Caste politics

In India, a caste is a (usually endogamous) social

group where membership is decided by birth.[1]
Broadly, Indian castes are divided into the Forward
Castes, Other Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes,
and Scheduled Tribes. Indian Christians and Indian
Muslims are also function as castes (a full list of
castes can be found at the end of this article). With
castes separating individuals into different social
groups, it follows that each group will have
conflicting interests; oftentimes putting those with A diagram depicting the structure of varnas in
lower social standing in less favorable positions. An India. See more at Caste system in India.
attempt to address this inequality has been the
reservation system, which essentially acts as
affirmative action to provide representation to caste groups that have been systematically disadvantaged.
There have also been other cases where political parties, like the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), was formed
to challenge the power of the upper castes.

The role that castes play in India's political system was institutionalised by the British colonist where
upper-caste dominance within government was perpetuated and reinforced. Although there were efforts to
address this discrepancy through measures like the Communal Award and educational empowerment (see
'Sanskritization'), this remained the status quo until the 1990s when an economic liberalisation in India
diminished state control and fueled the rise of caste-centric parties focused on empowering lower castes.
However, these parties were often rife with corruption as it was seen as a way to level the playing field.
Leaders of what came to be known as 'caste mafia' took advantage of lower caste dissent towards upper
caste institutions and openly robbed state institutions.

Caste not only determines one's role in political institutions; it also influences access to resources like
land as well as police and judicial assistance. Despite the traditional dominance of upper caste parties, the
concentration of lower caste individuals in specific areas can lead to regional dominance, impacting
political representation. However, this mainly impacts male members of the lower castes as women from
lower castes have traditionally been excluded from participating in the political sphere. This
discrimination has continued in recent times as women from lower castes are continued to be looked
down upon for their low educational levels. Organizations such as the Gulabi Gang as well as the United
Nations are currently working to improve lower caste women's social mobility and independence.

History
Historically,[2] it has been very hard to change the structure of caste politics in India. More recently
however, there has been a flux in caste politics, mainly caused by economic liberalisation in India.
Contemporary India has seen the influence of caste start to decline. This is partly due to the spread of
education to all castes which has had a democratising effect on the political system. However, this
"equalising" of the playing field has not been without controversy. The Mandal Commission and its
quotas system has been a particularly sensitive issue.

Colonial history
The British institutionalised caste into the workings of the major government institutions within India.
The main benefactors of this indirect rule were the upper castes or forward castes, which maintained their
hegemony and monopoly of control and influence over government institutes long after independence
from the British. The state of post-colonial India promised development, rule of law, and nation building,
but in reality, was a complex network of patronage systems, which solidified the upper-caste position of
dominance over civil service institutions. This network undermined the very promises of 'nation building'
that post-colonial India had made and ushered in an area of upper-caste dominance that lasted for the next
four decades.

In August 1932, the then Prime Minister of Britain, Ramsay MacDonald, made what became known as
the Communal Award. According to it, separate representation was to be provided for communities such
as the Dalit, Muslims, Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans. These depressed classes
were assigned a number of seats to be filled by election from special constituencies in which only voters
belonging to these classes could vote.

Caste-based mobilisation
The rise of caste-based mobilisation allowed marginalized
caste groups to move past the mere consolations of legislative
abolition, extending caste into the political frameworks.[3]
The term refers to the 'second democratic upsurge' from the
late 1980s with high voter turnout and representation of
lower-caste communities in state and national assemblies.[4]
Caste-based political mobilizations carried out by regional
parties, like the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj
Party, especially in agrarian settings. The objective was caste-
empowerment, aimed at resisting the inequalities perpetuated Mulayam Singh Yadev was the founder of
the Samajwadi Party. Another notable
by the oppression of powerful upper-caste bureaucracies and
member of the founding member is Beni
governments.[5] Regional political parties tapped into Prasad Verma
frustrations of marginalization by lower-caste communities.
However, the rise of caste politics has not necessarily resulted
in developmental gains for those at the bottom of the caste ladder.[6]

Published studies have presented evidence suggesting that the influence of caste has been declining since
the mid-1990s, including areas in rural India where the higher class castes held greater dominance over
lower class castes, and also in urban interaction and hereditary occupations.[7][8] Rather than a long-
established, unchanging institution, caste is subject to political influence. Changes in political leadership
throughout the history of India have led to changes in the structure of the caste system. India's colonial
past has shaped caste into a flexible institution, generating a new system that has crucial influences on
political mobilisation.[9] In some regions of India, strategic reconstructions of the caste system have taken
place. For instance, the Bahujan Samaj Party in the state of Punjab was first initiated by urban political
entrepreneurs who belonged to the former lower caste groups.[10] The pliable caste system in the post-
independence era acts as a tool for identifying marginal groups and political mobilisation. Various
political leaderships can alter and influence the caste system to give different groups of people unequal
rights in accessing public services and political competition.

A distinct feature of lower caste mobilization in North India is the importance of 'Sanskritization' as
ideological grounds; by comparison, 'ethnicization' has been more prevalent in West and South India.
Sanskritization refers to the process of emulation that lower castes may adopt, to enhance their status in
society by mirroring Brahminical (upper caste) rituals and values.[11] In contrast, ethnicization endeavors
to establish a separate identity for a lower caste group because the objective is to produce
"nonhierarchical social imaginaries."[11] For instance, the Yadav caste group did not resort to inventing a
Dravidian identity to position themselves against the Aryan identity, as leaders in the South and the West
had done. Instead, the key logic was to enhance their status by identifying themselves within the Aryan
group.[11] At the same time, it is important to note that the two processes are not mutually exclusive and
in fact, most leaders wanted to develop separate identities from the dominant culture. The prominent
influence of Sanskritization meant that mobilizations in the North were restricted by conforming to the
existing hierarchies, and in practical terms, this reinforced the dominance of elites within a specific
region.

Education
Education spread to the lower castes after India gained independence. The younger generations of all
castes have had access to educational resources since the 1980s. The number of the Scheduled and
Backward Castes people receiving education increased at a faster rate than that of the upper caste groups.
The spread of education to all castes generated democratizing effects. Some representatives of the SC and
ST groups obtained access to Congress in the 1950s~1960s (1179). Due to their higher education levels,
they are less likely to respond to the upper-caste patrons, but to the needs and interests of the lower
castes.

Caste and political power

The removal of the boundaries between "civil society" and "political society" meant that caste now
played a huge role in the political arena and also influenced other government-run institutions such as
police and the judicial system. Though caste seemed to dictate one's access to such institutions, the
location of that caste also played an important role. If a lower caste were concentrated enough in one
area, it could then translate that pocket of concentration of its caste members into political power and then
challenge the hegemony of locally dominant upper caste. Gender also plays a significant role in the
power dynamic of caste in politics. Women's representation within the political system seems to also be
tied to their caste. Lower, more conservative castes have less female participation in politics than upper,
more socially liberal, castes. This has caused a disproportionately large number of upper-caste women to
occupy political office when compared to their lower caste counterparts. The hierarchy of caste and its
role in politics and access to power and resources has created a society of patron-client relationships
along caste lines. This eventually led to the practice of vote banking, where voters back only candidates
that are in their caste,[12] or officials from which they expect to receive some kind of benefits.
The caste system has traditionally had significant influence over people's access to power. The privileged
upper caste groups benefit more by gaining substantially more economic and political power, while the
lower caste groups have limited access to those powers. The caste system distributes to different castes
different economic strengths. The upper caste groups can then manipulate the economic and political
system to transfer economic strength into political power.[13]

It has been argued by Professor Dipankar Gupta that the role of castes in Indian elections have been
overplayed.[14]

Access to power
In rural North India, upper and middle-ranking castes dominate the ownership of land. They were able to
transfer this control over wealth into political dominance over the Panchayat decision. The Panchayat is a
local government unit that is in-charge of resources disbursement. The dominant caste groups
monopolised leadership positions in the Panchayat, thus gaining more opportunities to government
contracts, employment and funding.

Access to police and judicial assistance also depends on which caste one belongs to. By bribing,
influencing and intimidating the police and judicial officials, the rural north Indian middle and upper
castes tend to manipulate the local police and judicial power more successfully. These types of political
rent-seeking have also helped secure the supply of rents to dominant castes through other channels such
as 'rigging Panchayat elections, capturing electoral booths, and using pre-election intimidatory tactics in
elections for the state assembly.'[13] Whether an individual or a group can raise enough money for
constant bribes depends on the caste-based socioeconomic status. Hence, the advantage in accessing
economic resources not only transfers into but also reinforces the political might of the dominant caste
groups.

Certain scientists and activists, such as MIT systems scientist Dr. VA Shiva Ayyadurai, blame caste for
holding back innovation and scientific research in India, making it difficult to sustain progress while
regressive social organisation prevails.[15][16]

Caste, ascribed at birth, is also influenced by where one is born. Political lines in India have often been
drawn along caste lines; however, this is only part of the story. Caste is often specific to a particular area.
These caste pockets create a locally dominant castes. Because of the political structure in India, local
dominance can translate into regional dominance. This concentration of caste population has meant that
smaller, less influential castes have the opportunity stake there claims in the political power arena.
However, if a non-dominant caste is not concentrated in a particular area, then they are not likely to get
any representation without teaming up with another caste to increase their influence. This means that
"localized concentration facilitates a space for contesting the domination of State-level dominant
caste".[17] For instance, the Maratha-Kunbi caste has concentrations of populations all over the Indian
states. They thus managed to receive maximum representation at the state legislature.[17]

Though the caste system factors greatly in determining who makes up the local elites, it also plays a huge
role in determining women's influence and representation in the political system. In India's bicameral
parliamentary system, women represent a minuscule amount of each house. Of the people's assembly,
made up of 545 members, women represent a mere 5.2 percent; and in the State assembly, with 259
members, women make up only 8.8 percent. Both houses have seen an alarming decline in female
representatives in the most recent decades. Of the 39 women representatives in the Indian Parliament
most were members of higher castes. Caste, which eventually effects class, is one of the most important
factors in determining a woman's successful inclusion into the political system. This may be due to the
fact that higher castes challenge the role of the traditional Indian woman and so their caste position gives
them a greater range of options that are not available to lower more traditional castes. This inflated
representation of elite caste in public offices has meant that the impact they have on public policy is
disproportionately large in comparison to their actual numbers.[18]

Political corruption
Corruption thus translated into power and a means to enter the political arena, once only open to upper
caste members. Corruption in India became a way to level the playing field. This struggle for
empowerment that was forced to operate outside of the rule of law produced caste-based mafia networks.
These mafia-networks began to chip away at upper caste control over state institutions.[19]

However, unlike their predecessor, these caste mafia groups were not concerned with 'development', but
mainly viewed elections and democracy as a way of gaining control of the state, which would enable
them to level social inequalities. This new state envisioned a government of "Social Justice" through
caste empowerment. Within the context of "social justice" corruption pontificated by the caste mafias
became tolerated, and in some cases, as in the province of Bihar, even celebrated.

The very nature of caste politics inherently means that there are no boundaries between "civil society"
and "political society", as demonstrated by the proliferation caste mafia. The mafia dons became mayors,
ministers, and even members of Parliament. Therefore, there was no alternative to fight against these
mafia figures and political brokers. Because rule of law was perceived to be a mechanism of upper caste
control, corruption used by caste mafia became popularly accepted, as it was perceived to be a means to
achieve lower caste empowerment. The corruption elevated to such a level that nearly all elected officials
in some towns and regions were also criminals. The upper castes who had used their control over the state
to discreetly plunder its institutions for their own gain, were now replaced by the mafia dons who now
openly pillaged the state institutions. Many of these elected ministers/mafia dons were jailed for the
illegal practices they employed; however, this was widely touted as the upper castes trying to regain
dominance by eliminating supporters. Corruption and politics became so common that at a time it was not
uncommon for election results to be contested from a prison cell.

Corruption therefore translated into power and a means to enter the political arena, once only open to
upper caste members. In this way corruption was seen as a way to level the playing field. As a result,
corruption was tolerated and in some villages championed under the banner of "social justice".[19]: 73–85

In the 1951 election, three ethnic parties challenged the Congress party: the Ram Rajya Parishad, the
Hindu Mahasabha, and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. These three parties sought to gain support from the
Hindu majority. The All India Scheduled Caste Federation bid for support from the ex-untouchable
castes. Three of the four ethnic parties gradually disappeared because they were not able to obtain enough
votes. In the late 1980s, the Congress began to decline. More non-congress parties started to challenge the
Congress dominance. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) descended from the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. It
attempted to pit Hindus against Muslims. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Janata Dal (JD) tried to
seek support from the Scheduled Castes, and Muslims against the upper castes.[20]
The intense party competitions that started in the late 1970s have also weakened the influence of caste in
Indian politics. Traditionally, Indian political parties have been constructed from top-down. Party leaders
relied on preexisted patron-client networks to collect votes. Hence, no parties established fixed
organisations to keep constant contacts with the village-level. Since 1977, the number of youth
participating in politics has significantly increased. Due to the lack of fixed organisations, political parties
had to rely on the young village members for political mobilisation.[10] Often, these young villagers
exerted more political influence than the upper caste leaders and patrons. The status of these young
people in the village depended on how much he could contribute to the economic development of the
village. It is easier for the youth to maintain their status by rallying rather than remain loyal to a specific
party. This also weakened the influence of caste and clientelism on Indian politics.

In the 1990s, many parties Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the Janata Dal started claiming that they were
representing the backward castes. Many such parties, relying primarily on Backward Classes' support,
often in alliance with Dalits and Muslims, rose to power in Indian states.[21] At the same time, many Dalit
leaders and intellectuals started realising that the main Dalit oppressors were the so-called Other
Backward Classes, and formed their own parties, such as the Indian Justice Party. The Congress (I) in
Maharashtra long relied on OBCs' backing for its political success.[21] Bharatiya Janata Party has also
showcased its Dalit and OBC leaders to prove that it is not an upper-caste party. Bangaru Laxman, the
former BJP president (2001–2002) was a former Dalit. Sanyasin Uma Bharati, former CM of Madhya
Pradesh, who belongs to OBC caste, was a former BJP leader. In 2006 Arjun Singh cabinet minister for
MHRD of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was accused of playing caste politics when
he introduced reservations for OBCs in educational institutions all around.

In Tamil Nadu, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party rose to power promising representation of all
castes in all important sectors of society.

Clientelism
Politics in India highly depended on patron-client ties along the caste lines during the Congress-
dominating period. The caste that one belongs to serves as a strong determinant of his or her voting
pattern.[22] In India, different political parties represent the interests of different caste groups. The upper
and merchant castes such as Brahmin, Rajput and Kayasth and the rich Muslim groups tend to express
their interests through the Congress Party. The agrarian upper caste Jats tend to vote for the competing
parties. Numerically minor parties, represented by the Jan Sangh, receive votes almost exclusively from
the upper and trading castes.[22]: 4–5 However, caste does not solely determine voting behaviours.
Discrepancies occur especially for the upper caste groups .[22]: 5 This means that not everyone from the
same caste would vote for only one particular party. The upper caste people have more freedom to vote
by political beliefs. The Mandal Commission covered more than 3000 Other Backward Castes. It is thus
not clear which parties are associated with each castes.

Loyal groups of voters usually back a certain candidate or party during elections with the expectation of
receiving benefits once their candidate is in office. This practice, called "votebank", is prolific throughout
most regions of the country. Many political parties in India have openly indulged in caste-based votebank
politics. The Congress party used votebank to maintain power; the competing parties constructed
votebanks to challenge the Congress dominance of politics.
Women in caste politics
Women in higher castes have always had the advantage to participate in the political sphere in
comparison to their lower caste counterparts. While the exclusion of women in politics has long been and
continues to be prominent in these caste-based countries, women in these upper castes are privy to
resources—such as better social, economic, health, education, employment, and political standing—that
Dalit, or untouchable, women could never attain and thus leave these women with little to no chance at
political participation and representation.

Social standing
Dalit women are the lowest social class due to the intersectionality of their gender and untouchable social
standing. These women have to work to provide for their families and complete domestic housework all
while being subject to psychological and emotional abuse from their spouse.[23] When working outside of
the home, these women complete jobs alongside their male counterparts as hands in the fields and other
low paid risky jobs. They work these laborious jobs to be able to afford basic necessities for their family
and home such as shelter, food, and water. This idea of keeping Dalits away from higher castes in the
workforce is more extreme than just the types of jobs the different castes work. When food is being
served to workers, Dalits must eat away from higher castes. This separation extends to other basic
necessities such as water. Dalits are not allowed to use the same water sources as the upper castes and if
they do, untouchables risk physical abuse and the water tank needs to be purified.[24]

Because untouchable women have no social standing, their issues are not noticed or deemed an issue in
the political sphere. This lack of awareness creates a vicious cycle as these women must continue to work
low paying jobs to be able to support their families and complete house work, so they do not have the
time to dedicate to political intervention after this double-shift. Thereby, Dalit women are not represented
in politics.

Economic standing
Dalits do not have consistent pay. Usually, they will work seasonal jobs such as sewing clothes during the
rainy season or fix tools when they are being used.[23] These jobs are usually low-paying and short,
causing Dalit women to take any job available to them at the time. Because of their need for money,
women have turned to alternative forms of work such as sex work to be able to have consistent funds.
Sometimes one income is not enough so Dalit families have begun to prepare their daughters for similar
work.[25]

These jobs do not have the credibility untouchable women would need to be taken seriously by
politicians. Sex work is seen as promiscuous and perverted while upper caste women spend their time in
the private sphere focusing on the house and the home. These jobs are safer and take less time, thus
allowing upper caste women to be able to provide their attention to the feminist movement and gaining
equal rights economically, politically, and socially to their upper caste male counterparts.
Health standing
Because of their sex work, Dalits are much more likely to
suffer from diseases such as HIV and AIDS.[26] Additionally,
most Dalit live in unsanitary homes with high risk for disease.
Because of this, Dalits are more likely to suffer from
gastrointestinal, water, and airborne diseases in comparison to
upper castes.[23] Though, the ones most vulnerable to disease
is Dalit women; They work both inside and out of the home
meaning that they are more likely to catch and have to care
for disease all while still having to complete their household
work.[23] They also have shorter life spans[27] probably due to
malnutrition and this increased risk for disease. This shorter
lifespan causes Dalit women to have to have many
pregnancies and births earlier in life in hopes that few of the
children survive and thus help the family economically.[28]

Because of their health issues and other responsibilities, Dalit An Untouchable Woman of Bombay
women do not have the time nor the health to be able to gain according to the Indian Caste System
any political standing. Instead, they must shift their focus to
survive another day regardless of the conditions they are in
economically, socially, and politically.

Educational standing
As the lowest class, Dalits and were not allowed to easily access education and Dalit women were
completely prohibited.[29] However, around 1950, Dalit women were granted access to education. This
was not a smooth transition. Dalit women faced discrimination as their teachers were often from the
Brahman class and enjoyed the power they held over Dalit women.[29] This discrimination along with
their needs to support their families led many Dalits and specifically Dalit women to drop out of school.
In a study titled Access of Disadvantaged Children to Education 2005, as much as 30% of the schooled
children dropout of school.[30] Dalit women's literacy is below 5%.[23]

Because of their lack of literacy, education, and priority to care for their families, Dalit women are not
currently equipped to engaged in politics. They cannot read or understand any of the legislation that is
written for or against them and do not have the time to fight for legislation that would benefit them as
they must ensure their families well-being, a full-time job in and of itself.

Women's movements for Dalit women

Relatively recently, the position of Dalit women have been heard. Specifically, the creation of the Gulabi
Gang and the United Nations have taken positions to help improve the lives of these women.

Gulabi Gang
The Gulabi Gang is not a gang in the traditional sense, the founder, Sampat Pal explained. The gang was
founded in the poorest region in India and works to improve Dalit women's social mobility and
independence while working to eradicate violence and oppression.[31] The Gulabi Gang is known for its
bright pink traditional saris and wielded bamboo sticks. Pal chose this color because it was free from any
religious or political associations in India while the bamboo sticks prepare the women for any battle they
may face.[32]

If the gang is successful at lowering violence and oppression for all women in the caste system and
specifically Dalit women, they would have the chance to engage in politics. These women are working to
create change and allow Dalit women to live fulfilling lives and fight for what they believe in within the
political and justice systems instead of being forced to provide for their families.

United Nations
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released a statement on June 17,
2014, titled "Violence against Women and Girls from caste-affected communities."[33] The speech opens
by claiming "caste-based discrimination fundamentally undermines human dignity" and explains how
low-caste women such as Dalits face double discrimination against their gender and class which
ultimately leads them to live low socioeconomic lives.[33] The speech comes after the death of two Dalit
girls whose village sat at the site of their death until their deaths were investigated. The global uproar of
these deaths became so intense that the United Nations commented and committed themselves to help
improve the position of low-caste women through legislation, humans' rights mechanisms, and special
procedures.

If these methods are effective, Dalit women would be able to live sustainable lives that would not require
them to constantly work low paying jobs, live in poverty, and eat better. In return, they would have more
free time to be able to commit to politics and ultimately become an engaged and civically involved
citizens.

List of castes
For political/government purposes, the castes[34] are broadly divided into[35]

Forward Castes (30.8% of the population)[35]

Other Backward Classes (OBC) (about 41.0% of the population)[35]
Scheduled Castes (about 19.7% of the population)[35]
Scheduled Tribes (about 8.5% of the population)[35]
The Indian Muslims (14.2%), and Christians (2.3%) often function as castes.

Official lists are compiled by states recognizing the OBC, Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
The dividing lines can be ambiguous, several castes have demanded a lower rank so that they can avail
the privileges offered. The term upper caste also refers to forward castes, when news reports refer to the
Scheduled Castes in relation to the two upper groups.

Delhi
Yadav
Jats
Gurjar
 Tyagi
Rajputs
Brahmins
Punjabis

Haryana
Yadav
Gujjar
Brahmin
s[36] (Brahmin belt of Haryana)

Jats, 25% of state's population[37]

Saini
Jangid
Rajputs
[38]

Gujarat
Kolis[39]
Patidar, 13% of state's population[37]

Andhra Pradesh, Telangana

Kamma,[40] 5% of state's population [37]
Reddy,[40] 8% of state's population [37]
Kapu[41]

Bihar
Source:[42][43]

Kurmi
Yadav, [37]
Dusadh
Kushwaha or Koeri
Brahmins (Maithils)
Rajput
Bhumihar

Uttar Pradesh
Gujjar
Yadav, 8.7% of state's population[37]
 Rajput
Bhumihar
Brahmin
Kurmi
Chamars/Jatav, 9.9% of state's population[37]
Koeri
[44][45]

Jammu & Kashmir

Muslims Gujjars
Brahmin Sikhs
Dogra Brahmins and Rajputs

West Bengal
Muslims[46]
Mahishya, largest caste of Bengal forming around a quarter of province's Hindu population
Rajbanshi, largest SC community of West Bengal, mainly concentrated in Coochbehar
district
Namasudra/Matua
Gorkha

Karnataka
Lingayat/Veerashaiva, dominated in North Karnataka and Central Karnataka and some
parts in Southern Karnataka, forms 15.3% of state's population [37]
Vokkaliga/Gowda dominated in Old Mysuru region / Southern Karnataka especially in
Mandya, Hassan and Bangalore, forms 10.8% of state's population [37]
Kuruba
AHINDA (Kannada acronym for minorities, backward classes and Dalits) or MOD (Muslims,
OBCs and Dalits)[47][48] in Bidar, Kalaburgi and Chamarajanagara.

Kerala
Ezhava
Mapilla
Nair
Saint Thomas Christian

Tamil Nadu
Chettiar
Mudaliar
Vanniyar
 Kongu Vellalar
Nadar
Mukkulathor Thevar
Devendrakula Velalar
Reddiar

Punjab
Bhuee
Dalits [49]
Brahmins and Khatris
Saini
Jat Sikhs,[50] who tend to support Akali Dal (Badal)

Rajasthan
Jats
Yadav
Gujjar
Jangid
Meenas,
Rajputs,
Brahmin
[51]

Maharashtra
Dhangar
Kunbi (sub caste of Maratha), Maratha, 31.2% of state's population [37]
Mahar
Malis
Brahmin

Odisha
Yadav
Brahmin
Karan
Khandayat, Chasa

Madhya Pradesh
Gujjars
Yadav
 Kurmis
Rajputs
Brahmins

Controversial issues

SC/ST Reservation system

In 1954, the Ministry of Education suggested that 20 per cent of places should be reserved for the SCs
and STs in educational institutions with a provision to relax minimum qualifying marks for admission by
5 per cent wherever required. In 1982, it was specified that 15 per cent and 7.5 per cent of vacancies in
public sector and government-aided educational institutes should be reserved for the SC and ST
candidates, respectively.[52]

OBC Reservation system

The Mandal Commission, or the Socially Backward Classes Commission (SEBC), was established in
India on 1 January 1979 by the Janata Party government under Prime Minister Morarji Desai[53] with a
mandate to "identify the socially or educationally backward classes" of India.[54] It was headed by the
late B.P. Mandal an Indian parliamentarian, to consider the question of reservations for people to redress
caste discrimination, and used eleven social, economic, and educational indicators to determine
backwardness. In 1980, based on its rationale that OBCs ("Other backward classes") identified on the
basis of caste, economic and social indicators comprised 52% of India's population, the commission's
report recommended that members of Other Backward Classes (OBC) be granted reservations to 27 per
cent of jobs under the Central government and public sector undertakings, thus making the total number
of reservations for SC, ST and OBC to 49%.[55]

Though the report had been completed in 1983, the V.P. Singh government declared its intent to
implement the report in August 1990, leading to widespread student protests.[56] It was thereafter
provided a temporary stay order by the Supreme court, but implemented in 1992 in the central
government.[57]

The commission estimated that 52% of the total population of India (excluding SCs and STs), belonging
to 3,743 different castes and communities, were 'backward'.[58][59][60] The number of backward castes in
Central list of OBCs increased to 5,013 (without the figures for most of the Union Territories) in 2006 as
per the National Commission for Backward Classes.[56][61][62]

See also
Caste system in India
Identity politics
KHAM theory
Luv-Kush equation
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Further reading
Kothari, Rajni (2004). Caste in Indian Politics. Orient Longman. ISBN 978-81-250-0637-4.
Bayly, Susan (1999). Caste, Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to the
Modern Age (https://web.archive.org/web/20071013192735/http://www.cambridge.org/uk/cat
alogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521264340). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-
26434-1. Archived from the original (http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?i
sbn=0521264340) on 13 October 2007. Retrieved 12 December 2006.
Jain, Meenakshi, Congress Party, 1967–77: Role of Caste in Indian Politics (Vikas, 1991),
ISBN 0706953193
Ahmed, Bashiruddin (1970). "Caste and Electoral Politics" (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2642
818). Asian Survey. 10 (11): 979–992. doi:10.2307/2642818 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F26
 42818). JSTOR 2642818 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2642818).
Firstpost News, Signature kids? RSS formula of perfect babies is fed by our own
nightmarish hopes (http://www.firstpost.com/india/signature-kids-rss-dream-of-perfect-babie
s-is-fed-by-our-own-nightmarish-hopes-dreams-and-actions-3435522.html)
Hussain, Ghulam (2019). "Understanding Hegemony of Caste in Political Islam and Sufism
in Sindh, Pakistan" (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0021909619839430).
Journal of Asian and African Studies. 54 (5): 716–745. doi:10.1177/0021909619839430 (htt
ps://doi.org/10.1177%2F0021909619839430).
Hussain, Ghulam (2020). " 'Dalits are in India, not in Pakistan': Exploring the Discursive
Bases of the Denial of Dalitness under the Ashrafia Hegemony" (https://journals.sagepub.co
m/doi/metrics/10.1177/0021909619863455). Journal of Asian and African Studies. 55: 17–
43. doi:10.1177/0021909619863455 (https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0021909619863455).

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