379 Phil.

515

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000 ]
VERONA PADA-KILARIO AND RICARDO KILARIO PETITIONERS,
VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SILVERIO PADA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

The victory[1] of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court[2] in an ejectment suit[3] filed against them by private respondent Silverio Pada, was
foiled by its reversal[4] by the Regional Trial Court[5] on appeal. They elevated their cause[6] to
respondent Court of Appeals[7] which, however, promulgated a Decision[8] on May 20, 1998,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.

The following facts are undisputed:

One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina
and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut
land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area
of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the
subject of the instant controversy.

During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from
him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died,
his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona
Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960.

Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his
estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never registered
in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his other
brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died
without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented
by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private
respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter,
Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died,
his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.

On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as
co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.

On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of his
father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.

Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went through a series of
meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all
earnest efforts toward that end, failed.

On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom,
Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner spouses.

On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-
Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of Donation[9] transferring to petitioner Verona
Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.

On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They
contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was
invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by either Marciano,
Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who represented them in the extra-
judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that was never
registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. It made the
following findings:

"After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court finds that
the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his ownership over x x x
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 x x x while defendants has [sic] successfully proved by
preponderance of evidence that said property is still under a community of
ownership among the heirs of the late Jacinto Pada who died intestate. If there was
some truth that Marciano Pada and Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly
of [sic] the above-described residential property x x x as their share of the
inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial settlement, how come that since
1951, the date of partition, the share of the late Marciano Pada was not transferred in
the name of his heirs, one of them Maria Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in the
name of Jacinto Pada up to the present while the part pertaining to the share of
Ananias Pada was easily transferred in the name of his heirs x x x.

"The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and the
genuineness and due execution of said document was assailed as doubtful and it
appears that most of the heirs were not participants and signatories of said
settlement, and there was lack of special power of attorney to [sic] those who
claimed to have represented their co-heirs in the participation [sic] and signing of the
said extra judicial statement.
 "Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-described
property long before the sale of said property on November 17, 1993 was executed
between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the plaintiff, as vendee. They are in
possession of said portion of the above-described property since the year 1960 with
the consent of some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic] present some of
the heirs of Jacinto Pada has [sic] donated x x x their share of [sic] the above-
described property to them, virtually converting defendants' standing as co-owners of
the land under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-owners became the undivided
owners of the whole estate x x x. As co-owners of x x x Cadastral Lot No. 5581 x x x
their possession in the northern portion is being [sic] lawful."[10]

From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On
November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It held:

"x x x [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo were
never questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than 40 years, thereby
lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two vendors were indeed legal and lawful
owners of properties ceded or sold. x x x At any rate, granting that the co-heirs of
Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo have some interests on the very lot assigned to
Marciano and Ananias, nevertheless, said interests had long been sadly lost by
prescription, if not laches or estoppel.

"It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule, but this
doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of the heirs possessed the
property as an owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription because
from the moment one of the co-heirs claim [sic] that he is the absolute owner and
denies the rest their share of the community property, the question then involved is
no longer one for partition but of ownership. x x x Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993
covers a period of 42 long years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may
have, was long extinguished by laches, estoppel or prescription.

"x x x

"x x x [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a brother of
Marciano Pada, took place only during the inception of the case or after the lapse of
more than 40 years reckoned from the time the extrajudicial partition was made in
1951. Therefore, said donation is illegal and invalid [sic] the donors, among others,
were absolutely bereft of any right in donating the very property in question."[11]

The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment earlier

promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, [sic]
consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby ordered:

"1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the appellant,
being the lawful possessor in concept of owner;
 "2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the option of
acquiring the same, in which case the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code has
to be applied;

"3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their occupancy and
use of the portion of the land in question in the sum of P100.00 commencing on June
26, 1995 when the case was filed and until the termination of the present case;

"4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00 as moral
damages and the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;

"5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit."[12]

Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the foregoing decision of the
Regional Trial Court.

On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing said petition. It
explained:

"Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is possession de facto
or physical or material possession and not de jure. Hence, even if the question of
ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon such issue but only to
determine the question of possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked
with the latter. It cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such issue
being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession
x x x.

"Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the land
possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his favor by vendor Maria
Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada who was the registered
owner of the subject lot. The right of vendee Maria Pada to sell the property was
derived from the extra-judicial partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of
Jacinto Pada, which was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the
subject land was adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo's father, and Ananias Pada.
Although the authenticity and genuineness of the extra-judicial partition is now
being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no action was ever previously filed in
court to question the validity of such partition.

"Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the antecedent facts that
Maria Pavo is one of the co-owners of the property originally owned by Jacinto Pada
x x x and that the disputed lot was adjudicated to Marciano (father of Maria Pavo)
and Ananias, and upon the death of Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took
possession of said lot, i.e. Maria Pavo the vendor for Marciano's share and Juanita
for Ananias' share x x x. Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the
respondent court that during the cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of
Maria Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581, while the share of Juanita Pada
was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria Pada Pavo and Juanita were
in possession of their respective hereditary shares. Further, petitioners in their
 Answer admitted that they have been occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in
dispute without paying any rental owing to the liberality of the plaintiff x x x.
Petitioners cannot now impugn the aforestated extrajudicial partition executed by the
heirs in 1951. As owner and possessor of the disputed property, Maria Pada, and her
vendee, private respondent, is entitled to possession. A voluntary division of the
estate of the deceased by the heirs among themselves is conclusive and confers upon
said heirs exclusive ownership of the respective portions assigned to them x x x.

"The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute made by the
heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, in favor of
petitioner Verona Pada is a futile attempt to confer upon the latter the status of co-
owner, since the donors had no interest nor right to transfer. x x x This gesture
appears to be a mere afterthought to help petitioners to prolong their stay in the
premises. Furthermore, the respondent court correctly pointed out that the equitable
principle of laches and estoppel come into play due to the donors' failure to assert
their claims and alleged ownership for more than forty (40) years x x x. Accordingly,
private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the vendor over Lot No. 5581
which include [sic] the portion occupied by petitioners."[13]

Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision.

On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying said motion.

Hence this petition raising the following issues:

"I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT

PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE
PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA DONATED
TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.

"II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT

MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE.

"III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH."

[14]

There is no merit to the instant petition.

First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made
in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition
among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid.[15] The requirement in Sec.
1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and
registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy
claims.[16] The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then
that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved.[17] Without creditors to take into consideration, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place,
nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid.
[18] The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be

effective as regards the heirs that participated therein.[19] The requirement of Article 1358 of the
Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is
only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability
of the acts of the parties as among themselves.[20] And neither does the Statute of Frauds under
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to
the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is
renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance.[21] The 1951
extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs,
Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to
Engr. Paderes and private respondent, respectively.[22]

Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and
spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status.[23] When they discussed and agreed on the
division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their
mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there
were debts existing against the estate which had not been paid.[24] No showing, however, has
been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason
why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.

The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of
donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44) years of never having disputed
the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano
and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada
was not the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom,
Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang,
Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The
donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not
the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate
the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.

Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs
of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying the
subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality
and tolerance of the Pada family.[25] Their admissions are evidence of a high order and bind
them insofar as the character of their possession of the subject property is concerned.
Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its
owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons
who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.[26]
Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both
Article 448[27] and Article 546[28] of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of
useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a
possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.
[29] Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not
possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada
that they were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good
faith for at the time the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet
fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized.[30] More
importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza
and Angelito Pada were not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot
be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[1]Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court promulgated on February 29, 1996 and penned
by Judge Venancio E. Rances, Rollo, pp. 23-29.

[2] 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII, Bato-Matalom, Leyte.

[3] Civil Case No. 91.

[4] In a Decision dated November 6, 1997 copy of which however does not appear in the Rollo.

[5] Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 18, Hilongos, Leyte.

[6] In a Petition for Review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46101.

[7] Fourth Division.

[8] Penned by then Court of Appeals, now Supreme Court, Associate Justice Minerva P.
Gonzaga-Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Demetrio G.
Demetria, Rollo, pp. 31-41.

[9] Annex "D" of the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated August 11, 1998, Rollo, p. 44.

[10]Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court dated February 29, 1996, pp. 4-6, Rollo, pp.
26-28.

[11] Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 8-9, Rollo, pp. 38-39.

[12] Id., p. 4, Rollo, p. 34.

[13]Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 6-8, Rollo, pp. 36-38. Emphasis supplied by the Court
of Appeals.

[14] Petition supra, p. 6, rollo, p. 13.

[15] Vda. de Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 646, 659 (1991), citing Madamba v. Magno,
et al., 10 Phil. 86, 88 (1908); De Guzman, et al. v. Pangilinan and Azarcon, 28 Phil. 322, 325
(1914); and De Garces, et al. v. Broce, et al., 23 SCRA 612, 615-616 (1968)

[16] Id., citing Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196, 205, 208 (1946)

[17] Id., citing Hernandez, supra, p. 209.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 536, 552 (1998)

[20]
Vda. de Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 646, 657 (1991), citing Thunga Chui v. Que
Bentec, 2 Phil. 561, 563-564 (1903)

[21]Id., p. 659, citing Barcelona, et al. v. Barcelona and Court of Appeals, 100 Phil. 251, 255
(1956)

[22] Id., p. 553.

[23] Leaño v. Leaño, 25 Phil. 180, 183-184 (1913)

[24] Ibid.; De Garces, supra, pp. 615-617 (1968)

[25] Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 7, Rollo, p. 37.

[26] Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 347, 370 (1996)

[27] "Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the owner who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of
the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon
the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."

[28]"Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor
in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof."

[29] Geminiano v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 344, 351 (1996)

[30] Id., p. 352.

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