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Strategic Communication
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 Strategic Communication
Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates

Christopher Paul

Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues

Copyright 2011 by Christopher Paul
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of
brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Paul, Christopher.
Strategic communication : origins, concepts, and current debates / Christopher Paul.
p. cm. — (Contemporary military, strategic, and security issues)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-313-38640-4 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-313-38641-1
(ebook) 1. Communication policy—United States. 2. Communication,
International. I. Title.
P95.82.U6P38 2011
320.97301'4—dc22 2010053144
ISBN: 978-0-313-38640-4
EISBN: 978-0-313-38641-1
15 14 13 12 11 1 2 3 4 5
This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook.
Visit www.abc-clio.com for details.
Praeger
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ABC-CLIO, LLC
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Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911
This book is printed on acid-free paper
Manufactured in the United States of America
The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views or
opinions of RAND or its sponsors.
 For my daughter, Lillian,
who will grow up to a brighter future if we get better at this
This page intentionally left blank
 Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments ix

Chapter 1 Introduction: The Promise and Peril of Strategic

Communication 1
Chapter 2 What Is Strategic Communication,
and What Should It Be? 17
Chapter 3 History of Public Diplomacy
and Strategic Communication 71
Chapter 4 Who Does Strategic Communication? 83
Chapter 5 Challenges Facing U.S. Strategic Communication 111
Chapter 6 Improving Strategic Communication 136
Chapter 7 Conclusions and the Way Ahead 174

Appendix I: Definitions of Strategic Communication 185

Appendix II: Department of Defense Report on Strategic Communication,
December 2009 193
Appendix III: White House National Framework for Strategic
Communication, March 2010 205
Bibliography 217
Index 231
This page intentionally left blank
 Preface and Acknowledgments

This book is intended primarily as a reference resource but can also be used
as a primer. The topic of discussion is U.S. government strategic communica-
tion, an enterprise of critical importance burdened by a lexicon that is both
vague and contested, and facing a host of additional challenges. This book
makes clear what is contested, presents the competing perspectives, puts
them in historical context, and presents the consequences and implications
of adhering to each of the disparate views.
The original working title for this book was The Promise and Peril of Stra-
tegic Communication. While that is now only the title of the first chapter, the
theme remains prominent. This work offers a clear (and hopefully compel-
ling) vision of what strategic communication could be and the benefits that
will accrue if that promise is realized, as well as making clear the dire conse-
quences for failing to improve U.S. government strategic communication and
some of the shapes such failures could take.
In addition to laying out key areas of contention and ongoing debates in
strategic communication, this book makes several suggestions or observations
that will help to move some of the debates forward and offers practical advice
for those who are asked to do strategic communication while these debates
rage on. No matter how deeply ensconced you are in the theory or practice of
strategic communication, from complete novice to seasoned veteran, there is
something here for you.
The manuscript for this book was completed in fall of 2010. I have been
doing research on, related to, or relevant for strategic communication since
roughly 2004. While all of that research was conducted while working for
the RAND corporation and much of it was RAND project work, the views
expressed here are solely mine and do not reflect the views or opinions of
RAND or its sponsors. Where RAND research is foundational to thinking
here, I have so indicated in the citations. I am indebted to several RAND
x Preface and Acknowledgments

colleagues for their contributions to this effort: I thank Mike Lostumbo and
Jim Dobbins for their support of and encouragement for research in this
area, to include the present work. I thank Maria Falvo for her meticulous
recording-keeping and for helping me to work more efficiently, protecting
my time outside of work for projects such as this. I thank friend, colleague,
and coauthor Todd Helmus for long hours of discussion and collaborative
thinking that remains foundational in my views of and about strategic com-
munication. I offer special thanks to Colin Clarke, not only as a collaborator
and coauthor on research in this area, but also for serving as a sounding board
and discussion partner, and for reading and providing valuable feedback on
an early manuscript of this book.
My debts extend beyond RAND. My thinking in this area could not have
matured and developed as it did without discussions with Austin Branch,
Scott Riggs, Larry “Bingo” Vincent, Larry Chinnery, Matt Armstrong, and
many other officers, defense civilians, interested academics, or other profes-
sionals who have shared ideas with me through conferences, papers, reports,
correspondence, or conversations. My gratitude to both Bruce Gregory and
Dennis Murphy is particularly strong. Not only are their intellectual con-
tributions foundational in this work (as the repeated citation of the work
of both herein attests), but also their detailed comments on an early draft
inspired me to make significant improvements on its way to becoming what
you now hold in your hands.
I also need to thank the very professional ABC-CLIO publishing and
editorial staff. I truly appreciate the encouragement from and flexibility of
Nicole Azze, project manager at ABC-CLIO, and Steve Catalano, Senior
Editor, Praeger Security International. I must acknowledge the contribution
of the team at Apex CoVantage; without their efforts, many more embar-
rassing typos, incorrect capitalization, and other crimes against the English
language would remain.
Finally, I would be remiss if I failed to thank my family for their patience
with my occasional distant stare as I mulled through the concepts presented
here, and the weekends and evenings I disappeared into my office to pound
away at the computer. Thank you all.
Errors and omissions remain my responsibility alone.
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Promise and

Peril of Strategic Communication

What you do speaks so loudly that I cannot hear what you say.
—Ralph Waldo Emerson

This book is about strategic communication. What, exactly, strategic com-

munication is, what it includes, and what is excluded is hotly contested;
discussions of possible interpretations of and definitions for strategic commu-
nication (and the implications thereof) constitute one of the core themes of
the book. While what strategic communication is remains unclear to many,
what is clear is that perceptions and understandings of images, policies, and
actions matter, that the success of many policies is contingent on the support
they receive from various populations (both foreign and domestic), and that
perceptions are influenced both by what you do and what you say.
These facts are particularly relevant in the realm of foreign policy, espe-
cially national-security policy. One of the greatest challenges of our time is
the threat posed by violent extremism. Efforts to combat violent extremism
must consider the beliefs, motives, and perceptions that predicate extremism
as well as those that lead to support for violence. What is accomplished by
killing or capturing the members of a terrorist network if the perceptions and
beliefs that motivated the terrorists and their supporters remain to generate
a similar network in its place?1 Similarly, U.S. military operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan have starkly exposed the truth that some military objectives
depend in large part on the behavior and attitudes of the populations in the
area of conflict and cannot be achieved solely through the application of
traditional military force. As the 2009 Department of Defense Strategic Com-
munication Science and Technology Plan notes: “Warfare is changing. While
that statement has been true throughout the course of military history, a com-
pelling argument can be made today that the public perceptions and implica-
tions of military operations might increasingly outweigh the tangible benefits
actually achieved from real combat on the battlefield.”2
2 Strategic Communication

Strategic Communication promises a set of answers to these challenges. This

book will enumerate that promise and also takes pains to spell out the peril
that threatens if strategic communication is abandoned or done poorly.
The remainder of this chapter provides a starting place for our exploration
of strategic communication. I begin with a starting definition for strategic
communication and present what I will argue are elements of the unassail-
able core of any effective conceptualization of strategic communication. The
chapter concludes by introducing the core themes of the book, which include
both the promise and the peril of strategic communication; the relevance of
all that we say and do; a characterization of the problem space as the inform,
influence, and persuade mission set; the argument that the development of
different capabilities in strategic communication follows a natural crawl,
walk, run progression.
A final note, before beginning: this book unashamedly takes the perspec-
tive of the U.S. government in general and the U.S. Department of Defense
specifically throughout much of the discussion. I am a U.S. citizen, and, more
importantly, virtually all of my relevant research and experience has involved
the U.S. approach to strategic communication. The general principles es-
poused, however, should be applicable in any national (or other organiza-
tional) context.

Strategic Communication Defined

One of the challenges facing strategic communication is the significant
struggles that have occurred in trying to define it. While there appears to be
broad consensus about the core of the concept, in the actual details strategic
communication is different things to different people. There are broad dif-
ferences in understandings of what strategic communication is and is not,
particularly at the boundaries (what things should and should not be con-
sidered part of strategic communication). Many are happy to define strategic
communication as they define pornography and “know it when they see it,”3
but as I will argue in the next chapter this leads to policymakers talking
passed each other, incorrect assumptions of shared understanding, and ac-
tivities being labeled as part of strategic communication that many might
think should be excluded. Some, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, are fed up with the term, and would prefer
to do away with it.4
Further complicating the issue is that strategic communication is not alone
in its ambiguity: there are also struggles over much of the related lexicon. The
related concept “public diplomacy” is the subject of shared misunderstanding,
as is the relationship between strategic communication and public diplomacy.
For example, some contributors use the two terms interchangeably, while
Introduction 3

for others public diplomacy is subordinate to strategic communication, and

for others still strategic communication is subordinate to public diplomacy.5
“Information operations” is another related term suffering from misuse and
misunderstanding. In fact, the lexicon relevant to strategic communication is
in such disarray that I spend a significant fraction of the next chapter discuss-
ing alternate definitions and understandings of strategic communication and
many related terms.

A Working Definition
For me, strategic communication is coordinating the things you do and
say in support of your objectives. More formally, I define strategic communi-
cation as coordinated actions, messages, images, and other forms of signaling or
engagement intended to inform, influence, or persuade selected audiences in support
of national objectives. I can and will deconstruct each element of that defini-
tion in chapter 2, along with a discussion of the elements of many other
offered definitions of strategic communication. For now, let it suffice to have
a working definition laid out so it is at least a little bit clearer what we are
talking about.
Note that this is my definition and mine alone. It aligns more or less well
with some of the definitions offered by others. If you do not agree with my
definition in whole or in part, that is OK. The exact definitional details do
not really matter to me, nor even does the overarching label “strategic com-
munication.” The underlying concepts do matter, and I would be happy with
any term of art and any effective definition that captures the essence of the
construct and helps, rather than hinders, in actually doing what is referred to
here as strategic communication.

Strategic Communication Is a Moving Target

Complicating definition (and execution, if we are candid) is the fact that
strategic communication as defined and practiced in the U.S. government
and U.S. Department of Defense is in a state of flux. Nearly a decade of
recommendations and proposals from various studies are in the queue for
consideration, discussion, or adoption.6 As of this writing (fall of 2010), sev-
eral members of Congress have drafted legislation that mentions strategic
communication by name and would impact its conduct or structure if passed
into law. In response to requirements included in the National Defense Ac-
quisition Act of 2009, both the White House and the Department of De-
fense released reports to Congress on the status of strategic communication
in the government (both are excerpted in their entirety in this book; see
appendices II and III).7 The Department of Defense has conducted a Strategic
4 Strategic Communication

Communication Capabilities Based Assessment, but the results have not

been released as of this writing. Also at the time of this writing, the De-
partment of Defense is conducting a high-level study on information opera-
tions and strategic communication for the fiscal year 2012 program objective
memorandum process.8
In short, the topic is a hot one; debate is ongoing; and changes are being
considered and possibly made. This book captures as much as it can of current
debate but takes care to emphasize the unassailable core of what is currently
called strategic communication. Even if some part of the government makes a
new authoritative statement of what they intend for strategic communication
to be (something I would advocate they do, by the way), or if the term stra-
tegic communication is jettisoned in favor of a less ambiguous term with less
contentious baggage, the core ideas identified and the conclusions reached
here will still obtain.

The Unassailable Core of Strategic Communication

Whatever you call it and whatever you choose to include or exclude at the
boundaries, I believe the concept of strategic communication can be boiled
down to four core elements. If a new construct or definition excludes any of
these four elements, it is something fundamentally different. To be sure, an
effective implementation of strategic communication will contain more than
just these four elements, but they form the unassailable core of my concep-
tion of strategic communication. They are:

• Informing, influencing, and persuading is important.

• Effectively informing, influencing, and persuading requires clear objectives.
• Coordination and deconfliction are necessary to avoid information fratricide.
• Actions communicate.

In what follows, I elaborate on each.

Informing, Influencing, and Persuading Is Important

Though I made a brief and I hope compelling argument for the impor-
tance of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs in foreign policy in the intro-
duction to this chapter, I want to repeat the point here. The first part of
the unassailable core of strategic communication is the belief that it is im-
portant to attempt to inform, influence, and persuade people (domestic,
foreign, adversarial) in pursuit of policy objectives. This has never been
more true than it is today, in the digital age, where populations previously
disconnected from U.S. foreign policy now have both an opinion and the
Introduction 5

ability to make it heard. As the authors of a 2009 Congressional Research

Service report eloquently argue:

The attitudes and perceptions of foreign publics created in this new envi-
ronment are often as important as reality, and sometimes can even trump
reality. These attitudes affect the ability of the United States to form and
maintain alliances in pursuit of common policy objectives; impact the cost
and the effectiveness of military operations; influence local populations to
either cooperate, support or be hostile as the United States pursues foreign
policy and/or military objectives in that country; affect the ability to secure
support on issues of particular concern in multilateral fora; and dampen
foreign publics’ enthusiasm for U.S. business services and products.9

This applies doubly with regard to military operations. In fact, a 2008 sym-
posium on information and cyberspace conducted at the U.S. Army Combined
Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth acknowledges that “success or failure of land
operations is susceptible to the perceptions of the diverse, but relevant, groups
and individuals among whom the operations take place [emphasis in original].”10
General Peter Chiarelli echoes this conclusion in an article in Military Review:

Once the decision to employ the military has been made, those of us in uni-
form must accept that in most modern conflicts, the decisive elements of
power required to prevail may, more often than not, be non-kinetic. While
we must maintain our core competency to defeat enemies with traditional
combat power, we must also be able to offer the populations of countries
affected by war the hope that life will be better for them and their children
because of our presence, not in spite of it. In other words, in contrast to the
idea that force always wins out in the end, we must understand that not all
problems in modern conflict can be solved with the barrel of a rifle.11

I agree wholeheartedly. More importantly, I think that you should too.

Effectively Informing, Influencing, and Persuading Requires Clear Objectives

This is what makes strategic communication “strategic.” Informing, influ-
encing, and persuading in support of national objectives requires both that the
objective be clear and that it be clear how a certain set of audience attitudes,
behaviors, or perceptions will support those objectives. I completely agree with
Dr. Emily Goldman, who is currently part of the office of communication at U.S.
Central Command, when she says, “Effective strategic communication requires
clear, consistent core messages that flow from policy goals [emphasis added].”12
It is critical both that the objectives be clear and that the desired effect
sought through communication be clear. Vague, hand-waving goals like “win
6 Strategic Communication

the long war” (a phrase prominent in the national-security strategy and in

various defense-planning guidance under the George W. Bush administra-
tion) do not imply any observable or measureable indicators of progress, nor
do they do much to allow the articulation of supporting objectives to which
an influence campaign could connect.
Similarly, vague communication goals like “make them like us” are not
a good example of informing, influencing, and persuading in support of na-
tional policy. “Liking” is not by itself a precise national political objective,
though it could be conducive to attitudes that could enable a specific policy
objective, if clearly articulated that way and connected to a plausible path of
support for such an objective.
Another way to describe the desired connection between objectives and
strategic communication is to borrow a page from the military and to think in
terms of “information effects.” If every action, message, image, or other form
of signaling is acknowledged to have a possible impact on the information
environment, then it becomes more straightforward to harness those impacts
to accomplish intended (and clearly articulated) information effects. With-
out loss of generality, these objectives could be articulated to support national
political intent or desired political effects as well.

Coordination and Deconfliction Are Necessary to Avoid Information Fratricide

Even if everyone in government accepts that informing, influencing, and
persuading in pursuit of policy objectives (or information effects) is a wor-
thy undertaking, and acknowledges that doing so effectively is predicated on
clearly articulated objectives with communication efforts explicitly tied to
those objectives, such efforts can still fail without adequate coordination and
deconfliction.
While a fire-support cell has a host of different munitions and platforms
to call upon when tasked with the destruction of a building, so too does a
proponent of influence have many different means of communication and
possible themes available. Worse for influence efforts, while any one of the
fire-support coordinator’s strike assets is likely to be sufficient to destroy a
building in a single salvo or sortie, many instruments of influence may need
to work together over an extended period before the objective is realized.
Army Field Manual 3–13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Tech-
niques, and Procedures, defines “information fratricide” as “the result of em-
ploying information operations elements in a way that causes effects in the
information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or
adversely affect friendly forces.”13 When one piece of information a govern-
ment or its forces provide contradicts or is otherwise inconsistent with an-
other piece of information provided by that government, that is information
Introduction 7

fratricide. “Since each USG agency has its own mission, each habitually
targets different audiences, with different messages, through different chan-
nels. By communicating different messages to multiple audiences at home
and abroad, the USG risks the perception of being seen as disingenuous.”14
Getting every possible source of messages and signals in an enterprise as
sprawling as the U.S. government (or even just the U.S. military) to avoid
contradicting each other is nontrivial. Nonetheless, integration, coordina-
tion, and deconfliction are central to strategic communication.

Actions Communicate
Actions speak louder than words. This truism is absolutely central to an ef-
fective strategic communication construct. Any implementation of strategic
communication that includes only traditional communication, such as mes-
saging, press releases, media relations, and so forth, is all but doomed to fail.
This holds true even if it includes nontraditional media, such as Web or other
technology, new media/now media (discussed further in chapter 5), and indi-
vidual engagement. To be successful, strategic communication must include
the communicative content and signals of actions, images, and policies.
“Actions” include not just policy actions but a much broader set of be-
haviors, deeds, and undertakings by members and representatives of the gov-
ernment. This goes double for the kinetic actions (maneuver and fires) of
military forces. If a picture can be worth a thousand words, then a bomb can
be worth ten thousand.
The smart thinkers in this area realize that actions communicate, and I
echo their call. Whether you think of it as minimizing the “say-do gap,”15
or wish to discuss the “diplomacy of deeds,”16 what you do matters at least
as much (if not more) than what you say, especially for deployed military
forces. Every action, utterance, message, depiction, and movement of a na-
tion’s military forces influence the perceptions and opinions of populations
that witness them, both in the area of operations (first hand), and in the
broader world (second or third hand).17 The 2010 White House National
Framework for Strategic Communication gets it exactly right: “Every action
that the United States Government takes sends a message.”18
The 2010 Marine Corps Functional Concept for Strategic Communication
also correctly notes that strategic communication “is affected significantly
more by actions than by words or images.”19 Major Cliff Gilmore echoes the
point: “Every action communicates something to somebody somewhere.”20
Despite this obvious point, too often influence efforts or implementations of
strategic communication include only media-based communications. An of-
ficer I spoke with who was involved in the strategic-communication efforts of
Multi-National Forces, Iraq (MNF-I) in 2008 described those efforts as “public
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