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 A New
Division of Labor
Meeting America’s Security
Challenges Beyond Iraq

Andrew R. Hoehn, Adam Grissom, David A. Ochmanek

David A. Shlapak, Alan J. Vick

Prepared for the United States Air Force

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

PROJECT AIR FORCE

The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States
Air Force under Contract F49642-01-C-0003. Further information may
be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans,
Hq USAF.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A new division of labor : meeting America’s security challenges beyond Iraq /

Andrew R. Hoehn ... [et al.].
p. cm.
RAND Project Air Force.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-8330-3962-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. United States—Military policy. 2. United States—Armed Forces—
Reorganization. 3. World politics—21st century. I. Hoehn, Andrew R.

UA23.N375 2007
355'.033573—dc22
2006102730

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing

objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges
facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s
publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients
and sponsors.
R® is a registered trademark.
Cover design by Stephen Bloodsworth

© Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any
form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying,
recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in
writing from RAND.

Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation

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1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050
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To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact
Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002;
Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected]
Preface

In January 2005, George W. Bush committed the nation to the extraor-

dinary goal of “ending tyranny in our world,” a goal consistent with
Bush’s earlier national security statements but one that had not been
expressed before in such expansive fashion.
Since then, there has been a storm of debate in the United States
and abroad about the appropriateness of this goal as a motivating factor
for U.S. foreign policy. To the extent that Americans equate “ending
tyranny” with toppling hostile regimes, as in Iraq, and replacing them
with new forms of representative government, they are divided on the
issue and increasingly suspicious of the prospects for success. But to
the extent that Americans see “ending tyranny” as a broader, long-term
response to the challenges posed by terrorism rooted in radical inter-
pretations of Islam and the proliferation of destructive technology, a
consensus appears to be emerging that this is an appropriate strategy
for the United States and its allies. Should this broader strategy be sus-
tained, as we expect it will, this will have far-reaching effects on the
institutions of the U.S. government.
This monograph explores the implications of this strategy and
of key factors shaping the international security environment for the
Department of Defense (DoD). We focused on DoD for two key rea-
sons:

• First, the armed forces of the United States have been used to
spearhead this new strategy, and they have achieved important
successes. But it is also clear that, in several instances, U.S. armed
forces are being called on to perform missions that are well out-

iii
iv A New Division of Labor

side their normal repertoire. If these missions are only temporary,

ad hoc arrangements may suffice. But if these new missions rep-
resent a more permanent set of demands on the armed forces,
pursuant to an enduring change in strategy, more lasting changes
need to be considered.
• Second, and on a more urgent basis, DoD is again involved in a
major review of strategy and policy, which follows on the recent
Quadrennial Defense Review. This review and the period of imple-
mentation that will follow it offer the administration the oppor-
tunity to consider anew the demands of the international secu-
rity environment, missions assigned to the armed forces, proper
emphasis among these missions, and allocation of resources allot-
ted to them.

The purpose of this effort is to offer ideas and insights to the lead-
ership of DoD on key issues as it strives to align defense resources and
capabilities with the demands of a new strategy and stressing security
environment.
The approach taken in this monograph aims first and foremost
to explore the implications of a new and demanding strategy. Examin-
ing threats to the objectives embodied in that strategy, we define what
would logically be the central elements of a defense strategy appropri-
ate to the conditions likely to emerge in the coming years. Forces and
posture are then examined to determine how well they provide the
capabilities most appropriate to implementing that strategy.
The work presented here does not seek to address important issues
relating to broader institutions of government, which should be the
subject of a separate study, or the management of DoD, including
acquisition reform, the industrial base, business and accounting prac-
tices, or personnel management. Neither does this monograph attempt
in any direct way to address the question of whether the aggregate level
of resources the United States is devoting to its armed forces is appro-
priate, although this work recognizes that resource constraints are sig-
nificant today and are likely to tighten in the years ahead.
Finally, although the recommendations put forward in this report
are based on the authors’ judgments regarding future strategy and the
 Preface v

implementation of that strategy, many of the same recommendations

could be made with the objective of achieving greater efficiency within
DoD.
We have drawn on work undertaken at the RAND Corporation
and elsewhere over the past several years. Chief among our sources have
been assessments of international terrorism and strategies for defeating
terrorist groups; war games featuring hostile regional powers armed
with nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them; operational
analyses of possible scenarios involving conflict over Taiwan; detailed
evaluations of concepts and systems for airborne and space-based sur-
veillance; assessments of evolving threats to airfields and other key
components of military infrastructure in potential theaters of conflict;
and, importantly, lessons from recent wars.
Although it is not practicable to provide the full rationale behind
the many judgments and recommendations contained in the mono-
graph, substantial amounts of research and analysis underlie our find-
ings and much of the documentation of this work is available to the
public.1

RAND Project AIR FORCE

RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corpo-

ration, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and develop-
ment center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with
independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development,
employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future
aerospace forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Aerospace
Force Development; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource
Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. Integrative research projects
and work on modeling and simulation are conducted on a PAF-wide

1 Publicly available sources relevant to the material presented in this monograph are cited
in the bibliography. Several of these sources and others are available through the RAND
Web site: http://www.rand.org.
vi A New Division of Labor

basis. The research reported here was prepared within the Strategy and
Doctrine program.
Additional information about PAF is available on our Web site at
http://www.rand.org/paf.
Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv

CHAPTER ONE
Promoting Democracy and Freedom Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
America’s New Grand Strategy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
New Friends, New Commitments, New Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
What Does This Mean for America’s Armed Forces? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

CHAPTER TWO
Conflict in the Post Post–Cold War World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Terrorism and Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The New Nuclear Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Rise of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Welcome to the Post Post–Cold War World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

CHAPTER THREE
Toward a New Division of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Countering Terrorists and Insurgent Groups Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Supporting New Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Deterring and Defeating Regional Adversaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Dissuading Military Competition in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Defending the Homeland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

vii
viii A New Division of Labor

Countering the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Setting Aggregate Levels of Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
One Homeland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Beyond Four Regions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Two Major Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
One “Decisive Win” and Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Implications for Forces and Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

CHAPTER FOUR
What Will It Mean to Be Joint? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Different Demands for Joint Warfighting Prowess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Maintaining Strategic Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Achieving Joint Tactical Proficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A New Joint Division of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

CHAPTER FIVE
Implications for the Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Building the “Inform and Act” System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A Strategically Decisive Army: Winning at Peace as Well as War . . . . . . . . . . 65
Organizing, Training, and Equipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Stability Operations—Scoping the Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Equipping the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
A New Air-Ground Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Integrating Air, Space, and Maritime Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Protecting the Commons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Projecting Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Defeating Terrorist and Insurgent Groups Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Getting More from the Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Security Cooperation in the New Security Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

CHAPTER SIX
Potential Actions for DoD’s Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Summary

In January 2005, George W. Bush took the oath of office for his second
term as President. In his inaugural address, Bush pledged his admin-
istration to “seek and support the growth of democratic movements in
every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in
the world.” In so doing, he echoed a widely held sentiment that, over
the long run, safeguarding America against extremism and tyranny
will require a national commitment to fostering democracy, stability,
and prosperity in other societies.
In a sense, this is a natural, almost reflexive American response to
a threat to core U.S. interests. The spread of democracy and freedom
has been a prominent feature of American policy and culture since
the founding of the republic. It had been a key theme of nearly every
20th-century president and, in fact, animated Wilson and Roosevelt
as they sought to shape the outcomes of the two great wars of that
century. Moreover, it was a theme that motivated Bush’s immediate
predecessors, particularly William Clinton, and led to American sup-
port for emerging democracies in Latin America, East Asia, and South
Africa, as well as American military involvement in such places as the
Balkans.
But, in another sense, it represents a sharp departure for Ameri-
can foreign and security policy in that this administration has dem-
onstrated a willingness not only to stand up to America’s foes but also
discomfit its friends. In pursuit of this strategy since September 11,
2001, the United States has demonstrated a willingness, in some cases,
to create near-term instability to secure longer-term goals.

ix
x A New Division of Labor

This expansive strategy has important implications for the entire

national security establishment, and diplomats and soldiers alike are
adapting to new demands and seeking to define new roles. Should the
nation continue to pursue the broad contours of this strategy, if not
some of the specific applications—and we believe that there is every
evidence that it will2 —the institutions of government will, of neces-
sity, change and adapt, much as they did when America accepted new
global responsibilities at the end of World War II.

A New Grand Strategy?

Just as in the late 1940s, when it took the emergence of a clear and
compelling threat—Soviet expansionism backed by powerful military
forces—to induce the United States to shake off its tradition of isola-
tionism and adopt the strategy of containment, so too did the shock
of 9/11 prompt this nation to put forth a far-reaching and ambitious
national security strategy. That strategy, the centerpiece of which is
promoting democracy and freedom abroad, is the necessary response
to conditions that can breed serious threats to the security of Ameri-
cans worldwide. Although this strategy has roots in all post–Cold War
administrations, it has been given clearest expression by the current
administration in the wake of 9/11. As a consensus forms around the
idea that the United States and its allies must work to extend the reach
of democracy and freedom, this strategy could come to be recognized
as the long-awaited replacement for containment. (See pp. 3–7.)
The strategy is nothing if not ambitious. Pursuing this strategy
in earnest will require the United States and its partners to marshal
substantial levels of resources and to apply them with patience and
commitment. It will require the energy of the public and private sec-
tors and a renewed focus on diplomacy, education, outreach, and assis-

2 In judging that the nation will continue on this path for the foreseeable future, we also
recognize that different leaders will interpret this strategy in different ways. Just as “contain-
ment” was modified and adapted over the long years of the Cold War, so too will the strategy
to promote democracy and freedom take different forms.
 Summary xi

tance. It will also call for the involvement of, and significant changes
to, America’s armed forces.

Conflict in the Post Post–Cold War World

A new and expansive strategy, along with challenges posed by adversar-

ies of the United States and its allies, will place daunting demands on
America’s military forces. Three in particular present novel and stern
challenges to the armed forces of the United States:

• Terrorist and insurgent groups. Poverty, weak governance, and

conflicts over identity have helped to create conditions that terror-
ists and insurgents can exploit. The spread of technological know-
how related to means of killing—ranging from powerful explosive
devices to biological and, ultimately, nuclear weapons—is giving
small groups the means to kill thousands. By harnessing militant
interpretations of Islam to new means of violence, al Qaeda and
related groups have created a virulent threat that all responsible
states must act to defeat. (See pp. 14–15.)
• Regional powers with nuclear weapons. Such states as North
Korea and Iran appear determined to acquire nuclear weapons.
Indeed, it is possible that North Korea already possesses a limited
number of nuclear weapons. They and others, including terrorist
organizations, have access to a worldwide supply chain that is not
entirely under the control of states. If such adversaries succeed in
fielding deliverable nuclear weapons, the implications for regional
stability and the security of U.S. allies will be highly troubling. In
the short run, the U.S. armed forces will face a challenge in pos-
turing themselves appropriately for such contingencies in a way
that reassures U.S. allies of its commitment to their security. In
the long run, the challenge for this and future administrations
will be coupling the appropriate military posture with a long-term
political framework for evolving these societies toward democ-
racy, stability, and integration into regional security structures.
(See pp. 16–19.)
xii A New Division of Labor

• Military competition in Asia. Arguably, U.S. forces can prevail

over the conventional forces of any nation, provided the full pan-
oply of U.S. capabilities can be brought to bear. Recognizing this,
regional adversaries are focusing their military investments on
capabilities that can be used to impede U.S. forces from getting
to the fight. China, with its burgeoning economy and growing
technological sophistication, is fielding the most impressive set
of such capabilities. They include advanced air defenses; numer-
ous systems for attacking surface ships; antisatellite weapons; and,
most troublingly, large numbers of accurate, long-range strike
systems, principally conventionally armed ballistic and cruise
missiles. These weapons not only can keep U.S. expeditionary
forces at bay for significant periods but also be used to coerce and
intimidate the leadership of Taiwan and other states in the region.
The challenge here, again, will be coupling an appropriate mili-
tary posture vis-à-vis China with a long-term effort to integrate
it into the international system as a stable, responsible power. (See
pp. 19–24.)

Meeting These Challenges

These developments carry several implications for U.S. defense plan-

ners:

• First, a substantial and sustained level of effort to suppress ter-

rorist and insurgent groups abroad is essential if the nation is to
make headway against the threats they pose.3 For DoD, this will
sometimes take the form of direct action to locate and capture or
kill terrorists and insurgents. Far more often, it will involve under-
taking indirect actions, principally long-term, “hands-on” efforts
to train, equip, advise, and assist the forces of nations that seek to
suppress these groups in their own territories. (See pp 28–31.)

3 We recognize that not all fragile states will invite terrorists and that not all terrorist
struggles are insurgencies in character.
 Summary xiii

• Related to this, U.S. forces will be called on to help bring stabil-

ity and security to nations struggling to implement democratic
reforms. This will involve providing support to defeat internal
threats and shoring up regional security to cope with external
enemies. (See pp. 31–33.)
• To sustain deterrence against hostile regional states and, in the
future, to counter nonstate adversaries, U.S. forces must develop
and field far more effective means for locating and destroying or
otherwise defending against nuclear weapons and their means of
delivery. (See pp. 33–35.)
• U.S. forces must also ensure that they can overcome modern anti-
access weapons and methods. Of particular urgency is the need
for highly effective, wide-area defenses against theater ballistic
missiles. Cruise missiles also are a concern. (See pp. 36–38.)

America’s new strategy, combined with daunting challenges ema-

nating from states and nonstate adversaries, will impose new demands
on U.S. armed forces. These demands will stress our forces both quali-
tatively (by creating needs for new types of capabilities) and quantita-
tively (calling for high and sustained levels of commitment abroad). At
the same time, fiscal realities are placing strict limits on the resources
available not only for defense but also for important related activities,
such as counterproliferation initiatives, international development
assistance, and public diplomacy. This combination of an ambitious
strategy, a dynamic and challenging threat environment, and tightly
constrained resources creates a profound dilemma for military strate-
gists and force planners. How might these factors be reconciled?

Recasting U.S. Defense Strategy

DoD first needs to define a defense strategy that embraces the goal of
extending the reach of democracy and freedom. This will not, in our
estimation, necessarily involve more instances of forcible regime change
along the lines of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Rather, it means placing
far more emphasis than heretofore on helping to create or enhance sta-
xiv A New Division of Labor

bility in key areas abroad so that governments can effectively control

their own territories. We refer to this as stability operations, by which we
mean both direct counterinsurgency and other irregular operations by
U.S. forces and, more importantly and more often, indirect efforts to
train, equip, and advise allied indigenous forces. Practically speaking,
this means that the force sizing criterion posited by the defense strat-
egy of 2001—“1-4-2-1”—should be recast.4 Specifically, the nation
will no longer be able to limit its day-to-day activities and posture to
only the four regions in which it is deemed to have important geopo-
litical interests, as classically defined: Europe, Northeast Asia, the East
Asian littoral, and the Middle East and Southwest Asia. It is now clear
that such seemingly remote areas as Afghanistan, Sudan, the Horn
of Africa, the Sahel, Central Asia, the Philippines, and Indonesia can
gestate serious threats not only to regional peace and stability but also
to American security interests. In fact, the number of places in which
U.S. and allied forces might be called on to engage in promoting sta-
bility, democracy, and military competence is indeterminate. Thus, in
our assessment, “4” has, of necessity, become “n.”5
At the same time, the familiar missions of deterring aggression,
redressing imbalances in military power, and defeating aggression
through large-scale power-projection operations have not diminished
in importance. In fact, these missions are, in many ways, becoming
more challenging. Protecting U.S. national interests in Southwest Asia,
East Asia, and elsewhere will demand that U.S. forces, in conjunction

4 The criterion that became known as “1-4-2-1” directed the armed forces to be prepared
simultaneously to defend the United States (1), deter aggression and coercion in four critical
regions (4), and swiftly defeat aggression in two overlapping conflicts (2), while preserving
the option to impose a change of regime in one of the conflicts (1). It also stated that the
forces were to be able to conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.
For further elaboration, see DoD (2001).
5 DoD, in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, has recognized this, stating that
U.S. forces must be structured and postured to operate on a sustained basis “around the
globe and not only in and from the four regions called out in the 2001 QDR” (see DoD,
2006, p. 36). DoD has not, however, indicated how forces should be configured for these
operations or where the capacity to sustain them will come from. For purposes of force plan-
ning, DoD should designate a rotation base of forces capable of sustaining roughly 50 “train,
equip, and advise” missions of various size and duration worldwide (see Chapter Five).
 Summary xv

with those of our allies, remain able to defeat the forces of adversary
states in more than one region. This is critically important not only to
credibly deter our adversaries but also to assure our allies and partners.
Needless to say, U.S. forces must also do whatever is necessary to pro-
tect the United States itself. (See pp. 41–45.)
The question then becomes whether and how DoD can support a
demanding “1-n-2-1” criterion for sizing and shaping the armed forces
of the United States.

A New Division of Labor

The first thing to recognize is that the demands of “1-n-2-1” need

not apply equally to every branch of the armed forces. The impera-
tive to promote stability and democracy abroad will place the great-
est demands on America’s ground forces—the Army and the Marine
Corps—and special operations forces (SOF). Air and naval forces can
make important contributions to these missions, principally in the
areas of intelligence, lift, base operating support or offshore bases, and
humanitarian support. But by and large, these missions call for sub-
stantial commitments of ground forces to work directly with their host-
country counterparts. By the same token, the most plausible major
combat operations that U.S. forces might be called on to fight in
the coming years—involving Iran, China (over Taiwan), and North
Korea—call for heavy commitments of air and naval forces and, in the
first two cases, smaller numbers of U.S. ground forces.
Given limited resources, including limited numbers of available
personnel, the nation’s leaders face a choice of where to apportion risk:
Either they can continue to ask U.S. ground forces to prepare for major
wars and risk a diminished ability to operate effectively in direct and
indirect stability operations, or they can focus a much larger propor-
tion of U.S. ground forces on such missions and accept the risk of
shifting some of the burden for large force-on-force contingencies to
air and naval forces. Given the demands of America’s new strategy,
the certainty of the need for a sustained level of effort against terrorist
and insurgent groups, and recent advances in the ability to use pre-
xvi A New Division of Labor

cision firepower to shape the battlefield to the ground commander’s

advantage, we suggest that DoD’s leaders consider the latter course.
Such a decision would permit the Army and Marine Corps, in con-
junction with SOF, to improve their stability operations capabilities
qualitatively and quantitatively by relieving these two services of the
requirement to provide forces for more than one major war. Taking
this step would help keep overall demands on the forces of these two
services manageable. Equally important, it would also permit substan-
tial portions of both services to optimize training, doctrine, and equip-
ment on the development of forces for manpower-intensive operations
now demanded by America’s new strategy. Under this construct, the
Navy and Air Force would retain their primary focus on large-scale
power-projection operations, although both services will be called on
to provide essential enabling capabilities for direct and indirect stabil-
ity operations. Both will also need to place much greater emphasis on
defeating enemies armed with nuclear weapons and with more sophis-
ticated antiaccess capabilities than have heretofore been encountered.
(See pp. 45–47.)

Potential Actions

The foregoing considerations suggest that DoD’s leaders should con-

sider the following actions to bring America’s defense capabilities into
better alignment with the nation’s new strategy:

• Recast U.S. defense strategy to incorporate “1-n-2-1” as its force

sizing construct. Relieve the Army and Marine Corps of the
requirement to provide forces for more than one major combat
operation at a time. Bringing stability to troubled nations, train-
ing and advising the forces of other countries, and conducting
effective operations against insurgents and terrorists are impor-
tant, complex, and politically charged missions. A greater level
of effort is called for here if we and our allies are to make last-
ing progress against global terrorist threats. The accumulation of
recent experience suggests that these missions cannot be done well
 Summary xvii

by forces whose primary focus is large-scale combat. Changes in

the nature of the threats regional adversaries pose will allow DoD
to reduce the level of ground forces it plans to commit to major
combat operations. (See pp. 40–45.)
• Complete the transition of the joint command structure.
Regional commanders need to remain focused on strategic mat-
ters, including achieving strategic victory in areas where U.S.
forces are engaged. To allow them to do so, more, and more effec-
tive, joint task force headquarters are needed for running ongoing
operations. Ongoing efforts in this regard at U.S. Joint Forces
Command should be buttressed. Moreover, the joint division of
labor among regional commands, global commands, and military
services and supporting agencies should be clarified. The concept
of a division of labor among users, managers, and providers may
be useful in guiding this effort. (See pp. 52–55.)
• Complete the effort to realign U.S. global military posture;
reevaluate that posture regularly. The overseas posture of U.S.
military forces and bases should directly reflect broader U.S.
strategy. That is not the case today. Forces and facilities will need
to be realigned to support new democracies, counter terrorist and
insurgent groups, deter and defeat regional adversaries, and dis-
suade military competition in Asia. Current plans for adjusting
the global basing structure should be implemented and reevalu-
ated regularly to ensure that U.S. strategy and posture remain in
proper alignment. (See pp. 47–50.)
• Increase investments in promising systems for surveillance
and reconnaissance. U.S. defense planners should aspire to put
an end to the situation in which sensor systems and the means
to interpret the information they acquire are chronically “low-
density, high-demand” assets. And efforts should be made to
accelerate the development of new systems better suited to find-
ing such targets as mobile missiles, nuclear weapons, and small
groups of armed combatants. (See pp. 61–64.)

But realigning the defense strategy and reallocating risk alone will
not provide the needed results. New partnerships need to be formed
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