State of The Space Industrial Base 2024
State of The Space Industrial Base 2024
NewSpace Nexus
In collaboration with Key Partners to support NewSpace Nexus in developing topic areas for the SSIB Conference
Edited By:
PETER GARRETSON, NewSpace Nexus
SCOTT MAETHNER, NewSpace Nexus
April, 2025
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this report reflect those of the workshop attendees and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of NewSpace Nexus. Use of NASA photos in this report does not state or imply the
endorsement by NASA, or by any NASA employee, or the DoD, or by any DoD employee, of a commercial
product, service, or activity.
Cover: Starship Re-entry (Credit: SpaceX via Howell E. (2024). Relive SpaceX's epic Starship
launch (and rocket catch) in these jawdropping photos and video. Space.com)
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WORKING GROUP CHAIRS
Novel Space Activities Outernet
Co-Lead: Gabe Mounce, AFRL Co-Lead: Steve Nixon, Outernet Council
Co-Lead: Rob Antypas Co-Lead: Michael Cheng, Outernet Council
Co-Lead: Scott Maethner, NewSpace Nexus
The workshops and this report would not have been possible without the incredible NewSpace Nexus team: Casey Anglada DeRaad, Kaitlyn
Clark, Arial DeHerrera, Jordan DeRaad, Peter Garretson, Andy Germain, Erika Hecht, Jaime Holmes, Andrew MacKenzie, Scott Maethner
(NewSpace Nexus), Shelby Rasmusan, Scott Sadler, and Edgar Zapata. Thanks to the Space Northwest team for the Seattle Workshop: James
Burk, Mike Doyle, Kelly Maloney, Sean McClinton, Margo Shiroyama, Stan Shull and Michelle Wilmot.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
INTRODUCTION 7
NOVEL SPACE ACTIVITIES 29
OUTERNET 42
SPACE POLICY & FINANCE LANDSCAPE 47
NEXT GENERATION POWER & PROPULSION 53
COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH 60
SPACE SENSING 63
INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE 69
SPACE WORKFORCE, STEM & EDUCATION 85
EPILOGUE 96
APPENDIX A WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS 99
APPENDIX B PREVIOUS REPORTS 104
APPENDIX C KEY ACTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM SSIB’23 REVISITED 108
APPENDIX E ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS 111
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Figure 1. Starship Booster returns to be captured by the ‘Chopstick Arms’ (Credit: SpaceX1)
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
The State of the Space Industrial Base 2024 report underscores the urgency of defining a national
strategy for space amid growing global competition. The United States has made critical progress in
space policy and industrial development, yet it still lacks a unifying "North Star Vision" to guide its
long-term objectives in economic development, human settlement, and leadership in space. Strategic
competition with China and other state actors continues to shape the space domain, driving the need
for accelerated action, investment, and interagency coordination.
KEY OBSERVATIONS
● A Grand Vision is Missing: There is broad consensus that the U.S. needs a strategic vision to
build a safe, stable, and sustainable space domain in alignment with democratic values and
global leadership goals.
1
Irene Klotz, I. (2024). SpaceX Steps Toward ‘Aircraft-Like Ops’ With Starship Booster Catch. Aviation Week.
2
Nesi, C. (2024). Elon Musk jubilant as SpaceX Starship makes flawless flight, splash-down — and a first-ever ‘Mechazilla’
booster recovery. New York Post.
4
● Licensing Novel Activities is Stalled: Despite White House and congressional proposals,
there is still no formal regulatory pathway for licensing novel in-space activities. This regulatory
uncertainty hinders commercial innovation and growth.
● Space Mobility & Logistics is Underfunded: SML remains largely aspirational due to
insufficient investment, despite being vital to the in-space economy and operational flexibility
for defense and commercial systems.
The 2024 workshop reaffirmed that space is now a central arena for geopolitical and economic
competition. The Joint Concept for Competing reinforces that strategic success involves shaping the
environment with allies, not just preparing for war. The U.S. must integrate civil, commercial, and
military space strategies to maintain freedom of action, deny adversaries strategic goals, and ensure
national prosperity.
China continues to expand its space capability rapidly, including reusable launch systems, Cislunar
plans, sample return missions, and commercial space activity. Its integration of commercial, civil, and
military assets positions it to challenge U.S. leadership across orbital regimes. China is aggressively
pursuing space resource extraction, space-based solar power, and counterspace capabilities.
The U.S. has made meaningful policy strides, including new DoD and USSF commercial space
integration strategies, growth in commercial launch volume (led by SpaceX), and successful technology
demonstrations like Varda's in-space manufacturing and Intuitive Machines' Lunar landing. However,
progress is uneven. Programs like OSAM-1 were canceled, ISAM remains underfunded, and debates
continue over roles in GEOINT and TacRST. The U.S. risks falling behind in areas like sample return,
Cislunar domain awareness, and orbital maneuver.
The greatest risk is not technological failure but institutional incoherence. While innovation flourishes,
agency efforts remain siloed, and the absence of coherent demand signals in key areas like propulsion,
sensing, and Cislunar operations is stalling progress where it matters most. No single body owns
emerging domains like space-based solar power, advanced propulsion, or the Outernet, leaving critical
capabilities adrift. Regulatory bottlenecks—from ITAR and EAR to launch licensing and energy
policy—are mismatched to the speed of the sector, and technical interoperability remains elusive across
architectures. Physical infrastructure—from LNG pipelines to payload processing—lags the cadence of
commercial launch. And while the private sector shows growing strength, it often lacks federal backing
to de-risk new technologies. The dominance of a few key players, particularly in launch, highlights the
risk of fragility and market distortion.
5
At the same time, America's long-standing edge in human capital is slipping, threatened by STEM
educator shortages, rising education costs, and declining global rankings. Workforce shortages, declining
STEM performance, educator attrition create persistent gaps that are choking the space talent pipeline.
Public-private coordination remains fragmented, and no national framework exists to harmonize
STEM mentoring, workforce tracking, or training standards. At the same time, U.S. agencies are
publishing strategic documents without follow-through, further weakening confidence and dampening
momentum. As China executes a comprehensive, state-directed strategy across Cislunar, Lunar, and
orbital domains, the U.S. finds itself with world-class innovations—but no integrated roadmap for
turning them into enduring advantage.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Define and Promote a North Star Vision for Space. Articulate a shared national vision
centered on the peaceful economic development and human settlement of space, to inspire
investment, attract allies, and unify public and private sector efforts.
2. Finalize Novel Space Activity Licensing. Congress and the Administration must establish a
clear, streamlined process to license and regulate new in-space commercial activities.
3. Invest in Space Mobility & Logistics. Fully fund R&D and programs for in-space
maneuver, servicing, and infrastructure. Prioritize dynamic operations that reduce operational
surprise and enhance resilience.
CONCLUSION
Winning the new space race means more than outpacing competitors—it means securing a future of
prosperity, liberty, and leadership beyond Earth. The SSIB 2024 workshop affirms the need for
immediate action to align national vision, regulatory frameworks, and investment strategies. The U.S.
must act with urgency to lead the next space age, shape the rules of the domain, and ensure that the
largest geographic zone of human activity reflects American values and interests. Integration, clarity of
purpose, and a decisive investment in human and industrial capacity will determine whether the U.S.
continues to lead—not just in innovation, but in shaping the future of space civilization.
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INTRODUCTION
Figure 2. Artist rendering of the X-37B conducting an aerobraking maneuver using the drag of Earth’s
atmosphere (Credit: Boeing Space3)
“The United States should not stand by and allow China to assume leadership over the
global space economy. Rather, the United States should make strategic investments today
to secure its global leadership and economic prosperity in space tomorrow.”
- Capt TYLER BATES, The Hill, Jan 2023
PURPOSE
The State of the Space Industrial Base (SSIB) conference is an annual meeting to assess progress and
provide input and recommendations for the U.S. on its journey to secure the space future that honors
commitments made in our Constitution to provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare,
and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. It solicits direct feedback from the U.S.
space industrial base, investors, analysts, thought leaders and other stakeholders to assess our progress,
suggest paths of synergy to build enduring national advantage, sustain and expand the space industrial
base and the broader national security innovation base. It is meant to provide actionable
recommendations to actors in the space ecosystem enabled by leaders across the entirety of U.S. society
as well as those of our closest allies and partners.
3
USSF (2024). X-37B begins novel space maneuver.
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WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES
Winning the New Space Race. This workshop continues to assess the United States’ progress toward
preferred futures identified in The Future of Space 2060 and Implications for U.S. Strategy4 which
cautioned, “The U.S. must recognize that in 2060, space will be a major engine of national political,
economic, and military power for whichever nations best organize and operate to exploit that
potential.”5 The Future of Space 2060 report defined the preferred future as one of thriving off-Earth
human communities, a vastly expanded and self-sustaining economic sphere, with a balance of power that
favors U.S. leadership in shaping a free and open system. As noted in the previous year, “what’s at stake is
no less than whether the largest geographic zone of human activity is one of democratic freedom and fair
trade, or an autocratic exclusion zone.”6
To sustainably win the new space race is to determine the conditions for which future generations may
inherit not just the technological achievements of our day, but the preservation of our values, a free and
open society, a free market economy, and the right of self-determination free from tyranny and
oppression. This is an enduring and worthy pursuit.
Strategic Competition. The State of the Space Industrial Base Report series has been approached
through the lens of Strategic Competition. In late 2023, the Joint Staff introduced The Joint Concept
for Competing which for the first time provided rigorous definitions, explanations, central concepts and
methodologies for successful strategic competition. It defined ‘strategic competition’ as a persistent and
long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible
interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other, and asserts that Strategic
competition is thus an enduring condition to be managed, not a problem to be solved. Thus,
‘succeeding’ means retaining freedom of action to pursue national interests at an acceptable risk and
sustainable cost and avoiding armed conflict with adversaries. The Joint Concept for Competing
recognizes the inherently multi-dimensional nature of strategic competition, and the Joint Force will
routinely play a mutually supporting role with other USG departments and agencies, allies and
partners, and other interorganizational partners, and that the Joint Force is normally a supporting actor
in strategic competition. Shaping the competitive space depends on the U.S. network of allies, partners,
proxies, and surrogates. To achieve unity of effort, the Joint Force must seek opportunities to integrate
its operations and activities in time, space, and purpose with the activities of interorganizational
partners, proxies, and surrogates.
Never Off the Clock. The Joint Concept for Competing asserts the Joint Force is not just in the
“warfighting business”--it is in the “national security business” and that the Joint Force is never “off the
4
Mozer, J. (2019). The Future Of Space 2060 & Implications For U.S. Strategy. DTIC.
5
Air Force Space Command (2016). The Future of Space 2060 & Implications for U.S. Strategy.
6
DIU (2021). State of the Space Industrial Base 2021 Infrastructure & Services for Economic Growth & National Security.
8
clock.” It does, however emphasize the ability of the Joint Force to provide area security, logistics,
communications, engineering, and other support to partners that do not have the resources or the
ability to operate effectively in remote, austere, and contested environments, as well as information,
intelligence and logistic support to augment or supply capabilities when operational requirements
exceed their capabilities, such as via strategic lift for humanitarian and foreign disaster relief efforts or
conduct noncombatant evacuation operations in crisis situations in response to natural disasters,
domestic disturbances, or adversary attempts to impede access. It cautioned that the United States risks
ceding strategic influence, advantage, and leverage while preparing for a war that may never occur, and
that while the United States must remain fully prepared and poised for war, this alone will be
insufficient to secure its strategic objectives and protect its freedoms. Thus, if the United States does
not compete effectively against adversaries, it could "lose without fighting." The concept asserted that
the Joint Force may lack concepts and capabilities critical to succeeding strategically in the current
competitive environment and that the Joint Force must ask itself whether it is appropriately and
adequately prepared and postured to help defend the United States from threats that do not require the
Joint Force to engage in warfighting. The concept seeks to advance integrated campaigning employing
combinations of military and non-military power to achieve our nation’s strategic objectives as well as
counter adversaries’ competitive strategies and deny their strategic objectives indefinitely. The concept
directs the Joint Force to focus on pursuing and promoting U.S. national interests and strategic
objectives in addition to focusing on denying adversaries’ incompatible interests.
Building a Competitive Strategy. Toward that end, The Joint Concept for Competing states a
competitive strategy to tilt the competitive balance and shape to competitive space must be developed.
A competitive strategy differs from conventional military strategies because its purpose is to integrate
activities across the instruments of national power to succeed in enduring strategic competition, not just
warfighting, and that these competitive strategies require a different logic trail because they do not focus
on military victory and do not locate interagency partners or ‘Commercial-Industrial’ in a supporting
role. This document helps advance progress towards a competitive strategy and integrated campaign
through articulation of national interests, strategic objectives, analysis and net assessment of adversary
competitive strategies, and best military and industrial advice regarding actionable components of an
integrated campaign plan.
The North Star Vision Provides Unity. The path toward unity of effort begins with a shared vision
of our national interests and strategic objectives. As championed by the participants of the previous
three workshops and reports, The North Star Vision is one of economic development and human
settlement, a vastly expanded and self-sustaining space economy, with a thriving off-Earth human
presence and a balance of power that favors U.S. and allied leadership in shaping a free and open system.
As observed in last year’s Global Partnership workshop, this call for a grand strategy in space is shared by
our closest allies and partners who recognize the necessity and wish to participate in the journey.
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CURRENT STATE
Advances in DoD Policy. OSD Space Policy released a revision of DoD Instruction 3100.1012 which
incorporated significant and previously not captured White House-level guidance, as well as a Space
Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,13 and its 2024 DoD Commercial Space Integration
Strategy.14 The DoD also released its first National Defense Industrial Strategy.15 The Joint Staff also
released a revision of JP3-14 Space Operations which reflected a broader astrographic conception of the
Space Area of Operations.16 The Space Force also released its first Commercial Space Strategy.17 The
USSF also released Space Doctrine Publication (SDP), SDP 3-100, Space Domain Awareness.18
USSPACEFOR-JPN. Two years after the establishment of U.S. Space Force Indo-Pacific,19 on
December 4, 2024, the Space Force activated a new component field command in Japan
(USSPACEFOR-JPN) at Yokota Air Base.20
7
White House (2023). United States Novel Space Activities Authorization And Supervision Framework; White House (2023).
Fact Sheet: U.S. Novel Space Activities Authorization and Supervision Framework.
8
White House (2023). Authorization and Supervision of Novel Private Sector Space Activities Act.
9
U.S. House of Representatives (2023). H.R.6131: Commercial Space Act of 2023.
10
Hitchens, T. (2024). White House charges Pentagon to develop cislunar monitoring tech, including for ‘planetary defense’.
Breaking Defense; White House (2024). National Cislunar Science & Technology Action Plan.
11
White House (2024). National Cislunar Science & Technology Action Plan.
12
DoD (2024). DOD Directive 3100.10 Space Policy.
13
DoD (2023). Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites.
14
DoD (2024). DoDCommercial Space Integration Strategy 2024.
15
DoD (2024). National Defense Industrial Strategy.
16
Hitchens, T. (2023). EXCLUSIVE: New Joint Force space doctrine clarifies Space Command’s ‘offensive’, ‘defensive’ ops
Breaking Defense.
17
USSF (2024). U.S. Space Force Commercial Space Strategy.
18
USSF (2023). SDP 3-100, Space Domain Awareness.
19
Space Force (2024). US Space Forces Indo-Pacific marks two years of accomplishments, growth.
20
PACOM (2024. Space Force activates component field command in Japan.
10
Figure 3. Space Economy Valuation (Credit: NovaSpacee)
Global Growth. NovaSpace reported the 2024 Space Economy as valued at $596 Billion, with
government investments in space rising from $117 billion in 2023 to $135 billion in 2024, while private
investment declined for the third consecutive year.21 ESA reported a 7% growth rate for the space
economy in 202422 while the World Economic Forum reported 9% growth and projected a valuation of
1.8 billion by 2035.23
The world experienced a record number of space launches–263 orbital launch attempts.24 Over 2,700
satellites were launched in 2024 (slightly fewer than 2023), but the mass-to-orbit grew by nearly a
quarter, to over 2,000,000 kg for the first time (it was just 1,500,000 kg in 2023)25--equivalent to
launching 10 diesel locomotives worth of mass. At the end of 2024, there were over 14,000 satellites in
orbit, with more than 10,400 actively functioning.26 ABI research expects that by 2032, these numbers
will rise to 480 orbital launches (nearly double today), to support 43,000 active satellites (over a
four-fold increase).27
21
NovaSpace (2025). Highlights of the 2024 Space Economy.
22
Wall, R. (2024). ESA Sees 7% Space Economy Growth In 2024. Aviation Week.
23
WEF (2024). Space is booming. Here's how to embrace the $1.8 trillion opportunity.
24
By Jack Kuhr, J. (2025). 2024 Orbital Launch Attempts by Country. Payload Space.
25
Harrison, T. (2025). Space Trends in 2024. AEI.
26
ABI Research (2024). Over 480 Orbital Launches and 43,000 Active Satellites Expected by 2032.
27
ABI Research (2024). Over 480 Orbital Launches and 43,000 Active Satellites Expected by 2032.
11
Figure 4. Space Launch Attempts by Country (Credit: Payload Space28)
U.S. Leading Space Access & Mobility. The U.S. had an exceptional year,29 accomplishing a record
number of space launches,.30 U.S. launches grew from 109 in 2023 to 145 in 2024–a 33% increase;
moreover the U.S. accounted for 55% of all 263 total global launch attempts, with SpaceX accounting
for 95% of all U.S. launches.31 SpaceX’s Starship conducted several test launches, including its first
successful capture of the Superheavy Booster on the “Mechazilla” ‘chopsticks’ tower on the return of its
5th test flight, October 13, 2024–a milestone crucial for enhancing reusability and cost efficiency of the
Starship system.
ULA Vulcan successfully launched for the first time.32 Blue Origin’s New Glenn was stacked for the
first time ahead of its first launch.33 The USSF X-37B conducted its first maneuver using aerodynamic
lift and braking from a highly elliptical orbit.34 The AFRL Rocket Cargo Program–which is exploring
the potential of commercial rockets for rapid global logistics–awarded $4.5 million to Stoke Space via
DIU to develop and demonstrate technologies for rapid, responsive, and cost-effective space-based cargo
delivery.35
28
Kuhr, J. (2025). 2024 Orbital Launch Attempts by Country. Payload Space.
29
Goswami, N. (2024). Taking stock of the US space program. The Space Review.
30
Foust, J. (2025). SpaceX launch surge helps set new global launch record in 2024. SpaceNews.
31
Kuhr, J. (2025). 2024 Orbital Launch Attempts by Country. Payload Space.
32
ULA (2024). United Launch Alliance Successfully Launches First Next Generation Vulcan Rocket.
33
Tingley, B. (2024). Blue Origin stacks huge New Glenn rocket ahead of 1st launch. Space.com.
34
USSF (2024). X-37B begins novel space maneuver.
35
Kuhr, J. (2024). DoD’s Big Bet on 1 Hour Space Cargo Delivery. Payload Space.
12
“Our nation’s commercial space industry continues to demonstrate innovation,
excellence, and a commitment to ensuring American preeminence in space.
Over the past several years, this industry has undergone exciting growth,
particularly for launches and reentries … But this growth - and our national
security along with it - are at risk unless the Department of Transportation
(DOT) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) initiate immediate
changes to their implementation of the launch and reentry regulatory
framework (Part 450).”
- U.S. SENATOR JERRY MORAN, Letter to FAA Administrator Michael G. Whitaker
Varda, in its first attempt, successfully demonstrated in-space manufacturing and return of a finished
pharmaceutical product, producing crystals for its? drug ritonavir, and received the first commercial
FAA reentry license on February 14, 2024 for its return via capsule.36
Figure 5. Varda Space Industries completed its first mission by landing its capsule in Utah Feb. 21, 2024 (Source:
VARDA37)
36
Foust, J. (2024). Varda capsule lands in Utah. SpaceNews.
37
India Today (2024). IM-1 enters lunar orbit, sends first picture; private mission eyes Moon landing; See also: PBS (2024).
Private U.S. lunar lander to cease operations Tuesday after landing sideways.
13
The commercial Polaris Dawn mission, led by Jared Isaacman put private astronauts into the highest
orbit since Apollo aboard SpaceX’s Crew Dragon Capsule, tested a new Space Suit38 and Isaacman,
along with mission specialists Sarah Gillis and Anna Menon ventured outside in the newly developed
SpaceX spacesuits on September 12, 2024, performing the first private spacewalk on, a significant
milestone in private space exploration.39
Figure 6. America’s First Commercial Lunar Lander IM-1 in Lunar Orbit (Source: Intuitive Machines40)
Intuitive Machines’ Odysseus achieved an historic milestone, conducting the first successful private
Lunar Landing–and the first U.S. Lunar landing since Apollo 17 (in 1972).41 KMI launched its
REACCH (Responsive Engaging Arms for Captive Care and Handling) to ISS which aims to demo
safe capture and release a variety of objects of nearly any shape, size, or surface condition, providing a
potential commercial solution for orbital debris removal.42
38
Tingley, B. (2024). SpaceX Polaris Dawn astronauts perform historic 1st private spacewalk in orbit. Space.com.
39
Rannard, G. (2024). Billionaire completes first private spacewalk. BBC.
40
India Today (2024). IM-1 enters lunar orbit, sends first picture; private mission eyes Moon landing; See also: PBS (2024).
Private U.S. lunar lander to cease operations Tuesday after landing sideways.
41
Greshko, M. (2024). First Commercial Moon Landing Returns U.S. to Lunar Surface. Scientific American.
42
Gorman, D. (2024). Kall Morris Inc. Begins ISS Residency. Payload Space.
14
Figure 7. KMI REACCH (Credit: KMI)
Booming Foreign Military Sales Demand. Space Systems command reported a 500% increase in
demand for space systems,43 leading to think tank exploration of potential options for the Proliferated
Warfighter Space Architecture as foreign military sales (FMS), excess defense articles, or commercial
sales.44
Starlink for Hurricanes. Commercial space proved its utility with Starlink’s support for disaster
Relief. During Hurricane Helene in September 2024, Starlink helped restore communication services
to western North Carolina, with FEME initially distributing 40 Starlink systems followed by another
140 units which enabled the broadcast of emergency alerts to cell phones on all networks in North
Carolina.45
43
Albon, C. (2024). US Space Force sees surge in foreign military sales demand. Defense News.
44
Peter Garretson, Natalie Sturza, and Ashton Walter. Orbiting Partnerships: A Constellation’s Second Life in Space Defense.
AFPC.
45
Singh, K. (2024). Dozens of Starlink systems deployed for Hurricane Helene by Biden administration. Reuters.
46
Jones, A. (2024). China launches 10 satellites on 2 rockets less than 6 hours apart. Space.com
47
Jones, A. (2024). China debuts modified solid rocket with remote sensing satellite launch. SpaceNews.
15
the Kuaizhou-1 (KZ-1), LM-6, and LM-11 can launch relatively small payloads of only up to
approximately two metric tons into LEO.48
“While the PRC’s space budget is significantly less than NASA’s, its estimated budget
was $14.14 billion in 2023. In 2022, the PRC conducted over 60 successful space
launches, a three-fold increase compared to 5 years ago. One of these launches was a
technology testing mission of a reusable space plane, which was in orbit from August
2022 until May 2023. These 2022 launches carried over 180 satellites into orbit, which
is a five-fold increase in satellites deployed compared to 5 years ago. Last year, the PRC
completed construction of the three-module PRC space station.”
49
– Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
The People's Republic of China - In 2024 attempted 68 orbital launches, barely surpassing its 2023
(67 launches) and 2022 (64 launches) totals, but failing in its announced goal of 100 launches in 2024.50
As of 2024, Beijing officially included commercial spaceflight in its list of priority emerging industries,
and commercial rockets accounted for 70% of China's launches in 2024–a 65% increase compared to
2023 and a 55% increase compared to 2022.51 Presently China is reported to have 77 NewSpace
startups, of which 47 are backed by the government and 21 receiving A+ funding (capital investment
from private investors).52
“The PLA has rapidly advanced in space in a way that few people can appreciate”
– MAJOR GENERAL GREG GAGNON, deputy chief of space operations for intelligence53
China’s Orbital Ambitions - In September of 2024, China also for the first time surpassed 1,000
satellites on orbit54 (China had only 129 satellites in 201555) with over 200 specifically for
military/intelligence, and over 220 for commercial remote sensing.56 In August57 and October58 of
48
DoD (2024). Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
49
DoD (2024). Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
50
Jones, A. (2024). China’s 2024 space plans include 100 launches and moon sample return mission. SpaceNews.
51
Kazinform (2025). The battle for the Moon & spy satellites: What U.S. and China are competing for in space.
52
Kazinform (2025). The battle for the Moon & spy satellites: What U.S. and China are competing for in space.
53
Decker, A. (2024). Chinese satellites are breaking the US 'monopoly' on long-range targeting. Defense One.
54
Hadley, G. (2024). USSF Intel Boss: China Now Has 1,000 Satellites on Orbit. Air & Space Forces.
55
By Todd Harrison, T. (2024). Unleash the Space Force. Military Times.
56
Harrison, T. (2025). Space Trends in 2024. AEI.
57
Kuhr, J. (2024). China Kicks Off its First Mega Constellation. Payload Space
58
CGTN (2024). China launches a group of 18 satellites for internet constellation project.
16
2024, China launched the first and second batch of 18 satellites of its “Thousand Sails” constellation.59
China has announced three satcom mega-constellations: 14,000 for Shanghai Spacecom Satellite
Technology (SSST)’s Spacesail/Thousand Sails/G60, 13,000 for China Satellite Network Group Ltd.’s
Guowang, and 10,000 Shanghai Lanjian Hongqing Technology’s60 Honghu-3. China’s entry into the
global broadband (and expected $6B direct-to-device (D2D) market61) has significant national security
implications.62 China is “building a massive architecture of remote-sensing satellites to help target U.S.
forces if they move to defend Taiwan” and “Chinese satellites are breaking the US 'monopoly' on
long-range targeting.”63
China Space Recovery - China is also looking to compete in the LEO bio-tech, pharmaceutical and
untended laboratory sub-sector. Toward that end, China launched and recovered Shinjian 19, its first
reusable and recoverable satellite, which carried plant and microbial breeding payloads in hopes that the
microgravity environment would accelerate genetic mutations that may enhance crop resilience and
productivity; its 500 to 600 kilograms of payload included payloads from five countries, including
Thailand and Pakistan. By making its recoverable satellites reusable, China hopes to reduce cost and
improve efficiency.64
China’s Lunar Ambitions - In 2024, China outlined its position on space resources. China considers
space resource utilization as permissible stating, the “Working Group in scoping space resources should
refer to the major projects of States members on exploring deep space planned for the near future and
focus its discussion on physical resources such as water-ice in Lunar regolith and Lunar rocks” and “The
Working Group should look into how to enforce the above-mentioned international responsibility with
respect to space resource activities carried out by non-governmental entities.”65 In April, China
published, The Geologic Atlas of the Lunar Globe, the first high-definition Lunar geological map, and
the most detailed Lunar atlas to date with double the resolution of Apollo-era maps to “support the
ambitions of China and other countries.”66 China continued to sign on new members to its
international Lunar Research Station, including Serbia, Nicaragua, and Thailand.67
59
Page, M. (2024). ‘China may be putting the Great Firewall into orbit’. ASPI; Feldstein, S. (2024). Why Catching Up to
Starlink Is a Priority for Beijing. Carnegie Endowment.
60
ABI Research (2024). Over 480 Orbital Launches and 43,000 Active Satellites Expected by 2032.
61
NovaSpace (2025). Highlights of the 2024 Space Economy.
62
Garretson, P. Nystrom, S. and Zou, D. (2025). Thousand Sails: Why Low Earth Orbit is the Next Frontier for Great Power
Competition between the U.S. and China. AFPC.
63
Decker, A. (2024). Chinese satellites are breaking the US 'monopoly' on long-range targeting. Defense One.
64
Jones, A. (2024). Shijian-19 reusable satellite lands after 2 weeks in space. SpaceNews.
65
Jones, A. (2024). China outlines position on use of space resources. Space News; PRC (2024). Submission by the Delegation
of China to the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. COPUOS.
66
Zhang, W. (2024). China releases world's first high-precision geological map of moon. Global Times; Chen, N. (2024).
China Publishes World's First High-definition Lunar Geologic Atlas. Chinese Academy of Sciences; Ling Xin, L. (2024).
China’s Moon Atlas Is the Most Detailed Ever Made. SCIAM.
67
Jones, A. (2024). Serbia becomes latest country to join China’s ILRS moon base project. SpaceNews.
17
“The PRC has devoted considerable economic and technological resources to growing all
aspects of its space industry, improving military space applications, developing human
spaceflight, and conducting Lunar and Martian exploration missions….Furthermore,
the PRC has launched a robotic lander and rover to the far side of the Moon; a lander
and sample return mission to the Moon; and an orbiter, lander, and rover in one
mission to Mars.”
China’s Cislunar Ambitions - In 2024, China articulated a Cislunar infrastructure plan,69 and toward
that end launched its second China’s Queqiao-2 relay satellite into Lunar orbit.70 China’s interest in
Cislunar drew significant interest from America’s intelligentsia.71
China launched Chang’e 6 in May to the Lunar far side to collect samples72 began its return in June73
successfully delivering the first-ever far-side samples.74 In August of 2024 China reported results from
the previous Chang’e 5 sample return mission of an unknown Lunar Material, a “prismatic, plate-like
transparent crystal” roughly the width of a human hair they call ULM-1.75 Chang’e 7, which consists of
a relay satellite, an orbiter as large as a rover and a mini hopper which will fly into a permanently
shadowed crater to look for water at the Lunar South Pole is expected to launch in 2026.76 In 2024,
China formally announced plans for a human Lunar landing by 2030 (and that they have the spacesuit
to do it)77 calling into question whether NASA accomplished its Presidential-level order to land the
next human on the Moon.
Its ambitions for the Lunar surface continue to advance, with a "Proposal to Develop China's Lunar
Orbital Space Station and Moon" presented at the 3rd Annual Space Science Conference," showcasing
the automated construction of a human tended habitat. China’s ILRS is expected to be nuclear
powered, and China has articulated a desire for nuclear shuttles which can enable asteroid mining at
68
DoD (2024). Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
69
Jones, A. (2024). Chinese scientists outline major cislunar space infrastructure project. SpaceNews.
70
Jones, A. (2024). China’s Queqiao-2 relay satellite enters lunar orbit. SpaceNews.
71
Aerospace Corporation (2024). High Ground Or High Fantasy: Defense Utility Of Cislunar Space; AFPC (2024). Reacting
To Major Space Events On The Moon And In Cislunar Space; Galbreath, C. (2024). Securing Cislunar Space and the First
Island Off the Coast of Earth. Mitchell Institute; Garretson, P. (2024). Congress Must Demand Stronger Leadership from
OSD Space Policy. Global Security Review; Swope, C and Gleason, L. (2024). Salmon Swimming Upstream: charting a course
in Cislunar space. CSIS.
72
Jemma Crew, J. (2024). China rocket blasts off for far side of Moon. BBC.
73
Frances Mao, F. (2024). China's far-side Moon mission begins journey back. BBC.
74
Jones, A. (2024). Chang’e-6 delivers first lunar far side samples to Earth after 53-day mission. SpaceNews.
75
Yeung, J. (2024). China moon samples reveal water molecules in groundbreaking discovery, scientists say. CNN.
76
NASA (2024). CHANG-E-7.
77
McCarthy, S. (2024). China’s astronauts are aiming to land on the moon by 2030. CNN.
18
scale78 as part of a solar-system wide resource utilization plan.79 Toward that end, in 2024, China
continued to develop their designs for a 1.5 megawatt space reactor.80 Chinese scholars are now
publishing designs for a rotational Lunar massdriver (catapult).81 China has previously linked Lunar
industrialization efforts with its Solar Power Satellite plans.82
Despite NASA doubling-down on its pessimistic assessment,83 China continued to make progress in
2024, with its research team presenting design and technology details for space solar-powered satellite84
and creating concerns by a former NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Technology, Policy and
Strategy and as the agency’s Deputy Chief Technologist that America must win the race for space solar
power — or buy it from China.85 In 2024, China also sought to ban materials necessary to develop
Space Solar Power and high efficiency photovoltaics.86
China’s Military Reorganization - In April of 2024, China reorganized its military space forces,
separating it from cyber forces87 and stating the new ‘Aerospace Force’ was “of great significance to
strengthening the capacity to safely enter, exit and openly use space, enhancing crisis management and
the efficacy of comprehensive governance in space and promoting peaceful utilization of space.”88
China has previously sought to develop transatmospheric vehicles, sub-orbital and orbital spaceplanes89
and fractional orbital bombardment systems.90 In late November 2023, China also added a “hypersonic
‘near-space command’ to its military for ‘precise and merciless’ attacks.”91 This is amidst DoD estimates
that China has over 600 operational nuclear warheads (100 more than the previous year), and that it
will have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and will continue to expand its nuclear force beyond
that.92
78
Chen, S. (2017). China’s nuclear spaceships will be ‘mining asteroids and flying tourists’ as it aims to overtake US in space
race. SCMP.
79
Jones, A. (2023). Chinese scientist proposes solar system-wide resource utilization roadmap. SpaceNews.
80
Houser, K. (2024). China is one step closer to having a nuclear-powered spacecraft. FreeThink; Wu, Y. et al. (2024). Design
and R&D of megawatt lithium-cooled space nuclear reactor. SciEngine.
81
Williams, M. (2024). China proposes magnetic launch system for sending resources back to Earth. Phys.org; Xin, L. (2024).
Chinese scientists planning rotating launch system on the moon. SCMP.
82
Xinhua (2016). Exploiting earth-moon space: China's ambition after space station. China Daily.
83
Foust, J. (2024). NASA report offers pessimistic take on space-based solar power. SpaceNews.
84
TechXplore (2024). Research team presents design and technology details for space solar-powered satellite; NCSTI (2024).
China looks set to build space solar power station.
85
Steitz, D. (2024). NASA that America must win the race for space solar power — or buy it from China. SpaceNews.
86
Fernholz, T. (2024). China’s Materials Bans Could Transform Space Solar. Payload Space.
87
Goswami, N. (2024). The Reorganization of China’s Space Force: Strategic and Organizational Implications. The Diplomat.
88
Sachs, D. (2024). Six Takeaways From the Pentagon’s Report on China’s Military. CFR.
89
Goswami, N. and Garretson, P. (2024). The Strategic Implications of China’s ‘Divine Dragon’ Spaceplane. The Diplomat.
90
Hitchens, T. (2021). It’s a FOBS, Space Force’s Saltzman confirms amid Chinese weapons test confusion. Breaking Defense;
Gupta, R. (2023). Orbital hypersonic delivery systems threaten strategic stability. The Bulletin.
91
Chen, S. (2024). Fifth force: is China adding hypersonic ‘near-space command’to its military for ‘precise and merciless’
attacks?. SCMP.
92
DoD (2024). Senior Defense Official Briefs on 2024 China Military Power Report.
19
“The People’s Republic of China is moving at breathtaking speed in space, and they are
rapidly developing a range of counter-space weapons to hold at risk our space capabilities.
They’re also using space to make their terrestrial forces, their army, their navy, the
marine corps, their air force, more precise, more lethal and more far ranging…And so
that obviously is a cause for concern and something that we are watching very, very
closely.”
– GEN. STEPHEN WHITING, COMMANDER, U.S. SPACE COMMAND93
China’s Counterspace - In 2024 RAND released a report noting China’s growing appetite for a space
fight with U.S., noting that the PLA changed its approach to space operations in 2013, focusing on
military competition and controlled escalation to achieve political objectives, and highlighting China’s
increasingly aggressive space strategy, “a potent mix of coercion and deterrence aimed at the US.”94 The
DoD’s assessed that the “PRC’s goal is to become a world space power” and that the “PRC considers
space-based capabilities essential in enabling joint operations and force projection capability by
providing communications, intelligence, surveillance, early warning, and navigation during peacetime
and war” and that the “PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled
information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and
communication capabilities, as a critical component to conduct modern ‘informatized warfare.” As a
result, the “PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent anti-satellite
missiles, co-orbital satellites, EW [Electronic Warfare], and directed-energy systems—to contest or deny
another nation’s access to and operations in the space domain”95 elaborating that the “PRC has
launched multiple ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles that can destroy satellites and developed
mobile jammers to deny SATCOM and Global Positioning System (GPS)” including in “2013, the
PRC launched an object into space on a ballistic trajectory with a peak orbital radius above 30,000 km,
near GEO altitudes.” The DoD report assesses that the “PRC has an operational ASAT missile
intended to target LEO satellites. The PRC probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons
capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.” They note that the “PRC is
developing other sophisticated space-based capabilities, such as satellite inspection and repair. At least
some of these capabilities could function as a weapon…Over the past two years, the PRC has launched
multiple satellites to conduct scientific experiments and to verify new technologies. In January 2022,
Shijian-21 moved a derelict BeiDou navigation satellite to a high graveyard orbit above GEO. The
Shijian-17 is a PRC satellite with a robotic arm. Space-based robotic arm technology could be used in a
future system for grappling other satellites.” Moreover, the PRC’s counterspace development efforts
93
Choi, S.H. (2024). Cause for concern: US watching China’s ‘breathtakingly fast’ space development ‘very, very closely’, top
commander says. South China Morning Post.
94
Honrada, G. (2024). China’s growing appetite for a space fight with US. Asia Times.
95
DoD (2024). Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
20
include orbital counterspace systems with EW and directed-energy weapons systems” and “The PRC
has multiple ground-based laser weapons of varying power levels to disrupt, degrade, or damage
satellites, including a limited capability to employ laser systems against satellite sensors. By the mid- to
late-2020s, the PRC may field higher power systems to extend the threat to the structures of
non-optical satellites.” As a result, the “PRC continues to strengthen its military space capabilities
despite its public stance against the weaponization of space. The PLA continues to invest in improving
its capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology as well
as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration. The PRC has built an expansive ground support
infrastructure to support its growing on-orbit fleet and related functions, including spacecraft and SLV
manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink. The PRC continues to develop counterspace
capabilities—including direct ascent, co-orbital, EW, and directed-energy capabilities—that can contest
or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.”96
“The PRC has launched multiple ASAT missiles, which can destroy satellites, and
developed mobile jammers to deny SATCOM and GPS. The PLA continues to acquire
and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related technologies, including
kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots as well as expanding
space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space in their field of view
and enable counterspace actions.”
97
– Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
In their annual 2024 Global Counterspace Capabilities report, Secure World Foundation concluded,
“China appears to be highly motivated to develop counterspace capabilities to bolster its national
security…China has conducted multiple tests of technologies for close approach and rendezvous in both
low-earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary earth orbit (GEO) that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT
capability. “98 The CSIS Space Threat Assessment 2024 provided details, “Over the course of 2023 and
into early 2024, SJ-23 and other Chinese spacecraft exhibited unusual behaviors in GEO, particularly in
proximity to certain U.S. government and commercial satellites…Elsewhere, in late 2023, a pair of
Chinese satellites—Shiyan (SY) 12-01 and 12-02—appeared to move in synchronized yet opposite
direction…These RPOs continue to enable China to mature operational concepts and technical skills
necessary for orbital ASAT weapons.”99
96
DoD (2024). Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
97
DoD (2024). Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
98
Weeden, B. and Samson, V. (2024). Global Counterspace Capabilities. SWF.
99
Swope, C. Bingen, K, Young, M. Chang, M. Songer, S., Tammelleo, J. (2024). Space Threat Assessment 2024. CSIS.
21
China Planetary Defense - In July, China announced the target for its dual-spacecraft observation and
impact mission, asteroid 2015 XF261, a roughly 30-meter-diameter near-Earth asteroid similar to
DART,100 with the launch expected in 2027 (a two-year slip).101 China is also studying concepts for a
space-based observatory to search for near-Earth asteroids which might include “novel orbits” for the
observatory, such as sun-Earth L1 Lagrange point, positions leading or trailing Earth in its orbit, and
possibly a constellation of spacecraft in a distant retrograde orbit around the Moon.102
Space Mining. In 2024 China for the first time outlined its position on space resources to the United
Nations, stating that space resource utilization is permissible.103 Scientists from the China Academy of
Sciences also articulated a pressing need for China to amplify its asteroid research, tapping into the vast
untapped potential for discovery and innovation.104 China's Tianwen 2 probe is expected to launch in
May 2025 to return samples from a near-Earth asteroid 469219 (also known as Kamo'oalew) and then
explore main-belt comet 311P/PANSTARRS.105 The PRC unveiled plans for a Lunar Electromagnetic
launcher.106
Eyes on China’s Ambitions. China’s strides in space attracted several think tanks to examine potential
scenarios.107 The scale of China’s ambitions led some to state that they dwarf U.S. ambitions108 and
others to note that should asteroid mining become reality, it is essential for the future of U.S. National
Security “given the announcement in July 2023 that China would restrict exports of gallium and
germanium for reasons of national security, the United States needs to aggressively explore new mineral
supply chains decoupled from China.”109
DOMESTIC CONCERNS
Losing national focus? Despite a statutory requirement to hold a National Space Council Meeting,
vice president Harris did not convene NSpC meeting in the final quarter. Moreover, the future of the
National Space Council is in doubt.
100
Andrew Jones, A. (2024). China targets its first planetary defense test mission. Planetary Society.
101
Foust, J. (2024). China reschedules planetary defense mission for 2027 launch. SpaceNews.
102
tlpnetwork.com (2024). China Delays Asteroid Deflection Mission to 2027, Changes Target.
103
Jones, A. (2024). China outlines position on use of space resources. SpaceNews; PRC (2024). Submission by the Delegation
of China to the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities Of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. UNOOSA.
104
Jones, A. (2024). Chinese scientists call for focus on asteroid missions. SpaceNews.
105
Mansfield, S. (2024). China's Tianwen 2 Probe to Undertake Ambitious Asteroid and Comet Mission. Space Daily
106
Williams, M. (2024). China proposes magnetic launch system for sending resources back to Earth. Phys.org; Xin, L. (2024).
Chinese scientists planning rotating launch system on the moon. SCMP.
107
AFPC (2024). Reacting To Major Space Events At Or Below Geostationary Orbit; AFPC (2024). Reacting To Major Space
Events On The Moon And In Cislunar Space; AFPC (2024). Reacting To Future Major Space Events;
Galbreath, C. (2024). Securing Cislunar Space and the First Island Off the Coast of Earth. Mitchell Institute.
108
Aedan Yohannan, A. (2024). China’s Space Strategy Dwarfs U.S. Ambitions. National Interest.
109
Blue, A. (2024). A Sci-Fi Concept That Should Become Reality: Asteroid Mining Is Essential for the Future of U.S.
National Security. CNAS.
22
Continuing Resolutions. The likelihood of a continuing resolution will continue to differentially
harm national efforts to begin new programs to maintain national advantage. This combined with
concerns over tariffs which could raise the cost of aerospace materials, potential hiring freeze and culling
of bureaucracy which might slow licensing could be counterproductive to the goals of the incoming
administration to advance U.S. spacepower.
Resourcing. Various actors have called for the Space Force to grow. HASC Chairman Mike Rogers
asserted that the Space Force should grow in both people and budget.110 The NSSA called for
increasing the Space Force budget to $45-$50 billion.111 CNAS discussed the USSF’s need for ‘Space to
Grow.’112 Yet the Space force budget is going down. After a large increase from $26.3B in FY23 to $30B
in FY24, the Space Force saw a modest decrease to $29.4B for 2025.
GEOINT and Tactical Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Targeting (TacRST) Turf Wars.
Turf wars continued over space roles and responsibilities with regard to geospatial intelligence
(GEOINT) and tactical reconnaissance and surveillance –who has the authority and who should be
allowed to own collection and dissemination of timely information critical to warfighting kill chains.
ISAM in Jeopardy. Despite the priority given by the White House, and the creation of the
Consortium for Space Mobility and ISAM Capabilities (COSMIC),113 we learned that NASA had
cancelled both OSAM-1114 and OSAM 2.115
Getting Behind In Prospecting & Sample Return. Despite China’s experience with Lunar sample
return, and the priority that China has placed on their own Mars sample return,116 NASA’s Mars sample
return appears in jeopardy or cancelled.117
110
Mike Rogers (2024). Rogers Gives Speech on Space Force and its Future. Armed Services.
111
NSSA (2024). Moorman Center for Space Studies Releases Second Tranche of Presidential Transition Issue Papers.
112
Dennis, H. (2024). Space to Grow Foundational Opportunities and Challenges for the U.S. Space Force. CNAS.
113
COSMIC (2024). COSMIC.
114
Foust, J. (2024). NASA reaffirms decision to cancel OSAM-1.
115
Katalyst Space (2024). In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM).
116
Kuthunur, S. (2024). China moves Mars sample-return launch up 2 years, to 2028. Space.com
117
Friedman, L. (2024). NASA’s no to Mars. SpaceNews.
23
– GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING USSPACECOM Commander118
SML in Jeopardy. The Space Force announced space mobility and logistics as one of its core
competencies in 2020. In 2024, despite the significant buzz over ‘dynamic space operations,’ ‘sustained
maneuver,’119 a second Space Mobility Conference,120 the creation of the Consortium for space mobility
and ISAM capabilities (COSMIC)121 and urging by the White House to to provide “real” resources and
funding to developing space mobility and logistics,122 such investments have yet to materialize, and in
fact, the Space Force zeroed out funding for in-space mobility in its FY26 budget request.123
"What is the Space Force going to look like 50 years out? Well, we're going to need to
preserve all of the routes between here and the Moon. We're going to need to preserve all
the Cislunar insertion orbits. We're going to need to protect a lot of the asteroids that are
near Earth that we need to be mining for critical minerals, critical resources that are
going to power our infrastructure here on Earth, but also as we expand out into space.”
– PALMER LUCKEY, founder of Anduril Industries124
Sufficient Attention to Looking Out. In 2024 the debate raged about the importance of Cislunar /
xGEO or ‘looking out’ spacepower125 with one paper “a bluewater USSF, pegged to 3.2% of U.S. Space
GDP, growing rapidly to eclipse the warfighting budget in 2035, achieving a total budget nearly nine
times the size of the base budget in 2070”126 and a separate paper by the Mitchell Institute’s Charles
Galbreath providing a concrete suggestion that “Congress must fund additive growth of about $250M
118
Hadley, G. (2024). SPACECOM Boss Wants Satellites That Can Maneuver to and from New Orbits. Air & Space Forces;
USSPACECOM (2024).
119
Hadley, G. (2024). SPACECOM Boss Wants Satellites That Can Maneuver to and from New Orbits. Air & Space Forces;
USSPACECOM (2024). ‘Extending the Advantage:’ USSPACECOM outlines elements of victory; Stone, C. (2024). The US
needs to get real about maneuver warfare in space. Breaking Defense; Chris Williams, C. (2024). Dynamic Space Operations:
An Overview and Assessment. NSSA; Hendrick, S. (2024). Sustained maneuver: Why the time is now for in-space refueling.
GovExec; SpaceWerx (2024). Sustained Space Maneuver (SSM) Challenge; Staats, B. (2024). The USSF Should Prioritize
Sustained Space Maneuver as a Central Space Warfighting Principle. Aerospace.
120
Tribou, R. (2024). Space Coast’s new general spearheads more cooperation with private space companies. Stars and Stripes.
121
COSMIC (2024). About COSMIC.
122
Hitchens, T. (2024). White House official urges more ‘real’ Pentagon investment in space mobility. Breaking Defense.
123
Hitchens, T. (2025). Space Force zeroed out funding for in-space mobility in FY26 budget request. Breaking Defense.
124
Lucky, P. (2025). Fox News Sunday (Feb 16, 2025). Cited in NSNX Sadler Report.
125
Aerospace Corporation (2024). High Ground Or High Fantasy: Defense Utility Of Cislunar Space; AFPC (2024).
Reacting To Major Space Events On The Moon And In Cislunar Space; Garretson, P. (2024). Congress Must Demand
Stronger Leadership from OSD Space Policy. Global Security Review; Swope, C and Gleason, L. (2024). Salmon Swimming
Upstream: charting a course in Cislunar space. CSIS.
126
Garretson, P. (2023). Bluewater and Brownwater Space Strategies and Their Budgetary Profiles. NPEC.
24
a year to the Space Force budget and increase end strength by approximately 200 personnel for the new
responsibilities associated with emerging national interests on the Moon and the Cislunar region.”127
“Think about the type of space domain awareness that we're gonna have to do out to
ex-GEO, Cislunar. How are we going to do that? As we start to collect data on moving
target indications, what's the battle management process that your Space Force will use
to make sure that the data from the sensor gets to the shooter on operationally relevant
time? This is the kind of thought process that's going to go through this Concepts and
Technology Center.”
– GENERAL CHANCE SALTZMAN, Chief of Space Operations128
Commercial Space Act of 2023 (H.R. 6131) - Introduced in November 2023, H.R. 6131 aims to
amend Title 51 of the United States Code to update government oversight of commercial space
activities. The bill seeks to enhance the regulatory framework governing commercial space operations,
ensuring safety, sustainability, and competitiveness in the U.S. space industry. As of September 12,
2024, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a cost estimate for the bill, indicating ongoing
legislative evaluation.129
National Space Council Proposal - In parallel, the National Space Council has been developing a
comprehensive proposal to regulate commercial space activities. This initiative focuses on establishing a
new commercial space transportation administration, creating a commercial spaceflight research
alliance, and developing a national spaceport network. The proposal aims to strengthen the nation's
position in space by supporting the licensing and operation of commercial space transportation systems
and spaceports.130
The Commercial Space Act of 2023 (H.R. 6131) and the proposal from the National Space Council
both reflect a concerted push to modernize and streamline the regulatory environment for commercial
127
Galbreath, C. (2024). Securing Cislunar Space and the First Island Off the Coast of Earth. Mitchell Institute.
128
Saltzman, C. (2024). Remarks by Chief of Space Operations General Chance Saltzman during the AFA Air Warfare
Symposium’s Great Power Competition Senior Leader Panel. SpaceForce.mil.
129
CBO (2023). H.R. 6131, Commercial Space Act of 2023.
130
NSS (2024). Proposed Commercial Spaceflight Operations Act of 2024.
25
space activities, balancing the need for innovation with the imperative of safety and national security.
Both aim to regulate and support the growth of the commercial space sector, but they differ in their
focus, scope, and specific policy approaches. The National Space Council proposal is more ambitious
in terms of infrastructure and national strategy, while H.R. 6131 is more regulatory and focused on
operational clarity.
Scope and Regulatory Focus - The Commercial Space Act of 2023 (H.R. 6131) focuses primarily on
refining and improving existing regulations to enhance the safety, operational standards, and
competitiveness of commercial space activities. It aims to provide clearer guidelines on space
operations, including licensing and safety standards for launch and re-entry activities, to ensure U.S.
leadership in the global space sector. The bill is designed to streamline regulatory processes, helping
private companies remain competitive internationally while ensuring the sector operates safely. In
contrast, the National Space Council's proposal takes a more comprehensive approach, focusing not
only on regulation but also on establishing a broader strategic framework for the U.S. space industry. It
emphasizes creating new infrastructures, such as a national spaceport network and partnerships with
the private sector, to drive growth and long-term success in the space domain.
Infrastructure and Development - The Commercial Space Act (H.R. 6131) does not directly address
infrastructure development. Its primary focus is on improving the regulatory framework for space
activities, ensuring that existing systems operate efficiently and that the regulatory environment
supports private sector growth. By streamlining licensing processes and clarifying safety standards, the
bill aims to reduce bureaucratic hurdles for space companies. On the other hand, the National Space
Council's proposal is heavily focused on infrastructure, including the establishment of a national
spaceport network and the creation of a commercial spaceflight research alliance. These initiatives aim
to foster technological innovation and provide the necessary physical infrastructure to support a
growing commercial space industry.
Government vs. Private Sector Focus - The Commercial Space Act (H.R. 6131) is centered on
creating a balance between government oversight and private sector freedom. It seeks to modernize
existing regulations and provide a predictable environment for private companies to thrive without
introducing overly burdensome regulations. The goal is to foster competition and innovation while
maintaining essential safety and operational standards. In contrast, the National Space Council's
proposal positions the government as an active partner in driving the growth of the commercial space
sector. It emphasizes the need for public-private partnerships and infrastructure investments, with a
focus on long-term collaboration between the government and private industry to ensure that the U.S.
remains a global space leader.
Long-Term Strategic Goals - The Commercial Space Act (H.R. 6131) primarily addresses immediate
needs by refining regulatory processes to improve the efficiency, safety, and global competitiveness of
26
commercial space activities. It focuses on enhancing clarity in the regulatory framework, helping space
companies navigate current challenges and thrive in a growing market. In contrast, the National Space
Council's proposal is forward-looking, focusing on building a sustainable, competitive space ecosystem
over the long term. It aims to position the U.S. as a leader in the space economy by investing in
infrastructure, fostering collaboration, and ensuring the country's space capabilities remain robust for
decades to come. The proposal envisions a more integrated approach, bringing together both
government and industry to drive space policy, innovation, and development.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
At present, there are four key observations requiring immediate attention to fuel our collective
industrial base, retain its pace of innovation, and flourish in terms of new capabilities, jobs and
contribution to our gross domestic product.
Licensing Novel Space Activities Must Be Resolved - Despite proposals by both the House and the
White House, the nation remains without a stable, well understood, and legislatively authorized process
for licensing novel in-space activities. This must be resolved to allow for a vibrant in-space economy.
131
Sinek, S. (2016).Simon Sinek: 'Vision Without Execution Is Hallucination'. Inc.
27
KEY ACTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
From the above observations and additional inputs from the working groups, participants advocated for
or expressed interest in these overarching recommendations for action:
1. Articulate an Enduring U.S. North Star Vision for Space. America needs a unifying
vision for this second space age with its unparalleled potential for breakthroughs in
manufacturing, biotechnology, mining, and new sources of energy – to build a thriving space
economy and become a true spacefaring civilization. The vision must motivate America to
invest in creating and protecting this bright future, and attract allies and partners interested in
economic prosperity and collective security in the grand project of economic development and
human settlement of space.
2. Finalize a Process to License Novel Space Activities. The Administration and Congress
need to finalize a process that can enable rapid licensing to keep the U.S. in a dominant
position in space innovation and allow the maximum contribution from the U.S. commercial
sector to our prosperity and security.
3. Make the Necessary investments in Space Mobility and Logistics. Space Mobility and
Logistics, including in-space servicing, assembly and manufacturing constitute a new avenue
for prosperity and national advantage, but demand serious and sustained investment.
28
NOVEL SPACE ACTIVITIES
Working Group Co-Lead: Gabe Mounce, AFRL
Working Group Co-Lead: Rob Antypas, AFRL
Working Group Co-Lead: Scott Maethner, NewSpace Nexus
BACKGROUND
Novel space activities refer to innovative and previously unexplored or currently unregulated
applications and operations conducted in outer space. They represent a transformative shift in
how humanity utilizes space, including promising advancements that can significantly benefit both
132
Lele, A. (2024). Framing the success of the Polaris Dawn mission. The Space Review.
133
Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board (1992). The Future of the U.S. Space Industrial Base: A Task Group Report.
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Earth and space economies. This includes capabilities like in-space manufacturing and assembly,
satellite servicing, on-orbit refueling, debris removal, space tourism, energy collection and transmission,
and in-situ resource extraction from celestial bodies like the Moon and asteroids. Unlike traditional
space missions that focus on exploration, data collection or signals propagation, novel space activities
aim to establish sustainable and economically viable operations that can support long-term human
presence, robotic activities and commercial endeavors in space with tangible benefits for Earth.
Figure 9. America’s First Commercial Lunar Lander IM-1 on its way to the Moon (Source: Intuitive Machines134)
Novel Space Activities Elevate National Pand Prestige. They project a nation’s pioneering spirit
and drive to open new economic frontiers. Investments and resulting accomplishments can inspire
generations of new students, promote public enthusiasm, national pride and geopolitical influence.
These activities signal technological leadership on a global stage and attract international partners.
Novel Space Activities Drive Technological Advancements, increasing efficiencies, and furthering
ever more activities in space. For example, in-space manufacturing enables the production of stronger,
lighter and more complex structures that are built in space which are not possible or cost effective on
Earth due to the constraints of gravity. The benefits are transformative with respect to efficiency,
flexibility, and sustainability of space missions. In-situ resource utilization accompanied by space
134
Foust, J. (2024). IM-1 mission on course for the moon after engine test. SpaceNews.
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manufacturing and assembly reduces dependence on Earth-based supply chains and enhances mission
flexibility, particularly for long-duration missions to the Moon or Mars where resupply opportunities
are limited. In-space manufacturing has the potential to lower the costs of space missions by reducing
the mass and volume of payloads launched from Earth. Over time, this could make space missions more
economically viable and sustainable.
Novel Space Activities Have the Potential to Create New Markets and Industries. In-space
manufacturing and assembly, exemplified by recent Northrop Grumman and ESA 3D printing
experiments onboard the ISS, will reduce operating/mission costs and enable on-demand production of
customized parts, creating new commercial opportunities in space construction and repair services, and
increasing the longevity and sustainability of our orbiting labs. Space tourism, driven by companies like
SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, and Blue Origin, offer luxury experiences and broad market potential, leading
to the development of training programs and spaceport operations. Asteroid mining, pursued by firms
like Planetary Resources and Cislunar industries, promises high-value materials and supports
long-duration missions by providing resources for in-space manufacturing, life support systems, and
propellant. Satellite servicing and on-orbit refueling, demonstrated by Northrop Grumman’s Mission
Extension Vehicle (MEV), extends the lifespan of satellites and fosters a new market for maintenance
and refueling services.
Novel Space Activities Contribute to the Sustainable Use of Space Resources. They promote
resource efficiency and reduce waste and the environmental impact on and around Earth. In-space
recycling of inoperable satellites and rocket bodies for raw materials and parts can mitigate debris
hazards. Extracting materials from asteroids or the Moon can reduce the dependency on Earth-based
resources and support the development of a space-based economy. In-space manufacturing and
assembly help create a sustainable space economy by reducing the need for frequent launches from
Earth, thereby lowering the carbon footprint associated with space missions.
“…there are interests clearly within the Earth Moon system that we need to be thinking
about as we go forward.”
- JOHN E. SHAW, Space Strategy Podcast 18 May 2022
CURRENT STATE
In recent years, the space industry has witnessed significant advancements in In-Space Servicing,
Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM) as well as the introduction of National Policy, new legislation,
and strategic initiatives aimed at fostering innovation and sustainability. Despite these achievements,
several challenges remain that hinder the full realization of novel space activities. These include
regulatory and bureaucratic hurdles, a lack of long-term roadmaps, uncertainty in the value proposition
and business case for new technologies, and the difficulty many companies face in transitioning from
early development stages to full-scale commercialization. Addressing these challenges is crucial for
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ensuring that the commercial space sector can thrive and contribute effectively to national and global
space objectives.
Several ISAM Demonstration Missions Have Been Planned and/or Executed –Northrop
Grumman's MEV-2 successfully docked with Intelsat 10-02, extending its operational life by several
years and demonstrating the ability to provide life-extension services to existing satellites. Astroscale's
ELSA-d mission demonstrated space debris removal capabilities and completed end-of-life operations in
Oct 2022. NASA's Restore-L mission (now OSAM-1) which aims to refuel and service a satellite in
low Earth orbit was formally canceled but contributed greatly to the national knowledge base.
DARPA/NRLs RSGS, in partnership with Northrop Grumman, has finished testing and is
preparing for integration and launch. The Space Infrastructure Dexterous Robot (SIDR) project,
which is designed to assemble large structures in space, completed successful ground-based testing of its
robotic arm and autonomous operations systems. Additionally, Made In Space’s Archinaut One
project, which aims to 3D print and assemble parts in space, achieved milestones for ground testing,
robotic arm development, integrations and systems testing and pre-launch preparations. ESA has
achieved critical design review milestones for Space Rider, an uncrewed robotic laboratory that will be
able to service satellites, perform repairs, and conduct in-space manufacturing. Sierra Nevada
Corporation's Dream Chaser Cargo spacecraft completed thermal vacuum testing, flight software
testing and launch vehicle integration. Dream Chaser is designed to transport cargo to the ISS and
includes capabilities for on-orbit servicing and assembly tasks. Finally, the SpaceWERX Orbital Prime
program has pipelined 28 companies toward in-space demonstrations via matching of Small Business
Administration funding with US Space Force and private investment to include three Strategic Funding
Increases (STRATFI) and nine Tactical Funding Increases (TACFI) valued at approximately $55M, one
Space Systems Command (SSC) Other Transaction valued at $26M (under the Space Enterprise
Consortium), establishment of several Work Programs with IN-Q-Tel and SSC’s Commercial Solutions
Office (CSO).
Considerable Progress Has Been Made with Respect to the Introduction of Legislation, Policy,
Strategy, and the Creation of Organizations – The Orbital Sustainability Act of 2023 or the
ORBITS Act has been introduced to create a regulatory environment that supports the long-term
sustainability of space activities. Policy development is underway for the regulation of Novel Space
Activities with key tensions remaining in the areas of regulatory or market-driven innovation, the scope
of the frameworks (national or international) and short-term flexibility vs. long term stability. The
DoD introduced its Commercial Space Integration Strategy which outlines its approach to leveraging
commercial space capabilities through space innovation and collaboration while enhancing resilience
and capability of defense operations. The USSF introduced its Commercial Space Strategy to enhance
integration of commercial space capabilities into military operations emphasizing rapid acquisition and
deployment, enhanced resilience, interoperability, integration, promoting innovation and security.
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Finally, the creation of organizations like CONFERS and COSMIC , which are international or
industry-led collaborative initiatives focused on advancing technologies and best practices related to
novel space activities such as space mobility and in-space servicing assembly, and manufacturing, have
enhanced dialogue and improved coordination.
Regulatory and Bureaucratic Hurdles are Barriers to Innovation and Speed – Regulatory and
bureaucratic hurdles are often cited as significant barriers to innovation and speed, particularly in the
space industry. For example, the lengthy and complex process of obtaining licenses and approvals from
multiple government agencies can delay the development and deployment of new technologies, as seen
in the case of commercial satellite launches and on-orbit servicing missions. Companies have also
reported that unclear or outdated regulations make it difficult to innovate, particularly when
developing novel technologies like in-space manufacturing or debris removal. Additionally, the
time-consuming nature of navigating existing and emerging regulatory frameworks can lead to
increased costs and reduced competitiveness, particularly when compared to countries with more
streamlined processes. The ambiguity of ownership for defunct or “disposed” of space assets and
convoluted international policy make rendezvous and proximity operations for servicing, reuse or
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disposal difficult to coordinate. These challenges highlight the need for more adaptive and responsive
regulatory environments to foster innovation.
Lack of Long-Term Roadmaps for Novel Space Activities – Constantly shifting directions of
technical innovation in novel space activities make long term planning unreliable. There is a recognized
dearth of long-term roadmaps for novel space activities, which hinders the strategic development and
investment in emerging technologies like in-space manufacturing, asteroid mining, and on-orbit
servicing. While agencies like NASA and the Department of Defense have initiated programs to explore
these areas, comprehensive and coordinated long-term plans that outline clear goals, timelines, and
pathways for commercial and governmental collaboration are often lacking. This lack of strategic
foresight leads to uncertainty in the industry, making it difficult for companies (especially startups,
small and early growth companies) to plan investments and align their innovations with future
government needs. Furthermore, the absence of detailed road maps can result in fragmented efforts and
missed opportunities to collaborate or fully capitalize on the potential of these new space domains.
Uncertainty in Value Proposition and Business Case for Novel Space Activities: Uncertainty in
the value proposition and business case for novel space activities is a significant challenge, as evidenced
by the hesitation of commercial companies to fully invest in emerging sectors like in-space
manufacturing and satellite servicing. Many companies cite the lack of clear government demand
signals as a barrier to scaling up their capabilities, fearing that without predictable contracts or
government partnerships, the return on investment might not justify the risks. For instance, the
fluctuating priorities, budgets, and unclear long-term plans from agencies like NASA and the
Department of Defense leave companies unsure about the future market for these advanced
technologies. It is becoming clear that the Department of Defense and commercial space markets have
different priorities in emerging ISAM fields. Commercial space companies see business cases closing
around high efficiency longer duration timelines that do not close military use cases. This is driving a
wedge in between emerging commercial and government driven markets. This uncertainty stifles
innovation and slows the growth of the commercial space sector, underscoring the need for more
explicit and consistent government demand signals to drive commercial participation and investment.
NASA’s Moon to Mars Architecture and the commercial space strategies issued by the DoD and USSF
are important first steps, but more dialogue and studies are needed to quantify demand signals.
“But if we want to have robust capabilities, we really need to make sure that we’re
investing properly in research and development, to include prototyping activities that we
do with commercial companies that are doing really interesting things to give the U.S. a
competitive advantage in space.”
- BRIG GEN STEVE “BUCKY” BUTOW - SpaceNews 11 Jan 2023
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Figure 10. AI Vision of Organ Bioprinting (Source: Ilak Manoharan with AI135)
Too Many Space Companies are Stuck in the Valley of Death - Many space companies find
themselves stuck in the "Valley of Death," where they struggle to transition from early-stage
development to full-scale commercialization. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 49.4%
of startups fail within the first five years, often due to a lack of funding and market traction. This
number is likely higher for space startups given the additional challenges they face like longer time to
market, regulatory hurdles and high operational costs. This situation is particularly challenging because
companies have typically exhausted initial funding sources but have not yet secured the larger, sustained
investments needed to scale their operations. For example, numerous small satellite and space
technology firms have completed successful prototypes and proof-of-concept missions but face
difficulties in securing follow-on contracts or investment to move to large-scale production or
deployment. The lack of clear government contracts or commercial customers exacerbates this issue,
leaving many promising technologies at risk of stalling before they can achieve commercial viability.
This gap highlights the need for more robust support mechanisms, such as government procurement
programs or public-private partnerships, to help companies bridge this critical phase.
ASPIRATIONAL GOALS
● Expand Human Presence Beyond Earth: Establish sustainable human habitats on the
Moon and Mars, using Lunar bases as stepping stones for deeper space exploration, and aiming
for permanent settlements on Mars to ensure humanity’s long-term survival.
● Leverage In-Space Resources, Manufacturing, and Energy: Develop advanced in-space
manufacturing and resource utilization technologies, including 3D printing, asteroid mining,
and space-based solar power stations, to reduce reliance on Earth, generate abundant clean
energy, and enable long-duration space exploration.
● Promote Space Sustainability and Environmental Protection: Implement strategies to
135
Manoharan, I. (2024). Bioprinting in Space: Revolutionizing Regenerative Medicine in Microgravity. Medium.
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mitigate space debris, develop technologies for debris removal, and enhance space-based Earth
observation systems to monitor and protect Earth's environment from climate change and
disasters.
● Foster Commercial Space Ventures and International Cooperation: Encourage space
tourism, private space stations, and international collaborations, while establishing regulatory
frameworks to govern the peaceful and sustainable use of space resources and activities.
Need for Sustainable and Reusable Space Technologies – The growing focus on developing
sustainable and reusable technologies for satellites and other space assets marks a significant and
promising shift in the industry. However, significant challenges remain, particularly in establishing a
clear business case for in-space activities such as refueling and recycling. These challenges are
compounded by the need to address space debris and traffic congestion, which are critical to ensuring
the long-term sustainability and safety of space operations. As the industry progresses, it will be
essential to demonstrate the economic viability of these technologies while also implementing strategies
to manage and mitigate the risks associated with an increasingly crowded orbital environment.
Lack of Clear Government Strategy and Support – Uncertainty surrounding government demand
signals and the absence of coordinated long-term strategies have created significant challenges for the
development of novel space activities. Bureaucratic hurdles and ambiguous ownership of
responsibilities across various agencies further complicate efforts to support these emerging sectors. As
a result, it has been difficult to secure consistent government backing for cutting-edge technologies such
as in-space manufacturing and space-based solar power. To drive innovation and ensure progress, a
more unified and transparent government approach is essential, with clear roles, responsibilities, and
strategies that provide the necessary support and guidance to the commercial space sector.
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Commercialization and Public-Private Partnerships – Clearer and more effective public-private
partnerships are essential for advancing novel space ventures and fostering innovation. Currently, there
are significant gaps between government expectations and the realities faced by commercial entities,
which can hinder the success of these partnerships. One of the main challenges is the transition from
government being the primary or initial customer to expanding into broader commercial markets. To
bridge this gap, it is crucial to align government policies and incentives with the needs of the private
sector, ensuring that both sides can collaborate effectively and sustainably to support the growth of
emerging space industries
Innovation and Development of ISAM Capabilities – A growing number of companies are actively
pursuing innovations in ISAM, yet they face significant challenges in securing both funding and
government support. Demonstrating these capabilities is essential not only for driving market
development but also for shaping the future landscape of space activities. However, the absence of a
coherent and unified government strategy (national security and civil space sectors) for the development
and funding of ISAM infrastructure is a major obstacle, stifling commercial investment and slowing the
pace of innovation. For example, the military wants to embrace commercial ISAM offerings but is
realizing that those offerings are not approaching the high impulse and high thrust technologies needed
to provide military utility. Commercial solutions business cases are largely focused on high efficiency
low thrust capabilities. To unlock the full potential of ISAM, a strategic, well-coordinated approach is
needed from government stakeholders, ensuring that the necessary resources and support are in place to
foster growth in this critical area.
Shifting Economics of Space Infrastructure and Services - The rapid evolution of the space
market, driven by the proliferation of LEO constellations, lower-cost rideshare launches, and the
potential impact of Starship, is reshaping the economics of space activities. While the demand for LEO
refueling infrastructures is declining, the need for satellite disposal, orbital transfer, and repositioning
services is rising. This shift creates uncertainty around the profitability of long-term infrastructure
investments, posing a challenge for businesses to adapt to an environment where affordable
mass-to-orbit options are changing the calculus of sustainable space operations.
136
Gravity Lab (2024). Gravity Lab.
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KEY INFLECTION POINTS
● Starship/New Glen has the potential to revolutionize space access by significantly reducing
launch costs and lowering the barriers for novel space activities and missions.
● In-Space infrastructure development is essential for progress in novel space activities and
missions as is akin to how interstate highways and the internet spurred innovation.
● Clear government demand signals for ISAM/SAML can accelerate the development of novel
space activity technologies. Inconsistent or weak signals may hinder commercial investment
and innovation.
● Human spaceflight expansion and permanent Lunar presence can anchor future space
activities. Sustained support & international cooperation are crucial for success in these areas.
● Collaborative efforts like COSMIC and CONFERS demonstrate the value of industry
collaboration and standards development in advancing space technologies.
● Enabling technologies like AI, ML, and automation are key drivers for complex robotic space
missions. Slow adoption or underinvestment in these technologies could limit the
advancement of novel space activities.
● Down-mass capabilities and proliferated LEO constellations are crucial to improving public
perception of the value of space, and to unlocking new opportunities and markets in space.
● Geopolitical conflicts and resource allocation will affect the ability to achieve space priorities
and development milestones.
● China’s megawatt-class power milestone could set a new standard for in-space power
capabilities, induce regret within the U.S. and accelerate global competition and investment in
space technologies.
● On-orbit structure demonstrations with high-definition videos of on-orbit structure assembly
could inspire further innovation, proving the feasibility and potential of in-space
manufacturing and assembly.
“The Space Force should pursue an investment strategy that rapidly develops and deploys
commercially produced ISAM, SBSP and rocket cargo prototype systems. This strategy
will allow commercial operators to take calculated risks and maximize innovation. The
resulting prototype systems will provide the Space Force with initial demonstration
capabilities to validate operational concepts and incrementally increase joint force
resilience and flexibility in the short term. This investment strategy will yield ISAM,
SBSP and rocket cargo capabilities that are economically viable in new civilian markets
and ready to be procured as future programs of record for new Space Force missions.”
- Capt Tyler Bates, The Hill, Jan 2023
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SHORT-TERM PAYOFF
Studies and Dialogues on ISAM Capabilities: Conduct and present studies on ISAM capabilities
from both government and industry perspectives, facilitating opportunities for comments and
dialogues. (OPR: COSMIC/Aerospace)
Update and Review National ISAM Strategy: Review and potentially update the April 2022
National ISAM strategy, engaging industry for feedback to ensure it remains relevant. (OPR: NSpC)
Establish Standards Working Group: Create a working group to harmonize government and
commercial standards for ISAM, facilitating a common understanding and implementation
framework. (OPR: CONFERS)
Engage in Outreach Programs: Have space industry representatives engage with applicable adjacent
industries to identify transferable technologies and solutions, bringing back insights on potential pain
points. (OPR: Government group or non-profit)
Space Solar Power Roadmap: Develop a technology development roadmap for U.S. space solar
power and space nuclear power programs, aiming for 1MW power output within the next decade.
(OPR: Needs government support)
ISAM Platform Development: Develop a versatile ISAM platform, in-space and digital, to test
multiple technologies, aiming to reduce technical risks and increase technology readiness levels (TRL).
Collaborate with companies like SpaceX (Starship) for rapid & iterative testing & development. (OPR:
DIU)
Design/Build/Test Competitions: Organize competitions under tight timelines to design, build, and
test interface technologies, promoting innovation and practical solutions. Recommend the U.S.
government specifically identify funding toward prize competitions, especially as might be applied
toward international cooperation (example- via the X-Prize Foundation)
MID-TERM PAYOFF
Demonstrate Novel Space Activities: Focus on demonstrating novel space activities to showcase
capabilities and drive market development. Include discussions on standardizing fuel types to
streamline logistics.
Define Long-Term Space Strategy/Vision: Develop a comprehensive vision and plan for the
long-term U.S. space strategy, focusing on managing strategic competition and ensuring sustained
leadership in space. (OPR: DoD)
Public-Private Partnership Clarification: Foster a better understanding of public-private
partnerships (PPPs), ensuring clear expectations and roles for both government and industry.
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LONG-TERM PAYOFF
ISO Guidelines for ISAM: Work on developing International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) guidelines for ISAM, recognizing the lengthy process but aiming for international
standardization to facilitate global cooperation.
Sustainability Scoring System: Investigate and develop a sustainability scoring system for space
activities, akin to LEED for construction, to encourage sustainable practices and economic viability.
Permanent Lunar Infrastructure: Establish an entire program office in DARPA for space
industrial development, including a permanent infrastructure between Earth and the Moon,
involving public-private partnerships and substantial government investment to motivate industry
participation. (OPR: DARPA, DARPA-EXO)
Defense Production Act Title 3: Utilize the Defense Production Act Title 3 to issue a presidential
determination for developing the in-space industrial base, covering mining, manufacturing, power
generation, and servicing. (OPR: OSD Industrial Policy)
Prepare for Space Economy: Develop infrastructure and standards to support a thriving space
economy, including fiducials for docking on all spacecraft and advancing ISAM technologies to build
satellites in space.
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Figure 12. Early Inversion Prototype (Source: Adam Amengual for The New York Times137)
137
Wakabayashi, D. (2022). Dreaming of Suitcases in Space. New York Times.
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OUTERNET
Working Group Co-Lead: Steve Nixon, Outernet Council
Working Group Co-Lead: Michael Cheng, Outernet Council
Figure 13. The Space Development Agency will begin launching its Tranche 1 Transport Layer communications
mesh network in 2024 (Source: Northrop Grumman138)
“The outernet is the internet in space. The basic idea being that if I’m a sensor or a
satellite in space, I shouldn’t have to worry about how my data gets to where it needs to
go...That’s very important because it gives us real-time command and control and access
to our data... which we don’t always have today.”139
- COLONEL ERIC FELT, director of architecture and integration, C4ISRNET April 26, 2023
BACKGROUND
Following developments in the last year, namely the creation of the Outernet Council, the Hybrid
Space Communications working group was renamed to the Outernet working group. The Outernet
138
Hitchens, T. (2025). SDA again postpones launch of first ‘operational’ data relay, missile warning satellites. Breaking
Defense.
139
U.S. Space Force Chief of Space Operations, General B. Chance Saltzman delivered this statement during his keynote
address at the 38th Space Symposium on April 19, 2023, emphasizing the need for innovation in response to emerging space
challenges.
42
Council140 describes the Outernet as “a connected, secure, resilient, network of communications
satellites.” The same goal as 2023 was set forth: discuss challenges, opportunities, and risks associated
with a diversified network of operators and intersatellite links.
The Outernet has the potential to completely uproot the way network traffic is handled around the
world. Globally, almost a million miles of undersea cables keep opposite ends of the earth connected.
However, each mile of cable represents a vulnerability to attack by an ever-increasing number of global
actors. Even in its early stages, the Outernet can serve as a backup for important communications
channels to remain open during times of crisis. As with other space-based technologies, much of its
viability relies on the foreseen drop in launch costs over the coming decade; with reusable vehicles such
as SpaceX’s Starship, Stoke’s Nova rocket, and claims of cheap kinetic launch on the horizon.
CURRENT STATE
In 2024 and the latter half of 2023 saw significant progress in the hybrid space communications realm,
with commsat upmass increasing, proliferation of interconnected satellites, and increased global interest
in space data. Multiple government agencies have shown significant interest in HSA, and most
importantly have well-defined, funded programs to mature nascent technologies. Increased global
conflict and incidents with terrestrial infrastructure have heightened global attention to the need for a
non-terrestrial communications network.
Creation of the Outernet Council – Following the recommendations of the SSIB 2023 report, the
Outernet Council was established to accelerate creation of the space internet. The Council aims to do
so by development of standards and facilitation of partnerships among industry, government, and other
organizations.
Proliferation of Walled Gardens – SpaceX Starlink, Amazon Kuiper, OneWeb, Telesat, and other
companies continue development and deployment, adding significantly to the bandwidth provided
from space. However, these systems also continue to be developed without the ability to interconnect
with each other. Eventually, a widely adopted Outernet will require commercial players to
communicate amongst each other. The earlier this is realized, and the faster hardware standards
develop, the more beneficial the Outernet can be in the short term.
140
Outernet Council (2024). Outernet Council.
141
Amazon (2023). Amazon's Project Kuiper completes successful tests of optical mesh network in low Earth orbit; Boyle, A.
(2024). Amazon reveals that its satellites are using lasers. Cosmic Log.
142
NASA (2023). NASA’s Deep Space Optical Comm Demo Sends, Receives First Data; ScienceBlog (2024). NASA's Laser
Communication Breaks Distance Record, Paving Way for Future Space Exploration.
43
bandwidth of space-to-space communications is ever increasing, each exists in its own ‘walled garden’
where no companies can communicate with each other’s hardware.
Space Development Agency Accelerating Pace of Transport Layer Buildout – SDA’s rapid and
steady growth of contract awards of its Transport Layer reflect the agency’s commitment toward
proving optical link technology. Since the last SSIB, another $1.5B has been awarded by the agency for
72 more satellites, all capable of intersatellite communication. DARPA and DIU are also increasing
funding levels for HSA activities, with DIU completing an on-orbit test of intersatellite communication
capabilities and DARPA awarding Phase 2 contracts for its Space-BACN program. The Space Force
also released an RFI exploring USSF adoption of a space orchestration API, similar to the Outernet
Council’s Federation API. Moreover, a recent RAND report suggests overcoming fragmentation to do
enterprise wide commercial satcom purchases.143
Lack of Standards for Optical Interfaces – Although SDA standards are being used, the bandwidth
capabilities are too limiting for widespread and long-term use. The vast majority of commercial ISLs
already operating in space are operating 50-100 times faster than the SDA standard. As it stands,
multiple private entities are developing proprietary communications standards and hardware, which
will make interconnection substantially more difficult down the road. Additionally, government
dominance of the current market biases any potential standards toward government needs, leaving the
nascent commercial developments behind.
Lack of Clear, Large-Scale Benefits to Outernet Architecture – The Outernet concept and its
benefits are still just being realized, making it difficult to persuade significant government financial
backing. Additionally, the few commercial entities developing Outernet infrastructure lack a larger,
concerted advocacy group. The Outernet Council seeks to change this, but requires never-seen-before
cooperation among industry and government partners.
Commercial and Other Entities are Each Developing Proprietary Interfaces – “pockets” of
interconnection are created when standards don’t exist, and companies aren’t incentivized to adapt to
or compromise with their competitors. Commercial entities are also disincentivized from making their
networks interoperable due to proprietary terminal revenue. The use of non-proprietary hardware
would significantly alter business models, both on the ground and in space. The longer these
proprietary interfaces continue to be developed and proliferated, the harder it will be to integrate them
143
Erwin, S. (2023). New report recommends Space Force change how it buys commercial satellite services. SpaceNews.
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together. This challenge also extends internationally, where competitor nations may have wildly
different norms and standards.
Kuiper or another constellation begins real competition with Starlink – Starlink’s dominance of
LEO, in addition to SpaceX’s launch market share, make it difficult for competitors to emerge in this
space. Although OneWeb, Kuiper, and other proposed constellations show promise, none have yet to
pose serious competition to Starlink.144
Due to rising widespread global tension, the need for geospatial products is expected to rise.
With regional conflicts and tensions building across the globe, the need for geospatially driven
situational awareness also grows. The commercial sourcing of Earth-imaging has recently provided
both the Government and the public with an unprecedented amount of up-to-date information that
drives public opinion and Government decision making.
New technologies in intersatellite links may provide a future with lower latency in communications
and control. The latency present in any satellite constellation due to bandwidth of RF communications
has been a consistent design limitation since space communication’s inception. With the rapid advent
of optical communications, new satellite constellations will likely enjoy greater bandwidth with lower
latency arranged as networks as opposed to static chains.
SHORT-TERM PAYOFF
USG Should Aggressively Encourage Industry to Develop Outernet Standards: In the absence
of a strong signal from major customers such as the USG, the space communications industry will
continue its current technical fragmentation, reducing economic efficiency, resilience, and future
commercial viability. The USG should encourage industry to develop Outernet Standards, and provide
funding and government participation in an industry-led standards initiative.
Outernet Council to Provide Neutral Advocacy: The Council should survey its constituents to
provide thought leadership and advocacy across the industry, following the Linux Foundation as an
example.
144
Roulette, J. (2024). SpaceX to sell satellite laser links that speed in-space communication to rivals. Reuters.
45
Industry Consortium to Define Procurement Language: Interoperability and standardized
interfaces should be prioritized, and the government should give preference to hardware with these
attributes.
MID-TERM PAYOFF
Encourage Operators to Data Share to Undesignated Government Agency: Real-time STM will
become more necessary for collision avoidance, a central data authority can help resolve.
U.S. Government to Incentivize Interoperability and Develop Standards: Collaborate with
industry to develop these standards. Award contracts preferentially to companies who opt into the
Hybrid Space Architecture.
Industry to DevelopInteroperable and Non-Aggression Incentive Framework: Use the Open
Innovation Network and LOT Network as examples.
LONG-TERM PAYOFF
Develop Ship-to-Ship Communications Protocols Between Human Vessels: Traffic management
of human vessels takes priority over other unmanned spacecraft.
Encourage International Cooperation, Even with Adversaries: Problems on-orbit affect all
nations. Collaborate with the international community by disincentivizing adversarial action against
cooperative assets, tying in the Outernet to the Outer Space Treaty/Artemis Accords.
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SPACE POLICY & FINANCE LANDSCAPE
Working Group Co-Lead: Ilsa Mroz, Aerospace Industries Assoc.
Working Group Co-Lead: Bruce Cahan, Urban Logic
Working Group Co-Lead: Nikolai Joseph, AFRL
BACKGROUND
The commercial and government sectors of space historically have been inseparable. Government has
been, and remains, an anchor customer to the growing commercial space enterprise, and government
policy and regulatory regimes continue to help shape public-private interdependence. Strategic
planning for policy/finance considerations at private companies is often at the mercy of the market, the
political climate, and the competition.
Private company stakeholders of the Policy and Finance Working Group identified a series of challenges
and inflection points faced by industry, as well as successes that have benefited the public-private
enterprise as a whole. They noted that collective growth of the commercial space sector depends on
transparency, consistency, continuity, and harmony between the government and private sector,
especially in clarity of communication and scope and timelines for funding.
New entrants to the commercial sector struggle to successfully close a business case alone (independent
of government as customer, investor or grantmaker). Private company stakeholders noted that
emerging companies look to the US government to bail them out of the Valleys of Death, but that the
lack of a “pure” commercial space market demands the commercial sector, for as long as necessary, rely
on the government for support. “Valleys of Death” arise from the risks of managing a new enterprise, in
a technically challenging scientific area (space) while competing for initial and follow-on funding, and
designing products and services that customers have yet to see and integrate into their own business
models. Private company managers will succeed only by navigating and properly prioritizing a parallel
sequence of readiness levels - technology, manufacturing, integration, business, systems and
commoditization.145
It is difficult for new space companies to compete against the major established aerospace companies
(primes) and existing programs of record, and they are faced with diverse and legacy embedded barriers
to entry for procurement organizations in order to meet a layer cake of regulatory requirements.
145
Cahan, B. (2023). Avoiding the Valleys of Death: A “System Readiness Level” metric could provide a baseline for lean
product development. Optics & Photonics News.
47
As space capabilities continue to advance, so does the appetite for both risk taking and efficiency. The
U.S. Government is increasingly interested in demonstrations of small/proliferated vs large/exquisite
capabilities, and the DOD has grown more accepting of experimentation. This growth has also
stimulated the economic and regulatory environment further, and we’ve seen somewhat streamlined
regulatory approvals and contracting vehicles, such as OTAs, Strat Fis, and TacFis. The risk appetite of
traditional banking and insurance is also warming up to commercial space, and stakeholders are
encouraged by the increased USG visibility and support. However, equity investments in space are
relatively unchanged year-on-year.146
CURRENT STATE
In 2023, the USG continued a forward leaning approach to adopt commercial space capabilities and
increasingly focusing innovation on public private partnerships. This is a recognition of the role that
commercial services can provide in reducing costs, increasing flexibility in offerings, and introducing
more dynamism to the timelines of availability. The maturation of the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services and Commercial Lunar Payload Services programs within NASA are high
profile examples for transportation services, but the USAF has been purchasing weather data for several
years. In 2023, NASA is purchasing satellite-servicing and orbital debris mitigation capabilities from the
commercial market with Starfish’s SSPICY ("Small Spacecraft Propulsion and Inspection CapabilitY")
Otter.
The space industry has expanded into a $630 billion enterprise, and it is estimated that the global space
economy will be worth $1.8 trillion by 2035.147 Others estimate that the global space economy is $595
billion and is projected to grow to $944 billion by 2033.148 For more stats on startups/investments, see
Space Capital’s Space IQ report.149
Due to the space industry’s dependence on government procurement and political priorities, various
regional conflicts (Ukraine, Israel/Hamas) illustrate the value of space-based capabilities, while
inherently adding business risk to supply chains and foreign currency flows. (For Ukraine, see
Aerospace150; for Israel in Hamas War, see Quilette151; for Defense Industry, see Deloitte152).
In 2024, the run up to the US Presidential Election injected additional risks in predicting the form,
function and nature of federal space policy, for civil space and national security space. Workshop
Stakeholders were curious about how a new Administration would reconfigure Mission Authorization,
Space Force Commercial Space Strategy, National Space Council and other converging commercial
space coordinating bodies of domestic and international significance.
146
Space Capital (2024). Q1 2024 2024 SPACE IQ Space Investment Quarterly.
147
Acket-Goemaere, A., Brukardt, R., Klempner, J., Andrew Sierra, A., Stokes, B. (2025). Space: The $1.8 trillion opportunity
for global economic growth. McKinsey & Company.
148
NovaSpace (2025). The Space Economy to Reach $944 Billion by 2033.
149
Space Capital (2025). Space IQ: Space Investment Quarterly.
150
Gleason, M. (2024). Russia’s War In Ukraine: Key Observations About Space. Aerospace Corp.
151
Fox, A. (2025). Lessons for Western Militaries from the Gaza War. Quillette.
152
Berckman, L., Chavali, A., Hardin, K., Sloane, M., Dronamraju, T. (2024). 2025 Aerospace and Defense Industry Outlook.
Deloitte.
48
KEY ISSUES & CHALLENGES
Regulatory processes and priorities: The increasing number of U.S. government agencies involved
in space licensing processes impedes innovation and hinders the development of emerging technologies.
The current space policy and regulatory framework suffers from fragmentation and lags behind
technological advancements. Overlapping regulatory responsibilities and authorities contribute to
significant risks and delays. Companies face challenges due to the incoherence of government priorities
and processes, often necessitating the pursuit of parallel approval pathways with multiple, disparate
agencies (for instance, the bureaucracy associated with re-entry). Furthermore, timelines are
inconsistently synchronized across organizations and regulators, compounded by a lack of trust that
obstructs the alignment of all stakeholders. Substantial resources are dedicated to navigating regulatory
approvals, placing smaller companies at a disadvantage when competing with larger primes that possess
greater capacity for regulatory, compliance, and legal expenditures. This proliferation of U.S.
government agency involvement in space licensing continues to slow innovation and negatively impact
nascent technology development, with overlapping regulatory responsibilities and authorities
exacerbating risks and causing delays.
The unique nature of space, where activities are often scrutinized and disallowed in the absence of
explicit permission due to treaty obligations, contrasts with a model of presumptive approval. Many
regulatory processes require a single “no” to derail an application and the prevailing default is "no," or
inaction that yields the same outcome. A shift towards an approach where space activity is permitted
unless explicitly prohibited warrants consideration, as there are currently insufficient incentives for
government entities to actively seek consensus. Moreover, interagency groups dealing with or requiring
space capabilities often lack the clear authority or mandate to work effectively towards agreement.
Indeed, bureaucratic inefficiencies result in no adverse consequences for delays or cost overruns
stemming from a failure to achieve timely consensus, positioning the U.S. government as its own
primary obstacle in this regard.
Acquisition and Procurement Reforms: Government officials' advocacy for improved acquisition
and procurement processes is not adequately supported by necessary resources. The allocation of
appropriations and the designation of funding by Congress, the White House, and the Department of
Defense lack a cohesive, overarching "North Star Infrastructure Vision" to prioritize holistic financing
approach that supports building and maintaining the nation's Space Industrial Base capabilities.
Consequently, space government acquisition and procurement processes are protracted and tend to
favor established legacy primes and emerging new primes, often at the expense of smaller businesses.
Defense budgets are often pre-allocated and fail to adapt or keep pace with the emergence of new
technologies. Legacy programs, such as IRAD, frequently give a disproportionate advantage to, and
against their historical record, rely on, prime contractors for innovations that could potentially evolve
into products and services desired by the U.S. government.
The government needs to clearly articulate its intended role as both an "anchor customer" and as a
national steward focused on fostering a competitive and sustainable market. Despite concerns
regarding over-dependence on a limited number of suppliers, monopolistic tendencies persist in key
segments of the space industry. The government should assume a more proactive role in supporting
49
new companies to validate their markets and secure early-stage customers, thereby strengthening their
technological maturity. A fundamental misalignment exists in the perceived roles, where government
strategies often fail to acknowledge the necessity of being the anchor customer for early-stage
approaches or bespoke, but necessary, space capabilities which the market alone does not support.
Moreover, the allocation and designation of funding (limited tranches, constrained “colors” of use,
token next stage funding) represent outdated paradigms that routinely undermine U.S. government
efforts to effectively leverage and grow commercial space capabilities.
Financial markets: The commercial space market exhibits varying levels of maturity across different
space activities. Currently, the development of space assets and services that generate terrestrial revenue
streams attracts investment, which consequently delays investment in space assets and services of
longer-term strategic significance. The U.S. Government continues to be a primary customer for both
emerging and established segments of this market. From a financial perspective, Wall Street views the
space industry as a long-term investment, often referencing timelines beyond 2040 and currently not
classifying space as a core infrastructure asset class. Traditional banking and insurance sectors are
showing increasing interest in commercial space, driven by the role of space capabilities in monitoring
and mitigating terrestrial risks. However, a significant number of emerging companies are seeking U.S.
government funding to overcome the "Valleys of Death" funding gaps, indicating a relative scarcity of
purely commercial investment within the space sector. As with other critical infrastructure industries
(healthcare, finance, energy), venture capital can get a new space company started, but that company
will need different, larger and cheaper forms of debt and equity financing, along with risk-transfer
derivative mechanisms, to grow along a 5 to 10 year timeframe to maturity.
SHORT-TERM PAYOFF
Accelerate Regulatory Approvals. The current approach lacks certainty of time and risk for
completion, which risks absorbing, burning and wasting small to medium sized enterprise working
capital and equity, burn out technical teams who would take their knowledge elsewhere, and delay
delivery of critical novel innovations. Interagency approval processes need to be journey-mapped,
aligned, coordinated and analyzed to see that they are “fit for purpose” in building space services. The
current regulatory apparatus lags advances in technology and space business models. Pre-agency
coordination using industry associations and innovations like a Space Commodities Exchange may
50
forecast interdependencies, and thus synchronize government and private sector efforts, and find ways
to identify bottlenecks.
Interagency Approval: Interagency approval processes need to be better aligned and coordinated.
The current regulatory apparatus often lags behind advances in technology and new space business
models. Pre-agency coordination, potentially utilizing industry associations with resources, could help
synchronize government and private sector efforts and identify potential bottlenecks.
Space Activities and Investments Processes Journey Map: Develop a Space Activities and
Investments Process map as a journey map benchmarked by data-driven statistics on specific space
activities, procurement or investment commitments, Regulatory Approval Process and company /
government changed conditions. Identify pain points aligned to incentives at each approval element.
Parse Regulatory Approval Decision authority and intensity based on novelty / routineness of activity
and its risks to other activities in space. Examine where risk of failure or interference resides, and deal
with those risks holistically. Invert the accountability threshold of risk so that regulatory approval of
commercial space activity presumptively would be “yes, approved” until a justification is given to decide
“no, not approved because….” Consider speed and resiliency as overarching themes, tethering the speed
of regulation to the speed of technology change. Think about framing points under path speed,
asymmetric advantage path, align with commercial strategies recently released.
Support Nascent Space Companies via an Ombudsperson / Coach / Sherpa for procurement and
regulatory navigation. There is also potential for helping private sector companies, based on their
specific “Readiness Levels,” to advance their business case’s viability/credibility while growing the space
capabilities that specific U. S. Government customers need and commit to buying. Form a “Good
Lawyers Corps” to help government procurement, government operations and commercial parties
navigate the FAR, DFAR and other regulations with creative speed and authenticity to overcome
“lethargy” and “bureaucratic inertia” that stymies innovation or reasonable risk-taking. This Corps
would be especially relevant to “level the playing field” as new space companies seek to compete with
primes and other established vendors in winning and supplying USG customers.
Revise ITAR, MTCR – If industry can’t hire foreign born individuals, some direction is good (e.g. list
countries to avoid), but an alternative needs to be available. Preventing companies from gaining the top
talent undermines commercial viability while empowering adversarial advantages.
Space Financing bill, e.g what is the financing for in-space. Consider creating Space Infrastructure
Bonds (akin to the bonds that grow other Critical Infrastructures terrestrially) and the Space
Commodities Exchange.
MID-TERM PAYOFF
Financial markets: Establish a Center for Space Finance, Insurance and Market Formation to do such
research. Think of “space finance” as solving a Rubik's Cube where the parallel readiness levels of any
given company or project (technology, manufacturing, business model) needs to authentically tell
investors, customers and the government a coherent story of why it needs the next tranche of funding as
a means to anticipate and overcome the obstacles in progressing over the next set of readiness level risks.
Innovate ways to match appropriate finance mechanisms to the “story” of the readiness levels of a given
51
company or project. Develop new, or better aligning, financing mechanisms that match the timing and
budget for appropriate phases of development. Diversify supply chain/ensure resiliency: break up
monopolies and prevent them (launch example given, early stage).
LONG-TERM PAYOFF
Funding Mechanisms: Mirroring other critical infrastructure industries, the government should
establish funding mechanisms that support the maturation and resilience of space technology.
Diversifying supply chains is also crucial to ensure the resilience of the U.S. Space Economy.
Finally, the development of a coordinated, interagency space policy and regulatory approach is necessary
to support a unified "Moon to Mars"-like program and establish a cohesive "North Star Vision" for
space.
52
NEXT GENERATION POWER & PROPULSION
Working Group Co-Lead: Peter Garretson, AFPC
Working Group Co-Lead: James Winter, AFRL
BACKGROUND
Space-based energy and power remain among the most important underpinnings of comprehensive
spacepower, and a key area of great power competition. This year witnessed substantial new interest in
advanced power and propulsion systems.
CURRENT STATE
Space Operational Energy is a Focus Area. There is now official interest in Space Operational
Energy. In 2010, the Department of Defense (DoD) established its Operational Energy Office to
explore energy research and development for non-static applications.. The 2023 DoD Operational
Energy Strategy states, “Successful military capabilities are underwritten by assured access to sufficient
and secure supplies of energy”153 and the Operational Energy Capability Improvement Fund (OECIF)
has buoyed innovation in space energy. Space Force doctrine publication 4.0 Logistics states, “Actions
should be taken to order, receive, store, and issue all materiel needed for servicing and maintaining
energy, power, resources, and capabilities, both in garrison and deployed, to supply the mission, forces,
and infrastructure.”154 While the need is understood, there is a lack of institutional support elements to
make meaningful progress. Since 2024, the Space Force has had its own operational energy office, but a
Space Operational Energy Strategy is needed to guide future investments. The Department of the Air
Force also has its own Operational Energy Strategy, and at present, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Operational Energy (SAF/IEN) has an open PME topic for “Operational Energy in
Space.”155
Increasing Global and Allied Interest In SBSP - Since 2022 the world has seen a significant increase
in international interest in Space-Based Solar Power (SBSP). ESA released both a plan and tender,156
153
DoD (2023). Department of Defense Operational Energy Strategy.
154
USSF (2022). Space Doctrine Publication 4-0, Sustainment.
155
Air University (2025). Operational Energy in Space.
156
ESA (2023). SOLARIS activity plan 2023-2025.; ESA (2023). Pre-phase a System Study of a Commercial-scale Space-based
Solar Power System (SBSP) for Terrestrial Needs. DevelopmentAid.org; ESA (2023). Pre-Phase A System Study Of A
Commercial-Scale Space-Based Solar Power System (SBSP) For Terrestrial Needs. ESA.
53
Japan planned a demo for 2025,157 and the UK Space Energy Initiative is being supported by Saudi
Arabia.158 South Korea showcased its own design and RF power beaming. South Korea unveiled its
own 2GW design,159 and Korea’s KERI is the longest distance.160 ESA/UK jointly sponsored a Space
Conference on Energy from Space. 161 The UK’s Space Solar has partnered with Icelandic energy firm
Reykjavík Energy162 to advance their space-based solar power projects. ESA sponsored a visionary study
by AstroStrom163 of how to build solar power satellites at scale from a Lunar industrial base–providing
a powerful rationale for Lunar development.
China Space Solar Power - China announced plans to conduct power beaming demos on its space
station, in LEO and in GEO.164 The potential impact of these respective demos was examined in
wargames.165 China’s interest led a former NASA’s Deputy Associate Administrator and Deputy Chief
Technologist, David Steitz, to warn, “While America dithers, China is charging ahead, announcing
plans to build a prototype SBSP system by 2030 that would become the largest human-made object in
space. This isn’t just about energy — it’s about demonstrating space capabilities that could
revolutionize military operations and industrial development in orbit.”166
Domestic Progress on Space Solar Power - In some ways 2024 was a banner year for domestic space
solar power progress. Northrop Grumman delivered its SBSP payload for AFRL’s SSPIDR program.167
DARPA began its POWER program168, which profiles potential in-space applications.169 DARPA’s
LUNA-10 supported innovative power beaming work and research by Powerlight, Blue Origin,
Fibertek, and Redwire.170 CALTECH succeeded in the first space-to-ground transmission of power.171
After much anticipation, NASA delivered its updated SBSP study which ran a sensitivity analysis and
concluded that using a favorable combination of factors,172 a design similar to SPS-Alpha Mark-III
157
Gislam, S. (2023). Japan to demonstrate space solar power by 2025. Industry Europe.
158
UK Government (2023). Business Secretary in talks with Saudi Arabia to advance commercial collaboration in UK space
based solar. Gov.UK.
159
Wang, B. (2024) South Korea Plan for Space Based Solar for More Than All US Nuclear Power. NextBigFuture.
160
Pulse (2024). KARI successfully tests world’s longest-distance wireless power transfer.
161
ESA (2024). International Conference on Energy from Space 2024, 17-19 April 2024, London UK.
162
Stojkovski. B. (2024). 30 MW space solar plant designed to send electricity to Earth by 2030. Interesting Engineering.
163
Astrostrom / Greater Earth (2023). Greater Earth Energy Synergies ; Astrostrom (2023). Greater Earth Lunar Power Station
(GE⊕-LPS). ESA.
164
Jones, A. (2022). China to use space station to test space-based solar power. SpaceNews; Jones, A. (2022). China aims for
space-based solar power test in LEO in 2028, GEO in 2030. SpaceNews.
165
AFPC (2024). Reacting To Major Space Events At Or Below Geostationary Orbit; AFPC (2024). Reacting To Major Space
Events On The Moon And In Cislunar Space.
166
Steitz, D. (2024). America must win the race for space solar power — or buy it from China. SpaceNews.
167
David, L. (2023). Space Solar Power: Progress Reported in Air Force Demo Program. Leornarddavid.com.
168
DARPA (2022). POWER Aims to Create Revolutionary Power Distribution Network.
169
Savage, N. (2024). Optical power transmission lights up remote possibilities .SPIE.
170
DARPA (2024). LunA-10 LSIC Performer Binder. JHU. (p4,5, 39, 41, 82)
171
Caltech (2023). In a First, Caltech's Space Solar Power Demonstrator Wirelessly Transmits Power in Space.
172
These very reasonable assumptions “yields SBSP solutions that are cost competitive with terrestrial alternatives, with lower
GHG emissions: • lower launch cost: $50M per launch, or $500/kg; $425/kg with 15% block discount • electric propulsion
orbital transfer from LEO to GEO • extended hardware lifetimes: 15 years • cheaper servicer and debris removal vehicles:
$100M and $50M, respectively • efficient manufacturing at scale: learning curves of 85% and below” (p. ix)
54
could achieve an LCOE to 0.03 $/kWh “competitive with terrestrial alternatives” and GHG emissions
intensity of 3.78 gCO2eq./kWh, “values less than nuclear and wind-without-storage
technologies.”173,174 For the first time, DOE’s ARPA-E awarded its first grant on space solar power to
Virtus Solis.175 However, will all the progress, it is still disjointed, lacking a vision to orient along, and a
strategy to account for advancement..
Multiple US Space Solar & Power Beaming Start-ups Exist. In the US, multiple start-ups are
pursuing space solar power. Solaren176 and SST177 have been joined by Virtus Solis178–all are pursuing
RF power beaming. Virtus Solis is partnered with ThinkOrbital for an orbital demonstration for
2027.179 AetherFlux180 and Overview Energy181 are pursuing non-RF power beaming for Earth
applications. Powerlight, StarCatcher and Volta are looking for space-to-space optical power beaming.
Virtus Solis182 and Volta183 both conducted public power beaming tests. Space power beaming
companies are also raising capital, with Overview Energy raising $18+M.184, StarCatcher and Powerlight
with $12+M185186 , and Reflect Orbital began a seed round for $6.5M.187 Volta raised an undisclosed
amount in seed funding.188
ARACHNE is ready to fly! - The first major flight experiment of AFRL’s Space Solar Power
Incremental Demonstrations and Research Project (SSPIDR), and the culmination of years of work by
the AFRL and Northrop-Grumman teams, ARACHNE is nearly ready to fly.189 This will require
sufficient budget to enable it to perform its flight tests. Whether or not ARACHNE transitions to
exciting follow-on scaling such as SCORPION will depend both on Congressional resourcing and
USSF vision to POM for it.
173
NASA (2024). New Study Updates NASA on Space-Based Solar Power. (p. viii)
174
Virtus Solis provided its own response white paper concluding that ”SBSP can be an economically competitive contributor
to the world’s energy mix. The technical and safety viability of SBSP with low associated carbon emissions were established in
multiple prior studies…Applications for SBSP include grid-connected customers and point loads such as data centers, green
hydrogen generation, desalination, and other high-power customers” and suggested SSP could achieve an LCOE as low as
$25/MWh. Virtus Solis (2024). Persistent, global, scalable energy from space.
175
ARPA-E (2025). U.S. Department of Energy Announces $147 Million for Advancing Technologies to Strengthen U.S.
Energy Leadership, to Enhance Grid Reliability, and Accelerate Carbon Utilization.
176
Solaren (2024). Solaren Space Solar.
177
SST (2024). SST Space Solar Technologies: Baseload Space Solar Power.
178
Virtus Solis Technologies (2023). Persistent, global, scalable energy from space.
179
Werner, D. (2024). Orbital Composites and Virtus Solis announce space-based solar power demonstration. SpaceNews.
180
Alamalhodaei, A. (2024) Billionaire Robinhood co-founder launches Aetherflux, a space-based solar power startup. Tech
Crunch.
181
Overview Energy (2024). Overview Energy.
182
Virtus Solis Technologies (2023). Virtus Solis Beaming Day 2023 Drone Demonstration. Youtube.
183
Volta Space Technologies (2024). Volta Space First Outdoor Wireless Power Demonstration. Youtube.
184
Pitchbook (2024). Overview Energy.
185
Werner, D. Star Catcher banks $12.25 million for orbital energy grid. SpaceNews.
186
Trackn. (2024). PowerLight funding & investors.
187
Reflect Orbital (2024). Announcing Our $6.5m Seed Round.
188
Foust, J. (2024). Volta Space Technologies unveils plans for lunar power satellite network. SpaceNews.
189
David, L. (2023). Space Solar Power: Progress Reported in Air Force Demo Program. Leornarddavid.com.
55
AFRL JETSON - Hoping to encourage the USSF to develop competency in space nuclear electric
power, Congress added money to AFRL’s budget resulting in the AFRL’s Joint Emergent Technology
Supplying On-orbit Nuclear Power (JETSON) program, which awarded Intuitive Machines, Lockheed
Martin and Westinghouse Government Services to advance technologies for nuclear powered space
vehicles.190 Lockheed received $33.7 million for the high power track, Westinghouse received $17
million under the same track, Intuitive Machines was awarded $9.5 million for the low power track,
with all products due by December 29, 2025.191 In 2024, Intuitive Machines selected Cobalt-60 as its
heat source coupling it with a Stirling engine, the first time a non-plutonium heat source has been
selected for an RTG.192 Lockheed has stated its suite of nuclear capabilities (JETSON and DRACO)
could reach initial operating capability by 2030.193 Of note, these are the same three companies awarded
by NASA for Lunar Surface Power in 2022 for 40-kilowatt class fission power system194 (considered by
the community to be underpowered for most ISRU applications or to keep pace with PRC objectives).
DRACO - The NASA / DARPA’s Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar Operations (DRACO)
was originally expected to fly in 2026195 and selected Lockheed196 and began design and fabrication.197 It
slipped to 2027 but then appears to have been put on an indefinite hold for nuclear reactor test
requirements198 despite an environmental assessment Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).199
Megawatt Energy Requirements? The National Cislunar S&T Strategy states, “U.S. government
organizations will leverage collaborations with private entities to enable capabilities for large-scale ISRU
and advanced manufacturing at the Moon, consistent with the U.S. National Strategy for In-space
Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing. Use of Lunar materials should be included in the trade space
for Lunar surface elements and operations.”200 Several US companies have ambitions for large-scale
Lunar ISRU processing which may demand megawatt levels of power. These include Starpath,201 Ethos
190
Erwin, S. (2023). Air Force Research Lab awards design contracts for nuclear powered spacecraft. SpaceNews.
191
Hitchens, S. (2023). AFRL picks 3 contractors for JETSON effort to develop fission powered spacecraft. BreakingDefense.
192
Intuitive Machines (2024). Intuitive Machines Advances Radioisotope Power System for AFRL Space Vehicles Directorate;
Reim, G. (2024). Intuitive Machines Picks Ultra Safe’s Cobalt-60 Heat Source For Jetson. Aviation Week.
193
Easley, M. (2024). Lockheed Martin pitching nuclear propulsion portfolio for defense space mobility, logistics.
DefenseScoop.
194
NASA (2022). NASA Announces Artemis Concept Awards for Nuclear Power on Moon.
195
Wall, M. (2023). NASA, DARPA to launch nuclear rocket to orbit by early 2026. Space.com.
196
Hitchens, T. (2023). DARPA, NASA tap Lockheed Martin to design, build DRACO nuclear rocket for deep space
missions. Breaking Defense.
197
DARPA (2023). DARPA Kicks Off Design, Fabrication for DRACO Experimental NTR Vehicle.
198
Machi, V. (2025). Nuclear Reactor Test Requirements Put DRACO Launch Plans On Hold. Aviation Week.
199
NASA (2024). Finding Of No Significant Impact (FONSI) Environmental Assessment For The Demonstration Rocket For
Agile Cislunar Operations (DRACO) Mission.
200
White House (2022). National Cislunar Science & Technology Strategy.
201
Payload (2024). Mega Scale Prop Production, with Saurav Shroff (CEO of Starpath). Youtube; Starpath (2024). Mega Scale
Propellant Production in Space.
56
Space,202 and Cislune.203 As mentioned above, the ESA sponsored AstroStrom204 a project to build
Solar Power Satellites at scale from a Lunar industrial base would also require megawatt scale power.
Many large-scale ISRU projects would also require megawatt-level energy generation to move
commodities and products off the Lunar surface via Lunar electromagnetic catapults.
202
Space Settlement Progress (2024). Ethos Space has ambitious plans for the Moon and beyond; Kuhr, J. (2024). Lunar
Infrastructure Startup Ethos Emerges from Stealth. Payload Space; Ethos Space (2024). Critical Lunar Infrastructure: Space
development with lunar resources.
203
Berger, E. (2024). A Startup Will Try to Mine Helium-3 on the Moon. Wired; Cislune (2024). Cislune: Gateway to our
Lunar Future.
204
Astrostrom / Greater Earth (2023). Greater Earth Energy Synergies ; Astrostrom (2023). Greater Earth Lunar Power Station
(GE⊕-LPS).
57
Existing Space Industrial Base Fragmented with Opposing Philosophies - Legacy space
companies continue to build and market MEO/GEO while NewSpace is increasingly leaning toward
LEO for most, if not all services. Little overlap exists in funding leadership, which hinders overall
industry growth.
Lab work such as SSPIDR or DRACO may not transition - Although well funded, many
programs go defunct with changing administrations and their priorities, as well as a rapidly changing
commercial landscape.
A failure of requirements and vision. The primary risk to U.S. competitiveness in advanced space
power and propulsion is the lack of stated ambition and requirements from NASA, USSF, and
USSPACECOM to provide ‘tech pull’ and market demand. There is sufficient interest in industry and
academia and the national lab structure–and even Congress has proven repeatedly willing to add
budget for advanced power and propulsion–but no national level operational users (NASA, USSF,
USSPACECOM) have authored sufficiently ambitious requirements documents and time-bound goals
to keep apace with our pacing competitor. This is a failure of imagination, vision and leadership.
INFLECTION POINTS
The next five years hold great potential for advancements in power and propulsion technologies. Key
missions such as Artemis, broader Moon to Mars, as well as greater on-orbit maneuvering needs will
spur investment into advanced power and propulsion and associated companies. However, industry
success still depends on successful government-to-industry communication, demo-mission successes,
and engagement with international partners.
Key Milestones with New Launch Systems - Starship and/or New Glenn reaching orbit, Vulcan
reaching a higher operational cadence, as well as a number of small launch companies (kinetic or
traditional) reaching orbit and/or showing significant development will enable more ambitious power
and in-space propulsion..
Long-Term Vision - A crisp ‘North Star Vision’ for the overall U.S. space effort (e.g., eventual
settlement of the solar system) would build upon progress made during the past year at the national
level.
Successful In-Space Demos of Nuclear Systems - Any commercial in-space demo of a fission or
fusion reactor would serve to validate safety, regulatory, environmental, and technological concerns of
such a novel activity.
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Establish Immediate Material Sources for Embargoed Materials - I.e. Germanium, a key
component in space solar cells, nuclear fuels, and other materials with fragile supply chains. The US
must identify the most critical to its future ambitions and secure alternate sources of these materials.
Create Vetted Presentation of Tech Needs for Power & Propulsion for Industry - The USSF
should publish a requirements document with specifics regarding deltaV, total impulse, power, or other
requirements that are currently vague or not defined at all.
Fly ARACHNE, DRACO and JETSON and POM for Operational Capabilities - Congress has
generously funded these programs, and the DoD should take them to flight demo and provide a path
for transition to funded operational capabilities.
MID-TERM PAYOFF
Publish a Process Guide to Navigate Technology Development and SIB - Government support
such as SSC, AFRL, DIU, and others have opaque contracting and acquisition processes that require
(often external) specialized talent to assist prospective companies. The industry is in need of an “idiot’s
guide” to working with these agencies.
DoD to Publish Clear Goals for Power and Propulsion Needs - The DoD should publish a “book
of needs” with more specificity regarding on-orbit power and propulsion needs. The space industry
lacks clear, defined demand signals from any agency which hinders new technology development and
adoption. USSF should brief its “book of needs” tech needs for power and propulsion at SSIB.
Change Submission Forms to Web-Based Forms - While other agencies and entire industries have
modernized contracting processes, space acquisition lags behind. Agencies requiring space capabilities
should make efforts to streamline their processes, potentially utilizing AI for compliance checks, data
input, and feedback.
Establish a Space-Industry Equivalent to the CHIPS Act - The Space Industrial Base is struggling
with meaningful funding of new technologies, a congressional bill to support technology development
would remedy this with other meaningful benefits such as workforce development.
LONG-TERM PAYOFF
Establish a vision for space energy dominance - The DoD should take leadership to create a vision
for space energy dominance as part of its operational energy initiative.
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COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH
Co-Innovation Session Lead: Dale Ketcham, Space Florida
“I want resiliency in the different types of launch vehicles that we have, so, if you have a fleet
running anomaly, you have other launch vehicles that you can look to other families and
launch vehicles. I want resiliency across companies so, God forbid, if a company has a strike or
a serious financial issue that would prevent them from continuing operations, I have other
options. Resiliency across supply chains, because if something happens in another sector, we
want to make sure that they continue to launch … I see our ability to deter based on the launch
capacity we have, our readiness, our resiliency, because ultimately, we have a deterrent effect
when the adversary knows that.”
- BRIG. GEN. KRISTIN L. PANZENHAGEN, BREAKING DEFENSE, 28 Jan
2025.205
BACKGROUND
Although the US continues to lead with innovation, the global competition remains capable of creating
destabilizing advantages if we don’t stay hungry.
CURRENT STATE
The United States has historically maintained a leading position in space innovation. However, the
escalating global competition necessitates a proactive and adaptive strategy to preserve this leadership
and prevent the emergence of destabilizing advantages by other nations. The current state of the
commercial space sector reflects a period of adjustment, with private capital markets experiencing a
decline in enthusiasm, mirroring broader trends in spatial markets. This shift necessitates a critical
reassessment of investment strategies and market dynamics to ensure continued growth and innovation.
Several key issues and challenges are impacting the sector's trajectory. Firstly, significant infrastructure
deficiencies are hindering expansion. The required increase in launch capabilities, particularly at sites
like Cape Canaveral, demands substantial public infrastructure investment beyond traditional real
estate development. This includes upgrades to roads, bridges, power systems, wastewater management,
LNG pipelines, and maritime facilities. Specifically, the necessity to increase launch cadence from 1000
to 5000 tons to orbit per year requires a massive public infrastructure project. Additionally, unmet
private infrastructure needs, particularly in payload processing, remain a bottleneck. Secondly, the
market dominance of companies like SpaceX poses potential destabilization risks to the broader
commercial space market. Lastly, the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) regulatory framework
205
Daehnick, C. et al. (2013). Space launch: Are we heading for oversupply or a shortfall?. McKinsey & Co.
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has proven ill-suited for the rapid innovation and "fail-fast, break-things" approach essential for
maintaining US space leadership.
Furthermore, the emergence of heavy-lift launch vehicles, such as Starship, Vulcan, and New Glenn,
and their associated price points, presents a key inflection point that may significantly disrupt the
existing marketplace. In response to these challenges, several strategic actions and recommendations are
proposed. In the short term, aggressive deregulation and new governance models within the federal
government is crucial to playing to the strengths of the American marketplace. Federal policies should
prioritize leveraging the commercial space market as a National Security Space (NatSecSpace) asset.
Ongoing evaluations of other US and overseas launch sites are also necessary to diversify launch and
landing capabilities, enhancing NatSecSpace resilience. In the medium term, federal policies should
focus on ensuring the vibrancy of the commercial space marketplace, enabling a reduction in federal
oversight and liability. Finally, in the long term, the establishment of revenue-generating mechanisms,
such as fees and taxes, within the commercial space industry is recommended to supplement or replace
ongoing federal investment in shared space infrastructure, mirroring existing terrestrial industry models.
The enthusiasm of the private capital markets has waned for commercial space as a reflection of the
broader spatial markets. But for the long term, the concept of space infrastructure as part of a broader
investment portfolio of the capital markets continues to establish itself for the future.
The SpaceX domination is destabilizing – The marketplace at present reflects the reality of the
success of SpaceX as the disrupter. But history repeats itself with competitive pressures from
commercial and government customers likely bending the marketplace to a more level playing field.
The challenge is daunting and the question is when. With new vehicles coming online now it may be
soon.
FAA remains a chokepoint – Federal regulatory structures are woefully inadequate to the essential
‘fail-fast and break things’ approach which is so successful in assuring US leadership in space.
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KEY ACTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
SHORT-TERM PAYOFF
Aggressively pursue deregulatory regimes and governance models within the broader deregulatory
efforts across the Federal government.
Leverage the private capital markets to provide funding for infrastructure at existing launch sites.
Federal policies to support continued development of the commercial space market as a
NatSecSpace priority as that marketplace continues to mature.
Continue to evaluate other US and overseas launch sites to provide diversity of launch and landing
sites for NatSecSpace resiliency.
MID-TERM PAYOFF
Federal policies geared toward assuring the self-sustainment of the commercial space marketplace,
enabling gradual Federal disengagement
LONG-TERM PAYOFF
Establish revenue generating fees, taxes, etc. from the industry to supplement or replace ongoing
federal investment in common infrastructure in space similar to existing terrestrial industries.
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SPACE SENSING
Working Group Co-Lead: Jaime Stern, AFRL
Working Group Co-Lead: Katie Corcoran, DIU
Working Group Co-Lead: James Frith, AFRL
“The Space Force will add over 100 satellites just in 2025. That is to add resilient
capabilities for our winning capabilities, missile warning and missile track, secure
communications for the force, and, of course, reconnaissance and sensing that allows us
to close long-range fires on a scale that no other country can really do…Gaining cyber
and space superiority over your adversaries is an early objective in ground campaigns,
and I think that will play out as we move forward later into the 21st century with
additional conflict.”
-- MAJ. GEN. GREGORY GAGNON, deputy chief of space operations for
intelligence, Air and Space Forces Magazine 22 Mar 2025
BACKGROUND
Figure 15. Weather Satellite Map APK (Source: Weather Satellite Map206)
206
Weather Satellite Map (2024). Weather Satellite Map APK.
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The need for space sensing continues to grow in both military and civilian applications. As space traffic
and threats in space continue to grow, so does the need for both government-owned and
commercial-owned sensing and processing capabilities to serve the Space Traffic Coordination and
Space Situational Awareness missions. Similarly, earth-imaging capabilities have had profound impacts
on everyday life through such as via apps on mobile devices that provide satellite map overlays, weather
and tracking data, as well as for military and intelligence purposes. A thriving private sector is a
prerequisite to the continued capabilities in both these realms. The industry base and commercial
sector in both earth-imaging and non-earth-imaging space sensing have faced similar forward leaps and
setbacks in the last year, and workshop participants were eager to discuss the good and the bad. Several
concrete recommendations were put forward to mitigate the troubling trends and capitalize on the
opportunities at hand.
The More Things Change, The More They Stay The Same – Participants and track leads observed
that many of the challenges and concerns from previous years are echoed in discussions at this year’s
meeting. This suggests that while there have been bold movements and conspicuous intent from the
government in releasing strategy documents such as the National Cislunar S&T Strategy, the DoD and
USSF Commercial Integration Strategies, there has yet to be the tactical follow-up implementation that
turns these strategies into revenue- generating activities.
Hello Out There – A common theme throughout workshop discussion is the need for changing the
communication pipeline between government and commercial partners. While government strategy
documents are published, commercial partners still lack guidance in requirements. Conversely,
commercial partners are developing technology, but are unsure if their Research and Development
paths fit into the government acquisition strategy priorities.
CURRENT STATE
The government is beginning to open up space in actionable ways to the industrial base and commercial
providers. The establishment of marketplaces and accelerator programs continues to encourage
commercial involvement and investment, while broader strategic moves are setting the tone for
continued integration of non-traditional entities. However, these positive movements are offset by a
troubling trend in which companies of all sizes are reducing their workforce. With fewer talent
resources, commercial partners have to tread lightly in where they focus their energies.
Strategic Movements for Integrating Commercial Capabilities – The release of the DoD and
USSF Commercial Space Strategies suggest intent to truly integrate commercial sensing capabilities for
both earth imaging and non-earth imaging. While these are being implemented, flexible contracting
strategies such as Other Transaction Authorities, exemplified in Victus Haze, have successfully brought
non-traditional entrants into the space enterprise.
Data Sharing Venues – More concrete steps impacting the industry and commercial were also taken
this year, largely around the increased sharing of data and availability of non-traditional data into
government processes. These include the Commercial Space Marketplace for Innovation, the opening
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of the Space Domain Awareness Tools, Applications, & Processing (TAP) Lab, and the successful
use of public datasets in making the world aware of adversary activities. Another success story
exemplified was the COMSO Industry Day wherein distinctions were communicated for what
government tech will be done in-house, shared with commercial partners, or directed to be commercial
only. Additionally, the loosening restrictions on Tier 3 remote sensing licensing has been an additional
boon to the space sensing enterprise.
Workforce recruitment and industry layoffs – Talent acquisition and retention in the space
industrial base proves to be a significant challenge. SSIB conference attendees stated “Space may not be
a romantic field anymore.” Industrial partners are seeing recent graduates looking towards other
industries that have more attractive cultures and/or better compensation. Similarly, the industrial base
is seeing far more layoffs within the space industry. Workforce recruitment and retention challenges
lead to lack of innovation and commercial partners who communicate in echo chambers. One
identified cause of industrial layoffs is the uncertainty of “soft funds” from government partners
year-to-year.
Lack of feedback from government partners – Industrial partners express the difficulties in
developing relevant space sensing technologies due to the lack of communication and feedback with
government partners. One such example is the lack of beneficial feedback in Small Business Innovation
Research/Small Business Technology Transfer (SBIR/STTR) proposal submissions. Specifically in the
case of a proposal that has been rated “selected” and not “funded,” small businesses do not receive any
comments. The lack of feedback especially impacts small businesses, as they have limited monetary and
labor resources. Such businesses prioritize these resources based on the government communicated
tech needs, and without feedback, commercial partners misappropriate their resources while
government partners do not receive solutions which satisfy the Warfighters’ needs.
Lack of government communicated needs for Cislunar operations - Cislunar operations and
technology development is a popular topic at Space Situational Awareness conferences and meetings.
However, industrial partners cite the lack of communication from the government on technology
needs, current ongoing research and development, data production, and Cislunar architecture
requirements. The Cislunar regime is a significantly more difficult space to operate in, and technology
development needs defined requirements to overcome the difficulties. Balancing budgets, responding
to RFIs, and maintaining a workforce becomes difficult if there is a lack of demand signal. Industrial
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partners cite the current National Cislunar Strategy207 as a starting point, but the lack of clear
communication between government and industrial partners prevents any real industry investment. A
further-developed, DoD-specific with Cislunar technology and operation requirements would benefit
industrial partners.
Figure 16. National Cislunar S&T Strategy & Implementation Plan (Source: White House208)
● The proliferation of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) may encourage commercial activities in slightly
different regimes. As LEO becomes increasingly populated with mega-constellations, the
traffic and coordination within LEO is becoming more difficult to navigate. This may lead
future commercial and government investments into higher LEO orbits, posing new sets of
engineering and operations challenges.
207
White House (2022). National Cislunar Science & Technology Strategy; White House (2024). National Cislunar Science &
Technology Action Plan.
208
White House (2022). National Cislunar Science & Technology Strategy; White House (2024). National Cislunar Science &
Technology Action Plan.
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● Due to rising widespread global tension, the need for geospatial products is expected to rise.
With regional conflicts and tensions building across the globe, the need for geospatially driven
situational awareness also grows. The commercial sourcing of Earth-imaging has recently
provided both the Government and the public with an unprecedented amount of up- to-date
information that drives public opinion and Government decision making.
● New technologies in inter-satellite links may provide a future with lower latency in
communications and control. The latency present in any satellite constellation due to
bandwidth of RF communications has been a consistent design limitation since space
communication’s inception. With the rapid advent of optical communications, new satellite
constellations will likely enjoy greater bandwidth with lower latency arranged as networks as
opposed to static chains.
All agencies to improve the CRADA process and increase the USG workforce to offer more
program support, in general. Understaffing and turnover in program offices handicap commercial
programs, leading to delays in onboarding and poor program handoffs.
DoD to communicate a Cislunar strategy and define requirements for SSA-specific missions.209
The National Cislunar S&T Strategy outlines a government-wide approach to US and allied leadership
in Cislunar space. As part of the implementation of that strategy, the DoD needs to communicate to
industry its plans to develop Cislunar SSA capabilities to enable meaningful private sector investment in
technology and personnel.
CISA to designate space as a critical infrastructure sector. Space assets, systems, and networks are
vital to US national security and require formal strategic planning to ensure ongoing resilience.
DoD and DoC to adopt a north star vision to build out space domain awareness (SDA) and
space traffic coordination (STC) capabilities. These intertwined capabilities are critical to a
sustainable space economy, but an overarching strategy that communicates current and future needs
from the commercial sector and industry base is still lacking for both missions.
DICE to create a role or agency responsible for tracking and monitoring efforts of DoD, DoC,
DoS, NASA, commercial space, etc. including operational and technical standards.
209
Galbreath, C. (2024). Securing Cislunar Space and the First Island Off the Coast of Earth.
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Community awareness of efforts and core standards that may be agency or operator agnostic will
improve efficiency and minimize duplication of effort.
DoS and DoC to update, clarify, and eliminate no-longer relevant portions of ITAR and EAR.
Rules around space sensing remain unclear and require modernization to account for the diversity of
capabilities and operators represented in the commercial sector.
MID-TERM PAYOFF
Reassess classification levels of data, e.g., telemetry, IQ/sensor data. Improve communication
between government and industry about classification levels, e.g., accelerate the implementation of the
presidential reclassification directive.
All agencies to improve interagency communication regarding data, technical R&D efforts,
and available funding; and improve communication between government and industry, in
general. Agencies often don’t have current, or any, data pertaining to other agency budgets, including
unobligated and available funding.
Increase funding for the COMSO office to support Earth and non-Earth sensing capabilities,
while accounting for reasonable costs associated with industry development efforts. COMSO
has enabled communication lines which guide industry partners in their efforts to address government
needs.
Continue to expand data collection, fusion, and analysis architecture towards a resilient,
persistent network of cooperative capabilities.
LONG-TERM PAYOFF
SAF/IA to expand international collaborations - establish MOUs & better agreements between
allied/partnered nations to reduce barriers created by ITAR/EAR specific to imagery/space sensing.
Optimize acquisition strategies to include COTS components/systems to enable faster and cheaper
capabilities.
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INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE
Co-Innovation Session Lead: Namrata Goswami
Co-Innovation Session Co-Lead: Scott Maethner, NewSpace Nexus
BACKGROUND
Space activities are rapidly expanding, reflecting the growing ambitions of nations and private
organizations to explore and utilize space. What was once the domain of a few pioneering countries has
evolved into a truly international endeavor. As emerging space powers recognize the strategic,
economic, and scientific value of space, they are increasingly engaging in collaborative efforts to address
challenges and seize opportunities beyond Earth's atmosphere. Established space powers also recognize
the economic, scientific, strategic and security benefits of building and maintaining coalitions.
As space emerges as a critical domain for exploration, security, and economic growth, nations
worldwide are ramping up their investments and collaborations, fueling a surge in international space
activities that span satellite launches, Lunar missions, and ambitious space station projects, reflecting a
shared commitment to expanding humanity’s reach into space, exploiting space-derived services and
utilizing the domain for economic benefits. Alongside Apollo-like missions aimed at technological
demonstration, there is a growing focus on advancing ambitious goals such as establishing a permanent
human presence in space, mining celestial resources, and developing space-based solar power generation
and transmission. Many nations are adopting long-term strategic plans that prioritize space activities as
central to their economic and security agendas. The private sector is playing a transformative role,
driving down costs through innovations like reusable rockets and high-volume satellite deployments.
Space is also becoming more integral to both civil and military operations, with increased discourse
around the utilization of space resources and the development of ecosystems centered on affordable and
sustainable launch infrastructure. These shifts highlight the dynamic, competitive and collaborative
nature of the global space environment.
Today, eleven countries and one intergovernmental organization, the European Space Agency, maintain
the capability to launch objects into orbit using their own launch vehicles. This group includes major
space powers like the United States, Russia, and China, as well as emerging players like India, South
210
US Space Command (2024). Whiting underscores growing partnerships, capabilities required for competition, conflict at
Space Symposium 39.
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Korea, and New Zealand. Beyond launching capabilities, over 100 countries have placed satellites into
orbit, demonstrating the global reach of satellite technology. These satellites, launched either
independently or through international collaborations, support diverse functions, from
communications to Earth observation and scientific research. In terms of human spaceflight, citizens
from 48 countries have traveled to space, primarily through international partnerships. While only
three nations—the United States, Russia, and China—have independently launched humans into
orbit, collaboration through platforms like the International Space Station (ISS) has enabled astronauts
from 23 countries to live and work in space.
With over 7,500 active satellites currently orbiting Earth, the demand for space services continues to
rise. The increasing number of orbital launches exemplifies the acceleration of space activities. As of
December 30, 2024, the global space industry has achieved a record number of orbital launches,
surpassing previous years. In 2023, there were 223 orbital launches, setting a new all-time high at that
time. In 2024 there were 257, including the United States led with 154 launches, followed by China
with 67, and Russia with 17. This increase reflects the growing capabilities and ambitions of
space-faring nations, with private companies like SpaceX and Rocket Lab significantly contributing to
the surge in launch activities.
Figure 17. 2024 Orbital Launches by Country (Source: Gunter’s Space Page)211
211
Space Stats (2024). Orbital launches in 2024 | Space Stats
70
China's Grand Strategy in Space - China’s grand strategy in space revolves around securing access to
and utilizing space capabilities as a core element of its national development agenda. Viewing space as a
critical domain for extending its influence and presence, China has integrated its civil and military
efforts to maximize strategic and economic gains. Its ambitions include exploiting the economic
potential of the Earth-Moon zone, with projections of generating $10 trillion annually by 2050.
Additionally, China seeks to assert its power in shaping the rules of space commerce and influencing
international legal frameworks to define access and usage, positioning itself as a dominant player in the
global space economy.
China’s Key Space Drivers - China views its space program as an avenue for economic growth, job
creation, and the development of high-tech industries. It seeks to capitalize on the commercial aspects
of space exploration and foster a competitive space sector. China has expressed interest in the
exploration and utilization of extraterrestrial resources, particularly on the Moon. Helium-3, a
potential fuel for fusion reactors, and other valuable resources could be found on the Lunar surface.
China's space program aims to lay the groundwork for future resource extraction and establish space
infrastructure for long-term exploration and exploitation. China recognizes the important
contribution of space exploration for scientific discovery and technological innovation. China's space
program has significant military implications. Satellites play a crucial role in modern warfare, providing
capabilities such as communication, surveillance, reconnaissance, and navigation. China aims to
develop a robust space-based infrastructure to enhance its national security, protect its interests, and
potentially challenge the military dominance of other nations. China sees its space program as a symbol
of national prestige and a way to enhance its global standing. Achievements allow China to showcase its
technological capabilities and project itself as a major player on the world stage. And ignite the
imaginations of the Chinese population and foster a sense of unity and purpose.
China’s Key Space Objectives - China aims to expand the construction of the Tiangong space station
and conduct extended-duration missions, fostering scientific research, technological development, and
international cooperation. China has missions for establishing Lunar bases and enabling human
settlement on the Moon, conducting long-term scientific research, resource utilization, and expanding
human presence in Cislunar space. China plans to launch a Mars sample return mission, which would
involve collecting samples from the Martian surface and bringing them back to Earth for detailed
analysis. China aims to conduct close observation of a threatening asteroid and “implement an asteroid
impact” to change its orbit. Finally, China is planning for asteroid belt and Jupiter missions which
would include asteroid sample returns and exploration of the Jupiter system.
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Figure 18. China views space exploitation & utilization as key to its national power & prestige (Source: ChatGPT)
Russia Space Updates - Russia’s space program, led by the state corporation Roscosmos, remains
focused on maintaining its role as a leading spacefaring nation, despite facing challenges such as budget
constraints and international sanctions. Current goals include the continued operation and eventual
replacement of the Soyuz spacecraft and the development of the Oryol spacecraft for crewed missions.
Russia is also advancing plans for a new orbital station, known as the Russian Orbital Station (ROS), to
replace its participation in the International Space Station (ISS) program. Additionally, the program
prioritizes Lunar exploration, including the Luna-25 mission and broader ambitions for a Lunar base.
Russia is also pursuing advancements in satellite technology for communication, Earth observation,
and navigation, with a focus on military and commercial applications. Amid growing global
competition, Roscosmos aims to modernize its launch infrastructure, increase partnerships with
emerging space nations, and sustain its influence in the evolving international space landscape.
India Space Updates - India’s space program, led by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO),
is advancing ambitious goals to establish the country as a major player in the global space industry.
These objectives include expanding its satellite capabilities for communication, navigation, and Earth
observation to support domestic development and strategic needs. ISRO is also focused on deep space
exploration, with missions like Chandrayaan for Lunar exploration and Gaganyaan, India’s first crewed
mission to space. Beyond exploration, India aims to foster a thriving commercial space ecosystem by
encouraging private sector participation under its NewSpace India Limited (NSIL) initiative.
Additionally, India is investing in technologies for reusable launch systems and space-based solar power,
while also strengthening its international partnerships to collaborate on scientific research and space
72
applications. These efforts align with India’s vision to enhance its space capabilities for economic
growth, technological innovation, and national security.
India’s International Partnerships - India made a clear signal of its strategic intent when it joined the
U.S.-initiated Artemis Accords. The U.S. and India agreed to establish a working group for commercial
space collaboration, develop a strategic framework for human spaceflight and advance planetary
defense. India has advanced the idea of a BRICS satellite constellation and a BRICS space exploration
consortium ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms
race in outer space (PAROS) and of its weaponization, including through negotiations to adopt a
relevant legally binding multilateral instrument. India has advocated for a universally acceptable and
multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument on PAROS introducing a number of subjective
elements, including responsible and irresponsible behavior, characterization and interpretation of
behavior as well as perception of threats. India views commercial space as a major part of its diplomatic
space outreach. The country had over 150 startups in the Space sector as of 2023.
India’s Space Vision 2047 - India's Space Vision 2047 outlines an ambitious plan to position the
nation as a global space leader by its centennial year of independence. Key milestones include
establishing the Bharatiya Antariksha Station (BAS) by 2035, achieving a human Lunar mission by
2040, and advancing technologies like heavy-lift launch vehicles, human-rated spacecraft, docking
systems, and high-capacity landers. The vision emphasizes expanding satellite-based services to deliver
secure, high-speed broadband across India, supporting governance, education, and enterprise sectors.
Additionally, India aims to grow its share in the global space economy by focusing on cost-effective
small satellite production and space data services, leveraging its expertise in software and data analytics.
This comprehensive strategy highlights India’s commitment to innovation, sustainability, and
collaboration in the global space arena.
212
PTI (202). Gaganyaan: Space suits for India’s first manned space mission astronauts under production in Russia. Financial
Express.
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Europe Space Updates - Europe’s space program, coordinated by the European Space Agency (ESA)
and supported by national space agencies such as CNES (France) and DLR (Germany), focuses on
fostering collaboration among member states to drive innovation, sustainability, and competitiveness in
space. Current goals include advancing the Copernicus Earth observation program and the Galileo
satellite navigation system to enhance Europe’s autonomy in critical space infrastructure. ESA is also
committed to Lunar exploration, including contributions to the Lunar Gateway and Artemis
programs, as well as developing technologies for future Lunar and Martian missions. Europe is
investing in next-generation launch systems like Ariane 6 and Vega-C to ensure independent access to
space while reducing costs. Additionally, ESA emphasizes green technologies, such as space debris
mitigation and reusable systems, and promotes the growth of its space economy by supporting
private-sector initiatives and fostering entrepreneurship. Europe’s space ambitions underscore its
commitment to strengthening its position as a key player in the global space ecosystem.
CURRENT STATE
The landscape of international space activities has entered a dynamic era of collaboration and
competition, with nations pushing the boundaries of exploration and innovation. China and India
have emerged as major players, with China advancing its ambitious space station, Lunar exploration,
and satellite constellation projects, while India achieved landmark successes, such as the Chandrayaan-3
Lunar mission. At the same time, global partnerships are strengthening under initiatives like NASA's
Artemis Accords, which unite nations in Lunar exploration and sustainable space development, and the
International Lunar Research Station Cooperation Organization (ILRSCO), led by China and Russia,
fostering multilateral collaboration on Lunar research. These developments highlight a growing
emphasis on shared goals and rivalries in the pursuit of space as the next frontier.
China: Reorganization of its PLA Space Forces – In April 2024, China reorganized its People's
Liberation Army (PLA) space forces by dissolving the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and establishing
four specialized entities: the Aerospace Force (ASF), Cyberspace Force (CSF), Information Support
Force (ISF) and the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF). The ASF now oversees space missions,
including satellite management and space-based command, control, communications, and intelligence
systems. The CSF focuses on cyber operations, network security, and cyber warfare, while the ISF
manages electronic warfare and information-centric operations. This restructuring reflects China's
strategic emphasis on enhancing operational efficiency and bolstering its capabilities in space and cyber
domains to address the demands of modern warfare.
China: Long March 9 Rocket Concept – In 2024, China made significant advancements in the
development of its Long March 9 rocket, a super-heavy launch vehicle designed to enhance the nation's
space exploration capabilities. Notably, China unveiled an updated concept for the Long March 9,
featuring a fully reusable design reminiscent of SpaceX's Starship. This new configuration aims to
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support China's Lunar exploration and deep-space missions, reflecting a strategic shift towards
reusability to increase cost-effectiveness and operational efficiency.213
China: Key Space Objectives - Expansion of the space station and long-duration missions: China
aims to expand the construction of the Tiangong space station and conduct extended-duration
missions, fostering scientific research, technological development, and international cooperation. Lunar
bases and human settlement goals: China has missions for establishing Lunar bases and enabling human
settlement on the Moon, conducting long-term scientific research, resource utilization, and expanding
human presence in Cis Lunar space. Mars sample return mission: China plans to launch a Mars sample
return mission, which would involve collecting samples from the Martian surface and bringing them
back to Earth for detailed analysis. Planetary Defense: China aims to conduct close observation of a
threatening asteroid and “implement an asteroid impact” to change its orbit. Asteroid Belt and Jupiter
Missions: These would include asteroid sample returns and exploration of the Jupiter system
India: New Space Policy – India's new space policy focuses on developing a thriving commercial
space ecosystem by fostering private-sector participation and innovation. The Department of Space,
under the Prime Minister’s Office, serves as the central policymaking and implementation body,
overseeing directives and the distribution of responsibilities. The Indian Space Research Organization
(ISRO) will concentrate on research and development of advanced space technologies and applications,
while New Space India Ltd (NSIL) is responsible for commercializing technologies developed through
public expenditure and providing manufacturing and service support for space systems. Meanwhile,
the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Center (IN-SPACe) will act as a
single-window authorization center to facilitate activities by both public and private sectors, ensuring
streamlined and efficient collaboration within India's growing space industry.
India: Air and Space Forces – The Indian Air Force (IAF) has submitted a proposal to rename the
IAF as the “Indian Air and Space Forces”(IASF) in a shift in strategic thinking on Space security. The
213
Jones, A. (2024). China unveils fully reusable Starship-like rocket concept. SpaceNews.
214
Jones, A. (2024). China launches second batch of 18 satellites for Thousand Sails megaconstellation. SpaceNews.
215
Wall, M. (2024). China launches 1st set of spacecraft for planned 13,000-satellite broadband constellation. Space.com.
216
Xinhua (2025). Chinese commercial satellite constellation completes network connection test. China Daily.
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IAF aims to develop space-based precision, navigation, timing (PNT) and intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance (ISR). The IAF will include civilian space stakeholders to develop capacities for space
traffic management, space situational awareness, and space weather prediction. The IAF Air Force
Doctrine identifies space as vital for both tactics and strategy including ISR, PNT, military
communication, nuclear command and control, missile tracking, electronic warfare, battle management
and training and strategic guidance informed by deterrence, compellence, offense and defense.
India: Defense Space Agencies – In 2019, India set up the Defense Space Agency (India’s version of a
space force). The Defense Space Agency will develop a strategy to integrate space assets from the army,
navy, and air force. The Defense Space Research Organization will develop space-warfare systems and
technologies for the Defense Space Agency. India’s ability to utilize space for both economic and
national security will boost the entire gamut of space technologies.
India: Private Sector Engagement – Launched in October 2022, Mission DefSpace engages private
sector space companies to apply for 75 defense space challenges for indigenous development, covering
the entire range of products and services in the space industry including Launch System, Satellite
System, Communication & Payload System, Ground System, and Software System. India’s Chief of
Defense Staff (CDS) has called for developing dual-use platforms with special focus towards
incorporating cutting-edge technology, expanding NAVIC constellation, providing agile space-based
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and ensuring secure satellite-assisted
communications.
India: Space Capabilities and Missions - ISRO is developing key technologies for a fully reusable
launch vehicle aimed at reducing the cost of space access. The Space Docking Experiment (SPADEX) is
a twin spacecraft mission designed to advance technologies related to orbital rendezvous, docking,
formation flying, and other proximity operations, with applications in human spaceflight, in-space
satellite servicing, and beyond. The Chandrayaan-4 mission will be India’s Lunar sample return
project, incorporating multiple launch vehicles, including the Transfer, Lander, Ascender, and Reentry
modules. The NASA-ISRO SAR (NISAR) mission will provide detailed measurements of Earth's
ecosystems, dynamic surfaces, and ice masses, offering insights into biomass, natural hazards, sea level
rise, and groundwater, among other applications. ISRO is also progressing with plans to deploy the
first module of its space station, aiming for completion around 2040. The Gaganyaan human
spaceflight program will demonstrate the ability to launch a crew of three on a 400 km orbit for a
three-day mission, with a safe return to Earth via a sea landing. India’s Mars Orbiter Mission (MOM)
serves as a technology demonstrator for interplanetary missions and the scientific exploration of Mars.
The Lunar Polar Exploration Mission (LUPEX), a collaboration between ISRO and JAXA, will send a
rover and lander to explore the Moon's south pole. ISRO’s Shukrayaan-1 Venus orbiter will study the
surface and atmosphere of Venus. Mars Orbiter Mission 2 will feature a rover, sky crane, helicopter,
and communications satellite to study the Martian atmosphere, including experiments like Mars Orbit
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Dust Experiment (MODEX) and others. The Martian Boundary Layer Explorer (Marble) will conduct
aerial exploration of up to 100 meters above the surface.
France and Japan Strengthen Partnerships with the U.S. - In 2024, France and Japan took
significant steps to strengthen their space partnerships with the United States. France reaffirmed its
commitment to space cooperation through the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Initiative, which
focuses on coordinating national security space activities217, and through the U.S.-France
Comprehensive Dialogue on Space, where the two countries discussed opportunities for collaboration
in space exploration, satellite technology, and space situational awareness.218 Japan, similarly, advanced
its space ties with the U.S. by engaging in the U.S.-Japan Comprehensive Dialogue on Space, which
focused on commercial space collaboration, spaceflight safety, and space sustainability.219 Both nations
also participated in CSpO, underlining their shared commitment to responsible space operations.
These efforts highlight the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral partnerships between the U.S.,
France, and Japan, with a focus on space security, exploration, and commercial opportunities.
Artemis Accords – 52 counties have signed the Artemis Accords, a set of non-binding principles
based on the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the 1979 Moon Agreement that guide civil space
exploration and use. Led by the U.S. Department of State and NASA, the goals of the accords include
avoiding conflict in outer space, increasing the predictability, transparency, safety, and sustainability of
human space exploration, and ensuring space exploration benefits all countries and all humankind.
Signatories include 26 counties from Europe, 9 from Asia, 7 from South America, 3 from Africa and 2
from Oceania.
217
DoD (2024). Joint Statement From the Combined Space Operations Initiative.
218
DoS (2024). Joint Statement of the Second Meeting of the U.S.-France Comprehensive Dialogue on Space.
219
Office of Space Commerce (2024). U.S., Japan Hold Ninth Comprehensive Dialogue on Space.
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Figure 20. Counties that have signed the Artemis Accords (Source: Space.com)220
220
Lea, R. (2025). Artemis Accords: What are they & which countries are involved?. Space.com.
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Artemis ILRSCO
Leadership led by the U.S. with a broader led by China and Russia
international coalition
International Artemis promotes a more inclusive, open more centered on cooperation between
Collaboration approach to global cooperation China, Russia, and select nations
Geopolitical aligned with U.S. leadership and NATO counter to Western-led initiatives,
Focus allies particularly in space exploration
Figure 21. Counties that have signed the Artemis Accords and ILRSCO (Source: XXX)221
221
Ghouri, F. (2024). Picking sides in space: China’s ILRS Moon base or the US Artemis Accords?. Seradata.
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further complexity. Additionally, cultural and institutional differences between countries can affect
decision-making and project execution. Overcoming these challenges requires building trust, aligning
priorities, and creating standardized agreements to ensure successful and sustainable international
partnerships in space
Geopolitical Tensions: Space activities are often influenced by geopolitical dynamics, with
competition between space-faring nations and regions. Tensions, such as those between the U.S. and
China or Russia, can impact collaborative projects and lead to mistrust or reluctance to share
technologies and data.
Diverging National Priorities: Different countries have varying space objectives, ranging from
scientific research and exploration to commercial opportunities and national security interests.
Aligning these priorities for successful partnerships can be challenging.
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks: The space environment is governed by international treaties,
such as the Outer Space Treaty (1967), but enforcement of these laws can be unclear or inconsistent.
Disagreements about resource utilization, space debris management, or military uses of space add
complexity to partnerships. ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulation) export control laws
makes it challenging for countries to partner with the U.S. for space-related projects.
Funding and Resource Allocation: Space missions require significant financial investments, and
countries involved in international partnerships often face budgetary constraints. Disparities in
funding capabilities can affect the implementation of shared projects, leading to unequal contributions
or delays.
Technological and Standards Gaps: Countries and organizations may have different technological
capabilities, making interoperability of spacecraft, satellites, and other systems a key challenge.
Standardizing technologies and data formats is critical for seamless collaboration.
Space Debris: The increasing accumulation of space debris poses risks to satellites and space
exploration missions, and countries often have different approaches to addressing debris management.
Cooperation is needed to develop sustainable policies for debris mitigation.
Access to Space: Not all countries have equal access to space infrastructure, such as launch vehicles and
ground stations. Ensuring equitable access and sharing of resources is vital for international
collaboration.
Security Concerns: As space becomes more integrated into national security infrastructure, concerns
about the protection of sensitive technologies, cyber-attacks, and the militarization of space can strain
partnerships.
Ethical and Environmental Issues: The extraction of resources from celestial bodies, like mining
asteroids, raises ethical questions about ownership, environmental impact, and the long-term
sustainability of space activities. Collaborations must address these concerns to avoid conflicts.
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Cultural and Institutional Differences: Collaboration across nations involves navigating diverse
cultural and organizational structures. Differing attitudes toward risk, decision-making, and project
management can complicate effective cooperation.
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partnerships, redefining the role of government agencies as regulators or collaborators rather
than leaders in space exploration.
● Broadening participation from emerging space nations: Emerging nations (e.g., UAE,
India, South Korea) play key roles in international missions or develop independent
capabilities. Space activities could become more globally distributed, leading to more diverse
international partnerships and increasing the need for an equitable framework for technology
sharing and governance.
● Technological advancements in space-based energy: Space-based solar power becomes
viable as a large-scale energy solution for Earth. Policies could shift to prioritize investment in
orbital solar arrays, and nations may develop partnerships or compete for access to key orbital
slots and technology.
● Updates to international space governance: Revisions or replacements to the Outer Space
Treaty (1967) and related agreements to address new challenges like resource extraction,
human settlement, and private sector activities. This could unify or fracture global space
governance, depending on how inclusive and balanced the new frameworks are between
spacefaring and non-spacefaring nations.
● Civilian space flight milestones: Commercial space tourism and private missions become
more accessible to the general public. National policies would need to address regulations for
safety, liability, and environmental impacts of commercial spaceflight, while international
partnerships could emerge to standardize global protocols.
“We know the gains of cooperation. We know the losses of the failure to cooperate. If we
fail now to apply the lessons we have learned, or even if we delay their application, we
know that the advances into space may only mean adding a new dimension to warfare.
If, however, we proceed along the orderly course of full cooperation we shall, by the very
fact of cooperation, make the most substantial contribution toward perfecting peace.”
- PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Special Message to the Senate on Transmitting the Treaty on Outer
Space, 7 Feb 1967222
SHORT-TERM PAYOFF
Strengthen Existing Alliances. Deepen collaboration with established partners like ESA, Japan
(JAXA), and Canada (CSA) on ongoing missions such as Lunar exploration and the International
222
UCSB (n.d.). Johnson, L.B. (1967). Special Message to the Senate on Transmitting the Treaty on Outer Space. The
American Presidency Project.
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Space Station. Focus on seeking mutual benefits and alignment of interests such as joint training
programs for astronauts and mission-critical systems integration to enhance operational efficiency.
Leverage Private Sector Expertise. Facilitate public-private partnerships that allow U.S. companies
to partner internationally. For example, enabling U.S. firms like SpaceX and Blue Origin to launch
satellites for allied nations fosters economic and diplomatic goodwill.
Advocate for U.S. Companies in International Markets. The U.S. Government should take steps
to advocate for U.S. space Companies in international markets including establishing trade partnerships
and bilateral agreements, leveraging diplomatic channels to open markets, create export incentives for
space technologies, promoting U.S. space capabilities through global advocacy, and investing in
infrastructure to support international collaboration. (OPRs: National Space Council)
MID-TERM PAYOFF
Pursue Joint Missions to the Moon and Mars. Co-lead missions under programs like Artemis to
ensure U.S. leadership while encouraging significant contributions from partners, both in funding and
technology. Integrate international partners into Lunar gateway development, enabling shared
infrastructure for future exploration.
Expand Collaborative Research. Develop joint research initiatives focused on Earth observation
(e.g., climate change monitoring) and advanced propulsion technologies. Share scientific data from
space missions, creating opportunities for global innovation and goodwill.
Increase Support for Emerging Space Nations. Provide technical and financial assistance to
developing countries with emerging space programs, creating new allies and expanding the U.S.’s
influence in the global space ecosystem.
Comprehensive Regulatory Review. A legislative review of regulations such as ITAR should focus
on making the regulations more adaptable to the fast-evolving global and technological landscape while
still ensuring national security. Legislative reform could help balance the need for control with the
realities of international cooperation, technological innovation, and economic growth. Consider using
NATO as a vehicle for streamlining processes.
LONG-TERM PAYOFF
Build a Permanent Multinational Space Presence. Establish international partnerships for a
long-term human presence on Mars or other celestial bodies, leveraging resources, expertise, and shared
goals for humanity’s expansion into the solar system.
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Lead in Space Governance. Take a leadership role in creating and enforcing new international treaties
for space resource utilization, planetary protection, and orbital debris management to maintain a
sustainable space environment.
Foster Global Space Economy Development. Promote policies and partnerships that enable
equitable access to space resources, ensuring economic opportunities for all nations and reinforcing the
U.S.'s position as a leader in a thriving global space economy.
Lack of Federal Government Space Development Roadmap – Praise is widely shared by industry
toward the Space Development Agency’s approach to rapidly building out their communications
constellation. However, this rapid acquisition and contracting strategy has not been adopted by any
other agencies, and a unified whole-of-government strategy detailing broadly what the future of space
entails for regulations and public-private partnerships.
Look to Far future Space Activities: Approaching the future of all in-space activities with a
forward-thinking mindset is a necessity to keep developing the industry as well as prepare for the
inevitable global expansion into the stars. Striking a balance of properly regulating nascent technologies
is difficult and will require input from all sectors (government, industry, academia).
Space-Based Solar Power Needs an Owner: Specifically mentioned numerous times was the
regulatory landscape (or lack thereof) behind proposed SBSP programs. Because no agency will take
ownership of the controversial technology, regulations that will enable its development from current
stage to widespread adoption don’t exist. This topic requires collaboration across energy, environment,
defense, diplomatic, and space stakeholders to map the regulatory world that SBSP will exist in.
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SPACE WORKFORCE, STEM & EDUCATION
“That’s why building readiness is a central obligation of our service…It is based on the
straightforward observation that day-to-day space operations do not prepare
Guardians for the challenges they will face in a high-intensity combat environment.”
- - GENERAL B. CHANCE SALTZMAN, Chief of Space Operations, USSF224
BACKGROUND
The U.S. stands at a pivotal moment in ensuring its leadership in the space domain by prioritizing
workforce development. The space workforce bridges public and private sectors and is the engine of
scientific and technological progress, driving breakthroughs that secure our nation's future both on
Earth and beyond. The demand for skilled professionals in the space industry is surging, fueled by
initiatives from both public agencies and rapid growth in the private sector. As global competitors like
China, India, and the European Space Agency rapidly expand their space capabilities, the U.S. must rise
to meet this occasion by strengthening STEM education, fostering public-private collaboration, and
building robust, diverse, and inclusive talent pathways. To lead the world in space technology,
exploration, resource utilization and commercialization, the U.S. must take decisive action to prepare,
inspire, and retain a workforce equipped to tackle the complexities of tomorrow’s space missions and
technologies. Now is the time to invest in our people and reaffirm America’s role as the global leader in
space innovation.
Space Workforce Trends - The space workforce is undergoing significant transformation, driven by
rapid technological advancements, increased commercial activity, and evolving national security
priorities. One notable trend is the growing demand for professionals skilled in artificial intelligence,
223
NASA (2021). "NASA's Artemis Generation: Preparing the Future Workforce," NASA Workforce Development Press
Release.
224
Gordon, C. (2024). Saltzman: New Space Force Readiness Model Will Be ‘Drastic Change’. Air and Space Forces Magazine.
85
robotics, and cybersecurity, reflecting the integration of these technologies into space operations. The
rise of private-sector players has also shifted workforce needs, emphasizing agility and innovation in
spacecraft design, launch services, and satellite technologies. Additionally, the space industry is seeing a
diversification of roles, with emerging fields like space law, sustainability, and space tourism creating
opportunities beyond traditional engineering and science disciplines. Internationally, competition and
collaboration are reshaping workforce dynamics, as countries invest in space programs to secure
economic and strategic advantages. To meet these demands, there is a heightened need for the U.S. to
focus on and provide resources for space-related training, education, reskilling, and fostering a
workforce that is not only technically proficient but also adaptable to the rapidly changing space
landscape.
Figure 22. U.S. Space Private Industry Employment, 2013-2023 (Source: Source)225
Progress against 2023 Key Actions & Recommendations - The 2023 SSIB Report identified
several short-term, mid-term and far-term actions and recommendations to ensure the U.S. bolsters a
steady pipeline of human talent and does not fall behind its adversaries. See Table 2 below for a
summary and the following paragraphs for an update on the short-term goals for space workforce and
STEM.
225
Gorman, D. (2024).New Data Shows a Rapidly Expanding Space Workforce. Payload Space.
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Short Term Mid Term Far Term
Establish strategic messaging Assess and address funding Scale Pathways to the Stars
and marketing. gaps/engagement models as a Program
coordinated nationwide effort.
Table 2. Summary of key actions and recommendations from 2023 SSIB Report.
Pathways to the Stars - NewSpace Nexus launched the Pathways to the Stars program leveraging a
partnership with RocketLab for their CHIPS (Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce
Semiconductors) and Science Act of 2022 grant award. Pathways to the Stars aims to grow the space
industry talent pipeline inclusively with programming, mentoring, experiential learning, and career
connection services spanning K-12 to early career, with industry involvement and special attention
given to reaching minority populations to connect students to jobs and careers. Early accomplishments
include evaluating the pathways for students to gain access to space (STEM) careers to include
identifying gaps in programming support, evaluating current and future labor market trends, and
understanding employer workforce challenges.
While Federal government efforts to build a STEM workforce strategy take shape, disparate efforts to
promote space-related careers in the United States exist and involve a combination of government
initiatives, industry-led programs, and educational outreach, all orchestrated by various organizations.
Government Initiatives include NASA's Office of STEM Engagement which offers a range of programs
aimed at inspiring and preparing the next generation of explorers. Initiatives include internships,
226
White House (2022). Interagency Roadmap to Support Space-Related TEM Education and Workforce.
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fellowships, and educational resources designed to engage students and the public in space exploration.
The United States Space Force (USSF) has implemented several initiatives to enhance its recruiting
efforts and attract top talent. These initiatives are primarily orchestrated by the Air Force Recruiting
Service (AFRS), which oversees recruitment for both the Air Force and the Space Force. The National
Space Grant College and Fellowship Program supports a network of universities across the U.S. to
promote aerospace education and research. It encourages collaboration among universities, the
aerospace industry, and government agencies to enhance STEM education and workforce development.
Industry-Led Programs actively engage in marketing and outreach to attract talent, offering internships,
scholarships, and use career fairs to connect with potential candidates. Platforms like SpaceCrew.com
list marketing job opportunities within the space industry, reflecting the sector's commitment to
workforce development.227
Notable educational outreach initiatives include NASA's L'SPACE Program.228 This free, online,
interactive experience is open to undergraduate and graduate STEM students interested in pursuing a
career with NASA. It provides participants with hands-on experience in mission design and project
management. Additionally, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Education Office offers a variety of
educational programs, including internships and fellowships, to engage students and educators in space
science and technology. These programs aim to inspire interest in STEM careers and provide practical
experience in the field.
CURRENT STATE
The U.S. space STEM workforce is at a critical juncture, facing challenges that threaten its ability to
sustain leadership in space innovation and exploration. Declining STEM education outcomes,
educator shortages, and unequal access to resources have created a talent pipeline that struggles to meet
growing demands in the space industry. Compounded by rising education costs and global
competition, the U.S. risks losing its edge as nations like China and India ramp up investments in
STEM programs and workforce development. Efforts like the Space Force's SPAFORGEN model and
federal STEM strategic plans aim to address these issues, but significant gaps remain. Without a unified
national strategy and renewed investments in education, training, and professional development, the
U.S. could jeopardize its ability to lead in a rapidly evolving space domain.
The U.S. Is Falling Behind in Hi-Tech/STEM Education - The United States is facing a growing
challenge in maintaining its leadership in high-tech and STEM education, with significant implications
for its competitiveness in the global economy. While countries like China, India, and several European
nations are making substantial investments in STEM programs, infrastructure, and workforce
development, the U.S. has struggled to keep pace. According to the National Science Board, the U.S.
share of the global STEM workforce has declined as other nations produce a larger volume of graduates
227
Space Crew (n.d). The solar system's biggest space jobs site.
228
ASU (2024). NASA L'SPACE Program.
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in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.229 Chronic underinvestment in K-12 STEM
education, unequal access to resources, and declining interest among students in pursuing STEM
careers are exacerbating the problem. Additionally, the rising cost of higher education limits
opportunities for students to enter critical high-tech fields. If unaddressed, these trends could weaken
the U.S. innovation ecosystem, undermine its ability to lead in industries like aerospace, artificial
intelligence, and biotechnology, and erode its position as a global technology powerhouse.
“Without a steady pipeline of space workforce professionals, our ability to innovate and
compete globally is threatened.”
- MELANIE STRICKLAN, Executive Director of Space Workforce for Tomorrow
The U.S. is Facing STEM Educator Shortages - The United States is grappling with a significant
shortage of STEM educators, a critical issue that threatens the nation’s ability to prepare the next
generation for careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. According to the U.S.
Department of Education, many school districts across the country report unfilled teaching positions in
STEM subjects, particularly in underserved and rural communities.230 Low salaries, limited
professional development opportunities, and high turnover rates have contributed to a dwindling
pipeline of qualified educators in these fields. Additionally, competition from the private sector, where
STEM professionals can often earn significantly higher wages, makes it challenging to attract and retain
talent in education. Without sustained investments in teacher training programs, scholarships for
aspiring STEM educators, and incentives to keep skilled teachers in the classroom, the U.S. risks falling
further behind in equipping students with the skills needed to compete in a rapidly evolving global
economy.
229
NSF (2024). The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2024 Key Insights.
230
Teachers of Tomorrow (2024). Teacher Shortages in the U.S: Challenges, Solutions & Initiatives in 2025.
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also cultivates a highly capable workforce to sustain the United States' strategic advantage in the space
domain.
White House Issues STEM Education Strategic Plan - In April 2024, the White House issued a
2023 Progress Report on the Implementation of the Federal Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics (STEM) Education Strategic Plan.231 It served to update Congress and the broader STEM
education community on federal activities from Spring 2022 to Spring 2023 and provided a summary
of the Committee on STEM Education's (CoSTEM) progress in implementing the current five-year
STEM education strategic plan, details on interagency collaborations addressing common challenges,
and an inventory of federal STEM education programs. The report also includes actual investments for
Fiscal Year 2022, estimated investments for Fiscal Year 2023, and requested funding levels for Fiscal Year
2024.
National Framework for Mentoring: STEM outreach tends to be grassroots, regional efforts and
there is no existing national framework through which to share data, audiences, lessons learned, etc.
The U.S. lacks a “whole of government” approach to the challenge, including unreliable or highly
disaggregated funding for STEM programs.
Falling Behind in Education: U.S. students are still largely behind their global peers in STEM
education. Students take fewer STEM classes, perform at lower levels, and graduate less prepared for
college than elsewhere in the world.
231
White House (2024). CoSTEM Progress Report.
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Figure 23. Top Countries by Number os STEM Graduates (Source:CSET232)
232
Oliss, B. McFaul, C. and Riddick, J. (2023). The Global Distribution of STEM Graduates: Which Countries Lead the Way?. CSET.
233
Oliss, B. McFaul, C. and Riddick, J. (2023). The Global Distribution of STEM Graduates: Which Countries Lead the Way?. CSET.
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Lack of Meaningful Funding: The cost of getting a four-year degree is the highest it’s ever been.
Attaining and maintaining a scholarship through a four-year degree is prohibitively difficult for many
students.
STEM Education Pipeline Issues: The U.S. struggles to produce enough graduates in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) to meet the growing demands of the space industry
and government. Insufficient exposure to STEM in K-12 education, combined with teacher shortages
and declining interest in these subjects, limits the talent pipeline. As a result, the industry faces a
shortage of workers qualified to fill critical technical and engineering roles.
Rapid Technological Change: The pace of innovation in space systems, AI, robotics, and advanced
manufacturing often outpaces the ability to train workers with updated knowledge, skills, and abilities.
Emerging technologies evolve faster than traditional workforce development systems can adapt, leading
to a mismatch between the current workforce’s skills and the demands of next-generation space
operations.
Workforce Retention and Competition: Retaining skilled workers in the space sector is challenging
as they are lured away by other high-tech industries, such as AI and cybersecurity, offering higher
salaries and opportunities. Private sector competition and international demand for talent make it
difficult for space organizations to retain experienced professionals, particularly in critical, specialized
roles.
Security Clearance and Workforce Bottlenecks: Many government space roles require security
clearances, which can create bottlenecks in onboarding qualified professionals. Lengthy vetting
processes and restrictions on hiring non-U.S. citizens reduce the available talent pool, slowing the ability
of organizations like NASA and the Space Force to fill high-priority roles efficiently. However, there is
an opportunity here for unclassified skills development through onboarding programs dedicated to
training and apprenticeship programs.
Diversity and Inclusion Gaps: The space workforce remains underrepresented by women,
minorities, and underserved populations, limiting opportunities for innovation through diverse
perspectives. Systemic barriers, lack of mentorship, and unequal access to STEM education contribute
to this gap, narrowing the overall talent pool and missing opportunities to attract new talent.
Public-Private Training Gaps: Workforce training programs often lack coordination between
government, academia, and private industry, resulting in inconsistent preparation for space
professionals. Fragmented training systems and a lack of standardized requirements for knowledge,
skills, and abilities hinder the development of a cohesive, space-ready workforce.
Addressing Soft Skills for Space Missions: In addition to technical expertise, space missions require
strong soft skills, including communication, teamwork, leadership, and problem-solving under
pressure. Many training programs neglect these critical skills, leading to challenges in executing
complex, multi-partner missions that require seamless collaboration and adaptability.
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Economic and Resource Constraints: Workforce development programs are often subject to funding
shortfalls or deprioritization during economic downturns. Competing policy priorities and limited
resources hinder long-term investments in workforce development, impacting the future readiness and
competitiveness of the U.S. space workforce.
● Federal and Private Investment Levels in STEM Education - Greater funding for K-12
STEM programs, workforce development initiatives, and scholarships could produce a
stronger talent pipeline for the space industry
● Rapid Adoption of Emerging Technologies - Incorporation of AI, robotics, and virtual
training tools (e.g., VR/AR simulations) can accelerate workforce readiness, enabling faster and
more effective training for complex space operations.
● Public-Private Workforce Partnerships - Collaboration between the government,
academia, and private industry to design targeted training and internship programs can bridge
skills gaps and prepare workers for evolving space-related roles.
● High-Profile Missions and Innovations - Major successes like Lunar landings, Mars
missions, or breakthroughs in commercial space tourism could inspire more students and
professionals to pursue careers in space-related fields.
● Economic Downturn or Budget Cuts - Reductions in federal funding for space programs,
research, or STEM education could weaken workforce development efforts and slow progress
in preparing skilled professionals.
● STEM Educator Shortages - A persistent shortage of STEM teachers and educators could
hinder the talent pipeline, especially in underserved or rural communities where opportunities
are already limited
● Competition from Other High-Tech Industries - Fields like AI, cybersecurity, and biotech
often attract top talent with higher salaries, potentially drawing professionals away from
space-related careers
● Technological Disruption Outpacing Training - The rapid evolution of space systems and
technologies without corresponding upskilling or reskilling programs could leave the
workforce unprepared for new operational demands.
“Tell me and I forget, teach me and I may remember, involve me and I learn.”
- Xun Kuang, Chinese Confucian Philosopher (312-230 BC)
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KEY ACTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
SHORT-TERM PAYOFF
Advance NewSpace Nexus’ Pathways to the Stars Program – Document K-Grad workforce
exploration and readiness programs to include creating an ecosystem map of current New Mexico
programs supporting students in pathways to space careers. Conduct a labor market analysis to
compile and evaluate data trends in aerospace careers and job-ready technical skill, identifying skills gaps
and talent pipeline projections. Document industry workforce challenges via responses to a survey of
employers and economic development community members to understand workforce pipeline
challenges and identify technical skills and competencies.
Interagency Alignment and Coordinated Initiatives - Develop a unified national framework for
space workforce development that involves establishing a Space Workforce Task Force to align efforts
between federal agencies, academia, and industry. Create a national space workforce database to track
talent pipelines, skill needs, and workforce trends. Incentivize public-private partnerships for workforce
training programs with standardized certifications.
Launch a National Space Awareness Campaign - Promote public awareness and inspiration while
generating excitement about learning about space and working in the space industry. Promote space
careers through documentaries, advertising campaigns, and social media outreach. Highlight the
real-world impacts of space exploration, such as economic growth and technological innovation.
Encourage storytelling around successful space professionals to inspire the next generation.
MID-TERM PAYOFF
Include a Requirement for Internships as part of the SBIR/STTR Program. Mandate that all
SBIR/STTR awardees incorporate internships into their project proposals. Develop clear guidelines for
SBIR/STTR recipients on how to structure internships. Reduce administrative burdens for small
businesses implementing internships by offering toolkits and templates for onboarding interns, tracking
progress, and reporting outcomes. Allow businesses to apply for supplemental funding under
SBIR/STTR to support the cost of internship programs, including stipends and mentorship resources.
ale internship requirements as companies progress through SBIR/STTR phases
Streamline Security Clearance Processes - Improve the process for obtaining security clearances.
Reduce processing times for security clearances by modernizing systems and expanding personnel
dedicated to vetting. Develop pathways for non-U.S. citizens with critical expertise to contribute to
unclassified projects.
LONG-TERM PAYOFF
Investigate ways to reduce the cost of higher-education for STEM - Address affordability and
accessibility for higher education by reducing barriers to pursuing STEM degrees. Expand funding for
Pell Grants and space-focused scholarships to make education more accessible. Create loan forgiveness
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programs for graduates entering space-related careers in government or industry. Subsidize internships
and co-op programs to ensure students from underserved backgrounds can participate.
Provide Tax Incentives for STEM professionals. Implement tax deductions for STEM professionals
who remain employed in critical roles for a specified period (e.g., 5+ years). Provide tax credits for
relocation expenses for STEM professionals moving to areas with workforce shortages. Offer higher tax
deductions for educators teaching in STEM fields. Offer partial tax exemptions for retired STEM
professionals returning to the workforce as mentors, instructors, or consultants.
The U.S. is behind both China and India in producing STEM234 graduates,235 and that China is
outpacing the U.S. in PhD growth.236 While the U.S. led for years, and India had the most graduates of
any country worldwide with 78.0 million, China was right behind India with 77 million compared to
the U.S.’ 67.4 million graduates, with China seeing the fastest increase in graduates with a growth rate
of 300%.237 China is also building the most universities at the equivalent of one university a week.238
The U.S. is also no longer unchallenged in competition for global talent and U.S.-trained talent,
meaning that the DoD and Defense Industrial Base face stiff competition to compete for STEM
talent.239 According to the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the USA is only
38th of 71 countries in Math and 24th in Science, and the gap is widening for middle school students
(ages 11 to 13), with the US ranked eleventh among the forty-six participating education systems., with
the top leaders being Singapore, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia.240 Worse still, the U.S. faces a
shortage of STEM teachers, making it difficult to increase production241 or to develop emerging STEM
education trends in AI, Remote, Online, and Hybrid Learning, Vocational preparation, Virtual and
Augmented Reality, and Soft Skills and STEM,242 and with artificial intelligence quickly becoming a
focal point in K-12.243 The projections are dim for the U.S. on its present course, with expectations that
“by 2030, China and India will lead in a big way. They could account for more than 60% of the STEM
graduates. This is compared to only 8% in Europe and 4% in the United States.”244
234
Britannica (n.d.). STEM Education.
235
Oliss, B., McFaul, C. and Riddick, J. (2023). The Global Distribution of STEM Graduates: Which Countries Lead the
Way?. CSET.
236
Zwetsloot, R. Corrigan, J. Weinstein, E. Peterson, D. Gehlhaus, D. and Fedasiuk, R. (2021). China is Fast Outpacing U.S.
STEM PhD Growth. CSET.
237
Jones, A. (2023). Why there's a special education and STEM teacher shortage and what can be done: Experts say obstacles
include recruitment, funding and institutional support. ABC News.
238
Jones, A. (2023). Why there's a special education and STEM teacher shortage and what can be done: Experts say obstacles
include recruitment, funding and institutional support.. ABC News.
239
Gehlhaus, D., Ryseff, J. and Corrigan, J. (2023). The Race for U.S. Technical Talent: Can the DOD and DIB Compete?.
CSET; CSET (2023). How other countries are luring workers trained in U.S. universities.
240
Krystal DeVille, K. (2024). STEM Education Statistics in 2024. STEM education Guide.
241
Jones, A. (2023). Why there's a special education and STEM teacher shortage and what can be done: Experts say obstacles
include recruitment, funding and institutional support.. ABC News.
242
Marr, B. (2023). The Top 5 Education Trends In 2023. Forbes; See also, Labster (2023). The Top 4 Innovations in STEM
Education You’ll See in 2023.
243
Crawford, A and Wu, C. (2024). Riding the AI Wave: What’s Happening in K-12 Education?. CSET.
244
Krystal DeVille, K. (2024). STEM Education Statistics in 2024. STEM education Guide.
95
EPILOGUE
Figure 25. Still from an animation showing a SpaceX Starship Super Heavy booster being caught by the
"chopstick" arms of its launch tower after a liftoff (Source: SpaceX245)
“…but military we're going to reach and it's my plan. I'll talk to Elon: Elon get those
rocket ships going because we want to reach Mars before the end of my term–we want
to do it. We will lead the world in space. Remember, I did Space Force–I did that–I
rebuilt the military, I did a lot. But we have Space Force, first time in 79 years since
Air Force first time think of it Space Force and now we're leading in Space over Russia
and China. They were killing us when I took over and now we're leading but the
military we're going to reach and–and it's my plan. I'll talk to Elon: Elon get those
rocket ships going because we want to reach Mars before the end of my term we want to
do it–and we want to have also great military protection in space cuz that's where it's
going to be at… and unleash safety prosperity and peace for Americans of of every race
religion color and creed”
- DONALD J. TRUMP, Wilmington, NC, September 23, 2024246
245
Wall, M. (2024). Watch SpaceX catch Starship Super Heavy booster with 'chopsticks' in this animation. Space.com.
246
Trump, Donald J. (2024). 'Elon, Get Those Rockets Going’: Trump eyes Mars by end of his term’. The Economic Times,
Youtube.
96
As the year 2024 ended, Donald J. Trump was elected. President Trump’s first term featured a vibrant
space council, clear direction for Artemis, including goals and deadlines, and the creation of the Space
Force. Trump 2.0 is likely to continue its focus on space dominance and peace through strength, with a
focus on the Space Force. The proximity of Elon Musk to President Trump suggests a renewal of
interest in Mars. The Trump 1.0 goals were to return humans to Mars by 2024 and sustain a Lunar
presence by 2028. A new Trump administration is likely to expect a renewed urgency. President
Trump has also signaled an interest in using tariffs which in the short term could negatively affect space
supply chains, but in the long-term might help create and protect domestic supply chains. Trump has
nominated entrepreneur and private spaceflight participant Jared Isaacman to be the NASA
Administrator, whose acceptance tweet echoed past themes of SSIB recommendations.
247
Isaacman, J. (2024). Acceptance Tweet. X.
97
✩✩✩
98
APPENDIX A
WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS
In-Person:
Conley, Dawn, Catalyst Campus
Aguilar, Ricardo, Proof Labs Cook, TJ, CNM Ingenuity
Alvarez, Michael, Ecliptic Enterprises Corp Corcoran, Katie, Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)
am Ende, Barbara, The Aerospace Corporation Cordova, Andres Sebastian, X-ito / Zefra
Anderson, Robert, Retired UNM Cotterman, Keri, Catalyst Campus for Technology and
Anglada DeRaad, Casey, NewSpace Nexus Innovation
Antypas, Rob, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) Crandall, Dr. Sara, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
Asselin, Randy, Hoonify Technologies, Inc. Crouch, Dan, Integrated Solutions for Systems (IS4S)
Aurand, Joshua, Verus Research Cudzilo, Becky, Astroscale-US, Inc.
Austin, Emmanuel, Northrop Grumman Cutlip, Steven, Verus Research
Ayala, Miguel, Aphelion Damphousse, Paul, Volta Space Technologies
Baker, Julie, Ursa Space Systems Davis, Luke, BST North America
Baldwin, Morgan, Kuiper Government Solutions DeHerrera, Arial, NewSpace Nexus
Balster, Pace, Katalyst Space Technologies Dendiu, Rachel, Moonbeam Exchange
Banks, Darwyn, National Reconnaissance Office DeRaad, Jordan, NewSpace Nexus
Bargiel, Jeff, Hyperspace Challenge DeRaad, Dylan, BlueSpace
Barnes, Michael, Digantara U.S. Deshpande, Jayram, Aadi Space Inc
Barnett, Brian, Solstar Space Deuitch, Alex, Propel Space
Beam, Jon, Rogue Space Systems Corporation Dinelli, Chris, Rhea Space
Beck, David, Space Force Doyle, Mike, Space Northwest
Bellito, Justin, New Mexico Partnership Enoch, Michael, Lockheed Martin Space
Benitez, Salma, Rhea Space Erwin, Dr. Scott, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
Berglund, Andrew, Aerospace Corporation Esfahani, Mona, Relativity Space
Bisio, Todd, Redwire Flewelling, Brien, ExoAnalytic Solutions
Blenkush, Severin, Space Advisory Group Flynn, Kelly, Rhea Space
Boyer, Tom, Katalyst Space Technologies Francis, Will, Agile Space Industries
Breckenridge, Carter, NewSpace Nexus Frank, Donald, Vantage Systems
Brown, Kevin, All Points Logistics, LLC Frasca, Tyler, Verus Research
Buck, Lt Gen David, BRPH Frisco, Eric, ExoAnalytic Solutions
Butow, Steven "Bucky", Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) Frith, James, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
Cahan, Bruce, Urban Logic and Lecturer, Stanford Galladro, Victor, Verus Research
University School of Engineering Gapp, Nathan, Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)
Cappelli, Veronica, Rhea Space Garcia, Nico, Cheshir
Carlson, Joshua, Headquarters Space Force, Chief Gardner, Benjamin, Dekker Perich Sabatini
Technology Innovation Office Garretson, Peter, NewSpace Nexus
Carruth, Alice Germain, Andew, NewSpace Nexus
Caton, Ron, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) Gigeue, Jamie,
Cheng, Michael, Outernet Council Gill, David, AWE (UK)
Chesi, Simone, CHESI UAS Solutions LLC Goel, Aneesh, TRL11
Clark, Kaitlyn, NewSpace Nexus Good, Michael, Lockheed Martin
Colucci, Tony, Colucci Space Advisory Goodman, Bill, Goodman Technologies
99
Goodrum, Jennifer, Rocket Lab Lazich, Jason, Virgin Galactic
Goswami, Namrata, Professor and Author Leader, Jeremy, USSF, Commercial Space Office
Greason, Jeffrey, Electric Sky Lebar, Jr., Gerard, Northrop Grumman
Greer, Monty, The Aerospace Corporation/COSMIC Lee, Ghonhee, Katalyst Space Technologies
Hahn, Victoria, City of Albuquerque Lee, Nate, Bank of America
Handler, Jordan, Magma Space Linnaea Wise, Julia, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Hankamer, Dane, Amazon/Kuiper Government Lippay, Zachary, Verus Research
Solutions Lo, Eric, Booz Allen Hamilton
Harroun, Alexis, Juno Propulsion Inc. Loughlin, Jim, Vantage Systems Inc.
Hastings, Elliott, Rhea Space Lozada, Laura, Sierra Lobo Inc.: TEST3 @ White Sands
Hecht, Erika, NewSpace Nexus Luick, Landon, LEAP
Hernandez, Gustavo, INTUITIVE MacKenzie, Andrew, NewSpace Nexus
Herrera, Sheila, Moss Adams LLP Maethner, Scott, NewSpace Nexus
Hickman, Zach, OCEA Mahoney, Sean, Space Frontier Foundation
Hildebrant, Jordan, SpaceFund Mai, Max, AxientCorp
Hittle, Jerome, AmplifiedSpace Mallare, Jason, Umbra
Holmes, Jaime, NewSpace Nexus Marlow, Mike
Howard, Dr. Diane, National Space Council Martin, Josh
Hughes, Peter, GSFC NASA Martinez, Oscar, Air Force Research Lab
Huttenhoff, Kevin, Lockheed Martin Space Massa, Solange, Ecoatoms
Hwang, Sabrina, Verus Research Mayberry, John, The Aerospace Corp.
Irby, Rhonda, Volta Space Technologies McAlpine, Brad, Lockheed Martin Space
Jaeger, Theodore, Northrop Grumman McClain, Mike, Rivera Energy Solutions
Jaworowski, Dan, Infinity Systems Engineering McClain, Sean, Rivera Energy Solutions
Jordan-Tomaszewski, Steve, Aerospace Industry McDonald, Kathleen, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Association McLaughlin, Scott, Spaceport America
Joseph, Nikolai, Air Force Research Lab Merchant, Adam, LEAP Space
Kaplan, Susan, Modal Technology Corporation Metcalf, Andrew 'AJ', Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
Kater, Dennis, Freedom Space Technologies Meyer, Keith, NAI SunVista
Katz, Robert, World Innovation Network Meyers, Jill, Genuen, LLC
Keltchner, Bryan, Teknicare Mirza, Yahya, Aclectic Systems Inc
Kennedy, Bryce, ACSP Mitchem, Annie, Hyperspace Challenge
Ketcham, Dale, Space Florida Mommer, Ric, Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)
Keuchkerian, Martin, Voyager Space Morris, Troy, Kall Morris Inc (KMI)
Kfir, Sagi, SpaceFund Moulton, Jacob, Redwire
Kha, Yen, Urban Logic Mounce, Gabe, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
Kief, Craig, University of New Mexico Mroz, Ilsa, Aerospace Industry Association
Knight, Valerie, Air Force Research Lab Murphy Crawford, Meagan, Managing Partner,
Knighten, Patricia, Arrowhead Center SpaceFund
Kodeboyina, Sri, BlueSpace Nachshon, Nadav, GorillaLink
Kozuki, Toyotaka, GITAI USA Nakanishi, Yuto, GITAI USA
Kreisel, Joerg, iBOSS Nakanose, Sho, GITAI USA
Krukin, Jeff, Orbital Transports Nezar, Azzouz, Tekinsil
Kvale, Jay, Infinity Systems Engineering Nickle, Kent, Axient
Lacy, Seth, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) Nixon, Steve, SmallSat Alliance
Lai, Winnie, Auriga Space O'Malley, Curtis, NM Tech
Lam, Eric, Air Force Research Laboratory Pallares, Francisco, Spaceport America
Lavender, Harold, CNM Ingenuity Pandian, Muk, Varda Space Industries
100
Patterson, Michael, Desert Works Propulsion LLC Stafford, Kelly, Hyperspace Challenge
Peacock, Deborah, Peacock Law Stearns, Jaime, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
Pelc, Christopher, MTSI (SpaceWERX) Steen, Kathy, Universities Space Research Association
Penny, Cameron, Kall Morris Inc (KMI) (USRA)
Pereira, Wellesley, SpaceForce Steinke, Lee, CisLunar Industries
Pereira, Michael, Astroscale Stephens, Michael "James", Office of Space Launch
Peterson, Sam, Crean, Inc. Stevenson, Rhonda, ABOVE Space
Phan, Brian, SQUID3 Space Strozier, Ben, CNM Ingenuity
Pimentel, Omar, Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) Su, Warren, SQUID3 Space
Piovesan, Jorge, IDEAS Engineering & Technology, LLC Telano, Sara, Air Force Research Lab
Pizarro, David, Sierra Lobo, Inc. Terada, Takuma, GITAI USA
Poole, Lynwood, NRO Thayer, Chris, Motiv Space Systems
Preston, Abby, Rhea Space Theret, Tara, Northrop Grumman Corporation
Quinn, John, Exos Aerospace Tomanelli, Daniel, Voyager Space
Quinn, Teresa, Exos Aerospace Trujillo, Dan, AFRL
R. Rivera Jr., Dr. George, Rivera Energy Solutions Tyrrell, Matthew, NM Tech
Raley, Col Jeremy, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) Unruh, Ron, Goodman Technologies
Rao, Ashwin, SpaceForce Usman, Shawn, Rhea Space
Rasmusen, Shelby, NewSpace Nexus Vadapalli, Kumar, BlueSpace
Raynor, William, US Naval Research Lab Vakki, Oskari, The Aerospace Corp.
Reinelt, Adam, SpaceForce Vallejos, Indalecio, US Commercial Service - Albq
Remen, John, AFRL/RQR Valore, Vanessa, SandboxLife® and Diverse Vitality ®
Rittenbach, Angela, Riverstone Solutions Inc. Vaughan, Erin, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
Rivera, Therese, NM APEX Accelerator Velasco, Jaime, SpaceFund
Robinson, Mary Lou, Keystone Mission Solutions Vera Rojas, Alonzo, IDEAS Engineering & Technology,
Rock, Susan, Vantage Systems Inc LLC.
Rock, Thomas, ENSCO Vick, Robert, AFRL/Space Vehicles Directorate
Rodriguez, Leo, SpaceFund Vigil, Dr. Veronica,
Rosprim, David, Axient Vincent, Roger, Northrop Grumman
Roth, Col Joseph, Space Systems Command (SSC) Walsh, Steve, UNM
Rughani, Rahul, Arkisys Wegner, Peter, BlackVe
Sadler, Scott, NewSpace Nexus Welsch, Carol, CRC Consulting
Sanders, Bradley, SpaceForce Westmark, Vince, Keystone Mission Solutions
Sandoval Johnson, Monica, Stem Boomerang White, Neil, Vantage Systems
Santangelo, Andrew, sci_Zone Wible, Jim, NAI SunVista - MaxQ
Schatzman, Dan, SpaceFund Wildes, Gregg, DornerWorks
Schatzman, Vivian Wilkes, Jess, Orbit Fab
Scherbath, Mark, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) Williams, Teoifolis, Science Applications International
Schervan, Thomas A., iBOSS Corporation (SAIC)
Seeley, Greg, MaxQ Williams, Dr. Andy, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
Shinnick, Mathis, Goodman Technologies Wilson, Franklin, FSL
Shravah, Vijay, TRL11 Winter, James, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
Shumaker, Nicole, TransAstra Winter, Laura, The DownLink
Smas, Scott, Arizona State University Yu, Kristina, University Of New Mexico | SPACE TEAM
Smith, Thomas, SSC | McCLAIN+YU Architecture & Design
Spesard, Clint, AFRL Zamora, Gilberto, Ideas-Tek
Spicer, James, Kepler Communications US Zapata, Edgar, NewSpace Nexus
Springs, Hailey, AFRL Scholars Ziegler, Scott, Space Kinetic Corp.
101
Zivnuska, John, Hoonify Clopton, Josh, Ciena
Coffee, Kayla, Aerospace Futures Alliance (AFA)
Virtual: Cover, Park, Avalanche Energy
Crosier, Clinton, U.S. Space Force
Anderson, Eric, And One Technologies
DeHerrera, Arial, NewSpace Nexus
Asselin, Randy, Hoonify Inc.
Doyle, Mike, Space Northwest
Azoulay, Tal, Space Products and Innovation, Inc.
Ellerbrock, Sarah, WA Sen. Bob Hasegawa's Office
Coyne, Sarah, Partners in Air and Space
Enteman, Rep.Debra, Washington State Legislature
Crouse, Brian, USAF
Faith, Ron, RBC Signals
Franklin, Fletcher, Blue Origin
Free, Amanda, City of Renton
Freece, Todd, ATLAS Space Operations
Galer, John, The Aerospace Corporation
Garb, Merrick, Commercial, Civil and Interagency
Gantz, Tommy,
Partnerships Branch Chief
Gebert, Matt, Maxar
George, Tom, SaraniaSat
Gorbunova, Triniti, U.S Rep Adam Smith's Office
Harroun, Alexis, Juno Propulsion
Hasegawa, Sen. Bob, Washington State Legislature
Hecht, Adam, University of New Mexico
Hettinger, Seth, JX Crystals
Hehn, Trevor, Hehn Law
Hudson, Kristina, OneRedmond
Ketcham, Dale, Space Florida
Huguet, Hector, Kymeta Corporation
Kief, Craig, UNM
Kodati, Vikash, Godel Space
Kniseley, Col Rich, Commercial Space Office
Mackenzie, Andrew, NewSpace Nexus
Kodati, Vikash, Godel Space
Marcu, Marius,
Kuntzelman, Kurt, RS21
Matson, Shannon, Renton Technical College
Langster, Travis, Defense Department
McClinton, Sean, Space Northwest
Lopera, Juan, Verus Research
McIrvin, Ryan, University of Washington Bothell
Martin, Jeffrey, University of Alabama
Millman, Robert, Electric Sky
McLynn, Kim, Market Ascent
Mirza, Yanya, Ecliptic Systems Inc
Mendoza, Paul, Neutron Star Systems
Mommer, Ric, DIU
Mitchem, Annie, Hyperspace Challenge
Morgansen, Kristi, University of Washington
Mokhtar, Sina, Verus Research
Muenzberg, Lynnette, TLG Aerospace
Nickle, Kent, Axient Corporation
Nakamura-Messenger, Keiko, Exploration Laboratories
Pullen, George, MilkyWay Economy
Pant, Priyanka,
Quilty, Chris, Quilty Space
Penna, James, Wave Motion Launch Corporation
Santangelo, Andrew, sci_Zone, Inc
Rodick, Titan, SAC
Smas, Scott, Arizona State University
Shiroyama, Margo, OneRedmond
Tournear, Derek, SDA
Shull, Stan, Alliance Velocity
Wirth, Rachelle, NGC
Slatter, Rep. Vandana, Washington State Legislature
Stearns, Rep. Christopher, Washington State Legislature
Partner Workshop - Seattle
Suberlak, Krzysztof, UW
Thornburg, Jeff, Portal Space Systems
In-Person: Utemei, Rachel, U.S Senator Patty Murray's Office
Van Donkelaar, Finn, Wave Motion Launch Corporation
Alger, Rachel, U.S Rep Suzan DelBene's Office
Vorbach, Ian, Portal Space Systems
Anglada DeRaad, Casey, NewSpace Nexus
Waine, Michael, Liftport
Arny, Matt, CAS Enterprise Management, LLC
Wessel, Brook, Xplore Inc
Baerwaldt, Craig, Space Happy Hour
Wilmot, Michelle, City of Kent
Bergquist, Rep. Steve, Washington State Legislature
Laine, Michael, Liftport
Boyer, Tom, Katalyst Space
Cheng, Michael, Outernet Council
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Virtual:
103
APPENDIX B
PREVIOUS REPORTS
January 2025
DistributionA.
Approved for public release: distribution unlimited
Download
December 2023
DistributionA.
Approved for public release: distribution unlimited
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8 Aug 2023
Distribution D:
Authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only
24 Mar 2023
Distribution A:
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104
State of the Space Industrial Base 2022
Winning the New Space Race for Sustainability, Prosperity and the Planet
August 2022
Distribution A:
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October 2021
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5 Aug 2021
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July 2020
Distribution A:
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105
The Future of Space 2060 & Implications for U.S. Strategy
Report on the Space Futures Workshop
5 Sep 2019
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30 May 2019
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9 Mar 2019
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APPENDIX C
KEY ACTIONS &
RECOMMENDATIONS
FROM SSIB’23
REVISITED
1. Embrace a Collective North Star Vision for the U.S. and its Global Partners. The US must
create a safe, stable, secure, and sustainable space domain which builds and advances an enduring
competitive advantage for the United States and its global partners for economic prosperity and
collective security in pursuit of national goals that embrace the peaceful economic development and
human settlement of space in a manner that is consistent with our shared values, democratic principles
and appreciation for both human rights and the environment.
2. Accelerate Transition to Dynamic Space Operations. The U.S. must create capabilities for the
conduct of operations which can respond to challenges in the space operating environment in a rapid
and agile manner at scale. This includes responsive spacecraft and payload development and integration,
responsive space access not only to orbit but to all areas of U.S. interest, sustained maneuver, and the
ability to resiliently re-allocate within and across constellations.
3. A Shift toward Agile Policy Making and Execution. We are immersed in a Fourth Industrial
Revolution highlighted by accelerated change in the advancement of new technologies. Policy and
precedent must maintain pace so that the U.S. and its global partners remain leaders in establishing
global standards, norms, and practices consistent with U.S. National Policy, strategy, and objectives
outlined in the Space Framework. Policy must outpace innovation, or else the U.S. will concede its
competitive advantage for the sake of bureaucratic convenience.
UPDATE: No agreement between the White House and Congress on licensing novel space
technologies.
4. Development and Production at Speed and Scale. Fast following commercial technology to
achieve strategic outcomes requires timely, effective, streamlined, flexible, and enabling contracts,
procurement approaches, architectures, digital systems engineering practices, funding paradigms,
collaborative development efforts, rapid prototyping, concurrent engineering, and active technology
demand pull to fully harness and leverage commercial speed, scope, scale, and production capacity to
compete economically while contributing to integrated deterrence.
108
UPDATE: No clear evidence of highly scaled space systems at present.
5. Address Bureaucratic Delay. The U.S. needs to incentivize private investment in the space
economy so that the USG doesn't have to carry the full burden, but bureaucratic delay (including delays
in launch and re-entry licenses per FAA Part 450) destroys or drives away private investment and U.S.
competitive advantage. Bureaucratic delays in licensing and permitting are the single most
self-defeating--and addressable problem across the space enterprise.
UPDATE: Licensing delays remain a concern. Varda had a significant delay in re-entry.
6. Sustained Funding for Programs that Leverage Commercial Solutions. Examples include the
Space Development Agency Proliferated Warfighting Space Architecture, Artemis, Hybrid Space
Architecture, Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS), xGEO and Cislunar Space Domain Awareness
partnerships, and many others.
7. Protection of Space Commerce. A continuum of conflict from competitive, through crisis, and
conflict, exists today where space systems, networks, ground stations and infrastructure are all
experiencing cyber attacks or are at risk of physical damage through the actions of peer competitors and
criminal enterprises. Peacetime is ‘all the time’ which requires protection of commercial capabilities that
contribute to the growing space economy. Integrated deterrence begins with the protection of our
national interests across all domains including space.
UPDATE: OSD Policy did release its Congressionally mandated “Space Policy Review and
Strategy on Protection of Satellites”
8. Supply Chain Trust and Resiliency. A dynamic, robust, diverse, resilient, innovation-driven, and
scalable supply chain, industrial base, and entrepreneurial ecosystem are essential to achieve and sustain
our national goals and objectives in space.
9. In order to save the planet, we must get off-planet. Advancements in space power production,
manufacturing, connectivity, and Lunar resource extraction will be foundational to creating and
powering the future multi-trillion-dollar space economy. In order to lead, enabling new and evolved
strategy, policy, and law, perhaps even treaties, are required. Activities and human presence in space
should be driven by an international rules-based order and systems that uphold liberty and prosperity
for all humankind.
UPDATE: The US has yet to refocus its narrative about Artemis to focus on industrial
development and strategic competition. The US has yet to establish a strategy for in-space
power production or space solar power.
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APPENDIX E
ACRONYMS &
ABBREVIATIONS
AFA –Air & Space Forces Association DPA – Defense Production Act
AFRL – Air Force Research Lab DRACO – Demonstration Rocket for Agile
AFRL/RV – Air Force Research Lab Space Cislunar Operations (DARPA)
Vehicles Directorate DSO – Dynamic Space Operations
AI – Artificial Intelligence EO – Electro Optical
AI/ML – Artificial Intelligence/Machine EO – Executive Order [White House]
Learning EOP – Executive Office of the President
AMC –Air Mobility Command FAA – Federal Aviation Administration [DoT]
CASR – Commercial Augmented Space FCC – Federal Communication Commission
Reserves FMS – Foreign Military Sales
CISA – Cybersecurity and Infrastructure FY – Fiscal Year
Security Agency GAO – General Accounting Office
CLPS – Commercial Lunar Payload Services GEO – Geostationary Earth Orbit
(NASA) HSA – Hybrid Space Architecture
COMSO – Commercial Services Office (under IA – International Affairs Offices
USSF/SSC) IC – Intelligence Community
COVID – Coronavirus Disease ISAM – In-Space Servicing Assembly and
COSMIC– COnsortium for Space Mobility Manufacturing
and ISAM Capabilities ISRU – In-Situ Resource Utilization
COTS – Commercial Orbital Transportation ISS – International Space Station
Services ITAR – International Trafficking in Arms
CR – Continuing Resolution Regulation
CSO – Commercial Solutions Openings ITAR/EAR – International Trafficking in
[DIU] Arms Regulation or Export
CSO – Chief of Space Operations [USSF] Administration Regulations
CSET – Center for Security and Emerging JETSON – Joint Energy Technology
Technology Supplying On-Orbit Nuclear
CSPO –Commercial Systems Program Office kWe – Kilowatt-electric
(NRO) LEO – Low Earth Orbit
CRADA - Cooperative Research and MEO – Middle Earth Orbit
Development Agreement MEV – Mission Extension Vehicle
DARPA – Defense Advanced Research MW – Megawatt
Projects Agency [DoD] NASA – National Aeronautics and Space
DIU – Defense Innovation Unit [DoD] Agency
DoC – Department of Commerce NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DoD – Department of Defense NDAA – National Defense Authorization Act
DoE – Department of Energy NOAA – National Oceanic and Atmospheric
DoS – Department of State Agency [DoC]
DoT – Department of Transportation
111
NRO – National Reconnaissance SAF/IA – Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
Organization [DoD] for International Affairs
NRO/CSPO – National Reconnaissance SAF/SQ – Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Organization Commercial Systems Space Acquisition and Integration
Program Office [DoD] SAR – Synthetic Aperture Radar
NSA – National Security Agency SATCOM – Satellite Communications
NSC – National Security Council [EOP] SBIR – Small Business Innovative Research
NSF – National Science Foundation SBSP – Space Based Solar Power (renewable
NSIC – National Security Innovation Capital energy source)
[DoD] SDA – Space Development Agency
NSpC – National Space Council [EOP] SDA – Space Domain Awareness
ODNI – Office of the Director of National SpaceX – Space Exploration Technologies
Intelligence (company)
OIG – Office of Inspector General [NASA] SSA – Space Situational Awareness
OMB – Office of Management and Budget SSC – Space Systems Command [USSF]
[EOP] SSC/CSCO – Space Systems Command
OPR – Office of Primary Responsibility Commercial Satellite
OSAM – On-Orbit Servicing Assembly and Communications Office[USSF]
Manufacturing SSIB – State of the Space Industrial Base
OSC – Office of Strategic Capital [DoD] (report)
OSC – Office of Space Commerce [DoC] STEM – Science Technology Engineering and
OSD – Office of the Secretary of Defense Math
[DoD] STM – Space Traffic Management
OSTP – Office of Science and Technology STTR – Small Business Technology Transfer
Policy [EOP] U.S. – United States
OTA – Other Transaction Authority UK – United Kingdom
OUSD R&E – Office of the Undersecretary of UKR – Ukraine
Defense for Research and Engineering USA – United States of America
PNT – Precision Navigation & Timing USAF – United States Air Force
PRC – People’s Republic of China USCG – United States Coast Guard
PWSA – Proliferated Warfighter Space USG – United States Government
Architecture USML – United States Munitions List
R&D – Research and Development USSF – United States Space Force [DoD]
RDT&E – Research Development Test and USSPACECOM – United States Space
Evaluation Command [DoD]
RF – Radio Frequency USSOCOM – United States Special
RTG – Radioisotope Thermoelectric Operations Command
Generators VICTUS HAZE – Victus Haze is a tactically
SAF/IA – Office of the Assistant Secretary of responsive space mission that includes
the Air Force for International Affairs the design, build, launch, own
S&T – Science and Technology spacecraft
SA – Situational Awareness xGEO – Beyond Geostationary Orbit
Yr – Year
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