LUC ET LUC LTD v SOCIÉTÉ LAZULI & ANOR

2024 SCJ 553

Record No. 123149

THE SUPREME COURT OF MAURITIUS

In the matter of:-

Luc et Luc Ltd

Appellant

Société Lazuli

Respondent
In the presence of:-

Lakaz Chamarel Ltd

Co-Respondent

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JUDGMENT

This is an appeal from an Order made on 26 April 2022 by a learned Judge of

the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court sitting in Chambers –

(a) over-ruling the objection raised by the appellant, then respondent,

(“Luc et Luc”) to the appointment of a local arbitrator;

(b) granting the application made by the respondent (“Société Lazuli”) for
the appointment of a suitable arbitrator, and appointing Mr Paul Lam
Shang Leen, former Judge of the Supreme Court, as arbitrator for the
determination of the dispute between the parties.

The appeal is being resisted by Société Lazuli while the co-respondent, a

company in which both parties are shareholders and which is the subject matter of
the dispute, has left default.
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Proceedings before Judge in Chambers

The chronology of events leading to the impugned appointment of the

arbitrator is as follows –

On the application of Société Lazuli, Mr Maxime Sauzier SC was on

9 March 2018 appointed by Angoh J., as he then was, as arbitrator for the
determination of a dispute between the parties relating to the development of “Lakaz
Chamarel”, a boutique lodge “niched” in Chamarel, pursuant to a Sale Subscription
and Shareholders’ Agreement (“SSSA”). The appointment was appealed from and
upheld by the Supreme Court on 8 January 2020.

Mr Sauzier thereafter informed the parties’ legal advisers on 7 and

25 February 2020 that, on the basis of information informally imparted to him by Luc
et Luc’s attorney regarding possible conflict and without any formal challenge having
been made, he had decided to recuse himself.

After its Notice Mise en Demeure dated 26 February 2020 suggesting three
names for appointment was not responded to, Société Lazuli made an application to
the Judge in Chambers on 2 September 2020 under Article 1005 of the Code de
Procédure Civile for the appointment of an arbitrator for the determination of the
dispute.

Despite several reminders issued and extensions granted by the Judge in

Chambers, Luc et Luc failed to file any affidavit in reply and Société Lazuli moved in
terms of the proecipe. Luc et Luc’s attorney then informed the Judge in Chambers on
16 November 2021 that it is “looking for and contacting foreign arbitrators which will
be suggested in its affidavit”.

Société Lazuli’s attorney replied by letter dated 17 November 2021 that it was
not agreeable to the appointment of a foreign arbitrator and invited the Judge in
Chambers to appoint an arbitrator, given the history between the parties which made
it unlikely that they would ever agree on the appointment of an arbitrator. The Judge
in Chambers granted two further extensions of time to Luc et Luc to upload its
counter affidavit.

On 16 December 2021 Luc et Luc informed the Judge in Chambers that it

was raising a preliminary objection to the effect that the arbitration of the dispute was
 3

governed by the International Arbitration Act. Société Lazuli replied by letter dated
23 December 2021 that the contemplated arbitration cannot “by any stretch of the
imagination be said to be an international arbitration” and again invited the Judge in
Chambers to set aside the objection and appoint an arbitrator.

Luc et Luc informed the Judge in Chambers on 20 January 2022 that it was
still “finalising its stand” on its preliminary objection and requested a postponement of
one month for disposal as there had been a Without Prejudice offer and counter-offer
made. This was objected to by Société Lazuli, which also indicated that there was no
counter-offer. Parties were then requested by the Judge in Chambers on 25 January
2022 to “carry on with the filing of affidavits” for the matter to be in shape for hearing
on the objection raised and on the merits.

On 24 February 2022 the Judge in Chambers suggested that, in the

exceptional circumstances of the case, an affidavit be put in by Luc et Luc, annexing
a letter signed by its representative, Mr Raffard, in which he would give his reasons
for the appointment of a foreign arbitrator.

In an affidavit dated 10 March 2022, one Mr Filleul, the representative of Luc

et Luc, stated that it has been advised that the arbitrator should be of a “neutral
nationality” which is different from that of the parties. The letter from Mr Raffard that
was appended to the affidavit as Annex 2 stated inter alia –

“3 Depuis que nous faisons des affaires à Maurice, nous avons

rencontré par le passé plusieurs situations de conflits d’intérêt avec
différents intervenants, dont s'est occupé Me R. CHETTY et compte
tenu de la taille géographique de l’Ile Maurice et du nombre limité de
personnes pouvant être qualifiées pour être nommé en tant qu'arbitre
pour ce type de dossier et de l’identité des plaignants, le danger de
relations directes ou indirectes, de partialité ou de perception de
partialité envers le Défendeur est réel. D’autant plus que Luc et Luc
Ltd est une société mauricienne filiale de la holding française OK SA
dont M LUC RAFFARD, de nationalité française est l’actionnaire
majoritaire. Un exemple flagrant en est la nomination de
Me M. SAUZIER par le juge en chambre dans la procédure portant la
référence SC/COM/JICA/00012/2017 qui a dû se récuser de Iui-même
suite à un conflit d’intérêt.”

The letter also points out that the SSSA does not specify that the arbitrator
must be Mauritian, so that a foreign arbitrator may be appointed. It goes on to state
the following –
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“5 Par ailleurs, en matière d’arbitrage, nous avons droit à un

arbitre qui soit neutre et impartial. Nous craignons que la nomination
d’un arbitre mauricien dans ce litige priverait peut-être le défendeur de
l’élément de neutralité et d’impartialité qui est essentiel. Par ce
courrier nous exprimons ces craintes.

Nous sommes informés que l’élément essentiel de l’arbitrage est

l’indépendance, I’impartialité et la neutralité de l'arbitre.

Nous sommes informés que la neutralité de l’arbitre nommé pour

arbitrer les litiges entre les parties doit se refléter dans la pensée et
l’action et nous pensons, dans les circonstances présentes, ceci n’est
possible que par la nomination d’un arbitre étranger dans ces
circonstances.

Avec tout le respect pour les professionnels mauriciens, je pense

néanmoins qu’un arbitre étranger est préférable pour traiter de ce
différend.”

Mr Raffard went on to state in his letter that, although he has for long been a
resident of Mauritius and has for 40 years been attached to Mauritius, he respectfully
expresses the wish that a foreign arbitrator be appointed “avec toute son
indépendance et aucun risque de partialité”. Reference was also made to lists of
foreign arbitrators from which parties could select an arbitrator, although no list was
attached, nor was any link provided indicating where the said lists could be
accessed. He further indicated that he would have had confidence in the Supreme
Court of Mauritius but since the dispute is to be resolved by private arbitration, a
foreign arbitrator should be appointed.

Submissions on behalf of the parties before Judge in Chambers

Counsel for Luc et Luc submitted inter alia that the question is less one of law
than one of fact and is to be addressed by the Judge in Chambers in her absolute
and unfettered discretion; no person is precluded, by reason of his or her nationality,
from acting as an arbitrator; it has no objection that a suitable arbitrator be appointed
for the determination of the dispute “provided that the arbitrator who is appointed is
independent of the parties and is impartial”; the appellant and its ultimate beneficial
owners, as foreigners, would be “uncomfortable” if the arbitrator were to be a
Mauritian; having regard to “the geographical size of Mauritius and the limited
number of persons who may be suitably qualified for appointment as arbitrator, the
danger of direct or indirect relationships or bias is real and not imaginary”; in
essence, the requirement that the arbitrator be of neutral nationality would only be
satisfied if the arbitrator who is appointed is neither Mauritian, nor French, nor
Monégasque.
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Counsel for Société Lazuli submitted in reply that the concerns of Luc et Luc
regarding the nationality of the arbitrator were unfounded and that it would be most
unfair to Société Lazuli, given the history of the case, to “risk adding a level of
complexity to the long-awaited arbitration by appointing a foreign arbitrator”. He
made extensive reference to the conduct of Luc et Luc which has for over five years
frustrated Société Lazuli’s bona fide efforts to have the commercial dispute resolved
speedily through arbitration. He also referred to the decision of the Cour d’appeI de
Paris in Société Grenwich Enterprises v Idemia France SAS, arrêt du 16 février
2021, 18/16695, on a request for annulment of an arbitral award on several grounds,
including the lack of independence and impartiality of the arbitrator, and submitted
that, in the absence of any objective challenge, the Judge in Chambers should
proceed to appoint an arbitrator from among the eminent law practitioners proposed
by it, indicating an order of preference in case the person appointed is unable or
unwilling to accept the appointment.

Order of Judge in Chambers

The learned Judge in Chambers stated in her Order that the crux of the
matter is the nationality of the arbitrator or, as she puts it, “(should) the arbitrator be a
local or a foreigner?” She pointed out that Luc et Luc had not raised any concrete or
verifiable evidence of conflict with regard to the local arbitrators proposed by Société
Lazuli and concluded that she would not be exercising her discretion judicially in not
proceeding with the appointment of a local arbitrator in view of the “lack of cogent
proof regarding the [lack of] impartiality and independence of the local arbitrators
who, inter alia, are no less than former Judges of the Supreme Court and Counsel”.
She over-ruled Luc et Luc’s objection to the appointment of a local arbitrator, granted
the application and appointed Mr Justice Paul Lam Shang Leen as arbitrator for the
determination of the dispute between the parties.

Grounds of Appeal

The two grounds of appeal read as follows –

“GROUND I

Because the Learned Judge in Chambers erred when she failed to

properly consider that even if the nationality of the arbitrator did not
per se form part of the “clause compromissoire”, given the
geographical size of Mauritius and the strong likelihood of the
appointment of a local arbitrator being unsuitable, the Honourable
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Judge in Chambers should not have, in the circumstances, narrowly

construed her role as simply appointing a replacement for the
previously-appointed Mauritian arbitrator who had recused himself but,
instead, directed her mind to the appointment of a foreign arbitrator by
adopting a broader approach and consider (sic) the consensual basis
of arbitration.

GROUND 2

Because the Learned Judge in Chambers erred in proceeding with the

appointment of a replacement arbitrator without first ascertaining from
the legal advisers of the Respondent (then Applicant) whether the
replacing arbitrator would have had any conflict of interest in the
matter in view of the chequered history of this application, of the
disputes between the parties, and the fact that either of them may
have had prior dealings with the arbitrators proposed by the
Respondent (then Applicant) of such a nature so as to create a
situation of conflict or bias or apparent bias as had been the case with
the appointment of the previously-appointed arbitrator upheld by the
Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”

Submissions on appeal

Learned Senior Counsel for Luc et Luc has referred in his submissions to
Ground 1 as raising “a nationality issue” and Ground 2 “a procedural issue”.

He submitted, under Ground 1, that there was in this matter, even in the
absence of a nationality restriction in the “clause compromissoire”, a need to appoint
a foreign arbitrator to ensure neutrality of proceedings so that both parties have full
confidence in the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. He was at pains to
point out that he was not attacking the integrity of local arbitrators. He also drew a
distinction between judicial officers, who are less expected to be affected by issues of
conflict in view of their “droit de réserve”, and private arbitrators, who are free to
conduct business dealings, be in partnerships and belong to law firms.

It was submitted that neutrality of nationality is a fundamental tenet of

arbitration, especially where parties are of different nationalities and there is a sole
arbitrator. Reference was made to an article by Pierre Lalive entitled “On the
Neutrality of the Arbitrator and of the Place of Arbitration” in “Recueil de Travaux
Suisses sur l’Arbitrage International”; to the declaration required to be signed by an
international arbitrator under the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)
Rules; and to an extract from Dalloz on “Instance Arbitrage”, Chapitre 2, note 261.
Learned Counsel submitted that the learned Judge in Chambers, as appointing
authority or “juge d’appui”, should have ensured that there is consensus about and
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confidence in the process and identity of the arbitrator at source, instead of relying on
the recusal mechanism after appointment of the arbitrator.

Under Ground 2, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant questioned the fact
that, after giving her ruling on the nationality issue, the learned Judge in Chambers
had proceeded straightaway to appoint a local arbitrator without the appellant having
been given the opportunity to appeal or to express his preference as to a particular
local arbitrator. It was submitted that, since the appointment process is meant to be
consensual, the appellant should have been allowed to give evidence as to his
choice of local arbitrator before the appointment of the arbitrator, rather than be
required to invoke conflict and move for recusal of the arbitrator after his
appointment.

Learned Senior Counsel for Société Lazuli submitted in reply under Ground 1
that the only issue for determination was whether Luc et Luc had valid reasons to
insist on the appointment of a foreign arbitrator. It had been contended on behalf of
Luc et Luc that no Mauritian arbitrator could be independent or impartial in this
matter, and the learned Judge in Chambers was right to find that this was mere
apprehension on the part of Mr Raffard who had put forward no “faits précis” or
concrete evidence in that regard.

With regard to Ground 2, learned Counsel referred to the fact that the new
Article 1456 of the French Code de Procédure Civile imposes a duty on the
arbitrator to disclose, before or after accepting his appointment, any issue which may
affect his independence or his impartiality. The Judge in Chambers could, in the
absence of concrete evidence on the part of the appellant challenging the arbitrators
proposed by the respondent, properly appoint an arbitrator from the respondent’s list,
the more so since the objection on the basis of nationality had been raised at the
eleventh hour after nine Orders had been made by the Judge in Chambers and six
reminders had been issued by the respondent’s attorney. Giving the appellant an
opportunity to express its preference regarding a local arbitrator after the ruling would
have amounted to condoning Luc et Luc’s laches, unacceptable attitude and lack of
respect for the process.

Analysis

We have carefully considered the submissions of learned Counsel and the

authorities cited by them.
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With regard to Ground 1, we have no hesitation in upholding the Order of the

learned Judge in Chambers over-ruling Luc et Luc’s objection to the appointment of a
local arbitrator.

As rightly emphasised by learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, the

arbitration subject matter of this appeal is a domestic arbitration and not an
international one governed by the International Arbitration Act. Tellingly Luc et Luc
has not pressed an earlier preliminary objection to the effect that this is a case of
international arbitration and its legal advisers have cited provisions of the Code de
Procédure Civile, rather than the International Arbitration Act, in support of its
submissions.

Domestic arbitration in Mauritius is indeed governed by the Code de

Procédure Civile of Mauritius. The relevant provisions of the Code relating to the
“clause compromissoire” and the appointment of an arbitrator read as follows –

“1003. La clause compromissoire est la convention par laquelle les

parties à un contrat s’engagent à soumettre à l’arbitrage les litiges qui
pourraient naître relativement à ce contrat.
1004. La clause compromissoire doit, à peine de nullité, être stipulée
par écrit dans la convention principale ou dans un document auquel
celle-ci se réfère.
Sous la même sanction, la clause compromissoire doit soit désigner le
ou les arbitres, soit prévoir les modalités de leur désignation.
1005. Si le litige né, la constitution du tribunal arbitral se heurte à une
difficulté du fait de l’une des parties ou dans la mise en œuvre des
modalités de désignation, le juge en Chambre désigne le ou les
arbitres.
Si la clause compromissoire est soit manifestement nulle, soit
insuffisante pour permettre de constituer le tribunal arbitral, le juge en
Chambre constate et déclare n’y avoir lieu à désignation.

1012. La constitution du tribunal arbitral n’est parfaite que si le ou les

arbitres acceptent la mission qui leur est confiée.
L’arbitre qui suppose en sa personne une cause de récusation doit en
informer les parties. En ce cas, il ne peut accepter sa mission qu’avec
l’accord de ces parties.
1013. Le tribunal arbitral est constitué d’un seul arbitre ou de
plusieurs en nombre impair. (..)
1021. Un arbitre ne peut s’abstenir ni être récusé que pour une
cause de récusation qui se serait révélée ou serait survenue depuis
sa désignation.
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Les difficultés relatives à l’application du présent article sont portées

devant le juge en Chambre.”
(the underlining is ours).

Now clause 8.2 of the SSSA, which amounts to a “clause compromissoire”,

reads as follows –

“8.2 Arbitration

The Parties hereby agree that all disputes arising between the Parties
in connection with the validity, interpretation, execution or termination
of the Agreement which cannot be resolved amicably shall be
conclusively resolved by one arbitrator in accordance with the
arbitration laws of Mauritius. The arbitrator shall be appointed by
mutual agreement of the Parties and if the Parties fail to agree on the
choice of the arbitrator within fifteen days following notification to all
Parties of the request to go to arbitration, the said arbitrator shall be
appointed by a judge of the Supreme Court, sitting at chambers. The
costs of the arbitration will be borne by the losing party. The place of
arbitration shall be the Republic of Mauritius. The language of
arbitration shall be English.”
(the underlining is ours).

Clause 8.2, while providing for arbitration as a mode of settling disputes

between the parties, does not require that the sole arbitrator be, or not be, of a
particular nationality. In particular it does not exclude the appointment of Mauritian
nationals. The emphasis in the arbitration clause is on the need for the parties to
mutually agree on the appointment of the arbitrator, failing which the arbitrator is to
be appointed by a Judge in Chambers.

Now it is of course essential that the arbitrator appointed by the Judge in

Chambers be, and be perceived to be, independent and impartial. However a blanket
objection to local arbitrators in a domestic arbitration on the ground of possibility of
conflict or bias is quite simply preposterous. We are not in the realm of international
arbitration where “the national neutrality of an arbitrator” is said to be “a vital factor
for the proper functioning of a good arbitral tribunal” (see Lalive, op.cit, at page 25)
and rules made by leading international arbitral institutions expressly provide that the
prospective arbitrator’s nationality shall be taken into account when appointing an
arbitrator (see, for example, Article 13 of the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) Rules of Arbitration and Article 6 of the London Court of International
Arbitration (LCIA) Rules 2014).
 10

This is a domestic arbitration relating to a dispute on the implementation of a

project in Mauritius and a prospective Mauritian arbitrator cannot be disqualified from
appointment on the basis of his nationality only, unless there are precise and
verifiable facts which may, applying an objective standard, create a doubt as to his
independence and impartiality.

We find relevant the following observations of the Cour d’Appel de Paris in

Société Grenwich Enterprises (supra), which were cited on behalf of the
respondent and relied upon by the learned Judge in Chambers –

“52 – L’appréciation d’un défaut d’indépendance d’un arbitre procède

d'une approche objective consistant à caractériser des facteurs précis
et vérifiables externes à l’arbitre susceptibles d’affecter sa liberté de
jugement, tels que des liens personnels, professionnels et/ou
économiques avec l'une des parties.

(….)

56 – L’impartialité de l'arbitre suppose l’absence de préjugés ou de

partis pris susceptibles d’affecter le jugement de l’arbitre, lesquels
peuvent résulter de multiples facteurs tels que la nationalité de
l’arbitre, son environnement social, culturel ou juridique.

57 - Toutefois pour être pris en compte ces éléments doivent créer,

dans l’esprit des parties, un doute raisonnable sur son impartialité de
telle sorte que l’appréciation de ce défaut doit procéder d’une
démarche objective.”
(the underlining is ours).

We find no reason to interfere with the finding of fact of the learned Judge in
Chambers that no concrete or verifiable evidence had been adduced by Luc et Luc
to question the independence and impartiality of local arbitrators and no serious
doubt has been cast on their impartiality, save for the ipse dixit of Mr Raffard. Indeed
his apprehension appears to be based on the geographical size of Mauritius, the
dearth (according to him) of practitioners qualified to act as arbitrator in a case of this
nature, his French nationality, other unspecified cases of conflict of interest and the
earlier self-recusal of Mr Sauzier SC, which would, on an objective approach, not be
enough to create a reasonable doubt as to the independence and impartiality of all
prospective Mauritian arbitrators.

Mr Sauzier’s decision to recuse himself was, ex facie his email dated

7 February 2020, based on his being a Board member of “DMH” and there is no
objective basis for saying that all the other local arbitrators proposed would have the
same or similar personal or professional predicament merely because they are
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Mauritians. In any event any arbitrator would still have the possibility, after being
appointed and before accepting his mission, of informing parties of any cause for
recusal (see Article 1012 of the Code de Procédure Civile).

In the light of the above we find that the ruling of the learned Judge in
Chambers setting aside the objection of the appellant to the appointment of local
arbitrators cannot be faulted. Ground 1 is therefore devoid of merit.

Although Ground 2, as formulated, challenges the fact that the learned Judge
in Chambers did not ascertain whether there was any possible conflict of interest
before appointing the arbitrator, both Counsel addressed us under Ground 2 on the
wider issue of whether the learned Judge in Chambers should have given an
opportunity to Luc et Luc to express its preference as to a particular local arbitrator
after she had ruled that Mauritian arbitrators were not excluded. We shall accordingly
deal with the submissions made by Counsel on the wider issue raised under
Ground 2.

It was submitted by learned Senior Counsel for Luc et Luc at the hearing that,
once the learned Judge had over-ruled the objection, it would be “fairer” to seek the
appellant’s views before appointing a local arbitrator was appointed. It was argued
on behalf of the respondent that the Judge in Chambers may exercise his or her own
absolute discretion in appointing an appropriate arbitrator under Article 1005 of the
Code de Procédure Civile.

Now, it is true that neither the Code de Procédure Civile nor the “clause
compromissoire” provides that the Judge in Chambers, as the appointing authority in
default of agreement, has to obtain proposals from the parties or needs to select and
appoint an arbitrator from proposals made by the parties.

In this particular case, the parties had been given ample opportunity to
propose names of potential arbitrators for the consideration of the Judge in
Chambers before she gave her ruling. Société Lazuli has, ever since the dispute
arose, sought, but not obtained, the concurrence of Luc et Luc for the appointment of
the arbitrator from among a series of Mauritian persons, including Justices Sik Yuen
and Lam Shang Leen and Senior Counsel M. Sauzier SC, late Y. Mohamed SC and
D.K. Dabee SC, as well as Ms. Y. Moonshiram, barrister. The appellant, for its part,
has suggested no name for the consideration of the respondent, contenting itself with
vaguely pointing to lists of foreign arbitrators that could be resorted to.
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After the Judge in Chambers gave her ruling on local as opposed to foreign
arbitrators, she appointed Justice Lam Shang Leen from the list of names provided
by Société Lazuli without giving a fresh opportunity to Luc et Luc to express its
preference as to a local arbitrator.

We have carefully reviewed the relevant provisions of the Code de

Procédure Civile of Mauritius and of the French Code de Procédure Civile. As legal
advisers on both sides have acknowledged, the Code de Procédure Civile in France
was amended in 2011 to provide for a new Livre IV on “L’Arbitrage”. No such
amendments have been brought to Livre Troisième of our Code de Procédure
Civile so that guidance may only be obtained from French doctrine and case-law on
the pre-2011 Livre IV of the French Code de Procédure Civile.

We may usefully refer to the following notes in Dalloz, Code de Procédure

Civile (Edition Limitée 2015) on the former Article 1443 of the French Code de
Procédure Civile (which is identical to Article 1004 of our Code de Procédure
Civile) –

“3. Volonté des parties. La désignation du ou des arbitres doit

résulter de la commune volonté des parties. • TGI Paris, 22 mars
1983: JCP 1983.II. 20004, note d'Antin et Lacorne; RTD civ. 1984.
545, obs. Normand; RTD com. 1983. 533, obs. Dubarry at Bénabent;
Rev. arb. 1983. 479, note Moreau. • Le président du tribunal, appelé à
prêter son concours à la constitution du tribunal arbitral, doit respecter
la volonté des parties. • Civ. 2e, 16 mars 2000: • Bull. civ. II, n° 45; D.
2000. IR 149. • En l'état de conditions générales prévoyant que tout
litige sera résolu par un arbitre unique désigné par des conditions
particulières, le fait que celles-ci indiquent deux noms n'implique pas
que ces deux arbitres doivent être désignés cumulativement, mais
qu'à défaut de disponibilité de I’un, I’autre serait désigné. • Versailles,
20 déc. 2001: Gaz. Pal. 2002. Somm. 753.

5. Principe d’égalité. Un principe d’égalité des parties s'impose dans

la désignation des arbitres; ce principe est d’ordre public et on ne peut
y renoncer qu’après la naissance du litige. • Civ. 1re, 7 janv. 1992: •
Rev. arb. 1992. 470, note Bellet. • V. également, rendu au visa du
principe de l’égalité des parties dans Ia désignation des arbitres: • Civ.
1re, 8 juin 1999: • Bull. civ. I, n° 190; D. Affaires 1999. 1247 (le juge
appelé à régler une difficulté de constitution du tribunal arbitral ne peut
désigner un arbitre au nom d’une partie sans avoir égard aux
conclusions de cette partie qui, subsidiairement à son refus de
l’arbitrage, proposait un arbitre, nommément désigné). • Adde: • Civ.
2e, 31 janv. 2002: • JCP 2003, I. 105, n° 5, obs. Seraglini.”
(the underlining is ours).
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and the former Article 1444 of the French Code de Procédure Civile (which reads the
same as Article 1005 of our Code de Procédure Civile, save for the “juge d’appui”
being the Judge in Chambers under our Code) –

“7. Mesure préparatoire. En ordonnant une mesure préparatoire

(injonction à la société ayant saisi le juge d’appui d’une demande de
désignation d’arbitre de communiquer au défendeur le nombre
d’arbitrages dans lesquels elle avait désigné le même arbitre, des
doutes étant exprimés sur l’indépendance de cet arbitre), le juge
d’appui n’excède pas ses pouvoirs, dès lors qu’il a pour mission de
résoudre les difficultés de constitution du tribunal arbitral de manière à
ce que cette juridiction soit investie de la confiance des parties. • Civ.
1re, 20 juin 2006: • Bull. civ. I, n° 311; D. 2006. IR 1840, note Avena-
Robardet; ibid. 2008. Pan. 185, obs. Clay •; JCP 2006; II. 10155, note
Chabot; Dr. et proc. 2006, p. 342, note Asfar-Cazenave. • V. déjà,
dans la même affaire: • Paris, 10 févr. 2005: D. 2005. Pan. 3057, obs.
Clay •; Rev. arb. 2005. 709, note Henry.”
(the underlining is ours).

We are also mindful of the proposition in Dalloz, Encyclopédique

numérique, Répertoire procédure civile, décembre 2012, Arbitrage en droit
interne, paragraph 261 that the “juge d’appui”, in a case where the parties are
agreeable to arbitration, “a toujours le souci, constatant la volonté des parties d'aller
à l’arbitrage, de favoriser celle-ci en sollicitant autant que faire se peut leur
consentement à la constitution du tribunal arbitral (TGI Paris, 31 janv. 1986, Rev.
arb. 1987. 164, note Fouchard)” (emphasis added). The conduct of the parties is
therefore of relevance.

True it is that the record of proceedings indicates that Luc et Luc has made
extensive use of dilatory tactics in the form of inter alia ignoring deadlines for filing of
replies, praying for extension of time, raising objections which were not subsequently
pressed and, as the learned Judge in Chambers noted in her ruling, an eleventh hour
objection to local arbitrators being appointed.

However we cannot ignore the fact that the reason for which Luc et Luc had
not proposed any local arbitrator was that it was insisting on a foreign arbitrator being
appointed.

We are of the view that, since it is incumbent on the learned Judge in

Chambers, as “juge d’appui” tasked with constituting the arbitral tribunal, to respect
the “principe d’égalité des parties” which is “d’ordre public” (see Dalloz (supra)), she
should, following her ruling, have provided a reasonable opportunity to Luc et Luc to
 14

provide, within a strict time-frame, a list of local arbitrators or to agree to any local
arbitrator proposed by the respondent. She could thereafter have proceeded to
appoint an arbitrator, taking into consideration the preference expressed, if any, by
both parties pursuant to the “principe d’égalité des parties”.

Ground 2, as argued, must therefore succeed and we quash the appointment

of Justice Paul Lam Shang Leen as arbitrator. We refer the matter back to the
learned Judge in Chambers for her to: (a) order Luc et Luc to provide one or more
names of local arbitrators within such delay as she may specify; and (b) appoint an
arbitrator pursuant to Articles 1005 and 1006 of the Code de Procédure Civile.

We can only remind the parties that they need to honour their obligations
under the SSSA and ensure early resolution of the dispute by arbitration. It is a
matter of regret that, although the dispute between them arose in or before 2016,
parties are still at the preliminary stage of appointing an arbitrator for resolution of the
said dispute pursuant to clause 7 of the SSSA.

We make no order as to costs since the appellant has been partly successful.

A.D. Narain
Judge

P. Harrah
Judge

13 December 2024

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Judgment delivered by Hon. A.D. Narain, Judge

For Appellant : Mr J. Gujadhur, SA

Mr D. Basset, SC, together with
Mr K. Namdarkhan, of Counsel

For Respondent : Ms K. Mardemootoo, Attorney-at-Law

Mr H. Duval, SC, together with
Ms L. Bazerque, of Counsel