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Summer 2024

Navigating the Future of Global Challenges: Analyzing U.S.

Foreign Policy in the 21st Century
Chance Lee Hepola
Missouri State University, [email protected]

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NAVIGATING THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL CHALLENGES: ANALYZING U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A Master’s Thesis

Presented to

The Graduate College of

Missouri State University

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Science, Defense and Strategic Studies

By

Chance Hepola

August 2024
Copyright 2024 by Chance Hepola

ii
NAVIGATING THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL CHALLENGES: ANALYZING U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Defense and Strategic Studies

Missouri State University, August 2024

Master of Science

Chance Hepola

ABSTRACT

In recent years, traditional American foreign policy norms have been rocked by dissent and
challenges to the status quo. The rise of American populism, the 2016 election, and the
admiration of ‘America First’ policies have contributed to the shift of modern American
internationalism and statecraft to a retreat towards isolationism and a wariness to the
international order. More so, questions regarding the United States’ role in NATO, approach to
Ukrainian aid, and the ever-evolving Israel-Hamas War have all but exacerbated the issue of the
American approach to foreign policy. Members of Congress, both from the left and the right, are
deeply divided on America’s place in the world. The questions remain - Where does America
belong in the international space, how should the United States approach foreign policy, and
what does the world look like if America is not at the forefront as the liberal superpower? With
U.S. adversaries on the rise and becoming increasingly more aggressive, the United States must
come to a consensus on its foreign policy principles. A 2024 Presidential Election is fast
approaching, and a divergent view of American foreign policy is on full display between the
sitting President and the leading candidate of the opposition party. This thesis attempts to
examine America’s historical foreign policy roots, evaluate three specific competing ideological
differences, and ultimately, identify key recommendations of the United States’ approach
towards foreign policy.

KEYWORDS: foreign policy, retrenchment, isolationism, China, Russia, Middle East

iii
 NAVIGATING THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL CHALLENGES: ANALYZING U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

By

Chance Hepola

A Master’s Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate College
Of Missouri State University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Science, Defense and Strategic Studies

August 2024

Approved:

John Rose, Ph.D., Thesis Committee Chair

David Trachtenberg, M.S., Committee Member

Christopher Ford, J.D., Committee Member

Julie Masterson, Ph.D., Dean of the Graduate College

In the interest of academic freedom and the principle of free speech, approval of this document
indicates the format is acceptable and meets the academic criteria for the discipline as
determined by the faculty that constitute the committee. The content and views expressed in this
document are those of the student-scholar and are not endorsed by Missouri State University, its
Graduate College, or its employees.

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Chapter I: Theoretical Framework 4

Global Retrenchment 4
Accepting New Spheres of Influence 7
Asserting American Leadership 8

Chapter II: Historical Overview of American Foreign Policy 12

Establishing a Foundation 12
The Monroe Doctrine 22
Cold War Policies 28
America First 32
Conclusion and Analysis 33

Chapter III: The Current State of American Foreign Policy 39

China 39
Russia 45
The Middle East 48
Looking Forward 52

Chapter IV: Global Retrenchment and Accepting Spheres of Influence: A Dangerous Gambit 55
Dangers of Global Retrenchment 55
The False Premise of Spheres of Influence 63

Chapter V: Recommendations for Policymakers 66

Affirming and Honoring U.S. Commitments and Alliances 67
The Value of Free Trade 75
Reinforce Nuclear Modernization and Deterrence 79
Enhance Global Security in Latin America 83
Conclusion 88

References 90

v
 INTRODUCTION

The United States’ global role has a long, complicated, and drawn-out history. While

many policymakers and everyday Americans view U.S. foreign policy through a limited

viewpoint of events and U.S. actions over the past twenty years, the approach to foreign policy

has much more nuance than conventional wisdom might assume. For 235 years, the American

foreign policy pendulum has swung back and forth based on the changing of international events,

executive and legislative decisions, and the opinions of the American public. Yet, for more than

four decades, the U.S. foreign policy approach has received bipartisan support and consistency

among the executive and legislative branches. Though there had been few differences between

both the left and the right on the U.S. approach to the rest of the world, both parties have

universally agreed on America’s international standing. From a global leader focused on

deterrence, security alliances, and American supremacy in the 20th century to Congress

universally authorizing military force in Afghanistan in 2001 and later an overwhelming majority

of Congress supporting action in Iraq in 2003, U.S. foreign policy has been predicated on a

consistent narrative with few dissenting factions in U.S. foreign policy. However, beginning in

the early stages of the 2016 presidential election, American foreign policy perceptions began to

shift. No longer has ‘America First’ or ‘isolationism’ received the negative reactions of the past,

but it has become popularized by those on the right and embraced by members on the left

(though, there are clear semantic differences and even substantive differences).

By the onset of the 2016 election, and the rise of isolationist sentiments, ‘America First’

ideology dominated the Trump Presidency and has since become a cornerstone of the Republican

Party. Outside of Republican circles, Progressive Democrats have dissented from their centrist

1
colleagues - both Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders vowed to cut defense spending,

end military interventions, and reform the global economy during the 2016 democratic primary

election cycle. Democrats and left-leaning individuals are starkly divided on U.S. support for

conflicts abroad, specifically with the conflict between Israel-Hamas. Since the outbreak of the

war in Gaza, progressives have demanded the United States cease military and financial support

to Israel because of their view of alleged “genocide” occurring in the Gaza Strip. Russia’s

subsequent second invasion of Ukraine, Israel’s war with Hamas, China’s persistent aggression

towards territorial claims to the South China Sea and Taiwan, and Iran’s ever influential proxies

in the Middle East, have put foreign policy front and center for President Joe Biden, Congress,

and the American public.

This thesis not only revisits the historical roots and development of American foreign

policy, but it paints a picture of American foreign policy from the founding of the United States

to the modern-day. In addition, this thesis seeks to identify and explain the differing foreign

policy perspectives and competing ideologies, and ultimately, identifies a direction and key

recommendations for policymakers in the future.

Regarding structure, Chapter One establishes a theoretical framework. While there are a

multitude of nuanced approaches and ideologies, I have identified three competing approaches in

American foreign policy. These three approaches are meant to be distinguished as the most

important and persistent approaches by most policymakers and the average foreign policy

observer. In this chapter, the three approaches are identified with real-world examples that

includes the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Chapter Two provides the historical

overview of American foreign policy. The chapter gives the reader context and the historical

knowledge of the U.S. approach to the international realm. Furthermore, Chapter Two focuses on

2
policies, events, legislation, and public opinion that has helped shape American grand strategy.

From early American history to the more recent foreign policy maneuvers, the chapter helps give

the reader an understanding of how the United States arrived in its place in the world. To avoid

creating a “history encyclopedia” and a laundry list of historical events, this thesis only identifies

a limited number of policies and events that helped shape U.S. grand strategy. Throughout the

chapter, and by the end, the three competing ideologies are interwoven based on the historical

analysis that is presented.

Chapter Three details the current state of U.S. foreign policy and the most persistent

issues that the United States faces in the 21st century. In this chapter, the focus is on three

persistent and future consistent adversaries – China, Russia, and the terrorist groups and regimes

of the Middle East. Chapter Four touches on the fallacies of global retrenchment, isolationism,

and the issues of accepting spheres of influence. In addition, Chapter Four explains why the U.S.

should continue to embrace its global role, and why it is important for the United States to lead.

Chapter Five offers’ recommendations and analyzes key considerations for policymakers, the

national security apparatus, and a conclusion.

3
 CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Before examining the history of American foreign policy in Chapter II, this chapter lays

out the practical framework for future analysis. Though there are several different ideologies,

viewpoints, and practices when it comes to U.S. engagement with the rest of the world, this

chapter, and the rest of this thesis, lays out three specific world views – global retrenchment

(isolationism), accepting spheres of influence, and asserting American leadership and

dominance. While there are possibly more foreign policy viewpoints, these three approaches are

the most significant ones in current American discourse. Specifically, I will reference and

explain three specific Foreign Affairs articles from three different competing perspectives. This

thesis identifies three articles suggesting different approaches to the role of the United States in

the world. Throughout history the United States has implemented a form of one of the three

perspectives. In addition, the three foreign affairs articles help readers establish a practical

framework with real-world ramifications. While it is important to understand the theory of

foreign policy implementation, it is even more important to understand the practical and real-

world consequences that come with it. The three perspectives follow:

Global Retrenchment

In his piece, “The Price of Primacy: Why America Shouldn’t Dominate the World,”

Stephen Wertheim touches on why the United States should not dominate the world. According

to Wertheim, the United States had an unfettered leadership in the international community after

the collapse of the Soviet Union.1 Many others claim that the United States was the sole

1
Stephen Wertheim, "The Price of Primacy: Why America Shouldn’t Dominate the World," Foreign Affairs, 2020,
19, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-02-10/price-primacy.

4
superpower. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have seen a rise in different powers -

China with its military and geopolitical expansion and advancements, has risen; Russia maintains

an aggressive military posture reflected in the invasion of Ukraine; North Korea remains an

unbalanced and unpredictable nuclear threat to the Korean peninsula and the Indo-Pacific region;

and Iran seems bent on a nuclear weapon capability while they export terrorism across the

Middle East. The United States is the unchallenged leader in Europe and the Pacific, a persistent

voice in the UN, and is almost unmatched militarily and economically. While the United States

is limited in its unilateral leadership in the United Nations because of the veto power of the “Big

5” on the Security Council, it remains the voice of democratic governance around the world.

With this global dominance both in the 20th and 21st centuries, Wertheim argues the

United States has focused entirely too much on dominance and supremacy and has failed to

realize its consequences. In a scathing assessment regarding United States’ foreign policy over

the past two decade, Wertheim states the following:

Rather than practice and cultivate peace, Washington pursued armed domination and
launched futile wars in Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, and Libya in 2011. These
actions created more enemies than they defeated. They killed hundreds of thousands of
civilians and overextended a generation of U.S. service members. They damaged laws
and institutions that stabilize the world and the United States. They made the American
people less safe.2

Wertheim continues by stating the United States failed to address the AIDS pandemic, climate

change, and other human rights issues while focusing too much on militarization.3 More so, he

goes on to list several consequences of American primacy: financial costs, strategic overreach,

and geopolitical backlash.4

2
Ibid.
3
Ibid, 23.
4
Ibid.

5
 Instead of global primacy, Wertheim argues the United States should pursue diplomacy

over militarized coercion, multilateralism and international cooperation, restraint in the use of

military force, and selective engagement.5 For the approach to Russia and China, he recommends

reducing the U.S. military presence in Asia and Europe, while retaining the ability to intervene if

either power becomes a threat to its respective region.6 Though, one might argue that

maintaining a force large enough to intervene is similar to maintain primacy. Furthermore,

providing allies with the tools and resources they need to repel an attack by either great power

would be beneficial compared to U.S. military enforcement.7 In a dissent from previous views of

Russia, Wertheim recommends the United States pursue a policy “that respects Russia’s

consistent view of its vital interests - preserving its regime, avoiding hostile governments in its

‘near abroad,’ and participating in core European security and diplomatic discussions.”8

Overall, Wertheim’s “camp” and beliefs are generally consistent with isolationist tenants

- retreating from the global stage, restraining from conflicts, and allowing other hostile regimes

to flourish and not pushing back against them. With the debacle in Afghanistan, and the Russian

invasion of Ukraine, Americans are truly questioning the U.S. role in the rest of the world.

Wertheim ultimately argues that the United States should reevaluate its place in the world, retreat

to regional influence rather than international leadership, and focus on diplomacy more than

anything. Above all else, Wertheim’s camp believes the United States should retreat from its

militarily alliances, bring home U.S. servicemen and servicewomen, and embrace global

retrenchment.

5
Ibid, 26.
6
Ibid, 25.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.

6
Accepting New Spheres of Influence

The second competing approach is introduced in “The New Spheres of Influence” by

Graham Allison. In this article, Allison discusses the evolving dynamics of global power and

influence in the 21st century. Allison argues that the traditional notion of spheres of influence,

where great powers dominate specific regions, is being reshaped by technological advancements,

economic interdependence, and unconventional warfare tactics.9 Furthermore, Allison defines

spheres of influence as the “ability of other powers to demand deference from other states in

their own regions or exert predominant control there…”10 Examples of spheres of influence

throughout history has been the Soviet Union’s influence in Eastern Europe and the United

States enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America. Shortly after World War II, the

United States accepted there would be areas of the world that would be under Soviet Union.

According to the author, despite the terrible consequences, the “best course for the United States

was to bolster those powers on the periphery of this Soviet sphere while reinforcing the strength

and unity of its own sphere.”11

In the modern-age, Allison highlights China's rising influence, particularly in Asia, and

its challenge to the existing U.S.-led order. He warns against a simplistic return to Cold War-

style containment strategies, advocating instead for a nuanced approach that recognizes the

complexities of contemporary geopolitics.12 He emphasizes the importance of understanding and

engaging with the diverse range of actors and factors shaping global power dynamics to navigate

this new era effectively.

9
Graham Allison, "The New Spheres of Influence: Sharing the Globe with Other Great Powers," Foreign Affairs,
2020, 32, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence.
10
Ibid, 30.
11
Ibid, 31.
12
Ibid.

7
 Allison argues for “somewhere in the middle.” Unlike the opposing views between

isolationism and interventionism, the United States should find an approach between the two by

allowing other spheres of influence and the opportunity to share the globe with others. Allison

lists the several different decisions by China and Russia that are challenging traditional Western

spheres of influence and creating spheres of their own such as the Chinese Belt and Road

Initiative, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and the newfound issue of cyber warfare.13 Ultimately,

Allison argues that different approaches are necessary to the world we see today.

The United States has seen a pragmatic approach to foreign policy before, especially

under the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Overall, Allison contends that accepting shared

spheres of influence across the globe will lead to peace and alleviate the contentious nature of the

world in its current state. Spheres of influence advocates believe the United States should accept

that U.S. adversaries have an influence throughout the world. By accepting spheres of influence,

the United States would acknowledge the “reality” that countries like Russia, China, and Iran are

not going away. The author ends his piece by exclaiming: “Going forward, U.S. policymakers

will have to abandon unattainable aspirations for the worlds they dreamed of and accept the fact

that spheres of influence will remain a central feature of geopolitics.”14

Asserting American Leadership

The third, and final, perspective this thesis evaluates is the support for American

hegemony and leadership throughout the world. Thomas Wright’s editorial in Foreign Affairs,

“The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw from the World,” takes a deep dive

into why the United States should not retreat from its responsibilities, alliances, or place in the

13
Ibid, 32.
14
Ibid, 40.

8
world. The author argues for maintaining the historic “status quo” of U.S. foreign policy. Wright

states: “Although successive administrations had major disagreements over the details,

Democrats and Republicans alike backed a system of alliances, the forward positioning of forces,

a relatively open international economy, and, albeit imperfectly, the principles of freedom,

human rights, and democracy.”15 Wright contends that both the fringe left, and the fringe right,

have accustomed themselves to a retrenchment of American foreign policy.16

While leading Republican and Democrat members of Congress are committed to the

United States’ traditional role in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, there are simmering beliefs

within each party that Washington should retreat from its alliances and enter an era with the

United States not as the global leader. Wright contends that though retrenchment seems

appealing to some, it would become detrimental for U.S. interests and global stability. Especially

in today’s international environment, a retreat to isolationism would cede ground to U.S.

adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. To Wright, and others like him,

retrenchment would worsen regional security competition in Europe and Asia, it would increase

and worsen nuclear proliferation, heighten nationalism and xenophobia, and threaten regional

stability.17

Wright concludes that, for all of the flaws with retrenchment, it would be wrong to

pretend that the world would change for the better if the United States did not maintain global

leadership and the status quo.18 Meaning, U.S. policymakers who espouse retrenchment and

isolationism assume the nation and the world would be a safer place if the United States retreated

15
Thomas Wright, "The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw From the World," Foreign Affairs
2020, 10, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/folly-retrenchment.
16
Ibid, 11.
17
Ibid, 12-15.
18
Ibid, 17.

9
from its historic foreign policy approach of the past eighty years. Yet, he states the United States

should pick and choose when to implement retrenchment in certain areas of the world. For

instance, Wright advocated for the ending of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Those who agree

with Wright advocate for an American foreign policy that honors its alliances, asserts its

leadership, and challenges adversaries. Wright’s views reflect an ideology of U.S. economic and

military leadership that has been the norm since the end of World War II.

In summation, American lawmakers and policymakers have several different “options”

when developing the future of American foreign policy. Retrenchment, a policy of diminished

U.S. presence abroad, has become increasingly attractive for policymakers that span across party

lines. Whether it be “America First” from the right, or retrenchment from the left, Congressional

members have flirted with the idea that U.S. leadership is no longer needed abroad. The presence

of U.S. troops and bases around the globe are perceived as aggressive, unwarranted, and not of

American interest. As for the acceptance of new spheres of influence, policymakers could

conclude that Chinese and Russian influence over their respective regions is now the new

normal. This would mean Russia has a dominant influence over Eastern Europe, while China

would exert its influence throughout East Asia and the Pacific. Since the end of the Cold War,

the United States has experienced global influence and unipolarity. But with the resurgence of an

aggressive China and Russia, Congress may have to come to terms with the reality that both

nations have an outsized influence in their broader regions. Despite the resurgence of these two

foreign policy views, there are still several policymakers who value the “status quo” of American

leadership. This foreign policy view not only values American military and economic presence

abroad, but it pushes back against new spheres of influence throughout Europe, Asia, and the

10
Middle East. As world events continue to evolve, the United States will surely grapple with the

direction of American grand strategy.

11
 CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

To understand contemporary and prospective American foreign policy, one must

understand the history of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, one must understand how particular

events and policy positions guided American foreign policy from the nation’s founding and

beyond. Globalization, internationalism, and security assurances were outgrowths of a post-

World War II era, and the commencement of the Cold War. Yet, the United States has more than

200 years of differing foreign policy approaches that were overwhelmingly popular for decades.

America’s history with the rest of the globe is complicated, and it has differing distinctions

throughout each presidency. This chapter tries to explain the U.S. role in foreign affairs in a

clear, concise, organized, and understandable manner. As mentioned previously; to avoid

creating a history encyclopedia and a long list of historical events, this thesis only identifies a

limited number of policies and events that helped shape U.S. grand strategy.

Establishing a Foundation

Long before the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the creation of the American

governance framework through the approval of the U.S. Constitution in 1783, the Founding

Fathers had a millennia of foreign policy history to study. For centuries, war, global alignments,

and great-power competition had plagued the “Old World”-- specifically the European continent.

Death and destruction were a reality for all too many in Europe. The alliance and competing

nations of the Old World may have influenced the founders’ thinking when establishing the new

nation. There are multiple examples of entangled alliances, and cyclical warfare on the European

continent before the founding of the United States, but this section only identifies a few. For

12
example, the ”Hundred Years” War lasted more than a century between the 14th - 15th centuries

as both France and Britain vied for political, economic, and geographic dominance.19 The War of

Grand Alliance in the late 17th century was fought between the French and a British led coalition

that consisted of the Dutch and the Austrians.20 In addition, the French and Indian War, a

segment of the broader Seven Years’ War, hit colonists closer to home. Though, some colonists

exacerbated the conflict by expanding to the West themselves. The competitive nature of the

European powers had expanded beyond the European continent and the North American colonies

became a breeding ground for European competition. In the current age of perceived perpetual

conflict and conversations revolving around “endless wars,” British, French, Dutch, and Spanish

descendants of the colonial era encountered continuous conflict among their European ruling

nations.

While official U.S. foreign policy did not officially begin until the Constitutional

Convention and the George Washington presidency, the framers approached foreign affairs

based on their immediate experience with the European powers. If the American experiment was

going to work early on, many of the Founders believed in a nation that was not subjugated to the

alliances and wars of the past. Leading up to the writing of the Constitution, the Federalist

Papers not only had a profound impact on the contemporary U.S. system of governance, but the

literature was not silent on the subject of foreign policy. Arguing that foreign policy is superior

under a unified government rather than a confederation of states, John Jay in Federalist No. 3

asserted that the United States had an obligation to national security, should apply treaties

19
"Hundred Years’ War," Encyclopedia Britannica, February 13, 2024, https://www.britannica.com/event/Hundred-
Years-War.
20
Ibid.

13
consistently on behalf of the states, and participate in commerce abroad.21 While this was simply

a skeletal argument on why foreign policy is better under a centralized government rather than

individual states, it laid a foundation for the early Republic.

The Constitution of the United States gives foreign policy powers to both the executive

and legislative branches. Article I enumerates several foreign affairs matters to the legislative

branch – “regulate commerce with foreign nations, declare war, raise and support armies,

provide and maintain a military, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land

and naval forces.”22 Article II lays out presidential powers in foreign affairs - the President is the

“commander and chief of the army and navy.”23 In addition, the President has the authority to

make treaties and appoint ambassadors with the advice and consent of the Senate.24 The framers

agreed that foreign policy would be a core issue of the American Republic. While implicit and

explicit powers were given to Congress and the president regarding foreign affairs, it was up to

policymakers and America’s leaders to define the United States’ place in the world. For decades

on, American leadership would grapple with varying foreign policy approaches.

For much of the first century, the United States had long followed the foreign policy

precedent of the presidency of George Washington and his Farewell Address. President

Washington’s foreign policy focused on protecting the new nation’s sovereignty and avoiding

expensive and debilitating wars.25 This new democratic experiment had to be protected against

encroaching powers. The Founders’ believed in a robust domestic policy focused on advancing

21
John Jay, “The Federalist Papers : No. 3,” The Avalon Project : The Federalist Papers No. 3, 2024,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed03.asp.
22
U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8.
23
U.S. Constitution, art 2, sec 2.
24
Ibid.
25
Lindsay Chervinsky, "Foreign Affairs," Miller Center, 2024,
https://millercenter.org/president/washington/foreign-affairs.

14
liberty at home, but a foreign policy that was restrained, non-interventionist, and neutral.

Though, the United States wanted to extend commercial and diplomatic ties with other nations.

As mentioned previously, President Washington wanted to protect the fragile nation from

external forces. As Europe experienced several new wars and the French Revolution came to

fruition, the United States had a choice – intervention or neutrality. Washington’s Administration

declared a policy of neutrality in the Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 in a response to the raging

wars and revolution taking place in Europe. It is important to note that Washington’s secretaries

unanimously agreed on neutrality, but there had been some disagreements on the extent of

neutrality between the Federalists and the Democratic Republicans.26 The proclamation stated:

“The duty and interest of the United States require… that they [the United States] should with

sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent

Powers.”27 The United States remained neutral, but also offered “friendly” and “impartial”

relations with other nations. Not without critics, many individuals viewed the neutral position as

a retreat from U.S. commitments to France, which helped the U.S. achieve victory over the

British in the War for Independence. One anonymous correspondence to the president stated,

“The cause of France is the cause of man, and neutrality is desertion.”28 The United States had

previously signed two treaties with France - one defensive in nature and one establishing

economic relations. The Treaty of Alliance in 1778 acknowledged U.S. independence and was

defensive in nature.29 The Treaty of Amity and Commerce established diplomatic and

commercial relations between the two countries.

26
Ibid.
27
“Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, Presidential Proclamations, George Washington Administration, Records of the
U.S. Senate,” National Archives, 2024, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=15.
28
"Neutrality Proclamation," George Washington's Mount Vernon, 2024,
https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/neutrality-proclamation/.
29
“Treaty of Alliance, 1778.” Avalon Project Yale Law School, February 6, 1778,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fr1778-1.asp.

15
 A lasting, and by far the most consequential precedent established by Washington, was

his 1796 Farewell Address. Often quoted by his successors and scholars alike, Washington’s

Farewell Address guided the nation towards a foreign policy that has been characterized as

“isolationist” in nature. Washington noted that foreign relationships should focus on

commercialization and neutrality rather than alliances and entanglements. In his reasoning,

Washington made clear that disallowing alliances and foreign interventionism within the U.S.

foreign policy apparatus was integral to the success of liberty and stability at home.

Furthermore, the outgoing president remained steadfast in citing the geographic

advantage of the United States: “Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit

our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of

Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest,

humor or caprice?”30 His Farewell Speech had been consumed with the subject of foreign policy,

and why the United States should remain at arm’s length with other foreign nations. What

Washington may have not realized is that his administration and speech would be the catalyst for

grand strategy for decades to come. As we discover in following chapters, Washington’s

clarities, and emphasis on neutrality in global conflicts are understandable and applicable.

The “Virginia Dynasty,” the first four presidents who hailed from the state of Virginia,

carried on Washington's foreign policy legacy. With the French Revolution still raging, and the

rest of Europe continuing its competing rivalries, the United States still maintained a neutral and

hands off approach to the rest of the world. The weak and feeble nation sought to avoid the

conflicts and alliances that Washington warned of in his Farewell Address. Yet, U.S. neutrality

had been challenged by the Quasi War - an undeclared conflict between the United States and

30
George Washington, “George Washington Papers, Series 2, Letterbooks -1799:” Letterbook 24, April 3, 1793 -
March 3, 1797. April 3, - March 3, 1797, 1793, https://www.loc.gov/item/mgw2.024.

16
France. French privateers began to seize American shipping in the Caribbean shortly after the

election of President John Adams. In an effort to end the privateers’ illegal seizures and quell a

broader conflict, pulling the U.S. into a war it did not want nor was ready for, President Adams

pursued diplomatic options. Yet, this diplomatic pursuit failed.

In response to the failed diplomatic mission, the United States sent the newly established

Navy to defend U.S. shipping and its interests. After a seemingly short war, the United States

and France signed the Treaty of Mortefontaine. While this war does not gain the recognition of

other significant wars in American history, it played a significant role in shaping further foreign

policy. Once Adams passed the torch to Jefferson, the 3rd President of the United States

reaffirmed U.S. foreign policy motives in his inaugural address. President Jefferson declared:

“Peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”31

Only a few weeks after the Louisiana Purchase, Napoleon declared war on Great Britain.

Once again caught in the middle, Jefferson was at a crossroads. British naval ships began to

impress American sailors into the Royal Navy. Such an act outraged Americans with many

calling for a declaration of war on their former colonial power. In response, Jefferson

subsequently banned all British ships from U.S. ports, ordered state Governors to raise thousands

of militiamen, and suspended trade with the entirety of the European continent.32 Known as the

Embargo Act (1807), this policy pushed by Congress and the president decimated the American

economy. By the spring of 1808, American exports had dropped substantially from $108 million

to $22 million.33 In his last days in the Executive Branch, Jefferson and Congress replaced the

31
Thomas Jefferson, “Thomas Jefferson Inaugural Speech,” March 4, 1801, https://www.loc.gov/item/2020782247/.
32
Peter Onuf, “Thomas Jefferson: Foreign Affairs,” Miller Center, 2024,
https://millercenter.org/president/jefferson/foreign-
affairs#:~:text=By%20spring%201808%2C%20however%2C%20the,settled%20upon%20the%20mercantile%20No
rtheast.
33
Ibid.

17
Embargo Act with the Non-Intercourse Act, which banned trade with England and France, but

allowed globalized commerce with the rest of the world.34 Long before trade wars were part of

the 24/7 news cycle of the current age, the early Republic found itself in similar and precarious

situations.

Before James Madison’s ascendancy to the White House, he was a key player in the

founding of the country. Often referred to as the “Father of the Constitution,” Madison served as

Secretary of State in the Jefferson Administration. Madison entered office with insurmountable

odds: trade relations with France and Britain suffered greatly through the Non-Intercourse Act,

the U.S. economy had plummeted due to the trade war, and both France and Britain had

continued to undermine U.S. independence.

Like the Embargo Act, the Non-Intercourse Act had struggled to gain traction and

persuade the warring powers from involving the United States in their fight. By May of 1810,

Congress passed legislation stating that if either power lifted their trade restrictions on the United

States, then the United States would lift restrictions on the respective country.35 France had met

such standards, but Britain remained committed to seizing American merchant ships and

restricting trade.

While the United States had avoided direct and declared war between any of the

European powers, pressure to act against Britain intensified. The United Kingdom continued to

restrict U.S. maritime rights while encouraging Native American hostility towards American

citizens.36 Congressmen Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun were a few of several members of

34
Ibid.
35
Donald Hickey, “American Trade Restrictions during the War of 1812,” December 1981, 522,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1901937?seq=6.
36
Ibid, 524.

18
Congress becoming increasingly hawkish towards Great Britain.37 These war hawks continued to

apply pressure on President Madison to act against the British for their actions. Though the

House and the Senate were divided on the prospects of war, Congress officially declared war for

the first time in the nation’s history on June 18, 1812.38

By end of the war, the British pursued an armistice with the United States. Peace talks

between the two nations ended with the Treaty of Ghent. While it is debated who was the clear

“winner” of this war, the United States took this as a victory as it was once more able to maintain

its sovereignty and independence, especially from the hands of the British.

Consistent with Washington’s Farewell Address, the United States pursued a pragmatic

approach to foreign policy. The United States understood that the democratic experiment, the

principles espoused in the founding documents, and the pursuit of a society driven by

meritocracy was an idealist vision. But Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and future U.S.

presidents understood that the world was anarchic. European powers such as France and Britain

made decisions based on their own self-interest and driven by their desire to conquer one

another. The founders understood that for liberty and independence to be protected at home, The

nation must be pragmatic and realistic abroad. Most, if not all, of the conflicts that occurred in

the early Republic were defensive in nature and of “last resort.” The early presidents understood

the United States could not stand if it involved itself in the full-scale conflicts and rivalries of the

European continent.

Because of Washington’s assertions in his farewell address, and the lack of commitments

and alliances with other nations, many have labeled the United States as isolationist. Though the

term isolationism is defined as a “policy of national isolation by abstention from alliances and

37
Ibid, 522.
38
Ibid.

19
other international political and economic relations,” the term had not been coined until the early

20th century.39 Author Lawrence Kaplan, in a chapter titled “Toward isolationism: the Rise and

Fall of the Franco-American Alliance 1775-1801,” believed Washington’s farewell speech was

defined as a symbol of isolationism.40 In the modern-day, advocates for isolationism and

retrenchment might argue a return to the “tradition” of isolationism in the early republic. Yet,

isolationism of the early republic is a myth, and the Founders’ never intended to be fully shielded

from the world.

While it is easy to categorize the United States as isolationist, it is important to note the

Founders sought peaceful coexistence with other world powers as well as commercial, economic,

and trade ties with the outside world. In keeping with the early presidents pursued diplomatic

missions, the United States sent Benjamin Franklin on the first overseas mission to Paris, and

then John Adams to the Netherlands. As is evident, the United States avoided offensive wars and

declared neutrality in international conflicts. Yet, with the nation’s commercial and diplomatic

ties, the early Republic was far from isolationist. According to Caspar Weinberger in his piece,

“George Washington, Isolationist?”, Weinberger made two important distinctions in George

Washington’s address and early Republic assumptions on isolationism. First, the author argued

that Washington and other Founders did not believe that the Republic should cut itself off from

external commercial relations; he only advised it to remain impartial.41 Second, Washington

understood that the country was at the time a weak and fragile nation that was geographically

blessed.42 Circumstance seemed to be the prevailing tendency. The United States had isolationist

39
“Isolationism,” Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/isolationism.
40
Marie-Jeane Rossignol, “Early Isolationism Revisited: Neutrality and Beyond in the 1790s,” Journal of American
Studies, 1995, 215 https://www.jstor.org/stable/27555923?seq=1.
41
Caspar Weinberger, “George Washington, Isolationist?” The National Interest, 1986, 88,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/42894419?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
42
Ibid, 89.

20
tendencies, but never truly embraced isolationism. The lack of military alliances was because of

circumstances and the geopolitical ramifications of the day.

Though there has not been a nation that has embraced total isolationism, there are

examples of those who have embraced forms of an inward foreign policy. Japan implemented a

form of isolationism for 250 years throughout the Tokugawa Period, as has the “Hermit

Kingdom” of North Korea. U.S. foreign policy has much more nuance than being labeled

“isolationist” vs. “interventionist.” The United States remained neutral rather than isolationist in

nature. Washington’s administration, and other successive administrations, pursued neutrality,

but also commercial relations with other nations.

Forms of isolationism are not a new phenomenon in American foreign policy. As

discussed in this section, and future sections, the United States is, at times, weary of global

engagement. Washington’s Farewell Address established strong precedent to avoid military

entanglements and alliances. But early U.S. foreign policy was driven on circumstance, historical

experience, and to protect the fragile nation. The United States’ declared neutrality and choosing

not to involve itself in the French Revolution, were clear indications of America’s foreign policy

motives. Yet, retrenchment in the modern age is a far too idealistic approach.

The modern-day isolationist, or advocate of global retrenchment, contends that avoiding

military alliances, defense treaties, and American military presence across the world leads to

greater peace and stability. As evidenced in the early republic, however, that is simply not true.

Though the United States chose to stay neutral and avoid alliances, it still faced outside

aggression. To name a few, the United States fought the French in the Quasi War after the

French began seizing U.S. naval ships in the Caribbean; the Navy battled with the Barbary States

after piracy threatened U.S. commerce; and the United States engaged in the War of 1812 over

21
British violations of U.S. maritime rights. Despite the efforts of U.S. policymakers to remain

neutral and avoid war, the United States still engaged in broader conflict. But according to

isolationists and retrenchment advocates, wouldn’t avoiding defense commitments and military

“aggression” lead to peace? History tells a different story. The Founders did everything modern-

day isolationists aspire for – avoiding entanglements, remaining neutral, and limiting military

presence across the world. Yet, the United States still engaged with overtly aggressive nations

and pirates. As the commencing sections and chapters reveal, peace is found in military strength,

not isolation and retrenchment. Early Republic presidents were keen on avoiding war but were

pulled in despite their “wishes.” Assuming retrenchment leads to less war, and more peace, is a

dangerous fallacy.

The Monroe Doctrine

The seeds of the Monroe Doctrine had been evident throughout previous administrations,

but not to the fullest extent, as enunciated in President Monroe’s policy declaration. President

James Monroe’s term as President began in 1817, but his monumental foreign policy doctrine

had not been articulated and established until 1823. In his 7th annual State of the Union, on

December 2, 1823, President James Monroe declared his administration’s stance in the Western

Hemisphere and the way forward for U.S. engagement with European powers.43 Monroe

exclaimed: "that the American continents...are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for

future colonization by any European powers."44 This bold and profound doctrine helped forge an

American foreign policy that would guide the country’s interactions with the rest of the world for

43
James Monroe, "Monroe Doctrine," Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1823,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe.
44
Ibid.

22
the rest of the century and beyond. The Monroe Doctrine was one of the first significant policy

assertions by the United States regarding grand strategy.

The doctrine emerged in response to the changing dynamics in European politics. At the

end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Austrians, Prussians, Russians, and British formed the

Quadruple Alliance under the Treaty of Paris in 1815.45 Three years later France would be added

to the Alliance.46 After the French revolution, European leaders feared the threat of revolution in

their respective countries. Austrians quelled a series of revolts in Italy, the French defeated an

uprising in Spain, and the entirety of the Alliance helped the Ottoman Turks undermine a

rebellion in Greece.47 Fearing similar ambitions by the Spanish to re-colonize Latin America,

and Russia claiming territories in modern-day Alaska and the Pacific Northwest, U.S. leadership

was critically aware of the dangers of European encroachment.

The Monroe Doctrine affirmed three essential points. First, the United States was

committed to a policy of non-colonization.48 Secondly, the policy endorsed a “hands off”

approach regarding the Europeans, such that “any attempt” by the Europeans to “extend their

system to any portion of this hemisphere” would be critically dangerous to the safety and

security of the United States.49 The third point affirmed the U.S. commitment towards

Washington’s Farewell address of refraining from European political affairs. Monroe exclaimed,

“In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves have never taken part, nor

does it comport powers with our policy to do so…”50 The Monroe Doctrine was an outright

rejection of potential European encroachment.

45
Mark T. Gilderus, ‘The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2006, 6,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552742.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid, 8.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.

23
 European involvement in the Western Hemisphere, specifically in Latin America, had

occurred consistently in the past. The British, French, and Spanish had dominated the “New

World” for decades and even shortly after the American colonies broke from Great Britain. As a

unilateral policy, the Monroe Doctrine was the United States’ first step toward regional

hegemony, and decades later, global hegemony. The shell of neutrality and focus on the

geographical foothold of North America expanded to the entirety of the Western Hemisphere.

Monroe and his successors felt that the United States had an obligation and responsibility to the

surrounding regions, not European powers. In addition, the Monroe Doctrine signified a break

from the domineering motives of the European powers.

Not only did the Monroe Doctrine have serious implications upon its declaration, but it

shifted the trajectory for the future of American foreign policy. In practice, the Monroe Doctrine

played a pivotal role in grand strategy for future presidents and policies. President Polk invoked

the Monroe Doctrine to warn against British and French meddling in California and Texas, and

at the end of the Civil War, Secretary of State William Henry Seward threatened the French over

their intervention in Mexico.51 While the Monroe Doctrine was defensive and reactive, it soon

put the nation on a path of more aggressive engagement with its neighbors.

1898 was a defining year for the United States. Since the founding of the nation, the

United States had built economic stability, expanded its geography, and limited itself to avoid

outside alliances and devastating wars. While the country would still be years away from global

hegemony, 1898 offered a glimpse of what the future might be.

Not without dissent, the anti-expansionist and anti-imperialist faction feared an American

Empire would be too costly and out of step with American tradition. The leading “anti-

51
Ibid.

24
imperialists” included author Mark Twain, former presidential candidate William Jennings

Bryan, and Republicans like Andrew Carnegie and Benjamin Harris.52 Anti-imperialists did not

necessarily come from similar parties or backgrounds; many of them were from varying political

factions, ideological backgrounds, and occupations. The debate between imperialism and anti-

imperialism would soon become the most contentious topic of the day.

As one of the last few colonies Spain had, Cuba was at a breaking point. The Cuban war

for independence broke out in 1895. President William McKinley sought a pragmatic end and

approach to the Spanish-Cuban issue. Throughout the first year of his presidency, McKinley

pressured the Spanish to make concessions and seek a meaningful end to the conflict.

Unfortunately, McKinley all but exhausted his diplomatic solutions to avoid war. After sending

the U.S.S. Maine along the coast of Cuba, only to be destroyed by an explosion killing more than

250 crew members, Americans became outraged by the untimely death of American servicemen

and Spanish treatment of the Cubans, and war became inevitable. In late April of 1898, Congress

declared war on Spain

In the end, the Treaty of Paris was signed between the United States and Spain. Under the

treaty, the United States obtained Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. America’s place had

changed. Now, it possessed colonial holdings, and introduced the nation to a hunger for world

leadership. Though McKinley’s presidency ended in a dreadful assassination, the United States

had entered a new age of foreign policy and standing in the world.

President Theodore (Teddy) Roosevelt, now at the helm of an emerging American

empire, built up the nation’s army and naval forces into a formidable force for the future. His

“Great White Fleet” was intended to be a marvel across the world. Before the Roosevelt era, the

52
Lewis Gould, “Foreign Affairs,” Miller Center, 2024, https://millercenter.org/president/mckinley/foreign-affairs.

25
President and Congress saw the American experiment as an example of representative

democracy at work. But for Roosevelt, he believed it was America’s moral imperative to export

American values and democracy abroad. He wanted to aggressively pursue a foreign policy

agenda that was not reserved and passive in nature. Despite Roosevelt’s aggressiveness, he

became popular as a peacemaker across the globe. Roosevelt guided peace talks to help end the

Russo-Japanese War, and even received the Nobel Peace Prize. In addition, the president

negotiated Britain and Germany’s dispute over Morocco. President Roosevelt’s tenure can not

only be defined by his imperialist foreign policy, but he was also pragmatic and pursued peace

deals. President Taft continued the Roosevelt Corollary and focused much of his foreign policy

on expanding international trade.

In the previous section, the foundations of American foreign policy were rooted in the

Founders’ reflections upon European history. The “Old World” was filled with unfettered

competition and war, and early Americans wanted to avoid this. At the turn of the nineteenth

century, U.S. policymakers may have understood American sovereignty as threatened. From the

War of 1812 to the Quadruple Alliance, European encroachment persisted.

Graham Allison contends allowing spheres of influence leads to peace and lowers the

prospect of aggression. While the Monroe Doctrine emphasizes divided spheres of influence in

the “New” and ”Old” world, the United States rejected European influence by claiming the New

World as its own American sphere of influence. The U.S. understood to defend its borders and

interest in the region, it had to establish a policy that didn’t allow the Europeans to carve up the

Western Hemisphere once more. In a sense, Graham Allison’s acceptance of spheres of influence

proved to be successful for the United States.

26
 Under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States was able to deter European aggression in

the region. Though a few European colonies persisted until the late 19th century, along with the

current British Virgin Islands and French Guadeloupe, the United States asserted its dominance

in the region through the Monroe Doctrine. Prior to the establishment of the Monroe Doctrine

and U.S. hegemonic influence in the region, Great Britain, France, and Spain still exerted

influence and power in the Western Hemisphere. More so, the United States had to share the

Western Hemisphere with the Europeans, but it did not lead to more peace or concessions from

the Europeans. The country was able to exert an enormous amount of influence as a result of the

Monroe Doctrine and successive policies after its initial declaration. If the United States had

allowed the European powers to potentially re-colonize and exert influence in the Western

Hemisphere, the nation may have not been able to experience the peace it obtained under the

Monroe Doctrine.

Despite the success of the Monroe Doctrine in the 19th century, the acceptance of spheres

of influence may not translate to the modern age. For one, the European powers were still

preoccupied with their own issues, such as the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and the

domestic problems that followed. This limited their ability to challenge the doctrine.

Additionally, many of the Latin American countries had recently gained independence from

European powers and were committed to resisting any form of re-colonization. While aspects of

the Monroe Doctrine still exist, the doctrine could struggle within the current international order.

The modern international system is multipolar, with multiple influential powers like China and

Russia who have a vested interest and influence in the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, the

strong interconnectivity and interdependence among Latin America and countries outside of the

Western Hemisphere makes the Monroe Doctrine less feasible.

27
Cold War Policies

By the end of World War II, the global landscape had shifted dramatically. Europe had

been decimated, Japan suffered significant losses due to conventional bombing and the

detonation of the U.S. atomic bomb, and only two superpowers remained. The United States and

the Soviet Union were the undisputed leaders of the world. Like the early American republic,

and the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States experienced a new era of grand

strategy.

The country entered World War II not only as a response to the attack on Pearl Harbor,

but with the goal of defeating the Axis powers and reestablishing a stable international order.

Shortly after the war, the United States was the greatest economic and military power in the

world, as well as the sole possessor of nuclear weapons. It instituted several policies and

strategies that epitomized its global leadership and resistance against Soviet expansion. To

combat the spread of communism, the United States instituted the Truman Doctrine. The Truman

Doctrine effectively provided political, economic, and military assistance to nations facing the

threat of communism and Soviet influence. Though the Truman Doctrine was established in

1947, the policy endured throughout the Cold War through successive presidential

administrations. Under the Truman Doctrine, the “containment” theory and strategy became

popularized. Though containment policies evolved over the years during the Cold War, the goals

of containment were to limit the spread of communism and Soviet power across the globe. The

United States spearheaded the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as one

of its first acts of containment. After World War II, the Soviet Union had significant influence

over Eastern Europe. The United States and its allies were fearful of a potential Soviet invasion

of Western Europe. More so, the United States wanted to combat Soviet influence in the region

28
and in the world, to prevent allies and vulnerable states from falling victim to communism. As an

outgrowth of these fears, and the need for collective security, NATO was born.

The United States implemented a large amount of foreign aid to Western Europe. Under

the Marshall Plan, it provided foreign aid to rebuild the economies and infrastructure of its allies

after World War II. The Marshall Plan not only helped improve the lives of Europeans and

stabilizing their governments, but it also strengthened the allyship and relationship between the

United States and Western Europe. The success of the Marshall plan helped pave the way for

future foreign aid that helped combat the spread of communism and the encroachment of the

Soviet Union.

Outside of Western Europe, President Truman requested $400 million in military and

economic aid for Greece and Turkey.53 The Soviet meddling in Greek and Turkish affairs, the

civil war in Greece, and the withdrawal of British assistance to Greece became the necessary

catalyst the Truman Administration needed to provide aid for both nations.54 Beyond the

Marshall Plan and aid to Greece and Turkey, the Truman Doctrine positioned the United States

for further policies and actions that would combat the Soviet threat.

In pursuit of further containment, the United States engaged in proxy conflicts with the

Soviet Union throughout the mid-20th century. In the early 1950s, the United States sent troops to

Korea to combat the invading forces of the Soviet-backed North Koreans. A U.S. led coalition

spent years in Vietnam trying to limit the expansion of communism in South Vietnam. For

decades, the United States spent billions of dollars and lost tens of thousands of lives trying to

contain communism and the Soviet threat. Yet, the communist and Soviet threat persisted in

53
Dennis Merrill, “The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity,” Presidential Studies Quarterly,
2024, 27, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552744.
54
Ibid, 33.

29
Eastern and Central Europe, Africa, Cuba, and Afghanistan. Though the success of NATO

helped hinder Soviet expansion into Western Europe, the record of success with containment

strategies remained mixed.

Under the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations, the United States followed the policy

of détente. Détente was understood as an easing, or relaxing, of relations between the United

States and the Soviet Union. The United States pursued détente with the Soviet Union through

several arms controls’ treaties and diplomatic engagements. These treaties included the Strategic

Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty (SALT I), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the

Helsinki Accords. Despite the initial “successes” of the easing of relations, the United States and

Soviet Union would experience a heightened sense of tension in the late 1970s and throughout

the 1980s.

In a change of strategy, and in recognition of the potential crumbling of the Soviet Union,

the Reagan Administration shifted gears. “We win, they lose” became the mantra of the Reagan

Administration.55 The Reagan Doctrine sought to defy Soviet influence and erode the Soviet

Union’s international standing through support for anti-Communist resistance groups and

actively pushing back against Soviet influence. To rollback Soviet influence, President Reagan

invested heavily in supporting freedom fighters in Afghanistan, Central America, and Africa, and

supported anti-communist movements in Eastern Europe.

Prior to the Reagan Administration, previous presidents focused on containment

strategies throughout the globe. Though Truman and successive presidents had experienced some

successes of containment, the Soviet Union still had a grip on global power. Containment

strategies pushed back on Soviet influence, but to the delight of those who are in Allison’s camp,

55
Richard Allen, “The Man Who Won the Cold War,” Hoover Institution, January 30, 2000,
https://www.hoover.org/research/man-who-won-cold-war.

30
policymakers still accepted the spheres of influence approach. In addition, the Nixon

Administration’s détente policy also affirmed the acceptance of spheres of influence with the

Soviet Union. Despite these strategic initiatives, the Soviet Union not only remained, but the

communist nation expanded its influence beyond its borders and region. The Soviet Union’s

influence in Latin America threatened the United States’ interests. The invasion of Afghanistan

also challenged U.S. influence in the Middle East. Though containment and détente had brief

successes, the Soviet Union still expanded.

Moreover, the United States did exactly what Allison advocates for – accepting spheres

of influence. But this did not lead to more peace and tranquility; it continued to allow the Soviet

Union to expand beyond its own regional space. Leading up to the election of President Reagan,

the United States was “losing” the Cold War. According to Will Inboden, at the time of the 1980

election, the United States was in poor shape internationally. The country was reeling from a loss

in Vietnam seven years earlier, and the advance of communism was rampant in almost every

continent – in Asia: South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; in Africa: Mozambique, Ethiopia, and

Angola; in the Middle East: South Yemen; in Latin America: Nicaragua and Grenada.56 Kremlin-

sponsored insurgency groups were able to exert their influence and establish communism in

these countries, while the United States grappled with the prospect of increased Soviet spheres of

influence. The Hudson Institute reiterated the failures of détente by stating: “As the Soviets

themselves believed, the correlation of forces by the end of the 1970s had apparently so moved

in Moscow’s direction that the end of the US dominant role in the world was soon to be

achieved.”57 The containment and détente policies were failing to achieve the end result of

56
“The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink,” Hoover Institution, March 15,
2023, https://www.hoover.org/research/peacemaker-ronald-reagan-cold-war-and-world-brink.
57
Peter Huessy, “Should the US Scale Back Its Global Presence,” Warrior Maven, 2024,
https://warriormaven.com/global-security/should-the-us-scale-back-its-global-presence.

31
limiting the spread of communism, containing the Soviet Union, and leading to broader peace.

Allowing spheres of influence did not lead to peace; it empowered the Soviet Union. This

philosophical belief ushered in an era of Soviet advancement and the erosion of democratic and

U.S. influence.

The Reagan Administration rejected the status quo of separate spheres of influence. To

“roll back” Soviet influence, President Reagan provided aid to anti-communist groups. Through

the Reagan Doctrine, the United States was able to advance liberty and reject Soviet influence.

Communism should not just be contained, but it must be defeated, was the strategy of Reagan’s

leadership. The Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan, Nicaragua had a democratic election,

and more than 40,000 Cuban troops left Angola and held United Nations-monitored elections.58

While some of these international changes occurred quickly after Reagan’s tenure in the White

House, his policies helped rollback the Soviet influence. In addition, the Reagan Doctrine was

incredibly cost effective when supporting insurgency groups. It cost the United States less than a

billion dollars a year while the Soviet Union spent $8 billion annually to deflect its impact.59 The

Reagan Doctrine challenged the containment and détente of the past. The doctrine rejected the

fact that the Soviet Union and communism had a place in the globe. Taking on Soviet influence

resulted in the collapse of the evil empire in 1991 and a new “world order” had been established.

America First

While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment American foreign policy views began to

shift, retrenchment and America First came into fruition in the 2016 presidential election. The

58
Lee Edwards, “How Ronald Reagan Won the Cold War,” The Hill, December 26, 2019,
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/474669-how-ronald-reagan-won-the-cold-war/.
59
Ibid.

32
United States had struggled to end two wars that had no end on the horizon. Despite President

Obama’s decision to pull out of Iraq, the U.S. once again engaged in the region with the rise of

ISIS. Thousands of American lives were lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, and billions of taxpayer

money was spent in both wars. Donald Trump came onto the political scene in 2015. Americans

were frustrated with “establishment” policies, and American workers were angry with perceived

“unfair” trade deals.

With sixteen Republicans vying for the Republican nomination in the 2016 election,

Trump gave the United States a different view. He fed off the fears and frustrations of everyday

Americans. Trump wanted to end the “endless” and “forever” wars the United States had

engaged in. He gave hope to Americans who struggled economically and lost their jobs by

advocating for protectionist policies. Trump was the perfect storm for a nation that was eager for

something different. By the time of his election, President Trump focused his foreign policy on

unilateralism and challenging the recent “norms” of U.S. grand strategy. Throughout his

presidency, Trump threatened to reconsider U.S. involvement in NATO, pulled out of a variety

of cooperative agreements, and enacted tariffs. His administration became the center piece for

the future of the Republican Party foreign policy doctrine. While history will be the judge of the

Trump Presidency, it is true that that “America First” policies have changed the trajectory of the

country for the time being.

Conclusion and Analysis

For much of the late 18th and early 19th century, U.S. foreign policies adhered closely to

Stephen Wertheim’s philosophy but did not fit the complete mold of isolationism. After the

American victory against the British in the Revolutionary War, the framers and early presidents

33
refrained from a direct role in international affairs. Whether it was declaring neutrality in the

French Revolution, or not seeking to conquer external territory, the United States shielded itself

from the affairs of the “Old World.”

As Wertheim writes, modern-day American dominance has supposedly led to “endless

wars.” To Wertheim, and those who subscribe to his philosophy, the United States experienced

devastating losses with little to no positive strategic outcome in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the time of the founding, and briefly after that, American leadership might have concurred.

The Founders were deeply skeptical of the old vanguard; to them, European nations were in a

repetitive process of war after war. These wars only led to exacerbated international divisions,

expanded upon volatile competition, and ultimately, took the lives of millions of Europeans over

a span of multiple decades. The United States was so wary of international conflicts that it

continuously declared its neutrality and strayed away from pursuing a more global role. The

Founders were fully aware of the dangers of endless wars and how it might negatively impact its

populous.

In addition, Wertheim argued the economic cost of war prevented investment in domestic

programs and made the American taxpayer foot the bill. Early Americans and colonists were

perplexed to find out that their taxes had been raised to help the British pay off its war debts

from the French and Indian War. Like Wertheim, early American leaders believed war and

global competition could limit an economy and place responsibility on the taxpayer. The

experience with Europe and the examples of the Old World forced Americans to retreat from

global involvement, not pursue it. Second, Wertheim believes policymakers should refrain from

making permanent enemies and permanent friends. In retrospect, this belief is encompassed in

Washington’s Farewell Address. As mentioned previously, President Washington warned future

34
American leadership about the ills of foreign entanglements. According to Washington, the

United States should pursue positive and beneficial international relationships, but not at the

expense of an alliance or another war. Third, and lastly, Wertheim’s arguments directly reflect

Early American foreign policy – lead by example. To the Founder’s, this new democratic and

republican experiment should be mirrored abroad. As Thomas Jefferson exclaims, the United

States should be an “Empire of Liberty.” Yet, late 18th century and early 19th century

policymakers wanted to lead by example, not by force. Ultimately, the views of the new nation

in approaching foreign policy are reflected today in Wertheim’s approach.

Proponents of modern-day retrenchment and neutrality might point to America’s early

history as an example of American foreign policy successes. While it may seem viable in the

contemporary world on the surface, U.S isolation and retrenchment was a product of

circumstance and only worked because of specific circumstances. First, the United States was in

its infancy compared to the rest of the world. The Founders rightfully believed the new nation

was fragile and any outside focus on expansion or other conflicts might ruin the fragile country.

Focusing on liberty and building up the nation at home, neutrality was the most viable option.

Second, even if the U.S. wanted to go beyond its borders, it simply couldn’t. The U.S. army

consisted of separate militias rather than a standing army. The Navy was nowhere near the

strength of the other European powers. Broader expansion, outside of North America, would

cripple the young nation and only cause critical losses. Lastly, early policymakers were aware of

the European rivalries and the past wars of the Old World. The United States not only shifted its

domestic approach to politics from the Europeans, but it also dissented from the foreign policy

approaches of Europe.

35
 In the early Republic, many would argue the U.S. global stance reflects Wertheim’s

views on foreign policy. Yet, based on the Monroe Doctrine, U.S. influence slowly grew in the

Western Hemisphere, and in its war with Spain at the end of the century, the United States

shifted its global stance from a more restrained and neutral position to a push towards expansion

and outside influence. While the United States wasn’t the sole dominant power, it wasn’t in

isolation either. In “The New Spheres of Influence,” Graham Allison has a more modern take on

global hegemony with the threats of China and Russia, but his arguments even existed in 19th

century American foreign policy.

As mentioned, the United States was not the domineering force it became known to be,

nor was it shielding itself from the outside world. As Allison might recommend, the United

States had a willingness to share the global stage with other European nations, but still wanted

influence in its own geographic region. The Monroe Doctrine cemented the United States as the

power of the Western Hemisphere. The United States became fearful of recolonization efforts by

the Europeans and sought to protect its own interests in the region. But U.S. policymakers

accepted that not every part of the globe was a sphere of American influence. U.S. leadership

raised no issue with other powers’ domination of their own neighborhoods.

As Allison argues, the United States historically has not objected to other nations having

specific economic and military influence in a particular area of the globe. Simply, the United

States “had” the Western Hemisphere, while Europe focused on European and Asian affairs. The

U.S. intervention in Cuba, and acquisition of the Philippines from Spain, further cemented the

U.S. role in Latin America, and it seemed U.S. leadership was content on this prospect.

The end of World War II resulted in two outsized superpowers – the United States and

the Soviet Union. U.S. foreign policy was fully immersed in the Cold War, both at home and

36
abroad. Abroad, the United States combatted the Soviet threat through foreign aid, resistance

proxies, and military intervention. As Graham Allison mentioned, the United States accepted

spheres of influence throughout most of the Cold War. The Soviet Union had its immediate

influence in Eastern Europe, while the United States asserted its dominance in the Western

Hemisphere. The two powers would engage in proxy conflicts in Latin America, Africa, and

Southeast Asia. Policymakers realistically understood that the Soviet Union would not go away

and had to walk a fine line to avoid a nuclear war. In his article, Allison labeled the balance

between the United States and the Soviet Union as an “accommodation.” The fall of the Soviet

Union would challenge Allison’s accommodation perspective. The United States became the

undisputed superpower. Ushering in a new era of American dominance, the United States

experienced unfettered dominance and global influence.

Sharing the world through “spheres of influence” was perceived as a reality in the Cold

War. U.S. policy makers chose to “coexist” with the Soviet Union despite the ideological and

economic differences. The Soviet Union was an oppressive regime that dominated Eastern

Europe, undermined democratic and free-market values, and was a direct threat to the United

States and its Western European allies. Sharing the global stage throughout the Cold War was a

pragmatic choice for U.S. policymakers and was believed to bring global stability. Yet, as

mentioned previously, the Reagan Doctrine challenged this belief by hindering the Soviet Union

and ending the Cold War in America’s favor.

Already, China has reached outside of its region and has direct influence in Africa and

Latin America. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has become a test on whether the United States and

the West will allow the Kremlin to march through Ukraine and occupy a sovereign nation. If the

world is to be a safer place, the United States should avoid allowing other powers antithetical to

37
democratic and western values to share the global stage. While war with the Soviet Union should

have been avoided at all costs, the downside of sharing the global stage resulted in a multitude of

proxy conflicts, global competition, and a fear of nuclear war. On paper, sharing the global stage

and influence with China and Russia would limit confrontation and “satisfy” the powers at hand.

But throughout the Cold War, containment and détente ceded influence to the Soviet Union.

Communism had a foothold in every continent despite the goal of limiting it through accepting

spheres of influence. The Soviet Union’s refusal to limit itself to its own sphere proved the

danger of accepting spheres of influence.

The post-Cold War era and the war on terror helped assert American dominance across

the globe. From the retrenchment and neutrality of the early republic to accepting spheres of

influence in the late 18th century and throughout the Cold War, America’s global stance has

shifted dramatically. In Thomas Wright’s, “The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t

Withdraw from the World,” Wright’s perspective is one that defends the idea of American

dominance. As previously mentioned, according to Wright, the U.S. approach to the world

should be marked by uncontested leadership and an embrace of the American role in

international affairs. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the commencement of the war on

terror, the United States had remained the dominant power and leader in foreign policy. Prior to

Trump’s presidency, the U.S. bolstered its alliances, valued NATO, expanded its influence, and

led the world economically and militarily. While the United States has yet to make a complete

shift in its foreign policy approach, both the Trump and Biden Administrations have fled from

the norms of recent history. Critics of Wright’s position believe the United States has projected

far too much power, which pulls the United States into unnecessary conflicts and makes the rest

of the world “American-centric.”

38
 CHAPTER III: THE CURRENT STATE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

It is no secret that the world, specifically the western world, is facing crisis after crisis.

The invasion of Ukraine, the war between Israel and Hamas, Chinese threats towards Taiwan’s

sovereignty, and countless terrorist attacks and threats have significantly raised the stakes for the

future of U.S. foreign policy. Discussing the volatile situation in the Middle East, Secretary of

State Anthony Blinken stated, “I would argue that we’ve not seen a situation as dangerous as the

one we’re facing now across the region since at least 1973, and arguably even before that.”60

Taiwan’s reaffirmed autonomy through its recent presidential election has only intensified

China’s longing to possess the independent island. This chapter evaluates U.S. relationships and

grand strategy, and its current state, with China, Russia, and the Middle East and begins to

address the role of the United States in the global security environment.

China

After the opening of China and the progression of a free market-based economy in the

late 1970s, one could have assumed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would become less

aggressive, more democratic, and a greater respecter of human rights. It has been quite the

opposite – as China has risen, so has the competition with the United States. China’s aggressive

behavior, its expansionist goals, its extensive conventional and nuclear buildup, and its increased

global influence has created a challenge for the Biden Administration and successive

administrations in the future. While there are several issues to consider with China, this thesis

60
Miranda Nazzaro, "Blinken on Middle East: Israel, Iran," The Hill, January 30, 2024,
https://thehill.com/policy/international/4437128-blinken-middle-east-israel-iran/.

39
examines four specific issues with the far east nation: the issue of Taiwan, the Russia-Ukraine

War, bilateral trade relations, and the Chinese military build-up.

Since 1949, Taiwan has considered itself autonomous from the mainland of China, but

the PRC views it differently. As years have gone by, China has maintained its goal of unifying

Taiwan under a “One China” rule. The United States has committed itself to the Taiwan

Relations Act (TRA), the Six Assurances, and the U.S.-PRC joint communiques since 1979 and

the early 1980s. Regardless of these assurances, the United States has no concrete obligation to

defend Taiwan. The United States maintains unofficial and partner like relations with Taiwan.

One of the provisions in the TRA states that the United States “will make available to Taiwan

such defense articles and defense services” as necessary for Taiwan’s self-defense.61 However,

there is no treaty forcing the United States to come to the aid of Taiwan. As for the Six

Assurances, the United States has reaffirmed these policies in a bipartisan manner. The

Republican Party platform of 2016 affirmed the assurances, President Trump affirmed the same

in 2020, and Congresswoman and former Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi displayed her

support for the Assurances in her 2022 visit to the island.62 Since 2017, Congress has affirmed its

support of the Six Assurances eight separate times.63 Those assurances are that the United States:

1. Has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China.
2. Has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms sales to the
Republic of China.
3. Would not play a mediation role between the PRC and the Republic of China.
4. Would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act.
5. Has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and
6. Would not exert pressure on the Republic of China to enter negotiations with the PRC.64

61
"Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief," CRS Report, January 4, 2022,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Michael Green and Bonnie Glaser, "What Is the U.S. One-China Policy and Why Does It Matter?" Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-
matter.

40
 In December of 2023, in a summit in San Francisco, Xi Jinping bluntly told President

Biden of Beijing’s intentions to unify Taiwan under Chinese rule.65 Though the United States

does not recognize Taiwan’s independence, it maintains that China should not take control of

Taiwan by force and the Taiwanese exercise self-determination. U.S. diplomatic relations with

mainland China rest on the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful

means, not military. An increase in Chinese threats, military exercises, and overall aggressive

rhetoric towards Taiwan is cause for great concern for the United States and the Western world.

Taiwan’s presidential election resulted in the election of Lai Ching-te; Lai was the most pro

sovereignty and status quo candidate in the three-way race.66 Days before the election, the PRC

emphasized Lai’s policies were a “route to Taiwan independence.”67 The United States is faced

with a true balancing act regarding Taiwan.

The second most pertinent issue for the United States is Chinese involvement in Russia’s

unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Since the war broke-out, China has become Russia’s most

important trading partner. China’s overall trade with Russia hit an all-time high with a 30 percent

increase in 2022.68 In addition, China has purchased large quantities of oil and gas from the

Russian Federation. In July of 2023, a declassified U.S. report said that support from China is

“critical” to Russia’s ability to continue waging war against Ukraine.69 Whether it be supporting

Russia’s oil and gas, or the semiconductor trade, China is fueling the fire in Russia’s campaign

65
Kristen Welker et al., "Xi warned Biden at summit that Beijing will 'reunify' Taiwan with China," NBC News,
December 25, 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/xi-warned-biden-summit-beijing-will-reunify-taiwan-
china-rcna130087.
66
“Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief," CRS Report, January 4, 2022,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275.
67
Ibid.
68
Karen Gilchrist, “How surging trade with China is boosting Russia’s war,” CNBC, September 28, 2023,
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/28/how-surging-trade-with-china-is-boosting-russias-
war.html#:~:text=Total%20bilateral%20trade%20between%20Russia,%2C%20up%2030%25%20from%202021.
69
Rob Garver, "US Report: Chinese Support Is Critical to Russia's War Effort," Voice of America, 2024,
https://www.voanews.com/a/us-report-chinese-support-is-critical-to-russia-s-war-effort-/7202759.html.

41
against Ukraine. As the war rages on, the United States will not only have to deal with Russia,

but also China’s support of the war.

Third, a great source of division between the two nations has been trade relations and

economic strains. Historically, the United States and China enjoyed a prosperous trade

relationship. Specifically, from the U.S. perspective, Americans have relied heavily on the

inexpensive products created in China. The trade war between the two countries began under the

Trump presidency in 2018. From the Trump Administration’s perspective, the United States was

in an unfair trade deal and American jobs were being relocated to China. As a result, Trump

imposed sweeping tariffs in 2018-2020 that covered most Chinese imports.70 Furthermore,

President Biden continued the Trump era tariffs and increased stringent export controls on

computer chips. Not only have tariffs affected U.S. consumers by higher prices, but they are also

one of the biggest hindrances of U.S. – China relations currently.

Lastly, and what might be the most challenging issue for the United States, is the

excessive military build-up by China. China’s build-up is not only a threat to Taiwan, but it

challenges U.S. military supremacy. China’s military build-up challenges potential U.S.

deterrence in the Southeast Asian region and signals a potential invasion of Taiwan. China’s

rapid military modernization has induced considerable fear for Western policymakers. The build-

up is a result of soaring defense budgets for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). From 2000 to

2016, China’s military budget increased annually by almost 10 percent.71 According to a

Department of Defense (DOD) report on China, CCP leadership seeks “the great rejuvenation of

the Chinese nation” by 2049 – the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Community Party’s takeover

70
Anshu Siripurapu and Noah Berman, “The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship," Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR), 2024, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship.
71
Timothy Heath, “Why Is China Strengthening Its Military? It’s Not All About War,” RAND Corporation, March
24, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/why-is-china-strengthening-its-military-its-not-all.html.

42
of the world’s largest country.72 The report also estimates the Chinese have more than 500

operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023.73 At sea, China boasts the world’s largest navy

with an impressive battle force of more than 370 ships and submarines.74 U.S. have officials have

long warned of the dangers of the Chinese military build and how it might directly threaten U.S.

supremacy. During his service, U.S. Air Force Major General Cameron Holt stated that China

was acquiring weapons at “five to six times” the rate of the United States.75 Some assume this is

evidence of China preparing for war and an imminent invasion of Taiwan. For instance, Admiral

John Aquilino, head of the Indo-Pacific Command, stated he believes China will be prepared to

invade Taiwan by 2027.76 With China’s military build-up, an increase in military exercises, and

threats to Taiwan and the West, the United States must be poised for any Chinese aggression in

the coming years. The “outlandish” threats to Taiwan refer to China’s goal to unify Taiwan

under its rule.

Why does China matter? Should everyday Americans and policymakers ignore China’s

relative economic and military rise? Why should Americans care about a war in Ukraine taking

place thousands of miles away on a different continent? In Graham Allison’s piece, the author

argues that China’s rise is an inevitable part of the 21st century. Allison does acknowledge that

the rise of China is simply not good. China’s continued domestic suppression, militarization of

the South China Sea, its military build-up, and its threats to Taiwan is more than worrisome. But

72
Jim Garamone, “DOD Report Details Chinese Efforts to Build Military Power,” U.S. Department of Defense,
October 19, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3562442/dod-report-details-chinese-
efforts-to-build-military-power/.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
Timothy Heath, “Why Is China Strengthening Its Military? It’s Not All About War,” RAND Corporation, March
24, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/why-is-china-strengthening-its-military-its-not-all.html.
76
Ty Roush, “China Will Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, U.S. Admiral Says,” Forbes, May 8, 2024,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tylerroush/2024/03/20/china-will-be-ready-to-invade-taiwan-by-2027-us-admiral-
says/.

43
from Allison’s viewpoint, U.S. policymakers “will have to abandon unattainable aspirations for

the worlds they dreamed of and accept the fact that spheres of influence will remain a central

feature of geopolitics…”77 Though Allison recommends alternative approaches such as sanctions

and other forms of consequences, he still contends the United States should accept new spheres

of influence that includes China and Russia.

China has ambitions beyond its own borders – Taiwan and the South China Sea. In

addition, China’s investment in Africa and Latin America is cause for alarm. Allison’s views are

admirable and, on the surface, seem realistic, but allowing new spheres of influence doesn’t

necessarily translate to peace. For centuries, European powers competed and vied for influence

not only on the continent, but also in the New World. World War I was a result of regional

conflicts that never went away. Competing influences resulted in war and continued conflict.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union not only exported its influence across Eastern Europe,

but the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. As mentioned in previous sections, accepting

Soviet influence failed.

Allison wants to accept new spheres of influence in exchange for peaceful coexistence.

But what Allison refuses to acknowledge is China could push beyond its geographical

boundaries. As this thesis discusses later, Chinese influence has made its way into Africa and

Latin America through commercial means. In addition, the Chinese have made significant

investments in cultural and educational exchanges. Beijing’s views are antithetical to Western

and democratic views. With the United States having a plethora of allies in the region, and

around the world, allowing China to dominate with coercion would put U.S. allies and interests

in harm’s way. Allison views sharing the globe with adversaries as a form of stability. This

77
Graham Allison, "The New Spheres of Influence: Sharing the Globe with Other Great Powers," Foreign Affairs,
2020, 40, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence.

44
couldn’t be further from the truth. Throughout history, allowing evil regimes to expand and

counter U.S. influence has made the world unstable. Throughout the Cold War, and specifically

through the 1970s, the Soviet Union exported communism in Latin America, Africa, Eastern

Europe, and Asia. As Soviet backed insurgency groups came to power, the Soviet Union became

further empowered to the point of invading Afghanistan directly to bolster the newly established

communist regime. Though China is not promoting guerilla fighters across the world, Beijing is

exporting influence through economic means. Whether it be in Africa or Latin America, the

Chinese government is influencing nations outside its region. As we see in the last chapter of this

thesis, China is wielding great influence in the neighborhood of the United States. Conceding

ground to China would not bring peace, but rather, it would empower a regime with ambitions

that threaten the current international order.

Russia

United States-Russia relations are at an all-time low since the fall of the Soviet Union and

establishment of the Russian Federation. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States

ushered in a “new world order.” While things looked promising for U.S.-Russia relations, the

rise of Vladimir Putin has all but eliminated the prospect of a stable, secure, and non-threatening

environment between the two counties. Unfortunately, Vladimir Putin’s disdain for the West, his

human rights violations, aggression towards Ukraine and other sovereign nations has created a

rift in relations between the White House and the Kremlin. Despite these issues, Wertheim’s

camp doesn’t acknowledge the reality of Russian aggression. Though the article written in 2020,

Russia invaded Crimea and parts of the Donbas in 2014, and an invasion of Georgia in 2008.

Since the invasion of Ukraine, it is potentially unlikely Russia, and the West will garner trust and

45
improve diplomatic relations. The specific U.S. foreign policy stance towards Russia is to end

the war in Ukraine by protecting Ukrainian borders and sovereignty, preventing a global war,

and protecting the interests and security of NATO. U.S. foreign policy “seeks to deter Russian

aggression by projecting strength and unity with U.S. allies and partners, building resilience and

reducing vulnerability among allies and partners facing Russian pressure and coercion.”78

Since the war broke out, Russia has made various threats to the United States, NATO,

and non-NATO members. Putin deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and warned of

“serious danger” if the U.S. and NATO are drawn into the war in Ukraine. As recently as

February 2024, Russia has been accused of developing a space-based weapon.79 While this

information does not constitute further aggression, the United States should be wary of Russian

development of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. Currently, the war in Ukraine is a war of

attrition. It seems Russia is neither winning nor losing. More than 315,000 Russian soldiers have

been killed or wounded, according to the CIA; others place Russian losses at a higher level.80 As

for weapons and battle operations, Russia has lost 2,600 main battle tanks.81 Ukraine has turned

into a formidable force even amidst the nation being put on the defensive. Yet, Russia has

managed to capture small amounts of Ukrainian territory and inflict significant damage on

Ukrainian forces. In September 2022, a UN Commission concluded that war crimes have been

inflicted by Russia on the Ukrainian civilian population. The UN found documented violations of

illegal use of explosive weapons, indiscriminate attacks, executions, torture, and sexual based

78
"U.S. Relations With Russia," U.S. Department of State, 2024, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-russia/.
79
Joey Roulette and Arshad Mohammed, "Russia seen highly unlikely to put nuclear warhead in space," Reuters,
February 15, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/russia-seen-highly-unlikely-put-nuclear-warhead-
space-2024-02-15/.
80
Steven Pifer, “Does the West’s Ukraine policy need a reality check,” Brookings, February 15, 2024,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/does-the-wests-ukraine-policy-need-a-reality-check-a-brookings-debate/.
81
Ibid.

46
violence.82 Regardless, two years into the war, Ukraine has fought mightily. According to a

White House report, Ukraine has retaken more than half of the sovereign territory that was

illegally taken by Russia.83 The United States has provided more than $45 billion in security

assistance to Ukraine and has helped train more than 123,000 Ukrainians.84 Depending on

support, Ukraine’s future is in the hands of potential security assistance from other nations,

including the United States.

Besides Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine, Putin continues to rule Russia with an

iron fist. Putin and his colleagues crush any dissent that challenges his grip on power. In

February 2024, prominent Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny died in a Russian penal

colony. According to Russian officials, Navalny collapsed and died after a walk in the prison

camp.85 Many Western officials, including President Biden, expressed outrage at the accused

murder of Navalny. Unfortunately, Navalny was one of the few opposition leaders in Russia that

posed a threat to Putin and his rule. While Navalny’s death is one of many unjust killings under

Putin’s regime, Russia will continue to be an oppressive regime. Putin’s oppression of political

enemies, limits to individual freedoms, and a disdain towards democracy is antithetical to the

U.S. domestic approach. Future U.S. administrations and policymakers will have to deal with the

increasing democratic limitations under Putin’s Russia.

82
“UN Commission concludes that war crimes have been committed in Ukraine, expresses concern about suffering
of civilians,” United Nations Human Rights, September 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/10/un-
commission-concludes-war-crimes-have-been-committed-ukraine-expresses.
83
Todd Lopez, “Two Years in, Russia’s War on Ukraine Continues to Pose Threat to Global Security,” U.S.
Department of Defense, February 24, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-
Stories/Article/Article/3686148/two-years-in-russias-war-on-ukraine-continues-to-pose-threat-to-global-security/.
84
Ibid.
85
Guy Faulconbridge and Felix Light, “Putin foe Alexei Navalny dies in jail, West holds Russia responsible,”
Reuters, February 16, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/jailed-russian-opposition-leader-navalny-dead-
prison-service-2024-02-16/.

47
 Ultimately, the United States will continue to focus on the war in Ukraine if the status

quo remains, unless isolationists or sphere-of-influence thinkers prevail in U.S. policy. As

Congress and the president continue to debate and disagree on the future of Ukrainian aid, Russia

looks to expand its offensive. While direct conflict is unlikely, the Biden Administration looks to

continue to deter Russia from further aggression.

The Middle East

On October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorists stormed the across the Israeli border from the Gaza

Strip and raped, pillaged, and murdered more than 1,200 Israelis. The world watched in horror as

hundreds more - women and children - were kidnapped and brought back to Gaza via the Hamas

tunnel system. In response, Israel has responded with air and naval assaults in the Gaza Strip

against Hamas. Thousands of women and children in Gaza have lost their lives due to the

fighting between Israel and Hamas. Unlike previous skirmishes of the 21st century, the war

between Israel and Hamas is large-scale and will be drawn out for months to come.

For decades, U.S. foreign policy has focused on the Middle East region. War after war

has plagued the region, and “stable” countries such as Saudi Arabia are ruled by authoritarian

regimes. With the debilitating withdrawal in Afghanistan, the war in Gaza, and Iran’s proxies

threatening the stability of the region, U.S. attention in the Middle East has been reinvigorated.

The Biden Administration has four distinct issues it is facing in the Middle East: The Israel-

Hamas War, Iran, Confronting Human Rights Issues, and Balancing Allied Relationships.

As mentioned, the war in Gaza is a true test for American foreign policy commitments.

For decades, support for Israel has been a bipartisan effort. Outside of the biblical perspectives

from Evangelical Christians in Congress, the United States has long believed Israel to be a key

48
strategic partner in the Middle East as well as a democratic beacon for a region that desperately

needs reform. But the Biden Administration faces a balancing act in this war. Though the Biden

Administration has affirmed its commitment to Israel and its support of the nation’s self-defense,

the administration has also called for Israel to tread lightly in the wake of thousands of civilian

deaths—alleged by Hamas. As Israel moves to eradicate Hamas and try to end its final

stronghold in Rafah, President Biden urged Israel to have a plan for the displaced Palestinians

before commencing an attack. According to the Gaza Health Ministry, a Hamas-run

organization, more than 28,000 Palestinians have been killed in the fighting. As a result of the

alleged civilian death toll, the United States is experiencing the power of public opinion, much

like during the Vietnam War. As President Biden is up for reelection, U.S. foreign policy is

being challenged by Americans at home. Accusing Israel of “genocide” and committing war

crimes, some Americans have called for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. According to an

AP News poll, half of U.S. adults believe Israel has gone too far.86 Nearly three quarters of

Americans ranging from age 18 to 29 disapprove of the Biden Administration’s handling of the

conflict in Gaza.87 In addition, the Biden Administration has struggled to work with Congress on

aid to Israel, which has been tied to aid for Ukraine and Taiwan. American foreign policy norms

have been rocked by not only the conflict itself, but the public opinions that surround it.

The United States has dealt with Iranian proxies across the Middle East since the

inception of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet, since the war in Gaza began, Iranian proxies are

seemingly working “overtime” against U.S. soldiers and interests. Iranian proxies such as

86
Ellen Knickmeyer and Linley Sanders, "Half of US adults say Israel has gone too far in war in Gaza, AP-NORC
poll shows," Associated Press, February 2, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-poll-biden-war-gaza-
4159b28d313c6c37abdb7f14162bcdd1.
87
Anthony Salvanto, Jennifer De Pinto, and Fred Backus, "Most Americans disapprove of Biden handling Israel-
Hamas war: poll," CBS News, December 10, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-americans-disapprove-
biden-handling-israel-hamas-war-poll-2023-12-10/.

49
Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels in Yemen have launched attacks against the United

States and its allies. Specifically, the Houthi rebels have played a significant role as a

destabilizing force in the Middle East. Beginning in November 2023, Houthi rebels launched

attacks in the Red Sea. Not only have American vessels been harmed, but it has disrupted global

trade - 12 percent passes through the Red Sea.88 In response, the United States launched direct

attacks against the Houthis. In addition to Iranian proxies, Iran’s nuclear program is seen as a

grave threat to regional and global security. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, otherwise

known as the JCPOA, is an agreement that tried to place restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in

exchange for sanctions relief. Though the Trump Administration pulled out of the JCPOA in

2018, the Biden Administration has tried to revive the talks. Iran has already made substantial

progress on its nuclear program. According to U.S. intelligence assessments, Tehran has the

capacity to produce nuclear weapons at any point. Yet, the regime reportedly still has not

mastered all the necessary technologies to build the weapons. Iran, arguably the greatest threat to

American interests in the Middle East, has been and will continue to be a key focal point of

American foreign policy.

Third, the Biden Administration has made human rights a key cornerstone in its current

foreign policy. While issues with Israel and Iran have bumped issues like human rights lower on

the priority list, it remains a top issue for the current administration’s foreign policy. Secretary of

State Anthony Blinken stated: “President Biden is committed to a foreign policy that unites our

democratic values with our diplomatic leadership, and one that is centered on the defense of

democracy and the protection of human rights.”89 But the administration is already at a

88
Chris Baraniuk, "Red Sea crisis: How global shipping is being rerouted out of danger," BBC Future, 2024,
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240119-red-sea-crisis-how-global-shipping-is-being-rerouted-out-of-danger.
89
Anthony Blinken, "Putting Human Rights at the Center of U.S. Foreign Policy." U.S. Department of State,
February 24, 2021, https://www.state.gov/putting-human-rights-at-the-center-of-u-s-foreign-policy/.

50
crossroads. While the United States has enjoyed a cozy friendship with Saudi Arabia, President

Biden promised to make the authoritarian regime into an international “pariah” after revelations

that it ordered the killing of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi.90 In addition, Saudi

Arabia, like many other Middle Eastern countries, has imposed strict laws and restrictions on its

population.

Lastly, the Biden Administration and policymakers have a precarious struggle when

dealing with allies in the Middle East. Currently, the United States still has an influential position

in the region. With the war in Gaza raging, it has challenged U.S. relationships in the Middle

East. The United States is supporting Israel in its fight against Hamas, but also must remember it

has several Arab “friends” in the region. Since Israel’s establishment in 1948, the Israel-Palestine

issue has been a wedge between the United States and other Arab nations. Recently, the signing

of the Abraham Accords has led to an unprecedented coexistence and relationship between Israel

and some of its Arab neighbors. In addition, the United States must still counter Iranian influence

in the region.

As Wertheim and Allison contend for retrenchment and an acceptance of new spheres of

influence, one must understand the dangers this poses to the Middle East. As a hotbed of

terrorism, and a threat to U.S. interests, the United States should be wary of retrenchment from

the region. The retreat from Afghanistan is the most recent example of the dangers of American

retrenchment. Not only did this lead to the takeover of the Taliban, key enablers of the 9/11

conspirators, but it also resulted in the deaths of thirteen American service members. President

Obama’s withdrawal in Iraq led to the unintended rise of ISIS – the world’s most egregious and

90
Jarrett Renshaw and Nandita Rose, “Biden to Meet with Saudi Crown Prince despite ‘pariah’ Pledge,” Reuters,
June 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-meet-with-saudi-crown-prince-during-middle-east-
trip-2022-06-14/.

51
heinous terrorist organizations. Additionally, Russian and Iranian adversaries remain invested in

the Middle East. Russia has supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime throughout the duration of the

Syrian Civil War that has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians. Iran continues to export

state-sanctioned terrorism through Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthi’s in

Yemen. As for Beijing, in March of 2023 the Chinese helped broker discussions between Iran

and Saudi Arabia.91 China has arrived on the regional diplomatic scene in the Middle East. Aside

from these concerns, America’s allies are under duress. Particularly, Israel is still under

immediate threats from not only Iranian proxies, but directly from the Iranian government. The

Biden Administration, and successive administrations, must continue U.S. presence in the region,

bolster continued relationships, and combat Iranian, Russian, and Chinese influence. A retreat

from the Middle East and allowing another nation to exert influence in the region would sow

chaos in the region.

Looking Forward

China’s military build-up, threats toward Taiwan, and an overtly aggressive stance have

put policymakers on high alert. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, threats to NATO, cyber-attacks on

American infrastructure, efforts to steal American technology, and human rights violations have

culminated in all-time low relations with the United States and its allies. In the Middle East, Iran

is on the cusp of developing a weapon of mass destruction and continues to empower its proxies

across the region. In addition, the war in Gaza has forced the Biden Administration to turn its

91
Maria Fantappie and Vali Nasr, “A New Order in the Middle East?” Foreign Affairs, March 22, 2023,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/iran-saudi-arabia-middle-east-
relations#:~:text=On%20March%206%2C%202023%2C%20representatives,had%20decided%20to%20normalize%
20relations.

52
attention closer to the Middle East. The world is watching, and the United States must evaluate

every decision to ensure American interests, allied interests, and the greater good for humanity.

With the pervasive issues facing the West, the United States has ideally seen itself as a

beacon of democracy. The value of human rights, the rule of law, and democratic principles are

cornerstones for the United States not only at home, but abroad as well. As discussed in this

chapter, the dilemmas with China, Russia, and the Middle East coincide with the debate on

where the United States should be in the world. As Stephen Wertheim asserts in his piece, the

United States should place greater emphasis on human rights and democracy abroad. Though

these principles have always existed in American foreign policy, Wertheim’s camp believes the

United States should place a stronger emphasis on it. In addition, one might assume Wertheim

and individuals who share his thinking would seek to pull the U.S. military from certain

locations around the globe. This could potentially mean leaving the Middle East, no longer

remaining in Southeast Asia, and allowing Western Europe to defend itself from Russian threats.

Specifically in the Middle East, Wertheim was critical of U.S. involvement in the region.

Retrenchment beliefs seemed to be bolstered after U.S. ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the

Gaza-Israel conflict persists, expect the camp of global retrenchment to find one more reason to

leave U.S. partners in the region.

The emergence of China and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could challenge Graham

Allison’s views on sharing the globe with other powers. Allison assumes there are times of

peace, and accepting new spheres of influence will only increase the prospect of peace. Yet, this

is simply not a reality. There will always be adversaries in the world and global competition.

China, Russia, and regimes in the Middle East have been persistent thorns in the side of the West

for decades. According to Allison, sharing spheres of influence with adversaries like Russia,

53
China, and Iran is realistic. Specifically with China, the CCP not only has influence in Southeast

Asia, but across the world. In addition, China is a nuclear power with high-level conventional

military capabilities. To Allison and others like him, the best course of action is to coexist with

China and allow the CCP to have influence in the world.

The current situation does reinforce Thomas Wright’s assertions the most. As indicated in

the recommendations in the next chapter, Wright’s views are the perfect combination between

idealism, realism, and ultimately, practicality. Wright’s camp understands the consequences of

retrenchment or allowing China and Russia to have the same outsized influence that the United

States currently has. Though Wright agrees the United States should refrain from intervention as

often as possible, he understands the need for the United States to be the global leader militarily

and economically.

54
 CHAPTER IV: GLOBAL RETRENCHMENT AND ACCEPTING SPHERES OF

INFLUENCE: A DANGEROUS GAMBIT

Since both Republicans and Democrats have criticized and sought to minimize U.S.

global stance, this section identifies America First policies and global retrenchment as

synonymous with each other. Though America First policies are nothing new in American

history, they have made a resurgence in the political classes of America. On the surface, America

First policies and global retrenchment look attractive - No “endless wars,” more investment

towards domestic priorities, and a “protection” of U.S. sovereignty. Yet, the devastating effects

of the United States retreating from the world stage are far reaching.

The second portion of this chapter is focused on the false premise of accepting spheres of

influence. Pundits and policymakers like Graham Allison believe accepting new spheres of

influence is the best course of action for U.S. foreign policy. This section focuses on the fallacies

and issues regarding accepting spheres of influence in the modern age.

Dangers of Global Retrenchment

Global retrenchment risks abandoning allies and vital American interests that protect the

world from tyranny. At times, policymakers, and foreign policy hawks struggle to make the case

to everyday Americans why alliances are integral to American interests abroad. To the

retrenchment advocate, the United States shouldn’t be the “world police,” nor should the nation

entangle itself with further alliances and military commitments. Alliances and commitments

abroad are perceived as incredibly costly. Aside from the billions of dollars spent on wars in Iraq

and Afghanistan in the past twenty-five years, a Quincy Institute study found that American

55
military bases and instillations cost the United States close to $55 billion annually.92

Additionally, the same study found that the United States has nearly three times as many bases

compared to embassies and consulates, and has three times as many installations compared to all

other countries combined.93 Furthermore, it is argued, defending other nations is not our

responsibility, and it puts U.S. sons and daughters in harm’s way. In essence, the costs are high,

and the benefits are limited. While the sentiments of the retrenchment advocate and isolationist

are warranted, they fail to understand that these policy proposals have detrimental effects and

long-term consequences for the United States.

For one, global retrenchment fails to acknowledge that the United States’ presence

abroad allows the U.S. to have leverage to restrain partners and allies from making detrimental

policy decisions. For example, the U.S. extension of its nuclear umbrella not only provides U.S.

allies with protection and deterrence of adversaries, but it prevents other nations from seeking

nuclear weapons of their own. In the 2022 National Defense Strategy, the U.S. reiterated its

commitment to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the multi-faceted value U.S.-led nuclear

deterrence brings to the table.94 Aside from the primary goal of deterrence, a motivator for the

U.S. nuclear umbrella is to prevent allies from pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. If allies no

longer feel protected, or if the U.S. rescinded its nuclear umbrella, nations under the American

security blanket could possibly seek out nuclear weapons of their own. Already, South Korea has

flirted with the idea of developing its own nuclear weapons. In 2023, President Yoon Suk Yeol

92
David Vine, Patterson Deppen, and Leah Bolger, “Drawdown: Improving U.S. and Global Security through
Military Base Closures Abroad,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, January 12, 2021,
https://quincyinst.org/research/drawdown-improving-u-s-and-global-security-through-military-base-closures-
abroad/#.
93
Ibid.
94
Jennifer Bradley, “Preventing the Nuclear Jungle: Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Nonproliferation,”
National Defense University Press, February 15, 2024, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-
View/Article/3679143/preventing-the-nuclear-jungle-extended-deterrence-assurance-and-nonproliferation/.

56
stated that South Korea may have to consider acquiring nuclear weapons if the regional situation

in Asia worsened.95 Allies such as Japan and Australia have navigated the prospect of developing

nuclear weapons of their own.96 On the surface, the U.S. nuclear umbrella can be perceived as an

over extension of U.S. influence. Despite this perception, the nuclear umbrella not only prevents

war, but it prevents allies from proliferating nuclear weapons and making the world a more

volatile place. A failure of the nuclear umbrella could dramatically change the international

landscape by risking a nuclear arms race, putting allies in harm’s way, or worse, nuclear war.

Moreover, retrenchment advocates refuse to understand the deep-rooted economic

benefits of security agreements and alliances. The current state of alliances prevents arms races,

minimizes regional conflicts, and instability that otherwise occurred before the Cold War. The

reduction in threats has opened economic doors for the United States. Regardless of one’s

political or foreign policy leanings, a healthy global economy is incredibly important for

American and international stability. According to an analysis produced by the RAND

Corporation, alliance partners have higher rates of trade and investment compared to non-allies.97

Higher trade and investment constitutes more jobs, expanded industries, and an overall healthy

economy. In addition, a separate RAND Corporation report found that “U.S. security

commitments have significantly positive effects on U.S. bilateral trade.”98 The study suggested

that trade would fall to $450 billion if security commitments were cut by 50%.99 Moreover,

NATO expansion not only benefitted the economies of current and new members, but it also had

a direct impact on the United States’ economy. U.S. exports to new NATO members rose from

95
Ibid.
96
Ibid.
97
Ryan Rooney et al., “Does the U.S. Economy Benefit from U.S. Alliances and Forward Military Presence?”
RAND Corporation, September 1, 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA739-5.html.
98
Keith Rockwell, “Criticism of NATO Ignores Its Economic Benefit to the US,” Wilson Center, March 29, 2024,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/criticism-nato-ignores-its-economic-benefit-us.
99
Ibid.

57
$900 million in 1989 to more than $9 billion in 2016.100 To espouse retrenchment views is to put

U.S. economic standing at risk. The alliances and security agreements between nations have a

direct impact on the positive trajectory of the U.S. economy. To simply say, “come home,

America” could result in severe economic damage.

Additionally, the retrenchment and America First apologist value protectionist policies

that harm the American economy. Per previous chapters, both former President Trump and

President Biden have implemented tariffs on several products traded with the Chinese. In a

potential second term, former President Trump has proposed a 10% tariff on all imported goods.

A 2019 study by Moody Analytics found the U.S. – China trade war cost the U.S. economy

300,000 jobs.101 Bloomberg reported the trade war cost the U.S. economy $316 billion by the

end of 2020. The Biden Administration has maintained tariffs and protectionist policies that was

implemented by the Trump Administration. According to the Tax Foundation, “Historical

evidence shows tariffs raise prices and reduce available quantities of goods and services for U.S.

businesses and consumers, which results in lower income, reduced employment, and lower

economic output. Tariffs could reduce U.S. output through a few channels.”102 Outside of the

presidency, the Senate’s two most prominent members – Republican Senator Josh Hawley and

Independent (caucuses with the Democrats) Bernie Sanders – introduced legislation that would

apply high tariffs to imports from China.103 The Sanders-Hawley tariffs would be between 11.1

percent to 40.9 percent and would place a high tax on a combination of items such as shoes,

100
Ibid.
101
Ryan Hass and Abraham Denmark, "More pain than gain: How the US-China trade war hurt America," Brookings
Institution, August 7, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/more-pain-than-gain-how-the-us-china-trade-war-
hurt-america/.
102
Erica York, "Impact of Tariffs and Free Trade," Tax Foundation, June 27, 2018,
https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/impact-of-tariffs-free-trade/.
103
Bryan Riley, “Sanders-Hawley Tariff Would Be Biggest Tariff Hike Since Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,"
National Taxpayers Union, 2024, https://www.ntu.org/publications/detail/sanders-hawley-tariff-would-be-biggest-
tariff-hike-since-smoot-hawley-tariff-act-of-1930.

58
clothing, toys, and computers.104 In return, the U.S. consumer would potentially have to pay $86

more for smartphones and $111 more for laptop computers.105 Protectionism not only harms the

overall economy for the United States, but it also impacts the American consumer.

Despite the dangers of retrenchment and America First policies, policymakers and

thought leaders still contend the U.S. should pursue a change of course. In Keith Kellogg and

Fred Fleitz’s article, In Defense of the America First Approach to National Security, the author’s

contest the assumption that America First policies are conflated with isolationism and

retrenchment. According to Kellogg and Fleitz, the America First approach to national security is

to put the interests of the people of the United States through “decisive leadership, negotiating

from strength, working with allies, and trying peaceful tools to resolve global conflicts before

turning to military force.”106 The article points to the successes of President Trump engaging

with North Korea in 2018 and avoiding broader international conflicts as a means to justify

America First policies.

In addition to the foreign policy successes mentioned by Kellogg and Fleitz, President

Trump did accomplish several foreign policy victories – the Abraham Accords, curtailing illegal

immigration, pulling out of the JCPOA, and the killing of Iranian General Qassam Soleimani.

Yet, a few foreign policy “wins” does not constitute the success of a broader foreign policy

strategy, nor does it mean America First policies will result in long-term success. President

Jimmy Carter signed the Camp David Accords but failed in bringing home American hostages

from Iran. The Nixon Administration negotiated the end of the Vietnam War and was thought to

104
Ibid.
105
Ibid.
106
Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz, “In Defense of the America First Approach to National Security,” National
Review, February 22, 2023, https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/02/in-defense-of-the-america-first-approach-to-
national-security/.

59
be a “success,” only for the communists to take over the entirety of Vietnam. Policymakers must

understand that few successes do not create long-term stability. Though the U.S. never fully

embraced retrenchment, America First policies flirted with the idea of the United States not

leading in the international space.

Under President Trump’s foreign policy, the U.S. threatened to desert allies and long-

term bipartisan commitments. President Trump threatened to leave NATO and labeled the

organization “obsolete,” ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops in Syria and leaving Kurdish

allies to fend for themselves and started the process of withdrawal from Afghanistan that ended

in a disaster under the Biden Administration. The Trump Administration also announced troop

reductions in Germany, but the withdrawals were frozen by the Biden Administration, and the

administration made threats to reduce troop numbers in both South Korea and Japan putting our

Asian allies in harm’s way of China and North Korea. Again, the Trump Administration never

embraced isolationism or full retrenchment. Yet, the Trump Administrations withdrawals and

further threats to pull the U.S. from commitments and assurances constitutes a transactional

foreign policy that dangers traditional American leadership. Former Trump Administration

officials and prominent voices in foreign policy have expressed their dismay with the former

President’s foreign policy. In a 2023 speech at the Hudson Institute, former Vice President Mike

Pence warns against “appeasement Republicans” and stated that some Republicans, including

former President Trump, are “abandoning the traditional conservative position of American

leadership on the world stage and embracing a new and dangerous form of isolationism.”107

Former National Security Advisor John Bolton offered a scathing analysis of both the Trump

107
Mike Pence, “Mike Pence Warns Donald Trump Is Embracing Isolationism over American Leadership,” C-SPAN,
2023, https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5084549%2Fmike-pence-warns-donald-trump-embracing-isolationism-
american-leadership.

60
Administration’s foreign policy, and the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, in the article

Containing Isolationism. In this piece, Bolton identifies the “isolationist virus” and the dangers

that follow with retrenchment and isolation policies.108

America First advocates believe in “negotiating from strength,” as Kellogg and Fleitz

state. In reality, America First apologists have negotiated from a state of weakness. Former

President Trump has stated Ukraine may have to give up some territory for the war with Russia

to win.109 Not to mention, President Trump encouraged Russia “to do whatever the hell they

want” if NATO allies didn’t meet defense spending targets.110 Ceding territory would only

empower Putin on his quest for Russian superiority. His goal is not only regional stability, but to

return Russia to Cold War eminence. America First policies focus on “cutting deals” but it is

cutting corners and placing allies in a vulnerable state. The administration even had a willingness

to engage in peace negotiations with the Taliban. Aside from the Taliban’s brutality and its

history of providing safe harbor to terrorists, negotiating and cutting deals with the enemy is

problematic. Under the agreement with the Taliban, the Trump administration laid the

groundwork for the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan. As the Trump Administration

emboldened the Taliban, the Biden Administration executed a dismal evacuation that led to the

deaths of thirteen U.S. serviceman and utter chaos in Kabul. Part of the U.S.-Taliban agreement

was that the Taliban would not provide safe harbor for terrorists. But it seems the Taliban have

broken this promise. Aside from the Taliban’s terrorist enemies – ISIS-K – Al Qaeda, the

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and a number of Central Asian jihadis operate in

108
John R. Bolton, “Containing Isolationism,” National Review, January 5, 2023,
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2023/01/23/containing-isolationism/.
109
Dalibor Rohac and Mathieu Drain, “Trump’s Proposed Ukraine ‘Deal’ Threatens European Security,” AEI, April
19, 2024, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/trumps-proposed-ukraine-deal-threatens-european-security/.
110
Ibid.

61
Afghanistan.111 Al Qaeda leader Aimen al-Zawahiri, an architect of 9/11, was identified in Kabul

and was killed by a U.S. drone strike in 2023.112 Despite repeated assurances and a signed

agreement from the Taliban, Afghanistan is still harboring terrorists within its borders. America

First policies not only leave out allies vulnerable, but also the United States vulnerable.

Despite the fallacies of America First policies, the Trump Administration still had its own

rationale for its foreign policy approach. As mentioned, the Trump Administration viewed the

world transactionally. In the case of NATO, President Trump believed alliance members were

not paying their “fair share.” Similarly, in a 2014 EU-U.S. Summit in Brussels, President Obama

shared similar concerns and said, “if we’ve got collective defense, it means that everybody has

got to chip in.”113 Though the Obama Administration failed in getting European nations to pay

their ”fair share,” the Trump Administration succeeded by enticing NATO members to increase

their defense spending. The rationale from the Trump Administration was understandable, but

the threat to leave NATO and labeling the alliance as obsolete sends the wrong message to allies.

Despite the “imperfections” or lack of fair share from fellow NATO members, the alliance’s

advantages far exceed the few disadvantages. A world without NATO would not only end the

collective defense between the United States and Europe, but it could spur a newfound arm’s

race, an increase in Russian power and aggression, and a threat to European regional security.

The dissolution of NATO, or the United States leaving NATO, would translate into minimal cost

savings and limited advantages for the country. The U.S. would lose allies, U.S. presence abroad,

111
Mir Asfandya, “Two Years under the Taliban: Is Afghanistan a Terrorist Safe Haven Once Again?,” United States
Institute of Peace, August 15, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/two-years-under-taliban-
afghanistan-terrorist-safe-haven-once-again.
112
Ibid.
113
“Press Conference by President Obama, European Council President Van Rompuy, and European Commission
President Barroso,” National Archives and Records Administration, March 16, 2014,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/26/press-conference-president-obama-european-
council-president-van-rompuy-a.

62
and leadership prestige. Again, the Trump Administration and America First policies made

several accomplishments. But for the longevity of the country, the United States should still

pursue alliances, military strength, and military presence abroad.

The False Premise of Spheres of Influence

Why should American policymakers reject a new age of spheres of influence? Why does

it matter for the United States to pushback against Chinese and Russian expansion? To the casual

observer, accepting spheres of influence seems like a pragmatic choice. Allowing U.S.

adversaries to have significant economic and geographic influence in their respective regions

(and beyond) could promote stability and peace, right? Allison’s arguments seem alluring, but

they are incredibly misguided. As China and Russia look to carve out the world to their

advantage, U.S. policymakers must understand accepting new spheres of influence threatens U.S.

security and economic interests. A competitive, dangerous, and unforgiving world is inevitable.

But the world becomes much more treacherous and menacing with the welcoming of newly

minted superpowers.

Allowing new spheres of influence threatens the sovereignty and stability of democratic

nations and U.S. allies. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given Russia a foothold

outside of its own borders. Yet, others still argue that Ukraine is not in strategic interest for the

United States. This, among other things, is a false premise and assumption. If Russia goes

unchallenged when invading Ukraine, one may assume Russia could expand its ambitions. In

2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russia’s border “has no end.”114 In

February of 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pronounced that democratic

114
William Courtney, “Russia’s Appetite May Extend beyond Ukraine” RAND Corporation, February 16, 2023,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/02/russias-appetite-may-extend-beyond-ukraine.html.

63
Moldova could become the “next Ukraine.”115 If the U.S. were to accept, or cede any ground to

the Russians, this will only embolden the Kremlin to look further west. Allowing new spheres of

influence hinders democracy and places an immediate pressure on U.S. allies. U.S. markets,

businesses, and citizens would be in the crosshairs of a dictatorial regime if Russia is victorious

in Ukraine. Throughout history, we have seen the dangers of allowing aggressive regimes to

establish a new sphere of influence. In the late 1930s, Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany were able

to make significant gains because of Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement policy. Appeasement is

a negotiation policy that gives material or territorial concessions to an aggressive power to avoid

a broader conflict. In the case of Nazi Germany, Hitler’s regime annexed Austria in 1938 and in

the Munich Agreement, annexed the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. In essence, appeasing Nazi

Germany not only emboldened the regime, but it also allowed Hitler to have a sphere of

influence in Central Europe. Though the U.S. and its allies would go on to fight a war to reject

Nazi Germany’s claim to Europe, the West failed to deny Nazi Germany its initial sphere of

influence. In similar fashion, the U.S. must not allow Russia to go unchallenged and have a

sphere of influence beyond its borders. Other U.S. allies might follow a similar fate if Russia is

not defeated in Ukraine. A danger of accepting new spheres of influence is the false premise of

peace and stability.

Furthermore, embracing new spheres of influence would mean ceding ground to human

rights abuses. If U.S. leadership and everyday Americans truly cared about human rights abroad,

then one should acknowledge that allowing Russia and China to carve up rest of the world

threatens the very people the U.S. intends to protect. China and Russia are authoritarian regimes

which limit speech, the press, religion, and repress political dissidents. Assuming Russia or

115
Ibid.

64
China would change in nature based on achieving the influence they desire is a farce. In a more

recent display of such abuses outside of their own borders, China’s authoritarian decisions in

Hong Kong are cause for concern. After the British “handoff” to Beijing in 1997, and the

promise of 50 years of self-government and freedoms not allowed on the Chinese mainland, the

Chinese government has slowly chipped away the rights and freedoms in Hong Kong.116 In 2020,

Beijing implemented a sweeping national security law in Hong Kong that curtailed the rights and

freedoms of inhabitants. Authorities have arrested pro-democracy activists, curbed voting rights,

and limited freedoms of the press and speech.117 In a 2022 speech, Chinese President Xi Jinping

confirmed that China has achieved comprehensive control over Hong Kong.118 The case of Hong

Kong is a warning to those content of spheres of influence. Though the Hong Kong handover

was agreed between the British and Chinese, it has only empowered China to take further steps

at dismantling human rights and eroding democratic values. The U.S. has a moral obligation to

uphold human rights as a focal point of American foreign policy and allowing spheres of

influence threatens the integrity of human rights abroad. Taiwan’s robust and capitalist

democracy would be decimated under Chinese rule. Again, accepting new spheres of influence

doesn’t translate to a more peaceful world.

116
Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong, “Hong Kong’s Freedoms: What China Promised and How It’s Cracking
Down,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-.
117
Ibid.
118
“China’s XI Says Full Control over Hong Kong Achieved, Determined on Taiwan” Reuters, October 15, 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-says-full-control-over-hong-kong-achieved-determined-taiwan-
2022-10-16/.

65
 CHAPTER V: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS

As the world faces reoccurring conflicts and international crises, U.S. policymakers are

struggling to convey a clear and concise message on foreign policy. Even fellow Americans are

asking what we stand for, what do we represent, and what is the role of the United States in the

geopolitical and economic environment. As a new generation comes into the realm of foreign

policy, and a new class of lawmakers enter the policymaking space, so do potential new policies.

A 2023 Gallup poll confirmed that most Americans want the U.S. to take a leading role in

international affairs, but more than ever, there are an increasing number of Americans who want

the United States to have a more limited role.119 While there are positive elements to the different

foreign policy practices, there is ample evidence to suggest that Thomas Wright’s view

expressed in the “Folly of Retrenchment” offers the most sustainable approach going forward.

The United States should not only remain the world’s greatest superpower, but it should continue

the leadership the world desperately needs. This final chapter explores the key recommendations

for the current global climate as noted in the Thomas Wright analysis. While Graham Allison

and Stephen Wertheim provide solid evidence for their perspectives and arguments, they fail to

acknowledge the realities and historical ramifications of global retrenchment or allowing Russia

and China to share expanded influence in the world. For policymakers, the U.S. must lead

through enduring alliances and commitments, free trade and global connectivity, emphasizing

the importance of nuclear deterrence, and expanding global security in Latin America in addition

to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

119
Jeffrey Jones, “Fewer Americans Want U.S. Taking Major Role in World Affairs,” Gallup, 2023,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/471350/fewer-americans-taking-major-role-world-affairs.aspx.

66
 Going forward, the president, policymakers, and the general populace should understand

the implications of a U.S. withdrawal from the world. While the United States is unlikely to fully

embrace isolationism fully if certain progressives and America First Republicans get their way,

one should assume the United States would withdraw from alliances, retire from its

commitments, enact harmful protectionist policies, and ultimately, shrink the American global

stance. Additionally, U.S. policymakers should reject new spheres of influence. These spheres of

influence not only erode American influence, but also harm American allies.

Not only should the United States honor its commitments and its role in the world, but

the United States should reassert its leadership in the world through several pragmatic steps. This

section offers several different considerations for policymakers and practical policy solutions for

the U.S. to reassert its dominance across the world and lead the globe against foreign adversaries.

Affirming and Honoring U.S. Commitments and Alliances

For decades, bipartisan efforts have reinforced U.S. commitments and alliances abroad.

Yet, calls for ending aid to Israel on the left, failing to help Ukraine on the right, and an overall

disdain for American supremacy abroad harm the United States and its allies. In the House of

Representatives, seventy Republicans voted in favor of Congressman Matt Gaetz’s amendment

on a defense bill that would have prohibited security assistance going to Ukraine. In the Senate,

fifteen Republicans and two Democrats voted against an essential $95 billion emergency foreign

aid bill that included defense allocations to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine.

The “Nays” had their own rationale for voting against the various security assistance

measures. In one faction, several Republicans demanded an overhaul of domestic border policies

at the southern border before sending further security assistance abroad. Senator Tommy

67
Tuberville (R-AL) encapsulated this conviction by stating: “We should not send a dime to

Ukraine until our borders are fully secure.”120 Senator Eric Schmitt (R-MO) exclaimed:

“Missourians sent me to Washington to fight for them, not to just go along with the failed

Washington way of doing things, like spending billions we don’t have to defend the Ukrainian

border while nothing is done to secure our own border.”121 Other policymakers viewed aid to

Ukraine equivalent to putting “America last,” and have maintained a hardline approach against

sending any foreign aid to the war-torn Eastern European nation. Believing the sovereignty of

Ukraine is not a vital interest for the United States, a minority, yet vocal, group of Republicans

have denounced any foreign aid package to Ukraine. Representatives such as Matt Gaetz, Jim

Jordan, and Marjorie Taylor Greene stated that by supporting Ukraine meant “we’re ignoring our

own people’s problems.”122 Additionally, Republican voters may have influenced the opinion

and views of various lawmakers. In a December 2023 Pew Research poll, roughly 50% of

Republicans and Republican-leaning independents believe the U.S. is giving too much aid to

Ukraine.123

While these views are understandable, they are not substantiated. Aside from the

principles of supporting democracies abroad and pushing back against tyranny, the United States

is not making a fiscally irresponsible decision of supporting Ukraine. According to a House

Foreign Affairs Committee report, twenty-nine European countries have provided more aid to

120
Tuberville: Not One Dime for Ukraine Until the Border Is Secure, 2024,
https://www.tuberville.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/tuberville-not-one-dime-for-ukraine-until-the-border-is-
secure/.
121
Senator Schmitt Statement on Foreign Aid Supplemental Vote, 2024,
https://www.schmitt.senate.gov/media/press-releases/senator-schmitt-statement-on-foreign-aid-supplemental-vote/.
122
Bernd Debusmann, “Why Are Some Republicans Opposing More Aid for Ukraine?,” BBC News, December 7,
2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67649497.
123
Richard Wike et al., “Growing Partisan Divisions over NATO and Ukraine,” Pew Research Center, May 8, 2024,
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/05/08/growing-partisan-divisions-over-nato-and-ukraine/.

68
Ukraine than the U.S.124 Furthermore, NATO allies, who are sharing the burden of supporting

Ukraine, have boosted their defense spending by 8.3% - the largest yearly increase in the past

decade.125 Despite Congressional members’ reservations with spending too much taxpayer

money, the United States has only spent 1.5 percent of the federal budget on support to

Ukraine.126 Foreign aid to Ukraine, and other U.S. interests abroad, are miniscule compared to

the broader federal budget. If lawmakers want to reign in federal spending, it should focus on

reforming entitlement spending. Regarding polling data, lawmakers must fall into the trap of

relying on the populist whims of the electorate. Policymakers must be driven by the principle of

protecting American allies and interests.

Though the House amendment was overwhelmingly voted down and the Senate

legislation was passed, many policymakers are turning to an American retreat. Despite the calls

for retrenchment, the United States is stronger and safer when commitments are strengthened and

honored. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. couldn’t simply rely on the Atlantic and

Pacific to protect itself. It was only a matter of time until the world pulled the United States into

conflict. The world needed the United States to guide the Western world to victory in both World

War I and World War II. U.S. policymakers must understand that alliances and strategic

commitments make the world a safer place.

The United States should remain committed to the integrity of NATO, the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization. As the 75th anniversary of NATO approaches, it is paramount for U.S.

policymakers to emphasize its support for the security agreement – vocally and in practice.

124
Michael McCaul, Mike Rogers, and Mike Turner, “Proposed Plan for Victory in Ukraine,” House Foreign Affairs
Committee, 2024, 13, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Proposed-Plan-for-Victory-in-
Ukraine.pdf.
125
Ibid, 14.
126
Ibid.

69
NATO has historically offered stability for its members. With the additions of Finland and

Sweden, the collective security agreement must remain. Despite the questions of the integrity of

NATO, there are several reasons why the United States should not only remain in NATO but

remain the leader of the security alliance.

NATO has been the world’s greatest deterrent to Soviet and Russian aggression.

Centuries of warfare, two world wars, and a Cold War prove that Europe and the rest of the

world are unstable. NATO has offered unprecedented stability for its members. Throughout the

Cold War, Western Europe was protected from Soviet encroachment because of NATO.

Currently, Western Europe is faced with a volatile Russia. Labeling the fall of the Soviet Union

as the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century, Vladimir Putin is determined to recreate a Russian

empire that challenges the United States.127 Putin’s determination for regional hegemony is more

reason to the protect the sanctity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Moreover, alliances and commitments give the United States immense influence over its

allies and strategic partners. While the United States should honor the individual sovereignty and

self-determination of fellow nation-states, it is advantageous for the United States to have the

utmost influence throughout Europe and Asia. As the moral authority of the world, and the

beacon of democracy, alliances give the United States significant influence and power across the

globe. The United States should affirm and improve its alliances, like NATO, and lead the

charge through continued collective security agreements.

There are several ways the United States can bolster its support for the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization. First, Congress can affirm its commitment through legislative means.

Already, Congress has bolstered its support for NATO through the National Defense

127
“Putin: Soviet Collapse a ‘Genuine Tragedy,’” NBC News, April 25, 2005,
https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057.

70
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024. Senators Tim Kaine and Marco Rubio

spearheaded a provision in the NDAA that would prevent any president from withdrawing the

United States from NATO without the approval of the Senate or an Act of Congress.128 Similar

to this legislation, Congress should pass a Joint Resolution that affirms the U.S. commitment to

NATO and our allies within the organization. In 2019, Congressman Jimmy Panetta introduced

the NATO Support Act which reiterates U.S. commitment toward the security organization.

Though the bill did not pass, the United States Congress should move swiftly in affirming its

support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Congressional action is the utmost

reaffirmation for U.S. allies abroad. Congressional support not only provides concrete steps

towards bolstering U.S. investment into NATO, but it signals support to our allies. At the

conclusion of the Soviet regime, former Soviet client states flocked to NATO for protection,

cooperation, and peace. The invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, and the threats to Moldova, have

only increased the need for NATO.

Not only should Washington continue to bolster and affirm its relationships with Japan

and South Korea, but the United States must also provide strategic clarity toward Taiwan. For

decades, Washington has maintained “strategic ambiguity” – a practice of not stating whether the

United States will come to Taiwan’s defense in the face of a Chinese invasion. Despite the

ambiguity, President Biden stated the United States would defend Taiwan from a Chinese

invasion.129 The White House and the U.S. State Department walked back the president’s

128
“Kaine & Rubio Applaud Senate Passage of Their Bipartisan Bill to Prevent Any U.S. President from Leaving
NATO,” Tim Kaine, United States Senator from Virginia, December 13, 2023, https://www.kaine.senate.gov/press-
releases/kaine-and-rubio-applaud-senate-passage-of-their-bipartisan-bill-to-prevent-any-us-president-from-leaving-
nato#:~:text=WASHINGTON%2C%20D.C.%20-
%20Today%2C%20U.S.,Treaty%20Organization%20(NATO)%20without%20Senate.
129
Josh Chin, Andrew Restuccia, and Ken Thomas, “Biden Says U.S. Would Intervene Militarily If China Invaded
Taiwan - WSJ,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-says-u-s-would-intervene-
militarily-if-china-invaded-taiwan-11653286228.

71
defense claim by stating: “Our One China Policy and our commitment to peace and stability

across the Taiwan Strain of course remains.”130 Understood as a “gaffe,” President’s Biden’s

statements regarding Taiwan are a smart strategy to deter China; regardless of if the comment

was unintended.

For far too long, the United States’ policy of “strategic ambiguity” has been a relic and

foreign-policy artifact of the past. China’s nuclear modernization, military build-up, expansion

into Latin America, and ultimately, threats to Taiwan, has exposed the need for strategic clarity.

Richard Haas, President of the Council of Foreign Relations, advocating dropping the ambiguous

policy: “The policy known as strategic ambiguity has, however, run its course. Ambiguity is

unlikely to deter an increasingly assertive China with growing military capabilities. The time has

come for the United States to introduce a policy of strategic clarity: one that makes explicit that

the United States would respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan.”131 If the United

States truly wants to deter China, protect its Asian allies, and affirm the autonomy of Taiwan,

policymakers and the president should adopt a policy of strategic clarity. The failures of

Afghanistan, the lack of “iron clad” support for Israel, and inconsistent messaging regarding

Taiwan has made the situation in Asia more dire. Despite the supposed deterrence of strategic

ambiguity, it has only empowered China to grow its military power and push beyond its bounds.

Aside from the perils of strategic ambiguity, there are a few advantages toward the

policy. First, it does not require the United States, or any country, to come to the direct aid of

Taiwan. Unlike other strategic guarantees and treaties, ambiguity allows for the United States to

130
Ralph Jennings, “US State Department Walks Back Biden’s Unusually Strong Comments on Taiwan,” Voice of
America, May 29, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-state-department-walks-back-biden-s-unusually-strong-
comments-on-taiwan-/6588234.html.
131
Doug Bandow, “It’s Time to End ‘Strategic Ambiguity’,” CATO, December 16, 2021,
https://www.cato.org/commentary/its-time-end-strategic-ambiguity.

72
be “flexible” in their commitments towards Taiwan. For instance, the Budapest Memorandum of

1994 gave Ukraine assurances but no guarantees, which do not carry any legal weight. Second,

strategic ambiguity can potentially restrict unilateral decisions from both China and Taiwan.

Particularly from Taiwan’s perspective, it prevents the island territory from declaring formal

independence from China. Such a declaration could provoke an aggressive China.

Yet, even with minimal advantages, the U.S. should shift from strategic ambiguity to

strategic clarity. For one, China has already committed itself to “reunification” with Taiwan.

President Xi Jinping stated in his New Year’s address in 2023 that “reunification of the

motherland [China] is inevitable.”132 In a recent government report delivered by Premier Li

Qiang at the opening of the National People’s Congress (NPC), China dropped the mention of

“peaceful unification” with Taiwan.133 Despite the past success of strategic ambiguity and the

“threat” of American retaliation, China has committed to taking control of Taiwan. Though

China has yet to act on its promises, it has undermined the policy of strategic ambiguity and still

seeks reunification. The United States, and its western allies, would be better suited by affirming

its commitment of the defense of Taiwan to better deter China. Strategic ambiguity sends mixed

signals and can be perceived as an absence of policy; a commitment to strategic clarity gives

China a definite “red line.” In Glenn H. Snyder’s “Deterrence and power,” a strong deterrent is a

function of certainty, its celerity, and its severity.134 Specifically, meaningful deterrence would

mean ditching strategic ambiguity and guaranteeing a protection of Taiwan and further economic

and political consequences for the CCP. The prospect of getting into a war with the United States

132
“China’s XI Says ‘reunification’ with Taiwan Is Inevitable,” Reuters, December 31, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-calls-taiwan-president-frontrunner-destroyer-peace-2023-12-31/.
133
Yew Tian and Laurie Chen, “China Drops ‘peaceful Reunification’ Reference to Taiwan,” Reuters, March 5,
2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-drops-peaceful-reunification-reference-taiwan-raises-defence-
spending-by-2024-03-05/.
134
Glenn Snyder, “Deterrence and power,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1960, 167,
https://doi.org/10.1177/002200276000400201.

73
should terrify Chinese leadership. Further, strategic clarity not only gives assurance to Taiwan,

but it gives assurance to communist China. Currently, the Chinese can only speculate how the

United States might respond. NATO, the perfect form of strategic clarity, has deterred the Soviet

Union and the Russian regime since the mid-20th century. China must weigh the costs and

benefits of invading Taiwan. The United States, and the rest of Taiwan’s allies, need to be

transparent and forthright about the costs of aggressive re-unification. These commitments have

not only bolstered the relationship between allies, but it has thwarted any Soviet/Russian

advancement. If the United States truly wants to deter China, it will need to clarify its stance on

the issue of Taiwan. By clarifying the defense of Taiwan, China may step away from its hopes of

reunifying with the island territory.

A coherent and unified policy statement reflecting the defense of Taiwan is needed more

than ever. The origins of strategic ambiguity for the United States were initially appropriate at

the time. The United States had hoped China would become a positive trade partner and a more

democratic-leaning nation. Additionally, policymakers believed China could never rival the

United States; they were wrong. Since then, China leadership has clung to authoritarian rule and

aims to undermine U.S. leadership. A statement of strategic clarity is a step toward the defense

of Taiwan and the hindrance of Chinese aggression. The United States should pledge to defend

Taiwan and clearly define what Beijing’s actions would constitute a response from the United

States and its allies.

Aside from clear defense of Taiwan statement, U.S. policymakers should bolster its

investment in Taiwan. The U.S. should allocate billions of dollars in defense aid to the island

nation. Already, the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act included $10 billion in aid to

74
Taiwan.135 With China potentially invading Taiwan in 2027, the United States must deliver

timely and sufficient aid for the security of Taiwan. Additionally, the United States should

partner with its regional allies – such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines – to aid Taiwan

before a potential Chinese invasion. South Asia allies must understand that a threat to the

stability of Taiwan is a threat to their stability. A Chinese dominated region could amount to

increase threats, broader coercion, and an empowered Beijing if it is allowed to acquire Taiwan

aggressively. The United States should request its Asian allies to redefine their own Taiwan

policies that include the defense of Taipei. If the United States expects to lead, it must lead the

world by reinforcing its commitment to its allies, NATO, and the defense of Taiwan.

The Value of Free Trade

Since the nation’s inception, the United States has promoted commerce, but also had

been wary of free trade. Motivated by protectionist policies and bolstering American industry,

the United States implemented a wide range of tariffs. This economic policy not only harms the

consumer, but it diminishes the U.S. economy and international cooperation. Promoting free

trade and an international free market makes the world a safer, more cooperative, and

economically viable environment. As mentioned in previous chapters, several studies have found

that increased trade leads to fewer armed conflicts among nation-states. In a piece by Mathew

Jackson and Stephen Nei, the authors stated the following: “The number of wars per pair of

countries per year from 1950 to 2000 was roughly a 10th as high as it was from 1820 to 1949…

Increased trade decreases countries’ incentives to attack each other and increases their incentives

135
Bryant Harris and Joe Gould, “Senate to Add $10 Billion in Taiwan Aid, Scale Back Arms Sale Reform,” Defense
News, October 17, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/budget/2022/10/17/senate-to-add-10-billion-in-
taiwan-aid-scale-back-arms-sale-reform/.

75
to defend each other, leading to a stable and peaceful network of military and trade alliances that

is consistent with observed data.”136 In “Trade, Peace, and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic

Dispute,” authors Solomon W. Polachek and Carolos Seiglie found that a doubling of trade leads

to a 20 percent reduction of conflict.137 Yet, there are no guarantees. Many at the turn of the 20th

century argued increase trade would lead to peace, but World War I quickly “debunked” these

views. Despite this early case study, free trade and broader globalization still has positive effects

on the American consumer and American national security. A threat to free trade is a threat to

national security.

Not all international agreements, whether it be economic or security, are in the interest

for the United States. The JCPOA and the Paris Climate Accords are examples of international

agreements that were not in the interest of the United States. Among other things, the JCPOA

gave Iran a pathway to nuclear weapons through the sunset clause, it allowed Iran to receive

permanent benefits up-front, and ultimately, it still allowed the regime to finance terrorism and

destabilizing activities across the Middle East.138 As for the Paris Climate Accords, the

agreement would have costed hundreds and thousands of jobs and destroyed $2.5 trillion in gross

domestic product by the year 2035.139 Additionally, the agreement costed billions of dollars in

taxpayer funds and hindered American energy competitiveness.140 Particularly from an economic

136
Matthew Jackson and Stephen Nei, “Networks of military alliances, wars, and International Trade,” December 14,
2015, https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1520970112.
137
Solomon W. Polachek and Carlos Seiglie, “Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic Dispute,” SSRN,
July 25, 2006, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=915360.
138
“The Iran Nuclear Deal: What’s Wrong with It and What Can We Do Now?” United Against Nuclear Iran, 2024,
https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/iran-nuclear-deal.
139
Nicolas Loris and Katie Tubb, “4 Reasons Trump Was Right to Pull out of the Paris Agreement,” The Heritage
Foundation, June 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/environment/commentary/4-reasons-trump-was-right-pull-out-
the-paris-agreement.
140
Ibid.

76
standpoint, there are economic international agreements that have benefitted the United States

both economically and geopolitically.

In 2017, President Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership

(TPP). According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the TPP was set to become the world’s

largest trade deal, covering more than 40 percent of the global economy.141 The TPP not only

would have increased cooperation, but it would also have given the United States influence with

Southeast Asia countries such as Japan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore who opted-

into the trade agreement. The TPP eliminated and reduced tariffs on a variety of goods, the trade

service was liberalized, intellectual property protections were enacted.142 The TPP was never

ratified due to the United States’ withdrawal.

According to the Trump Administration, the TPP eliminated American jobs while

benefiting large corporations. Many Americans felt disenfranchised and angered because jobs

were being outsourced overseas. On the other side of the political aisle, Senator Bernie Sanders

(I-VT) celebrated the demise of the TPP. According to the Sanders’ Office, trade deals similar to

the TPP have “cost us millions of decent-paying jobs and caused a ‘race to the bottom’ which

has lowered wages for American workers.”143

More than an economic partnership, the TPP demonstrated the United States’

commitment to its allies in the pacific region and its pursuit of global influence. The TPP aimed

to further the United States’ strategic interests in at least three ways. First, an opportunity for the

United States and Asian leadership to strengthen military and diplomatic power. Second,

141
James McBride, Andrew Chatzky, and Anshu Siripurapu, "What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?,"
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 2024, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp.
142
Ibid.
143
Sanders Statement on Trans-Pacific Partnership, January 23, 2017, https://www.sanders.senate.gov/press-
releases/sanders-statement-on-trans-pacific-
partnership/#:~:text=For%20the%20last%2030%20years,lowered%20wages%20for%20American%20workers.

77
focusing on a broader effort to improve the international order through market economies and

liberal values. Third, aiming to strengthen key partners; particularly in Japan and Vietnam.144

According Timothy Heath, the TPP “served as an important component of the rebalance to Asia

initiative.”145 The lack of U.S. presence has allowed China into the fold. A Wall Street Journal

article points out that failed trade liberalization gave China an opportunity:

Beijing’s pro-trade steps have fueled concerns among American businesses and close
allies. They worry that the U.S.’s absence in regional trade agreements gives Beijing an
opening to establish its leadership in setting rules and standards for trade and economy,
particularly in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and digital trade.146

After the early months of the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, Philippine President Rodrigo

Duterte sought warmer relations with China.147 Hanoi began taking steps to stabilize ties with

Beijing as well.148 From the ashes of the TPP, came the Comprehensive and Progressive

Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Already, China has applied to the partnership (though

China has a process to go through). In addition, the Regional Comprehensive Economic

Partnership, a trade agreement led by China, includes fifteen Asia-Pacific countries but not the

United States.149

With China’s Belt and Road Initiative, countries are moving on with or without the

United States. The United States will lose influence if it continues to retreat from free trade and

worldwide economic cooperation. Outside of the geopolitical ramifications of free trade, U.S.

144
Timothy Heath, “Strategic Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal from TPP,” RAND Corporation, March 27, 2017,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2017/03/strategic-consequences-of-us-withdrawal-from-tpp.html.
145
Ibid.
146
Yuka Hayashi, “U.S. Readies New Asia-Pacific Economic Strategy to Counter China,” Wall Street Journal,
February 6, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-readies-new-asia-pacific-economic-strategy-to-counter-china-
11644148801.
147
Timothy Heath, “Strategic Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal from TPP,” RAND Corporation, March 27, 2017,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2017/03/strategic-consequences-of-us-withdrawal-from-tpp.html.
148
Ibid.
149
Ibid.

78
policymakers should understand that free trade is economically advantageous for everyday

Americans. Free trade provides economic stability for Americans, while enhancing U.S. national

security goals. The United States should pursue deals that not only benefit American interests but

pursue agreements that benefits allies and alleviates reliance on adversaries.

Reinforce Nuclear Modernization and Deterrence

One of the critiques Wertheim has of U.S. foreign policy is that the United States has a

history of overextending itself abroad. Though Wertheim does not call on the United States to

pull back its nuclear umbrella, he assumes American actions warrant near-peer aggression.

According to Wertheim, “clinging to the dream of never-ending primacy will ensure trouble,

mandating the containment of rivals and provoking insecurity and aggression in return.”150

China, Russia, and Iran’s aggression is not a result of American primacy; these regimes are self-

motivated aggressors. If the United States provokes such aggression and conflict, then one must

question if the nuclear umbrella is enabling instability. This assessment would be quite the

opposite. To limit further aggression and further stabilize certain parts of the world, the United

States must continue to lead through its nuclear modernization efforts, the nuclear umbrella, and

ultimately, deterrence.

To strengthen U.S. security abroad, protect U.S. allies, and prevent nuclear proliferation,

the U.S. should not only continue to place a strong emphasis on nuclear deterrent leadership, but

it should also modernize the nuclear arsenal to meet the threats of the 21st century. Russia still

maintains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, China’s nuclear stockpile is growing, North Korea

continues to make threats to our allies, and Iran is on the cusp of developing nuclear weapons of

150
Stephen Wertheim, “The Price of Primacy: Why America Shouldn’t Dominate the World,” Foreign Affairs, 2020,
21, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-02-10/price-primacy.

79
its own. As mentioned previously, countries like South Korea and Japan have questioned if the

U.S. nuclear arsenal is “enough” for their protection. With Russia and China vying for influence

and control in their respective regions, the United States needs to maintain its nuclear umbrella.

Aside from preventing nuclear proliferation, the nuclear umbrella prevents nations coming under

the aggressive sphere of influence of adversarial regimes. Specifically, the nuclear umbrella

protects South Korea and Japan from further aggression from the CCP.

More so, the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile depends on facilities that are, on average, 50

years old.151 These aging facilities pose a significant threat to safety and further nuclear

operations. If the U.S. wants to maintain international superiority, advance peace, and assure

allies, modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent should be a top national priority. There is a dire

need for modernization. Congress has already raised alarm bells for the need for nuclear

modernization. U.S. Senators Deb Fischer, Angus King, and Roger Wicker have introduced the

“Restoring American Deterrence Act” in order improve the nuclear preparedness needs of the

modern age.152 If the U.S. is to deter its enemies, and reassure allies, policymakers must overhaul

its nuclear arsenal.

An increasing unstable international environment has led to reevaluations of U.S. nuclear

arsenal and deterrence. The U.S. has focused much of its attention on “life extension” programs

rather than developing new and improved nuclear weapons. The “newest” nuclear warhead in the

151
“Over Budget and Delayed-What’s next for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Research and Production Projects?,” U.S.
GAO, August 17, 2023, https://www.gao.gov/blog/over-budget-and-delayed-whats-next-u.s.-nuclear-weapons-
research-and-production-projects.
152
“Fischer, King, Wicker Introduce Bill to Overhaul Nuclear Preparedness, Address Future Threats from China and
Russia,” The Office of Senator Deb Fischer, April 18, 2024,
https://www.fischer.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2024/4/fischer-king-wicker-introduce-bill-to-overhaul-american-
nuclear-preparedness-address-future-threats-from-china-and-
russia#:~:text=The%20Restoring%20American%20Deterrence%20Act%20contains%20multiple%20provisions%20
aimed%20at,Posture%20of%20the%20United%20States.

80
U.S. inventory, the W-88, was developed almost 35 years ago.153 Other warheads, such as the B-

61 gravity bomb, is more than 60 years old. The United States has not produced a new war

reserve plutonium pit since 1989, and the current developments are well behind schedule. While

modernization efforts began early in the Obama presidency, the U.S. has failed to meet its

modernization goals. In the bipartisan 2023 Strategic Posture Commission report, the report

articulated that there is a growing “deterrence gap.”154 The report also reinforced that the United

States is on the cusp of having two nuclear peer adversaries – China and Russia.155 Furthermore,

the commissioners wrote: “It is an existential challenge for which the United States is ill-

prepared, unless its leaders make decisions now to adjust the U.S. strategic posture.” In addition,

the Heritage Foundation’s 2024 Index of U.S. Military Strength found the nuclear platform

reliability, warhead modernization, nuclear weapons complex, and national labs talent to be

“marginal.”156

Policymakers should make warhead production a top national priority for the coming

years. An aging nuclear arsenal coupled with Russia and China increasing their own nuclear

capabilities, the U.S. must transform its warhead production. Currently, the production rate for

plutonium pits is far too low to meet the need to replace the aging pits.157 In 2022, the U.S. only

manufactured 10 pits, but statutory law requires the United States to produce no fewer than 80

pits per year.158 Pit production is a complex process, so U.S. Congress should prioritize and

increase funding for a number of aspects that include developing skilled labor and industrial

153
Madelyn R. Creedon, “America’s Strategic Posture,” October 2023, 89, https://www.ida.org/-
/media/feature/publications/a/am/americas-strategic-posture/strategic-posture-commission-report.ashx.
154
Ibid.
155
Ibid.
156
Michaela Dodge, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” The Heritage Foundation, 2024, https://www.heritage.org/military-
strength/assessment-us-military-power/us-nuclear-weapons.
157
Ibid.
158
Ibid.

81
infrastructure. After spending decades of not developing plutonium pits, current engineers and

skill workers are scarce. As for industrial infrastructure, facilities such Savannah River Site in

South Carolina were either repurposed or closed. New facilities that are under construction have

faced significant delays.

In addition, Congress and the President should work in conjunction to enact the Restoring

American Deterrence Act introduced above. Many of the provisions within the bill are based on

the Commission’s recommendations. Among other provisions, the legislation would enact a

national workforce strategy. This provision would require the Secretary of Defense, in

coordination with fellow Cabinet members, to develop a strategy to promote the skilled

manufacturing and vocational workforce to expand the U.S. nuclear enterprise.159 As mentioned,

one of the issues of nuclear modernization is a need for a skilled workforce. The American

Deterrence Act would help guide the country into developing the next nuclear workforce.

Furthermore, the legislation would require the Secretary of Energy to evaluate locations best

suited to host facilities to enrich uranium, including highly enriched uranium.160 By evaluating

the potential sites for enrichment of uranium, the United States would be poised to implement a

safe, secure, and stable environment for uranium enrichment. While this legislation doesn’t solve

the immediate problems facing America’s nuclear deterrent, it is a step in the proper direction.

159
“Fischer, King, Wicker Introduce Bill to Overhaul Nuclear Preparedness, Address Future Threats from China and
Russia,” The Office of Senator Deb Fischer, April 18, 2024,
https://www.fischer.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2024/4/fischer-king-wicker-introduce-bill-to-overhaul-american-
nuclear-preparedness-address-future-threats-from-china-and-
russia#:~:text=The%20Restoring%20American%20Deterrence%20Act%20contains%20multiple%20provisions%20
aimed%20at,Posture%20of%20the%20United%20States.
160
Ibid.

82
Enhance Global Security in Latin America

It is worth mentioning once more, Graham Allison’s calls for the United States to accept

new spheres of influence are unwarranted. Allowing authoritarian regimes to dictate their

surrounding regions is dangerous. Russia has already begun to expand upon its sphere of

influence by invading Ukraine. China may follow suit by invading Taiwan in the coming years

and may look further in the South China Sea soon after. History reminds us of that authoritarian

and aggressive regimes do not stop with one piece of territory; they expand. Unfortunately,

America’s enemies have already expanded into its neighborhood – Latin America. Before the

United States can fully pushback against China, Russia, and Iran in their own regions, the nation

must enhance global security in the Western Hemisphere.

Though it might seemingly be harmless to lawmakers and everyday Americans,

reasserting American influence in the region is vital to American interests – economy, security,

and democracy. Though Venezuela and Cuba are authoritarian, and several countries in the

region have corruption, it is still vital for the United States to uphold and promote democratic

values in the region. Allowing adversaries to exert influence in the region threatens the

democratic stability in the region. Moreover, Latin America plays a growing role in the global

economy. The Panama Canal is a vital access point for U.S. and global trade. The growing

economic investment by China threatens U.S. economic stability. By losing influence in the

region, the United States runs a risk of losing trade partners, access to Latin American markets,

and key resources. Another danger of Chinese and Russian influence is a threat to national

security. As we will see later in this section, China and Russia have supplied anti-American

regimes in Latin America with military advisors, soldiers, weapons, and equipment.

83
 Currently, U.S. adversaries maintain a geographic foothold in the Western Hemisphere.

In early 2023, U.S. Southern Command Army General Lara Richardson confirmed that 21 of the

31 nations in the command’s area of responsibility had signed on with China’s Belt and Road

initiative.161 In addition, according to the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs

Committee, China’s influence in the region is vast and deeply interconnected. Between 2000-

2020, Chinese trade with Latin America grew 26-fold – increasing from $12 billion to $315

billion; and is expected to double by 2035.162 Aside from continued investment in the region,

Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina have purchased Chinese equipment. In the realm of

education, China has slowly established “Confucius Institutes” with 44 In Latin America and the

Caribbean.163 Further educational partnerships such as scholarship programs and research

support in Latin America have been expanded greatly. The Chinese have used these educational

ventures to not only teach the Chinese language and culture, but it has also acted as a “segue” for

diplomatic relations.

China has also sought to engage with the region through the Community of Latin

American and Caribbean States (CELAC), a region-wide partnership that excludes the U.S. and

Canada. Through CELAC, the parties adopted a China-CELAC Joint Action plan to guide

cooperation in areas of security, infrastructure, and economy.164 One of the main priorities of the

partnership is for China to isolate Taiwan by pushing for partnered states to end formal

161
John Grady, “Chinese Investment in Western Hemisphere Raising Concerns for U.S., Says SouthComm
Commander,” USNI News, January 22, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/01/22/chinese-investment-in-western-
hemisphere-raising-concerns-for-u-s-says-southcom-commander.
162
“China Regional Snapshot: South America,” Committee on Foreign Affairs, October 25, 2022,
https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-snapshot-south-america/.
163
Margaret Myers, “China’s Education Diplomacy in Latin America,” Wilson Center, March 15, 2024,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/chinas-education-diplomacy-latin-america.
164
“China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean,” CRS, June 23, 2023,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10982.

84
diplomatic ties with the democratic nation.165 Currently, seven out of the thirteen governments

maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.166 Since 2017, give of the partnered governments

have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), ending formal

recognition of Taiwan. Honduras was the most recent country to end their formal recognition of

Taiwan.

As for Russia, the Kremlin has made it a priority to entrench itself in the Western

Hemisphere. In a 2022 Congressional testimony, Evan Ellis emphasized Russia’s relationships

with Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba as a vehicle to undermine the United States in its region.

In February 2022, Russia and Venezuela signaled stronger military ties and cooperation.167

Russia has provided Venezuela with military equipment, troops, and technical assistance to the

regime. Specifically, Russia has deployed the S-300 Air Defense Systems, at least 100 military

trainers, and Wagner group mercenaries in Venezuela.168 Though Russia has support Venezuela

since the mid-2000s, the military and technical assistance and the increasing aggressive nature of

Russia has caused for concern. In Nicaragua, the nation authorized limited numbers of Russian

troops and equipment into the country for training opportunities and other forms of support.169

More than 200 troops are stationed in Nicaragua with several pieces of military equipment.170

While it seems Russia and China’s presence in the Western Hemisphere is used to

intimidate the United States and pursue aggression towards the United States and its allies, U.S.

policymakers should not underestimate the danger of Russian projected power in the region.

Unfortunately, there is currently no real strategy to push back on the growing Chinese and

165
Ibid.
166
Ibid.
167
“Russia in the Whem: Assessing Putin’s Malign Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 2022.
168
Ibid.
169
Ibid.
170
Ibid.

85
Russian influence in the region. If the U.S. doesn’t reevaluate its approach to the western

hemisphere, expect China and Russia’s growing economic and military ties to the region to

exacerbate.

To enhance global security in the region, the United States must implement a multiprong

approach. While the U.S. can’t “expel” Chinese and Russian influence in the region, this focus

on Latin America must alleviate adversarial influence as much as possible. U.S. policymakers

must emphasize this is not a return to the Monroe Doctrine and would not be a pretext for U.S.

intervention of the past. The U.S. should emphasize economic, democratic, and security

partnerships to curtail Chinese and Russian influence. In the past decade, Chinese President Xi

Jinping has toured the region ten times while U.S. presidents have only visited the region five

times in the past decade.171 Currently, the U.S. has seven vacant ambassadorships in Latin

America.172 While much of the heavy lift is on Congress, the vacant ambassadorships pose a

significant void in diplomatic relations in the region. The lack of diplomatic engagement in the

region helps the Chinese and Russians fill the void the U.S. has left. As Chinese and Russian

trade and investment in the region increases, specifically through the Chinese Belt and Road

Initiative, the closer Latin America gets to U.S. adversaries. Policymakers must understand

investment in Latin America is vital to having influence in the region and push for market-

oriented alternatives compared to what China offers. The U.S. should encourage private-sector

American investments in the Latin American region, as well as pursuing free trade agreements.

Furthermore, enhancing security in Latin America should prioritize a secure southern

border with Mexico. While every nation must emphasize its need for strong border security, the

171
Julio Guzman, “How the U.S. Should Counter China in Latin America,” Time, April 27, 2023,
https://time.com/6272322/us-plan-latin-america-china/.
172
Ibid.

86
United States must understand there are significant national security threats at the Southern

border. By the end of 2023, migrant encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border hit a record high.173

More 24,000 Chinese nationals had been encountered at the border, with one breaching a

military base in California.174 More so, multiple Iranians and Russians have tried to enter the

U.S. illegally. In 2023 alone, 151 individuals on the terrorism watch list were apprehended at the

border.175 In addition, the Mexican Cartel has exacerbated the fentanyl crisis that is the leading

killer of Americans aged 18-45.176 Much of the fentanyl has been manufactured on Chinese

soil.177 Aside from the political rancor, the U.S. southern border faces unprecedented national

security threats. U.S. Border Patrol Chief Jason Owens called the situation at the southern border

a “national security threat.”178 In March of 2024, a self-identified Hezbollah terrorist who wanted

to ‘make a bomb’ was arrested by border patrol in Texas.179 With the current state of the

southern border, and the national security threat, current and future policymakers must place an

immediate focus on the nation’s border.

Policymakers should not just rely on more funding or border patrol agents, but there

should be genuine reforms that secures the southern border and preserves U.S. national security.

With a divided Congress, it is difficult to accomplish any type of meaningful immigration

173
John Gramlich, “Migrant Encounters at the U.S.-Mexico Border Hit a Record High at the End of 2023,” Pew
Research Center, February 15, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/02/15/migrant-encounters-at-
the-us-mexico-border-hit-a-record-high-at-the-end-of-2023/.
174
“Startling Stats Factsheet: Encounters of Chinese Nationals Surpass all Fiscal Year 2023 at the Southwest
Border,” Homeland Security Republicans, April 18, 2024, https://homeland.house.gov/2024/04/18/startling-stats-
factsheet-encounters-of-chinese-nationals-surpass-all-fiscal-year-2023-at-the-southwest-border/.
175
Rudy Koski, “Iranian Encounters Confirmed on Texas Border, Says DPS Director,” FOX 7 Austin, October 16,
2023, https://www.fox7austin.com/news/iranian-encounters-confirmed-texas-border-dps-director.
176
Ibid.
177
Ibid.
178
Camilo Montoya, “U.S. Border Patrol Chief Calls Southern Border a ‘National Security Threat,’ Citing 140,000
Migrants Who Evaded Capture,” CBS News, March 24, 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jason-owens-border-
patrol-southern-border-national-security-threat/.
179
Haley Strack, “Self-Identified Hezbollah Terrorist Who Wanted to ‘make a Bomb’ Caught by Border Patrol in
Texas,” National Review, March 17, 2024, https://www.nationalreview.com/news/self-identified-hezbollah-terrorist-
who-wanted-to-make-a-bomb-caught-by-border-patrol-in-texas/.

87
reform. Successive administrations and policymakers should focus on the U.S. southern border

as a key tenant of global security. Congress can very well enact policies to curtail illegal

immigration and prevent a national security crisis, but the executive could prevent such actions.

Under current statute, the U.S. president can restrict the entry of aliens according to “such

reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exemptions as the

President may prescribe.”180 In 1979, President Carter invoked the statute to deny visas to all

Iranian nationals.181 While the U.S. should make a clear distinction between legal and illegal

nationals, the President should use their executive authority to prevent the infiltration of illegal

Chinese, Iranian, and Russian nationals. Additionally, the President and Congress should

implement policies that hold the Chinese, Iranian, and Russian governments accountable for

exacerbating the situation at the southern border. In addition to Europe, Asia, and the Middle

East, the United States must also expand upon its leadership and presence in Latin America to

combat adversarial influence.

Conclusion

More than ever, the U.S. is in dire need of strong leadership and a robust foreign policy.

The policymakers face difficult decisions regarding the challenges in the Middle East, the Asia-

Pacific, and Eastern Europe. As the country is in an election year, it is important for U.S. voters

to realize the gravity of the international situation. This thesis tries to look back on the successes

and failures in American history, the current state of American foreign policy, and offer several

courses of action. The United States remains at a crossroads, and it is vital for the nation to lead

180
“Can the President ‘Close the Border’? Relevant Laws and Consideration,” CRS, 2024,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10283.
181
Ibid.

88
the world through alliances, free trade, nuclear deterrence, and an enhancement of global security

in Latin America. Yet, leadership comes at a cost for policymakers. Everyday Americans are

focused on the issues at home – inflation, crime, and the economy. With the general populace

and policymakers growing displeased with the issues at home; it will only trickle into the

opinions of U.S. grand strategy. Whether it be U.S. support for Israel, or sending aid to Ukraine,

policymakers are struggling to get the message across – America must lead. Despite Americans’

reservations for global involvement, the temporary consequences outweigh the detrimental

effects if the U.S. chooses not to lead. Though these concerns are warranted, as we have seen,

U.S. global leadership has led to more peace and prosperity, not less. U.S. allies expect and rely

on the United States to lead and undermining that leadership might make the world a more

dangerous place.

89
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