Important Judgments of the Month of February

I. The Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd vs. Central Bank

of India & Ors.

Dated: 4th February 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 243

Court: Supreme Court

Bench: Justice J. B. Pardiwala & Justice R. Mahadevan

Facts:

The borrowers availed two loans from Central Bank of India and Cosmos Cooperative
Bank Limited respectively in the years 1989 and 1998. To secure the loans, a flat was
mortgaged in favour of both the banks by depositing property related deeds. While
the borrowers had deposited different agreements to sell with both the banks, the
share certificate which evidenced the ownership of Flat was deposited with Cosmos
Bank. The borrowers defaulted in paying back both the loans whereby Central Bank
initiated recovery proceeding before the Bombay High Court which later got
transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Mumbai and Cosmos Bank took steps
to sell the Flat by enforcing the security interest.

The DRT held that Central Bank did not have a valid mortgage in its favour. Central
Bank's appeal to the Appellate Tribunal which held that Central Bank had a valid and
prior mortgage in its favour and that it will prevail over the mortgage created in
favour of Cosmos Bank. Cosmos Bank was unsuccessful before the Bombay HC in its
challenge to the order of the DRAT, and therefore preferred a civil appeal before the
Supreme Court.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Transfer of Property Act 1884

o Section 54: Sale

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
o Section 58: “Mortgage”, “mortgagor”, “mortgagee”, “mortgage-
money” and “mortgage-deed” defined
o Section 100: Charges

Issues:

1. Whether an equitable mortgage will have a priority in enforcement

over a legal mortgage?

Judges and Opinions:

1. Justice J. B. Pardiwala: after dealing with the nature of the mortgages

created in favour of the banks in light of the applicable laws and judicial
precedents stated an agreement to sell does not by itself create any interest in
a property; and it cannot be considered as a deed conferring title or
ownership.

Further a legal mortgage is created when proprietary interest in property is

transferred by complying with the formalities prescribed under the applicable
laws; and that equitable mortgage is created solely based on a clear intention
of the parties to create mortgage.

Considering the difference between the legal and equitable mortgages; and
that the equitable mortgage creates only a right in personam, an equitable
mortgage would have priority over subsequent charges or mortgages only if
the subsequent charge holder or mortgagee was aware of the equitable
mortgage.

Mortgage by deposit of title deeds is statutorily recognised under section 58

and hence is a legal mortgage and not an equitable mortgage, in contrast to
the position under English law.

While there was clearly an intention to create mortgage in favour of Central

Bank, considering that, the share certificate, which was the title deed for the
Flat was not deposited by the borrower with the Central bank and the bank
had also not taken steps to obtain the title deed from the borrowers; the

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
mortgage in favour of Central Bank was only an equitable mortgage. By
placing reliance on section 78 TPA the Court held that the mortgage in favour
of Central Bank, will not have priority over the subsequent legal mortgage in
favour Cosmos Bank, since Central Bank had not issued any public notice
regarding the mortgage in its favour and Cosmos Bank was unaware of the
equitable mortgage in favour of Central bank.

2. Justice R. Mahadevan (Concurring Opinion)

Judgment:

Impugned order passed by the High Court is not correct and was set aside.
Accordingly, the Court held that Cosmos Bank will be entitled to appropriate the
proceeds from the sale of the Flat

Precedents:

 Bank of India v. Abhay D. Narottam and Others (2005) …without a

transfer of interest there is no question of there being a mortgage. The
same principle would apply to a charge under Section 100 of the
Transfer of Property Act….As far as the flat is concerned, it needs no authority
to say that a contract for sale of immovable property does not of itself create
any interest in or charge over such property…; Dattatreya Shanker Mote
and Ors. v. Anand Chintaman Datar and Ors. (1974)

 Russel v. Russel (1783) Lord Thurlow held that where there is

delivery of title by the borrower to the lender for the purpose of
availing a loan, although such deposit may not constitute a valid
mortgage, but the courts in granting specific performance to the lender to
create a security or lien over the property

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
II. Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana & Anr.

Dated: 6th February 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 162

Court: Supreme Court

Bench: Justice Abhay Oka & Justice Kotiswar Singh

Facts:

Appellant was arrested on 10th June 2024 at about 10.30 a.m. at his office premises
and was taken to DLF Police Station. He was allegedly produced before the learned
Judicial Magistrate (in charge) at Gurgaon on 11th June 2024 at 3.30 p.m. After the
appellant was arrested, he was hospitalised in PGIMS, Rohtak. The learned counsel
appearing for the appellant produced photographs which showed that while he was
admitted to the hospital, he was handcuffed and chained to the hospital bed.

The Court heard the Appeal filed by the appellant against the Punjab & Haryana
High Court's decision rejecting his Writ Petition alleging illegal arrest and seeking
CCTV footage was dismissed. The High Court accepted the State's timeline, finding
no 24-hour rule violation, and rejected Kumar's claim of not being informed of the
arrest grounds, aggrieved appealed to the Supreme Court.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Code of Criminal Procedure/Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita

2023
o Section 57/58: Person arrested not to be detained more than twenty-
four hours.
o Section 50/47: Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest
and right to bail
o Section 41(1)(ba)/53(1)(c): When police may arrest without
warrant- (c) against whom credible information has been received..
2. Constitution of India 1950

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
o Article 21: Protection of life and personal liberty
o Article 22: Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases

Issues:
1. Is there violation of appellant’s right under Article 22 of the
Constitution of India?

Judges and Opinions:

1. Justice Abhay Oka: Laid the following principles for communicating

grounds of arrest:
(a) The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of
arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1);
(b) The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the
arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of
the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and
communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which
he understands. The mode and method of communication must be
such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved;
(c) When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the
requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the
Investigating Officer/Agency to prove compliance with the
requirements of Article 22(1);
(d) Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the
fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said Article.
Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to
personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.
Therefore, non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1)
vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further orders passed by a
criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will
not vitiate the investigation, charge sheet and trial. But, at the same
time, filing of chargesheet will not validate a breach of constitutional
mandate under Article 22(1);
(e) When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial
Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other
mandatory safeguards has been made; and
(f) When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of
the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That
will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the
grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of
the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution is established.
2. Justice Kotiswar Singh (concurring):…the requirement of
communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not only to the arrested
person, but also to the friends, relatives or such other person as may be
disclosed or nominated by the arrested person, so as to make the mandate of
Article 22(1) of the Constitution meaningful and effective failing which, such
arrest may be rendered illegal.

Judgment:

 Allowed the appeal, arrest of the appellant stands vitiated and he is ordered to
be forthwith released and set at liberty. Further directed the State of Haryana
to issue guidelines/departmental instructions to the police with regard to no
handcuffing of accused in hospital bed and to ensure constitutional safeguard
under Article 22 to be strictly followed.

Precedents:

● Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2024) The SC laid down 2 primary

reasons to why a copy of written grounds of arrest to be furnished:
(i) if grounds are orally read out, it might boil down to whether or not
compliance of communication of grounds of arrest was made or
not & (ii) it is only if the arrested person has knowledge of these facts
that he/she would be in a position to plead and prove before the Special
Court that there are grounds to believe that he/she is not guilty of such
offence, so as to avail the relief of bail.

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
● Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) reiterated that “the
requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of
detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a
person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1)
and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be
breached under any situation. Non-compliance would lead the custody or
detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be.”

“…any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of

arrest and remand. Mere fact that a charge-sheet has been filed in the
matter, would not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality
committed at the time of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police
custody remand to the accused.”

Latest Judgment:

 Kasireddy Upender Reddy Versus State Of Andhra Pradesh And

Ors. (2025 INSC 768) [23RD May 2025] “If a person is arrested on a
warrant, the grounds for reasons for the arrest is the warrant itself; if the
warrant is read over to him, that is sufficient compliance with the
requirement that he should be informed of the grounds for his
arrest”

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
III. K. Mangayarkarasi & Anr. vs. N.J. Sundaresan &
Anr.

Dated: 12th February 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 687

Court: Supreme Court

Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala & Justice R. Mahadevan

Facts:

The dispute had arisen between two factions of a family over ownership and usage
rights of the trademark “Sri Angannan Biriyani Hotel”

The appellants had approached the Commercial Court seeking a permanent

injunction and ₹20 lakh in damages, claiming infringement. However, the
respondent argued that the dispute was governed by a Trademark Assignment Deed
that included an arbitration clause. Accordingly, the respondent filed an application
under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to refer the matter to
arbitration.

Both the Commercial Court and the High Court ruled in favour of arbitration.
Challenging these decisions, the appellants approached the Supreme Court.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996

o Section 8: Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an
arbitration agreement
o Section 16: Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction
o Section 34: Application for setting aside arbitral award

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
Issues:

1. Can contractual disagreements involving intellectual property

rights (IPRs) be resolved through arbitration?

Judges and Opinions:

1. Justice J.B. Pardiwala: allegations of fraud or criminal wrongdoing or of

statutory violation would not detract from the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal to resolve a dispute arising out of a civil or contractual relationship on
the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by the arbitration agreement.
Once an application in due compliance with Section 8 is filed, the approach of
the civil court should be not to see whether the court has jurisdiction but to
see whether its jurisdiction has been ousted.
The general law should yield to the special law - generalia specialibus non
derogant. In such a situation, the approach shall not be to see whether there is
still jurisdiction in the civil court under the general law. Such approaches
would only delay the resolution of disputes and complicate the redressal of
grievance and of course unnecessarily increase the pendency in the court.
Fraud is one such category spelled out by the decisions of this Court where
disputes would be considered as non- arbitrable. However, the moot question
here which has to be addressed would be as to whether mere allegation of
fraud by one party against the other would be sufficient to exclude the subject-
matter of dispute from arbitration and decision thereof necessary by the civil
court.
Once there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, a judicial
authority before whom an action is brought is under a positive obligation to
refer parties to arbitration by enforcing the terms of the contract. There is no
element of discretion left in the court or judicial authority to obviate the
legislative mandate of compelling parties to seek recourse to arbitration.
2. Justice R. Mahadevan (Concurring Opinion)

Judgment:
Upheld the decision of High Court, SLP stands dismissed

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
Precedents:

 A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Ors. (2016) while dealing with the

question „whether the dispute raised by the respondent in the suit is
incapable of settlement through arbitration.‟ Court stated that the Act
does not make any provision as to excluding any category of
disputes treating them as non-arbitrable. Though courts have held that
certain disputes like criminal offences of a public nature, disputes
arising out of illegal agreements and disputes relating to status, such as
divorce, cannot be referred to arbitration; (i) patent, trademarks and
copyright; (ii) anti-trust/competition laws; (iii) insolvency/winding
up; (iv) bribery/corruption; (v) fraud; (vi) criminal matters.
 SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning (2024) Referring
the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Boghara
Polyfab P. Ltd. (2009), the Court observed that the aspect of full and
final settlement having been obtained by fraud or coercion itself
gives rise to an arbitrable issue and thus does not act as a bar to
arbitration.
Under Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration Act, the referral court's role is
confined to determining the existence of an arbitration agreement.
Once such an agreement is found, it would be inappropriate for the
referral court to encroach upon the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction,
which is empowered to decide on matters such as the validity of claims, full
and final settlement and issues of frivolity or dishonesty in litigation are areas
that fall squarely within the tribunal's domain.

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
IV. Gayatri Balasamy vs ISG Novasoft Technologies
Limited

Dated: 13th February 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 605

Court: Supreme Court

Bench: Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice B. R. Gavai, Justice Sanjay Kumar,
Justice K. V. Viswanathan & Justice A.G. Mash

Facts:

Gayatri Balasamy an employee at ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., filed a criminal

complaint against senior officers of the company for offences relating to sexual
harassment on which she met with criminal complaints of defamation and extortion
by the company. When the matter reached the Supreme Court, it was referred to
arbitration, where the Arbitral Tribunal awarded the Appellant a compensation of 2
crores. Dissatisfied, she sought to set aside the award under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 before the Madras High Court. The High Court
modified the award, granting an additional 1.6 crores. However, a Division Bench on
appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act reduced this additional award to 50,000,
deeming the initial compensation excessive. The Appellant then appealed to the
Supreme Court.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996

o Section 33: Correction and interpretation of award; additional award
o Section 34(2)(a): Application for setting aside arbitral award
o Section 37: Appealable orders

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
Issues:

1. Whether the Indian Courts are jurisdictionally empowered to

modify an arbitral award.
2. Whether the power to set aside an award under Section 34 of 1996
Act being a larger power, will include the power to modify an
arbitral award and if so, to what extent.
3. Whether an arbitral award can be modified by using Article 142 of
the Constitution.

Judges and Opinions:

1. Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna (Majority Opinion):

Contours of Section 34: Section 5 of the 1996 Act limits judicial
intervention in an arbitral award to what is authorized by Part I of the Act.
Section 34(1) stipulates that „recourse‟ to a court against an arbitral award
may be made only by an application for setting aside the award in accordance
with Section 34(2) and 34(3).
Section 34(2)(b) stipulates setting aside of an arbitral award when the subject
matter of the dispute cannot be settled by arbitration as per the applicable law
or it conflicts with the public policy.
Severability of Arbitral Awards: the proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv)
states that if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be
separated from those not submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which
contains decisions on matters non-submitted may be set aside thereby
embodies the doctrine of severability, empowering courts to separate invalid
portions of an arbitral award based on Section 34(2)(a) grounds while
upholding valid parts.
This power of severability is deemed inherent in the Court‟s jurisdiction.
Applying the doctrine of omne majus continent in se minus (a greater power
includes the lesser power) the court held that the power to set aside an award
necessarily includes the power to partially set it aside. But this power is not
applicable in all awards, but only when “valid” and “invalid” portions are
legally and practically inseparable

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
However Justice Viswanathan (Dissenting Opinion) largely agreed that
Section 34 inherently recognizes the power to sever parts of an arbitral award
but he found that there was a conceptual difference between a “modification”
and “severance” & the power to modify is not a lesser power subsumed within
the power to set
A limited power of modification under Section 34: the 1996 Act
aimed to provide a quicker and cost-effective alternative to courtroom
litigation. There is a difference between modification & setting aside, while
modification involves altering specific parts of an award, setting aside does
not alter the award but results in its annulment. The power of modification
may invite judicial interference with the merits of the dispute; which is not
recognized by this court.
On the other hand, denying courts the power to modify would lead to absurd
outcomes, impose hardships, increase costs, and cause delays. Thus, court can
apply the doctrine of severability and modify a portion of the award while
retaining the rest.
However, Justice Viswanathan (Dissenting Opinion) the plain language
of Section 34 only permits setting aside. He reasoned that parties entering
arbitration consciously agree to step out of the normal judicial process, and a
Section 34 court, unless expressly authorized, cannot modify or vary an
award.
Power of modification is different from remand: Section 33
empowers an arbitrator to do correction of computational, clerical or
typographical errors, as well as giving interpretation on a specific point or a
part of the award, when mutually agreed upon by the parties & Section 33(7)
states order passed by the arbitral tribunal under Section 33 amounts to an
arbitral award.
Notwithstanding Section 33, we affirm that a court reviewing an award under
Section 34 possesses the same power to do correction provided that such
modification does not necessitate a merits-based evaluation as there are
certain inherent powers of the court.
The court found that under Section 34(4) courts are empowered to remit
issues back to the arbitral tribunal for specific determinations. However, the
majority held that Section 34(4) does not authorize the tribunal to rewrite or

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
set aside the award on merits; rather, it acts as a curative mechanism available
when permitted by the court.
However, Justice Viswanathan (Dissenting Opinion) does not agree
with the same
Modification does not render the amended award unenforceable
under the New York Convention: The interpretation of Section 34
includes a limited power to modify awards thereby will not affect the
enforcement of foreign awards under international commercial arbitration.
Though Article V of the New York Convention and Section 46 of the 1996 Act,
similarly worded, recognize the supremacy of the domestic law of the country
where the award is made for enforcement purposes.
However, Justice Viswanathan (Dissenting Opinion) held that
modifying New York Convention awards in India would complicate foreign
enforcement due to the lack of statutory provisions (unlike UK/Singapore)
that treat a modified award as part of the Tribunal's award. He pointed out
that this issue warrants legislative intervention.
Court can modify post award interest but not pendente lite: The
Court cannot modify pendente lite interest granted during arbitration where
the interest awarded contradicts the contractual position, the court, when
examining objections under Section 34, can either set aside the interest rate or
remand the matter to the arbitral tribunal under Section 34(4).
Further observed that post-award interest under Section 37(1)(b) is an
additional compensation for unpaid arbitral awards after due time. In cases
where this post-award interest appears unjustified, given the unpredictability
of the future unknown to the arbitrator, it is necessary for the Court to have
the authority to modify it for the dissipation of justice.
However, Justice Vishwanthan (Dissenting Opinion) held that a court
cannot modify interest, including post-award interest, and the proper course
is to remit the matter to the arbitrator for correction.
Supreme Court’s power to do complete justice under Article 142 of
the Constitution: The power under Article 142 of the Constitution must be
exercised in consonance with the fundamental principles and objectives of the
1996 Act to end protracted litigation and save parties time and
money. However, it should not be used to rewrite or modify the award on

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
merits but can be exercised where it is required and necessary to bring the
litigation or dispute to an end.
However, Justice Viswanathan (Dissenting Opinion) stated that the
Supreme Court's cannot exercise its power to modify an arbitral award as the
established jurisprudence on Article 142 clearly states it cannot be used to
"supplant" substantive law, achieve indirectly what cannot be achieved
directly, or contradict express statutory provisions.
2. Justice B. R. Gavai (Concurring Opinion)
3. Justice Samjay kumar (Concurring Opinion)
4. Justice A.G. Mash (Concurring Opinion)
5. Justice Viswanathan (Dissenting Opinion)

Judgment:

The Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, held that courts possess a limited power under
Section 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act to modify an arbitral award. The majority also
affirmed the courts power to modify post-award interest where justified.

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February

V. Vinod @ Nasmulla vs. State of Chhattisgarh

Dated: 14th February 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 220

Court: Supreme Court

Bench: Justice P.S. Narasimha & Justice Manoj Misra

Facts:

The incident dates back to the year 1993 when one person sitting behind the driver in
a Transport Bus put a country-made pistol on the temple of the driver and ordered
him to stop the bus. When the bus stopped, 8 men started beating the passengers
and robbed them of their belongings. A shot was also fired at one of the passengers
who sustained injuries. The culprits thereafter escaped with looted articles. The
driver took the bus to the Police Station where an FIR was lodged. The appellant was
thereafter arrested. He was carrying a country made pistol, which had five cartridges,
two live and three empty. He was put to the test identification parade (TIP) wherein
he was identified by the bus driver and the conductor.

The appellant Vinod @ Nasmulla and Mohd. Kalam Ansari were jointly tried by the
Court of Session. The trial court, inter alia, held that the factum of dacoity is duly
proved; PW-9 (police personnel) identified the appellant as one of the dacoits who
committed the crime; PW-5 (police constable) proved recovery of country-made
pistol from the appellant and, therefore, the appellant is liable to be convicted. The
trial court, however, acquitted co-accused Mohd. Kalam Ansari and convicted the
appellant under Section 395 read with Section 397 of the IPC and Section 25 (1)(b) of
the Arms Act.

Aggrieved by the judgment and order of conviction, the appellant preferred appeal
before the High Court, though without success. Aggrieved by dismissal of the appeal,
the appellant filed criminal appeal before SC.

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February

Statutory Provisions:

1. Indian Penal Code/Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023

o Section 395/310(2): Punishment for dacoity
o Section 397/311: Dacoity or robbery with attempt to cause death or
grievous hurt
2. Arms Act 1959
o Section 25 (1)(b): Punishment for certain offences
3. Indian Evidence Act/Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023
o Section 9/7: Facts that are necessary to explain or introduce relevant
facts or facts in issue

Issues:

1. What is the evidentiary value of the TIP conducted during

investigation?

Judges and Opinions:

1. Justice P.S. Narasimha: From the facts culled out above, there are just two
pieces of evidence against the appellant, namely, (a) dock identification by
PW-9; and (b) arrest of the appellant that night with a country-made pistol by
PW-5.
A test identification parade under Section 9 is not substantive evidence in a
criminal prosecution but is only corroborative evidence. The purpose of
holding a TIP during the stage of investigation is, firstly, to ensure that the
investigating agency is proceeding in the right direction where the accused is
unknown and, secondly, to serve as a corroborative piece of evidence when the
witness identifies the accused during trial.
Thereby if the witness who identified a person or an article in the TIP is not
examined during trial, the TIP report which may be useful to corroborate or
contradict him would lose its evidentiary value for the purposes of
identification. The rationale behind the aforesaid legal principle is that unless

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
the witness enters the witness box and submits himself for cross examination
how can it be ascertained as to on what basis he identified the person or the
article. Because it is quite possible that before the TIP is conducted the
accused may be shown to the witness or the witness may be tutored to identify
the accused.
In the instant case those three witnesses who participated in the TIP of the
appellant were not examined during trial. Thus, the TIP report, which could
have been used to either contradict or corroborate those witnesses, is of no
evidentiary value.
Hence, the only substantive evidence on record of the case in respect of
identification of the appellant is the dock identification by PW-9.
The dock identification by PW-9 does not inspire our confidence for the
following reasons: (a) PW-9 is a police personnel posted at police station.
During cross-examination, on being questioned about his movement papers,
he could not provide a satisfactory explanation for his movement in that bus &
other reasons.
In absence of any such corroborative evidence, it would be too naive on our
part to accept the prosecution story regarding the manner in which the
appellant is stated to have been arrested
2. Justice Manoj Misra (Concurring Opinion)

Judgment:

As the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the appeal
is allowed. The judgment and order of the trial court and the High Court are hereby
set-aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge for which he was tried.

Precedents:

● Rameshwar Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1971) “the

identification during police investigation…is not substantive evidence in
law and it can only be used for corroborating or contradicting
evidence of the witness concerned as given in Court.

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February

VI. State of Rajasthan vs. Surendra Singh Rathore

Dated: 19th February 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC

Court: Supreme Court

Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol & Justice Prashant K. Mishra

Facts:

A complaint was registered against respondent CEO-cum-Project Director, Bio-fuel

Authority, Government of Rajasthan, allegedly demanding bribe. FIR was registered
on 4th April 2022. Later a second FIR was lodged on 14th April 2022 as against the
respondent when the constable gave the information to DSP of indulgent of
respondent in taking bribe and thereby granting license to run bio-fuel pumps.

Respondent, aggrieved of 2nd FIR, seek quashing under Section 482 CrPC, alleging
no fresh incident took place, no sanction was taken; on these, HC held 2nd FIR was an
abuse of the process of law. Thereby through SLP the appellant approached the SC.

Statutory Provisions:

1. CrPC/BNSS
o Section 154/173: Information in cognizable cases

Issues:

1. Whether the registration of the subsequent FIR is legally

permissible and whether the High Court was correct in exercising
its inherent powers in quashing the same.

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
Judges and Opinions:

1. Justice Sanjay Karol: after perusal of conspectus of judgments, the

following principles emerge regarding the permissibility of the
registration of a second FIR:
i. When the second FIR is counter-complaint or presents a rival
version of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR already
stands registered.
ii. When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even though they
may arise from the same set of circumstances.
iii. When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the earlier FIR or
set of facts to be part of a larger conspiracy.
iv. When investigation and/or persons related to the incident bring to the
light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances.
v. Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different.

HC found both the FIRs regarding the same offence and thereby held not
maintainable however the scope of both is distinct. 1st one refers to a particular
incident and action taken therein is limited & 2nd one pertains to a larger issue
of widespread corruption in the concerned dept.

2. Justice Prashant K. Mishra (Concurring Opinion)

Judgment:

Judgment of the HC is set aside and 2nd FIR is restored back.

Precedents:

 Nirmal Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) second FIR would be

maintainable not only because there were different versions but when
new discovery is made on factual foundations.

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February

VII. Suneeti Toteja vs State Of U.P

Dated: 25th February 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 267

Court: Supreme Court

Bench: Justice B. V. Nagarathna & Justice Satish Chandra Sharma

Facts:

The Complainant who was an Associate Director, had alleged sexual harassment by
the ED during her tenure at the FSSAI. A Complaint was filed before the FSSAI for
action to be taken under the provisions of the Sexual Harassment Act, 2013. An
Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) was constituted to investigate the
Complainant‟s allegations and was found guilty. It was recommended that an FIR be
registered against him for the offences under IPC. However, the FSSAI did not take
any action against the said person.

Resultantly, the Complainant filed an FIR and during the investigation, she asserted
that the Appellant (employee of the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS)) in her
capacity as the presiding officer of the ICC on behalf of FSSAI representatives and
supposedly the complainant had filed a counter affidavit on her behalf without
consent during the proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT).
She alleged that she was transferred from Delhi to Chennai and when she gave a
representation to cancel her transfer, the Appellant threatened her by saying that if
she does not want to go to Chennai, then she can take a study leave and quit the
place, or else, she would be harassed. The Appellant was also allegedly involved in
threatening and pressurising the Complainant to withdraw the case. Thereby Special
CJM took cognizance of the same. The Appellant's Petition to quash the chargesheet
was dismissed by the High Court, which, however, granted bail. Hence, the Appellant
aggrieved by dismissal approached Supreme Court under SLP.

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
Statutory Provisions:

1. Code of Criminal Procedure/BNSS

o Section 197/218: Prosecution of Judges and public servants

Issues:

1. Whether the prior sanction was necessary for the prosecution of

the appellant (public servant) under section 197 CrPC, or whether
the Magistrate was correct in taking cognizance against the
appellant without there being any sanction.

Judges and Opinions:

1. Justice B. V. Nagarathna: if the accused public servant was acting in the

performance of his/her official duties, and if the answer is in the affirmative,
then prior sanction for their prosecution is a condition precedent to the
cognizance of the cases against them by the courts. It is therefore largely a
disputed question of fact here and not a question of law.
In the present case, the appellant was acting in her official capacity as she had
filed the counter affidavit and interacted with the complainant in her capacity
of a Presiding Officer, ICC and therefore it is sufficient to hold that a prior
sanction from the department was in fact necessary before the Magistrate
taking cognizance against her.
The Magistrate therefore erred in proceeding to take cognizance against the
appellant without the sanction for prosecution being received from BIS, and
since BIS has eventually refused to grant sanction for the prosecution of the
appellant, the prosecution against the appellant could not have been
sustained.
However argument advanced by the complainant with respect to “deemed
sanction” is also not tenable. Section 197 of CrPC does not envisage a concept
of deemed sanction. As the complainant relied upon the judgment of this
Court in Vineet Narain vs UOI (1998) and contended that “time period of
three months for grant of sanction has to be strictly adhered to” However, a
perusal of the said judgment reveals that it did not deal with Section 197 CrPC
and rather it dealt with the investigation powers and procedures of CBI and
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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
Central Vigilance Commission. While it did mention that the time limits for
grant of sanction for prosecution must be strictly adhered to, there is no
observation to the effect that lack of grant of sanction for prosecution within
the time limit would amount to deemed sanction for prosecution.
Similarly, they placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in
Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh (2012) and contended
that “if no decision is taken by the sanctioning authority, then at the end of
the extended time limit, sanction will be deemed to be granted for the
proposal for prosecution.” However, even the said judgment does not in any
manner lay down the notion of deemed sanction. Firstly, the said judgment
dealt primarily with the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the sanction
for prosecution under that Act. Secondly, court had given some guidelines for
the consideration of the Parliament. However, such a proposition has not yet
been statutorily incorporated and in such a scenario; this Court cannot read
such a mandate into the statute when it does not exist.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the learned Magistrate was not right in
taking cognizance of the offence against the appellant herein without there
being a sanction for prosecution granted by the competent authority.

2. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma (Concurring Opinion)

Judgment:

Appeal is allowed. Consequently, the charge-sheet, the summoning order and the
consequent steps, if any, taken by the trial court pursuant to the same are liable to be
quashed qua the appellant herein and are thus quashed.

Precedents:

 Amrik Singh vs The State of PEPSU (1955) It is not every offence

committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution
under section 197(1); nor even every act done by him while he is actually
engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act
complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, then
sanction would be necessary…

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
VIII. Radhika Agarwal vs. UOI & Ors.

Dated: 27th February 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 242

Court: Supreme Court

Bench: CJI Sanjiv Khanna, Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Bela M. Trivedi

Facts:

In Om Prakash v Union of India (2011), the Court had held that offences under the
Customs Act and Central Excise Act, 1944 were non-cognizable and bailable.
Therefore, an officer could arrest an individual only after obtaining a warrant from a
Magistrate. Prior to Om Prakash, offences under the Customs Act were considered
non-bailable by the courts.

Subsequent amendments to Section 104 of the Customs Act, which deals with the
power to arrest, altered this framework. The amendments added cognizable offences
and modified the conditions for arrest. The amendments also made certain offences
non-bailable.

Petitioners alleged misuse of arrest powers by customs and GST officers, claiming
arrests were made without sufficient evidence, often to coerce tax payments before
adjudication. They argued that such actions violated Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution. Hence the constitutionality of such provisions was questioned before
the Supreme Court.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Customs Act
o Section 104: Power to arrest
2. GST Act
o Section 67(10): Power of inspection, search and seizure

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
o Section 69: Power to arrest
o Section 70: Power to summon persons to give evidence and produce
documents
o Section 132: Punishment for certain offences
3. Constitution of India
o Article 20(3): Protection against self incrimination
o Article 21: Protection of life and personal liberty
o Article 246-A: Special provision with respect to goods and service tax
4. Code of Criminal Procedure
o Section 41: When police may arrest without warrant
o Section 41-B: Procedure of arrest and duties of officer making arrest
o Section 41-D: Right of arrested person to meet an advocate of his
choice during interrogation
o Section 50: Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and
of right to bail
o Section 55A: Health and safety of arrested person

Issues:

1. Whether the arrest provisions provided under the Customs Act,

1962 and GST Law are constitutional
2. Whether the powers of arrest under the Customs Act and GST Act
align with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and
22 of the Constitution of India.
3. The extent of power of judicial review of Courts in cases where the
parties challenge the exercise of the power of arrest by the
authorized officers under the Special Laws

Judges and Opinions:

1. CJI Sanjiv Khanna: Constitutionality of Customs Act – it is settled

that customs officers are not police officers. However, while customs officers
do not undertake investigation like a police officer, "they enjoy analogous

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
powers such as the power to investigate, arrest, seize, interrogate, etc under
the Customs Act".
The Court held the arrest procedure and safeguards as laid down by various
cases and in the provisions of the code like Section 41-B, 41-D, 50 & 55A of
CrPC is applicable for offences under the Customs Act
While distinguishing the approach for arrest under the Code and Customs Act,
the Court stated that the threshold is higher in the case of Customs Act. While
Section 41 CrPC allows a police officer to arrest a person without a warrant, if
a “reasonable complaint has been made”, or “credible information has been
received”, or “a reasonable suspicion exists” that the person has committed a
cognizable offence, Section 104(1) Customs Act stipulates that a customs
officers may only arrest a person if they have “reasons to believe” that a
person has committed an offence.
"A person is said to have a “reason to believe” a thing, if they have sufficient
cause to believe that thing but not otherwise. This represents a more stringent
standard than the “mere suspicion” threshold provided under Section 41"
Arrest under GST Act - The Court further observed that "To a large extent,
our reasoning and the ratio on the applicability of the Code to the Customs Act
would equally apply to the GST Acts”
"We would, therefore, agree with the contention that the GST Act is not a
complete code when it comes to the provisions of search and seizure, and
arrest, for the provisions of the Code would equally apply when they are not
expressly or impliedly excluded by provisions of the GST Act."
Court noted that Section 67(10) of the GST Act states that provisions of the
CrPC are applicable with the modification that the word “Magistrate” under
Section 165(5) is read as “Commissioner”. Moreover under Section 69 the
Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner has the same powers as an
officer in charge of a police station to release someone on bail in non-
cognisable and bailable offences.
Tax recovery can’t be forced - “… in case there is a breach of law, and the
assessees are put under threat, force or coercion, the assessees would be
entitled to move the courts and seek a refund of tax deposited by them. The
department would also take appropriate action against the officers in such
cases”

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
Furthermore, the Court clarified that a person summoned under Section 70 of
the GST Acts is not per se an accused protected under Article 20(3) of the
Constitution, because the prohibitive sweep of Article 20(3) does not go back
to the stage of interrogation.
It is obvious that the investigation must be allowed to proceed in accordance
with law and there should not be any attempt to dictate the investigator and at
the same time, there should not be any misuse of power and authority.
Constitutional validity of Section 69 & 70 of GST Act/Legislature
competent to make penal provisions under GST Act - These
provisions criminalises violations of the GST Act. Petitioners argued that
Parliament and legislatures are only competent to make laws on collecting
GST under Article 246A and not penal laws. They contended that powers to
summon, arrest, and prosecute are beyond “legislative competence”.
Rejected this argument the court stated “The Parliament, under Article 246-A
of the Constitution, has the power to make laws regarding GST and, as a
necessary corollary, enact provisions against tax evasion. Article 246-A of the
Constitution is a comprehensive provision and the doctrine of pith and
substance applies. The impugned provisions lay down the power to summon
and arrest, powers necessary for the effective levy and collection of GST”
therefore, rejected the challenge to Sections 69 and 70 GST Acts.
2. Justice M.M. Sundresh (Concurring Opinion)
3. Justice Bela M. Trivedi: While completely agreeing with the well-
considered opinion expressed by the Hon‟ble Chief Justice she emphasised
that “the power of judicial review in cases of arrest under such
Special Acts should be exercised very cautiously and in rare
circumstances to balance individual liberty with the interest of justice and
of the society at large. Any liberal approach in construing the stringent
provisions of the Special Acts may frustrate the very purpose and
objective of the Acts.”
Further the powers of judicial review may not be exercised unless there is
manifest arbitrariness or gross violation or non-compliance of the
statutory safeguards which are required to be followed by the authorized
officers when an arrest is made of a person prima facie guilty of or having
committed offence under the special Acts.

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 Important Judgments of the Month of February
Judgment:

Upheld the validity of the provisions of the Customs Act & GST Act

Precedents:

● State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram (1962) Ramesh Chandra Mehta v.

State of West Bengal (1969) and Illias v. Collector of Customs
(1969) decisively held that customs officers are not police officers.

● Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2021) an officer can be deemed to

be a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act if (i)
the officer has all the powers of a police officer qua investigation, which
includes the power to file a police report under Section 173 CrPC

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