SUDAN’S THIRD YEAR OF WAR: PROXY POWERS, HUMAN

RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE

LAKSHITHAA S.D

M.A. Public Policy – II Year,

M.O.P. Vaishnav College for Women (Autonomous), Chennai

NIAS GPYV Essay Submission, July 2025

Introduction

The Sudanese conflict, now entering its third consecutive year, has escalated from an internal

military confrontation into a prolonged crisis with far-reaching implications for regional

security and global geopolitics. Initially framed as a power struggle between the Sudanese

Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the war has since

evolved into a complex theatre of external influence, marked by the active involvement of

foreign powers such as Iran, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia.1 Through military

aid, political patronage, and strategic partnerships, these actors have transformed Sudan into a

battleground for proxy competition, intensifying the conflict and complicating prospects for

resolution.

Situated in northeastern Africa and sharing borders with seven countries as well as the Red

Sea, Sudan occupies a geostrategic position of immense importance. Its instability poses

serious threats not only to national cohesion but also to the broader Horn of Africa and Red

Sea corridor—regions already burdened by fragile governance and transnational security

challenges. The ongoing violence has triggered institutional breakdown, widespread

displacement, and a deepening humanitarian crisis, all while cutting down the effectiveness

of diplomatic intervention.

This paper contends that Sudan’s war must be understood not merely as a domestic contest

for power, but as a multi-dimensional crisis rooted in regional rivalries, governance failures,

and shifting geopolitical alignments.

1
International Crisis Group, Sudan’s Shattered Transition: Regional Risks and Global Stakes, Crisis
Group Africa Report No. 325 (Nairobi/Brussels: May 2024),
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/325-sudans-shattered-transition-regional-risks-an
d-global-stakes.

1
The essay proceeds in four parts: first, an outline of major developments from April to June

2025; then provides background to the conflict, followed by an analysis of the key issues and

what they reveal about deeper systemic fractures, and finally assesses the potential trajectory

of the conflict in the near future.

Key Developments

To begin with, Sudan has witnessed a marked intensification of foreign military engagement.

During the months of April and May 2025, Iran notably bolstered its backing of the Sudanese

Armed Forces (SAF) by supplying Shahed-series drones and dispatching military advisors

associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This support significantly

strengthened SAF’s aerial operations, facilitating territorial advances, particularly in

Khartoum and the northern regions. By June, verified satellite imagery and leaked customs

records revealed that Turkey had delivered Bayraktar TB2 drones to the SAF. These UAVs

were subsequently deployed in military offensives in Nyala, located in South Darfur, marking

Turkey’s first confirmed involvement in the conflict and underscoring the expanding regional

dimension of the war.

On May 4, SAF jets targeted Nyala Airport, destroying a UAE-linked cargo aircraft

reportedly transporting drones and weapons for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This was

interpreted as a warning to Gulf states, especially the UAE. In retaliation, RSF launched its

first drone strikes on Port Sudan between May 4 and 7, hitting key infrastructure including

airports, fuel depots, and power stations. These strikes disrupted humanitarian flights and

caused widespread outages, reflecting the growing sophistication and reach of RSF’s arsenal.2

Second, violence against civilians and ethnic groups has intensified alarmingly. Between

April 10 and 12, Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched brutal assaults on the Zamzam and

2
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Armed Conflict Database: Sudan 2025, June 2025,

2
Abu Shouk displacement camps near El Fasher, resulting in the deaths of more than 100

individuals—including women, children, and humanitarian personnel. Evidence from satellite

imagery and eyewitness accounts indicates the intentional demolition of shelters and medical

facilities, with members of the Masalit ethnic group being deliberately targeted. Additionally,

numerous reports document widespread sexual violence, including acts of rape and sexual

enslavement, in several camps. United Nations investigators have classified these atrocities as

elements of a larger campaign of ethnic cleansing.3

On May 30, RSF drone strikes hit Al-Dhaman Hospital in El Obeid, while Al-Mujlad

Hospital in West Kordofan was bombed from June 22 to 24, killing over 40 civilians. These

attacks reflect a pattern of systematic targeting of healthcare facilities. Médecins Sans

Frontières reported the closure of over a dozen hospitals. On June 2, an RSF ambush on a

World Food Programme–UNICEF convoy near Al Koma resulted in the deaths of five aid

workers, drawing international condemnation.

Third, Sudan’s political and institutional systems have effectively collapsed. On June 1, the

transitional government under Prime Minister Kamil Idris was dissolved, leaving a power

vacuum across the northern regions. While SAF regained some territory, no civilian authority

was reinstated. El Fasher, once a hub for aid operations, saw over 900 civilian deaths from

drone attacks, shelling, and RSF offensives. Courts, municipal offices, and public services

ceased functioning. Armed factions now govern many towns through violence and coercion.

In cities like Nyala and El Obeid, police and judiciary systems have vanished, subjecting

civilians to arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings.4

3
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report on Mass Atrocities in Darfur, July 2025,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports.
4
Crisis Group, Sudan’s Collapsing State: Governance Amid Armed Fragmentation, Africa Report No.
328, July 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan.

3
Fourth, the humanitarian crisis has reached catastrophic levels. By June 2025, 12.9 million

people were internally displaced, with an additional 4 million fleeing to neighboring

countries—especially Chad, now sheltering over 1.2 million Sudanese refugees. In the

Zamzam and Abu Shouk camps, 239 children died due to hunger and lack of medical care.

Aid organizations report critical shortages of antibiotics, IV fluids, and maternal health

supplies.5

Over 30 million people now require urgent humanitarian assistance. Nearly half the

population faces severe food insecurity. UN agencies have documented more than 330 cases

of conflict-related sexual violence since January, with actual figures likely higher. Cholera,

measles, and hepatitis are spreading rapidly in overcrowded camps. Aid convoys are

routinely blocked at RSF checkpoints, and key supply routes remain inaccessible. Without

immediate large-scale intervention, the UN warns that Sudan is at risk of famine and a

nationwide public health disaster by the end of 2025.

Background

Sudan entered a new phase of internal collapse on 15 April 2023, when a longstanding rivalry

between two dominant military factions—the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General

Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by General

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti)—erupted into full-scale civil war. What began as a

dispute over power-sharing quickly spread into violent clashes across Khartoum, Darfur, and

other regions.

5
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Sudan Humanitarian
Snapshot, June 2025, https://reliefweb.int/country/sdn.​

4
The roots of this conflict are deep. After the removal of former president Omar al-Bashir in

2019, Sudan began a fragile journey toward democracy. However, the partnership between

civilians and the military collapsed in October 2021, when Burhan led a coup and returned

the country to military rule. By late 2022, the United Nations tried to mediate a new

agreement between civilian groups and military leaders through the Framework Agreement,

but it failed due to a lack of trust and the existence of separate armed command structures.

The SAF and RSF, once allies, became sharply divided over reforms to the security sector

and the question of who would ultimately lead the armed forces.6

The RSF, enriched by control over gold mines and bolstered by support from the UAE and

Russia’s Wagner Group, has emerged as a powerful paramilitary actor. Meanwhile, the SAF

remains institutionally tied to the state and receives backing from Egypt. These external

alliances have transformed Sudan into a theater for regional rivalries, particularly among

West Asian and North African powers.

Sudan’s strategic geography—rich in gold and with vital access to the Red Sea—has

heightened international interest, further complicating the conflict. The consequences have

been catastrophic: over 8.5 million displaced, at least 15,000 civilians killed (many in

ethnically targeted attacks), and the near-total collapse of healthcare and humanitarian

systems.7

Government institutions have disintegrated, with RSF-aligned tribal militias taking control of

large parts of Darfur. Despite efforts by IGAD, the African Union, the UN, and the Jeddah

talks, all ceasefires have failed.

6
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Sudan: Humanitarian
Update No. 18, April 2024,
https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-update-no-18-april-2024.
7
Crisis Group, Escalating Violence in Sudan Risks State Collapse, Africa Briefing No. 202, May 2023,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/escalating-violence-sudan-risks-state-collapse.​

5
In the absence of unified international action, armed groups have entrenched themselves,

fragmenting Sudan into militarized zones and rendering the concept of national sovereignty

increasingly hollow.

Issues and What Do They Mean

First, Sudan’s ongoing conflict is increasingly being shaped by regional power rivalries. What

began as a domestic power struggle has now evolved into a regional proxy war. The

traditional global pattern of ideological competition between superpowers—such as during

the Cold War—has given way to a more fragmented and multipolar environment. In this

context, Sudan has become a battleground for regional actors seeking to expand their

strategic influence, secure access to resources, and strengthen their regional positions.

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), with control over gold-rich areas in Darfur, have attracted

private military assistance from Russia’s Wagner Group and military-financial backing from

the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These relationships are not based on ideology but are

transactional—militias offer access to resources, and foreign states provide support in

exchange for influence. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) receive support from

Egypt, which sees instability in Sudan as a threat to Nile water security and regional balance.

Iran’s involvement, particularly through the transfer of drones, signals its interest in

projecting influence across the Red Sea and challenging Sunni-led states. Turkey, leveraging

both its historical connections and growing defense industry, seeks strategic returns through

limited alliances.8As a result, regional military agendas have overtaken peacebuilding efforts.

Sudan has become a theatre for overlapping rivalries within the Arab world, Islamic blocs,

and African politics—further entrenching the conflict and discouraging peaceful resolution.

8
International Crisis Group, Sudan’s Fateful Power Struggle (Brussels: ICG, April 2023),
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudans-fateful-power-struggle.

6
Second, the erosion of civilian governance in Sudan has resulted in a militarized state

structure. Sudan does not fit the typical definition of a “failed state”; instead, it is

experiencing institutional capture, where state power is exercised by military groups rather

than civilian authorities.

Following the collapse of the military-civilian transitional council in 2021, key state

institutions—such as ministries, courts, and local governments—came under the control of

armed factions, either the SAF or RSF. What has emerged is a fragmented political order in

which territory is governed by force rather than constitutional legitimacy.

This form of militarized governance creates a long-term challenge: power is maintained

through armed strength rather than democratic processes or rule of law. As military actors

dominate state structures, peace negotiations, transitional justice mechanisms, and the role of

civil society are systematically excluded9. Such a model, once entrenched, makes

post-conflict reconstruction deeply difficult.

Third, the humanitarian crisis in Sudan is not simply a byproduct of conflict—it is being

deliberately intensified. While international agencies such as the World Food Programme

(WFP) report conditions approaching famine, these figures conceal a more troubling reality:

humanitarian suffering is being used as a weapon of war.

Over 13 million people have been displaced, more than 80% of medical facilities are no

longer functioning, and diseases such as cholera are spreading.Both SAF and RSF have used

siege tactics—blocking access to food, water, and medical supplies—in order to control

9
Alex de Waal, “The Fragmentation of Sudan’s Political Order,” World Peace Foundation, October
2023, https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2023/10/12/the-fragmentation-of-sudans-political-order/.

7
populations and gain advantage. This strategy turns starvation and disease into tools of

coercion.10

In this context, Sudan is not simply experiencing a humanitarian emergency; it is undergoing

a deliberate denial of access to basic services and survival needs. Similar patterns have been

seen in Yemen and Ethiopia’s Tigray region, where humanitarian collapse is used to pressure

opponents. Such tactics represent a disturbing shift away from internationally accepted norms

of warfare.

Fourth, international responses have been weak, fragmented, and largely ineffective. The

African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have

struggled to mediate effectively, often hampered by internal divisions and lack of

enforcement capacity. The Jeddah peace talks, facilitated by the United States and Saudi

Arabia, have also yielded limited results due to poor coordination and minimal on-ground

influence.

Major global powers have mostly avoided deep involvement. China and India, despite having

large economic interests in Africa, have pursued non-interference policies—choosing to

prioritise trade and infrastructure projects over political engagement. Their stance reflects a

broader trend of economic pragmatism, where commercial interests outweigh concerns about

governance or human rights.11 Similarly, Japan and South Korea, while contributing

10
World Food Programme, “Sudan: Emergency Situation Report #10,” May 2025,
https://www.wfp.org/publications/sudan-emergency-situation-report-may-2025; Human Rights Watch,
“Sudan: Starvation and Disease as Weapons of War,” June 2025,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/01/sudan-humanitarian-catastrophe.
11
Zach Vertin, “The Global South’s Complicity in Sudan,” Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2025,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sudan/global-souths-complicity-sudan; Yun Sun, “China’s Cautious
Strategy in Sudan,” Stimson Center, March 2024,
https://www.stimson.org/2024/chinas-cautious-strategy-in-sudan/.​

8
significantly to humanitarian relief, have refrained from participating in security or

diplomatic interventions.

This global disengagement, particularly when compared to international responses in regions

like Ukraine, reveals a troubling double standard in the treatment of African crises. The

absence of strong international accountability mechanisms in Sudan perpetuates a global

system in which some conflicts are prioritised while others are neglected.

Fifth, Sudan’s conflict is part of a broader strategic realignment in the Global South, with

East Africa emerging as a central focus of international interest. The involvement of Gulf

states, Russian mercenaries, and Asian economic powers highlights the increasing

geopolitical importance of the region.

The UAE’s strategy in Africa has expanded beyond port management and investment to

include direct support for armed groups, aimed at securing maritime trade routes in the Red

Sea. Egypt continues to view Sudan as a buffer state, essential for its national security and

water stability. Russia’s Wagner Group is using Sudan as a site for resource extraction,

particularly gold, in return for military services.

Meanwhile, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Sudan remain operational, but

Beijing has chosen to stay silent on the political breakdown, signalling its preference for

maintaining stability rather than promoting democratic reforms. India has adopted a similar

approach, seeking to preserve its trade relationships and avoid diplomatic friction with Gulf

allies.

In this landscape, South–South cooperation has become more focused on mutual self-interest

than on shared development goals or principles of sovereignty. As a result, East Africa is no

longer seen as peripheral—it is now central to global power shifts, though this shift is driven

9
more by conflict and competition than by collaborative diplomacy or sustainable

development.

Trajectory of the Sudan Conflict

First, Sudan is currently headed toward a prolonged military stalemate. Neither the Sudanese

Armed Forces (SAF) nor the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) hold a decisive military advantage.

Early battles in Khartoum and Nyala have shifted into long, drawn-out urban fighting, with

both sides now focused on defending territory rather than advancing. According to the

International Crisis Group, this marks a transition from fast-moving conflict to a slow and

exhausting struggle.12 As formal institutions weaken and both sides fortify their zones of

control, Sudan increasingly mirrors conflict zones like post-Gaddafi Libya or early-2000s

Somalia—places where rival groups exercise overlapping authority without a unified state.

Second, a ceasefire negotiated by foreign powers may be reached in the near future.

However, such a deal would likely confirm and formalize the current divisions within Sudan.

If countries like the UAE, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia help broker an agreement, it may reduce

immediate violence, but it could also lead to a divided country. Under such a scenario, the

RSF—supported by gold revenues and armed alliances—might take control of western

regions like Darfur, while the SAF would likely retain control over the Nile Valley and the

eastern part of the country.13 This outcome would resemble the Dayton Peace Agreement in

Bosnia, which ended the war but left major issues unresolved. In Sudan’s case, the ceasefire

could lead to an unofficial partition of the state rather than a lasting political solution.

12
International Crisis Group, Sudan’s Fateful Power Struggle: Prospects for Mediation and Peace,
Report No. 321, April 2023,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/321-sudans-fateful-power-struggle.
13
Alan Boswell, “Sudan's Deadly War Is Entering a Dangerous New Phase,” Foreign Policy, March
26, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/26/sudan-war-partition-rsf-saf-uae-egypt/.​

10
Third, while a return to civilian rule is a key goal for many, it remains unlikely in the current

climate. Groups such as the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) continue to push for a

democratic transition, but the space for civilian political action has been violently restricted.

Neither the SAF nor the RSF has shown willingness to accept civilian authority or share

power. For a real transition to occur, several conditions are needed: international

coordination, a properly enforced ceasefire, and a withdrawal of external military backing. At

present, none of these conditions exist.14 As a result, civilian rule remains more of an ideal

than a realistic outcome.

Fourth, Sudan is facing a growing humanitarian disaster. As of May 2025, the United Nations

reports that over 10.8 million people have been displaced, and around 18 million are suffering

from severe food shortages. Starvation is widespread in areas such as Darfur and Kordofan,

and much of the public healthcare system has collapsed. Aid delivery is being deliberately

blocked, hospitals are being attacked, and humanitarian assistance is being used as a tool of

war. Organizations like the World Food Programme and Médecins Sans Frontières have

issued strong warnings about the possibility of large-scale loss of life15. The situation is

becoming comparable to humanitarian crises seen in Yemen and Ethiopia’s Tigray region,

both of which involved deliberate starvation tactics.

Fifth, international involvement has been weak, divided, and mostly ineffective. The failure

of the most recent peace talks in Jeddah (May 2025) highlights the limits of current

diplomatic efforts. African organizations such as IGAD and the African Union have tried to

promote peace, but they lack the power to enforce agreements. Meanwhile, regional powers

14
Human Rights Watch, Sudan: No Will for Civilian Rule Amid Growing Atrocities, June 2024,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/06/10/sudan-no-will-civilian-rule-amid-growing-atrocities.
15
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Sudan: “The Situation Is Catastrophic”, May 2025,
https://www.msf.org/sudan-situation-catastrophic-humanitarian-crisis; World Food Programme,
Emergency Situation Report #11 – Sudan, June 2025,
https://www.wfp.org/publications/sudan-emergency-situation-report-june-2025.​

11
like the UAE, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, and Russia have increased their roles in the

conflict—often pursuing their own interests related to natural resources, military influence, or

strategic control of the Red Sea. This represents a shift from past global conflicts, which were

often driven by U.S.–Russia competition. In contrast, today’s involvement in Sudan is shaped

by multiple countries seeking practical gains, with little concern for long-term peace.

Conclusion

Sudan’s conflict exemplifies the failure of global governance in preventing state collapse.

Once poised for democratic reform, it has devolved into a proxy war shaped by regional

powers—such as the UAE, Egypt, Iran, and Turkey—pursuing strategic and resource-driven

agendas. This has fractured national sovereignty, leaving rival armed groups in control and

dismantling state authority.

The global response has been inadequate. The Responsibility to Protect remains largely

symbolic, while peace efforts like the Jeddah talks lack enforcement. Multilateral bodies have

acted reactively, and major powers—including those in South and Southeast Asia—have

prioritized economic interests over political engagement.

Sudan is more than a national crisis; it is a warning of what unchecked fragmentation can

lead to. Preventing similar outcomes elsewhere demands a fundamental reassessment of how

the international community approaches fragile states and conflict resolution

12
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