclie Courant and Mr. E. W. Dejong, of the Handelsblad
(Amsterdam), to Queenstown for an inspection of the Ameri-
can destroyer base. Upon returning from Queenstown the cor-
respondents had a long interview with Admiral Sims. Arriving
in Parison June 14, they proceeded to the French coast at St.
Nazaire and followed the American communication lines to the
front in Lorraine.

Thus, the two representatives of the two most important Dutch news-
papers had followed the course of an American soldier from the mo-
ment his transport was picked up by the convoys until he had arrived in
a front line trench. From this trip, which was one of the first excur-

46 R. H. Lutz, The Fall of the German Empire, 1914—1918 (Stanford

University, 1932), I, 161.
47 Hamilton Fyfe, Northcliffe, p. 243.
 NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AS BASES OF ATTACK 83

sions of neutral editors to the American front, there resulted 19 long

telegrams and 9 mail stories in the Dutch press, all of which were
copied extensively by the German press, and provided good neutral
testimony of the size of the American effort. 48

Great pains were taken by the American propagandists to

get Wilson’s speeches to the German people. Mr. Suydam and
the American Minister, John W. Garrett, at The Hague, both
insisted that these speeches be given directly to the Dutch and
German news agencies. In several instances, therefore, the ad-
dresses were telegraphed directly to the Committee on Public
Information headquarters and from there they were distributed
to a Dutch news agency, which either telegraphed the texts di-
rectly to the German press, or handed them to German corre-
49
spondents, who telegraphed them to their newspapers.
Suydam also had a list of people in Germany to whom ma-
could be sent directly through the mail. Wilson’s pro-
terial

nouncements concerning the League of Nations, comprising

excerpts from his speeches from February 1, 1916, to Septem-
ber 27, 1918, were put in pamphlet form. Efforts were made
to send these pamphlets to the German people on this list. Many
of them were also placed in Dutch and uni-
libraries, schools,
versities and distributed to editors and Dutch governmental
50
officials.

Thus did and Holland as centers

the Allies use Switzerland
of attack upon the morale of the enemy. The methods used
for this attack were many and varied. The aim was always to
win over the neutral press and through it to disseminate stories
in Germany, and to send propaganda leaflets directly into Ger-
many by whatever means possible. As Sir Campbell Stuart
states

Some of the methods can never be revealed, but it is permissible to

hint that, for instance, among foreign workmen of a certain nationality

48 C.I.P., Report, p. 177. Arrangements were made also to take the lead-
ing Dutch editors in Paris on similar trips.
49 Ibid.,
p. 176; Creel, How We Advertised America, p. 328.
50 Ibid.,
p. 332.
84 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
who went Germany each morning and returned each evening, there
into
might be some to whom propagandist work was not uncongenial. And
of course, all secret agents were not necessarily Allies or neutrals.
Somehow, huge masses of literature were posted in Germany to select
addresses from which the German Postal revenues derived no benefit.
.... No avenue of approach into enemy countries was considered
too insignificant, for each had its particular use. 61

61 Sir Campbell Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, p. 103.

 CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA
When in 1917, the Supreme Command was
quartered at Kreuznach, there was already a
vast amount of material. A collection of it,

consisting of extraordinary brochures, pam-

phlets, and of single leaflets and pictures, cov-
ered several layers thick, a table in my bureau
large enough for twelve people to sit at,

although there was only one specimen of each

document. Walter Nicolai, The German
Secret Service (p. 162).

A study of the leaflets, books, and pamphlets issued by the

Allies against the enemy reveals that the propaganda material
went through five fairly well-defined stages. Each of these
stages had a definite aim, and all led up to the final aim the :

destruction of the German Empire. Although it is impossible

to state exactly when one stage left off and the other began,
the five types of propaganda material are quite clearly distin-
guishable in the following order ( 1 ) propaganda of enlighten-
:

ment; (2) propaganda of despair; (3) propaganda of hope;

(4) particularistic propaganda; and (5) revolutionary propa-
ganda. Since it would be an endless task to give all of the
points of view of the messages, or all of the insinuations that
the many leaflets and pamphlets contained, we shall give ex-
amples of only the more or less typical, and through these see
just how the paper war was carried on. Only the first four
types will be discussed now, the revolutionary propaganda
being left for another chapter.

PROPAGANDA OF ENLIGHTENMENT
In time of war no nation gives out information regarding
the military or political situation which would be detrimental
85
86 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
to the fighting power of the country or disheartening or de-
pressing to its France, by the law of August 5,
population.
1914, forbade the publication of any news of a military or
diplomatic nature that might have the effect of weakening the
morale of the people. Only such military or diplomatic news
could be printed as came from the War Department. 1 In Eng-
land the Defense of the Realm Act regulated the printing and
distribution of pamphlets and leaflets. This act made it an of-
fense for any person by word of mouth or by writing or by
means of any printed book, pamphlet, or document to spread
reports or make statements “calculated to cause disaffection to
His Majesty or prejudice His Majesty’s relations with foreign
powers.” 2 In the United States the Committee on Public In-
formation persuaded the press to accept a “voluntary censor-
ship,” and only such war news was printed as emanated from
the C.P.I. or the War Department.
The press of Germany was no less restricted than that of
the Allies. The German General Staff set up the “Kriegs-
presseamt,” which supplied the press with war news. 3 In all
of the warring nations, therefore, there were restrictions on
the type of news that could be printed, and war news emanated
from official sources only.
This restriction meant that facts of a military nature were
withheld from the public. If the Germans failed to tell their
people of their military defeats, the English failed to report
4
all of the ships lost in the submarine campaign. If the Ger-

1 Vide supra chapter i.

2 See Supplement to the London Gazette, August 13, 1914, pp. 6380-81,
for complete provisions of the act. The Times (London) for February 4,
1918, tells of the arrest of one Samuel H. Street for distributing leaflets
outside of Central Hall, Westminster. On August 21, 1917, Arnold Lupton,
a former M.P., was charged with distributing leaflets to prisoners of war.
For a full discussion of German censorship during the war, see R. H.
3

Lutz, The Fall of the German Empire, 1914—1918 (Stanford University,

1932), Vol. I, chapter iv.

4 When the British battleship “Audacious” was sunk off the coast of
Ireland, October 27, 1914, the British failed to make its loss public. Shortly
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 87

mans neglected to inform their people of the actual size of the

American forces coming to the aid of France, the French failed

to report the full facts of the military situation before the

coming of the Americans. In other words, none of the warring
nations allowed facts that would weaken the people’s will to
fight to be published. As Will Irwin, who was in charge of
the Foreign Bureau of the American C.P.I., put it: “We never
—
told the whole truth -not by any manner of means. We told
that part which served our national purpose .”
5
And Spencer
Hughes expressed it well in a speech in the House of Com-
mons. Arguing in favor of Lord Northcliffe for the Minister
of Propaganda, he asked what that minister should do. An-
swering his own question he said: “It is to collect — I will not

say to concoct — information and to get the people to believe

the information .” 6
The first task of the Allied propagandists was, therefore,
to impart to the German
people those facts which their mili-
tary leaders kept from them. A “Trench Newspaper” was
published by the British and distributed to the German troops.
This was a single-page “newspaper” which told of the victories
of the Allies; it also illustrated the advances of the British
from month to month by means of maps. The French issued
the Truppen Nachrichtenblatt, which, though it was only a
small leaflet, contained such pointed statements as these “Foch :

Leading New Attack,” “Entente Armies Press Forward on

Another Wide Front,” “Turkish Army in Palestine De-

after the battle of the Falkland Islands,Mr. Churchill made up his mind to
go House of Commons and make a statement as to the loss of the
to the
“Audacious.” “But just as he was about to go out of the admiralty door he
was tackled by Lord Fisher, who cajoled him and threatened and browbeat
him to such an extent that he [Churchill] allowed himself to be turned away
from his intended course, and he remained silent on this point” (Rear-
Admiral Sir Douglas Brownrigg, Bt., Indiscretions of the Naval Censor
[New York, 1920], p. 46).
5
Will Irwin, “An Age of Lies,” Sunset, XLIII (1919), 54.
6 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., CIV, 82.
 '
r
rr t
;ppen-nachrichtenblatt. 1013

ffleut[c^er general ef
$ie (fatten gimatt toon Sanberd fitr itji' ttnfjeit
beranttoortlid).

5ht)ei Jlrmeeit vexnidjtct.

i®u(garen tuerben aud> auf audgebefynter ®a(fanfront
berfotgt.

pitfterc g>timmung bes> ^rafeit periling.

Set ©teg bet englifefen Sruppen in ipalaftina iibec bie 60 m beutfefen
©eneral Simon Don ©anberS befetjligten turfifefen Sntppen fat fief) ent<
toicfelt ltnb fat Biel grofjere ®imenfionen angenommen al§ bie erften SBeriefte
anbeitteien.
3mei tttrfifcpe Slrmeen, bie 7. unb bie 8 ., fiaben aufgefbrt ju ejiftieren.

3ift ganjeS Stain, alle if)te ©efdffife, ift gonjel SriegSmaterial ift

erbeutet rcotben. 3000 o SKann etgaben fief).

®ie toenigen, bie bem Sobe obet bet ©efangenfcfaft entgingen, flfiefteten
in fleinen, jufammenfangSlofen ©ruppen fiber ben Qorbanflufj unb treiben
fief nun im Sanbe fjetutn.

Qeft Berfolgen bie Engleinber bie 4. tfirtifcfje Sltrnee, toelefe auef) in

©efafr fteft Dernicf)tet ju toerben. Sluf feben fjall ift bet tfirftfefje SBiber-
ftanb in Spaleiftina entgfiltig gebroefert.
©eneral Simon bon ©anbetl, bet beutfefje SgefeflSfaber, bet fo boll*
ftanbig fiberrafeft unb bom feinbliefen §auptquartier an giifrung fo fiber*
troffen tourbe, flfiefjtet bor ben Englanbern.
®ie Sfitfen befaupten fie feicn berraten unb Bon ben beutfcfien Dffijieren,
bie il)ten ©treitfraften borgefeft toaren, inS Unglfief gefufrt tootben.
SJMaftina ift ifjnen nun auf etoig berloren. ®ie .^eiligen ©teitten finb
bon bet SJlufelmannfetrfcfaft befteit. ®ie Entente pat fief) berpflidjtet
fpataftina bem jfibifepen SBoIfe -jutucfjugeben.
$er ©ieg bet fraitjofifcpen unb bet ferbifefen Sruppen fiber bie SBulgaren
im SBalfangebirge pat fief; in fcplagenber SSeife entroidfelt.
®ie SBulgaren ji e f) e n fief jept auf einet ffront t, on
160 Sfilometern jutfief.

@ie fiaben bem SBorbringen bet Ententetruppen feinen ffarfen Sffiibetftanb

entgegengefept. Sie beutfefen Tciebetlagen an bet SBefrfront paben fie fefjt
niebergebrfidt unb ipren Sampfeifet gefeptoaept. 2Bit toiffen, bap e3 nuploS
ift ben Sfampf fortjufepen.

®iel toeif! auef) ©raf fettling, bet SReiefSfanjler. Er fat bem fiauptau^*
fcpttfs be? SReid^tagS gefagt, bap tiefe Unjufriebenpeit meite Slteife bet
SBebolferung ergriffen fat. SIBaS empfieflt et ? ®ap bal beutfefe SBolf ba3
alte, fidjere SBerttauen auf fpinbenburg unb Subenbotff betoaften foil, in bet

fpoffnung, bap fie bie Sage ein toenig beffern moeften. Slber er toeip, toil
toiffen unb alle Sffielt toeif, bap fie fie nieft beffern fbnnen ;

nut baS beutfefe 80 H S felbft

fann SBefferung fetbeifuften babutef, bap e3 bet SHutofratie unb bem

eiite

9Rilitart3mu3, bem Slllbeutfeftum unb ben beralteten Sdcferlicffeiten, bie

anbere S3 oiler fepon liingft abgefefafft faben, ein Snbe tnaeft.

A Bit of Enlightenment
The Truppen Nachrichtenblatt, issued by the British, kept
the Germans informed on the progress of the war on the
various fronts. The pointed headlines told much.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 89

stroyed,” “No Further Opposition to English Expected,”

“20,000 Prisoners Taken.” 7
Charts and diagrams showing plainly the number of pris-
oners taken and the number of dead and wounded on each
side were sent to the German trenches. So accurate were these
estimates of the losses to Germany that Eugene Netter was
prompted to write

The leaflets told the losses of the Germans in the first offensive.
The number lost in one of our regiments as given in the leaflets tallied
exactly with the actual loss. Hence thereafter the entire contents of
the leaflets was believed and one was stunned at the greatness of our
losses. 8

When French took the offensive in 1918, they also

the
sowed the German trenches with maps upon which their gains
were clearly marked. 9 They recalled the false hopes which
the German leaders had held out to the people and the army.
They circulated an alleged statement in a German newspaper
which lamented that “a few weeks ago it appeared as if our
armies were near their goal The defeat of the enemy forces
:

and peace. But what a change.” 10

Another method of enlightenment was to select special
topics from time to time and, by means of a series of “London
Letters,” to get them into the neutral press and from there
11
into Germany. These invariably told of the food supply of
the Allies and often contained stories of the shortage of food
in the enemy countries.
Whenever the Allied propagandists could make the Ger-
man officials appear guilty of falsification they did so. In
October 1917 the Germans gave out an estimate of the ton-
nage of the Allies for transporting American troops across the

7 Truppen Nachrichtenblatt, 1013; also Leaflet A.P. 1000, Hoover War

Library collection.
8 Eugene Netter, Der Seelische Zusammenbruch der deutschen Kampf-
9
front (Munich, 1925), p. 11. FI iegerabwurf-Schriften, No. 15.
10 Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique World War (New
in the
York, 1927), 11
p. 165. Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, p. 99.
90 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE

DER SIEG

DER ALLIERTEN.

8-8-18:
Gefangene
Schlitze -

9-8-18

The Victories of the Allies

This map, showing with large red lines the gains of the Allies, was part
of the intensive drive against the morale of the enemy in the last four
months of the war. '
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 91

ocean which showed that at best not more than 12 American

divisions (250,000 troops) could be brought to France by the
latesummer of 1918. This estimate was published in the
German papers in an effort to belittle America as a factor
12
in the war. Furthermore it was stated that these troops
would still be unfit for battle — would have to be trained in
France for several months yet before they could be pushed to
the front. And again on May 17, 1918, the official news
agency issued a statement for publication that the number of
American fighting troops in France was to be estimated at
about ten divisions —only four of these being at the front.
“The total of all those back of the lines as well as in them, is at
the most from 150,000 to 200,000 men.’’ And the report
continued, “Press notices should therefore state that America
has not been able to meet its expectations in the way of sending
troops and the earlier estimates of the German General Staff,
13
as to what Ameria could do, has proved to be true.”
The propagandists corrected this misinformation by send-
14
ing out, byleaflet, the letter of Secretary Baker to President
Wilson in which the Secretary of War gave the following
monthly figures on the arrival of troops in France between
May 1917 and June 1918:
1917
Month Troops Month Troops
May 1,718 September 32,423
June 12,261 October 38,259
July 12,988 November 23,016
August 18,323 December 48,840

1918
January 46,776 April 117,212
February 48,027 May 244,345
March 83,811 June 276,372
Marines 14,644

Total to July 1, 1918 1,019,115

12 Dr. Kurt Miihsam, Wie wir belogen warden (Munich, 1918), p. 11.
13 Ibid., As
a matter of fact there were at that time nearly one mil-
1.
p.

lion American troops in France.

14 Leaflet A.P. 61.
 92 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
BY BALLOON.
Xurrf) Suftbntlon.

g)ie erffe ^Tiltion.

America Is Coming!
This Air-Post Leaflet was part ol the campaign of despair, to show that the
odds were against the Germans.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 93

To emphasize the American help, another leaflet again

listed the troop arrivals for the months of April, May, and
June, 1918, which totaled 637,929. Commenting upon the
efficiency of this transportation of troops the leaflet stated:
15
“Lost at sea while coming over, 291.
The Friends of German Democracy later informed the Ger-
mans that 1,500,000 American troops had arrived in France,
while many more were ready to come over.

THE AMERICAN HELP

1,500,000 American soldiers are in France; more than twice that
number is being trained in America. One single draft call in a single
month gives almost as many recruits as a year in Germany. A fleet of
5 million tons, which can carry more than 13 million tons a year; a fleet
which, together with the English fleet, would form between Europe and
America, an unbroken line, and which brings an endless supply of steel,
copper, explosives, grain, petroleum, and munitions .... These are the
powers against which the cliques in Germany are struggling.
Friends of German Democracy in America 16

The propagandists impressed upon the Germans not only

the facts of American military aid but also the greatness of
America’s economic strength. The aim, of course, was to
convince the German people that the Allies had access to unlim-
ited food supplies. Leaflet A.P. 89 gave the International
Agricultural Institute estimates of 1918 crop prospects in the
United States and Canada as follows
Wheat
U.S. 211,519,000 doublehundred weight (36% increase over 1917)
Canada 63,042,000 doublehundred weight (10% increase over 1917)
Oats
U.S. 186,238,000 doublehundred weight (9% less than 1917)
Canada 59,789,000 doublehundred weight (7% increase over 1917)
Barley
U.S. 44,762,000 doublehundred weight (10% increase over 1917)
Canada 16,472,000 doublehundred weight (53% increase over 1917)

15 Leaflet A.P. 84.

16 Fliegerabwurf-Schriften, No. 23.
94 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Rye
U.S. 18,507,000 doublehundred weight (35% increase over 1917)
Corn
U.S. 716,680,000 doublehundred weight (same as in 1918) 17

When the questions of war aims came up, the Allied propa-
gandists saw another opportunity to push forward their cam-
paign of enlightenment. No people will continue to fight, or
to bear the hardships of a war if it does not know what it is

fighting for. The German had been told that the

people
Fatherland was fighting a defensive war. But as the war pro-
gressed and the German troops penetrated farther into the
enemy territories, some groups began to ask whether the
“defensive war” was not turning into a war of conquest.
Some of the press began to discuss the war aims but that ;

was soon forbidden. The German Chancellor’s speech of

August 19, 1915, led some newspapers to make inquiries re-
garding the Polish question. However, their attention was
called to the order prohibiting any public discussion of the
German war aims, “an order which covers the discussion of
events that, in the future, may occur in the east.” 18
The excuse given by the officials for not wanting the Polish
question discussed was that such discussion would be impos-
sible without arousing party antagonisms.

If opinions did not differ to such a degree, there would be no reason

for such a demand. But if the discussion were permitted at this early
date the quarrel of the parties would surely be carried by the papers
into the conquered countries and would affect the Polish people.
It is hardly necessary to point out how pleased our enemies would
be to discover something that might be taken for a symptom indicating
the disintegration of our inner solidarity, and that at a time when our
armies are so victorious. 19

17 Leaflet A.P. 89.

18
Hamburg-Polizeibehorde, Zensur-anordnungen, No. 6214, September 7,
1915, p. 177. Listed also as Document Xllf. of R. H. Lutz, The Fall of the
German Empire, 1914—1918, I, 185.
19 Ibid.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 95

But the newspaper V orwarts conducted a steady and in-

sistent campaign for an open discussion of the German war
aims. In January 1915 it printed arguments intended to show
why the ban on such a discussion should be lifted:
Even our diplomacy can profit by a sensibly restricted discussion in
the press, as the public opinion of a people, of whom the highest de-
mands are being exacted in all fields, expects to be enlightened in due
time about important questions by official agencies. 20

But those who favored such a “forward step” seemed to

be making no headway, for the Chancellor, in response to an
interpellation in the Reichstag on May 15, 1917, said:

Gentlemen, the interpellations which have just now been brought

forward demand from me a definite statement regarding the question
of our war aims. To make such a statement at the present moment
would not serve the interests of the country. I must therefore, decline
to make one. 21

This failure of the German government to announce its

war aims was a great help to the Allied propagandists. What

could be more effective than, on the one hand, to accuse Ger-
many of imperialistic designs and on the other to tell the
German people that the Allies had only idealistic interests in
the war, and were fighting for the liberation of humanity from
the yoke of militarism and greed. The French dropped pack-
ets of leaflets over Berlin which stated in part

Many clear-sighted Germans know today already that the war was
instigated by the military degenerates of Berlin and Vienna
The German people were lied to, to force them into a war which
they did not want. They call it a war of defense, a war of liberation
but it is nothing but a war of conquest and stealing. 22

20 Vorwdrts, January Also quoted

30, 1915. in Lutz, op. cit., I, 354,
Document 128.
21 Germany, Reichstag, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, May 15, 1917,
Band 109, pp. 3395-98. Also found in Lutz, op. cit., p. 354, Document 128.
22 Collection of French Military Documents, Hoover War Library;
cited also in R. H. Lutz, op. cit., I, 113. See also Hansi et Tonnelat, A Tra-
vers les lignes ennemies, p. 125.
96 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
The British called the attention of the German people to
the supposed war aims of their government in a still more
pointed manner when they said in a leaflet:

ONLY FOR A JOKE

Do you know that there is a man in Germany who regards this war
as a joke. This man is your Crown Prince! He is a great admirer of
Napoleon. Shortly before the outbreak of the war he showed an Ameri-
can woman his valuable collection of relics and remarked
Napoleonic
at the time that if war did not would certainly come after
come soon it

he became Kaiser Today everyone except you knows that if the

war had not come when it did, your Crown Prince would have started
23
it just as soon as he became Kaiser, just for a joke ! !

In this campaign of enlightening the German people as to

the supposed government the Allies made
war aims of their
extensive use of the writings of Grelling, Muehlon, Balder,
and Prince Lichnowsky. Extracts from Grelling’s famous
J’accuse, which blamed Germany for the war, were published
24
in the Zeitung fiir die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen a “news- ,

paper” issued by the French for the Germans in the French

prison camps. Muehlon’s Die Verheerung Europas was sent
to Germany by various means, and extracts of it were distrib-
uted in leaflet form. In this book the former director of the
Krupp Works gave a scathing indictment of the whole political,
social, and moral structure of Germany. He arraigned its
governmental system as repressive of individualism, freedom
of speech, and independence of thought. He accused the
German government of deliberately forcing war on Europe 25 .

23 Leaflet A.P. 6.
24 The June 20, 1915, contains the first installment of J’accuse.
edition of
This newspaper also told why America went to war, and attacked the Kaiser
in various ways. The issue of June 10, 1915, contains a schedule of prices
of foodstuffs for the months from July 1914 to March 1915, intended to
impress the prisoners with the high cost of living in the Fatherland and the
threat of a food shortage there.
25 The book is translated into English by W. L. McPherson under the
title of The Vandal of Europe (New York, 1918).
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 97

The British made the most of Prince Lichnowsky’s My

London Mission, 1912-1914. Printed in England, with false
covers and false titles, it was sent into Germany. According
to one report, the British sent 10,000 copies of the memoran-
26
dum into Germany in May The Freie Zeitung pub-
1918.
lished extracts of the book, and by this means many Germans
received “enlightenment” on the question of who started the
27
war.
The Allies sent out leaflets purporting to come from the
German soldiers in the French prison camps. The object of
these was to make the Germans believe that their comrades in
the Allied prison camps had discovered the real causes of the
war. These leaflets were signed, “Your Democratic comrades
in French prisons.” One read

26 Hans Thimme, Weltkrieg ohne Waffen, p. 125. Regarding the effect

of Prince Lichnowsky’s memorandum, C. R. M. F. Cruttwell ( A History
of the Great War, 1914-1918, p. 530) says: “No more sinister blow could
be struck at the conscience and inner peace of the average German, who had
profoundly believed in the justice of his cause, or at the endurance of the
over-wrought soldier.”
27 The made use
Allies also of revered German authors for propaganda
purposes. The British, for instance, wishing to remind the Germans what
Schiller thought of England, sent out that great writer’s Grosshersige
Britannia in leaflet form ( Leaflet A.P. 55). The last several stanzas follow:
Dir gegeniiber steht sie da,
Glucksel’ge Insel —
Herrscherin der Meere,
Dir Drohen diese Gallionenheere,
Grossherzige Britannia!
Weh! Deinem freigebornen Volke!
Da steht sie, eine wetterschwangre Wolke.

Gott, der Allmacht’ge, sah herab,

Sah deines Feindes stolze Lowenflaggen wehen,
Sah drohend offen dein gewisses Grab
Soil, sprach er, soli mein Albion vergehen,
Erloschen meiner Helden Stamm,
Der Unterdriickung letzter Felsendamm
Zusammenstiirzen, die Tyrannenwehre
Vernichtet sein von dieser Hemisphare?
Nie, rief er, soli der Freiheit Paradies,
Der Menschenwtirde starker Schirm verschwinden
98 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Pass this along
German War Comrades
Think about this
1. Only greedy rulers want war. The people want peace, and work
and bread.
2. Only the German Kaiser with his militarists, Junkers, and arms
manufacturers wanted war, prepared for it, and brought it on. No
one wanted to fight Germany, no one opposed her desires for a
“place under the sun.”

3. If a murderer shoots a revolver on the street it is the duty of every

peace-loving, dutiful citizen to hurry to the aid of the fallen. For
that reason Italy, Rumania, and the United States went to war
against Germany; to free Belgium, Serbia, and France from the
clutches of the murderer
28
10. Stop [fighting] Turn your cannons around Come over to
! ! us.
Shoot anyone who wants to hinder you from coming.
Your Democratic Comrades in French Prisons 29

One of most stinging leaflets sent out by the British

the
was Leaflet A.P. 12, which asked the question, “For what
are you fighting?”
They you that you are fighting for the Fatherland. Have you
tell

ever thought why you are fighting?

You are fighting to glorify Hindenburg, to enrich Krupp. You are
struggling for the Kaiser, the Junkers, and the militarists
They promised you victory and peace. You poor fools! It was
promised your comrades for more than three years. They have indeed
found peace, deep in the grave, but victory did not come ! . . .

It is for the Fatherland But what is your Fatherland? Is it

the Crown Prince who offered up 600,000 men at Verdun? Is it Hin-
denburg, who with Ludendorff is many kilometers behind the front
lines making more plans to give the English more cannon-fodder? Is
it Krupp for whom each year of war means millions of marks? Is it
the Prussian Junkers who still cry over your dead bodies for more
annexations ?

No, none of these is the Fatherland. You are the Fatherland

The whole power of the Western World stands behind England and
28 The present writer has supplied the word “fighting” the leaflet is
;

torn through here, and only “auf’ is readable.

29 Fliegerabwurf-Schriften, No. 27.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 99

France and America! An army of 10 million is being prepared; soon

it will come into the battle. Have you thought of that Michel? 30

Perhaps the British German people were too

felt that the
much impressed with the slogan, “Fur Gott und Vaterland”;
so they sent out leaflets which showed that the Germans were
fighting neither for God nor for the Fatherland

“Wir kampfen fur den Kaiser,

Wir kampfen nicht fur Gott ;

Wir kampfen fur die Reichen,

Die Armen gehn Kapott. 31

Thus the German people were not lacking “information”

as to why they were fighting. was for annexation, for the
It

Kaiser and his militarists, and for the rich who profited from
the war. How sadly these reasons contrasted with the noble
aims of the Allies ! For were not the Allies fighting for hu-
manity? Were not they fighting for peace and for justice?
Coming Lloyd George made
to the aid of the propagandists,
a speech in which he outlined the supposed war aims of the
Allies. This speech went to the Germans in another leaflet

We waging an aggressive war against the German people.

are not
.... The destruction or the dismemberment of the German people
was never one of our war aims, either at the beginning or today.
Against our will and wholly unprepared we were forced into it in
defense of the International Law of Europe, which was broken, and
in justification of the sacred treaties upon which European society
rested, and which were violated by Germany in a most cruel manner
by the invasion of Belgium. We had to go to war or see Europe
approach destruction and brutal strength triumph over international
law and international justice
We have not taken part in this war in order to disturb the consti-
tution of the Empire, although we regard the militaristic, autocratic
constitution in the 20th century as a terrible anachronism. 32

President Wilson’s speeches were used more extensively

for propaganda purposes than those of any other statesman.

30 Leaflet A.P. 12. 3i

Leaflet A.P. 73.
3
Leaflet A.P. 1; see also Leaflet A.P. 3.
100 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
The reason for this was that Wilson’s idealistic aims fitted in
well with the purposes of the propagandists. Throughout his
speeches Wilson insisted that the United States was fighting
for democracy and for humanity. He hammered continually
upon the note that the war was being fought for the liberty of
the German people no less than for the freedom of the people
of the Western Powers. The disinterestedness of America as
far as reward or conquest is concerned was also stressed.
America’s great desire, said the propagandists, was to help
free the world from Prussianism, militarism, and Junkerism.
Quoting from one of Wilson’s speeches, 33 Leaflet A.P. 3 says
in part:

What we want is that the world come to the point where security
and prosperity is insured; security especially for every peace-loving
nation which, like our own, desires freedom, the right to determine its
own destinies, and to be assured of justice and fair dealing with other
nations. 34

As George Sylvester Viereck puts it, “the eloquence of

Woodrow Wilson was the most powerful battering ram of the

33 It is some German writers considered

interesting to note here that
Wilson’s speech of January which he stated the Fourteen Points
8, 1918, in
as motivated by propaganda purposes. Ernest Wrisberg points out that in
January 1918, Edgar Sisson, the American commissioner of the C.P.I. in
Petrograd, sent a dispatch to George Creel of the C.P.I. in Washington,
stating that “if the president can give the anti-imperialist war aims and
the democratic peace aims of America in a thousand words or less, in short,
almost placard-like paragraphs and short sentences, then I can send them
into Germany in the German translation in great quantities, and spread them
here in the Russian version. It is necessary that the president show that he
is thinking of their momentary situation and that he is talking to them. I
can take care of the German translation and printing here.” After a con-
ference with Creel apropos of this dispatch, Mr. Wilson is supposed to have
drawn up the Fourteen Points. Ernest Wrisberg, Der Weg zur Revolution
1914-1918 (Leipzig, 1921), p. 108.
Edgar Sisson, One Hundred Red Days (New Haven, 1931), chapter xiv,
discusses this matter in detail and intimates that his message to Creel was
a deciding factor in the drawing up of the Fourteen Points.
34 Leaflet A.P. 3.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 101

Deutsche Soldaten !

Nun habt ihr die grosse Offensive, die —

wie die fruhcren, wie der
U-Bootkrieg und samtliche Kriegsanleihen —
den Feind vvieder einmal
u endgiiltig » aut' die Knie zwingen sollte.

Nach dieser letzten Schlacht sollte ja unfehlbar der Frieden kommen.

Diesen Frieden, den heissersehnten um den eure hungernden und
,

darbenden Frauen zu Hause taglich beten hatte man euch versprochen

,

und so gelang es wieder einmal, die deutschen Divisionen dem Feind

entgegen zu trciben.
Und wieder liegen ein paar Hunderttausende mehr deutscher Manner
in franzosischer Frde begraben. Ihr habt so ungefahr den Boden wiederge-
wonnen, den ihr im Friijahr 1917, nach griindlicher Verheerung,
geraumt hattet. Er reicht gerade, um Eure toten Kameraden zu
begraben Aber der Frieden ist weiter entfernt denn je. Denn ein
walirer Frieden, ein Frieden der Verstandigung, der Versohnung und
des gegenseitigen Vertrauens istunmoglich, solange nicht das deutsche
Volk den Frieden schliesst, sondern die preussischen Junker und
Generale. Diese Leute kennen nur den Ilaubirieden, der andere Volker
vergewaltigt, ausbeutet und zu Sklaven eurer Agrarier und Scliwer-
industriellen crniedrigt.
Die Verhandlungen in Brest-Litowsk haben zurGeniige bewiesen, dass

KAMERADEN!
Den langst versprochenen Sieg, den vom ganzen deutschen
Volke so heissersehnten Frieden sollte uns endlich diese West-
offensive «totsicher» bringen. Den Friedenssturm nannten
sie das Morden und diesmal sollten die « Gelbe-Kreuz-Gase»
die Franzosen, die Englander und Amerikaner in Grund und
Boden vernichten. Wieder hatten wir an die Luge geglaubt,
wie damals an den Verteidigungskrieg, oder an den Krieg gegen
den Tsarismus, oder an den U-Bootkrieg, der uns den Sieg
schon vor einem Jahre bringen sollte.
Und nun?
Schaut nach wieviel Tausende von Toten, wieviel bluhendes
deutsches Leben als Leichen von den blutgctrankten Fluten der
Marne vveggetrieben werden!
Hunderttausende Deutsche haben wieder ihr Leben lasSen
mussen, und von Sieg und Frieden sind wir weiter entfernt denn

Propaganda of Despair
These two examples are typical of the propaganda which aimed to dis-
courage the German troops. They reminded the Germans of the thousands
of comrades that they had lost in the last struggle. They informed them
that
the submarine campaign was a failure.
Only the front side of each is shown.
102 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Allied and American propaganda against Germany .” 35 And
similarly Professor Harold D. Lasswell ‘‘If the great gen- :

eralissimo on the military front was Foch, the great general-

issimo on the propaganda front was Wilson .” 36

PROPAGANDA OF DESPAIR
The second phase of the propaganda campaign aimed to
bring despair to the Germans. The leaflets stressed the hor-
rors of war and announced the intention of the Entente to
fight to the bitter end. One leaflet was addressed “To you in
the fields of death!” The German troops were told that wher-
ever they marched there was death. “Look about you All !

that you can see is the work of death!” The Allies then asked
“Why are you here with the dead? Why are you marching
over the dead?” And at the end of the leaflet the propagandists
told the German soldier, “You will lie where your comrades
are lying — in the field of death .”
37

In order that the Germans might not rejoice too much over
their victories the propagandists told them that their rejoicing
would not last long — soon the Germans would retreat, and
in this retreat they would lose greatly.

When your struggle began there were already 4 million fewer men,
women and children in Germany than when the war began. A pretty
high price to pay for a walk to and fro, isn’t it? 38

was futile, according to the Allied propagandists, for

It

the Germans to make further efforts to break the power of

the Allies. The only result of these efforts would be death and
the grave.

Probably tomorrow you too will lie in a shellhole with your face
up, looking toward heaven; then you will have peace, the peace of the
field of slaughter While at home your wives and children go hungry. 39
!

35 George Sylvester Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate (New York,

1930), p. 207.
36 Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, p. 216.

37 Leaflet A.P. 37. 38 Leaflet A.P. 38. 39 Leaflet A.P. 39.

 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 103

A great deal of propaganda of despair had in it a touch

of sentimentalism. It called attention to the suffering of the

wives and children of the soldiers.

DOES IT PAY?
Tomorrow you will probably be killed! Why? Because your
Kaiser wants it

Does it pay?
At home your wives and children and mothers are starving. Will
your death help them? Are you going to death for that reason? . . . .

—
Why then are you offering up your life? Are you certain it pays? 40
The only thing that the German soldier could be certain
of, according to the propagandists, was death: “For you the
grave is numbered. Tomorrow, day after, or perhaps first next
week, but certainly you continue to march west-
it is yours, if

ward. Only a few among you will return to Germany.” 41

Cartoons were also used to bring home to the German
soldiers the situation at home. The French, for example, pub-
lished a drawing in Die Feldpost in December 1915 which
showed the kitchen of a German family. The table was bare,
and two emaciated children were staring pitifully at the empty
table. The father, nothing but skin and bones, remarks to
his spouse, who still has a little life in her, “My insides are
rumbling with hunger.” Whereupon the wife replies, “Then
don’t go on the street or you will be arrested for disturbing
42
the peace.”
With the coming of the Americans, the odds were against
Germany and the propagandists made the most of that fact.
Along with the attacks of gas, bombs, and shells during the
great offensive, the Allies made increasing attacks with prop-
aganda.
One hundred thousand more men lie buried in French soil, and
thousands of others are being sent into the 80-kilometer-wide slaughter-
house 43

40 Leaflet A.P. 40. « Leaflet A.P. 14.

42 Fliegerabwurf-Schriften (no number), entitled “Does it Pay?”
43 Ibid., No. 48.
104 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
As for the war itself, that “may last for years yet,” the Ger-
mans were told. And to give the enemy troops a good tonic
before they entered another battle, the Allies sent the follow-

ing message to them

GERMAN TROOPS
You are being dragged into another battle. The ghastly months of
Verdun are being re-enacted Your General Staff itself admits
that the losses “in several places were greater than usual.” This means
that they were terrible.
Reports made by German officers, and which we found, bear this
out. Whole companies were destroyed ;
whole regiments, except a very
few men, were wiped out. Some divisions lost 70 per cent, many 50
per cent, of their number. 44

In order to impress upon the Germans the determination

of the Allies to fight to a Die Feldpost, the French
finish,

propaganda sheet, issued by the Hansi organization, said in its

issue of October 18, 1915:

WHAT THE CENSOR KEEPS FROM YOU

Do you know that the Allied Powers have agreed to continue the
war at least until the summer of 1916 and longer if necessary? Do
you know that peace cannot be thought of until the last German has
disappeared from French and Belgian territory ? 45

Another method of promulgating the propaganda of de-

spair was to paint a picture of the rewards of the crippled
soldiers after the war. Stories were circulated that veterans
of the war of 1870 died of hunger in the parks of Berlin
while begging from the rich who scorned their pleas for help.
One leaflet shows a picture of a poor crippled soldier standing
at the entrance of a large restaurant or hotel. Fat men and
buxom women, dressed in the richest evening clothes, are com-
ing out of the place with a look of contentment and happiness
on their faces. Not one of them notices the war-exhausted,
hungry cripple. The inference was that such a reward awaited
44 Leaflet A.P. 26.
45 Dr. George Huber, Die francosische Propaganda gegen Deutschland,
p. 252.
A.P. 70. BY BALLOON. Surd) tnyilnUlon

"31 n5an kba rk c i t

Gratitude !

The German soldier was told not only that he was fighting for the rich
Junkers but also that these people were living in luxury while he was suffer-
ing and starving in the trenches.
And when the soldiers returned home wounded and in need, this shows
how concerned the rich would be over their welfare
106 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
the soldiers who were wounded while fighting for the Father-
land.
When the war entered its fourth year the Allied propa-
Germans of the
gandists sent out leaflets which reminded the
suffering they had already undergone and assured them that
more and worse was to come.
YOU POOR GERMAN PEOPLE!
Already you are in the 4th year of this war. One shudders to think
of your suffering, which will increase this year. To the hunger, the
pestilence, the cold, will be added the terrible campaigns on the front
and the aeroplane attacks on your cities
Three million dead, the flower of your nation, the future of your
land, rest in foreign fields; one million of your best sons languish in
prisons millions of your children have become poor, helpless or-
;

46
phans

Such were the paper bullets by which the Allies attempted

to put discouragement and despair into the hearts of the
German troops and the people behind the lines. Such were
the arguments which aimed to get them to thinking, to wonder-
ing if, after all, Germany was invincible, if after all the odds
were not against them. The propaganda of despair was a
powerful force, and it no doubt set many a German soldier
to wondering if it really did “pay” to continue fighting.

PROPAGANDA OF HOPE
It was not enough to bring to the attention of the German
troops the fact that they were fighting a losing battle, that
they were the slaves of the military and Junker classes. They
had to be given something better to strive for. The soldiers
were told that they were being mistreated, and forced to fight
for the wealthy aristocrats of Germany. But where would they
be treated better? They were told that they were certain to
meet death if they continued to fight for their militarists.
But what else could they do? They were reminded that the
46 Fliegerabwurf-Schrijten, “You Poor German People,” sent out by
Der Ausschuss.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 107

war was taking away their best, that it was destructive of

their economic and ruinous to the common people. But if
life

they made peace, what assurance had they that the Allied
peace conditions would not be equally as destructive to their
economic life as the war? Here, then, was the task for the
propaganda of hope.
One way by which the German soldier could hope to save
his life, and perhaps return unmaimed, was by
to his family
surrendering to the Allies. Propaganda purporting to come
from the German prisoners already in the Allied camps was
used most extensively. These leaflets contained letters sup-
posedly from prisoners in France or England which told of
the good food, the comfortable quarters, and the fine treat-
ment that they were receiving at the hands of their captors.
One of these letters from “a German prisoner” to his
comrades still in the trenches said
Comrades
From the war prisons we are sending you a few words and hope
that they will meet with a little success and bring the end of this war a
little nearer.
First. Do not believe those who tell you that you will be treated
cruelly in prison. On the contrary we can assure you that we get more
to eat inone day than you get from your murderous leaders in three.
Second.Warm clothing and shoes and kind treatment from the
English officers such as a German soldier can hardly imagine.
Third. For whom are you taking your hide to market? For whom
are your wives and children suffering? For the Hohenzollerns and
Junkers Don’t you hear them laugh 47
?

The Allies wanted the Germans to desert as soon as pos-

sible. One leaflet calls
Come to us before too late. Report to us with the words, “We
it is

come to you by leaflet No. 1,” and we will know who you are.
Naturally, if you come only after your bullets are gone then your
coming will not be as pleasant as otherwise. Don’t hesitate do as your
;

common sense tells you then you

;
will soon be able to see your beloved
wives and children again. 48

47 Leaflet A.P. 48
66. Leaflet A.P. 68.
 2rut|ri)C ftnmrrnbcii!
3m .Riunvfi' finb Mr <vr«U}ofcn, „'\br imfst co ja,

uub tnuTlMtt(iri)c ©rftncr.

<2 obiilb nbcr bcv dtomvf lumibcr ill, icii\cu fir fid) itlo

rtulfocrjigc ^(Ciifri)cu.
2olltc (vtul' (Jucr aC'tii midi unfrrcu Vmifn fiilirru ,
rnril '>bv (fiuf) incllfidit iiuf ^nilrontllc

lu'rim tml't ober rtn'ii auo (Sfcl sor Km cnblofcii (Bliituc rtitcfjou

fo nirrt)tct (*mt> niriu,

(*'> li'irb Cruel) fcin l*ctb rntflctaii!

(5 o finb in Meier tBqichunti ben min$i'fifd)en Implicit fireiuje 3?efe(i(e

eneilf roorbcti.

dicr fount Oftv ff lieu , wic (vnrr gcfiitnieimi .ftamcrabcu ba into bcbmiKlt roerbon.

A Bit of French Propaganda

Here is an appeal in word and picture to the German soldiers to desert.
According to this, the French are terrible enemies to meet in battle, but when
the battle is over they are very kind-hearted. The pictures show how well
the German prisoners are treated by the French.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 109

And the “Comrades in France” are supposed to have sent out

letters asking the German soldiers to desert to the French.
One of these letters states that more and more troops are com-
ing over to the French every day.

Comrades ! They are the true friends of the Fatherland, for they
are shortening the war, which can only bring suffering, sorrow and
disappointment to the German people.

COME OVER TO US !

Your superiors are fighting for the rich, for the war-parasites, for
the enemies of the people ! . . . . Those who come over voluntarily
are treated even better than the other prisoners

Your Democratic Comrades in France49

Another leaflet from “a German prisoner” tells how, since

he has been in the hands of the French, he has come to feel
like a person “born anew.” :

Wake up, German Michel, be a man and make yourself free, that
your posterity may not despise you Come over to the beautiful
France; here one not only has plenty of food to eat, but here you
will also be treated like a human being and not like a beast. 50

Still other letters lament the fact that their German com-
rades at the front continue to fight for the Hohenzollerns
whose “thirst for blood is not yet quenched.” They appeal to
the men and children at home. “For
to think of their wives
you do not know why you are fighting,” says one appeal, “while
the French are fighting to recover their fatherland and for the
rights of humanity. Come over! Break the bonds that hold
you down, and see for yourselves how a free man is treated
51
in a free land .”
But perhaps the most unique piece of propaganda of hope
was the little card decorated in yellow, red, and black colors.
It contained a short but pointed message.

49 Fliegerabwurf-Schriften, No. 31.

50 Ibid., No. 29.
51 Ibid., No. 24.
110 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
REPUBLIC MEANS PEACE AND FREEDOM !

To the Comrades on the West Front!

The following order has been given out by the French Head-
quarters :

“He who permits himself to be captured (singly or in small groups)

and cries out
REPUBLIQUE
will no longer be treated as an enemy prisoner. If he desires, he can
help free Germany.” 52

Fearing that some of the enemy troops would hesitate to

obey this call because of the fear that they might be found
out by the German and be disgraced, the propagandists,
officials

in their instructions on the reverse side of the card, told them

not to fear, that their names would not be divulged to the
officials. Furthermore, their action would help free Germany

and “once Germany is free then the officials will have to be

53
the ones to express fear .”
Letters supposedly written by German prisoners to their
families were always good for propaganda purposes. These
were known as Griisse an die Heimat, Brief e deutscher Kriegs-
B4
gefangener Emanating from Hansi’s Service aerienne, they
.

invariably painted a glowing picture of life in a French prison

camp. How happy the writer of the following letter must have
been. ^ TT
To Herr Jacab Schmitt
Mainz
Rheinallee 53
Uzez, July 1917
Dear „ J 6,
Parents :

I thank God that I am at last out of the lazaret. You know how I

disliked being in a German lazaret I am in the most pleasant of

officers’ prison camps. Uzez is a beautiful little village of about 6,000

52 Fliegerabwurf-Schriften (no number). See also Generalleutnant Alt-

rock, Deutschlands Niederbruch, p. 32. Some time before this was sent out
the French distributed instructions on how to pronounce the word “Repub-
lique.” 53 Altrock, op. cit.

54
This was an 8-page sheet, lavishly illustrated with pictures of life in a
French prison camp. It did not appear regularly, eleven numbers having
appeared by May 1918.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 111

inhabitants in the wonderful fruit district near Nimes. Our prison

camp, a barrack before the war, is a good place for 200 of us comrades.
There are large rooms in the barracks; a large library, concert hall,
dining rooms, etc., are at our disposal. Daily the comrades give talks
on geography, history, languages, sport, etc. Besides that we have a
55
large ground at our disposal for games

And no doubt many a French soldier would have been en-

vious of the German prisoners’ rations as described in the
following letter:
To Fraulein Martha Blumel
Villa Sprotte
Bertelsdorf (Schlesien)
Fort de Blaye
.... we got bread with oil sardines and a good flask of wine, that was,
of course, the best of all. Then we bound grapes until 11 o’clock. When
we went to dinner we were to receive our greatest surprise when we
saw our dinner table. There stood two large bowls of soup, one plate
full of meat and two jugs of grape juice, which tasted excellently to us.

Ernest Hampel, Pg. No. 1921

B II L.A. 56

But perhaps the most ingenious scheme for getting the

enemy troops to desert was that used by the Americans. Our
propagandists dropped a “prisoner leaflet” over the German
lines which contained an extract from the orders prescribing

the treatment to be accorded by the A.E.F. to the prisoners of

war. Appended to it was a list of rations issued to the Amer-
ican soldier and prescribed for enemy prisoners. More than a
million copies of this were sent over to the enemy 57 This was .

followed by postcards, in exact reproduction of the official

German field postcard, which contained an invitation to de-

58
sert. The instructions on this card began:
Write the address of your family upon this card and if you are

55 Fliegerabwurf-Schriften (no number). 56 Ibid, (nonumber).

57 E. A. Powell, The Army Behind the Army, p. 352; also New York
Times, April 20, 1919, Section 7.

58 Heber Blankenhorn, Adventures in Propaganda (Boston and New

York, 1919), p. 78.
112 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
captured by the Americans, give it to the first officer who questions you.
He will make it forward it
his business to in order that your family
will be reassured concerning your welfare.

The reverse side — the message side —had the following greet-
ing to the homefolks all ready for the prisoner to sign and
send off
Do not worry about me. The war is over for me. have good
I

food. The American Army gives its prisoners the same food it gives
its own soldiers: beef, white bread, potatoes, beans, prunes, coffee,
butter, tobacco, etc. 59

The greatest propaganda of hope, however, came from

President Wilson. In his Fourteen Points and in his speeches
the American President laid down the conditions of peace.
He proposed a League of Nations which was to be a friendly
association of nations for the maintenance of peace. There
was to be freedom of the seas and open diplomacy. There
was to be no discrimination between the victors and the van-
60
quished when it came to a settlement at the end of the war .

A just and lasting peace was to be made with the German

people. All they needed to do to obtain this just peace was to
break away from the Hohenzollerns and establish a demo-
cratic government. Once the German people had set up a
republic, a new day would dawn for Germany; a new freedom
would come to them and they would again be received into
the society of nations as citizens of an honorable and respected
state.

Their hope then? Peace, freedom, respect, bread! These

the Allies would help them to get if they but broke with their

59 Many Germans immediately asked for these rations when they sur-
rendered. Blankenhorn says that sometimes “their tired captors answered:
‘That thing says that you get the same as me. I’ve had nothing for 24 hours.
March ” ! Heber Blankenhorn, “War of Morale,” Harper's Magazine,
!’

CXXXIX (1919), p. 512; also Powell, op. cit., and New York Times,
April 20, 1919, Section 7.

60 Blankenhorn, “War of Morale,” Harper's Magazine, CXXXIX

(1919), p. 520.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 113

autocratic and militaristic government. How many German

soldiers deserted to the Allies because of this propaganda of
hope no one knows. We know only that it played an important
part in weakening the morale of the German troops and the
people behind the lines.

PARTICULARIST PROPAGANDA
Conscious of the truth in the Biblical phrase that “a house
divided against itself cannot stand,” the Allied propagandists
spared no effort to break the unity of the Empire. Despite its

apparent unity, particularism was strong in certain parts of the

German Empire. Alsace-Lorraine was French by tradition
and had never become reconciled to German rule. 61 South
Germany was Catholic, while the north was Protestant. Ba-
varia had always been more or less jealous of the power of
Prussia, and this jealousy could easily be intensified by the
propagandists. As Ungewitter put it, the Entente “spared
nothing to tear us apart.” 62
The French concentrated upon Alsace-Lorraine from the
very beginning of the war. The unwise action of Germany in
making the relationship between Alsace-Lorraine and the Em-
pire similar to that of a conquered nation to the vanquished
made the feeling in these provinces still more bitter toward her.
By the bill of incorporation the sole control of the two prov-
inces had been vested in the Emperor and the Federal Council
until the first of January 1874. 63 Although a few changes had
been made in this original arrangement, Alsace-Lorraine had
never been made to feel that it was a part of the Empire or
on an equal footing with the rest of the states. This fact, to-
gether with the natural antipathy of the people in these prov-
inces toward Prussia, made them very susceptible to the
propaganda of the French.
61
Alphonse Daudet’s beautiful story, La derniere classe, gives a charm-
ing picture of the feeling of these people toward the Germans in 1870.
62 Richard Ungewitter, Wiedergeburt durch Blut und Eisen (Stutt-
gart, 1919), p. 490.
63 Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th edition), Vol. I, p. 702.
114 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
As August 1914 French aviators dropped leaflets
early as
in Alsace-Lorraine telling the people that France would fight
until these provinces were freed from the Prussian yoke. Later
the French propagandists recalled to the minds of these
people the joys that were theirs while they were under the
rule of the French, and told them that this joy could be real
again if only they broke away from Prussia.
For whom are you fighting? For whom did thousands of Alsace-
Lorrainers offer up their lives? ....
This nation took you under
its control against your will in 1870.

Thousands of Germans who brought their all in their handkerchiefs,

came across the Rhine and settled in our beautiful Alsace-Lor-
raine
When the war started, thousands of Alsace-Lorrainers were
dragged without reason to the prisons of Germany where they died
in their misery.

The leaflet goes on to show how Germany has always treated

the people in these provinces as second-class citizens of Ger-
many. It accuses that country of censoring the mail of the
soldiers and of discriminating against the troops of Alsace-
Lorraine in the granting of leaves of absences
Therefore, dear fellow countrymen, come to us in France, where
your ancestors, grandfathers, and fathers felt themselves fortunate;
the land where you will not be slaves of the Prussian militarists and
Junkers, but where you will be treated as equals.
Your Alsace-Lorraine Comrades in France64
Another leaflet calls upon the Alsatian troops to surren-
der to the French. It assuresthem that they will be received
with open arms, and that they will not be treated as prison-
ers but as friends.
Come over, bring your Alsace-Lorraine comrades with you. Think
of this ! The more that come over now the sooner will our land become
French Come over, think of your family and your beautiful land,
which we all want to see again.
Your Alsace-Lorraine Comrades in France 65
64 Fliegerabwurf-Schriften (no number).
65 Ibid., No. 50.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 115

Playing upon the pride of these people the French stated

that theGermans considered the Alsace-Lorraine troops merely
second-rate soldiers. Then picturing the enemy as a great
demon that “forces your women and children to work like
slaves in the fields ;
that permits the gendarmes to search your
homes for wheat and potatoes,” they assured the people that
the Allies would see to it that a change would be brought
about
France and her Allies will never make peace; they will lay down
their arms at no price until the injustice of 1870 is made good again;
until our land is again safe in the bosom of France. Thousands of
Alsace-Lorraine troops have already come over here. They are not
treated as prisoners but as full-fledged Frenchmen. They earn a good
living and have good food. 66

The Americans also sent out propaganda intended for the

Alsace-Lorraine troops. Captain E. A. Powell tells how the
American propaganda section of the Military Intelligence Divi-
sion of the A.E.F. distributed some 20,000 copies of a leaflet
designed to appeal to “those natives of Alsace-Lorraine who
were serving in the German Army.” These were
work of the
Captain Osaman of the G2, 4th Corps. Captain Osaman was
familiar with German Army organization and knew the names
of many German officers and men of the 224th Division,
which was composed mostly of natives of Alsace-Lorraine. 67
The attack upon Bavaria was more difficult than that upon
Alsace-Lorraine. That principality had not been under the
rule of the French; thus the method of attack had to be dif-
ferent. By the treaty between it and the North German Con-
federation on November 23, 1870, Bavaria, though becoming
an integral part of the new German Empire, had reserved to
itself a large measure of independence. From time to time,
however, it had accepted a number of laws of the North Ger-
man Confederation, thus drawing closer the bonds of the

66 Fliegerabwurf-Schriften, No. 21.

67 E. A. Powell, The Army Behind the Army, p. 352.
116 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Empire. 68 When the war broke out, Bavaria, like the other
states of Germany, gave up temporarily many more of its
rights in favor of the Empire. Many leaders in South Ger-
many opposed this centralization of power in Berlin. They
feared that the Berlin government would make this war-time
arrangement permanent by a change in the Imperial Constitu-
69
tion. Thus it was evident that Bavarian particularism, which
was founded upon traditional and religious antagonism to the
70
Prussians, was by no means dead.
The Allies understood this situation well. The French
were the first to take advantage of the religious antagonism
between the Bavarians and the Prussians. The Comite Catho-
lique issued propaganda to the Catholics, stating that the war
was a religious war and that the North Germans were trying
to crush Catholicism. The one great piece of propaganda of
this type was the book La Guerre Allemande et le Catholicisme,
published by the Comite Catholique in May 1915. In this
book the German government was pictured as the greatest
enemy of Catholicism and the war as a war against the
Church.
This people, forged and hammered by Luther, still pursues with its

hate the Roman and clergy. In thousands of German souls awakens

cult
the aggressive mentality which broke out under the pen of Wilhelm II
when he wrote to the Landgrave of Hesse who had recently been con-
verted to Catholicism: “I hate this religion that you have embraced.” 71

The German soldiers were accused of all kinds of sacri-

legious acts. It was said that they entered churches and

68 Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th edition), Vol. Ill, p. 550.

69 Crown Prince Rupprecht to
U.D.Z., VI, 238-40, quoting a letter of
the Bavarian Minister-President, Count von Hertling. Also cited by R. H.
Lutz, The Causes of the Collapse of the German Empire, pp. 177-78.
70 This antagonism dated back to the law of September 6, 1871, which

expelled the Jesuits from the Empire.

Alfred Baudrillart (ed. ) The German War and Catholicism (pub-
71
,

lishedunder the distinguished patronage of the Catholic Committee of

French Propaganda, Paris, 1915), p. 98. The book came out in a number of
different languages.
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Front and reverse of field postcard distributed by the Americans (photo

from Heber Blankenhorn, Adventures in Propaganda).

Friends DIE AMERIKAMSCHE HiLFE.

of
German Democracy
i,5oo,ooo (eine Million fiinf mal
hunderttausend) amerikanischo Sol-
daten stehen in Frankreich; mehr als
die doppelte Anzahl wird in Amerika
ausgebildet : eine einzige Aushebung
gibt in einem einzigon Monat fast
K«,,o Wfatam ebensoviel Rekruten als ein Jahrgang
n„yc* gv in Deutschland eine Flotte von fiinf ;

Millioncn Tonnen, wclcbe in weniger

alseinem Jahr dreizehn Millionen Tonnen betragen wil'd,
eine Flotte, vvelche zusammen mit der engliscben Flotte

Examples of American Propaganda

This little card distributed by the Friends of German Democracy told
the Germans how many Americans had arrived in France to swell the ranks
of Germany’s enemies.
118 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
danced to the tune of the church organs, and that when they
were tired of dancing they fiendishly set the churches on fire.
Nuns, it states, were cruelly treated, priests were murdered,
and women were violated by the German “savages.” One Ger-
man is quoted as having stated that it took him 57 shots of
210 millimeters to bring down the tower of a church. 72 In
contrast to the “barbarism” of the Germans, the book tells of
the nobleness and of the purity of the French troops, who
prayed morning, noon, and night the French were fighting —
on the side of God and for humanity. 73
The political relationship between Prussia and Bavaria also
was attacked by the Allies. Early in 1917 the French sent
inflammatory leaflets into Bavaria, examples of which are:
Bayern und der Fricden by Heinrich Sieger, Bayern nimt
Euch selbst den Frieden, and Seit Ihr Bayern ein Freies Volk
In this work the French had the assistance of certain Germans
who desired the liberation of their provinces from Prussian-
ism. Jacob Feldner of Regensburg, Hans Suttner of Dietrams-
zell, and Karl Ludwig Krause were outstanding in this work.
Suttner was a German deserter who appropriated to himself
the title of “Doctor” and who boasted of being an “anti-
74
boche.” His greatest contribution to the leaflet campaign
was Deutschland sein eigner Richter, which appeared in 1917.
Karl Ludwig Krause wrote the famous Wofiir stirbt das
deutsche Volk He was very bitter toward Prussia and ad-
vocated that Bavaria break away from Prussia. In Septem-
ber 1917 he wrote an open letter to Count Herding regarding
75
separation.
Most of the leaflets directed against Bavaria aimed to
show, by reviewing the political relationship between North

72 Baudrillart, op. cit., 115. 73 Ibid.,

p. p. 118.
74 Wilhelm Ernst, Die antideutsche Propaganda durch das Schweizer
Gebiet im Weltkrieg, speziell die Propaganda in Bayern (Munich, 1933),
p. 6; hereafter referred to as Ernst, Die antideutsche Propaganda.
75 Ernst, op. cit., p. 6. Dr. Thimme (op. cit., p. 92) expresses the belief
that Krause is the “Heinrich Sieger” who wrote Bayern und der Friede, etc.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 119

and South Germany, the many political errors that the Empire
had made in the province. Thus the Bavarians were sup- :

posed to be a “free” people, but the German Junkers and mili-

tarists were forcing them to fight for the interests of the Prus-
sians. The leaflet, Seit Ihr Bayern ein freies Volk states in
part
Are you Bavarians a free people? No you are not! Why? Be-
cause you are subjected by the instigator of the war, Prussian Mili-
tarism. Why are you in the war? Why are you fighting? .... Must
you defend your borders? .... Why then are you fighting? . . . .

Because you are a free people only in a limited sense. In reality you
are only, as history shows, an instrument for carrying out the Prussian
desires. You are forced to fight against innocent women, children,
and old people ;
to destroy everything that comes your way, to serve
the Prussian militarists and Junkers Ask yourselves why? . . . .

All that you can say now

you are slaves When your eyes
is that !

are open you will cry out, “We want to be free citizens of Bavaria
and serve our king. We want to be free from Prussian influence.”
The sooner you come to this view the sooner will peace come. 76

Another leaflet, Bayern! Landsleute!! sets forth the view

that neither France nor England was to blame for the war,
but only the Prussians, especially the king of Prussia. Far-
sighted men, continued the leaflet, had all along warned
against a union with Prussia which “has brought about the
destruction of Bavarian independence so that now the King of
Prussia has the right, in the name of Bavaria to declare war
and make peace.” After reminding the Bavarians that the
war was being conducted in the interests only of the Junkers
and militarists, it ended with the call
Leave work ! . . . . Strikes and demonstrations, until this ruinous
course is stopped, are your liberation Stand up and resist
Everything for our beloved Bavaria !

A Bavarian Interested in His Native Land 77

78 Leaflet A.P. 20.
77 Flic gerabwurf-Schrif ten, No. 4. Hansi et Tonnelat {op. cit., p. 120)
state that many a particularistic nature were written in Germany
leaflets of
and sent to Holland or Switzerland, where they were printed and sent to
Germany for distribution.
120 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
An appeal, An which the Hansi organi-
die Siiddeutschen,
zation sent out early in 1916, asked what interest the Bavarians
had in the Hohenzollern dynasty. The people of Baden were
reminded that their struggle for freedom in 1848 had been
quelled by the “Prussian Junker-officers.” At the close the
leaflet asked if the South German people were going to con-

tinue to give material aid to the “bloody work of the Prus-

sians.” Free Germany from the Prussian yoke and the Prus-
sian people from the yoke of Junkerism, it advised. Put an
end to the World War, it continued, so that “a free Germany
can be built on the wreckage of the Prussian castle.” 78
Different in its method, yet the same in its aim, was a
leaflet entitled Preussenherzen hoch! This was sent to editors

of Bavarian papers and marked “Confidential.” In order to

intensify the feeling between Prussia and Bavaria, the leaflet
purported to be a Prussian appeal to the Prussians. “Help
save Germany,” ran its call. “All important offices are in the
hands of South Germans. By particularistic hatred they are
'

trying to break the power of Prussia.” It then complained that

Bavaria “made her continued support of the war contingent
upon the making of Count Hertling the Chancellor.” It told
of the lack of discipline among the Bavarian high officials,

and related that a number of Bavarian office holders had to be

relieved of their positions because of their uncertain support
79
of the war. The purpose behind the leaflet was to create the
impression in Bavaria that a spirit of enmity toward South
Germany existed in Prussia, and thus to make the South Ger-
mans more susceptible to anti-Prussian propaganda. 80
From the very beginning of the war there was consider-
78
Dr. George Huber, Die fransdsische Propaganda im Weltkrieg gegen
Deutschland 1914 bis 1918, p. 259 also Hansi et Tonnelat, op. cit., p. 121.
;

79 Huber, op. cit., p. 260. Some Bavarian newspapers did not suspect the
propagandist purpose of this material and published it. On September 21,
1918, General Hoffmann forbade its publication.
80 The Miincher-Augsburger Abendseitung, September informed
27, 1918,
its readers that this leaflet was a piece of propaganda emanating from enemy
agents in Germany.
 ELSASS-LOTHRINGER
Fiir wen kampft und leidet Ihr? Fur wen liaben Tausende und
abermals Tausende Elsass-Lothringer ihr junges Leben opfern
mussen? — Fiir Deutschland.
Dieses hat Euch im Jahre 1870 gegen den VVillen Eurer Eltern
u liter seine Herrschaft gebracht. Tausende von Deutschen, die ihr
gauzes Yermogen in einem Taschentuche mitbrachten, kamen tiber
den Rhein und setzten sich in unserm scbonen Elsass-Lothringen
fest. Bald hattcn sie die ersten und bestbezahlten Pliitze inne und
sorgten auch dafur, dass ihre Kinder ebensogut untergebracht
wurden. VVenn sich Elsass Lothringer und Eingewanderte fiir eine
freigewordene Stelle meldeten, so waren die letzteren die Bevor-
zugten. Beim Steuerzahlen, bei VVahlen oder in letzter Zeit bei
Zcichnung der Kriegsanleihen, da waret Ihr die «lieben wieder-
gewamnenen Briidem , sonst aber werdet Ihr seit 48 Jahren behaudelt
wie Burger zweiter Klasse.
Als dcr Krieg begann, schleppte man Tausende von Elsass-Loth-
ringern ohne Beweise ihrer Schuld in die Gefangnisse nach Deutsch-
land, wo viele vor Elend starben. Selbst in Elsass-Lothringen
waren die Gefangnisse iiberfiillt, denn bei dem geringsten Anlasse
wurdet Ihr von bezahlten Spitzeln angezeigt und streng bestraft.
Und wie ging es Euch als Soldaten? Als Ihr bei der Mobil-
machung mit Euren Regimentern wie der nach Elsass-Lothringen
kamct, da sagten Euch Eure OfFiziere, sohald der Rhein uberschrit-
ten war «So, jetzt befinden wir uns in Feindesland»,
: Die ruch-
losen Zerstorungen von Burzvveiler, St. Moritz, Dalheim usw. geben
Euch reichliche Beweise dieser deutschen Anschauung. Spater
wurdet Ihr wie Gefangene, manchmal ohne Gewehre, von der
YVestfront nach der Ostfront vcrbracht. Im Regiment oder in der
Kompanie wurdet Ihr mit Wackes, Schangcls, Landesverrater,
Saubande oder mit anderen Schimpfnamen betitelt. Die Offiziere
scheuten sich niclit, dieses vor versammelter Man nschaft oder selbst
im Graben zu tun. Ein General sagle im Juni 1917 zu den vor
einem Bataillon versammelten Elsass-Lothringern «Euch bleiben
:

nur zwei Wege iibrig, entweder einen Strick zu kaufen um Euch

aulzuhangen oder eine Kugel durch den Ivopf.
Und wie stand es mit dem Urlaub ? Alle Eure deutschen Kame-
raden durftcn zu ihren Familien fahren, nur Euer Heimatland,
Elsass-Lothringen, war fiir Euch gesperrt. Nur nach Baden durftet
Ihr und dort konntet Ihr Eure Familien sehen. In letzter Zeit
endlich, nach langen Reklamationen, gab man Euch Urlaub nach
Hause und dann nur w'enn es irgend einem «Herrn Gedarmen, der
keine Not hatle», gefiel Euch ein gutesZeugnis auszustellen.

A Call to the People of Alsace-Lorraine

The French made numerous appeals to the people of the “lost provinces.”
In this leaflet the Alsatians are reminded of the cruel treatment of the Ger-
mans were meting out to the people of these provinces. And yet thousands
of their youths were offering up their lives for their German oppressors
122 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
able friction between the two sections of the Empire, and the
Allied propagandists made the most of this situation. The
food question was one of the chief sources of this friction. The
control of the food supply was left in the hands of the govern-

ments of the various federal states working through associa-

tions formed after a common model. The result of this was
suspicion and accusation. The great landowners of East Prus-
sia were said to be living in plenty while people in the cities
were in need. In some German states there was enough food,
and in others there was very little. Each state blamed the
others for scarcity. In the Bavarian Landtag, on May 9, 1916,
Deputy Schlittenbauer attacked the North German Agrarians,
who, not being able to provide Berlin with butter or fat,
blamed Bavaria for not coming to the rescue. The Deputy at-
tributed Prussia’s plight to her own selfish policy before the
war when she preferred to import her supplies from Denmark
instead of buying butter from Bavaria and encouraging dairy
81
farming. In Stuttgart, the Oberburgermeister and Council
sent a protest to Berlin complaining that, while in South Ger-
many the food regulations of the Bundesrat had been consci-
82
entiously obeyed, the North had refused to carry them out.
Crown Prince Rupprecht brought the complaint of Bavaria
to the attention of the Bavarian Minister-President Count von
Hertling, on July 19, 1918, when he said that the Berlin gov-
ernment was catering to the big industrialists “In Berlin, al- :

most nothing is talked about but business and pleasure. By

ruthlessly exploiting the distress caused by the war, business-
men in Berlin have been able to get the whole economic life of
Germany under their control.” He ended his complaint with
the significant words
The Bavarian Government is reproached with putting up with
everything done in Berlin, and the opinion is constantly gaining ground

81 Verhandlungen der Kammer der abgeordneten des Bayerischen Land-

tags, XII, Band 242, Sitzung von 8 Mai, 1916, pp. 832-33.
82 Supplement, Daily Remew of the Foreign Press, No. 69, June 16, 1916,

pp. 4 ff.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 123

that as, after all, everything is managed from Berlin, our government
isnothing but superfluous and expensive ballast For reasons
which I cannot go into here, the Kaiser has forfeited all respect and
the feeling goes so far that serious thinkers doubt whether the Hohen-
zollern dynasty will outlive the war. 83

Further evidence of between Bavaria and

this feeling
Prussia is the fact that at the Press Conference in Berlin on
May 21, 1918, the complaint was made that Bavaria permitted
agitation against Prussia because of the belief that she was
84
being cheated of her just bread rations.
Another source of jealousy between the two leading Ger-
man states was the war reports. The Bavarians felt that these
were partial to the Prussians, who got more credit than they
deserved. Princess Bliicher makes the following observation
in her memoirs

The Bavarians have a special complaint that the war reports are
always partial to the Prussians. They say that as long as losses of life
and materials are sustained by the Crown Prince’s Army, no mention
is made of them, but as soon as Prince Rupprecht’s Army is being
beaten, every detail of the defeat is being made public, and an open
confession is made of the enemy having penetrated the German lines. 85

Allied agents in Bavaria nursed along this feeling of dis-

content by circulating stories to the effect that great animosity
existed between Bavarian and Prussian troops. One of these
Verdun the Bavarian troops refused to
stories related that at
attack and that at Colmar there was actual fighting between
Bavarian and Prussian contingents. 86 The South Germans

83 U.D.Z., VI, 238-40 also quoted as Document 41 in Lutz, Cateses of

;

the German Collapse, p. 178.

84 U.D.Z., V, 221.
85 Princess Evelyn Mary Bliicher von Wahlstalt, An English Wife in
Berlin (London, 1921), p. 243.
86 The origin of this story is
a letter to one Herr Guerbach in Berne.
The confidential agent who wrote it was offered 5,000 marks if he would
name the regiment and the officers of the troops engaged in this “fight,” but
he refused.It was found later that Guerbach was the “cover name” of the
French Military Attache in Berne, Col. Pageot. Ernst, Die antideutsche
 124 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE

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-
(1238ft)

An Appeal to the Bavarians

In an effort to drive a wedge into the Empire the French tried to arouse
the particularist spirit in Bavaria. This leaflet informs the Bavarians that
they are not free but are slaves to Prussia.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 125

were also told that the Prussians regarded their soldiers as

second-rate men and that the Bavarian troops were pushed to
the front where they had to bear the brunt of the fighting.

BAVARIANS !

It was clearly shown that the German General Staff expected an-
other attack from the enemy at the end of September.
You know yourselves how many Bavarian Divisions were hur-
riedly established to intercept this attack.
So the Bavarians were again, as has so often been the case, sacri-
ficed. The Prussian used the Bavarians again. He always sees to it
that the bitterest struggles and the heaviest losses are assigned to the
Bavarians. 87

To argument that the Bavarians were always

bolster the
sent into the hottest fighting, while the Prussians were held
back and saved, the propagandists circulated leaflets giving the
88
comparative losses to the various German states .

Yes, yes, what you say is common knowledge. The losses to date
of the various German States are as follows

Bavaria 46%
Wiirttemberg 26%
Baden 24%
Prussia 11%
And the following issue of the Kriegsblatter fiir das deutsche
Volk was sent out by the Allies to show that the non-Prussian
German troops were bitter against the Prussian soldiers.
The accursed Prussians, the favorite children of Wilhelm. With
each charge against a stronghold the South German regiments are

Propaganda, p. 17, quoting Bayer. Kriegsarchiv, Akten des Kriegsministe-

riums “Verbreitung revolutionarer propagandaschriften Abwehr.” Vol. J,
: —
1917 mit 1918.
87 “Franzosischen Methoden,” Siiddeutsche Monatshefte, April 1924, p. 7.
88 Huber, op. cit., p. 255. Statistics of the the actual loss of men by the
different states in Germany during the entire period of the war tell a story
other than that in the leaflet cited above. The figures are taken from
Friedrich Felger, Was wir vom Weltkrieg nicht wissen, p. 625: Of the
2 million dead, Prussia lost 1,500,000, Bavaria 250,000, Saxony 150,000, and
Wiirttemberg and the rest of Germany 75,000.
126 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
sent ahead until just before the surrender of the enemy; then the
Prussian regiments step in and earn the honor of heroes by completing
our victory and are then “my brave Brandenburgers, my dear chil-
dren,” etc. 89

The French worked North and

for a definite split between
South Germany. In Heinrich Sieger’s pamphlet Bayern und
der Frieden, a parallel is drawn between France under Napo-
leon I and Germany in the World War. Both had to break
under the weight of the enemy coalitions. France was able, a
few weeks after her surrender, to deal upon an equal footing
with her enemies. “How was that possible? The word dynas-
tiewechsel explains all.” It then asked if Wilhelm II was pre-
pared to make the same sacrifice for Germany that Napoleon
made for France. In other words, the pamphlet suggested that
Germany should get rid of the Hohenzollerns and come before
the Allies with a new king, a Bavarian king.

Bavaria is the natural intermediate state between Germany and

France. On the horizon — perhaps not such a distant horizon —beckons
the German-French understanding, yes, the German-French Alliance.
This is possible under the democratic Germany under the kingship of
a liberal, popular man of Wittelsbach, tied to France by old traditions. 90

In the second chapter of this pamphlet the possibility of an

enlarged Germany was held out to the Bavarians. This en-
larged democratic state was to be under the rule of a Wittels-
bach. After the fall of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hun-
gary, the non-German portions were
become independent to
states and the German portion —
present-day Austria was to —
come under German control. These promises could, of course,
be fulfilled only after the overthrow of the Kaiser and all
91
the existing German dynasties .

The Allies used a variety of schemes to get particularist

propaganda into Germany. One scheme was to distribute leaf-
lets among the exchange prisoners who came to Germany by

89 Huber, op. cit., p. 255.

90 Heinrich Sieger, Bayern und der Frieden, “Pamphlets,” Ger-
p. 13, in
man Revolution, Vol. Ill, Bavaria. 91 Ibid., chapter ii, passim.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 127
92
way of Switzerland. was to smuggle leaflets
Another trick
into Germany by means of brass shells, which were sealed on
both ends with cork and stamped with the words, “Printed
matter, pass on.” These were thrown into the Rhine and car-
93
ried by the current into Germany. Another means was to put
the propaganda into book form and give false titles to the
books. For example, Grelling’s Das V erbrechen ( J’accuse )
had the title Die Europdische Lage, by Dr. Fr. Arndt; and
Grumbach’s Das Annexionistische Deutschland was sent into
94
Germany as Grossdeutschland by W. Siegwart.
Another method was to use a falsified seal and falsified
envelopes of the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Berne and
with the help of these send propaganda to certain persons or
groups in South Germany. The imprint on these was “K. u. K.
Osterr. Konsulate, Cs. es. K. Oss. —
Tr. Magy. Konsidatus
Basel.” This method was first followed in March 1917, when
a number of Heinrich Sieger’s pamphlets were smuggled into
Bavaria. At that time they were addressed to Bavarian burgo-
masters. It was again used in the summer of 1918 when
Siegfried Balder’s pamphlets were circulated in Germany.
Balder’s material was addressed to the locomotive-fireman,
and polytechnic unions, the workers and handicraft associa-
tions in all South Germany, and to two members of the Royal
95
family. Among the other leaflets sent out in this manner was
Die lustige Witwe, by Eric Miihsam. This contained a pic-
ture of the Kaiser going to the scaffold and implied that if the
Hohenzollern dynasty were destroyed the Bavarians would be
a free people. 96
92 Ernst, op. cit., p. 20.
93 Ibid., Bayer. Kriegsarchiv, Akten des
p. 22, citing stellv. Generalkom-
mandos I b. AK, “Einfuhr von —
Druckschriften Allg.,” Bund 345.
9i Ibid.

95 Ernst, op. cit., p. 25, quoting Bayer. Kriegsarchiv, Akten des stellv.
Generalkommandos I b. AK.
96The original of this leaflet is said to have been produced in Germany,
smuggled into Switzerland by Jakob Feldner, and printed by Meyer &
Larcheveque in Geneva in the latter part of 1917. Ibid.
128 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
That smuggling leaflets into Bavaria was an active enter-
prise demonstrated by the fact that the German customs
is

were kept busy. At the head customs house in Munich

officials

a 42-kilogram trunkful of material by Leonard Frank was

taken on December 8, 1917. At the port of Lindau, the fol-
lowing cargo was apprehended at the fast freight inspection in
September 1918:
150 copies of the pamphlet, Kaiser und Krieg oder Republik und Frie-
2,000
den.
200 copies of the pamphlet, Wilhelm II annoch deutscher Kaiser wir
2,000
klagen dich an.
leaflets, Zeichnet die Kriegsanleihe by Ludwig Thoma von Ehe-
den.
leaflets, Das Genossen Karl Liebknecht Brief an das Komman-
danturgericht.
2.000 leaflets, Die lustige Witwe, gedicht von Erich Miihsam. 97

According to a report of the Bavarian Legation in Berne

in the fall of 1917, the German and Swiss guards took many
propaganda leaflets, and revolutionary writings, and
letters,

arrested a number of propaganda agents. They took more than

200 copies of the leaflet Deutsches Volk wach auf. In June
1917 they intercepted a transport of the pamphlet Wie deutsche
Geschichtsschreiber einst urteilen werden written by a Ger- —
—
man deserter in Switzerland and at the end of July they
made 100,000 copies of Wilson’s speeches “harmless.” They
also arrested two under-agents, Fritz Demeter and Karl Schnei-
der, at Basel, because they had thrown a floating leather sack
containing 50,000 copies of the pamphlet Bayern und der
98
Friede, into the Rhine. And again in September 1917, some
90.000 copies of the leaflet Du armies deutsches Volk were
taken from Anderson, an agent of the French government. 99
97 Ernst, op. citing Bayer. Kriegsarchiv, Atken des stellv.
cit., p. 30,
Generalkommandos I AK
“Einfuhr von Druckschriften Uberwachung
v. : —
Miinchen” — Bund 346; “Einfuhr von Druckschriften Uberwachung Lin- —
dau” — Bund 346.
98 This was a common method used to get material into Germany. The
leather sacks had cork on each end. 99 Ernst, op. cit., p. 29.
 ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA 129

From the foregoing discussion we get a fair idea of the

first four types of propaganda with which the Allies attacked
Germany. Each type had a specific purpose, and the writers
of the propaganda were clever enough to make this purpose
stand out clearly. Having “enlightened” the German people,
having brought despair into their hearts, having given them
— —
something to hope for to look forward to and having finally
striven to break the unity of the Empire, the Allied propa-
gandists were ready to bring on the revolution in Germany.
 CHAPTER V
REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA
On the day the Kaiser of Berlin falls, you

will be liked in Paris, London, New York, and

Rome, as well as we like the Russian soldiers
today.
—Leaflet distributed by the Allies

The cause of every revolution exists among those against

whom the revolution is directed. Realizing this fact, the
Allied propagandists directed their efforts against “Kaiserism,”
“militarism,” and “Junkerism,” and promoted a “cause” for
revolution in the minds of the troops and the masses in Ger-
many. And taking their cue from the words of Goethe, who
said, “The revolution from below is always due to the habits
of those above,” the producers of “word bullets” directed their
ammunition at the Kaiser and the military leaders 1 .

The French propaganda sought from the very beginning

to inoculate the German people systematically with the thought

1 It is interesting to see how the revolutionizing of Germany became a

war aim of the French very early in the war. L’Humanite was the first of
the Left press to attack the Kaiser and make a distinction between the
German people and the ruling class. The war aims of the French Socialists
became the destruction of the system which was to blame for the war. Said
L’Humanite, in its issue of August 16, 1914: “and though he [William II]
calls himself Frederick, or Napoleon, or Bismarck, his defeat is certain. This
defeat will tear away the whole hated Prussian military system, as well
as his throne, which is the seat of the most shameful reaction of modern
times. On the ruins of the Hohenzollern family will arise, as soon as pos-
sible, the German Republic with which the French Republic can conclude an
honorable and lasting peace.” Soon the phrases, that the war was a
struggle “against militarism,” against German “imperialism,” and for a
“lasting peace” found their way also into the papers of the Right. Le Matin,
on September 18, 1914, stated that it was important for the French to
determine to fight, not alone for victory, but that “victory should carry
through the destruction of German Imperialism.”

130
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 131

of revolution. They strove to soften the fear which the word

“revolution” naturally evokes, and in one of Siegfried Balder’s
pamphlets itwas pointed out that a person who went against
the Kaiser was not an enemy of the Fatherland
He who opposes his government does not fight against the Father-
land.Even if the Fatherland is the Kaiser, it is the duty of every
German to oppose him and his government. 2

The revolution, the Germans were told, was to lead only

to the Republic and a rebuilding of Germany. They were told
that the Allies were fighting only Prussian militarism, “that
military caste in Berlin which has unchained the mass mur-
3
der.” The impossibility of a peace as long as the Kaiser
ruled in Germany was continually called to the attention of
the German people. In September 1917 Das Freie Deutsche
Wort stated that peace negotiations could take place only be-
tween such countries as are ruled by the people. “In Germany
such a fact does not exist.” The leaflet continues by quoting
from the reply of American government to the peace
the
offer of the Pope, in which it is stated that there could be no
dealings with an irresponsible government that the word of the
;

German rulers could not be accepted “unless supported by con-

clusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German
people themselves.” Without such guaranties, “treaties of
settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up
arbitration in place of force, territorial adjustments and re-
constitution of small states, if made with the German govern-
ment, no nation could depend on.” 4 In other words, no peace
could be made as long as the Hohenzollerns were in power.

2 Kaiser und Krieg oder Republik und Frieden, p. 13.

3
Flugbldtter fur das deutsche Volk, No. 16, April 1916.
4 Dr.
George Huber, Die franzosische Propaganda im Weltkrieg gegen
Deutschland 1914 bis 1918, p. 269; hereafter cited as Huber, Franzosische
Propaganda. See also the reply of the United States government on Au-
gust 27, 1917, to His Holiness Benedict XV in Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow
Wilson as I Knew Him (Garden City, New York, 1926), pp. 281 ff., or any
collection of Wilson’s state papers.
132 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
On August 2, 191 7 a soldier of the 7th Army received a
leaflet which said
On the day the Kaiser of Berlin falls, you will be liked in Paris,
London, New York, and Rome as well as we like the Russian soldier
and worker today German soldiers, think of this. Have counsel
with your comrades. Oppose the continuation of the war as forcefully
as you oppose your enemies.
Please pass this on to your comrades. 5

The attack upon the Kaiser and the ruling family was
made with pictures as well as words. One leaflet displayed two
pictures. The one at the top showed the Kaiser and his offi-
cial staff seated at a table in a beautiful garden. Upon the table
there was an abundance of food and beverages. A look of con-
tentment showed on the faces of the members of the “party.”
The picture is captioned “How the war looks at Headquar-
:

ters.” Below this is another picture, this one showing the ex-
plosion of a shell and two soldiers being blown to pieces. This
is labeled “How the war looks in the trenches.” 6
:

In another leaflet a drawing shows the Kaiser and his six

sons, in full dress uniform, with feathered caps, leather boots,
and medal-bedecked topcoats, smartly traversing a pathway
flanked by thousands of black figures of death. This ghastly
horde is stretching out skeleton arms toward the proud family.
The caption of the picture reads “One family which has not
:

7
lost a single member.”

Leaflet A.P. 47 shows the Kaiser riding his horse into a

dark wilderness filled with the bodies of dead soldiers. Skeleton
forms are pointing accusing fingers at their former ruler. One
deathlike figure is seen in front of the Kaiser’s horse, with a
long rope and noose, ready for action. The caption beneath
this reads “The King of Prussia goes to meet his death.” 8
:

And Leaflet A.P. 48 contains a picture of a heavy throne

labeled “Militarism” resting on a hill of dead bodies. A huge
form is seated on the throne. One hand of this image of mili-

5 U.D.Z., VI, 20. 6 Fliegerabumrf-Schriften (no number).

7 8
Leaflet A.P. 18. Leaflet A.P. 47.
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 133

BY BALLOON.
Suftbrt lion.

Cine 5#miUe »el$e tein SRitgiieb ttetloteti Gat.

An Attack upon the Kaiser

This leaflet shows the Kaiser and his six sons, all unscathed by the war,
marching proudly by as thousands of clamoring arms reach out to them in
anguish.
134 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
tarism is holding a bloodstained document and the other hand
is clasping a sword. A general, pointing to the hill of dead, is

saying to the Kaiser, who is smiling, “A few more dead, Your

9
Majesty, and the foundation will be safe .” And the next issue
of the shows the Kaiser and Hindenburg, seated in the
leaflets

midst of ammunition and heavy implements of war, being

carried on the shoulders of wounded, emaciated human beings.
Hindenburg says to his chief, “Your Majesty, the people are
depressed and are murmuring constantly,” to which the Kaiser
replies, “Why do they murmur? We feel no burden .”
10

In their attack upon the Kaiser, the English made further

use of their prisoners of war. In the leaflet entitled “What a
German soldier, recently taken prisoner by the English, told an
English officer,” the prisoner gives vent to his feelings as
follows

This war is the greatest crime the world has ever seen Here
on this front the Germans are falling like flies. Many are killed by
German bullets. The Germans are driven into the slaughter like beasts.
And why? Only because the Kaiser and his so-called statesmen fear
what would happen should the people know all
The Russians rose up and broke their chains, but not our people.
But our tyrants are sly they not only have the body but the
;
will of
the people in chains. No German will has been free in Germany since
1870 ! . . . . Thank God, I am out of it.

At the end of this the English propagandists added their call:

“German soldiers, follow the example of Russia! Drive your
11
tyrants to the devil .”
As much as possible the propagandists tried to bring about
antagonisms between the officers and men, and to destroy dis-
cipline. In one leaflet we find the following:

Your Kaiser, German

your Kaiser desires to play the part
soldiers,
of the ruler of the world and the representative of God on earth
Are you going to continue to fight so that the German steel barons,
the worst of all enemies of labor, can enslave the French workers of

9 Leaflet A.P. 48.

10 Leaflet A.P. 49. 11 Leaflet A.P. 16.
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 135

Longwy and Briey? .... It is up to you to put a stop to this world

12
butchery.

In this campaign against the officers the military leaders

were accused of prolonging the war for selfish reasons. They
were accused of living the life of heroes, amid splendor and
luxury, while the poor soldiers in the trenches were tired and
hungry
.... And that isn’t the worst yet, soldiers ! A Lieutenant Gen-
eral in Berlin takes bribes to firms, soldiers ! in order to supply goods
to the war officials .... It is a known fact but it is hushed up ! ....
And in the big hotels in Berlin champagne flows every night at
80 marks to the bottle ! . . . .

Do not die, soldiers! if you can! Save yourself if it is

Live
possible. Live and look the great revolution in the face! Weepingly
she arises from the sorrow which your war lords have spread over you.
She comes to bring you back to the “Heimat.” 13

The strike was suggested means of bring- as the quickest

ing on the revolution. In the leaflet Volk nim dir selbst den
Frieden! the suffering of the people and the soldiers is con-
trasted with the contentment of the militarists and the Junkers.
After speaking of humanity and peace, of a universal peace
and brotherhood, it cries “Down with the Government Down !

with the oppressors !” And at the end it gives a formula by

which peace can be hastened
The only means is Refuse to continue the war
: Refuse to shoot !

at the orders of your superiors Refuse to work in the munitions fac-

!

tories ! Strike ! In the field ! On land !

Strike ! Strike
Assemble by the thousands and cry out Peace and Freedom! 14

12 Fliegerabumrf-Schriften, No. 37.

13 Leaflet A.P. 42.
14 Fliegerabwurf-Schriften, No. 9. See also E. Drahn and Susanne Leon-
hard, Unterirdisches Literatur im revolution'dren Deutschland wdhrend
des IVeltkrieges (Berlin, 1920), p. 190. This is perhaps the best study of the
revolutionary agitation in Germany, especially the Bolshevik agitation, that
has appeared to date. It will be referred to hereafter as Drahn and Leonhard,
Unterirdisches Literatur.
A.P. 49.

ginbratmrg : ..SSajeftilt, ba» ®s»lf ifi gebrtttfi unb murrt unaufijilrlM)"

a»ofeft4i : „ WeSljolb ntarren fic V Sir )>imn teine

“Why Do They Murmur?”

This is another example of the attack upon the German high officials.

The supposed heartlessness and greed of the Kaiser were depicted in word
and picture.
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 137

And in the latter part of 1917 the French dropped over

the German lines the following leaflet, the front side of which
read:
FORESIGHT PASS THIS ON
3 days of universal strike and victory is yours.

The reverse side strove to create a class war by stating:

FORESIGHT
Can this war still end with a victory? Certainly! And with a
great victory of the workers over the manufacturers, war-wagers, the
Junkers and Princes; the victory of the proletariat over their exploiters.
How? Three days of universal strike and the victory is yours.
Against your will the war cannot be carried on. Three days of
universal strike and the war and your suffering will be ended. 15

A propaganda called upon the German

versified piece of
troops to lay down their arms and stop fighting. If the Kaiser
should insist that they continue the struggle, they were to tell
him to go into the trenches himself, for they were through
with the war. Reading like an old English ballad this leaflet
said
Wenn ich der deutsche Michel war
So wiisst ich was ich tat
Ich legte meine Waffe hin
Und sprach’ zu Majestat:

“Nun ist’s genug! Ich mach nicht mehr

Im Schiitzengraben sein;
Wenn du noch langer kriegen willst
So steige selbst hinein !

“Drei Jahre und ein halbes schon

Kampft ich furs Vaterland,
Stritt fur den Kaiser und furs Reich
Und lag im Unverstand;

“Ich litt an Hunger, Durst und Frost,

Ich stand im Kampfgebraus

15 Drahn and Leonhard, Unterirdisches Literatur, p. 181.

138 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Das Toten ist ein schrecklich Ding
Ich sehne mich nach Haus

“Hast du noch nicht genug vom Krieg,

So riicke selbst ins Feld,
Und kampf im heissen Schlachtgewiihl,
Als braver deutscher Held.” 18

When the Kaiser gave Hindenburg a high military deco-

ration the propagandists asked the German troops

What has he given you? Suffering, poverty, hunger for women

and children, misery, pestilence and tomorrow the grave They say !

—
you are fighting for the Fatherland but what is your fatherland? Is
it Hindenburg, who with Ludendorff is many kilometers behind the

front lines, making more plans to give the English more cannon-
17
fodder ?

Attacking all of the ruling families in Germany, a little

pink card stated that all princes should be sent to the lower
regions. These rulers weaken, it said, the power of the
people.
They are leading you to slaughter to make your children more
submissive. Millions should yet be offered up, but this revolution
should prevent it Save yourselves in the French camps. Who
wants to can. God will help him. Stop obeying and learn to think
Make yourselves free! 18

“Mother Revolution,” stated another leaflet, “will save

you.”
And what comes now? Who comes from this region of death?
Mother Revolution And weeping she brings you back to the Heimat.
!

Do not die, soldiers Live if you can 1 Live and look the ! . . . .

great revolution in the face. Weepingly she arises from the sorrow
which the war lords have spread over you. She comes to bring you
back to your homes. 19

The French often suggested to the German soldiers that

they unite with the radicals in Germany who were working for
international peace. After the arrest of Liebknecht, for in-

18 Liste I, Hoover War Library collection. 17 Leaflet A.P. 12.

18 Fliegerabzuurf-Schriften (no number). 19
Leaflet A.P. 42.
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 139

stance, theFrench Kriegsblatter fur das deutsche Volk, No. 21,

dated July 1916, warned:
Workers, Liebknecht’s cause is your cause. Through Liebknecht
they want to strike at you, to kill you, to silence you, so that the human
slaughter shall continue. Through Liebknecht it is hoped that the oppo-
sition of the German war criminals will be broken.
proletariat to the
Will you stand for that? .... Down with the war, down with the
Government. 20

By publishing, in neutral newspapers, stories of conflict

between German soldiers and officers, and supposed incidents
of mutiny among the troops, the Allies tried to make it appear
that there was a strong hatred among the troops for their
officers. An Tribune de Geneve for July 24,
article in the
1918, which reached the hands of the German soldiers, stated:
From information from a good source we are certain that discon-
tent is spreading in the German army. Many acts of disobedience are
known and High Command has not succeeded in stopping them.
the
A regiment which was to go to rest quarters had been sent to the
Western Front; the men mutinied and threw their rifles out of the
windows, stopped the train and fled across the field. 21

There is no doubt that the military failures of the spring

and summer of 1918 had a demoralizing effect upon the Ger-
man troops. There is evidence that, in many sections of the
army, discipline was broken. Many officers stood face to face
with opposition from some of their troops. One observer at
the front said : “As yet their doubled-up fist remained in their

20 Huber, Franzdsische Propaganda, p. 262. From a report of a con-

fidant in Switzerland, we learn that were held by
regular conferences
Haguenin, the chief of the French propaganda section, in which the revo-
lutionary propaganda, especially the smuggling of leaflets into Germany, was
discussed. conferences the French ambassador Dustata took a
In these
and Haguenin gave him regular reports on the conversations.
lively interest
In these conferences, also, most of the known foreign propagandists took
part, e.g., Flesch for the Italians, Delmar for the Americans, and Dr. Schlie-
ben, Hugo Ball, and Dr. Bloch for the German Democrats. Ernst, op. cit.,
p. 11, citing Bayer. Kriegsarchiv, “Akten des stellv. Generalkommandos,”
I b. AK, Bund 345.
21 Press Review, Second Section, United States General Staff, No. 212,
August 4, 1918.
 Solfcatcn ter bcutfcOen 2lrroee!

0 d)fnt nid)t Mr r»ffifd)c (*>>ffnnj^cnfd;aft! VflM cud) wit rnl)igcin 6cmtficn ^ffnngcn madicii.

pjlir bcfdjlnmij^t bnbnrd) b ir 'Bcciibigpti Mf)rg> fiir cud; liojjiiiiiii^lfiini .S\ricpcs> mib tninnt

fucr Vcbcn nab ('>Miinbl)dt in 0 id)crl)cit,

Sir, juvjcit in rufjifdjcr ®cfniijp|djflft fid) bcfiii^enbcu beutfd)en 0o!botcn in gciiuit

fdjin iiber m Jnufcnb, bic laisjcr uni? e|rlid) nide Senate Ijinbnrd) gefdmpft 1111b n!le Upl
crigifitnt biefee furd)fl)iucu SVricgeg ertrogen (jaben, tuenben uns on (Sud), ^aincrnbcn, mit

cinciii guten ?)!afe:

f
,ii)erfft bic Pnten nen end), tuic es bit uiiijten non mis gctnii ijnbcn,

unb ifib.t bind) frciiuillig non bin buffet! gffanp madjeu! pr bringt wciiigftcnS cucr ^eben

uni) BejuriMjcii in 2 idjeri)eit!". S'er .Sivirg inirii nod) fetjr knot bnuern nub gciuinnen feunen

mir ^cntidic ibn bod) nidjt. Scnn bid) bic 5 iugel nud) nod) uerfdjont Ijat, fo fnnnjt bn bod)

fidjer bfiUii; redden, baf> bu non iijr morgen ober iibermorgen getroften rnirff. Tv. S'cutfdjlanb

finb bnrd) biefen Siiieg fdjon im liliioncii Sinner firn^d gercorbeu. Ssergvii^ert bod) nidjt

burd) end) bie jnljl biefer ilngiiidlidjcn, bit tin .fyingcretot ermartet, ben.n ber 0toot fnnn

uniniiglid) fo old .Siriippel erua^ren, pintnl bit jnljl berfeiben jdjon je|t bos gricbensetnt bob

^eutfdjni fteeres uiits breifadje iiberftcigt.

('
5 iQubi nidjt bent (''lefdjluad encrer 'Cffi^eve iifcer bit gropen 8icge. irstibnn non 8eut

Idjlnnb dies or.^fbotfii toorbnt ij't, tjaben mir bis jd)t nut leilcrfolge jn
(
uer^ei^inu, bit fiir

beu be$ JiTrieges non garfeiner Stebeutung finb. 0\m Often ‘gotten inlr nidjt ciiiinni

Siu’l'dj't': itdjinni fiinnen, ini ffiefteo ftcljen tnir nod) ininier nit ber fran^ofifi^cR 8r«je. 0o
tuclien tulr bod) liebcr iiber unfrre 8icgc fdjmcigcn.

'Ben uns !)nt cs nod) nieinnitben gereut, bnf, cr in (Sefaugnifdjnft gcraten ij't. Sir
iMcrbct! gat bejjanbelt unb bdsMcii aiifgfjcidjuetcs Sfj’tu. 'fide non itus tssSru tiberij8U|)i oi$t

ntdji' nnd) ^entfdjloub jnriid unb nterben and) usd) bent Siriegc in Slnblaab Meikn.
cniinrtd tins in S'eBtfdjkiib? ?ir Xlolonien finb tuts ribgcuoiiiumt, utifre pkiefen ijnbcii bos

frott geatedjt unb iiufrc Sanbelsflatte ift in ben Bcfltit anberer 0tnaten fibergcgangett. Sdjon

jetd finM ber griifierc Soil ber Befeii'ennig feint 5irbeit unb mid) bent firiege tuirb es nod)

nit! fid" "icv nterben. Bei tins [jrddjt man, bob bit, mcldje fid) freirdliig ergekn, in Siufilonb

fofteulos iknb bcfontiiicn tuerben.

S iittneecben! iinr burl) ftejangeiifdjaft fount 8)1' cne r Vefciii in 0 id)er|eit Wngeii Jijjr
mcrbft co nidjt tieren c n, menu pr nnferem Bute fslgc leiftct.

An Invitation from Russia

This is another call for the German troops to desert. It assures them
that they have nothing to fear in the Russian prison camps, and it offers free
land to those Germans who come over to the Russians voluntarily.
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 141

pockets, but how long yet?” 22 And Richard Ungewitter ad-

mitted that “It finally came to the point where the leaders no
23
longer had the troops under their control.”
When German people toward the Kaiser
the attitude of the
in the last year of the war was analyzed by Princess Bliicher
she wrote in her memoirs
The feeling toward the Kaiser is steadily diminishing, and the same
people who greeted him with “Ave, Caesar,” a short time ago, are now
distributing leaflets in the back streets of Berlin proclaiming “down
with the Kaiser ;
down with the government.” 24

And the viewpoint of the troops is given in an entry in her

diary of February 1917. She had talked to a German soldier
just returned from the front, and he said
We all do our best for our country, and if we meet as prisoners or
otherwise we are perfectly friendly, but there must be something
wrong somewhere, to make us so hated by all other nations, as well as
by our allies. Who is to blame for it? That is what my comrades and
are trying to find out. 25
I

Yes, who was to blame? If there was any doubt in the

minds of the German soldiers on this point in February 1917,
that doubt must certainly have been dispelled by late summer
1918, thanks to the propaganda of the Allies.
The sentiment of the revolutionary propaganda is well
summarized in a leaflet, “Comrades, Awake!” After criticiz-
ing the German government and blaming the Kaiser for the
sufferings and tribulations of the nation, it closes with
For a more beautiful, higher, and nobler end our strength should
go. The holy aim of our strength should be A free and fortunate :

German Republic! .... Comrades, awake! Realize your strength. 26

22 Ludwig Lewinsohn, Die Revolution an der Westfront (Charlotten-

burg, 1919), Foreword.
23 Richard Ungewitter, Deiitschlands Wiedergeburt durch Blut und Eisen
(Stuttgart, 1919), p. 491.
24 Princess Evelyn Bliicher, An English Wife in Berlin, p. 190.
25 Ibid.,
p. 177.
26 Richard Muller, V om Kaiserreich zur Republik (Vienna, 1924), 2 vols.,
I, 117.
142 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
The dissemination of among the Ger-
revolutionary leaflets
man troops led to a dispute between Germany and the Allies
as to the legality of such activity. Even before the World War
experts in international law had discussed the question whether
the law of nations recognized the right of a warring nation
to induce the subjects of opponents to treason by means of
revolutionary leaflets. Vattel held that there is nothing in
strict internationallaw to prevent a belligerent from sowing
disaffection and treason among the armies of his opponent and
the population. But he thought that such a course could not
27
be compatible with good conscience. Although there are mod-
ern writers who condemn this practice, yet the actions of the
states during the World War certainly showed that they did
not accept such condemnation.
The German government, despite the fact that it had been
the first to distribute leaflets to enemy troops by means of the
airplane, considered such acts a serious breach of international
law. The leading case on the subject of leaflet-dropping that
came up during war is that in which two British officers,
the
Captain E. Scholtz and Lieutenant H. C. Wookey, were con-
cerned in the latter part of 1917. These two officers, carry-
ing propaganda were shot down and captured by the
leaflets,

Germans near Cambrai on October 17, 1917. They were

taken to the 2d Army Headquarters at Le Cateau and there
interrogated by Captain von Loehnegsen of the Intelligence
Staff, who informed them that the German government had
notified the Allies in April 1917 that the dropping of pam-
phlets was considered illegitimate and that the airmen guilty
of the practice were liable to be brought before a field-general
court-martial and to be shot. On November 22, 1917, the
officers were shown the charge which referred to two
sheet,
separate alleged offenses: The distribution, in September 1917,
of pamphlets detrimental to the German troops; and the at-
tempted distribution, on October 17, 1917, of pamphlets de-
27 H. Lauterpracht, “Propaganda by Governments,” transactions of Gro-
tius Society, XIII, 152-53.
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 143

scribing the favorable conditions in the English prison camps

and intended to induce the German soldiers to desert. On De-
cember 1 the two British airmen were placed on trial before
a court composed partly of civil and partly of military judges
sitting with a jury. They were found “guilty of treason” and
were sentenced to ten years of hard labor. 28
The British government learned of the case and took im-
mediate steps to obtain the release of the officers. The German
government was informed through the Dutch representative
at Berlin that unless the airmen were released His Majesty’s
government would take reprisals. The stand of the British
government was that the distribution of leaflets from the air
was not a breach of international law. Consequently, the con-
demnation of Captain Scholtz and Lieutenant Wookey to a
long term of penal servitude for this “offense” was held to be
abusive. Furthermore, it was pointed out that German and
Austrian airmen had committed similar offenses and no puni-
tive measures had been undertaken against them upon capture. 29
The German government was given one month the period —
fixed by the Hague Mission for giving notice of intended re-
prisals —
to release the airmen and cancel the sentences before
adequate retaliatory measures would be taken. The Prisoners of
War Department announced, on March 11, that the two men
had been released and returned to their camp. 30 Hence re-
prisal action was not necessary.
The question of the legality of fomenting political disturb-
ances in an enemy state or inciting enemy troops to desert or
surrender was cleared up by the Commission of Jurists who
drew up a draft code of rules for air warfare at The Hague

28 M.
J. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (London and New York,
1924), pp. 30 d ff. Mr. Spaight got his information concerning the details of
the case directly from Lieutenant Wookey, who wrote him a personal letter
regarding the matter.
29 The Times (London), February 2 and 6, 1918; also Spaight, op. cit.,
pp. 306-7.
30 The Times (London), March 12, 1918.
144 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
in February 1923. This commission included an article in the

following terms
—
Art. 21. The use of aircraft for the purpose of disseminating
propaganda shall not be treated as an illegitimate means of warfare.
Members of the crews of such aircraft must not be deprived of their
rights as prisoners of war on the charge that they have committed such
an act. 31

BOLSHEVIK PROPAGANDA
No attempt is made here to analyze all of the propaganda
which was issued by the Bolsheviks. A book could easily be
32
written on that subject. The Bolsheviks were interested in
a world revolution. They hoped that the war would be the
beginning of that world revolution which would result in the
overthrow of the capitalistic system. Hence their propaganda
was directed against all capitalist nations. In September 1914,
a month after the outbreak of the war, Lenin wrote his famous
theses on the war. Number One declared:
The European and World War has the sharp definite character of a
bourgeois imperialist and dynastic war. The struggle for markets and
looting of countries, the tendency to fool, disunite, and kill off the pro-
letarians of all countries by instigating the hired slaves of one nation
against the hired slaves of another for the benefit of the bourgeoisie
such is the real meaning and purpose of the war.

And in the thesis Number Seven he asserted

The slogans of social democracy at the present time should be

First an all-sided propaganda (spread also in the army and the area
of military activity) of a socialist revolution and of the necessity of
turning the weapons, not against brothers, hired slaves of other coun-
tries, but against the reaction of the bourgeois governments and parties
of all countries. To carry on such propaganda in all languages it is

31 Spaight, op. cit., 309. The article makes no distinction between

p.
military and political propaganda.
32 The most complete study of Russian propaganda that has appeared
thus far is E. Drahn and Susanne Leonhard, Unterirdisches Literatur im

revolutiondren Deutschland (Berlin, 1920).

 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 145

absolutely necessary to organize illegal cells and groups in the armies

33
of all nations

On October 6, 1917, the Central Committee of the Rus-

sian Social Democratic Labor (Bolshevik) party issued a call,
through its paper, Bote der Russischen Revolution, “to all
workers, sailors and soldiers of all lands” :

Five months have passed since the revolutionary proletariat and

the army brought to an end the government of the whip and put
Nicholas Romanov behind lock and key. The worker has stripped off
the fetters of the police regime. The soldier has become a free citi-

zen Workers of all lands ! We reach you the hand of brother-

hood over mountains of dead bodies We call you to make firm
the international unity
We bid you heed our call. Do not show this manifesto to your
officers. Spread it among your artillery comrades. 34

Although the ultimate aim of the Bolshevik propaganda

was a world revolution, a considerable amount of it was di-
rected against the German government. It is to this phase of
the Bolshevik propaganda that we will limit ourselves in this
study.
The designs against Germany were well summarized in
the newspaper, Rabochii Soldat, on October 17, 1917, almost a
month before the Bolsheviks got into power in Russia, when
it stated:
The German Kaiser, covered with the blood of millions of dear
people, wants to push his army against Petrograd. Let us call to the
German workmen, soldiers, and peasants, who want peace no less than
we do, to stand up against this damned war
This can be done only by a revolutionary government which would
really speak for the workmen, soldiers, and peasants of Germany, and
appeal over the heads of the diplomats directly to the German troops
fill the German trenches with proclamations in the German language.
. . . . Our airmen would spread these proclamations all over Germany. 35

R. H. Lutz, “World War Propaganda,” in Quincy Wright (ed.), Pub-

33

licOpinion and World Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 168.

Also Lenin, The Imperialist War (International Publishers, 1930), pp. 61
and 63-64. 34 Drahn and Leonhard, op. cit.,
p. 132.
35 John Reed, Ten Days That Shook the World (New York, 1919), p. 31.
146 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
On December 5, 1917, Lenin and Trotsky sent a proc-
lamation to the German soldiers as follows

RUSSIAN PROCLAMATION TO THE GERMAN SOLDIERS

The Provisional Government has fallen. The power is now in the
hands of the Russian people, and the new government considers the
immediate conclusion of peace as its foremost duty
We charge you soldiers to stand by us in the fight for peace and
socialism, for socialism alone can give to the proletariat a lasting
peace
Brothers, if you support us, the cause of freedom is assured suc-
cess
Our soldiers have laid down their arms. It is now for you to follow
this standard of peace.

May peace triumph ! May the Socialistic and International Revo-

lution live

For the Council of the People’s Commissars.

( Signed ) Lenin, Trotsky 86

A similar message was addressed to the German sailors

on February 15, 1918. This, which was sent out by wireless,
said

TO THE SAILORS OF THE BALTIC FLEET AND ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLES

Do you hear our voice, and do you hear the cries and groans of our
brothers, the soldiers who are drowning in their own blood, and the
sailors who are meeting their death day by day in the misty sea and
the cold depths of the seas and oceans ? Do you hear the heartbreaking
lamentations and the despairing sobs of mothers, brothers, and children
throughout Europe which is drenched in blood? Do you not see the
approaching shadow of the black specter of famine and his bony hand ?
If you hear and see all this, why do you keep silent? Give answer
to our cry and to the appeals of your brothers. Follow the example of
the Russian people Rise up like a hurricane, tear off the fetters
of bondage, overthrow the thrones of tyrants, and free yourselves
from the god you have created with your own hands Capitalism —
36 This message was picked up on April 11, 1918, near Ancerviller by
Americans. It is printed in full in Secret Summary of Intelligence A.E.F.
General Staff, No. 97, p. 395. It is also found in the Russian Daily News,
December 24, 1917.
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 147

Therefore raise boldly the standard of revolt. Leave the sepulcher

37
of the trenches; make an end to the despots.

In their propaganda activities before the Brest-Litovsk

Treaty the Bolsheviks paid special attention to the German
troops on the Eastern front. Beginning as early as October
1917, a continued and ever increasing stream of propaganda
found its way to these soldiers. A number of periodicals de-
signed to arouse a revolutionary spirit among the German
prisoners in Russia and the German
troops on the Eastern
Front were established. The and most influential of
largest
these was Der V dikerf riede, which was published in Petrograd
and was distributed along the northern sector of the German
38
line in the East. Another newspaper, Die Fackel, made its
appearance on December 6, 1917. It emanated from the
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Petrograd, by
whom it was published for free distribution among the Ger-
man troops. According to the New Russian Daily News this
paper was “to publish the proclamations of the Council and
secret diplomatic documents. It will set forth and defend the
39
Internationalist ideas.” The issue of December 9 contained
a proclamation by Trotsky which called upon the laboring
masses to form a united front against capitalism. 40
Appeals were also made to the German people at home. In
No. 24 of Das freie deutsche Wort appeared the “Call of the
Central Commitee of the Bolsheviks to the Socialist Proletariat
of Germany,” by Lenin and Trotsky. In this the German sol-
diers, workmen, and workingwomen were called upon to emu-
late the Russian proletariat and unite with the Russian Revo-
lution.

37
Fliegerabunirf-Schriften, No. 36; also British Daily Review of the
Foreign Press, VI, 904.
88 Drahn and Leonhard, Unterirdisches Literatur, p. 139.
39 New Russian Daily News, December 8 (21), 1917.
40Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, January 5, 1918, announced the
establishment of Die Fackel. See also Germany, Reichstag, Verhandlungen
des Reichstags, February 26, 1918, Band 134, 4171-75.
148 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Go to the streets ! Let the factories go There must not be a
!

fourth winter of fighting. Not another shot must be fired

An immediate Armistice ! Do not fire another shell. On to the
peace negotiations ! Come out and struggle for the peace made by the
free will of the people. 41

When, at the peace conference at Brest-Litovsk, the German

government disclosed her plans for a Gewaltfrieden, she put
another powerful propaganda subject into the hands of the
Russians. As soon as the annexationist demands of Germany
became known, the Russians sent their protests to all of the
42
world. In a series of brilliant speeches Trotsky declared to
the world that Russia’s desire for a peace without annexations
and reparations was being thwarted by the lust for conquest
43
displayed by the German militarists.
Following the same theme, Maxim Litvinoff, while in Eng-
land, made a stirring appeal to British labor to help end the
war. In this appeal, delivered on January 10, 1918, he said

41 Huber, Franzdsische Propaganda, p. 268.

42 The French used these protests to educate the German troops to the
policy of their government. Thus in No. 26 of Das freie deutsch Wort
there appear three official telegrams of the Russian peace commissioners (the
first without date and the others dated January 23, 1918). In the third it is
stated “The Austrian and German delegates have refused to give a definite
:

statement regarding the evacuation of the occupied territory. The matter at

stake is a monstrous annexation.” Then it concludes with the regret that the
German working class has not taken the opportunity to work for the good of
the class and the “good of mankind” (Huber, op. cit., p. 267).
43
Arthur Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic, translated from
the German by Ian F. D. Morrow (London, 1931), p. 205.
The German delegate, Kiihlmann, was no match for Trotsky in this
verbal duel. The man on the street was on Trotsky’s side in arguing that
whoever desired peace without annexations and reparations must at once
be prepared to withdraw his troops from districts they occupied beyond
his own frontiers. If he were not prepared to do so, then it seemed clear that
he must be entertaining plans of conquest. When matters became too en-
tangled in the coils of Trotsky’s dialectics, General Hoffmann intervened
(January 12) by bluntly informing the Russians that Germany was the
victor and that the Russians had better take this fact into account in making
her proposals. This declaration showed clearly to the mass of people what
were the war aims of their militarists. Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 205.
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 149

that the Russian revolutionary propaganda among the German

soldierson the Western Front and among the prisoners of war
“is undermining the strength of German autocracy and mili-
tarism more effectively than military victories could, and has
already provoked a strong peace movement in Germany and
44
Austria.”
When the 12th regiment of the Russian Army evacuated
Riga, it left behind the following summons for the German
troops

German Soldiers! The Vollzugsausschuss [Executive Committee]

of the 12th Army your attention to the fact that you are fighting
calls

for absolutism and against the Revolution, freedom, and justice! Your
victory signifies the death of democracy and freedom. We leave Riga,
but we know that the revolution will prove itself stronger and more
powerful than the power of cannons. We are certain that the German
soldiers will finally march with the Russian Revolutionary Army to
the victory of Freedom Throw your entire strength against
imperialism and, in union with us, hurl the enemy to the ground. 45

Another appeal issued by the Petrograd Soviet on Feb-

ruary 8, 1918, and addressed to the “Council of Workmen’s
Delegates in Berlin and Vienna,” calls upon the troops to stop
fighting and the workers to strike and make huge demonstra-
tions. The working class of Germany must not permit the
“hangmen and spoilers to impose a peace of violations and
annexations on the Socialist Republic of the Soviet.” The call
continued

Brothers, we cordially believe that you will do all that is possible

to ensure that the peace pourparlers, begun by the Russian Workmen’s
and Peasants’ Government with the government of Kiihlmann, shall
end in pourparlers between the Russian Workingmen’s and Peasants’
Government and the German Government of Liebknecht
Long live the Councils of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates of
46
Berlin and Vienna ! Long live Communism !

44 The Labor Leader, January 10, 1918.

45 Richard Miiller, V om Kaiserreich sur Republik, I, 113.
46 The Times (London), February 8, 1918.
150 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
A Russian government wireless message to German sol-

diers, on February 15, 1918, lamented that the German work-

ingmen had not yet overthrown their government. “Chase the
Kiihlmanns, the Hindenburgs, and the Tirpitz’s to the devil,”
ran the appeal, “and send us Karl Liebknecht and Fritz Adler.” 47
The protracted negotiations at Brest had their effect upon
the German soldiers. This is attested by von Hindenburg, the
Chief of the General Staff, in his report to the Kaiser in Janu-
ary 1918, where he stated that the manner in which the peace
conference was being conducted left a poor impression upon
the German The German diplomats, according to the
troops.
veteran warrior, had been more diplomatic than forceful, which
gave the German soldiers the impression of compliance.
This same impression is current in many quarters in the army and
is certainly calculated to call forth unfavorable criticism of the attitude
adopted by General Ludendorff and me .... I cannot prevent this
happening, for the long trench warfare and the confused conditions
in the country have also increased the pleasure taken in criticism at
the front. I am unable to suppress the apprehension that the manner
and results of the negotiations in Brest have unfavorable influence on
the frame of mind in the army. 48

The effect of the Bolshevik propaganda was to become even

more evident when the Germans withdrew their troops from
the Eastern Front and sent them
Western Front. These
to the
men had seen the Russian Army deprived of its leaders and
had been impressed with the methods of the Bolsheviks.
Not only did these \y2 million troops swell the West Front in
numbers but also a great many of these troops had been inoculated
with Bolshevism so that the foundation for the Revolution was laid. 49

The spirit of disintegration among the German troops may

already be read in the lines of a letter written by a gunner on
the Eastern Front as early as September 5, 1917. He writes

47 British Daily Review of the Foreign Press, VI, 905, February 19, 1918.
48 R. H. Lutz, Causes of the German Collapse, p. 27.
49 Richard Ungewitter, Deutschlands Wiedergcburt durch Blut und Ei-
sen, p. 586.
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 151

in part “That Socialism has already gained the upper hand in

:

everything is characterized in our battery by the fact that a

so-called Soldiers’ Council has its hand in everything. All the
doings of an officer which are not free from objection are most
sharply criticized by the non-commissioned officers and men.
But in doing this, everyone is cunningly serving his own in-
50
terest.” And on September 19, 1917, a member of a labor
battalion wrote

The longer the war lasts the more obvious it becomes that the
officers of all arms of the service consider it as a most favorable
opportunity to enrich themselves. The few exceptions prove the rule.
Everything is taken from the men, the officers are given everything
and besides this these gentlemen steal in Russian fashion. An institu-
tion on the model of the Russian Soldiers’ Councils would be a great
blessing for us and a good education for them. 51

Bolshevik propaganda was further strengthened by the re-

turn of German from Russia. Many of these refused
prisoners
to fight again and “poisoned their comrades on the front with
Bolshevism.” 52 Many of these troops were more active in agi-
tating against their own government than they were in fighting
53
the enemy. One of the leaflets distributed by the German
soldiers transported from the Eastern to the Western Front
closed with the words
Take heed where your government and your Kaiser are leading
you. Unite yourselves with the main conditions which are declared by
the Allies and force your government to do likewise. Then we can
end this war without trouble and conclude an honorable peace for all. 54

The German Army and the revolution-

revolutionists in the
ary circles withinGermany were richly supplied with printed
matter from Russia. At the Dresdener Hof in Moscow a Ger-
man Propaganda Centrale had been set up which sent out leaf-

50 U.D.Z., V, 151, statement of Dr. Philipp. 51 Ibid.

52 Generalleutnant Altrock, Deutschlands Niederbruch, p. 36.

53 Richard Muller, op. ext., I, 114.
54Siiddeutsche Monatshefte, April 1924, “Die Vermittlungsstellen im
Neutralen Ausland,” p. 13.
152 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
lets and pamphlets in great numbers. 65 Propaganda agencies
56
were established in Berlin, Leipzig, and other important cities.
The German government permitted the Petrograd Telegraph
Bureau to establish a filiale in Berlin, 57 and this was a great
boon to the revolutionists. Russian agitators in Germany were
numerous and some 200 couriers came to Germany from Rus-
sia between April and November 1918, bringing propaganda
58
material with them.
The material which came into Germany from Russia was
much more inflammatory than that which came from the Allies.
During the January strikes in Germany the Russians stated in
one of their leaflets sent to the German workers

The German workingmen are rising. For the first time in the
history of Germany all the factories throughout the country are silent
by the command of the proletariat The Russian Revolution has
staked its cards on the German and Austrian proletariats. Do not allow
yourselves to be used as the hangmen of the Russian proletariat.
German Soldiers The hour has struck in which a decision must
!

be made. Decide for the Russian Workingmen’s Revolution or for

German Generals and capitalists ;
for peace or for war without end. 59

Another appeal from the Russians called upon the German

soldiers to throw off their yoke of slavery and force the capi-
talists out of existence.

GERMAN SOLDIERS, WORKERS !

For four years your wives have wept their eyes out while you gave
yourselves as cannon-fodder in order to give world dominion to Ger-
man capital. Now the time has come to end German Imperialism, to
drive out the vermin that has drunk your blood and hold high the
standard of the revolution to drive out the bloodstained capitalistic
system. 00

65 Drahn and Leonhard, Unterirdisches Literatur, p. 146.

56 Walter Nicolai, The German Secret Service, p. 49.
57 Knesebeck, Die Wahrheit iiber den Propaganda Feldzug und Deutsch-

lands Zusammenbruch, p. 117.

58 U.D.Z., V, 32.
59 British Daily Review of the Foreign Press, VI, 905, February 18, 1918.
60 Ibid,,
p. 176.
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 153

When the German officials tried to appeal to their people

to defend the Fatherland, the Bolshevik propagandists said to
the workers: “You have no Fatherland to defend.” 61 The
Fatherland, they said, was in the hands of the oppressors of the
workers; let the workers end the war and take the Fatherland;
then they will not need to defend it, for no one will attack a
peace-loving Socialist government.
In this campaign against the German government the Rus-
sianswere aided by the revolutionists in Germany. The Spar-
tacistsand the Independent Socialists worked hand in hand
with the Russian agents in Germany. Since the re-establish-
ment of diplomatic relations with Germany, the Russian Am-
bassador, Joffe, had maintained a close connection with the
Independent Socialists. 62 On May 1, 1918, Deputies Haase,
Cohn, and Mehring took part in a May-Day celebration in the
marble room of the Russian Embassy where Haase proposed a
toast to the International. The Russian Embassy in Berlin be-
came the center for German govern-
the agitation against the
63
ment. Couriers traveled freely between Berlin and Moscow,
and agitators were brought from Russia to Berlin to work for
64
a revolution. The Russian telegraph agency, “Rosta,” was set
up at Friedrichstrasse 118, in Berlin, ostensibly for business

61 Tagliche Rundschau, March abends.

4, 1919,
62U.D.Z., V, 31. This circle of Russian sympathizers grew larger and
took in other deputies, notably Deputy Bernstein. Oscar Cohn became finan-
cial intermediary for money from Russia and M. Rosenberg maintained con-
nections with the Independent Socialist press, while Madame Markowska
kept in contact with the radical youth. Ledebour was also connected with
the Russian Embassy (ibid.).
63 Haase, Cohn, and Barth were accused of having received some 100,000
marks from Joffe for revolutionary purposes. No attempt is here made to
prove or disprove the many charges made against the Independent Socialists
and the Spartacists in Germany regarding alleged money received from the
Bolsheviks to agitate for a revolution in Germany. A separate study could
well be made of the relationship between the German Left parties and the
Russian Bolshevists during 1918.
64 Walter Nicolai, “Die Gesamtlege,” Siiddeutsche Monatshefte, April
1924, p. 34.
154 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
purposes, but really for propaganda activity. Russian consu-
lates were set up in Stettin and Hamburg for the same pur-
65
poses .

Joffe and his friends in Germany had a great deal of money

at their disposal. Much of this money came from sympathizers
in Germany who contributed to the revolutionary cause, and
some of from Russia. Dr. Cohn, a member of
it came directly
the Reichstag, received large sums from Joffe, which was used
to “good advantage.” A declaration of the Undersecretary of
State to the former Imperial Ministry quotes Dr. Cohn as
having stated
any formal statement or justification required that I was only too
Is
glad to receive themoney which our Russian friends put at my disposal
through Comrade Joffe for the purpose of the revolution? .... I
applied the money to the purpose for which it was destined, that is,
propagating the idea of a revolution. 66

The German government soon became suspicious of Joffe’s

activities. In the beginning of November the German Secret
Service, having long suspected the dozens of couriers who
traveled regularly between Moscow and Berlin, bringing heavy
trunks to the Russian Embassy, obtained direct evidence which
proved that Joffe was taking advantage of his extraterritoriality
rights for purposes of propaganda. It was arranged that one

65 “Die Gesamtlege,” Siiddeutsche Monatshefte, April 1924,

Nicolai,
p. 34 ;
Ewald Beckmann, Der Dolchstossprozess in Miinchen von
see also
19 Oktober bis 20 November 1925 (Munich, 1925), p. 212, testimony of
Roeder. General Hoffmann foresaw the danger of allowing a Bolshevik
Embassy to be established in Berlin or consulates to be opened which would
serve as centers for Bolshevik propaganda against Germany: “Not for a
moment had the Bolsheviks left it in doubt that their object was a World
Revolution and that they considered the revolutionizing of Germany as the
first step towards it. They used every opportunity for propaganda. Radik,
a member of the peace delegation even went so far as having propaganda
writings thrown out of railway coaches to be distributed among our sol-
diers.” General von Hoffmann, The War of Lost Opportunities (London,
1924), p. 231.
66Deutsche National Versammlung, stenographisches Bericht, Sitzung
15, February 25, 1919.
 REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA 155

of the twelve incoming trunks should “accidentally” fall down

the steps of the Friedrichstrasse station in Berlin. This acci-
dent caused the trunk to break open, and the contents to fall

to the ground. As had been suspected, the trunks proved to be

loaded with German government 67
leaflets directed against the .

The German Consul General at Moscow was instructed to in-

form the Russian government that Germany had been obliged
repeatedly to protest against Russia’s contravention of Article II
68
of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty . Further, Russia was reminded
that though the Soviet government had often promised to ap-
prehend the murderer of Count Mirbach 69 the instigators and ,

the murderer were still at large. The Russian government was

requested to withdraw all of the official representatives from
Germany until such time aswould guarantee that, in the
it

future, no revolutionary agitation and propaganda would be

70
carried on .

Joffe and his Russian co-workers were now out of Germany,

but the Independent Socialists and the Spartacists were still
there. And the clouds of revolution were becoming heavier and
heavier and drawing ever closer. The propaganda of the Allies
alone did not bring the revolution, nor did the propaganda of the
Bolsheviks and the revolutionary parties within Germany bring
it on. It was the propaganda of all three that stirred the Ger-

mans to take up arms against their rulers, their militarists and

Junkers. The capitulation of Germany was inevitable after a
psychological change had been brought about among the rank
and file of the Germans both at home and at the front. And
change was accomplished by the revolutionary
this psychological
propaganda of the Allies and the archpropagandists of Russia.

67
Walter Nicolai, The German Secret Service, p. 233; also The Times
(London), November 7, 1918.
68 This article stated that a foreign representative should not interfere
in the internal affairs of a country.
69 The German Ambassador to Russia who was murdered in Moscow.
70 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, November 6, 1918, Morgen Aus-
gabe.
 CHAPTER VI

INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY AN

AID TO PROPAGANDA
Since the Entente parties were certain that
there would be internal dissensions in our coun-
try they spared nothing to tear us apart.

—Ungewitter, Wiedergeburt durch

Blut und Risen (p. 490)

The vision of victory had buoyed up the rank and file of

the German people for almost four years. The Kaiser, Hinden-
burg, and the various German Chancellors had all promised
victory to them. Yet by the summer of 1918 the average Ger-
man had begun to see that the vision of victory was after all

only a mirage, that retreated as he pressed on after it. This

realization, together with the shortage of food, the scarcity of
clothing, and a general war-weariness, produced a restlessness
in the public mind of Germany.

THE DOLCHSTOSS QUESTION

In an article in the Star of November 30, 1918, entitled
“The Watch on the Rhine,” the British General, Sir Frederick
Maurice, asked how it was possible that an enemy which was
so united, so determined to win, should collapse. He answered
the question by stating that it could all be attributed to the
moral collapse of Germany. This opinion of the British Gen-
1
eral was the kernel of the Dolchstoss theory. German generals
1
Therean abundance of literature on the Dolchstoss question. A few
is

of the books that deal with the matter are Emil Barth, Aus der Werkstatt
:

der deutschen Revolution Drahn and Leonhard, Unterirdisches Literatur irn

revolutionaren Deutschland wahrend des Weltkrieges General von Wris-
berg, Der Weg sur Revolution 1914 bis 1918; Drahn and Friedegg, Deutscher
Revolutions Almanach fiir 1919; and, of course, U.D.Z., especially Vol-
ume VI. The Siiddeutsche Monatshefte is one of a number of periodicals
that gives considerable space to the question.

156
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 157

and German leaders immediately accepted this view and en-

larged upon it. It was their explanation for the defeat of
Germany: The militarists had been “stabbed in the back.” The
Army was still intact, but the collapse of Germany came be-
2
cause the home front had broken down There had developed,
.

behind the lines, a strong anti-war sentiment, and this sentiment

spread from the home front to the troops and thus tore down
the will to fight among the soldiers at the front.
Those who hold to the “stab in the back” theory say that
the tactics of the Dolchstoss were threefold. First, it centered
upon the intellectual revolutionizing of the front through the
spread of leaflets, pamphlets, and manifestos. Second, it cen-
teredupon the psychical or spiritual revolution of the front
through organization of deserters. Third, it concentrated upon
the organized revolutionization of the home front “through the
3
centralization of all the forces of the revolution .”
When comparing the loyalty of the people at home with
the soldiers at the front one has to remember that the civilian
population was confronted with more complex problems. The
people became despondent. Little irritations arose in the course

2
Winston Churchill, in The World Crisis 1916-1918 (New York, 1927,
I, 40 makes some comparisons which throw light on the strength of the
ff.),

German Army at the end of the war. “During the whole war,” he says, “the
Germans never lost in any phase of the fighting more than the French whom
they fought, and frequently inflicted double casualties upon them. In no one
of the periods into which the fighting has been divided by French authori-
ties did the French come off the best in killed, prisoners and wounded.
Whether they were on the defensive or were the attackers, the result was
the same. Whether in the original rush of invasion, or in the German offen-
sive at Verdun, or in the great French assaults on the German line—-it
always took the blood of 1J4 to 2 Frenchmen to inflict a corresponding injury
upon a German.
“The second fact which presents itself from the table is that in all the
British offensives the British casualties were never less than 3 to 2, and often
nearly double the corresponding German losses.”
3
U.D.Z., VI, 12 (von Kuhl’s Report) ;
see also Wolfgang Breithaupt,
“Die Auswirkung des Dolchstosses, Erinnerungen von Teilnehmern,” Sud-
deutsche Monatshefte, May 1924, p. 80. Von Kuhl’s report is also given in
Lutz, The Causes of the German Collapse, pp. 132-66.
158 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
of daily wartime activities. The numerous decrees of the gov-
ernment administrators and the police were not always com-
prehended by the people, who grew weary of regulations. The
poorer classes were jealous of the situation of the newly rich
classes, who often showed a lack of consideration for their less-
fortunate fellow countrymen. The heavy work, coupled with
the decreasing food allotments, caused discontent among the
masses of the people. All of these facts tended to make the
people receptive to any type of propaganda.
Among the fighting forces the spirit could easily remain
stronger than at home. The party struggles and the fight over
the “war problem” did not reach them. The mass of the sol-
diers were too busy to be bothered with such things. They
marched, they went into the trenches, and died in obedi-
bled,
ence to the call of their Fatherland. Eventually, however, they
became war-weary. In burning longing they looked toward
home. They wanted peace, an honorable peace.
This feeling was already noticeable in the autumn of 1915,
when there was a change in the attitude of the reserve forces.
The reserves disliked to go to the front. They felt that they
—
had done their share in the war in short, the service in the
army no longer appealed to them
So, already at this time one found evidence of extensive propa-
—
ganda among the reserve forces. This propaganda said that Germany
was responsible for the war; otherwise the number of Germany’s
opponents would not increase daily. We would be certain of losing
the war from which only munitions manufacturers and the high offi-
cials would profit 4 .

Speaking of the cause of the Kiel revolt, Lieutenant Cap-

tain Erich Galster von Seydlitz said

The mutiny was not the result of discontent despite the fact that
there were sufficient causes for it ... . It would be too unjust to our
men to say that this discontent led them to turn against their flag at
such an inopportune moment. This mutiny was rather the result of the

4 Kolnischc V olksscitung (Abends), February 3, 1919.

 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 159

systematic efforts of the betrayers among our own people and the
systematic work of the enemy propaganda. 5

The long duration of the war, the unprecedented demands

of the military situation upon the people, and the oppressive
economic burdens led to an ever increasing sentiment for peace
among the masses of the German people. There is no doubt
that this sentiment found it way from home to the front. There
is no doubt that the conditions at home were exaggerated by
the Allied propagandists and the propagandists of the revolu-
tionary groups within Germany. The complaints about the
suffering at home told on the soldiers. The manufacturers had
raised the prices to such an extent that the one thought of the
people was “How shall we get enough to eat?” Ever stronger
became the wish and the call for peace.
However, if the situation at home had its effect upon the
army, it must be admitted that the army also had its own
complaints
The Army was weary and embittered. Great injustices and un-
fulfilled promises demoralized the troops. The absolute separation of
the officers’ corps, the scandalous stories of provision stores, opened the
eyes of all The means of strengthening their morale, defen-
the men.
sive war was decried as a lie. The Vaterlandische
for the homeland,
Unterricht, which was conducted by young officers, was laughed at.
Hate was in the troops. Hate, not for the enemy who were suffering
the same, but hate for those who prolonged the war. 6

Hints of the threatening revolution in Germany come from

both the Right and the Left. One of the earliest proofs of this
is the well-known letter of May 5, 1915, from the Pan-German,
Freiherr von Gebsattel, to the Imperial Chancellor von Beth-
mann-Hollweg. Von Gebsattel said that the war aims of the
government did not justify the heavy burdens which the people

5 Deutsche Zeitung, December 28, 1918.

Ludwig Lewinsohn, Die Revolution an der West front ( Charlottenburg,
6

1919), Foreword. Although Herr Lewinsohn hoped, in this book, to wipe

out the “historical falsity” that the breakdown of the Army was the result
of the “revolution at home,” he admits that “those who came from home
told of unspeakable conditions there.”
160 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
were forced to bear, and that if the German people were not
promised more suitable compensation for their efforts they
would undoubtedly rebel against the monarchy. 7
The first really revolutionary remark in the Reichstag was
made, not, as might have been expected, by a representative of
the Labor Union ( Arbeitsgemeinschaft), but by the Majority
Socialist Hoch. On July 5, 1917, he uttered the following sen-
tence in the Main Committee of the Reichstag: “There is
always talk of whether the revolution will come or not; we
can only say that the German people are already in the midst
of the revolution.” He then went on to discuss the discontent
in Germany and said
The feeling in Germany is such that things cannot go on as they
are at present, for otherwise it will come to conflicts of the worst kind.
The Government ought to take to heart Goethe’s words : “The revolu-
tion from below is always due to the sins of omission of those above.” 8

In considering the moral collapse of must be Germany it

remembered that the war had lasted much longer than had been
expected. The old Reich had not provided during the war what
the German people had a right to expect of its institutions. It
had neither established a close connection between the “spirit
of the people and a strong external leadership, nor had it har-
nessed the industrial powers of the nation for the most terrible
war Germany has ever waged.” 9
These two factors explain the internal conditions of Ger-
many which played into the hands of the Allied propagandists.
The old Reich had not counted upon a blockade that would
cause a shortage of food, and it had not prepared the moral
force of the people for a long war. We shall now consider
these two factors more in detail.
7
U.D.Z., V, 151-71, statement of Dr. Philipp; also R. H. Lutz, The
Causes of the German Collapse, pp. 113 ff.
8 U.D.Z.,
V, 151-71, statement of Dr. Philipp; also in Lutz, The Causes
of the German Collapse, p. 113.

Rochus Albrecht K. von Rheinbaben, Stresemann, The

9 Man and the
Statesman (New York and London, 1929), p. 143, quoting an article Strese-
mann wrote for the Deutsche Stimmen in August 1918.
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 161

THE FOOD SITUATION

As has been noted in a previous chapter, the food supply
in Germany was left in the hands of the governments of the
different federal statesworking through associations formed
10
after a common model. This system was very unsatisfactory.
Because there was no central agency for the control of the food
supply some states had enough food and other states had very
little. Suspicion and jealousy resulted. When, for instance, the
meat supply reached the point of exhaustion in Prussia, the
Saxons were blamed. The Leipziger neueste Nachrichten, com-
ing to the defense of the Saxons in May 1916, said:
At present Saxony has no meat. This is partly due to bad distri-
bution. Saxony is dependent on imports and only gets its share of
meat from the Prussian provinces when these have satisfied their own
needs and when they have done that practically nothing is left for
;

Saxony. This must be altered. Prussia must reduce its consumption. 11

The growing difficulty in the supply of food caused great

anxiety among the people. They were, however, forbidden to
speak openly about the actual amount of food available in order
that the facts regarding the food situationwould not reach the
Allies. But much information on this matter leaked out through
the newspapers, which gave space to rumors “partly spread by
enemy agents, which hinted at profiteering and imperfect or-
ganization at home.” 12
The Allies made the most of the food situation in Germany.
They tried to make the German soldiers believe that the people
at home were starving. Leaflets entitled “Slow Starvation”
were sent across the lines in great numbers. These traced the
food situation from 1915 to 1917. By giving the menu of the
German worker in 1915 and comparing it with that of 1917,
10 Supra, chapter iv.
11 Confidential Supplement to the Daily Review of the Foreign Press,
No. 69, June 16, 1916, pp. 4 ff.

12
Rochus A. K. Rheinbaben, Stresemann, the Man and the Statesman,
translatedfrom the German by Cyrus Brook and Hans Herzl (New York
and London, 1929), p. 110.
162 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
the propagandists tried to show that Germany was headed
toward starvation. Said one of these leaflets

The workers’ menu of 1915 was:

1. Early morning lunch (5:45 a.m.)
4 slices of bread with butter or fresh lard, cheese or sausage,
coffee.
2. Breakfast at 8:00 a.m.
Bread and cheese sandwich and coffee.
3. Noon meal
Meat or fish, potatoes (any amount).
4. Supper
Soup, meat or fish, potatoes, peas, rice or hominy.

In April 1917 it was different.

1. Breakfast —2 pieces of dry bread and potatoes.

2. Dinner —cooked beets one day, the next day cooked sea weeds or
beets and a few potatoes. 13

After making this comparison of menus the leaflet called

upon the Germans to revolt against their government.

After the revolt of the German people, the Allies, who have no
hate for them, will supply them with food and clothing even as they
are supplying the war prisoners now. But these provisions will be
withheld until the military authority in Germany collapses.

News of the various hunger riots in Germany in 1916

reached foreign countries despite the efforts of the censors.
The Brief e aus Deutschland leaflets spread among the German
troops the news of these riots and kept before the eyes of the
German soldiers the picture of a Germany short of food. Die
Feldpost also made it a point to keep the German soldiers in-
formed regarding the food situation behind the lines. Such
phrases as “Carry through, suffer long, hunger long, kill long,”
were used often in this propaganda sheet of the Allies. Another
leaflet contained an “Apostle’s Creed” which ended with “I :

believe in the Holy War, a great universal usury, the commu-

nity of hamsters, the increase of taxes, the shortening of meat
14
rations, and an everlasting shortage of bread. Amen.” Leaf-
13 Leaflet A.P. 9.
14 Dr. George Huber, Franzdsische Propaganda, p. 233.
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 163

letA.P. 87 contained a number of quotations from various

German newspapers which showed what the situation was in
Germany. One of these from the Arbeiter Zeitung says
From Miinchen it is reported that a ministerial decree orders that
the dead be clothed with paper clothing- to give the living the linen of
15
the dead, because of the scarcity of clothing.

Letters to German prisoners in the hands of the Allies were

intercepted and those that complained of the conditions at home
were printed in the Brief e aus Deutschland series and sent to
the soldiers at the front. One of these letters gives the prices
of certain articles of food.
June 26, 1917
Dear Paul:
A year ago bread could be had without limit at nine marks. Now
there is no more. Now you some of the prices: 2 eighths
to give
( aclitel ) butter 70 pfennigs; a pound of marmalade (not eatable) 1.40;
a pound of potatoes 8 pfennigs. 16

Another letter complains

In a word, here in Germany it has come to the point of starvation.
The people just creep about, and now this terrible heaton top of it all.
Sickness is everywhere. A terrible dysentery has broken out here in
Berlin and surroundings. 17

A letter dated April 9, 1916, and sent from Dresden, found

on a prisoner of war by the British said in part

We are sending you less and less. Now they have made tickets for
meat. It is impossible to buy even a sausage.
I tell you everything is

going from bad to worse. They have seized everything, or one can only
sell for coupons. What is going to become of us? It is high time that

we had peace. 18
15 Leaflet A.P. 87.
16
The Briefe aus Deutschland came from the Hansi organization, the
Service aerienne. They appeared irregularly beginning in April 1916. Thir-
teen numbers appeared by November 1917. Hansi et Tonnelat, op. cit., p. 40;
also Huber, op. cit., p. 230.
17 Briefe aus Deutschland, No. 13, quoted by Huber, op. cit., p. 232.
18 Confidential Supplement to the Daily Review of the Foreign Press,
No. 54, May 30, 1916, p. 2.
164 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Another, also sent from Dresden and dated April 10, 1916,
stated

Let us hope that peace will not be delayed much longer. Otherwise
we shall be quite dead of hunger. Are we not already half dead? Even
for meat tickets are now necessary. One has the right nowadays to
600 grams of sausage, fat, and meat per week. There is something to
get fat on 19 !

Other letters complained of the lack of coffee, salad oil, and

beer. The butcher shops, they said, “look as if they had been
swept bare from top to bottom.” 20 Bread also was very scarce.
As early as April 1916 each family was allowed two loaves of
bread a week without a ticket: “And now a loaf costs 2.60
21
marks. It is a shame.”
Princess Bliicher, who lived in Germany throughout the
period of the war, gives a picture of the conditions within Ger-
many when she says in her diary in May 1918, regarding the
situation

Food growing scarcer from day to day and we have been reduced
is

to killing and eating our kangaroos. They have been kept here as a
curiosity and rarity for years past. Yesterday my husband received
a letter from a provision dealer in Breslau saying he would give any
price my husband asked if he would sell him a kangaroo. 22

Because of the high cost of food and the difficulty of obtain-

ing the necessities of life, there developed a feeling of enmity
between the poorer class and the well-to-do. The poor felt that

the rich were not subjected to the same restrictions as they

were, and that the upper class of people were making a profit
out of the war. The working class became hungry and resent-
ful. “The feeling of hatred daily grew stronger for the factory
owners, the rich shopkeepers, and business men who dealt in

19 Confidential Supplement to the Daily Review of the Foreign Press,

No. 54, May 30, 1916, p. 2.
20 Ibid.,
p. 3.

21 Ibid.

22 Princess Mary E. Bliicher, An English Wife in Berlin, p. 22.

 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 165

army supplies of all kinds, and for officers of the army and
navy.”
23
A letter to a German prisoner of war intercepted by
the British pictures the food situation in the following words
Landsberg, April 30, 1916
Weare having an infernal time here with regard to food. I feel
like smashing the shopwindows. Nothing can be had for love nor
money. There is food enough for us all, but the wretches will not part
with it. They feed themselves fat, fill their purses, and leave us to eat
dirt. And what is going to happen by and by? Nothing good; there

is nothing that we can hope for. The luckiest are the men who are
killed and dead. The others, the wounded and the mutilated, are patched
up only to be sent back to the front to be martyred again There
is precious little food fit for human beings meat, bacon, sausage, and
;

all fats are short. We are vegetarians, we are salad-soldiers and as

limp as rags. They can’t take us out on long marches any more, else
they would have to come and collect us in hay carts. 24

Deputy Haase gave his observations on the food question

in a speech in the Reichstag on April 6, 1916, in which he
pointed to the internal discontent in Germany as a result of the
food situation. On the previous day the Chancellor had spoken
of the great moral reserve which had enabled the German people
to maintain the enormously improved standard of living which
had come into being during the last decade. Haase pointed out,
however, that large groups of the labor and middle classes did
not participate in the rising standard of living. Continuing his
speech he pointed out that

even the better-situated circles have been forced away below the pre-
vious level. And in what would the masses more?
restrict themselves
Prices of food products are as a rule beyond their The means
well-to-do and the rich —
that we admit openly —
are subjected to some
restrictions and annoyances at this time. However, anyone having
money is still in a position to buy sufficient food materials and sweets.
The poor and those with lesser means suffer want again and again

23 Arthur Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic, translated from

the German by Ian F. D. Morrow (London, 1931), p. 91.
24 Confidential Supplement the Daily Review of
to the Foreign Press,
No. 55, May 31, 1916, p. 2.
166 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
The differences between various classes become more apparent than
25
ever.

Making capital of the growing bitterness of the people as a

result of the food shortage, the radical Socialists within Ger-
many sent out leaflets blaming the capitalists and the govern-
ment for the plight of the people. One of the leaflets states

HUNGER !

What was bound to come has come ! Hunger ! ! In Leipzig, in

Berlin, in Essen, and many other places there are riots started by
hungry masses of the people.
Herr Bethmann-Hollweg says England is the cause of the hunger
in Germany, and the other officials repeat this. The German govern-
ment should have known it would come to this. War against Russia,
France, and England had to lead to the blockade of Germany
Why has the government done nothing? Because the government,
the capitalists, the Junkers do not feel the pangs of hunger of the
masses
The workers can either continue in silent obedience and go to a
sorrowful end, or they can rise up, do away with the government and
the ruling classes, and force peace
Arise, you men, you women !

Down with the War !

26
Hail to the International Solidarity of the Proletariat !

When food became more scarce in the army, the feeling of

envy and resentment became noticeable among the men in the
ranks. They cast angry and envious glances toward the officers’
mess. This was especially true in the reserve battalions, among
the garrisons at home, and among the crews of the battleships
which were virtually inactive throughout the war and on whom
27
a barrack routine was enforced Of this situation, one Ger-
.

man authority states

The student seeking the causes of the revolution in the German

Army returns continually to the food question and the embitterment

25 Germany, Reichstag, Verhandliingen des Reichstags, April 6, 1916,

Band 881-89; also cited in R. H. Lutz, The Fall of the German
40, pp. Em-
pire, I, 226.
26 Fliegerabwurf-Schriften, No.
5.

27 Arthur Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic, p. 91.

 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 167

of the soldiers and sailors who believed they were less well-fed than
their officers. 28

Just what was the actual food situation in Germany during

the war period? In 1915 Paul Eltzbacher and a group of ex-
perts made a study of the food supply of the Fatherland and
the methods of conserving it. They came to the conclusion that
England could never starve Germany by the blockade, nor by
otherwise isolating her, if Germany adopted the various meas-
29
ures which the experts recommended. Another German, Dr.
W. Robert de Fiori, stated, in a conversation with Dr. George
Herron of the United States, that Germany could last ten
30
years. The fact was, however, that the German food supply
became more and more critical, and that it reached a danger-
ously low point before the end of the war. Dr. Philipp, in
discussing this question before the Untersuchungsansschnsses,
presented the facts in calorie form when he stated

At the end of the war the German people were allowed only 1,100
whereas before the war they had 3,300 calories per
calories each day,
day. The bread ration was 160 grams per day, whereas before the
war it was 320 grams per day meat, 135 grams per week, before the
;

war was 1,050 grams; lard, 7 grams per day in 1918, while it was 28
grams per day before the war. 31

28 Arthur Rosenberg, p. 91.

29
Paul Eltzbacher, ed., Germany’s Food: Can It Last? English version
edited by S. Russell Wells (London, 1915). The Committee concluded
(p. 232) that the English “starvation scheme, in spite of closed frontiers and
raids on shipping will be shattered by the willing co-operation of millions.”
30 “Herron Papers, Germany, First Conversation between de Fiori and
Herron, June 14, 1918,” Vol. I, Document XXV B (manuscript, Hoover
War Library), p. 58. In a later conversation between de Fiori and Herron,
the former admitted that the “economic condition of Germany was not nearly
so good as he first asserted. People are literally starving in Bavaria. The
Ukranian harvest bids fair to be a failure this summer, and the expected
food supplies of the Ukraine were a delusion. Germany is not in an eco-
nomic condition to continue the war, except the people accept great and con-
tinuous misery.”
31 U.D.Z., V, 137.
168 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
A Memorandum of the Public Health Office, dated Decem-
ber 16, 1918, gives further light on the food question.

Among the foodstuffs, the shortage of animal foodstuffs (butter

and other animal fats, eggs, meat, milk, and dairy produce) was felt

particularly acutely. In densely populated industrial districts and in

large cities the regular feeding of small children was often rendered
difficult by the shortage of milk. Vegetable fats and oils were also
available in such small quantities, owing to the insufficiency of imports,
that even the most pressing needs could not be met. 32

When we consider the fact that the Inter-Allied Food Com-

mission allowed 75 grams per head per day as the minimum
amount of fat necessary,and that this amount had to last an
individual in Germany for from 12 to 14 days, we get an idea
of the food situation in Germany in 1918.
What effect did this have upon the people of Germany?
Writing in her diary in May 1918, Princess Blucher said of
the situation

I notice a great change in the people here from what they were last
year. They are all “tired of suffering,” as they express it. “We want
our sons and husbands back, and we want food,” is all they say. 33

The German government was helpless before the rising

storm. When it started a strict food-control system, which
covered practically every article for home consumption, the
peasants complained bitterly. The proletariat in the cities be-
came restless. Even the men at the front became bitter as a re-
sult of the ever increasing number of complaints that came
—
from home complaints that told of the advantage that the
usurers were taking of the food situation to increase their
wealth while the mass of the people were on the point of star-
34
vation.

32 U.D.Z., VI, 434, Annex C to the Memorandum of the Public Health

Office; also cited by R. H. Lutz, The Causes of the German Collapse,
pp. 180-87.
33 Princess Blucher, An English Wife in Berlin, p. 224.
34 Kolnische Volkszeitung, February 1919.
3,
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 169

Failure, therefore, on the part of the German government

to distribute its food supply scientifically and to prepare her
industries for the greatest war in history resulted in hunger
and starvation. Germany had not counted on the blockade she ;

had not planned for a long war and when the war dragged out
;

and the blockade became effective, the result was bound to be

disastrous. Thus the student seeking the cause of the German
Revolution cannot overlook the food question and the hard-
ships resulting from a long-drawn-out conflict against great
odds.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

On August 4, 1911, the International Labor Conference
convening in London adopted the following resolution

The German, Spanish, English, Dutch, and French delegates of the

Workers’ Organizations declare that they are ready to oppose any
declaration of war, whatever the grounds may be. Every national
representative will, accordingly, undertake to oppose any criminal act
of the ruling classes. 35

Just three years later, the German Reichstag voted the

necessary war credits. The German Socialists, forgetting the
resolution of three years before, now supported the government
in the war. The various political parties in Germany not only
agreed to a truce between themselves but also agreed to abstain
from all opposition to the government during the period of the
36
war. The Social Democrats voted in favor of the war credits
demanded by the government on August 4, 1914. In a speech
before the Reichstag, Deputy Haase justified the stand of the
party by stating that, although the Social Democrats had al-

ways opposed imperialism and competitive armaments, support

35 Drahn and Leonhard, Unterirdisches Literatur, 7.

p.
36 The Social Democratic group in the Reichstag
was composed of 110
members. At a party meeting it decided, by a vote of 96 to 14, to support the
government in the war credits. The 14 dissentient voters, however, sub-
mitted to party discipline and voted for the war credits in the Reichstag.
Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 73.
170 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
of the war was necessary in order to render secure the civili-

zation and independence of Germany.

Much, if not all, is at stake for our people and its freedom in the
future, in case victory should be on the side of Russian despotism
sullied with the blood of the best of its own people. It is necessary to
ward off this danger, to render secure the civilization and the inde-
pendence of our own country. And we shall do what we have always
maintained: In the hour of danger we do not leave the Fatherland in
the lurch. In so doing we feel ourselves in agreement with the Inter-
national, which at all times has recognized the right of every people
to national independence and self-defense, just as we, in agreement
with it, condemn every war of conquest. 37

A party truce was thus declared.

So pleased were the mili-
tary leaders with this party peace and the united support for
the war that they lifted the restrictions upon the literature of the
Social Democratic party, a restriction which had been in effect
since 1894. General von Falkenhayn wrote to Comrade Stadt-
hagen, who represented the newspaper Vorwdrts:

Referring to your letter of the 17th inst. the War Office informs
you that Section 3 of the ordinance of the War Office, dated 24.1. 1894,
prohibiting the subscription to, and the distribution of revolutionary or
Social-Democratic literature, as well as the dissemination of such
literature in military barracks or other buildings used for military
purposes, has been repealed as far as Social-Democratic literature is

concerned, if published after 31.8.1914.

The Minister of War takes the occasion to state that this repeal
has been made in the expectation that nothing will be published which
might endanger the spirit of loyalty in the army. If this should not be
the case every Chief Command is empowered to put the ordinance in
force again. 38

However, the Burgfrieden, as the party truce was called,

could not withstand a long war and, when the German General

37 Germany, Reichstag, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, August 4, 1914,

pp. 8-9; also R. H. Lutz, The Fall of the German Empire, I, 15-16.
38 Vorwdrts, September The Fall
2, 1914; also cited in Lutz, of the Ger-
man Empire, I, 20.
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 171

Staffwas unable to give to the nation the speedy victory that

had been hoped for, the political and class warfare broke out
again. All hope of a speedy victory for Germany was destroyed
with the miscarriage of the Schlieffen Plan. After the first

battle of the Marne it became evident that the war would last
much longer than had been anticipated. The longer the war
continued the more clearly did political and class differences
manifest themselves within Germany.
Although the workers readily offered themselves for the
defense of the Fatherland, they could not understand how it was
that their old enemies, the Prussian militarists and the great in-
dustrialists, were all of a sudden to be regarded as friends.
They knew that the military and police regime in Prussia was
the same as it had been before the Burgfrieden. They soon
discovered that the workers had actually lost influence as a result
of their action on August 4, 1914, and that the promise, which
had often been made since the early part of the war, of reform
in the Prussian electoral system was not to be fulfilled. The
result was a “depression which held the working men and
women in its grasp,” and a “deep-seated discontent” which
animated the masses of the German people throughout the first
winter of the war. 39
This discontent grew stronger with each passing month of
the war. Questions began to be raised as to the war aims of
Germany. The Social-Democratic workmen had formulated
their war aims, but the government refused to tell what Ger-
many was fighting for. A certain portion of the populace gained
the impression that the war was started by the industrialists and
the militarists for their own selfish interests. The Peace of
Brest-Litovsk gave proof of the annexationist designs of the
militarists inGermany.
From the end of August 1916 until shortly before the Ar-
mistice in 1918, Germany was ruled by a small military and

39 Rosenberg, op. The Causes of German

cit., p. 90; also Lutz, the Col-
lapse, p. 98.
172 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
40
Junker class whose chief was Ludendorff The Kaiser was .

regarded by this ruling party as a fool and was completely dis-

regarded so far as the councils of government were concerned.
Nor did the Chancellor count greatly, for many of the most
important decisions were made and actions were taken without
reference to him. In fact, Ludendorff even claimed the right
to name the Imperial Chancellor. Bethmann-Hollweg was dis-
missed because Hindenburg and Ludendorff refused to work
harmoniously wdth him. The two generals agreed upon Mi-
chaelis as the successor, and the Kaiser accepted him, “although
41
he was forced to confess that he did not know Michaelis .”
But from the very beginning of Ludendorff’s dictatorship
there was evidence of a breach between the German people and
their rulers. There was a growing liberal movement that per-
ceived that the war was ruining Germany. However, this lib-
eral movement was not organized and it lacked leaders. Only
after the split in the Social Democratic party did opposition
leadership develop.
The Democrats divided because of differences regard-
Social
ing the party attitude toward the war. The party leaders were
convinced that it lay in the interest of the German workmen
to defend the country to the utmost. They felt that the party
should live up to the Burgfrieden and content itself with em-
phasizing that Germany should not attempt conquests in the
war. This official policy of the party encountered increasing
opposition. This opposition ultimately crystallized into two
groups : the Spartacus Association, and the Independent Social
Democratic party of Germany.
The Spartacus group grew out of the extreme Left Wing
of the Social Democratic party and was under the leadership
of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, and

40 “Herron Papers,” Germany, First Conversation between de Fiori and

Herron, June 14, 1918, Vol. I, Document XXV A, p. 6; also Rosenberg,

op. cit., pp. 125 ff.

41 Arthur Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 126; see also Germany, Verhatuilungen

des Reichstags, 116 Sitzung, July 19, 1917, p. 3586.
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 173

Klara Zetkin. Liebknecht broke the Burgfrieden pledge when

he refused to vote for the war credits in the Reichstag on De-
cember 2, 1914. Liebknecht justified his action in a speech
before the Main Committee of This speech was
the Reichstag.
put in leaflet form and circulated throughout Germany. Among
other things Liebknecht said :

This war, which the people did not want, did not blaze up for the
welfare of the German or any other people. It is an imperialistic war,

a war for the capitalistic monopoly of world markets and the political
control of worthwhile settlements for industry and capital. 42

From December 1914 to the end of the war the Spartacus

group hammered at the capitalists, the government, and the
militarists. Pacifist and revolutionary sentiment was stirred up
by pamphlets, and a certain portion of the press. Rosa
leaflets,

Luxemburg, in her Junius Pamphlet, which was printed in

Switzerland in 1915, and distributed secretly in Germany, at-
tacked the Social Democrats for their “treacherous action’’ in
supporting the war policy of the German government. The
war, according to the Junius Pamphlet, was a capitalistic war.
The desire for imperialistic expansion, the hope of “subjecting
all the riches of the earth and all means of production to capital,
to turn all the laboring masses of the peoples of all zones into
wage were the forces that brought on the war. But this
slaves,”
“brutal triumphal procession of capitalism through the world
has one bright spot: It has created the premise of its own final
43
overthrow.”
42 Ernst Meyer, ed., Spartakus im Kriege
; die illegalen Flugbldtter des
Spartakusbundes im Kriege (Berlin, 1927), Document No. 3. After the
break with the Social Democratic party Liebknecht regarded it as his duty
to protest publicly against the Burgfrieden. He was drafted into the army,
but despite this he took part in the street demonstration in Berlin on May 1,

1916. For this he was court-martialed and sentenced to four years. He thus
became a martyr for the Socialist peace movement. See Dr. Max Adler,
Karl Liebknecht und Rosa Luxemburg (Vienna, 1919), p. 9.
The Crisis in German Social-Democracy ( The Junius Pamphlet, New
43

York, 1915), p. 124. At a conference in January 1915, the Spartacus group

adopted the principles as set down by Rosa Luxemburg in her pamphlet as
the program of the Spartacus Association.
174 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
In the winter of 1915 Liebknecht began to circulate letters
which he wrote under the name of “Spartakus.” These Sparta-
kusbriefe were open letters to the German people in which
Liebknecht denounced the war and advocated the overthrow
of the German capitalist government. 44 These letters were hec-
tographed at first, but from September 1916 on they appeared in
printed form. For the most part they were distributed from
headquarters in Berlin in editions of from 5,000 to 6,000 copies.
In some provincial towns they were reprinted or were recopied
on typewriters for distribution. The distribution of the Sparta-
cus letters was also simplified by the fact that Baumeister’s
Internationale Korrespondenz, which was under the special
patronage of the General Commission of Trade Unions, re-
printed the letters for purposes of information and sent them
to thousands of trade-union officials. From this source they
also reached the official press of the Social Democratic party. 46
The purpose of the propaganda of the Spartacus League
was summarized by Liebknecht when he said

Universal peace cannot come without the overthrow of the ruling

powers of Germany The German workers are now called upon
to carry the message to the East and to the West. 46

Like the Russian Bolsheviks, the Spartacists believed that

they should take advantage of the war to get their system estab-
lished. As Liebknecht stated in a speech in January 1915 :

44 Dr. Ernst Meyer,ed., Dokumente des Kommunismus, No. 2, Sparta-

kusbriefe, Band Vorwort. This collection contains the Spartakusbriefe

II,

from September 1916 to October 1918. The hectographed copies are not
included. Dr. Meyer, in discussing the amount of money spent on Spartacus
propaganda, states that it is not true that the Spartacus group spent 20,000
marks weekly on propaganda. The expenditure of the head office up to
November 1918 was from 3,000 to 5,000 marks monthly at the most. “These
figures do not include the expenditure of the provincial organizations, but
their total expenditure was naturally far less than 20,000 marks Funds
were placed at our disposal by the Russian party which was friendly to us,
but they were only small amounts ” See also U.D.Z., V, 115-16.

5 Dr. Ernst Meyer, Dokumente des Kommunismus, No. 2; also U.D.Z.,

46 U.D.Z.,
V, 116. II, 112.
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 175

Class struggle is the watchword of the day. Class struggle not after
the war, class struggle during the war. If the party does not take up
the struggle today, during the war, people will not believe in its fighting
spirit. Now is the time to prove it true. 47

To further their propaganda activities the Spartacists ob-

tained the support of certain German newspapers. The Arbeiter
Politik, a weekly published inBremen, often contained articles
48
by leading Spartacists. The Leipziger Volkszeitung was also
favorable to Spartacan propaganda, while the Internationale,
the Internationale sozialisten D eutschlands and the Bremer
Linksradikale, were others of a definitely revolutionary char-
49
acter.
These newspapers and others of the same character were
freely circulated among the troops at the front. This fact
caused General Galwitz to state, before the Session of the
Secretaries of State on October 28, 1918
The fact that we have permitted newspapers of all political opinion
to be freely distributed throughout the army has also been proven to
have a bad effect. 50

The Spartacus organizations spread over Germany like a net.

Provincial organizations were founded, and these in turn started
local groups. All were in close connection with the central
organization in Berlin. In the beginning of 1918 these rev-
olutionary groups began an attack upon the morale of the Ger-
man troops with such leaflets asDer deutsche Soldat als Hanker
der Freiheit and Kameraden erwacht. The former attacked
the government for the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which “took by
force, from the Russian Revolution, a territory twice the size
of Germany.” The German soldiers, it said, “are being used as
the gendarmes for capitalist reaction in all of Europe,” and

47 Voices of Revolt, “Speeches of Liebknecht” (New York, 1927), IV, 75.

48 Walter Nicolai, Nachrichtendienst Presse und Volksstimmung.
49 Drahn and Leonhard, Unterirdisches Literatur, p. 10.
50 Preliminary History of the Armistice (Official Documents, Germany),
No. 86, p. 123.
176 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
thereby they are blocking the progress toward the freedom of
the German proletariat and the coming of Socialism
Arise German Worker! Rescue in these last hours, the freedom of
Europe.
Down with Imperialistic murder ! Down with the war !

Awaken again the international solidarity of the workers !

51

The leaflet, Kameraden erwacht, also attacked the policy of

the German militarists in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. It

lamented the fact that the German people were being “lied to”
by the much-censored press. It ended with the appeal
For a more beautiful, higher, nobler aim, our fight should con-
tinue. The holy aim of our struggle should be : a free and fortunate
GERMAN republic! ....
Comrades awake and realize your strength 52
!

When the German government court-martialed Liebknecht

and imprisoned him for his activities in the 1916 May-Day riots
in Berlin, it gave the Spartacists new material for their propa-

ganda. Liebknecht was a martyr to the cause of the Revolution.

The Spartacus letter of November 5, 1916, addressed to Karl
Liebknecht, said
No, you have not fallen! You are gone from us, but .... you
remain at your post as a fighter and leader for our holy cause and
each day that you spend in the prison is a thorn for the German work-
ing class, and each clanging of your chains is a trumpet-call to us all
To the fight! To the fight for yours and our liberation !
53

The same note was struck in the leaflet No. 14, when it

called

Do you Does it not come to your

hear the voice of Liebknecht?
ears through the prison walls? Are you not ashamed to know that
he is right? And yet you leave him alone .... you have betrayed
him Only when he is free will you be free. 54

51 Dr. Ernst Meyer, Spartakus irn Kriege, Document No. 47, p. 199.
52 Ibid., Document No. 48, p. 201.
53 Meyer, Dokumente des Kommunismus, No. 2, p. 22.
54 Fliegerabwurf-Schriften, No. 14. More than 60,000 workers in Berlin
went on strike as a protest against the trial of Liebknecht in July 1916.
Meyer, Dokumente des Kommunismus, Band I, No. 1, “Aus dem Reich.”
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 177

The upon the food rations also furnished ma-

restrictions
terial for an attack upon the government by the Spartacists. In

March 1918 they protested against the “starvation of human

beings” in a leaflet which said in part
After April 16 the bread rations for the hungry emaciated people
are to be reduced by more than one-fourth. While our sons and brothers
are being murdered and crippled in the trenches and battlefields, the
working people have to live in misery until their strength is gone and
they fall to the ground exhausted.

Then the leaflet tells how the Russian workers took matters
into their own hands and set up a people’s government.
And we?
Should we carry patiently the old misery, the hunger, the human
murders —the cause of all our torment and pain?
No! A thousand times No! Leave your work and the factories!
Let the work rest
Man der Arbeit aufgewacht
Und erkenne deine Macht.
Alle Rader stehen still

Wenn dein starker Arm es will.

Down with the war ! Down with the government.
Peace! Freedom! Bread! 55

Another group which differed in many respects from the

Spartacists but which worked for the cessation of hostilities and
for a republic in Germany was the Independent Socialist party.
This group differed from the radical Liebknecht group in that
they were opposed to any revolutionary action. They believed
that, since no enemy stood on the frontiers of Germany, the
question at issue was no longer one of national defense but
rather that of a Pan-German war of conquest. In December
1915 twenty Social Democratic members of the Reichstag, in-
spired by the belief that in order to prevent the annexationist
policy of the government from being carried out it was necessary
to refuse the war credits, separated themselves from the rest

65 “Die Tatigkeit deutscher Organizationen,” Siiddeutsche Monatshefte,

April 1924, p. 15.
178 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
of their party and voted against a proposed credit. This split

of the Social Democratic party in the Reichstag was carried

into the party organization throughout the country, until the
opposition was expelled in 1917 and formed itself into the In-
66
dependent Social Democratic party.
Although the U.S.P.D., as was known, was not
this party
as revolutionary as the Spartacists were, it carried on a lively
propaganda with the object of ending the war by a peace by
agreement and without annexations. Its chief weapon was the
strike, with which it hoped to force the government to initiate

peace negotiations. Deputy Dittmann expressed the views of

the U.S.P.D. in a speech on June 17, 1917, before the Main
Committee of the Reichstag as follows
The workmen are helots but they want to be free men after the
war must therefore be said openly that Germany wishes a
It

peace which will not make it necessary to continue competitive arma-

ments after the war, but a peace with disarmament and arbitration. 67

On April 14, 1917, a number of muni-

strikes began in the

tions factories in Berlin. These had been prepared by the

U.S.P.D. and came close on the heels of the announcement by
the government of further reductions in the food rations which
were to become effective on April 16. Though many people
participated in these strikes because of the food situation, there
was a political side to the disturbances. This is proved by the
fact that work was not resumed in all quarters even after the
wishes of the strikers in regard to the food provisions had been
met. General Grdner declared at the hearing of the Hauptaus-
schusses of April 26, 1917
Where did these political things come from? You are all ac-
quainted with the Leipzig Program and the shameful telegram to the
Chancellor. Their contents is a whole series of political demands,
above all, the establishment of a Workers’ Council patterned after

Arthur Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic, p. 121 also

56
;

R. H. Lutz, The Fall of the German Empire, II, 4.

57 U.D.Z., V, 160; cited also in Lutz, The Causes of the German Collapse,

p. 121.
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 179

those of the Russians, and for this purpose the Chancellor was to
receive a deputation.This political momentum was carried into the
German arms and munitions factories. We have evidence that agitation
material was smuggled in from the outside. Some of these smuggled
articles fell into our hands. 56

At first the party committee of the U.S.P.D., led by Haase

and Dittmann, was skeptical about the prospects of a Socialist
revolution in Germany. But the party gradually adopted a
sharper tone, and established connection with the Dresden In-
ternational Youth Organization, which had been organized to
tear “the mask from the face of the humbug of war and peace
at home,” and which appealed to the young men not to obey the
orders calling them to the colors and not to give themselves up
59
like cattle to militarism . Also, many radical Socialists and
Spartacists joined the U.S.P.D. and these inoculated the party
leaders with revolutionary ideas. Concerning this Dr. Philipp
said

Owing numbers of Left Radicals who belonged to the Inde-

to the
pendent Socialist Party, its active propaganda was doubly dangerous

to the conduct of the war and to the state it was the preliminary con-
;

dition which made the revolution the great mass movement on which
men like Eisner, who belonged to the Independent Socialist Party but
was a Left Radical at heart, could build up their work. 60

Haase, one of the leaders of the U.S.P.D., went even farther

when he said

Right from the beginning of the war, from the beginning of 1915
we worked systematically for the revolution in the navy. We sub-
scribed 50 pfennigs from our own pay every ten days, got into touch
with the members in the Reichstag, and drew up, printed, and dis-
tributed revolutionary leaflets in order to create the conditions neces-
sary for the events of November. 81

58 “Der Berliner Metallarbeiterstreik im April 1917,” Siiddeutsche

Monatsh-efte, April 1924, pp. 25 ff.

59 U.D.Z., von Kuhl’s Report, VI, 1-39.

60 Ibid., statement of Dr. Philipp, V, 164.
61 U.D.Z., von Kuhl’s Report, VI, 10.
180 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Among propaganda materials against the militarists
the
which the U.S.P.D. distributed was a little card which con-
tained an appeal for peace without annexations or indemnity
and was signed for the central committee of the party. 82 On the
reverse side of the card the following appeal was printed in
large letters

Stand up
Go to the streets !

Leave the factories

We don’t want a fourth winter campaign ! Do not fire another
shot
63
Long live peace !

Propaganda in the navy was especially effective, since the

prolonged inactivity of the fleet brought on a state of mind
among the men that made them readily susceptible to the activi-
ties of the agitators. On July 31, 1917, on board the battleship
“Konig Albert,” some four hundred sailors signed the follow-
ing proclamation

PEACE PROCLAMATION !

We whose names are appended to this declaration herewith claim

our membership in the U.S.P.D. and our approval of its policy. At
the same time we wish it to be known that we are in favor of a peace
without annexations and reparations, and that we are therefore anxious
for a conclusion of hostilities The U.S.P.D. has up to now
been the most determined champion of our interests in Germany and
hence alone possesses our confidence as is proved by our entry into
64
its ranks.

By the summer of 1917 it was evident that the German

government had lost the confidence of those people in Germany
who Through Erzberger a majority in the
desired peace.
Reichstag informed the Imperial Government that it no longer
enjoyed their confidence. Erzberger, with von Richthofen, had

62 The committee was composed of Dittmann, Haase, Adolph Hofer,

Gustav Laukant, Ledebour, Wengels, and Louise Zeits.

63 Fliegerabwurf -Schrif ten (no number).
84 Arthur Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 185.
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 181

made a journey to the Eastern Army Headquarters, where

General Hoffmann had revealed the true state of affairs to
them. From his observations and his conversations with Hoff-
mann, Erzberger resolved to induce the Reichstag to bring the
65
war to a conclusion as quickly as possible. On July 6, 1917,
therefore, he delivered his famous speech in the Reichstag in
which he demonstrated that since the government had been
completely mistaken in the question of submarine warfare it
could no longer expect to enjoy the confidence of the Reichs-
66
tag. The Reichstag, said Erzberger, must give the govern-
ment to understand that it desired a peace of compromise with-
out any forcible subjection of peoples or annexations.
Following the lead of Erzberger, the Center, the Majority
Social Democrats, and the Progressives united as a solid major-
ity upon the famous Peace Resolution of July 19, 1917, favoring
67
a peace without annexations. The significance of the resolu-

65 Ibid., The genesis of the Peace Resolution was tested with

pp. 153 ff.

particular care by the Committee of Inquiry. All the material on this ques-
tion can be found in U.D.Z., VII and VIII. For details, see especially
Vol. VII, Part I, pp. 282 ff., and Vol. VIII, pp. 69 ff.
66 Echo de Paris of July 11, 1917, for instance, said of it: “The good
speech of Herr Erzberger is a joyous announcement.”
67 The National-Liberals were opposed to the idea of the Peace Resolu-
tion, not because they considered that territorial expansion or war indem-
nities were an essential condition of peace, but because they believed that
the German government ought, in practice, to make it clear to her opponents,
without any public announcement, that readiness to make peace without an-
nexations or indemnities was the basis of its foreign policy. The Conserva-
tives were opposed on principle to the Peace Resolution because they re-
garded such action by the Reichstag as a danger for the conclusion of peace
and because they wished to prevent the adoption of parliamentary govern-
ment, which they considered to be unsuitable. The military situation did not
appear to them to demand the complete renunciation of all territorial and
economic claims.
After opposing it at first, the Supreme Command accepted the adoption
of the resolution and co-operated in its final wording without approving it

at heart. The Kaiser approved it in principle but refrained from adopting a

decisive attitude with regard to it in public. Chancellor Michaelis sup-
ported the resolution famous reservation, “as I interpret it.”
with the
Michaelis made it clear to the world at large that he interpreted the resolu-
182 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
tion was that it united for the time being the parties in the
Reichstag against the policy of the government. One German
authority goes so far as to state that the Peace Resolution
“hindered a German victory in that it strengthened the enemy
will to victory and weakened the will to victory in our own
68
land.”
Opposition to a war of conquest became stronger and
stronger in Germany. When the policy of the German gov-
ernment at Brest-Litovsk became known, the U.S.P.D. en-
couraged strikes as a demonstration against the measures that
the militarists were taking against Russia. So serious was the
strike threat that the high officials issued an order on January
29, 1918, as follows

We are still in a difficult struggle. Everyone who quits work at

home sins against our brothers in the field who are sacrificing their all

to fight off theenemy who is looking forward to the overthrow of

Germany, the destruction of our industries, and thereby the pauperiza-
tion of the German people and the German workers. 69

The National Workers’ and Professional Union issued an

appeal at about the same time as follows

From various sources the attempt is being made to put into the
minds of the German workers the idea of a general strike for political
purposes. The German worker is being betrayed, in the critical moment

tion very differently from the interpretation placed upon it by Erzberger

and Scheidemann. On July 25 the Chancellor elaborated upon his reserva-
tion when he wrote to the Crown Prince (U.D.Z., Vol. VII, Part II, p. 390,
or Part I, p. 294) “I have deprived it [the Peace Resolution] of its greatest
:

danger by my ‘interpretation.’ One can, in fact, make any peace one likes,
and still be in accord with the Resolution.” (For the attitude of the various
individuals and groups toward the Resolution see U.D.Z., Vol. VII, Part I,
pp. 3-13; also Lutz, The Causes of the German Collapse, pp. 190-91.)
68 Oscar Muller, Warum musten uhr nach Versailles Kriegspresseamt
publications, No. 1, p. 59.
69 Dr. Friedrich Purlitz, ed., Deutscher Geschichtskalendar, Der Eu-
ropaische Krieg in aktenmassiger Darstellung, 34 Jahrgang, Band I, 1 halfte,
Januar-Marz 1918 (Leipzig and Vienna, 1918), p. 102; also Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung (Abend Ausgabe), January 29, 1918.
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 183

of the war, when all our strength in the field and at home should be
dedicated to the effort to deprive the struggling brothers in the field

of war and thus bring on a catastrophe. These propagan-

necessities
dists are hard to discover. Loyal to our Fatherland, we call upon our
fellow members, and all loyal workers to oppose with all means and
energy such a move and to heed Hindenburg’s warning: “To strike is
treason.” 70

After the strike of January 1918 the conviction grew among

the Independent Socialists —and especially among the more
radical element who had associated themselves with this party
that if trouble started again they should not be content with a
strike but should resort to arms. From that time onward prep-
arations were made by such U.S.P.D. leaders as Barth, Daumig,
Eckert, Wegmann, and Neuendorf? for the Revolution. As
Ledebour said in a speech on December 17, 1918, at the Gen-
eral Congress of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Councils of Ger-
many :

They obtained weapons, they enlisted recruits, and we others who

co-operated with them to a certain extent, influenced our workmen
Besides, we had not only made preparations in Berlin but had estab-
lished relations with all the provinces. 71

The Independent Socialist Vater gave further proof of

his party’s machinations when he boasted in a speech at Mag-
deburg in December 1918:
The Revolution did not come as a surprise to us. We had been
systematically preparing for it since January 25, 1918. The work
was difficult and dangerous The party saw that big strikes did
not lead to revolution ;
so some other way had to be taken We
induced our men who were going to the front to desert. We organized
these deserters, supplied them with forged papers, money, and unsigned
pamphlets. We sent these men out in all directions, but principally
to the front, in order that they should work on the feelings of the
men at the front and bring about its dissolution. They persuaded the

70 Purlitz, Deutscher Geschichtskalendar, 104.

p.

71 See U.D.Z., Vol. V, Annex VIII, pp. 117-21, for the complete speech
of Ledebour.
184 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
soldiers to desert and so the work of destruction was slowly but surely
completed. 72

Ernst Lorenz, in a pamphlet, Funf Jahre Dresdner U.S.P.,

provides additional proof that the revolution did not come as a
78
surprise, when he states

It was a dangerous venture to attack the monster militarism by the

printing and distribution of leaflets during the war Nevertheless
we in Dresden did excellent work with regard to the production and
distribution of anti-war printed matter.

He continues by stating that the Dresden group did not limit

itself to distribution of material in and around Dresden but took
to mass production of blanket distribution throughout Germany.
“Hundreds of thousands of these warning, accusing, and incit-
ing leaflets left the press by night, under cover of the protecting
darkness, and then ....
found their way to every town in
74
Germany.”
Making one last attack upon the government in the Reichs-

tag before adjournment on July 12, 1918, the Independent

its

Socialist Deputy Geyer said, among other things

72 U.D.Z., VI, 10; Wrisberg, Der Weg zur Revolution, p. 103; and
Erich Ludendorff, My War Memories (London, 1919), II, 645. The Ger-
man government, desiring to get rid of the strike agitators, sent many of
them to the front or to prison. The result was that everyone sent to the
front or punished in any way became an agitator for the Revolution. U.D.Z.,
V, 117-21.
73 The Revolution came as a surprise to the Right Wing of the Social

Democratic party. The leaders of that wing did not really want the over-
throw of the government, but for various reasons they did not withdraw
from it in the end. U.D.Z., V, 151-71, statement of Dr. Philipp; also Lutz,
The Causes of the German Collapse, p. 113.

74 U.D.Z., VI, 7. It is interesting to note here that Deputy Haase had

said shortly after the outbreak of the war : “We will undermine the Army in
order to bring on the World Revolution.” And in the session of the Prus-
sian House of Delegates on February 23, 1915, Delegate Strobel, the editor
of V oriv'drts said: “I admit openly that a complete victory of the Reich will
not be suited to the interests of the Social Democrats.” U.D.Z., von Kuhl’s
Report, VI, 1-39; also Lutz, The Causes of the German Collapse, p. 135.
 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 185

The boundless distress of the people increases to an unbearable de-

gree.Hunger and misery destroy all that the war does not claim in
human lives. We say “Down with the War!” 75

Revolutionary agitation and sentiment was not confined to

the Spartacists and the Independent Social Democrats. In the
middle of 1918 the Majority Socialists joined with the U.S.P.D.
in voting against the budget. Scheidemann, in explaining the
vote, said that the war should be ended as quickly as possible

The greatest military victory by itself can never bring peace, but
only an armistice. The exasperation of the masses has reached the
highest pitch. There is now only one cry, namely to make an end of
76
the war, but of course, an end with honor.

In November 1917, on the occasion of the celebration of the

anniversary of the Reformation, a group of Berlin and Hano-
verian clergy issued a proclamation, which was endorsed by
many hundreds of influential men, to other parts of Germany.
This proclamation said in part:

We German Protestants, conscious of the Christian principles

and aims, heartily stretch out a brotherly hand to all co-religionists,
including those of enemy countries.
We recognize as the deepest cause of war the anti-Christian powers
dominating the lives of the peoples, e.g., suspicion, idolatry, or force
and covetousness; therefore a peace based on mutual understanding
and reconciliation is in our opinion the peace that must be brought
about. 77

Thus German government and

the militarists were con-
fronted with opposition at home as well as at the front. The
longing for peace grew stronger and stronger after the middle

75 Germany, Reichstag, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Band 191

313,
Sitzung, July 13, 1918, p. 6146.
76 Labor Leader, July 11, 1918.
77 Ibid., Another source of attack upon the German gov-
June 20, 1918.
ernment was the International Socialist Women’s Organization. At a con-
ference in Berne in March 1915 this group agreed upon a propaganda cam-
paign against the war. Women from Germany, France, England, Russia,
Italy, Holland, and Switzerland took part in this campaign.
186 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
of 1916. In a letter from a traveler in Germany, written from
Switzerland, we find a sentiment typical of those expressed in
the many letters intercepted by the Press Service for the British
General Staff.
Among the middle class they say with the Chancellor, “Look at
the map. We
have advanced too far into the enemy country for him
ever to recover all the territory he has lost. We can therefore now
talk peace.” This is the language of those who argue officials, pro- —
fessors, bank managers, and Socialistic intellectuals. But the crowds
do not argue. They merely say “When will the end come ?” 78
:

In a letter that a German soldier had written from Hause-

berge we find similar sentiments expressed when he says

Everybody here wants peace, that this horrible shedding of blood

may have an end. Only purveyors of army supplies think it is a good
thing that the war is lasting so long, because they make a profit out
79
of it.

Another intercepted letter from a German residing at The

Hague to a friend in New York demonstrates the feeling of the
masses of the German people. Dated June 14, 1917, it said:

About revolution yes, I have great hopes that it will break out in
Germany autumn. According to what I have heard at the frontier,
this
not only the people wish for it but the soldiers, and the non-commis-
sioned officers, lots of them speak about it among themselves in secret,
saying that the only way to get peace is to depose the Kaiser. May this
soon be would be a mercy and a blessing not only for the whole
! It
80
of humanity but especially for us Germans

The whole internal situation of Germany was well sum-

marized in the report of the Bureau for Social Policy when it

stated

The common people with large families have made great sacrifices
at the front and at home. A strong feeling of war weariness in these
classes is comprehensible and undeniable. The result of short rations,

78 Confidential Supplement to the Daily Review Foreign Press,

of the
No. 58, July 8, 1916, p. 4.
79 Ibid., No. 102, August 1916, Letter dated July 22.
p. 9.

^Ibid., No. 148, July 14, 1917, p. 4.

 INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF GERMANY 187

combined with undiminished and increased work is a feeling of nervous

irritation and mental susceptibility to all embittering impressions and
influences. 81

That is why the Burgfrieden broke up. That is why many

people lost faith in their government during the latter years of
the war. The people were hungry, weary, and irritable. Erich
Volkmann, in his study, Der Marxism and das deutsche Heer im
Weltkrieg, states:
In August 1914 one rejoiced with it. At that time it was in truth
the representative of the people’s will and the universal spirit. Since
then a grey layer of increasing disenchantment has come over the
entire land. 82

It was obvious that the longer the war lasted and the greater
the burdens and miseries it brought in its train, the more power-
ful became the forces that threatened the truce that had been

concluded between the rival parties, until the day should be

reached when war and revolution would be synonymous terms.
Thus we see the conditions in Germany which aided the
Allied propagandists in their campaign to tear down the morale
of the German troops and the people behind the lines. Dr.
Philipp summed it up well when he said before the Unter-
suchu n gsauschusses
The saddest thing in this dark chapter of the question of war guilt
is the assertion, continually confirmed by fresh material, that the
enemy’s revolutionary work would have been in vain without the
co-operation of certain German circles. 83

81 U.D.Z., V, 102.
82 Alfred Niemann, Revolution von Oben, Umsturz von Unden (Berlin,
1927), p. 54.
83 U.D.Z., Dr. Philipp’s statement, V, 151-71 ;
also Lutz, The Causes of
the German Collapse, p. 127.
 CHAPTER VII

MEASURING THE EFFECT OF

PROPAGANDA
If the historian ever has an opportunity to
delve into the files of the German Intelligence
Bureau, however, I imagine that he will find
ample evidence that the showers of leaflets
played no inconsiderable part in the collapse of
the German machine.
—E. Alexander Powell, The Army
Behind the Army (p. 355)

On July 31, 1917, the Chief of the German General Staff of

the Field Army issued a circular in which he lamented the feel-
ing “of profound depression” at home. This symptom was to
be attributed in part to the real distress, the difficult ’situation

with regard to the foodstuffs and the coal, financial worries, the
length of the war, and the loss of relatives. But for the greater
part this situation was due, said the circular, to the agitation of
certain enemies of state who “so unscrupulously endeavor to ex-
ploit this state of distress in order to further their political aims
and cause discontent, irritation, etc. of all kinds.” 1
The spirit of the people in Germany is further described by
Dr. George Herron after his fifth conversation with Dr. de
Fiori

Thepeasants and workers of Germany are already asking ques-

tions which predict the possibility of a revolution, continued Dr. de
Fiori. All through Germany, he declared, the peasants and workers are
saying to each other that if the whole world is against Germany there
must be some reason for it. It must be that their masters have not told
them the truth. It must be that they have been deceived about the war

1 U.D.Z., von Kuhl’s Report, VI, 20. The circular was signed by Luden-
dorff. Also found in R. H. Lutz, The Causes of the German Collapse, p. 148.

188
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 189

from the beginning. And why should they go on being killed and
starved for masters who tell them only lies ? It is better that they should
kill their masters. 2

The observing Princess Bliicher described the mood of the

German people in February 1917, when she wrote in her diary

. . . . the heroic attitude has entirely disappeared. Now one sees

faces like masks, blue with cold and drawn by hunger, with the
harassed expression common to all those who are continually specu-
lating as to the possibility of another meal. 3

The Siiddeutsche Monatshefte went so far as to credit the

Allied propagandists with having taken over the leadership of
the German people in the last few months of the war. By the
fall of 1918 “the majority of the German people placed greater
trust in Woodrow Wilson than in their own leaders.”
4

However, propaganda upon

in estimating the effect of Allied
the German troops and the people behind the lines we must
consider : first, the Reports of the Psychological Subsection of
the United States Army; second, the efforts on the part of Ger-
many at counter-propaganda; third, the desertions among the
enemy troops; fourth, the letters from German soldiers to their
relatives at home; and, fifth, the German army orders dealing
with propaganda.

REPORTS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBSECTION

OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
The Psychological Subsection of the United States Army
kept a closer watch on the morale of the German troops and the
German civilian population than any of the other propaganda
agencies or intelligence sections of the Allied countries. This
subsection set up a detailed system for watching the progress of
the deterioration of the German
Agents of the Intel-
morale.
ligence Division prepared daily reports which contained all news
in any way relating to the morale of the Germans in their par-

2 “Herron Papers,” Document XXV, de Fiori Conversations, I, 126.

3 Princess Evelyn Mary An
Bliicher, English Wife in Berlin, p. 16i2.
4 Siiddeutsche Monatshefte, April 1924, p. 1.
190 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
ticular sections. After studying these daily reports carefully, the
officers in charge prepared weekly reports which gave a general
5
interpretation of the drift of the enemy morale . Using as a
basis for its estimates material contained in these weekly reports,
supplemented by information obtained from other sources open
to the Military Intelligence, the Psychological Subsection
worked out famous “Chart of German Civilian Morale,”
its

which recorded the upward and downward trend of enemy

morale. This chart also recorded the variation in Germany’s
military position, the degree of political unity in Germany, the
food situation in North Germany, and the U-boat sinkings 6 .

To get information for their daily reports the agents of the

subsection interviewed prisoners in the Allied prison camps.
They held long conversations with prisoners in camps near Toul
and Souilly, where men of all ranks and from all parts of the
German Empire were kept, and from these interviews they got
valuable information concerning the feeling among the German
7
troops and the people beyond the Rhine .

During these conversations the German officer was “often

bored,” while the private was gratified and “we found him sick
of the war, doubtful of his leaders and passionately curious
about America’s war and peace .” 8 Occasionally, however, they

5
Major E. Alexander Powell, The Army Behind the Army, p. 356.

The writer encountered considerable difficulty in

6 locating this chart.
Major Powell referred me to Mr. Newton D. Baker, in whose office the
chart was kept during the last few months of the war. Mr. Baker, however,
did not recall the chart but stated that there might have been such since the
General Staff made continuous studies of the enemy morale. He referred
me to the Army War College, where it might be located. A letter from
Colonel W. S. Grant of the Army War College states that they have no
record of such a chart. Mr. Powell, however, insisted that there was such a
chart. After considerable more correspondence, the writer finally received
a letter from the Intelligence Division, General Staff, War Department,
stating that photostat copies of the chart were being sent. These have been
turned over to the Hoover War Library.
7
E. Alexander Powell, op. cit., p. 350.
8 Heber Blankenhorn, “War of Morale,” Harpers’ Magazine, CXXXIX
(1919), 518.
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 191

found officers also who talked freely. An artillery Lieutenant

L — ,
who was described as an “admirer of Ludendorff,” said in
one of these interviews concerning the effect of propaganda
I can only talk as a soldier at the front, but there its effects were
disastrous and especially so in the last six months. Even the little Flug-
blatter, after you read them, you imagined you read the truth, that our
government was lying to us. I remember one, after I read it, I felt like
blowing my brains out. I never let one of our men read them but it —
—
was difficult they were everywhere. 9

In the summary of the reports of the Intelligence Section of

the United States Army we find statements regarding the con-
ditions in the various sectors of the German Army. Regarding
the 41st Division, 20th Corps District, we find that the Com-
manding General issued an order on June 6, 1918, indicating an
increase in the number of instances in which subordinates em-
phatically refused to accompany their units into line and in
10
which officers neglected to enforce obedience to orders. Of the
45th Reserve Division, 2d Corps District, we read
According to the statement of prisoners, when the 212th Reserve
Infantry Regiment came from the Verdun front to Flanders it refused
to attack on September 30, 1917 About the 16th of October it
received a very large draft of replacements among which were a
considerable number of elements of decidedly Bolshevistic tendencies.
Men deserted to the rear, to the enemy, and quite a few were punished
for insubordination to officers, and some for refusing to fight. 11

The 6th Bavarian Landwehr Division was considered by the

American Intelligence Section a fourth-class division.

Morale was low, discipline poor. Several prisoners stated that the
men did not hesitate to say even in front of their officers that the war
had been lost by Germany and that they were thoroughly sick of it. 12

9 Ibid., 524.
p.
10
Histories of Two Hundred Fifty-one Dimsions of the German Army
Which Participated in the War, 1914—1918, compiled from records of Intel-
ligence Section of the General Staff, American Expeditionary Forces, at
General Headquarters, Chaumont, France, 1919 (Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1920), p. 450; hereafter referred to as Histories of 251
Dimsions. 11 Ibid., 12 Ibid.,
p. 266. p. 143.
192 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
In the 15th Bavarian Division the political discontent and
the “dissatisfaction with Prussia continued to give the division a
low morale.” 13 The 30th Bavarian Division possessed very little
value “The men are, for the most part old, and the fathers of
:

several children. Moreover, Bavarians came to believe that

Prussia was ‘using’ them.” 14
From the German authorities we learn that, when the Al-
pine Corps was sent up to the front occupied by the 18th Army
to the west of Nesle and the 2d Army to the north of Peronne,
men belonging to the divisions which had held the line up to then
streamed back in a more or less disorganized state. In spite of
the energetic work of the advancing line of the Bavarian Regi-
ment of Foot Guards, they did not succeed in inducing the men
to stop and renew the fight. The fact that this was due to lack
of fighting spirit and to wilful breach of discipline caused by
agitation “is proved by the repeated use of the expression that
the men of the Alpine Corps were prolongers of the war.” 15
Later on the report states that on August 10 men opposite Hallu
said : “The war won’t come to an end like this ;
we shall have
to put an end to it.”

According to a report made by the 2d Jager Regiment, the

men of the regiment were grossly insulted by retreating infantry
soldiers for holding out so long in the firing line. The general
commanding 2d Division of the Foot Guards stated:
the
“Everyone who spends his time among the troops knows that
the mood of some of the men is becoming depressed and that
10
this is due to influence from home and to agents, leaflets, etc.”
In a Summary of Information, A.E.F. General Staff, we
learn that after having been “bombarded with literature pictur-
ing the superior strength of the Allies, and the determination to
victory, the morale of the German soldier was lowered. Evi-
dences of nervousness in the face of what he thought an attack

13 14 Ibid.,
Histories of 251 Divisions, p. 261. p. 394.
15 U.D.Z., von Kuhl’s Report, VI, 21 also cited in Lutz, The Causes of
;

the German Collapse, p. 148.

16 U.D.Z., VI, 22; Lutz, op. cit., p. 150.
 Sections of the Chart of German Civilian Morale
Reprints of photostat copies of sections of the Chart of German Civilian Morale which were
sent to the writer by the United States War Department, General Staff, Military Intelligence
Division. The chart came in four sections, which were combined, for the purpose of this work,
into two sections. The chart shows not only the ups and downs of the German morale but also
the food situation in North Germany, the political unity of the Empire, the submarine sinkings,
and the variations in Germany’s military position from the beginning of the war to November
1918. Greatly reduced.
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 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 193
17
of superior forces, could be seen.” This is borne out by the
official from Headquarters of
report the 461st Infantry Regi-
ment, October 21, 1918, which stated in part

In the sector of the Army Corps the troops have recently again
shown marked tendency to request a barrage by light signals as soon
a
as they perceive the enemy in the advance zone. This practice not only
shows the enemy how much the infantry is frightened by his approach,
but it also indicates that the infantry lacks confidence in its own means
of defense. This idea is apparently becoming fixed in the companies. 18

On July 24, 1918, the Tribune de Geneve reported that

information from a good source revealed that discontent was
spreading in the German Army:
Many acts of indiscipline are known and the High Command has
not succeeded in stopping them. A regiment which was to go into rest
quarters has been sent to the West front. When these troops realized
that they were going to the West front they mutinied and threw their
rifles and packs out of the window, stopped the train and fled across
the fields. 19

Checking up on the initial propaganda campaign in the

spring and early summer of 1918, the Intelligence Section found
that German commanders were reporting lowered morale in the
ranks of their troops. The German soldiers had become uneasy
and were rapidly losing faith in their officers by reason of the
information scattered from the air. 20 In the Kolnische Zeitung
for October 31, 1918, a “High Officer on the West Front,” an-
alyzing the military reverses, wrote

What caused the most damage was the paper war waged by our
enemies who daily flooded us with hundreds of thousands of leaflets,
extraordinarily well arranged and edited. 21

17 Summary
of Information, Second Section, General Staff, General
Headquarters, A.E.F., Chaumont?, 1917-1919, Vol. Ill, No. 227, Novem-
ber 14, 1918, p. 1450.
18 Ibid.

19
Press Review, Second Section, General Staff, General Headquarters,
A.E.F., printed by the 29th Engineers 1917-1919, No. 212, August 14, 1918;
hereafter cited as Press Review.
20 Lieutenant C. H. Ball, New York Times, April 20, 1919, Section 7, p. 4.
21 Kolnische Zeitung, October 31, 1918.
194 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
In an American Divisional Summary of January 28, 1919,
is found the following, from the interrogation of S an ,

infantryman
One of the things that made a great impression on the German
and which S
soldiers, believes helped to shorten the war, was the
propaganda dropped by American planes Despite orders the
soldiers continued to obtain the papers. Many sent them home to their
families. 22

GERMAN EFFORTS AT COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

From Germany, like all of
the very beginning of the war,
the warring nations, conducted a campaign of patriotic propa-
ganda at home to keep up the morale of the German people and
the troops. This work had been put into the hands of the
Kriegspresseamt, which had also the task of issuing war news
to the German press. This double duty resulted in a failure to
organize an effective propaganda system in the Fatherland,
since the Kriegspresseamt concentrated its efforts mainly on the
war news. This deficiency was not noticed during the first few
years of the war, butwhen the Allied organizations began to
hammer German front with Flugblatter the Germans be-
at the

came aware of their weakness. Even then the military leaders

failed to act, since the majority of these leaders did not under-
23
stand the psychology of the war. As War,
for the Minister of
he was a soldier with military duties and therefore more in-
terested in the conduct of the war from a military standpoint
24
than from a morale standpoint.
By the spring of 1917, however, even the War Minister had
come to recognize the need for greater attention to counter-

22 Heber Blankenhorn, “War of Morale,” Harpers’ Magazine, CXXXIX

(1919), 524.
23 Matthias Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart and Berlin,
1919), p. 7.

24
General der Artillerie z.D. von Stein, Erlebnisse urid Betrachtungen
aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges, p. 102; hereafter cited as Erlebnisse und
Betrachtungen.
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 195

propaganda. In the latter part of May he called a meeting in

which the Imperial Chancellor, the Secretary for Foreign Af-
fairs, the Minister of the Interior, the Prussian Minister of the
Interior, the Minister of Education, and a number of military
officials took part. The confidential report of this meeting, is-

sued by the War Ministry, throws some light on the propaganda

activities of the Allies :

Z No. 4240/17. g. A. 1

War Ministry
Strictly Confidential
Report of the sitting of 25 May 1917 regarding the enemy anti-
Monarchistic activities and discussion of steps to be taken
The enemy endeavors to bring about anti-monarchical feeling
among the fighting forces and the people have taken on a wider field
recently and are supported by highly suspicious material spread in a
most vigorous manner. For the most part the enemy is concentrating
on leaflets in word and picture, which are being dropped from the air,
or come in from the outside and are disseminated here. It is high time
that this strong undermining work of the enemy be countered with
similar propaganda in even more active manner. 25

Then follows a discussion of the steps to be taken to fight

the demoralizing activities of the Allied propagandists. In the
Foreign Office there was up a central agency for the
to be set
collection of propaganda, and close co-operation between this
and the press was to be established. Important people were to be
enlisted to write articles for the press, or to give speeches in
towns and Germany to combat enemy propa-
villages all over
ganda and harmful rumors. The government was to adopt a
stronger internal policy. “Strong opposition to all propagandists
—even Deputies— is in order.” The churches, the schools, and
the Military Hospitals were to be used as agencies for “enlight-
enment.” Teachers and wounded officers were to conduct lec-
tures on patriotic subjects in an effort to raise the morale of the
mass of the people and the soldiers behind the front.
The co-operation of women was requested, and women’s

25 U.D.Z., V, 130, Anlage XIII.

196 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
organizations were to sponsor patriotic meetings and lectures
based on material sent by the Kriegspresseamt. The Kaiser was
to be placed more in the public eye than heretofore. To gain the
loyalty of the people hewas to make more trips to the smaller
towns and villages. He was especially asked to show his in-
terest in the working people by visiting factories and working
quarters. The press was to convey, in word and pictures, details
of the Kaiser’s activities, so that the people could see how hard
their rulerwas working for the welfare of his people. The
Emperor was also to be given the credit for all governmental
measures aimed at alleviating the food situation. The final point
in the report dealt with the necessity of providing ready money
26
for this internal propaganda.
The Army officials also took steps to raise the morale of the
men at the front. In a Memorandum drawn up and submitted
by General Ludendorfif to the Chief of the General Staff of the
Field Army, under date of July 29, 1917, we read

Everything which is likely to prejudice the morale of the troops,

e.g., leaflets sent down from the air by the enemy or sent out from
27
home must be kept at a distance.

By September 15, 1917, the “Vaterlandischen Unterricht

unter den Truppen” was set up. With this it was hoped to raise
the morale of the German soldiers. “Three years of the war,”
said the statement of purpose, “have naturally tired the soldiers
and made them long for home, family, vocation. The more these
desires press upon the troops the more it behooves us to impress
upon them the realization of their duty and bring them to a
28
stronger resolve to continue the fight.”

20 See U.D.Z., V, 130, Anlage XIII, for the complete report.

27General Erich von Ludendorff, The General Staff and Its Problems:
The History of the Relations between the High Command and the German
Imperial Government as Revealed by Official Documents, 2 vols., translated
by F. A. Holt, O.B.E. (New York, 1920), II, 388.

28 Walter Nicolai, Nachrichtendienst Presse und Volksstimmung im

Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1920), pp. 119 ff. ;
hereafter cited as Nachrichtendienst
Presse und Volksstimmung.
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 197

The Army High Command was to see to it that patriotic

instruction took place among the troops, the method by which
29
this was to be done being left for military leaders to decide.
The High Command asked for the co-operation of all officers.
The needs of the troops and their thought and action were to be
studied, and the necessary tact was to be used to impart the
patriotic instruction to the greatest possible advantage. The
officerswere to keep from the troops all incendiary material
such as enemy leaflets, and were to bend every effort to
strengthen the will to victory among their men. The instruc-
tions continued

It is important to find out which problems are disturbing the troops,

and to fit the instructions to the needs. The following are valuable
in this instruction

a) Correspondence of the Kriegspresseamt.

b Pictures and placards suited to the understanding of the men.
c) Leaflets.
The Kriegspresseamt will send educational material and from this
the material suited to the particular needs can be selected. 30

The patriotic instruction was to be conveyed through lec-

tures, films, field preaching, and army newspapers. It is signifi-
cant that “no discussion during the instruction is to be permit-
ted.” The points to be stressed in this work were: (1) The
causes of the war, reasons Germany entered, and results, es-

pecially to the German worker, if she lost; (2) the great

strength of the German military machine, the victories of the
U-boats, and the work of the great munitions factories (3) the ;

necessity and significance of the co-operation of all classes

29 On July 23, 1918, the French picked up documents which gave a pros-
pectus of the organization for patriotic instruction in the German Army.
According to these documents the purpose of the instruction was to instill
a uniform “patriotism in all the soldiers, to intensify their resisting power
and their common will to conquer.” Summary of Information, Second Sec-
tion, General Staff, A.E.F., Vol. II, No. 137, August 16, 1918, p. 949.
30 Walter Nicolai, Nachrichtendienst Presse und Volksstimmung, 119.
p.
See also Summary of Information, Vol. Ill, No. 228, p. 1454.
198 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
military, governmental, industrial, and commercial —and the
necessity for authority on the one side and obedience on the
other. Faithfulness to the Kaiser was especially to be urged. 31
One great weakness of this attempt at patriotic instruction
was that it was left in the hands of the military leaders. These
were too busy with military details to bother about the Vater-
32
landische Unterricht. To be sure, a great deal of work along
the line of patriotic instruction was done but, as ;
one German
writer expressed it, “What good would it do to try to oppose the
cry of the enemy for a struggle for freedom and justice against
33
the militarists of Europe?” Furthermore, the Kriegspresseamt
was not capable of enlightening and arousing the people at
home. To accomplish these a Reichspresseamt would have been
necessary, but such an organization was never set up by the
Germans. 34
As soon as it became known that Lord Northcliffe was to
be at the head of the British section on Propaganda for Enemy
Countries, the Germans became alarmed. Ludendorff wrote to
the Imperial Chancellor on March 20, 1918, suggesting that
Germany’s loose propaganda organization be centralized and
made more effective. Commenting on Lieutenant-Colonel von
Haeften’s suggestion, Ludendorff said, “I agree entirely with
the Lieutanant-Colonel’s suggestion.His proposal for the crea-
tion of a kind of Imperial Ministry of Propaganda seems to
me worthy of serious consideration.” 35
No effort was made, however, to set up an organization
similar to that of Northcliffe’s in England. The only evidence
of a more campaign against the Allied propagandists
spirited
was the appearance in the early part of 1918 of the Flugblatter

31 Nicolai, Nachrichtcndienst Presse und V olkstimmung p. 121.

32 Ludwig Lewinsohn, in the Foreword to his Revolution an dcr IVest-
jront, says that the Vaterlandische Unterricht, “which were conducted by
young officers, were laughed at.”
33 Friedrich Stieve, Gedanken iiber Deutschland (Jena, 1920), 109.
p.
34 General der Artillerie von Stein, Erlebnisse und Betrachtungen, p. 102.
35 Ludendorff, The General Staff and Its Problems, II, 405.
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 199
36
der deutschen Korrespondens. These were small pamphlets
dealing with various phases of German life written by uni-
versity professors or specialists in a particular field of German
political, social, or economic life. In the foreword to the May
1918 pamphlet Dr. Martin Hobohm says:

This pamphlet one of a series of pamphlets and correspondence

is

being put out by friends of the Fatherland to bring about a healthy

political understanding among the people. 37

The combat the increasing

military leaders took steps to
spirit of discontent among the troops in September 1918 when

they attached an Information Officer to the staff of the G.H.Q.

This “Offizier-Kriegsberichterstatter” was to be the head of a
press bureau which was to furnish newspapers with “authorized
war stories.” The aim was to interest the public in the happen-
ings at the front, thus strengthening the bond between the
country and the army, with the result that the morale of both
would be raised. The soldiers and officers were to furnish the
Offizier-Kriegsberichterstatter with information of interest.

When your division, your regiment, your company, when a group

of men, when a single man distinguishes himself by any remarkable
action, send me a brief account of it: a sort of “tableau d’honneur” 1

where each hero will be cited (surname, other names, unit, civil occu-
pation, birthplace,and place of residence, decorations). Send me at the
same time a list of newspapers, both local and regional, in which each
of those whose names have been inscribed on this “tableau d’lionneur”
would like to have it appear. I will take the necessary steps to have
your “homefolks,” your friends and acquaintances, know what you
have done. You will receive specimen copies. 38

Another effort to combat Allied propaganda was made

through the Nachrichtenblatt der 18 Armee, which made its

appearance in September 1918. This news sheet called on the

36 Otto Baumgarten, Vaterlandsdienst Flugblatter der deutschen Kor-

respondenz, Nr. 6, May 1918.
37 Ibid.

38 Summary of Information, Second Section, G.H.Q. ,

General Staff,
A.E.F., Vol. Ill, No. 170, September 18, 1918, p. 1121.
200 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
troops to pay no attention to the lies in the Flugblatter of the
Allies: “The enemy is trying to drive a wedge between our
forces and separate them, to call on the people to strike. Fight
against these temptations.” 39
Fighting the promises that the Allies were making to the
German soldiers these leaflets said:

The enemy is not promising- food or peace to the Kaiser, nor to

the people nor the government, but to the few soldiers in the rifle pits,

and to a future state of Germany which does not exist

Read them and you will find that the enemy is farther from peace
now than ever and that it is determined to destroy us Comrades,
the English propaganda minister is a crafty thief and knows all tricks,

and never keeps his promise. 40

Use was also made of letters from loyal German soldiers in

the campaign against the defeatist spirit within Germany. The
Kolnische V olkszeitung for October 31, 1918, printed the fol-
lowing from a soldier at the front.
One wants to fly in the air when one gets the inquiry from home:
“Tell me, Fritz, is it true that the soldiers do not want to advance
farther?” ....
The talkers and faultfinders in the hinterland ought to be ashamed
to think that of us.
Have we not done enough for you by protecting you for so long?
I am facing the enemy for the fifth time. I was wounded four times,
as were many others also.And yet you question our loyalty and our
love for the Fatherland. You talkers are not deserving of our sacrifice.
You are to blame if war is lost! Just continue as you
the are and you
will soon find out what it means to have the enemy in the land.

The writer then goes on to say that the soldiers are being
told to desert. The promise that such action on the part of the
soldiers will lead to their speedy return to their homes is false.
“Do you know what the English did to the Boers in Africa?”
If the people in Alsace or East Prussia lose their spirit, there is

some reason for it, he says ;

but for those “in the hinterland,
who have not heard the aeroplanes humming above nor the

39 40 Ibid.,
Nachrichtenblatt der 18 Armee, No. 1. No. 3.
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 201

sound of bursting bombs, there is no excuse. Pull yourselves

41
together and give yourselves and us a new spirit.”
But all of no avail. The Allies were better propagandists.
The contrast between the British and the German propagandists
is stated very well by Karl von Vetter when he says

In these days the Briton shot not only with thousands of cannons,
tens of thousands of M.C. He not only shot from hundreds of air-
planes he not only rammed with thousands of tanks against us but
; ;

he flooded us with millions of leaflets. Comrades, you know them. You

remember how it would often take one’s breath, when he wanted to
say —had to say
—“That is swindle !” Our responsible officials knew
nothing of the soldier in the what he wanted, asked, suffered,
field,

and feared. No! They did not want to know. The English knew and
told it And then the enemy told us everything that the criminal
had got us into Election scandals, the thousands of soldiers’
grievances, compensation, and the food situation, the fanatical annexa-
tion idea —
were thrown to us in the midst of the battle. How could
all

it help but have an effect on the used-up, half-starved, troops? . . . .

The G.H.Q. put a high premium for the delivery of the leaflets. It did
not receive many. 42

The 21st number of the Nachrichtenblatt der 18 Armee

admitted defeat in the field of propaganda.
In the sphere of leaflet propaganda the enemy has defeated us.
Shooting poison darts from a secure hiding place was never a German
art. We realized, however, that this struggle is a life-and-death matter,
and that one has to fight the enemy with his own weapons. Yet the
spirit of the enemy leaflets skulks around and refuses to be killed. 43

This issue of the Nachrichtenblatt also described how the

Allied leaflets “took hold” of the German troops. At first the
strong person laughed at them ;
but later, when be began to
think over the contents, the “poison” started to work slowly.
As for the weak person, “his heart pounds rapidly. He is stag-
gered, begins to question, and finally becomes faint-hearted.”
41 Kolnische Volksseitung, October 31, 1918.
42
Karl von Vetter, Der Znsammenbruch der Westfront. Ludendorff ist

schuld! Die Anklage der Feldgrauen (Berlin, 1919), p. 8.

43 Nachrichtenblatt der 18 Armee, No. 21.
 Nachrichtenblatt der 1 8. Armee.

\ s A II Uh den 17 Srjil 1**1 *

Den Starken zur Wehr,

Oen Schwachen zur Staerkung,
Den Zwelflern zur Aufkl»rung.

Kameraden!
Wicdcrum isl mi htutlibi iicli drs I’cindcs an drills* hd TupU-i ini. AiiMiauri Mini
1 I » 1 1 : I »«* /t'I'M Ill'll I

\N irilci iiin ist mil ( iiittrs Sr^rn uud -M'llxitiuM'i Arlint cmc Knilc i>lu» klidt iimIi-i
Einacndungen

-3 wclclic dir I ni i lining in der lltdtiml sicliri sldlt.

c.
h i* Vluvcil (Ics I entiles iiiui dir %\ irlsdi.dtlidir Absjirrnin*; IuImmi also wirderum
MM.sa-l

Nmmidii stub! ilii Iciml dunadi, mil YrrtruuidmiK wad Yerdrcliitl»j»t*u die mit

I li misi-icr imiutcii I rout /u diirdibndu-n In lausciiden von F)unl>l:Htcrt». K< fjrl.v:.hl( n > i

/riUm^cn, hnn ksm hcn usw. vrrsurhl der I’Viud dax Veiirancu /u unaerrn Ffihrttn /u
nnld^iaboii Kr will drntsdn* Soldntcn /.inn I dicrlutifrti vcrleitcn. dutch die vciM hitHlcnslcn Feldpost

<u M.u Iichm baflcii toiderl cr mi N.iiiumi ..^nl^csmntci Dditschcf. die un Ansland sil/cn
sollm /uni (iciid aUtn ik atif In hodnilosrr I'livcrsclueratheit bc/citbuen \\ ilwm.
t ii indueati uml l.loyd (ieor^c miter undrrrin die Hera us^abc dcs Imkrn Hltcinufeis als an

Im ' ^s/icI der Kntenle ! /'vietraeht wollen sic s.cen /wise hr n nns srlbst, /wisdin* tins mid
A.
en Itnndrs^rnoHsrn.
O iinxei
c Du find rcdmcl also mil Seliwaeldieit, Vcr/aglhiMl und selileeliler (usmmm^ m 0.
3 I

nnsdi-n lleibeii. cm \nsinndt. das jedem l>< utsdirn in iH'reehtigtein, dul/eu Sdbxtlx'wnxxt- K.
C
4> a i da* 111 ul /n ImijiIV I r*'» 1*1 ans dem (»rlud;l licraus, w ie j*erin^ tins der I'Vind der (jan/ni
05 18,
C \\ ell ;*»•£«• n no her ein/iiseliiel/eii \\;ij;t !

3
05 \u! /tim Kampl jjc^cn dirse cni|Mk*reiidt‘n \ ersuelie ! Dimh v\ ahi hrils^eliciir Abt.

W'lderleuim^en wollen tvir aueli dieses hntcrlisti^c K«in|)fverlahren «les (iejjners /or*
sctil ini'll ! V.

I . 1 1
(• lldlie von Mnybl.rlldii wml him/.ii in .net li.slci Zed \rrledt \ierden. has U.
isl I •: Zivcel. tics

N achrichtenblattes der 18 Armee: .

Den Starken zur Wehr!

Den Schwachen zur Staerkung
Den Zwelflern zur Aufklaerung !

Weitergeben von Hand zu Hand.

German Counter-Propaganda
Calling on the German troops to disregard the “lies” of the Allies this
Nachrichtenblatt aimed to combat the propaganda of the Allies. It was
distributed to the men by their officers. The men were asked to pass it on
to others.
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 203

Then and third leaflets flutter down: “The strong

the second
becomes weak, the weak becomes feeble and broken in spirit.”
The enemy has defeated us not as man against man in the field of
battle, bayonet against bayonet. No, bad contents in poor printing on
poor paper has made our arm lame. 44

The propaganda of the Allies was supreme! We need only

to look at the differences in the promises of the two opposing
propaganda groups to discover the reason for this. The Allies
promised a just peace, bread, home, liberation of the German
people from Prussian “slavery,” and the destruction of military
autocracy. What had the Germans to promise their people?
What bright future could they hold up to their troops ?

He who promises bread, should he not find believers among the

hungry ? He who promises peace should he not find believers ?
45

DESERTIONS AMONG THE TROOPS

Much of the propaganda of the Allies was intended to en-
courage desertions from the ranks. The German soldiers were
informed not only that they would be well treated if they sur-
rendered to the Allies but that by such action they would hasten
the end of the war and the establishment of a republic in Ger-
many. Furthermore, the mass of troops were told to turn
their guns on their and thus free themselves from
officers
Prussian militarism. The officers were accused of keeping
plenty of food for themselves and forcing the men to suffer
hunger and privation. The soldiers were told that the odds were
against them, that their cause was hopeless. Add to all this the
news of the conditions at home where the wives, children, and
parents were suffering untold hardships, and you have enough
cause for discontent in any army. As General von Hindenburg
said
Dangers and work in the field, complaints from home, were de-
moralizing to the troops, especially when they could see no end to it.

The enemy said in his innumerable leaflets that he did not mean to be

44 Ibid. 45 Nachrichtenblatt der 18 Armee, No. 21.

204 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
harsh with us, that we should only be patient and renounce all that we

have conquered, then all would be well. We could then again live in
peace. New men and a new government would provide for peace within
Germany. Further struggle and efforts were useless.
Such the soldiers read and discussed. The soldiers thought surely
these could not all be lies, and permitted themselves to be poisoned and
poisoned others. 46

A decline in discipline among

was noted as early
the troops
as August 1917, and from then it grew more and more serious.
On June 13, 1918, a transport in Limberg had the following
inscriptions

Wir kiimpfen nicht fur Deutschlands Ehr’

Wir kampfen fur die Millionare. 47

After the retreat of the Marne in July 1918, Hindenburg

and Ludendorff met with the Kaiser to discuss the situation.
Ludendorff opened the conversation by admitting a great defeat
and stated that the war spirit of a number of the divisions left
much to be desired. He related that an attacking division of
troops, while coming back from the front, were called “strike-
48
breakers” and “war-prolongers.”
Official reports from the front also revealed the spirit among
the troops. One of these, in telling about the defeat of August
1918, states:

41st. Inf. Div. Div. S.T. Qu.

den 14 Aug. 1918
DIVISIONAL ORDER
. . . . Many troops of the division however, did not fulfill their duty.
All those who did not go to the front when the enemy no longer pressed
them, those who, instead of looking for and holding the front line, made
the front free for the enemy, and sought for .... some safe place,
have shamefully violated their oath to defend the flag

40 Generalfeldmarschal von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben (Leipzig,

1920), p. 360.
V U.D.Z., VI, 15.

48 Alfred Niemann, Revolution von Oben, Umsturz von Unden (Berlin,

1927), p. 87.
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 205

But those who threw away their weapons in order to get away
sooner, and not be led into the battle again, acted traitorously and
absolutely without honor
Gen. (name)
General-Major and Division Commander49

In General von Kuhl’s Report to the U ntersuchungsaas-

schusses we read about “desertions en masse, countless hordes
of men on furlough who returned to the front either very late
or not at and the “voluntary surrender to the enemy of en-
all,”

tire battalions and divisions.”

50
And in the Kolnische V olkszeit-
ung we read that in the spring of 1918 “it came to the point
where many soldiers deserted from the front. This took such
a great hold upon the men that a field court-martial had to be
51
instituted.”
No accurate figures on the number of German soldiers who
deserted to the Allies are available. The number is variously
estimated at from 40,000 to 50,000. This may be too high and it

may be too low. The Allied propagandists, of course, felt that

they caused deserters to come over to the Allies in great num-

bers. Lieutenant C. H. Ball, for example, says

.... Many a prisoner was brought in with a well-thumbed copy of a

booklet which had been printed on the American side and presented to
the Boches for “educational purposes.” Toward the end of the war the
number of prisoners thus equipped with reading matter grew so rapidly
as to create a serious housing problem. 52

The only record of desertions that we have is the record of

those who deserted to Holland during the last two months of
the war. According to a communication of the Institute In-
termediate International there were, after the institution of the
“Fremdenamt” on September 16, 1918, 4,009 German deserters
53
registered in Holland. If one allowed the same number for

49 The complete report is printed in Philipp Scheidemann, Der Zusant-

menbruch (Berlin, 1921), pp. 185-86.
50 U.D.Z., III, 212; also Lutz, The Causes of the German Collapse, p. 85.
51 Kolnische Volkszeitung, February 1919.
3,
82 New York Times, April 20, 1919, Section 7, p. 4.
53 U.D.Z., VI, 171.
206 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, and then added a
graduated percentage of the total thus obtained for deserters
before September 16, 1918, and another percentage for deser-
tions to the Allies, the total would probably run higher than
40,000.
The German High Command was feeling the effects of the
loss of troops. On June 23, 1918, General Ludendorff issued a
general order as follows

General Headquarters of the Army in the Field. Ia No. 8915

DESERTIONS
1. Every man going to the enemy will be punished with death on
return to Germany.
2. All his property within the country will be seized.
3. He will lose his citizenship; his next of kin will not have the right
to receive an allowance.
4. If a man is suspected of having betrayed his country, if only for
having been admitted into a so-called privileged camp, action will
be taken against him for treason to his country.
5. It is useless to reckon on escaping the penalty by remission or by
lapse of time
( Signed Ludendorff 54

However, even this threat of the officials did not stop deser-
tions. The soldiers were tired of the war. Since Germany could
promise them no relief, they accepted the invitation of the
Allies to desert. In the Allied prison camps they could find
relief. The feeling among the troops in this regard is well ex-
pressed in a letter of a German officer when he wrote on Janu-
ary 23, 1918
There are people who would rather desert, who would rather hang
themselves, than carry on another year. And these are not only the
lower but the higher level of the people. 55

LETTERS OF GERMAN SOLDIERS

Nowhere are the suffering and hardships of the war more
realistically described than in the letters of the soldiers. The

54 Summary of Information, A.E.F. Second Section, General Staff,

Vol. No. August 55 U.D.Z., V, 184, Anlage
II, 127, 6, 1918, p. 899. I.
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 207

German Michel not only was concerned over the conditions in

the army but was greatly disturbed over the situation behind the
front. Complaints from home came frequently in the latter part
of the war, while some came as early as the summer of 1916.
A letter from a German soldier, dated July 15, 1916, lamented:
Almost all of the letters from home are filled with complaints. The
wife complains that she, for instance, has to stand in the street at
night to get butter. Others fear the neglect of wife and children.
Comrades who have been in the Army only a short while tell of their
heroic deeds when they are home on furlough. What preparations
are being made to get the returning men into their occupations again?
They will in many cases find their positions taken. Many fears beset
them; twice I even heard the word “revolution” in this connection. 50

In many of the letters the capitalists were attacked as the

greedy ones who had brought on the war and who were pro-
longing it for their own good. One letter dated May 25, 1916,
exclaims
. ... or do we small tradesmen and middle-class people have to dig
our own graves here while the large landowners and big capitalists,
who are profiteering, are being relieved by substitutes, and we and our
families have to go to destruction. 57

The ever growing breach between the men and the officers
is illustrated by the entry that Joseph Merk made in his diary in

June 1917
June [1917], Again and again the crass difference between officers
and men shows itself. Most of the officers eat and drink well and work
hardly any at all. Behind in the resting places they almost tread on
each other’s feet. The average man and the General Staff carry the
burden in the war. The sentiment among all the men is worse than
bad. Only the officer is the fine man the other fellow is
;
a slave. 58 —
On
September 18, 1918, Field Marshal Duke Albrecht of
Wiirttemberg was moved to issue an army order concerning the
complaints that officers were given preference over other ranks
in the distribution of food and canteen supplies. Officers were
ordered to take steps “to prove that this kind of talk has no

56 U.D.Z., V, 183. 57 Ibid., 58 U.D.Z., V, 271.

p. 266.
208 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
foundation.” Another object of complaint, according to this
order,was that the officers sent home large quantities of food
which, it was said, they obtained from canteens at the expense
of the men’s share

I draw attention once more to these two points and expect the
strictest check to be exercised in this respect, especially at a time when
everything must be done to combat the growing discontent and lower-
ing morale at the front and at home. 59

Impatient over the prolonged peace negotiations at Brest-

Litovsk, the German soldiers showed evidence of the influence
of the Russian propaganda. S. Ludwig Schroder wrote to his
parents on January 20, 1918:

The peace is still not coming. It makes no difference to any of us

whether or not we get Courland, if only peace comes I came
out as a great idealist ;
but I am greatly disillusioned. Do not think
that we are going to keep quiet about all that we have seen and ex-
perienced. Things and must change in Germany.
will The Prussian
officer dare not be the man in the government. 60

And in a letter of February 1, 1918, the same writer said in

part

And whenthe World War is ended then will come the World
Revolution. As to that there is no longer any doubt among us. You
men there in Germany behind the green tables, who sit on your money
—
bags beware! “Well, wenn sich in dem Schoss der Stddte der Feuer-
znndcr still gehauft,” says Schiller. Yes, the barrel full to the top with
powder. A spark is enough. 61

On July 15, 1918, another soldier, Carl Lawrenz, of the

Landwehr-Infantry Regiment 2131, wrote to his aunt, Frau
Biindiger, in Charlottenburg:

My dear Martha writes that they want to take her cow out of her
stable. If that happens the war is over for me. The officers have so
many cows here in pasture that they suffer no hardship, and the officials

69 Summary Information, Second Section, General Staff, A.E.F.,

of
Vol. Ill, No. 219, p. 1403, November 6, 1918.
60 U.D.Z., V, 271. 61 Ibid.,
p. 281.
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 209

would take the bread from the tables of our family. They are starting
as they did in Russia. What have recently
the paper says is right. I

seen many things happen as they did in Russia. Officers go on leave

every 6 months while we have to wait 12 months 62

By the summer of 1918 many of the soldiers felt that they

were at the end of their strength. “At home the discontent
grows and out here one is already past the scolding stage and is
still. Not a good sign!”
63
From an entry in the War Diary of
Dr. Croner we get the following
August 9, an example of the absolute lack of
1918. But here is

the fighting spirit among our

They don’t want any more
troops.
From each soldier who comes from the front one hears, “We have
had enough.” 64

Almost complete submission to the will of the Allied propa-

gandists in certain sectors of the German Army is evinced
from from Lieutenant Werner Stephen, of
the following letter
the Reserve Infantry Regiment, No. 69, 12th Company, to
Fraulein Luise Stephen:
May 15, 1918
. . . . The Entente is right when it says that our endless-suffering
home-folks, our soldiers used to the last man, will have to collapse
sometime
“Believe in the victory” is the criterion for one or the other opin-
ion. At the front hardly a man of us believes in this any longer. 65

ARMY ORDERS DEALING WITH PROPAGANDA

In the course of 1918 the attacks on the morale of the
enemy became so numerous that the military officials sought
means of defense against this onslaught. Army orders were
issued which instructed the men to deliver immediately all prop-
aganda materials that they found, or suffer severe punishment.
Each German soldier received three marks for the first example
of a leaflet turned in and thirty pfennigs for each additional

62 Ibid., 62 U.D.Z., V, 184.

p. 298.
64 Ibid., 65 Ibid.,
p. 299. p. 294.
210 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
piece of propaganda literature. He received five marks for de-
68
livering a book.

To check the growing number of desertions the German

military authorities issued “Instructions and Rules of Guidance”
for the conduct of German soldiers who were taken prisoners
Not to be taken into the front line. To be issued to the rank and
file by companies for perusal, then collected again and filed by regi-
mental staff's for occasional re-issue and collection.
For a man to allow himself to be taken prisoner by the enemy with-
out having defended himself to the utmost is a dishonorable act equiva-
lent to treachery.

The document then continued by telling how the German pris-

oners were tortured by the Allies. It warned them emphatically
67
not to talk and give away any military secrets.
That German became recruits for the Allied propa-
soldiers
gandists in the last few months of the war is shown by the army
order of August 12, 1918.
15th Infantry Division
On the afternoon of August 9, propaganda tracts of a seditious
character, probably dropped by hostile aviators, were distributed along
the road from Bac D’Arblincourt to the canal by German soldiers . . . .

to passing soldiers.
Everyone will be strictly warned that all tracts, whether loose
leaves or packets tied up with a string, dropped by hostile aeroplanes
or found, will be immediately turned over to headquarters with a
statement of the place where they were picked up. It should be ex-
plained to the men, by citing the above example, how much damage
they may cause by thoughtlessly distributing these tracts, and that they
are liable to severe punishment.

66 Friedrich Felger, Was wir vom Weltkrieg nicht wissen, p. 502. The
totalnumber of leaflets that the German soldiers delivered during the three
months from May to July 1918 was as follows: in May, 84,000; in June,

120,000; in July, 300,000 (ibid.). In September in ten armies more than

803,760 leaflets were given up.
Estimating the total for the fourteen armies
on the West Front we reach the total of 1,100,000 leaflets in September 1918
alone (Thimme, Weltkrieg ohne Waffen, p. 50).
67 Great Britain, General Staff (Intelligence) translation of a German
document, July 1918 (SS. 737).
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 211

Every man in whose hands such a tract has been placed is in duty
bound to ascertain the name and unit of the distributor and report it. 68

General von Hutier’s order of August 29, 1918, gives us an

idea of the extent of Allied propaganda, and it also tells us what
the Germans thought of Lord Northcliffe:

XVIIIth Army August 29, 1918

ARMY ORDER
The enemy begins to realize thatwe cannot be crushed by blockade,
superiority of numbers, or force of arms. He is, therefore trying a
last resort : while engaging to the utmost his military force, he is

racking his imagination for ruses, trickery and other methods, of which
he is the past master, to induce, in the minds of the German people a
doubt in their invincibility. He has founded for this purpose a special
Ministry, “The Ministry for the Destruction of German Confidence,”
at the head of which he has put the most thoroughgoing scoundrel
[der geriebenste Schurke ] of all the Entente, Northcliffe The
letters of German prisoners are falsified in the most outrageous man-
ner; tracts and pamphlets are concocted to which the names of German
poets, writers and statesmen are forged His thought and aim
is that these forgeries.... may suggest a doubt even for a moment
in the minds of those who do not think for themselves and that their
confidence in their leaders, in their own strength and in the inexhaust-
ible resources of Germany may be shattered
Explain these infamous attempts to your young and inexperienced
comrades
Pick up the leaflets and pamphlets and give them to your com-
manders You will thus help the Command and you will help
to hasten the hour of victory.
von Hutier,
Infantry General and Army Commander69
The Division Order of September 1, 1918, No. 9688, in
compliance with Army Order, lid, Section No. 85704 (secret)
of August 24, 1918, pointed out the dangers caused by the
ever increasing propaganda tracts of the Allies. It gave orders
for the officials to refute the propaganda. A few of the points
to which the order called attention follow

68 Summary of Information, Vol. Ill, No. 157, September 5, 1918, p. 1054.

69 Ibid., No. 171, September 19, 1918, p. 1126.
212 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
a) In every single case it must be admitted that the authorities do not
know of the presence of tracts before they have been read and the
troops have assimilated them. That is why the arguments of these
tracts should be refuted by us by facts and persuasion.
b ) Each officer may under the necessity of refuting these
find himself
tracts as is set forth in (a) and should be capable of so doing,
relying in the main on facts as they exist
c) Explanation and reaction must be rapid. Chiefs of regiments and
separate units are held responsible that they combat without delay
and by every means the errors and sentiments which enemy tracts
have instilled in the troops.
d) A man of a unit of the 239th Division recently found in a copy of
the Cologne Gazette, which he had bought, a seditious tract. An-
other one of exactly the same nature which must surely have come
from another newspaper was found in a camp at Kairschesch
It has not been determined whether these tracts came from the
press of the Cologne Gazette itself or whether they were shipped
in with the papers after their arrival in the circulating field li-

brary
Report in detail, without fail, each new case of this kind.
( Signed ) Paschen 70

Wilson’s peace proposals and his Fourteen Points had a

decided effect on the morale of the soldiers. An army order of
September 16, 1918, instructed the officers to counteract, with
every possible means, the effect of Wilson’s proposals.

119th Inf. Div. Ia/II No. 4233. Secret

DIVISIONAL ORDER
The latest peace manifesto carries with it the great danger of
weakening the fighting determination of our troops. It is now the
first duty of each and every officer to counteract this pernicious result

by every means possible.

It is advisable, first of all to lay down the facts of the Peace Note

as briefly as possible.
In spite of this, discussion as to the note is bound to arise amongst
the rank and file. This will afford the best opportunity for officers to
influence their men in an unconstrained manner. It will be advisable
for this purpose to secure the support of the more intelligent and
reliable men
70 Summary of Information, Vol. Ill, No. 178, September 26, 1918, p. 1156.
 MEASURING THE EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA 213

The men must be influenced, in a serious but kindly manner to use

their weapons in order to withstand the enemy’s attack It must
never be allowed to happen that strong detachments should be captured
by the enemy .... without noise of fighting being heard
We must shoot and we must fight; then no enemy will be able to
break through and peace will be with us sooner than many think pos-
sible.

This work of instructing the men and of winning them over is now
the most important duty of all officers.

( Signed ) Hagenberg 71

Many other army orders were of the same tone. Always

the appeal was for the troops to disregard the leaflets or for
the officers to take steps to counteract them. During the months
of September and October German high officials appealed di-
rectly to the people and the troops to disregard the propaganda
and to keep their fighting spirit. In the V ossische Zeitung for
September 8, 1918, Freytag-Loringhoven pleaded for a new
spirit in the face of difficulties. He asked his readers to re-
member the spirit of the Prussian people in 1811 when they
72
faced Napoleon, and pleaded for this same spirit to the end.
On September 2, 1918, von Hindenburg issued his famous
address to the German people which was printed on a large
placard and posted throughout the Empire. In this he told of
the attacks the enemy was making on the spirit of the German
soldiers and people behind the lines.

Summary of Information, Vol. Ill, No. 192, October 10, 1918, p. 1249.
71

From an order of October 17 we learn that the Allies were making use of
the radio to influence the German soldiers. “The messages,” said the order,
“contain unfavorable reports on our political, military, and economic situa-
tion.” Immediate counteractive measures were enjoined. To this effect the
following orders were issued
“1. The receiving of German Communiques and of German news service
from now on is permitted to all Army radio stations.
“2. The receiving of communiques, news service and propagandistic appeals
of the enemy, often in German, clearly is forbidden.”
Three stations only were to be allowed to receive this propaganda, and these
were ordered to send it to the station commander “without allowing it to be
seen by a third person” {ibid., No. 226).
72 V ossische Zeitung, September 8, 1918.
214 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
We are in a terrible struggle against our enemies. If numbers
Germany would have been defeated long since.
alone decided the war,
The enemy knows, however, that Germany and her associates are not
to be defeated by force of arms alone.
The enemy knows that the spirit,which prevails among our troops,
is making us victorious. For that reason he has begun, besides the
struggle against German military force, a struggle against the spirit
of the Germans. He wants to poison the spirit of the Germans and
believes that our military force will cease when the spirit is destroyed.
We must not take this plan of the enemy too lightheartedly
Therefore, German soldiers and people, if one of these poisonous
pieces comes to you in the form of a leaflet, or a rumor, remember that
it comes from the enemy
Resist it, German people and soldiers
( Signed ) von Hindenburg

Generalf'eldmarschal 73

The Kaiser also sent out an appeal which was published

in the 10th number of the N achriclitenblatt der 18 Armee:

To the German Army and the German Navy. For months past
the enemy has been storming our lines with immense efforts of strength
and without any pause in the fighting. You have to endure and defy
the numerically far superior enemy during weeks of struggle, often
without rest
Troops of all German tribes are doing their duty and defending the
Fatherland heroically on foreign soil.

The position of my fleet, in asserting itself against the combined

enemy naval forces and assisting the Army in its hard struggle of
their untiring work, is a difficult one
The hour is grave. However, in reliance on our strength and on
God’s gracious help, we feel ourselves strong enough to defend our
beloved country.
Great Headquarters
October 4, 1918
Wilhelm I. R.
Everyone’s initiative and co-operation is being sought
Communications via field-mail to A.O.K. 18, Division V.U.
(To be passed from hand to hand.) 74
73 See illustration on next page.
74 N achriclitenblatt der 18 Armee, No. 10; also Lutz, The Fall of the
German Empire, I, 166-67.
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tangra nidtl. Bit bantu mrit 6diffe aid fit Dtr(ralre. Cntt ftanbtl iR Dmrfdtft.

©eueralfcIbmarf^alL

A Message Hindenburg
This message of September 2, 1918, was posted throughout Germany.
The Fieldmarshal appeals to the German people to remain loyal and to pay
no attention to the propaganda of the enemy and the revolutionists within
Germany.
216 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
But neither Hindenburg’s nor the Kaiser’s appeals were
heeded in some quarters. The Leip 2 iger V olkszeitung gives us
an idea of how they were received when it says in the issue of
November 2, 1918
For the Crown of Wilhelm II to uphold the military apparatus and
;

the power of Hindenburg the people are being goaded on to continue

the fight. No more war! Immediate peace! Full political freedom!
Down with militarism! .... Long live the Socialist Republic! 75

The people behind the lines and the soldiers had been
“swamped by enemy propaganda.” 76 The morale of the troops
had dropped to the lowest possible level. Ludendorff wired to
Berlin to request an immediate armistice of the Allies. On
October 3 Hindenburg and a major of the General Staff ap-
peared before Prince Max of Baden and told of the precarious
condition of the Army. Von Kiihlman recognized the im-
possibility of a victory for Germany in view of the state of
mind of army and the
the home front. Germany had been
“hypnotized by the enemy propaganda as a rabbit is by a
77
snake.”
Thus, even though, as the French Deputy Favry stated in
the FrenchChamber on February 25, 1920, the Allies “saw the
German army, at the end of the war, as well equipped as is pos-
sible,” was something
there lacking. He explains what that
something was when he says that the German Army “did not
have behind it the support of the home front and the will of
everyone to give the sacrifices necessary for war, and to con-
tinue the war. It has been demonstrated by this war that a
strong army is doomed to failure if it does not have behind it
78
the whole-hearted support of the people.”

75 Leipsiger V olkszeitung November 2, 1918.

78 Ludendorff, My War Memories, II, 642.
77 Ibid., I, 361.

78 France, Assemblee Nationale, Annales de la Chambre des Deputes,

Debats parlementaires, Session ordinaire de 1920 (Paris, 1920), Tome I,

p. 235.
 CONCLUSION
The enemy propaganda
highest aim of
the revolutionizing of Germany has come to—
pass. —
Max Schwarte, Der Grosse Krieg, III,
494

An accurate estimate of the relative importance of the part

played by propaganda in bringing about the collapse of the Ger-
man Empire is impossible. It is impossible to give the exact
percentages of victory due to any arm of would
the service. Who
say, for instance, that to the air service should be given 42
per cent of the credit for Germany’s defeat and to the artillery
30 per cent? Or who would even venture to apportion the credit
between the different Allied armies? How much more difficult
it is then to weigh imponderables —
states of army morale and
the ideas which influence them As between the effects of
!

leaflets and shells it must be remembered that shell-fire worked

in plainer view, and that it is difficult to put a yardstick to re-

sults produced by leaflets picked up unobserved, pondered un-
observed, and, even when acted upon, probably denied by the
German who surrendered.
We have seen throughout this study, and particularly in the
last chapter, the important part that propaganda played in the
war against Germany. We have seen how it reached the soldiers
in the trenchesand the people behind the lines. We have seen how
it educated them to the war aims of the Allies and showed them

weaknesses of the German forces in comparison with the Allied

strength. We have seen further how the propaganda aimed to
destroy the hope of a German victory and how it sought to give
the enemy a new hope of a “better and how finally the
life,’’

“paper bullets” encouraged them to overthrow their govern-

ment, rid themselves of the militarists and Junkers, and thereby
bring Germany back into the society of nations.

217
218 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Allied propaganda, therefore, sought to work not only nega-
tively but positively as well. It not only aimed at the destruction
of the Empire but also gave promise of a new
new nation and a
day. It sought to awaken a new spirit of freedom and a new
nationalism in the hearts of the German people. While attack-
ing the autocratic system, it praised democracy and showed the
superiority of a democratic government over an autocratic gov-
ernment. And, premium upon the overthrow of
finally, it set a
the Hohenzollern dynasty in the form of promises of mild peace
terms and aid in restoring the economic life of the new Ger-
many.
These promises could not help but have an effect upon a
war-weary German people and the battle-scarred German troops.
In the army the effect was shown by the decline in discipline
directly traceable to propaganda. General Marwitz stated in
in an army order in June 1918: “The discipline, which is the

keystone of our army is seriously shaken.” 1 The Second Guard

Division, which was one of the best divisions in the German
army, “lost over 1450 prisoners in the fighting near Peronne
in August.” The prisoners of this division taken near Epehy
even exhibited “every sign of pleasure at being captured. Each
fresh batch of prisoners brought into the cage was greeted with
2
delight at our success.”
Behind the lines among the German people the effect was
shown by bitterness and despondency that were all too prevalent
during the last few months of the war. Siegfried Heckscher,
head of the publicity department of the Hamburg-America
Lines and a member of the Reichstag, summarized this feeling
when he wrote in the Vossische Zeitung on July 7, 1918:
Hundreds of thousands of Germans, when they have read a pro-
nouncement by the President of the United States, ask themselves in
despondency and bitterness what the German government says. So

1 General Headquarters,
Great Britain, General Staff ( Intelligence ),
June 1918 (SS. 753).
2 Great Britain, General Staff (Intelligence ) General Headquarters, Sep-
,

tember 1918 (SS. 753).

 CONCLUSION 219

there is formed a cloud of discontent and dull doubt which, in a great

part, thanks to this Northcliffe propaganda, spreads itself more and
more over the German people
We try to shut our country off from the enemy espionage and from
the work of agents and rascals but with open eyes we leave it defense-
less while a stream of poisonous speeches pours over our people
I repeat today what
have said for years, that Reuter and the
I

English news propaganda are mightier than the English fleet and more

dangerous than the English army. 3

However, it must be remembered that propaganda was only

one of the many weapons used in the war to combat the enemy
and that it could not have been successful without the aid of
the military forces and the conditions within Germany. After
all, the odds were against Germany. The British blockade had

such an effect upon Germany that by the spring of 1918 many

4
people were actually on the verge of starvation. This situation
reacted unfavorably upon the spirit of the people, for empty or
unsatisfied stomachs prejudice all higher impulses and tend to
make people indifferent. As one German authority expressed it
“The people lived not only bodily but spiritually from hand to
mouth.” 5
The German soldier lived under a continual strain, for he
was facing great difficulties. He groped for a last straw. This
last straw, this last ray of hope, was given him by the propa-

gandists.
Without the British blockade and the help of America the
propagandists would have made little headway in their attacks
upon the morale of the enemy. America, by her entrance into
the war, opened up new resources and gave a new spirit to the
Allies, while the blockade was paralyzing the material resources
of Germany and having a depressing effect upon the spirit of
her people. “Dark tidings flowed in upon Great Headquarters”
and, as Winston Churchill expressed it,

The German nation had begun to despair and the soldiers became con-
scious of their mood. Ugly incidents occurred. Desertions increased,

3 Vossische Zeitung, July 1918. 4 U.D.Z., I, 340. 5 Ibid., VI, 49.

7,
220 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
and the leave men were reluctant to return. The German prisoners
liberated from Russia by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk returned infected
with the Lenin virus. In large number they refused to go again to the
front. A campaign of unmerited reproach was set on foot against the
German officer class. Their painstaking and thorough routine which
had enabled them on all fronts to exact two Ally lives for every Ger-
man, was no protection from the charge that they did not share the
privations of the troops. 6

Lieutenant General Altrock describes the situation in the

following words
Our people gave the best. It struggled and suffered, hungered and
bled, until finally the ground was prepared for the propagandists of
the enemy, in union with the enemies within our country who were de-
sirous of our downfall, to accomplish their end. 7

Perhaps the best picture of the gradual disappearance of the

morale of the German troops is given by L. G. Knesebeck, when
he says that in the first year of the war the soldiers spoke of
“death in the field of honor” ;
in the second year they spoke of
“giving our lives for the Fatherland” ;
in the third year they
spoke of “falling in a foreign land in the fulfillment of our
duty” ;
and in the fourth year they spoke of “dying as a further
offering to this terrible war.”*
Thus it cannot be denied that the propaganda of the Allies
was effective. Allied authorities were generally agreed that,
sooner or later, Germany would be defeated ;
but even the most
authoritative people thought that this defeat could not be ac-
complished before August 1919. Thus propaganda probably
helped to hasten the end of the war. Speaking of this fact the
London Times stated :

Good propaganda probably saved a year of war, and this meant the
saving of thousands of millions of money and probably at least a mil-
lion lives. 9

6 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis 1916-1918 (New York, 1927),

II, 218.
7
Lieutenant General von Altrock, Deutschlands Niederbruch, p. 18.
8 Wahrheit iiber den Propaganda Feldzug und
L. G. Knesebeck, Die
Deutschlands Zusammenbruch (Munich, 1927), p. 117.
9 The Times (London),
October 31, 1918.
 CONCLUSION 221

On November 10, 1918, the day before the Armistice, Lord

Northcliffe was entertained in Paris at a dejeuner d’honneur by
the Continental Daily Mail. In the course of his speech on the
war situation he summarized the work of the propagandists as
follows

We have conducted our propaganda through many channels and in

increasing volume, and our leaflets and other publications have amounted
to many millions of copies every week.
If we have to some extent hastened the end, it is due to the fact that
we are a company of experts and enthusiasts, and from the outset there
has been a concentration of purpose born of complete unity
Ours has been a bloodless campaign and a costless one. I wish that
we had embarked upon it at an earlier stage of the war. 10

Dr. Philipp stated before the Committee of Inquiry that,

while was difficult to measure the influence of enemy propa-
it

ganda, “I do not believe that without its successful help the

German downfall could have succeeded as it did.” 11
When, therefore, all allowances have been made and all ex-
travagant estimates pared to the bone, “the fact remains, propa-
ganda is one of the most powerful instrumentalities in the
modern world.” 12 And, as history has shown, the highest aim
—
of enemy propaganda the revolutionizing of Germany came —
to pass.
Thus, propaganda was an important instrument of warfare
during the world conflict, and without a study of the part it

played no historian can come to a real conclusion as to the causes

of the collapse of the German Empire in 1918.

10 Ibid., November 1918.

11,
11 U.D.Z., V, 167.
12 Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, 220.
p.
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 BIBLIOGRAPHY 225

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the gospel of America to every corner of the globe. New York and
London, 1920.
Cutlack, Fredric Morley. The Australian Flying Corps in the West-
ern and Eastern Theatres of War 1914—1918. Sidney, 1923.
Demartial, Georges. La Guerre de 1914; comment on mobilisa les
consciences. Rome, Paris, [etc.], 1922.
Drahn, Ernst, and Leonhard, Susanne. Unterirdisches Literatur
228 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
im revolutiondren Deutschland wdhrend des IV eltkrieqes. Berlin,
1920.
Eltzbacher, Paul. Die Presse als W erkzeuq der answartiqen Politik.
Jena, 1918.
Ernst, Wilhelm. Die antideutsche Propaganda durch das Schweizer
Gebiet im Weltkrieg, speziell die Propaganda im Bayern. Munich,
1933.
Felger, Friedrich, ed. Was wir vom Weltkrieg nicht wissen. Berlin
and Leipzig, 1929.
Hansi and Tonnelat, A Travers les lignes ennemies, Trois annees
d’ offensive contre le moral Allemand. Paris, 1922.
Hentig, Hans von. Psychologische Strategic des grossen Krieges.
Heidelberg, 1927, Vol. IV.
Hinter der Kulissen des franzosischen J ournalismus ,
i’on einem Pariser
Chefredakteur. Berlin, 1925.
Huber, Dr. George. Die franzosische Propaganda im Weltkrieg gegen
Deutschland 1914 bis 1918. Munich, 1928.
Knesebeck, Ludolf Gottschalk von dem. Die Wahrheit iiber den
Propaganda Feldzug und Deutschlands Zusammenbruch; der Kampf
der Publizistik im Weltkrieg. Munich, 1927.
Kuhl, Hermann von. Enstehung, Durchfiihrung und Zusammenbruch
der Offensive von 1918. Berlin, 1927.
Lambach, Walther. Ursachcn des Zusammenbruchs. Hamburg, 1919.
Lasswell, Harold D. Propaganda Technique in the World War.
London and New York, 1927.
Lewinsohn, Ludwig. Die Revolution an der Westfront. Charlotten-
burg, 1919.
Liddell Hart, Basil Henry. The Real War 1914—1918. London,
1930.
Molter, Bennett A. Knights of the Air. New York and London,
1918.

Moser, Dr. Otto von. Kurzen strategischen Uberblick iiber den Welt-
krieg 1914-1918. Berlin, 1923.
Muehlon, William. The Vandal of Europe. Translated from the
German by W. L. McPherson. New York, 1918.
Muhsam, Dr. Kurt. Wie wir belogen warden. Munich, 1918.
Muller, Oscar. W
arum inusten wir nach Versailles Kriegspres-
seamt publications, No. 1.

Muller, Richard. Vom Kaiserrcich zur Rcpublik. Vienna, 1924. 2

vols.
Netter, Eugene. Der seelische Zusammenbruch der deutschen Kampf-
front. Munich, 1925.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 229

Nicolai, Walter. N achrichtendienst Presse und V olksstimmung Ber-

lin, 1920.
The German Secret Sendee. Translated with an additional
.

chapter by GeorgeRenwick. London, 1924.

Niemann, Alfred. Revolution von Oben, Umsturz von Unden. Ber-
lin, 1927.
. Reichsniedergang. Munich, 1919.
Pterrefeu, Jean de. French Headquarters 1915-1918. Translated
from the French by Major C. J. C. Street, O.B.E., M.C. London,
1927.
Powell, E. Alexander. The Army Behind the Army. New York,
1919.
Rechberg, Arnold von. Reichsniedergang Munich, 1919.
Reed, John. Ten Days That Shook the World. New York, 1919.
Rosenberg, Arthur. The Birth of the German Republic. Translated
from the German by Ian F. D. Morrow. London, 1931.
Runkel, Dr. Ferdinand. Die Deutsche Revolution. Leipzig, 1919.
Scheidemann, Philipp. Der Zusammenbruch. Berlin, 1921.
Schwertfeger, Oberst. Ursachen des Zusammenbruchs. Berlin, 1923.
Spaight, J. M. Air Power and War Rights. London and New York,
1924.
Stern-Rubarth, Dr. Edgar. Die Propaganda als politisches Instru-
ment. Berlin, 1921.
Stieve, Friedrich. Gedanken iiber Deutschland. Jena, 1920.
Stuart, Sir Campbell. Secrets of Crewe House. London and New
York, 1920.
Thimme, Hans. Weltkrieg ohne Waffen. Die Propaganda der West-
machte gegen Deutschland, ihre Wirkung und ihre Abwehr. Stutt-
gart and Berlin, 1932.
Ungewitter, Richard. Deutschlands Wiedergeburt durch Blut und
Eisen. Stuttgart, 1919.
Vetter, Karl von. Der Zusammenbruch der Westfront. Ludendorff
ist schuld! Die Anklage der Feldgrauen. Berlin, 1919.

Viereck, George Sylvester. Spreading Germs of Hate. New York,

1930.
Wolf, Professor Dr. Heinrich. Angewandte Geschichte. Band 4,
Weltgeschichte der Liige. Leipzig, 1925.
Wright, Quincy, ed. Public Opinion and World Affairs. Chicago,
1933.
Wrisberg, Ernst. Der Weg zur Revolution 1914-1918. Leipzig, 1921.
Young, George. The New Germany. London, 1920.
230 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
PAMPHLETS
(No attempt is here made to list all of the pamphlet material used
in this research. In order that this bibliography may not be too lengthy,
only the most important pamphlets are listed.)

Adler, Victor. Die Arbeit Bewegung im Kanipfe gegen den alten

Klassenstaat. Socialistische Bucherei. Heft 10. Wiener Volksbuch-
handlung, 1919.
Altrock, Generalleutnant. Militarische-politische Zeit und Streit-
fragen. Heft 3. Berlin, 1919.
Baudrillart, Alfred. Notre propagande. Edition Speciale de la Re-
vue Hcbdomadaire. Paris, 1918.
Baumgarten, Friedrich. Das Landwehr-Infanterie Regiment. Nr. 25.
Erinnerungsblatter Deutsche Regimenter.
Baumgarten, Otto. Die Schuld am deutschen Zusammenbruch. Tage-
buchblatter eines hoheren preussischen Verwaltungsbeamter. Tu-
bingen, 1918.
. Vaterlandsdienst Flugblatter der deutschen Korrespondenz.
Nr. 6. Flugblatter series.
Beer, Dr. Max. Der demokratische Gedanke im Kriegfuhrenden
Deutschland. Bern, 1918.
Binder, H. Was wir als Kriegsbericht erst after nicht sagen durften.
(Private print of the author.) Munich, 1919.
Der “Dolchstoss” ; Warum das deutsche Heer Zusammenbruch (von
eincm Soldat von der Front). Berlin, 1920.
Gothein, Georg. Warum verloren mir den Kricg? Stuttgart and Ber-
lin, 1919.
Haenggi, Karl. Die deutsche Propaganda und die Schweizer Presse.
Bern, 1918.
Kantorowicz, Hermann. Der Offiziershass im deutschen Heer. Frei-
burg im Breisgau, 1919.
Koester, Dr. Adolf. Fort mit der Dolchstoss Lcgende! Warum wir
1918 nicht welter kdmpfen konnten. Berlin, 1922.
Lehmann, Russbuldt. Warum erfolgte der Zusammenbruch an der
Westfrontf Flugerabunirftes des bundes Neues Vaterlandes, Nr. 3.
Berlin, 1919.
Northcliffc, die Gcschichte des englischcn Propagandafcldzuges. Ber-
lin, 1921.
Plenge, Johann. Durch Umsturz zum Aufbau. Munster i. Westf.
1918.
Rawitz, Prof. Dr. Berhard. Deutschlands Zusammenbruch und Wie-
deraufrichtung. Gegenwartsfragen II Reihe. Berlin, n.d.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 231

Stadtler, Dr. E. Der Bolshewismus und seine Uberwindung. Revo-

lutions Streitfragen, 6 Heft, Berlin, 1919.
Wernsdorf, Julius. Dies Buck gehort deni Bundesrat. Eine Studie
die “deutschen Republikaner in der Schweiz” wahrend des Welt-
krieges. Zurich, 1918.
Zimmerman, Bodo. Der Zusammenbruch. Berlin, 1919.
Zwehl, General Hans von. Der Dolchstoss in den Rucken des Sieg-
reichen Heeres. Berlin, 1921.

MAGAZINE ARTICLES
“Allied Propaganda,” Bellman, Vol. XXV, October 26, 1918.
Aston, Sir George, “Propaganda and the Father of It,” Cornhill
Magazine, XXXXVIII, pp. 233-44.
“Bernstorff Explains Why Germany Lost,” Current Opinion, LXIX,
August 1920.
Blankenhorn, Heber, “War of Morale; How America Shelled the
German Lines with Paper,” Harpers' Magazine, CXXXIX, 1919.
Clark, V. S., “The German Press and the War,” Historical Outlook,
Vol. X, November 1919.
Creel, George, “America’s Fight for World Opinion,” Everybody’s
Magazine, Vol. XL, February 1919.
“Der Grosse Betrug,” Suddeutsche Monatshefte, July 1921.
“Fashions in Propaganda,” New Republic, Vol. 19, July 2, 1919.
Ford, G. Stanton, “The Committee of Public Information,” Historical
Outlook, Vol. XI, March 1920.
“Government Propaganda,” Nation, Vol. CVIII, March 1, 1919.
“Government and Propaganda,” Nineteenth Century, Vol. LXXXV,
January 1919.
Herrick, R., “Paper War,” Dial, Vol. LXVI, February 8, 1919.
Hiltebrandt, Philipp, “Propaganda und Kriegsziele,” Deutsche
Rundschau, Vol. CLXXVI.
Irwin, Will, “Age of Lies: How the Propagandists Attack the Foun-
dation of Public Opinion,” Sunset, XLIII, December 1919.
Lauterpracht, H., “Propaganda by Governments,” Transactions of
Grotius Society, Vol. XIII.
Loringhoven, Freytag, “Heersverfassung und Volksmoral,” Deutsche
Rundschau, Vol. CLXXIX, April 1919.
“Ludendorff Realizes Defeat in 1918,” Current History, Vol. X, Part 2,

July 1919.
Ludwig, Emil, “The Great Revolt at Kiel,” Living Age, Vol. CCC,
March 29, 1919.
232 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Meinecke, Frederich, “Die geschichtliche Ursachen der deutschen
Revolution,” Deutsche Rundschau, Vol. CLXXIX, May 1919.
“Moral Breakdown of Germany,” Public, Vol. XXI, August 31, 1918.
“Our Publicity Offensive,” Literary Digest, Vol. LX, February 8, 1919.
“Propaganda Poison,” American Law Review, Vol. LIII, January
1919.
Slosson, E. E., “Propaganda and Projectiles,” Independent, Vol.
XCIII, March 30, 1918.
Street, C. J. C., “Behind the Enemy Lines,” Cornhill Magazine,
XXXXVII (1919).
“Success of Allied Propaganda,” Literary Digest, Vol. LIX, October 5,

1918.
Siiddeutsche Monatshefte, Jahrgang 21, 1923-24 (April and May 1924).
Vencesi, Ernesto, “The Roman Congress of Oppressed Nationali-
ties,” New Europe, May 2, 1918.

NEWSPAPERS
Berliner Tageblatt, 1917-1918. (Berlin).
Kolnische Volkszeitung November 1915 —November 1918. (Cologne).
Kolnische Zeitung, 1918. (Cologne).
Labor Leader, May 1918 to November 1918. (London).
The Times (London) (see index for 1917-1919).
Muncher-Augsburger Abendzeitung, September 1918. (Munich).
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 1918. (Berlin).
Stars and Stripes, official newspaper of the A.E.F. in France. Vols.
I— II, February 8, 1918, to June 13, 1919. Paris, 1918-1919.
Vorzuarts, 1917-1918. (Berlin).
Vossische Zeitung, 1918. (Berlin).

MISCELLANEOUS
Almanach Catholique frangaise pour 1920. Pub. sous le patronage du
Comite Catholique de propagande franqaise a l’etranger. Paris,
1920.
Times History of the War. (London) Vol. XXI. “British Propa-
ganda in Enemy Countries.” Printed and published by The Times,
London, 1920.
Dearle, N. B. Dictionary of Official War-Time Organizations. Lon-
don, 1928.
Vic, Jean. La Manuel methodique et critique
Litterature de Guerre.
des publications de langue franqaise (Aout 1914 11 Novembre —
1918). Ouvrage couronne par l’Academie franqaise. 5 vols. Paris,
1923.
 APPENDIX A
Letter from the director of the Bavarian Archives verifying
the citations in Ernst, Die antideutsche Propaganda durch
das schiveizer Gebiet im Weltkrieg, speziell die Propaganda
in Bayern.
22. August 1935
An Herrn George G. Bruntz
136 Loma Alta Ave.
Los Gatos
California, U.S.A.
Zu Ihrem Schreiben von 8. Juli 1935.
An den Generaldirektor der Staatl. Archive Bayerns.
Die gewiinschte Nachpriifung der Broschiire Ernst hat ergeben, das
die erwanten Zitate in den Akten des ehem. bayer. Kriegsministeriums
einwandfrei belegt und wortlich genau wiedergegeben sind.
Der Verfasser der Broschiire ist Uberdies rem bayer. Kriegs-
archiv als gewissenhafter Wissenschaftler wohlbekant.
J. A.
{Signed) Schad

233
 APPENDIX B
Correspondence regarding the names of the six Swiss jour-
nalists who came to America in 1918 to view the prepara-
tions America had made for the war. The first letters to Mr.
George Creel and Mrs. Vira Whitehouse are not included
because they were merely letters of inquiry.

1. Reply of Mr. George Creel to the inquiry from the writer regarding
the names of the Swiss journalists who, he states in his official
Report of the work of the C.P.I., were brought over here for propa-
ganda purposes.
September 23, 1935
My dear Mr. Bruntz:
I did not receive your first letter, hence my failure to answer it.

I am sorry not to be able to give you the information you request

but it would require a visit to the Congressional Library, and possibly
days of research, and I simply have not the time.
Mrs. Whitehouse wrote a book, and you may be able to find it in

one of your libraries out there.

Sincerely,

( Signed ) George Creel

2. Letter from Mrs. Vira B. Whitehouse in reply to one from the

writer requesting the names of the six Swiss journalists who came
to America under the auspices of the American C.P.I.

October 15, 1935

My dear Mr. Bruntz:
I trust you will pardon my delay in answering yours of
that
Sept. 30th but have been away and very busy. It seems ridiculous
I

that I can not tell you off hand the names of the Swiss journalists who
came to the United States for the Committee of Public Information in
1918, but 17 very busy years is a long time! I am no longer young but
I do not yet sit in an arm chair and think over old times.

There was, I know, a Monsieur Martin (one of the troublesome

prima donnas) from the Journal de Geneve and a Herr Oeuri or Uri
from the Basler Nachrichten. If you should write to either one of them,
if they are alive, they could tell you of the others.

234
 APPENDIX B 235

You ask also what German newspapers used the stories these jour-
nalists wrote. own Swiss papers, of course, used their stories
Their
and they were commented upon in German papers as the Swiss neutral
papers were closely studied in Germany. The office of the Committee
of Public Information in Bern had of course a clipping bureau but
I do not know what happened to its records I should think all

records must have been destroyed

Yours sincerely,
( Signed ) Vira B. Whitehouse

3. Letter sent to Herr Oeri of the Basler Nachrichten.

Cher Monsieur,
Je suis en train d’ecrire ma dissertation pour mon doctorat a la
Hoover War Library de l’Universite de Stanford, et je traite le sujet
“Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918.”
Une partie de cette recherche concerne le travaildu American Com-
mittee on Public Information. En 1918, Madame Vira Whitehouse
etait l’agent americaine du comite, et elle a persuade un groupe de
journalistes suisses a venir aux Etats-Unis. Elle m’avise que vous
etiez un de ceux qui vinrent aux Etats-Unis pour vous rendre compte
de la preparation militaire et industrielle de ce pays pour la guerre.
Madame Whitehouse ne peut me donner la liste des autres jour-
nalistes, en consequence, je me demande si vous pourriez me la fournir.
De plus, connaitreriez-vous quelques journaux qui ont publie les
comptes-rendus de ces journalistes pendant leur sejour aux Etats-Unis?
Je vous serais infiniment reconnaissant des renseignements qu’il vous
sera possible de me fournir, et dans l’attente du plaisir de vous lire, je
vous prie de croire, Cher Monsieur, a l’expression de mes sentiments
distingues.
George G. Bruntz
P.S. Repondez en allemand si cela vous est plus facile.

4. Reply of Herr Oeri of the Basler Nachrichten, to the preceding.

Sehr geehrter Herr,

In Beantwortung Ihrer geschatzten Zeilen vom 8 Dezember teile

ich Ihnen mit, dass die Swiss press Delegation von 1918 aus folgenden
Herren bestand:
1. JDr. Ed. Feuter, Neue Zuricher Zeitung, Zurich.
2. fDr. William Martin, Journal de Geneve, Geneve.
3. J. Elie David, Gazette de Lausanne, Lausanne.
4. *Ernst Schurch, Bund, Bern.
236 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
5. *Dr. Edwin Strub, National-Zeitung, Basel.
6. *Dr. Albert Oeri, Busier Nachrichten, Basel.
Die mit + bezeichneten Herren sind unterdessen gestorben. Die
mit * bezeichneten Herren haben ihre Zeitungsartikel in Broschuren
zusammengefasst, die ich als Druchsache separat habe an Sie abgehen
lassen. Ob Zeitungsnummern mit den Artikeln der Herren Feuter,
Martin und David noch zu haben sind, weiss ich nicht. Sie erkundigen
sich am besten direkt bei den betreffenden Redaktionen.
Unsere Einladung nach U.S.A. durch das Committee on Public
Information des Herrn Creel hatte den Zweck, durch die Schweizer-
presse, die wahrend des Kriegs auch in Deutschland viel gelesen wurde,
den Deutschen den richtigen Begriff vom Rustungs und kriegswillen
der Amerikaner beizubringen, an den sie immer noch nicht recht glau-
ben wollten. Dadurch, dass der Waffenstillstand wahrend unserer
Heimreise geschlossen wurde, viel naturlich dieser Zweck dahin. Aber
fiir uns Alle war die Reise doch ein wichtiges Erlenis voll unvergess-

licher Belehrung, und wir waren voll Dank fiir deren Ermoglichung.
Ich selbst bin als Gast der Carnegie-Friedensstiftung 1930 noch
einmal in U.S.A. gewesen und bin damalsauch nach Californien ge-
—
koinmen und konnte allerdings leider wahrend der Ferien die Stan-
ford Universitat besuchen. Mit besonderer Bewunderung erinnere ich
mich an deren Bibliothek. Meine Reise-erinnerungen von 1930 habe
ich den erwahnten Heften beigelegt
Mit vollkommener Hochachtung als Ihr ergebener.
( Signed ) Dr. A. Oeri
 APPENDIX C
Correspondence regarding the location of the “Chart of Ger-
man Civilian Morale.” Major E. Alexander Powell dis-
cusses the chart in his book The Army Behind the Army. In
an effort to locate it and to get photostat copies of it, the
writer sent a letter of inquiry to Mr. Powell. The letters

below are some of the replies received.

1. Letter from Major E. Alexander Powell

Maitland, Florida
13 February 1936
My dear Mr. Bruntz :

Your letter of January 25th, addressed to me at Chevy Chase, has

just overtaken me. I am sorry that it did not reach me more promptly.
have no idea what has become of the Chart of Civilian Morale
I

which hung on the wall of Secretary Baker’s office, and I doubt if he

knows either, though you might write to him at Cleveland. I think it
would be better, however, to address an inquiry to General Malin Craig,
Chief of the General Staff, in Washington, who will see that your
letter reaches the proper hands.
Regretting that I can not help you in this matter, but wishing you
all success with your thesis, I am
Very sincerely

( Signed ) E. Alexander Powell

P. S. Mr. Baker’s private secretary was Ralph Hayes, a very intel-

ligentyoung man. If you can find his address in Who’s Who why don’t
you write him?

2. Reply to a letter sent to Mr. Newton D. Baker

My dear Mr. Bruntz:
I have received your letter of January 25. I am sorry to say that I

do not remember the particular chart to which Major Powell refers,

but it is true that the General Staff made continuous studies both of the
enemy morale and of all other information procurable about the situa-
tion in enemy countries. No doubt these studies are all in the custody
of the Army War College, which is under the presidency of Colonel

237
238 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
W. Grant and is located in Washington.
S. I would advise that you
write Colonel Grant for any information you desire.
Very truly yours
( Signed ) Newton D. Baker
3. Letter from the Army War College

February 24, 1936

Dear Sir :

I am in receipt of your letter of the 11th instant relative to a chart

showing the morale of the German civilian population, said to have
been kept in Secretary Baker’s office during the last months of the
World War.
The preparation of such a chart and the keeping of it up to date
would not have devolved upon this institution, but in an effort to find
out what I could about it, the office of the Chief of Staff, which would
have been charged with such a function, was contacted. That office
informs me that it could find no record of it, and two employees in
the Secretary of War’s office, who were also there during the World
War, and who were in a position to have known of the chart, had there
been any such, contributed the information that they never saw it.
These facts coupled with Secretary Baker’s statement in his letter to
you that he did not recall it, lead me to believe that it never existed.
I regret my inability to give you a more satisfactory reply.

Very truly yours,

{Signed) W. S. Grant
Colonel, Cavalry
Acting Commandant

4. Letter from the War Department General Staff, Military Intelli-

gence Division
March 23, 1936
Dear Sir :

With reference to your request of March 3, 1936, addressed to the

Chief of Staff, which was referred to this Division for attention, there
are enclosed photostat copies of sections of “Graph to Indicate Varia-
tions in German Morale” which evidently furnishes the information
you desire.
Very truly yours,
For the A. C. of S., G-2

( Signed ) C. K. Nulsen,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
Executive Officer, G-2
 INDEX
Aero Squadron: 99th Squadron, 64; of German Legation on propa-
104th, of the 5th Army, 64 ganda activities in, 71 ff., 127
A.E.F., 38 Berthelot, M., head of Maison de la

Air Inventions Committee, 58 presse, 14

Albrecht of Wurttemberg, Field Blankenhorn, Heber, and Psycholog-
Marshal Duke, Army Order re- ical Subsection of the United
garding supposed inequality of States Army Military Intelligence
treatment between officers and Division, 38
men, issued by, 207 ff. Blockade, British, and morale of
Altrock, Lieutenant General, on German people, 219
propaganda in Germany, 220 Bliicher, Evelyn M.
Princess on :

American Revolution Colonial : conditions Germany, 164

in on ;

propaganda in, 5, 6; Tory propa- food situation in Germany, 168 on ;

ganda in, 5 German soldier’s attitude toward

Analysis of propaganda, 85 ff. the war, 140 on mood of the
;

Army Orders (German) dealing people in latter part of the war,

with propaganda, 209 ff. Division ; 189 ;
morale in Bavaria, 124 on ;

Order of September 1, 1918, 211 people’s feeling toward the Kai-

ff. ; German soldiers propagandists ser, 141
for the Allies, 210; Von Hutier’s Bolshevik propaganda, 144 ff. ;
at-
Order of August 29, 1918, 211 tack on German troops on East-
Asquith, Prime Minister Honorary : ern Front, 147; call of the Bol-
President of Central Committee, shevik party through Bote der
19 ;
Ministry of Information, 20 ; Russischen Revolution, 145 Die ;

War Aims Committee, 20; War Fackel, 147 ; Lenin’s theses on the
Propaganda Bureau, 20 war, 144; Petrograd Soviet’s ap-
peal to workers of Vienna, 149;
Baker, Newton D., United States proclamation of Lenin and Trotsky
Secretary of War, on troop arriv- to the German soldiers, 146; proc-
als in France, 91 lamation to the German sailors,
Balder, Siegfried :
pamphlet on food 146-147 Rabochii Soldat, 145
;

situation in Germany, 42; revolu- Brest-Litovsk, Peace of, 147 ff.

tionary leaflet, 131 German troops impatient over pro-
Ball, Lieutenant C.H. observations : longed negotiations, 208 proof of ;

on propaganda, 65 report on de- ;

annexationist designs by Germany,
sertions of German troops, 205 171 ;
protracted peace negotiations,
Bar-le-Duc, field station for Amer- 150; Spartacists and the Peace,
icanpropaganda section, 66 176
Beaverbrook, Lord, 23, 24 Briand, Aristide, Minister ofFor-
Berne, Switzerland : center of Zim- eign Affairs, 13 ;
and Maison de la
merwald propaganda, 76 ;
Report presse, 14

239
240 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Briefe aus Deutschland: as to food 206 estimated number of, 205
;

conditions at home, 162; as to General von Kuhl’s Report to Un-

hunger riots in Germany, 162 tersuchungsausschusses on, 205
Buchan, John, 22; Director of In- “Instructions and rules of guid-
telligence, 24 ance” for the conduct of German
Bureau de la presse et de l’informa- soldiers taken prisoners, 210
tion, 13 Despair, propaganda of, 102 ff. ;
car-
Bureau for Social Policy, report on toons used in, 103 ;
illustrations of,
war weariness in Germany, 186-87 101, 105
Die Feldpost, cartoons in, 103 ;
is-

sued by Hansi organization, 104

Carlton House Terrace, headquar-
Dittman, Deputy, leader of Inde-
ters for British Central Commit-
pendent Socialists, 178, 179
tee, 19
Dolchstoss, question of the, 156 ff.
Chart of German Civilian Morale,
Donald, Robert, director of propa-
190, 237-38
ganda in neutral countries, 24
Churchill, Winston, on propaganda
in Germany, 219-20
England:
Clemenceau, Georges, 15
Methods of distribution of propa-
Clergy of Berlin and Hanover, proc-
ganda, 50 ff. ;
airplane, 58; “com-
lamation favoring peace, 185
parative menu” leaflets, 53
Cohn, Deputy: and Joffe, 154; and
postcards from German prison-
Russian revolutionists, 153
ers of war, 55 ;
Lichnowsky’s My
Comite Catholique de propagande
London Mission, 53 ;
Minster’s
frangaise a letranger and Ba- :
activities in Holland, 78, 79;
varia, 116 and La Guerre alle-
;
“priority” and “stock” leaflets,
mande et le Catholicisme, 116
51; trench mortar, 56; “Trench
Committee on Public Information, 31,
Newspaper,” 52; War Pictorial,
32; Will Irwin in charge of For-
52; use of the free balloon,
eign Bureau of, 87 ;
work in Hol-
57 war aims of, reported, 56
;
land, 84
Propaganda organizations, 18 ff.
Creel, George, CivilianChairman of
Central Committee for National
Committee on Public Information,
Patriotic Associations, 18; De-
31-32; and Daily Bulletin, 63 n.
partment of Information, 22;
Crewe House, 25, 29
M.I. 7b, 29; Ministry of Infor-
mation, 24; Neutral Countries
Defense of the Realm Act, 86 Subcommittee, 19; War Aims
de Fiori, Dr. Robert W. : conversa- Committee, 20; Wellington
tions of with Dr. George Herron, House, 20 ff.
167 ff. ;
and spirit of German Ertzberger,Deputy: and Imperial
people, 188 Government as no longer enjoying
Democracy, praised by Allied propa- confidence of majority in the
gandists, 218 Reichstag, 180; and union of Ma-
Deschanel, Paul, 13 jority Social Democrats, Center,
Desertions among German troops, and Progressives on the Peace
204 ff. ;
Army Order regarding, Resolution of July 19, 1917, 181
 INDEX 241

Favry, French Deputy, and Ger- Freytag-Loringhoven, 213

many’s defeat, 216 Friends of German Democracy, on
Fife, George B., 32 American troop arrivals in France,

Flugblatter der deutschen Korres- 93 ;

organization of, 35 ;
propa-
pondenz, an attempt at counter- ganda of, 36 work ;
of, 37
propaganda, 199 Frouville, French attache at Berne,

Foncin, Pierre, founder of Alliance 70; propaganda activities of, 71

Franqaise, 10 Fyfe, Hamilton, 28

Food situation in Germany, 161 ff.,

164 Garrett, John W., American Minis-

Fournol, Etienne, director of Service ter to Holland, 83

de propagande, 9 Gautier, Jules, President of Alliance

France Franqaise, 10
Methods of distribution of propa- Gebsattel, Freiherr von, German war
ganda, 41 ff. airplanes, 46 ff.
;
aims, 159, 160
Escadrilles des Armees, 48 hand ;
German War Ministry : on import-
grenade, 46; LaFayette Flying ance of propaganda, 194; report of
Squadron, 47 “propaganda bul-
;
meeting of certain officials to dis-
lets,” 50 “propaganda shell,” 50
;
cuss propaganda, 195 ;
“Vaterland-
“sausage” method, 46 W. A. ;
ischen Unterricht unter den Trup-
Wellman and “Tommy” Hitch- pen,” 196
cock, 49 Geyer, Independent Socialist Deputy,
Propaganda organizations, 8 ff. 184
Alliance Franqaise, 10; Bulletin Grelling, Richard, his J’accuse, 16,

protestant franqaise, 12; “Bureau 127

of Enemy Psychology,” 47
Comite d’action aupres des juifs Haase, Deputy Hugo: and first war
des pays neutres,” 12; Comite credits, 169 leader of Independent
;

catholique, 11; Comite Israelite, Socialists, 179; and toast to the

12 Comite protestant, 12 Foi
; ; International, 153
et vie, 12; L’Union sacree de la Hall, G. Norman, 46, 47
propagande, 11; Maison de la Hansi, see Jean Jacques Waitz
presse, 9, 14; Military Intelli- Heckscher, Siegfried, 218 ff.
gence Division, 9; Service Herron, Dr. George, conversations
aerienne, 16; Service de propa- with de Fiori, 167
gande, 9 ;
Union des grandes as- Hindenburg, Field Marshal von
socations contre la propagande, “Address to the German People,”
13 213 ff. on cause of weakening
;

Franck, Lieutenant Harry A., 33-34 morale, 203 ;

complaint of lengthy
Freie Zeitung: combined with Tessi- peace negotiations at Brest-Li-
ner Zeitung and made a weekly, tovsk, 150; report to Prince Max
70 ;
board of, 59, founded,
editorial of Baden concerning condition of
42; first appearance as semi- army, 216
weekly, 70; supported by Friends Hoch, Deputy, leader of Majority
of German Democracy, 35 Socialists on discontent in Ger-
Fremdenamt, in Holland, 205 many, 160
242 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Holland: British activities in, 79; Jews, propaganda for, 12, 13
fear of German invasion, 77 Joffe, Russian ambassador in Berlin,
French propaganda sections in, 153; money for propaganda pur-
80 ;
German deserters in, 77 ;
de- poses, 154; evidence of secret
serters registered in, 205 ff. ;
Ger- service agents, 154, 155
man refugees in, 77 ;
Minster’s ac- Jones, Sir Roderick, 24
tivities in, 77 ff. ;
Northcliffe or- Junkers, attacked by the Allied
ganization and smuggling
in, 81 ff. ;
propagandists, 106 ; Bavarians
of propaganda into Germany, 80 urged to oppose, 120
Hope, Propaganda of, 106 ff. Amer- ; Jury, Sir William, 24
ican invitation to desert, 111;
“Comrades in France” letters, 109; Kahn, Otto H., 37 n.

“Griisse an die Heimat” letters, Kaiser Wilhelm II: attacks upon,

108 ff. ;
letters from German pris- 141 ;
English attacks upon, 134
oners used by Allies, 107 ff. final appeal to Army and Navy
House, Colonel E. M. suggestions : by, 214
for propaganda material, 62; let- Kern, John F., 74
ter to Wilson on subject, 62 Kerney Commission, 33-34
Hutier, General von, army order re- Kerney, James, 33
garding propaganda, 211 Kerry, Major the Earl of, 29
Kiel, revolt at, 158 ff.

Independent Socialists of Germany Knesebeck, L. G., and disappearance

(U.S.P.D.), 73; demand for peace of the morale of the German
without annexations, 180; “Hun- troops, 220
ger” leaflet, 166; origin of, 172, Kolnische Zeitung, 54; on military
178; and preparations for revolu- reverses, 193
tion, 183 ; resort to arms favored, “Konig Albert,” peace proclamation
183 ;
strikes in munitions factories, signed by sailors aboard, 180
stirred by, 178; work with Sparta- Kriegsblatter fur das deutsche Volk,
cists and Russian revolutionists, 125
153 Kriegspresseamt, 86 ;
concentration
Inter-Allied Commission, 26 on war news, 194; patriotic mate-
Inter-Allied Conference of Propa- rial designed to raise morale of
ganda Agencies, 34, 39 people and troops, 196
International Agricultural Institute, Kiihlman, von, on impossibility of
estimates of 1918 crop prospects in victory for Germany, 216
the United States and Canada,
93 ff. LaFayette Flying Squadron, French
International Labor Conference Res- propaganda distributed by, 46
olution of August 1914, 169 Lasswell, Harold Dwight, ix
Irwin, Will, 87 Lavisse, Ernest, 13
Leaflets, classification of, 51
J’accuse, 17; extracts used for prop- Ledebour, Georg, 183
aganda purposes, 96; sent into Legality of propaganda, 142 ff.

Germany under false titles, 127 Leipziger Volksseitung, attitude

James, Major Henry, 34 toward the appeals of Hindenburg
 INDEX 243

and the Kaiser for stronger morale, Maurice, Sir Frederick, and Dolch-
216 stoss question, 156
Lenin call to the Socalist proletariat
: Max, Prince of Baden, told of the
of Germany, 146-47 theses on the ;
weakened morale of the Army,
war, 143 216
Levi, M. Sylvain, 12 Mehring, Franz: leader of Spartacus
Leyguer, M., 12 group, 172; work with Russian
Lichnowsky, Prince, 53; My London revolutionists for overthrow of
Mission, by, 96, 97 German government, 153
Liebknecht, Karl and Spartakus-
: Menu, of German workers for 1915
briefe, and French propa-
174; and 1917, 161 ff.

ganda, 138 ff. and 1916 May Day

;
Military Intelligence Department, 29
riots, 176; and Spartacus group, Minster, Carl : and Der Kampf in

172; and vote on war credits in Amsterdam, 71, 78; editor of labor
December 1914, 173 paper in Germany, 77 and desert- ;

Lincoln,Abraham, views on public ers’ organizations in Holland, 78,

sentiment, 3 80; with English in Holland, 79;
Lindau: crate of propaganda books expelled from Social Democratic
taken by German officials at, 75 party, 77 flight to Holland, 77
;

propaganda leaflets at the port of, founder of German section of

128 Dutch Social Democratic party,
Lippmann, Captain Walter, editorial 78; relations with Independent So-
director of United States propa- cialists and Left radicals, 78
ganda in Paris, 62 Mirbach, Count, murdered in Rus-
Litvinov, Maxim, in England, Brit- sia, 155
ish labor, appealed to by, 148 ff. Mitchell, Captain Chalmers, at Crewe
Lorenz, Ernst, leader of U.S.P.D. in House, 28
Dresden, 184 Montgomery, Mr. C. H., 22
Ludendorff, Eric von : admission of Morale of the enemy chart of, 190, :

weakened war spirit among troops, 237-38; measured by Military In-

204; Army Order regarding de- telligence, 65
sertions, 206 and morale of
; Moscow, German Propaganda Cen-
troops, 196; power in government trale at Dresdener Hof, 151
of Germany, 172 suggestion of ; Muehlon, William, “The Vandal of
centralized propaganda organiza- Europe,” sent into Germany by
tion, 198 propagandists, 96
Luxemburg, Rosa : leader of Spar- Miihsam, Eric, Die Lustige Witwe
tacus group, 172; Social Demo- leaflet, 127
crats attacked in Junius Pamphlet, Munitions Inventions Department, 59
173
Nachrichtenblatt der 18 Armee: ad-
MacDonogh, Major General Sir mission of defeat in the field of
George, 29 propaganda, 201 ;
attempts to com-
MacRae, General A. D., 24 bat propaganda of the Allies, 200;
Mair, G. H., 22 finalappeal of the Kaiser to Army
Masterman, Rt. Hon. C. F., 20 and Navy, 214; founded, 199
244 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
National Workers’ and Professional Political situation in Germany, 169 ff.

Union, appeal to Germans to re- “Priority” leaflets, 51

main loyal, 182, 183 Public Health Office, Memorandum

Netter, Eugene, on the accuracy of on food situation in Germany, 168
the Allied propaganda charts, 89
Nicolai, Walter, Chief of German
Revolutionary propaganda, 130 ff.
Secret Service, 43
attack upon the Kaiser, 132-34;
Nolan, General Dennis E., 34
call for universal strike, 137 Das
N orddeutsche Zeitung, 74
Freie Deutsche Wort, 131
;

English
;
Northcliffe, Lord: German alarm at
leaflet, 134; Volk nim dir selbst
his appointment as chief of propa-
den Frieden, 136 ff. “Wenn ich ;
ganda in enemy countries, 198 his ;
der deutsche Michel war,” 137 ff.
aims in propaganda, 51 his sum- ;
Rosemeier, Hermann, 43
mary of the work of the propa-
Rosta, Russian telegraph agency set
gandists, 221 made Director of
;
up in Berlin, 153
Propaganda in Enemy Countries,
Rupprecht, Crown Prince, 123 ff.
24; member of advisory committee
to Buchan, 23 ;
work in Holland,
81 ff. Sailboats, as means of getting propa-
ganda into Germany, 74
Objectives of propaganda, 4 Scheidemann, Deputy, advocates end-
O ffizier - Kriegsberichterstatter at- ing the war, 185
tached to German G.H.Q., 199 ;
to Schlieben, Dr. Hans, 69
furnish war stories to strengthen Schlieffen Plan miscarried, 171
public morale, 199 Schlittenbauer, Deputy, 123
Osaman, Captain of G2, 4th Corps, Scholtz, Captain E., and Lt. H. C.
among Alsace-Lorraine troops, 116 Wookey, “Scholtz-Wookey” case,
141 ff.

Page, Captain Arthur, in charge of Service aerienne : examples of prop-

Paris printing of United States aganda, 45 ;
Frankfurter Zeitung
propaganda, 62 and Strassburger Post sent into
Particularist propaganda : Bavarian Germany, 75 Griisse an die Hei-
;

propaganda, 115 ff.; the Allied m-at letters, 108 ff.

cause and efforts win over

to Service de propagande, 9
Alsace-Lorraine, 113; French in- Seton-Watson, R. W., 25
fluence on Alsace-Lorraine to free Seydlitz, Erich Galster von, on the
itself of Prussian yoke, 114; sur- Kiel revolt, 158 ff.

render of Alsatian troops urged, Sieger, Heinrich, Bavarian propa-

114; United States propagandists ganda of, 118, 126, 127
in Alsace-Lorraine, 115 Social Democratic party: Burg frie-
Peace Resolution of July 19, 1917, den, 170; differences as to party’s
181 ff. stand on war, 170; repeal of re-
Philipp, Dr. A. importance of prop-
: strictions, 170 and union with ;

aganda to the Allies, 221 morale ;

Center and Progressives in favor
of the German nation, 187 views ;
of Peace Resolution, 181 ;
vote
on food situation, 167 favoring war credits, 169
 INDEX 245

Socialists, united with U.S.P.D. in man Civilian Morale, 190, 237-38;

vote against budget, 185 Divisional Summary of interviews
Spartacists : Carl Minster’s relations with German soldiers, 194; Intel-
with, 78; food rations cause of at- ligence Division agents’ reports,
tack on government by, 177 ;
or- 189 ff. ;
Intelligence Section’s re-
ganizational setup of, 175 ;
origin ports on the morale of certain Ger-
of group, 172; and Russian revolu- man divisions, 191, 192, 193 ;
Re-
tionists, 153 ports of Psychological Subsection,
Steed, H. Wickham, 25, 26 189 ff.

“Stock” leaflets, 51 United States

Stuart, Sir Campbell, 24 ;
and propa- Methods of distribution, 60 ff. ;
air-
ganda in neutral countries, 83 ff. planes of 104th Squadron of 5th
Siiddeutsche Monatshefte, 189 Army used, 64; kites flown over
Suydam, Henry, 33: C.P.I. agent in enemy lines with propaganda,
Holland, 82; “personal tours” of 67 ;
99th Aero Squadron used,
Dutch journalists to America, 82; 64 postcards
;
distributed by
and Wilson’s speeches, 83 Americans, 65 ;
rubber balloons
Switzerland German emigres estab-
: used by Americans, 66 war- ;

lish Freie Zeitung in, 69; revolu- aims pamphlet number 5, 60

tionary propaganda from, 75 ff. Propaganda organization of, 30 ff.
Swiss journalists in America, 64 Committee on Public Informa-
tion (C.P.I. ), 31 ff.; Foreign
The Times (London), how propa- Countries Bureaus of C.P.I., 34;
ganda hastened the end of the war, Friends of German Democracy,
220 35 ff. ;
Military Intelligence Sec-
Tinsley, Captain, British agent in tion of the United States Army,
Holland, 79 37 ;
Psychological Subsection of
Tonnelat, M., 16, 17, 18 the Military Intelligence Divi-
Toul, field station for American sion, 38
propaganda section, 66
“Trench Newspaper,” a British prop- Vandal of Europe, by Muehlon, 53
aganda sheet, 52, 87 Vater, speech at Magdeburg, 183
Tribune de Geneve, report of discon- “Vaterlandischen Unterricht unter
tent spreading in the German den Truppen” established, 196;
Army, 193 failure of the “Unterricht,” 198
Trotsky, Leon, proclamations to Ger- instructions to officers on methods
man soldiers and sailors, 146 ff. to be used, 197
Truppen Nachrichtenblatt, French Vetter, Karl von, British and Ger-
propaganda sheet, 87 ff. man propagandists, contrasted by,
201
Ungewitter, Richard, admits that
German troops no longer under Waitz, Jean Jacques (Hansi), 16;
the control of the leaders, 141 Briefe eines Kriegsgefangenen, 17 ;

Union des grandes associations contre entire edition of the Berner Tage-
la propagande ennemie, 13 blatt for March 29, 1917, bought
United States Army Chart of Ger-: by, 75
246 ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
War aims, Allied : outlined by Lloyd for propaganda purposes, 100;
George A.P.l and A. P.3,
in leaflets War Message of April 2, 1917, 31
99; outlined by Wilson, 100; per- use of speeches for propaganda
mission for discussion by press re- purposes, 61
fused by Germany, 94 ff. ;
sup- Wolfsohn ( alias Mendelbaum), agent
posed, of German government to for British in Zurich, 74
German people, 95, 96 Wookey, Lieutenant H. C., 142
War Aims Committee, 53 Wrisberg, Major General, Director
Watson, Captain Mark, 34 of German National War Depart-
Weiss, Andree, 12 ment, 73
Wells, H. G., Chairman of the Ger-
man Section for Propaganda in Zeitung fiir die deutschen Kriegsge-
Enemy Countries, 25 memoran- ; fangenen, French propaganda in
dum to Northcliffe, 27 quitting ;
French prison camps, 196
Crewe House, 28 Zimmerwald, propaganda from
Whitehouse, Vira B., C.P.I. Com- Berne, 76
missioner in Switzerland, 32 ;
and Zurich, Switzerland : British Con-
Swiss journalists, 63 sulate the center of British propa-
Wilson, Woodrow: effect of his ganda, 74; instructions for dis-
peace proposals and
Fourteen semination of leaflets by German
Points on German morale, 212 ff. women in, 72 ff. John Kern, the
;

Fourteen Points used as propa- American propagandist for British

ganda of hope, 113; New York from Zurich, 74 ff. Wolfsohn, in ;

Times tribute to, 62; speeches used service of British in Zurich, 74

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