Volume 33 Number 2 2025

Intellectual Discourse
Volume 33 Number 2 2025

Editor-in-Chief Associate Editors

Danial Mohd Yusof (Malaysia) Anke Iman Bouzenita (Oman)
Khairil Izamin Ahmad (Malaysia)
Editor
Saodah Wok (Malaysia)
Tunku Mohar Mokhtar (Malaysia)
Book Review Editor
Guest Editor
Mohd. Helmi Bin Mohd Sobri
Shafizan Mohamed (Malaysia)
(Malaysia)

Editorial Board
Abdul Kabir Hussain Solihu (Nigeria) Syed Farid Alatas (Singapore)
Badri Najib Zubir (Malaysia) Thameem Ushama (Malaysia)
Daniel J. Christie (USA)
International Advisory Board
Habibul H. Khondker (UAE)
Anis Malik Thoha (Indonesia)
Hafiz Zakariya (Malaysia)
Chandra Muzaffar (Malaysia)
Hazizan Md. Noon (Malaysia)
Fahimul Quadir (Canada)
Hussain Mutalib (Singapore)
Farish A. Noor (Malaysia)
Ibrahim M. Zein (Qatar)
Habib Zafarullah (Australia)
James D. Frankel (China)
John O. Voll (USA)
Kenneth Christie (Canada)
Muhammad al-Ghazali (Pakistan)
Nor Faridah Abdul Manaf (Malaysia)
Muhammad K. Khalifa (Qatar)
Rahmah Bt Ahmad H. Osman
Redzuan Othman (Malaysia)
(Malaysia)
Serdar Demirel (Turkey) Founding Editor
Shukran Abdul Rahman (Malaysia) Zafar Afaq Ansari (USA)

Intellectual Discourse is a highly respected, academic refereed journal of the

International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). It is published twice a year by
the IIUM Press, IIUM, and contains reflections, articles, research notes and review
articles representing the disciplines, methods and viewpoints of the Muslim world.

Intellectual Discourse is abstracted in SCOPUS, WoS Emerging Sources Citation

Index (ESCI), ProQuest, International Political Science Abstracts, Peace Research
Abstracts Journal, Muslim World Book Review, Bibliography of Asian Studies,
Index Islamicus, Religious and Theological Abstracts, ATLA Religion Database,
MyCite, ISC and EBSCO.

ISSN 0128-4878 (Print); ISSN 2289-5639 (Online)

https://journals.iium.edu.my/intdiscourse/index.php/id
Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

Published by:
IIUM Press, International Islamic University Malaysia
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 Intellectual Discourse
Vol. 33, No. 2, 2025

Contents

Note from the Editor 323

Research Articles
The Existentialist Conception of Man: A Comparative 331
Analysis between Muhammad Iqbal and Jean-Paul Sartre
Zubaida Nusrat
Adibah Binti Abdul Rahim

Equal Before Allah, Unequal Before the Prophet? 355

Ongoing Discourse on Matn Criticism and Its Influence
on Muslim Feminist Thought
Nuzulul Qadar Abdullah

Critical Thinking as a Mechanism for Situation Handling 385

and Problem Solving: Examples from Ḥadīth Literature
Bachar Bakour
Homam Altabaa

Shifting Geopolitics: The Gaza War and the Contours 411

of a Nascent Middle East Security Community
Nath Aldalala’a
Syaza Shukri

Power of Knowledge vs. Self-Knowledge Production: 437

The Protagonist’s Journey towards Embracing Islam in
Umm Zakiyyah’s If I Should Speak
Nadira Brioua
Rahmah Binti Ahmad H. Osman

A Muslim Female Bildungsroman: Quest for Identity 457

and Sisterhood in Islam in Leila Aboulela’s Minaret (2005)
Raihan Rosman
Freedom as Connection to God: An Analysis of Two Novels 475
by Muslim Women’s Writers in the Western Diaspora
Amrah Abdul Majid

‘The Politics of Fear’: How Does It Affect Youth Political 497

Participation in Malaysia?
Norhafiza Mohd Hed

Perceived Determinants of Child Poverty in Malaysia: 527

A Preliminary Analysis
Norhaslinda bt Jamaiudin

Türkiye’s Climate Change Policy: 555

An Evaluation of Its Transition to Low Carbon Policies
Burcin Demirbilek

The Role of Ulama in Shaping Attitude, Subjective Norms, 579

Digitalisation and Trust Towards Cash Waqf Behaviour
Gustina
Syukri Lukman
Muhammad Rizki Prima Sakti
Mohamad Fany Alfarisi

The Role of Local Wisdom in Shaping 607

Internationalisation Strategies of Islamic Higher
Education Institutions in Indonesia
Moh. Sugeng Sholehuddin
Isriani Hardini
Muhammad Jaeni
Eros Meilina Sofa
Thi Thu Huong Ho

Perceptions of Three U.S. Presidents 635

(Obama, Trump, and Biden) – A Malaysian Perspective
Syed Arabi Idid
Rizwanah Souket Ali
International Students’ Direct and Parasocial Contact, 659
and Attitude Towards Malaysian Host Nationals:
The Mediating Roles of Cultural Identification
and Islamic Identity
Tengku Siti Aisha Tengku Mohd Azzman Shariffadeen
Aini Maznina A. Manaf
Nerawi Sedu

Artificial Intelligence in Sinar Harian: Embracing 685

Readiness or Addressing Anxiety?
Hafezdzullah bin Mohd Hassan
Rizalawati binti Ismail
Awan binti Ismail

Healthcare Workers’ Challenges in Managing Disease 709

Outbreaks: A Systematic Review from an Islamic Perspective
Zeti Azreen Ahmad
Aini Maznina A. Manaf
Mazni Buyong
Sofiah Samsudin
Fuad Sawari
Hanani Ahmad Yusof

Faith-Based Approaches to Vaccine Misconception: 731

A Systematic Literature Review of Religious Messaging
Wan Norshira Wan Mohd Ghazali
Ahmad Muhammad Husni
Shafizan Mohamed
Mohd Helmi Yusoh
Kamaruzzaman Abdul Manan
Nur Shakira Mohd Nasir

Book Reviews
Jerome Drevon (2024). From Jihad to Politics: 759
How Syrian Jihadis Embraced Politics.
Oxford University Press. pp. 261.
ISBN 9780197765159.
Reviewer: Mohamed Fouz Mohamed Zacky
Zouhir Gabsi (2024). Muslim Perspectives on 762
Islamophobia: From Misconceptions to Reason.
Palgrave Macmillan.
Reviewer: Arief Arman
 Transliteration Table: Consonants

Arabic Roman Arabic Roman

‫ب‬ b ‫ط‬ Ï
‫ت‬ t ‫ظ‬ Ð
‫ث‬ th ‫ع‬ ‘
‫ج‬ j ‫غ‬ gh
‫ح‬ Í ‫ف‬ f
‫خ‬ kh ‫ق‬ q
‫د‬ d ‫ك‬ k
‫ذ‬ dh ‫ل‬ l
‫ر‬ r ‫م‬ m
‫ز‬ z ‫ن‬ n
‫س‬ s ‫ه‬ h
‫ش‬ sh ‫و‬ w
‫ص‬ Î ‫ء‬ ’
‫ض‬ Ì ‫ي‬ y

Transliteration Table: Vowels and Diphthongs

Arabic Roman Arabic Roman

َ◌ a ‫ ◌ًى‬،‫◌ًا‬ an
ُ ◌ u ‫◌ٌو‬ un
ِ◌ i ‫◌ٍي‬ in
،‫ ◌َى‬،ٰ◌ ،‫◌َا‬ É ْ‫◌َو‬ aw
‫◌ُو‬ Ë ْ‫◌َي‬ ay
uww, Ë
‫◌ِي‬ Ê ّ‫◌ُو‬ (in final position)
iyy, Ê
ّ‫◌ِي‬ (in final position)

Source: ROTAS Transliteration Kit: http://rotas.iium.edu.my

Intellectual Discourse, 33:2 (2025) 411–436
Copyright © IIUM Press
ISSN 0128-4878 (Print); ISSN 2289-5639 (Online)

Shifting Geopolitics: The Gaza War and the

Contours of a Nascent Middle East Security
Community

Nath Aldalala’a*
Syaza Shukri**

Abstract: The Gaza War, though geographically contained, served as a powerful

accelerant within a pre-existing trend for an ongoing regional transformation
in Middle Eastern security dynamics. This article argues that the conflict did
not merely reflect, but actively propelled a shift toward state-centric security
cooperation and the systematic sidelining of non-state actors. In doing so,
it catalysed the development of a nascent Middle East Security Community
(MESC), drawing on Karl Deutsch’s concept of security communities.
Motivated by converging regime security imperatives, key regional actors
including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf monarchies have intensified
institutional collaboration through mechanisms such as the Abraham Accords
and normalisation initiatives. The war underscored a growing consensus
around pragmatic conflict management; wherein ideological divisions are
increasingly subordinated to shared interests in regional stability and counter-
militancy. While structural and political obstacles to deeper integration remain,
the conflict marked a pivotal moment in the consolidation of interest-driven
and intergovernmental security architectures, signalling a regional realignment
grounded in mutual preservation rather than ideological affinity.

Keywords: Security-Community, October 7, Arab Response, Gaza War, Israel

Security, Regional Order.

* Professor, Department of Political Science and Madani Studies, AbdulHamid

AbuSulayman Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences,
International Islamic University Malaysia. Email: [email protected]
** Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Madani Studies,
AbdulHamid AbuSulayman Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge
and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia. Email:
[email protected]
412 Intellectual Discourse, Vol 33, No 2, 2025

Abstrak: Perang Gaza, walaupun terbatas secara geografi, bertindak sebagai

pemacu yang kuat kepada arah aliran yang sedia ada untuk transformasi
serantau yang berterusan dalam dinamika keselamatan Timur Tengah. Makalah
ini berhujah bahawa konflik itu bukan semata-mata mencerminkan, tetapi secara
aktif mendorong peralihan ke arah kerjasama keselamatan berasaskan negara dan
mengenepikan organisasi-organisasi bukan kerajaan secara sistematik. Dengan
berbuat demikian, ia memangkin pembangunan Komuniti Keselamatan Timur
Tengah (MESC) yang baharu, berdasarkan konsep komuniti keselamatan Karl
Deutsch. Didorong oleh keperluan keselamatan rejim, negara-negara utama
serantau termasuk Israel, Mesir, Jordan, dan monarki-monarki Teluk Parsi
telah memperhebat kerjasama institusi melalui mekanisme seperti Perjanjian
Abraham dan inisiatif normalisasi. Perang Gaza menggariskan konsensus
yang semakin meningkat di sekitar pengurusan konflik secara pragmatik, di
mana perpecahan ideologi semakin tunduk kepada kepentingan bersama dalam
kestabilan serantau dan anti-militansi. Walaupun halangan struktur dan politik
untuk integrasi yang lebih mendalam masih kekal, konflik itu menandakan
detik penting dalam penyatuan kerangka keselamatan antara kerajaan yang
dipacu kepentingan negara, menandakan penjajaran semula serantau yang
berasaskan pemeliharaan bersama dan bukannya pertalian ideologi.

Kata kunci: Komuniti Keselamatan, 7 Oktober 2023, Tindakbalas Negara-

negara Arab, Perang Gaza, Keselamatan Israel, Peraturan Serantau.

Introduction: The Security Community

The Gaza War and its parallel Lebanese front demonstrate a pattern
of calibrated escalation within the region’s deterrence-dominated
system, where high-risk confrontations remain spatially and politically
contained. Despite Israel’s sustained military operations against
Hamas and Hezbollah, the attritional weakening of these groups has
not triggered systemic escalation involving Iran or Arab states. This
restraint is particularly evident in Arab states’ responses, which were
limited to diplomatic condemnations while avoiding direct intervention.
Their cautious approach demonstrates evolving regional security
dynamics within a pre-existing trend, where Israel’s security becomes
increasingly intertwined with broader Middle Eastern arrangements.
These developments reflect and reinforce the regional security
architecture initiated by the 1991 Oslo Accords.
This article advances the argument that a nascent Middle East
Security Community (MESC) is emerging, defined primarily by the
The Gaza War and the Contours of a Nascent Middle East
Security Community 413

growing rapprochement and strategic convergence between Israel and

various Arab states. While the Middle East does not yet have a fully-
fledged, mature regional security community, it increasingly exhibits
the features of a nascent one, including the reduction of interstate
hostilities and the gradual institutionalisation of security cooperation.
This development has significantly reduced the likelihood of warfare
between regional actors, particularly a full-scale war between Arab
states and Israel, while also facilitating the progressive marginalisation
of non-state entities. Drawing upon Adler and Barnett’s (1998)
conceptualisation, a security community denotes a collective of states
bound by shared norms, values, and reciprocal understandings of
security threats, cultivating a diplomatic framework robust enough to
supplant military confrontation as the preferred mechanism for conflict
resolution. The Middle East’s evolving security architecture, though
still in its early stages, demonstrates the foundational elements of such
a community, suggesting the potential for deeper integration, even as
significant challenges remain.
According to Karl Deutsch (1957), a security community is
characterised by the expectation that disputes are resolved without the
use of force. Therefore, integration for Deutsch is the attainment, within
a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices
strong enough and extensive enough to assure dependable expectations
of peaceful change among its population (p. 5). Examples include the
European Union (Adler & Barnett, 1998), NATO (Deutsch et al., 1957),
ASEAN (Acharya, 2001), the Nordic countries (Wæver in Adler and
Barnett, 1998), the U.S.-Canada relationship (Deutsch et al., 1957),
and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in South America
(Hurrell in Adler & Barnett, 1998).
Since the 7 October 2023 attacks, Hamas and Hezbollah have
suffered significant military and political decline, diminishing their
regional influence. This weakening of non-state actors has enhanced a
strategic space for states to further develop regional alignments. The
Gaza War accelerated structural shifts, fostering closer cooperation
among Gulf monarchies, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel; all institutionalising
shared security interests through diplomacy and intelligence-sharing.
While non-state actors retain localised relevance, regional security is
now dictated by inter-state agreements, exemplified by the stark decline,
as mentioned above, of non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah
414 Intellectual Discourse, Vol 33, No 2, 2025

(International Crisis Group, 2024; US Department of Defense,

2024). This trend mirrors broader transitions toward state-dominated
governance, as seen in the PKK’s 2025 ceasefire with Türkiye.
Karl Deutsch’s foundational concept of security communities (1957,
pp. 5-7; 17; 430; 434) is considered as spaces where states develop
“dependable expectations of peaceful change.” In the Middle East, the
overriding motivation across regional actors remains regime survival,
which is ‘helped’ by dependable expectations of peaceful change. Adler
and Barnett argue that peaceful change arises not simply from shared
interests, but from the social processes of identity formation, norm
diffusion, and trust-building that transform interests over time (Adler
& Barnett, 1998, pp. 34–36). In this light, the emerging Middle Eastern
security architecture resembles what they term a “nascent” security
community, where states begin to coordinate policies in response to
shared threats but without the deep normative integration or collective
identity that characterises mature communities (Adler & Barnett, 1998,
p. 30). A key driver of this alignment is the shared perception of Hamas
as a common threat shaped by converging security concerns, ideological
opposition to Islamist militancy, and anxiety over Iranian influence. For
Israel, particularly after October 7, Hamas constitutes an existential
threat. For Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Bahrain, Hamas
is viewed both as a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and a destabilising
Iranian proxy.
This convergence has translated into practical coordination: Egypt
has tightened border controls to curb arms smuggling (Zohar, 2015),
Gulf states have directed financial support to the Palestinian Authority
to marginalise Hamas, and intelligence cooperation has intensified to
disrupt Hamas-Iran networks. This alignment, however, predates 2023.
The Abraham Accords (2020) institutionalised strategic ties, while the
Negev Forum (March 2022) convened Israel, Arab states, and the U.S.
to address transnational issues including Palestinian governance, health,
and water security (Reuters, 2022). More recently, Arab-Israeli backing
for Egypt’s UN-led Gaza reconstruction plan at the Arab Summit in
Cairo (March 2025) reinforces this strategic trend. These developments
indicate a departure from zero-sum antagonism toward structured
cooperation. They suggest that the behavioural thresholds of Deutsch’s
framework are increasingly evident, rendering inter-state war in the
region progressively less plausible.
The Gaza War and the Contours of a Nascent Middle East
Security Community 415

Scholars such as Michael Barnett (1998) and Louise Fawcett

(2013) have argued that persistent tensions, intermittent wars, and weak
regional institutions preclude the Middle East from constituting a fully-
fledged security community. Barnett views the region’s recurrent crises,
from the Arab-Israeli conflict to the Gulf Wars, as manifestations of deep
strategic mistrust, which undermines the emergence of stable, peaceful
expectations. Fawcett similarly notes that while regional organisations
like the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council have at times
fostered cooperation, they lack the institutional capacity to enforce
durable conflict resolution.
The Arab–Israeli conflict has historically been defined by a
succession of major interstate wars (1948–49, 1956, 1967, 1969–
70, 1973, 1982) and a protracted series of lower-intensity military
confrontations (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 188). This historical
context makes the contemporary regional response to the 2023-24
Gaza War particularly revelatory. Despite the catastrophic human toll,
with at least – as of February 2025 – 48,339 deaths in Gaza and 912
in the West Bank,1 regional powers have demonstrated unprecedented
restraint, opting for diplomatic channels. This strategic posture marks a
fundamental transformation in Middle Eastern conflict dynamics: where
previous eras saw violence spillover across borders, current approaches
reflect a calculus favouring containment and mediated resolution, even
amidst profound humanitarian catastrophe. Following this, our effort
to conceptualise the Middle East as a nascent security community is
informed by contemporary regional shifts, chief of which is the Gaza
War.
Before engaging directly with Barnett’s and Fawcett’s claims,
it is essential to consider Adler and Barnett’s critique of Deutsch’s
foundational theory. They observe that “notwithstanding the tremendous
admiration we have for Deutsch’s scholarly and political vision, his
conceptualisation of security communities was fraught with theoretical,
methodological, and conceptual difficulties” (1998, p. 5). Their revival

1
UNOCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel – Reported Impact, 22
February 2025, https://www.ochaopt.org; WHO, West Bank Health Crisis
Update, 24 February 2025, https://www.emro.who.int/pse/publications-attacks.
html; World Bank, Gaza Damage Assessment, 18 February 2025, https://www.
worldbank.org/en/country/westbankandgaza/publication/economic-monitor.
416 Intellectual Discourse, Vol 33, No 2, 2025

of Deutsch’s concept aims “to draw attention to the concept’s importance

for understanding “contemporary” events and to suggest refinements of
his initial formulation in order to generate a viable research program”
(Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 5). In light of this, and given the profound
geopolitical transformations since Barnett’s and Fawcett’s analyses,
including the Abraham Accords, Israel’s strategic convergence with key
Arab states, and the marginalisation of non-state actors, their frameworks
appear increasingly outdated. Moreover, if Deutsch’s original model
is theoretically contested, then part of the derivative applications by
Barnett and Fawcett likewise warrant critical reconsideration. While
we recognise their contributions, our analysis deliberately privileges
contemporary empirical developments over these earlier frameworks to
more accurately reflect the emerging regional security architecture.
A similar perspective appears in Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003),
who designate the Middle East as a regional security complex marked by
chronic insecurity, external interference, and a lack of shared normative
frameworks. This characterisation has grown increasingly untenable
since 2023, as the Gaza War catalysed structural transformations across
the region. The structural underpinnings of the region have begun to
shift, not by the eradication of traditional rivalries, but through the
institutionalisation of pragmatic cooperation, strategic convergence,
and emerging alignments that challenge the core assumptions of the
“self-help” regional order. Moreover, this evolving pattern undermines
Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett’s (2002) argument that fragmented
identities render a shared regional outlook unattainable. While identity
fragmentation persists, it no longer functions as an absolute barrier to
collective security practices. Instead, what is emerging is a conditional,
interest-based convergence that mirrors the early stages of what Adler
and Barnett termed a nascent security community, one in which war
among core states becomes increasingly improbable.
Hamas’s position in Gaza illustrates the limits of non-state
governance within the emerging inter-state security framework.
Lacking sovereign legitimacy, Hamas is treated as an armed entity
outside the bounds of recognised authority.2 Regional Forums in

2
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2023 (Washington,
DC: 2023), designation of Hamas as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)
since 1997, State.gov/terrorist-designations; European Union Council Decision
The Gaza War and the Contours of a Nascent Middle East
Security Community 417

Amman and Cairo reaffirmed that Palestinian leadership should remain

with the Palestinian National Authority, a stance supported by Arab
states and the international community (The Jordan Times, 2025). This
alignment allowed regional actors to avoid being drawn into Hamas’s
confrontation with Israel, preserving their focus on regime and state
security over ideological entanglement.
The Gaza War illustrates a shift in regional security dynamics
where the diminished role of non-state actors reinforces the primacy
of sovereign states and reflects a convergence around shared threat
perceptions that align with security community theory principles.
Israel’s dominant position reveals a structural paradox: it stabilises the
regional environment through deterrence and strategic coordination, yet
simultaneously reproduces asymmetries and grievances that obstruct
deeper normative integration. Although certain attributes of a pluralistic
security community such as sustained diplomatic engagement and
limited conflict escalation are increasingly evident, the region remains
deficient in institutional embeddedness and ideational convergence,
both of which are essential for full consolidation. Nonetheless, the
ongoing reconfiguration of alignments suggests the emergence of
a regional security architecture more aligned with contemporary
modalities of cooperative management, in which strategic divergence
is not suppressed but instrumentalised. As argued in this article, the
acceptance of political and ideological heterogeneity has become a
functional asset, reinforcing regime durability while contributing to a
minimally integrative, stability-oriented order.

2024/475, Official Journal of the European Union (2024), maintaining Hamas

on the EU terrorist list. “The Council of the European Union recently extended
these measures, including asset freezes and travel bans, for another year,
until January 20, 2026, against individuals and entities supporting Hamas
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s violent actions. This update builds upon
previous decisions, maintaining sanctions against those previously identified
as responsible for financing or enabling Hamas and PIJ’s activities,” https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/01/13/hamas-and-
palestinian-islamic-jihad-council-extends-restrictive-measures-by-one-year/;
United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-10/23, Illegal Israeli actions
in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(June 2023); Arab League, Cairo Declaration on Palestinian Reconciliation
(2024), Doc. 419/2024, reaffirming the Palestinian Authority as the sole
legitimate representative.
418 Intellectual Discourse, Vol 33, No 2, 2025

Key Features of the Nascent MESC

The Middle East Security Community (MESC), while ostensibly aimed at
fostering collective security in the conventional sense, is also accurately
characterised by a tacit and, at times, adversarial understanding among
regional actors that their own security is inextricably linked to the
preservation of incumbent ruling structures. In this context, the notion
of “community” does not rest on normative ideals of mutual trust or
shared identity, as emphasised in classical models, but rather on a
functional consensus that regime stability constitutes the paramount
strategic objective. The regime functions as the immediate agent of
the security structure. This logic also applies to Iran, where the regime
prioritises ideological commitments over interest-based alignments,
setting it apart from the broader regional pattern.
The Middle Eastern political landscape remains fundamentally
shaped by recurrent warfare. Conflicts increasingly pose existential
threats to regional regimes, as exemplified by the fate of Saddam
Hussein’s government. The 2003 collapse of Iraq’s Ba’athist regime
established a powerful precedent that has since deterred Arab leaders
from military adventurism (Hashim, 2018; Lynch, 2022). Furthermore,
a shared recognition among member states is that their core security
interest lies in suppressing actors that threaten the cohesion and
legitimacy of the regional order. This is evident in coordinated efforts
to contain disruptive non-state actors that are perceived as threats to
sovereign authority. Concurrently, the MESC displays certain features
that shape ongoing geopolitical realignments, including diplomatic
convergence, counterterrorism cooperation, and increased security-
sector engagement. It is from this premise that the defining characteristics
of the MESC can now be identified:
First, the defining characteristic of the MESC is the persistent
use of military force. The Middle East’s regional order emerged from
the Ottoman Empire’s collapse and subsequent Western intervention
exemplified by artificially imposed borders under agreements like
Sykes-Picot (1916). This legacy has made military force indispensable
for state consolidation, as evidenced by independence struggles such
as Algeria (1954–1962). Modern Middle Eastern geopolitics remains
fundamentally shaped by warfare. Conflicts including the Arab-Israeli
Wars (1948, 1967, 1973), Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), and Gulf Wars
The Gaza War and the Contours of a Nascent Middle East
Security Community 419

(1991, 2003) have directly reconfigured political alignments, borders,

and regional hierarchies (Sørli, Gleditsch & Strand, 2005). Military
power, thus, often supersedes diplomatic channels, as regimes frequently
rely on force to maintain authority, illustrated clearly by Assad’s Syria,
Saddam’s Iraq, and Egypt’s military-backed governments, and clearly
demonstrated by the outcome of the Arab Spring (2010–2012).
Yet, wars in this region seldom yield definitive Viktor’s Diktat;
instead, they perpetuate cycles of unresolved hostilities. The 1948 Arab-
Israeli war, despite an Israeli victory, set conditions for subsequent
conflicts. Likewise, the inconclusive Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and the
aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War directly contributed to further instability
and eventual emergence of groups like ISIS. Additionally, the Middle
East’s military dynamics extend beyond direct warfare into coercive
diplomacy and economic sanctions, reinforcing force as a cornerstone
of diplomatic engagement (Schelling, 1966; Art & Cronin, 2003). The
2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) exemplify this,
as the U.S. combined economic sanctions and explicit military threats
under a ‘maximum pressure’ strategy (Davari, 2020; Shalal, 2025;
Holland et al., 2025).
Second, a core feature of the MESC is Israeli dominance following
the post-1990–91 fragmentation of regional powers, most notably the
marginalisation of Iraq and the initiation of the Peace Process. This
enabled Israel’s deeper integration into Middle Eastern geopolitics.
The Kuwait Crisis reordered regional dynamics, loosening the pre-
existing Arab consensus and allowing states to prioritise national
interests. Since 2020, this shift has accelerated through normalisation
(Abraham Accords), intelligence and security cooperation (e.g., Saudi-
Israel overflight permissions), and economic integration. Arab silence
on Gaza is marked by the erosion of Pan-Arab boycotts and a functional
recognition of Israel’s regional legitimacy.
Third, the MESC is shaped by divergent survival imperatives:
Arab regimes prioritise regime preservation through authoritarian
consolidation, patronage, and reliance on external powers (Aldalala’a,
2024), while Israel focuses on state survival via military supremacy,
deterrence, and regional integration amid contested legitimacy. This
asymmetry forms a paradox where divergent security logics converge.
Israel’s liberal-democratic façade coexists with occupation policies,
420 Intellectual Discourse, Vol 33, No 2, 2025

including actions labelled genocidal by the International Criminal Court

(2024), aligning it structurally with authoritarian states that similarly
flout human rights (Amnesty International, 2024). Following Deutsch’s
model, these actors foster mutual conflict-management norms and
forging a pragmatic, trust-based security community that prioritises
stability.
Another defining feature of the Middle East Security Community
is the United States’ influence on the region. From a structural realist
perspective (Waltz, 1979), the U.S. influence is maintained through a
combination of military deterrence, strategic alliances, and economic
aid. The U.S. serves as a crucial pillar in this security architecture
by providing Israel with advanced military capabilities, intelligence
cooperation, and diplomatic backing, ensuring that its qualitative military
edge remains unchallenged (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). A feature of
the security community is the application of force, which effectively
renders American influence an extension of Israel’s dominance. This
particular feature of regional politics is likely to persist well into the
future. The immediate cause lies in the deeply entrenched historical
mistrust among Arab states. While a detailed examination falls beyond
the scope of this article, it is worth recalling that the region’s current
trajectory of political transformation was catalysed by Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait in 1990, a moment that significantly deepened intra-Arab
suspicions and fractured collective regional trust.
Despite the developments outlined above, the Palestinian issue
continues to represent a major point of contention within regional
politics, reflecting the enduring complexity involved in achieving
lasting regional stability (Maher, 2020). Yet, the declining influence of
groups like Hamas and Hezbollah marks a regional shift toward state-
centric security as Iran’s traditional support wanes. Tehran’s ability to
sustain Hezbollah has eroded due to disrupted arms routes via Damascus
and crippling economic sanctions. U.S.-driven informal sanctions, in
particular, forced global banks to sever ties with Iranian institutions,
prompting a retreat to cash-based transactions and reducing Iran’s
capacity to fund proxies (Clawson, 2008). Iran’s nuclear programme
and its broader regional ambitions have also emerged as central
concerns. Accordingly, this article will later examine how both actual
and perceived Iranian threats have shaped the genesis and evolution of
The Gaza War and the Contours of a Nascent Middle East
Security Community 421

the MESC against the backdrop of shifting regional geopolitics (Fakhro

& Baconi, 2022; Quamar, 2020).
Israel’s Security
Israel’s national security conception is fundamentally forged by
recurrent warfare. The October 7 attack fractured Israel’s perceived aura
of invincibility and profoundly impacted its security sense; nevertheless,
it reaffirmed an entrenched truism within the Israeli strategic psyche:
the perception of an enduring existential threat remains permanent
(Michael, 2009). This belief originates in the nation’s inception. Upon
Israel’s declaration of independence on 14 May 1948, neighbouring
Arab states rejected UN Resolution 181 and invaded Israel the next day.
Israel’s victory in this inaugural conflict was not merely military but
an existential prerequisite for survival. Consequently, preserving this
hard-won “triumph” against future existential defeat remains the core
principle underpinning Israel’s evolving security doctrines reinforced
by the paradigm of an ‘occupying force.’ Israel’s uncompromising
prioritisation of security and survival is inextricable from its enduring
role as an occupying power. The logic embedded in Israeli national
security discourse, marked by doctrines of pre-emptive force and
existential vigilance, implicitly acknowledges a condition of permanent
occupation as foundational to its strategic posture. Israel prioritises
overwhelming deterrence, maximalist control mechanisms, and pre-
emptive suppression of perceived threats, often entrenching the very
conditions that fuel resistance and undermine long-term stability. This,
coupled with state-centric security priorities, systematically exclude
not only non-state actors from political and economic structures, but
also any actors, including states, who could challenge the regionally
dominant-Israeli security arrangements.
Strategic calculus of occupying powers has been subject to
significant scholarly scrutiny. Roberts (2006) contends that historical
precedents demonstrate how occupying forces often employ coercive
measures not solely to suppress immediate resistance, but also to
rationalise the perpetuation of their military presence and territorial
control. Within the Israeli context, recurring military engagements
with Hamas arguably serve multiple, intertwined strategic purposes
beyond immediate retaliation. These conflicts function to underline the
perceived necessity of ongoing and robust military operations, thereby
422 Intellectual Discourse, Vol 33, No 2, 2025

reinforcing the legitimacy and scope of Israel’s expansive domestic

and regional security apparatus. Simultaneously, they fortify domestic
political narratives and bolster justifications presented to Western allies,
all emphasising the continuous and proximate nature of security threats
facing the state.
This practice aligns with broader historical patterns observed in
prolonged occupations where cyclical violence serves to perpetuate
the rationale for sustained military dominance by the occupying
power (Gordon, 2008). The immediate outcomes of conflicts such as
the Gaza War predictably conform to a recurring regional paradigm:
such wars seldom produce definitive victors capable of imposing a
stable political resolution. Instead, they primarily function to reinforce
entrenched security doctrines and the underlying conditions that
perpetuate them.
Israel’s strategic posture, epitomised by its operations against
Hezbollah, reveals a defining feature of the new MESC: protracted
conflicts persist without escalating into conventional interstate war.
The region’s paramount objective has crystallised around consolidating
state control and eradicating non-state challengers via limited attacks.
This paradigm, normalised through recurrence, manifests in Turkey’s
struggle with the PKK, Iraq’s campaigns against Al-Qaeda and ISIS,
Syria’s multifaceted civil war, and Israel’s sustained confrontations with
Hamas and Hezbollah. Within this context, the Gaza War transcends
mere retaliation for October 7; it embodies a regional imperative of
asymmetric warfare, systematically neutralising entities operating
beyond the state framework, perceived as existential threats to the
established order and Israel’s security.
This state-centric imperative defines the post-Kuwait Crisis regional
order, explicitly structuring Arab-Israeli relations around state actors.
Hedley Bull’s framework (1977, p.10) crystallises this logic, defining
“order” as inherently state-based, prioritising survival, security, and
stability through state interactions. Iran, however, represents a critical
exception to this paradigm. Deliberately leveraging asymmetric power,
Tehran strategically cultivated non-state proxies, most prominently the
“Axis of Resistance” (Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, pro-Assad forces, Iraqi
militias). This article analyses Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis not
as legitimate peers but as challengers operating outside, and deliberately
The Gaza War and the Contours of a Nascent Middle East
Security Community 423

marginalised by, the dominantly state-centric MESC framework.

MESC’s focus on inter-state security cooperation and economic
initiatives formalises the systemic sidelining of such groups, reinforcing
the very conditions that perpetuate protracted, sub-conventional warfare
aimed at neutralising perceived threats to the state-centric established
order. The affiliation of these groups with Iran unifies the objectives
of both Israel and Arab states, where Islamist organisations have been
seen as a threat. The rounds of attacks and counterattacks between Israel
and Iran demonstrated how regional security constellation’s function:
Iranian missile attacks against Israel on 14 April 2024 were thwarted
with the help of Arab air forces (Arab Centre Washington DC, 2024)
and similarly Iranian drones were intercepted by Jordan in the early
morning attacks on 13 June 2025 (Aladam, 2025). Additionally, talk
of Saudi-Israeli normalisation has persisted despite the Gaza War (The
Arab Centre Washington DC, 2023).
Saudi Arabia has not rejected normalisation with Israel outright
but has tied it to progress on Palestinian statehood. This approach aims
to maintain U.S. support and uphold its leadership in advocating for
Palestinian rights (Al Jazeera, 2025). Saudi Arabia’s regional strategy
exemplifies calibrated pragmatism in a volatile security environment,
enabling Riyadh to advance its interests without overtly compromising
its ideological or diplomatic positions. By fostering close ties with
the Trump administration, the Saudis can secure U.S. guarantees and
shape regional dynamics in ways that tacitly support normalisation with
Israel without formally endorsing it. Simultaneously, by insisting that
normalisation is contingent on the establishment of a Palestinian state,
Saudi Arabia maintains alignment with the Palestinian cause, projecting
itself as a guardian of Arab consensus. In parallel, its rapprochement
with Iran allows it to distance itself from Israeli or U.S.-led escalations,
reducing the risk of appearing complicit in regional aggression. This
multidirectional diplomacy is particularly effective in an evolving
security landscape increasingly characterised by elements of a nascent
security community, where shared interests in de-escalation, regime
preservation, and conflict containment among regional actors are
beginning to override ideological divides. Within this emerging order,
Saudi Arabia’s strategy not only mitigates risks but positions the
kingdom as a central broker in shaping the terms of Middle Eastern
stability.
424 Intellectual Discourse, Vol 33, No 2, 2025

In the current regional security architecture, the protection of Israeli

security has become a shared strategic interest among several Arab
states, particularly those aligned with the United States and engaged in
normalisation processes. While this does not imply unanimity across
the region, it reflects a broader convergence around threat containment
and the preservation of regional order, where Israeli stability is
increasingly viewed as integral to managing wider security dynamics.
This orientation was most clearly demonstrated when several Arab states
coordinated efforts to intercept Iranian missiles directed at Israel (Arab
Centre Washington DC, 2024). Such actions highlight an emerging
willingness to contribute to regional stability through direct cooperation
in safeguarding Israeli security.
The Gaza War in Security Community Context
In terms of immediate security outcomes, the Gaza War highlights
several key points. First, it stresses Israel’s readiness, with the U.S. and
Western support, to take prolonged military actions against any threat to
its security. Second, it highlights the profound fragmentation within the
Palestinian leadership, with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank
adopting a largely passive and detached stance regarding the situation
in Gaza. Factionalism between Hamas and Fatah perpetuates instability
and undermines the prospects for a sustainable peace. As Scham (2023)
explains, Israel has a vested interest in maintaining the separation of
Palestinian factions as unity among them would pose a strategic threat
to Israel’s security. Their strategic divisions, coupled with external
political pressures particularly from Israel and the U.S., continue to
delay the creation of a unified Palestinian front that might pave the way
for a more robust and coherent peace process (Stock, 2017; Alhamdan,
2020).
Third, the factionalised nature of Palestinian politics, marked by
the paralysis of the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority and its public
criticism of Hamas, has deepened internal divisions and weakened
collective resistance. This internal discord has enabled Israel to frame
the war as a counterterrorism operation that fits within the MESC’s
framework of defeating non-state actors. Meanwhile, the initial protests
across the Arab World have largely given way to indifference. Gaza’s
suffering has become a recurrent media fixture, no longer a catalyst for
Arab street mobilisation. This shift reflects not only media fatigue but
The Gaza War and the Contours of a Nascent Middle East
Security Community 425

also a broader strategic recalibration among Arab regimes. Stability,

regime preservation, and alignment with powerful international actors
increasingly take precedence over popular sentiment. The muted
response of institutions such as the Arab League emphasises the
declining centrality of the Palestinian issue in Arab political discourse,
even as the humanitarian devastation in Gaza continues.
The Gaza War has clarified and reinforced the emergence of a
nascent pluralistic security community among key Arab states and
Israel. In Adler and Barnett’s (1998) terms, such a community is defined
by “dependable expectations of peaceful change” (p. 34), and “mutual
responsiveness” (pp. 47-49; p. 134) among states that, while retaining
their sovereignty, develop “a compatibility of core values derived from
common institutions” (p. 7). Ironically, all peace agreements between
Arab States and Israel, including major accords such as in 1979, 1994,
and the Abraham Accords were a transition from “ideological Arabness”
to interest-based conduct. The Arab states’ preference for non-
intervention and diplomatic containment over mobilisation suggests
the internalisation of mutual expectations for crisis management and
conflict avoidance, even in the absence of deep collective identity. As
such, the Gaza War has not disrupted the process of regional security
integration; rather, it has clarified its underlying structure, revealing
how the inclusion or exclusion of particular actors plays a central role
in shaping emerging security arrangements. This reflects Adler and
Barnett’s assertion that “who is inside, and who is outside, matters most”
(Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 4) in determining the normative boundaries
and operational logic of security communities.
Following Donald Trump’s provocative statement in early 2025
calling for the “cleaning out” of Gaza and the deportation of its residents
to Egypt and Jordan, Arab states issued a unified and unequivocal
rejection of the proposal. At a Cairo summit on 1 February 2025,
representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE,
Palestine, and the Arab League declared that any forced displacement
of Palestinians would be a violation of their “unalienable rights” and
warned it would “threaten the region’s stability...spread conflict and
undermine prospects for peace” (CBS News, 2025). Egypt’s President
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi firmly stated that such displacement “can never
be tolerated or allowed” due to its implications for Egypt’s national
security, and cautioned that the relocation of Palestinians could
426 Intellectual Discourse, Vol 33, No 2, 2025

jeopardise the Camp David peace framework (Reuters, 2025). Similarly,

Jordan’s King Abdullah II reiterated his government’s longstanding
position: “no refugees in Jordan, no refugees in Egypt,” affirming a
regional consensus against resettlement schemes (Malik, 2025). On 4
March 2025, an Arab League emergency summit endorsed Egypt’s $53
billion counterproposal focused on Gaza’s reconstruction, advocating a
technocratic transitional administration of Palestinian professionals and
eventual restoration of Palestinian Authority governance, specifically to
preserve Gaza’s demographic integrity and thwart any attempts at mass
expulsion (Doucet & Hussein, 2025). These coordinated diplomatic
actions illustrate not only the rejection of external coercion but also
the consolidation of a shared regional approach that defends Palestinian
territorial continuity and reflects the logic of a nascent, policy-oriented
security community in the Arab world.
External forces and regional security
The strategic landscape of the Middle East remains profoundly shaped
by the preferences and priorities of the United States (Byman &
Moller, 2016; Dunne, 2023). The origins of the contemporary U.S. role
in the Middle East can be traced to the aftermath of the 1990–1991
Kuwait Crisis, when, at the formal request of Saudi Arabia, the U.S.
stationed its troops on Saudi soil for the first time in the kingdom’s
history (Bunton, 20240). This military presence evolved into sustained
regional dominance not only due to America’s unique power projection
capabilities, accelerated by the concurrent collapse of the Soviet Union,
which cemented U.S. status as the sole superpower (Malik, 2014), but
also because of the strategic legacy generated by the Kuwait Crisis. This
legacy entrenched a framework of security dependency among Gulf
states while exacerbating mistrust within the Arab world, particularly
between U.S.-aligned monarchies and populations resentful of Western
military encroachment (Nicolas, 2024).
The primary security concern for Arab states, particularly those
in the Gulf, has not been the threat of military invasion or external
aggression, but rather the risk of domestic instability, which is in line
with the argument made by Barnett and Gause in Security Communities
(1998). In this context, regime survival has consistently remained the
central objective guiding Arab states’ security strategies (Tibi, 1998).
The United States has come to be perceived as a stabilising force in
The Gaza War and the Contours of a Nascent Middle East
Security Community 427

the region, simultaneously supporting incumbent regimes and deterring

Iran’s regional influence, thereby providing crucial security assurances
to both Gulf and broader Arab states. This role is further exemplified by
substantial annual U.S. military and financial aid to Egypt, amounting
to approximately $1.4 billion, and to Jordan, approximately $1.1 billion
(Salhani, 2025).
The return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025 has not
fundamentally altered the path or outcomes of the Gaza War. His
Trump 2.0 policies are an extension of his previous administration’s
regional policies, particularly on the question of Iran, which remains
key in understanding the formation of a regional security community.
Trump’s firm stance against Iran and his unwavering support for Israeli
security bolstered a collective alignment among several Arab states,
oriented around threat containment and the marginalisation of non-
state actors (Dunne, 2023; Kelly, 2024). Although this alignment has
been shaped more by strategic interests and external patronage than
by deep normative integration, it has nonetheless fostered increased
transnational cooperation and identity convergence. As Barnett and
Gause argue in their analysis of the Gulf Cooperation Council, even
alliances initially formed for regime protection can create conditions
that facilitate community-building through social interaction and
shared security frameworks (Barnett & Gause in Adler & Barnett, 1998,
pp. 119-160). In this evolving context, the sustained presence of the
United States continues to serve as a stabilising force, offering security
guarantees that underpin the gradual emergence of regional cohesion
(Byman & Moller, 2016).
Trump’s objectives rest on a functional logic: an end to the Gaza
War, or the beginning of any War, is only viable if it conforms to the
stabilising imperatives of the emerging regional security community,
which demands the systematic exclusion of destabilising actors. Within
this context, if Iran is perceived as a threat to the coherence of this
alignment, structured increasingly around Israeli strategic centrality, the
United States, Israel, and aligned Arab states may not only endorse but
also support coercive measures, including military action, to safeguard
the integrity of the evolving regional security architecture.
In Security Communities, Adler and Barnett articulate a nuanced
view of external intervention in the context of security community
428 Intellectual Discourse, Vol 33, No 2, 2025

development. They emphasise that the role of external actors is double-

edged. On one hand, powerful states can support the emergence of
security communities by acting as “cores of strength” that anchor
integration and generate positive expectations of security and prosperity.
These actors, through persuasion or “nudging,” can encourage weaker
states to converge around shared norms and interests. This supports
Deutsch’s observation that security communities develop around cores
of strength. The United States is the “core of strength” in the emerging
Middle East security community.
However, the authors caution that the effects of external intervention
are contingent. When intervention is coercive, unilateral, or seen as
undermining sovereignty, it can hinder the trust-building and norm-
sharing essential for a security community. For instance, the history of
U.S. intervention in Latin America, particularly its disregard for regional
consensus and sovereignty norms, is presented as a major obstacle
to regional community-building, despite the absence of major wars
in the region. In contrast, where external actors act as facilitators of
multilateralism and value diffusion, such as through the United Nations,
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or
regional organisations, their involvement can foster the social learning
and normative alignment needed for communities to emerge. The
authors call such efforts “strong multilateralism,” which contrasts with
transactional, interest-based “weak” multilateralism and is more likely
to lead to community formation. Ultimately, Adler and Barnett argue
that external powers do not simply impose or prevent the emergence of
security communities; rather, their influence is mediated by the degree
to which their actions align with shared norms and institutional practices
already present or nascent in the region, which is the precise case of
American engagement in the Middle East.
Given that Iran remains a central security concern for Israel and,
to a considerable extent, for Gulf Cooperation Council members, it
functions as a focal point for consolidating a nascent regional security
community. A key reason is that Iran lacks viable options for engaging
in open warfare with Israel, a reality that highlights the effectiveness of
regional security arrangements in constraining escalation. In effect, Iran
had never fought a war with Israel for Palestine. Yet, Israel’s posture
towards Iran is not dislodged from the overall security arrangements
in the region. Israel’s strike capabilities depend on U.S. logistical and
The Gaza War and the Contours of a Nascent Middle East
Security Community 429

diplomatic support, and Israeli defence analysts consistently caution

that unilateral military action without Washington’s coordination would
be both strategically limited and regionally destabilising.
At the same time, Iran’s regional influence through its proxy
networks, particularly Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria, has
been significantly diminished as discussed earlier. Aware of these shifts,
Gulf states have increasingly favoured diplomacy and coordinated
deterrence as strategies to manage Tehran’s asymmetric threats, such as
maritime disruption, rather than opting for direct military confrontation
(Stimson Center, 2024; CSIS, 2020). These converging patterns of
behaviour suggest the emergence of a regional security architecture
grounded in shared threat perceptions, mutual restraint, and pragmatic
cooperation, all of which align with the defining features of a nascent,
pluralistic security community.
Importantly, the resilience of this emerging community lies in its
capacity to manage internal fragmentation and external threats without
escalating into open conflict. The region’s preference for diplomatic
coordination and interest-based security partnerships, exemplified by
Arab states’ rejection of Trump’s call to displace Gazans and their
assumption of reconstruction responsibilities, reinforces the notion
that security communities can emerge not solely from cultural or
ideological unity but through sustained social interaction and functional
interdependence. As Adler and Barnett caution, the success of such
communities depends on whether external powers act in ways consistent
with the region’s evolving norms and practices. In the case of the
Middle East, the alignment between American strategic interests and
regional security imperatives (Nasr, 2025) appears, for now, to support
rather than obstruct the formation of a pluralistic, if nascent, security
community.
As Adler and Barnett emphasise, the development of institutions
within a nascent security community marks a critical shift from ad hoc
cooperation to more structured, norm-guided interaction. In this early
phase, institutions do not emerge fully formed but evolve incrementally
through social processes of interaction, persuasion, and norm
internalisation. These institutions function initially as mechanisms for
information sharing, threat identification, and behavioural coordination,
helping to reduce uncertainty and build trust among historically
430 Intellectual Discourse, Vol 33, No 2, 2025

adversarial actors (Adler & Barnett, 1998, pp. 50–53). Importantly, they
also serve latent functions by fostering social learning and constructing
collective identities, even when formal treaty arrangements remain
absent.
The institutionalisation process is thus both instrumental and
constitutive; it facilitates cooperation while gradually reconstituting
state interests and identities. As interactions become routinised and
expectations of peaceful change deepen, the institutions themselves
transform from instruments of utility to embodiments of community
norms. In the Middle East context, the emergence of shared fora,
coordinated security responses, and diplomatic alignments, though
still fragile, suggests that the region may be traversing this formative
stage. Whether the security community in the region grows strong
or remains stable depends on the same factors that create security
concerns. These factors include Israel, backed by the United States,
without a counterbalance to U.S. influence in the region. China’s role
is mainly economic, acting like the region’s “factory and supermarket.”
Meanwhile, Iran, since 1979, has remained in conflict with other regional
countries. It is unlikely, according to regional political norms, for Iran’s
relationships with other states to develop beyond U.S. influence.
Conclusion
The Gaza War is poised to reinforce the pre-war regional security
architecture rather than disrupt it. Due to Israel’s enduring presence,
non-state actors within the region could consistently emerge to challenge
it as an extension of the people’s disapproval for normalisation with
Israel as reported in the Arab Barometer (Robbins, 2025). The potential
for any future conflicts to escalate into war, as seen currently, hinges
on the security community’s ability to contain these threats. However,
eliminating such groups or preventing minor conflicts remains uncertain.
State hegemony defines the Middle East system, progressively
marginalising non-state actors. While militant groups historically
demonstrated disruptive capacity, their influence remains contingent
on state patronage, external sponsorship, or fragile governance. The
securitisation of politics (See Abrahamsen & Williams, 2006), state-
centric counterterrorism, and Arab-Israeli normalisation (absent popular
consensus) reinforce this paradigm. Even in conflict zones like Yemen
or Syria, non-state actors’ operational viability depends on sovereign
The Gaza War and the Contours of a Nascent Middle East
Security Community 431

states’ strategic calculus regarding material support and operational

constraints. The region thus remains fundamentally structured by
interstate engagement, with sovereignty and regime security as its
organising principles.
The Iran-Israel conflict remains intractable. Trump’s ‘maximum
pressure’ strategy – marked by severe sanctions – may force Tehran to
negotiate rather than escalate, especially given Netanyahu’s persistent
threats of military action. As Nephew (2024) notes, Iran’s regional
weakening (including Hezbollah’s decline and Assad’s faltering regime)
could paradoxically facilitate comprehensive talks rather than preclude
them.
Middle East dynamics offer Israel strategic options against Iran.
Strikes on Syrian military assets, aimed at degrading defences, could
precede broader action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Advocates argue
the current climate favours pre-emptive strikes, citing Tehran’s nearing
nuclear breakout, failed diplomacy, and ongoing regional instability
(Kroenig, 2024). Historical models like Israel’s 1981 Osirak and 2007
Syrian reactor operations provide precedents.
Nonetheless, Israel’s security apparatus would grapple with a
paradoxical reality: while the neutralisation of Iran’s nuclear capabilities
is deemed essential for safeguarding national security, the elimination
of Iran as a strategic counterbalance could, in the long run inadvertently
destabilise the broader security architecture. In such a scenario, Israel
might find its role in containing Iran’s influence marginal, or worse,
diminished. This could potentially erode the strategic leverage that
underpins its regional security model. This duality highlights the
complexity of Israel’s calculus in confronting the multifaceted Iranian
threat. The Israel-Iran relationship demonstrates the mutually reinforcing
benefits that have, paradoxically, served the strategic interests of both
regimes within the state-centric security community. Iran’s leadership,
particularly its clerical establishment, has leveraged its advocacy for the
Palestinian cause as a mechanism to bolster domestic legitimacy.
Israel’s regional dominance relies on two key factors: strong U.S.
support and weaker neighbouring states. Therefore, the persistent
weakness and fragmentation of regional counterparts further consolidate
Israel’s cyclic strategic advantage. The absence of a unified Arab security
bloc reduces the likelihood of coordinated opposition. While Israel
432 Intellectual Discourse, Vol 33, No 2, 2025

remains the dominant regional actor, its hegemony requires continuous

reinforcement through strategic alignment with global powers and
the exploitation of regional power asymmetries. The durability of
this dominance is not structurally guaranteed; it is conditioned by
evolving variables such as shifts in U.S. foreign policy priorities,
changes in regional threat perceptions, and potential realignments
among Arab states or with external powers like China or Russia. In
this sense, Israel’s pre-eminence must be understood as a contingent
geopolitical configuration: resilient but inherently adaptive, rather than
a fixed or inevitable strategic outcome. The long-term sustainability
of this dominance is, therefore, a dynamic rather than a predetermined
certainty. This concludes the title of this article: shifting geopolitics.

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(ii) Ibn Ḥanbal, A. (1982). Musnad Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal. Istanbul: Cagri Yayinlari.

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In This Issue
Note from the Editor

Research Articles

Zubaida Nusrat & Adibah Binti Abdul Rahim

The Existentialist Conception of Man: A Comparative Analysis between
Muhammad Iqbal and Jean-Paul Sartre
Nuzulul Qadar Abdullah
Equal Before Allah, Unequal Before the Prophet?
Ongoing Discourse on Matn Criticism and Its Influence on Muslim Feminist Thought
Bachar Bakour & Homam Altabaa
Critical Thinking as a Mechanism for Situation Handling and Problem Solving:
Examples from Ḥadīth Literature
Nath Aldalala’a & Syaza Shukri
Shifting Geopolitics: The Gaza War and the Contours of a Nascent Middle East Security Community
Nadira Brioua & Rahmah Binti Ahmad H. Osman
Power of Knowledge vs. Self-Knowledge Production:
The Protagonist’s Journey towards Embracing Islam in Umm Zakiyyah’s If I Should Speak
Raihan Rosman
A Muslim Female Bildungsroman:
Quest for Identity and Sisterhood in Islam in Leila Aboulela’s Minaret (2005)
Amrah Abdul Majid
Freedom as Connection to God: An Analysis of Two Novels
by Muslim Women’s Writers in the Western Diaspora
Norhafiza Mohd Hed
‘The Politics of Fear’: How It Affects Youth Political Participation in Malaysia?
Norhaslinda bt Jamaiudin
Perceived Determinants of Child Poverty in Malaysia: A Preliminary Analysis
Burcin Demirbilek
Türkiye’s Climate Change Policy: An Evaluation of Its Transition to Low Carbon Policies
Gustina, Syukri Lukman, Muhammad Rizki Prima Sakti & Mohamad Fany Alfarisi
The Role of Ulama in Shaping Attitude, Subjective Norms, Digitalisation and
Trust Towards Cash Waqf Behaviour
Moh. Sugeng Sholehuddin, Isriani Hardini, Muhammad Jaeni, Eros Meilina Sofa & Thi Thu Huong Ho
The Role of Local Wisdom in Shaping Internationalisation Strategies of
Islamic Higher Education Institutions in Indonesia
Syed Arabi Idid & Rizwanah Souket Ali
Perceptions of Three U.S. Presidents (Obama, Trump, and Biden) – A Malaysian Perspective
Tengku Siti Aisha Tengku Mohd Azzman Shariffadeen, Aini Maznina A. Manaf & Nerawi Sedu
International Students’ Direct and Parasocial Contact, and Attitude Towards Malaysian
Host Nationals: The Mediating Roles of Cultural Identification and Islamic Identity
Hafezdzullah bin Mohd Hassan, Rizalawati binti Ismail & Awan binti Ismail
Artificial Intelligence in Sinar Harian: Embracing Readiness or Addressing Anxiety?
Zeti Azreen Ahmad, Aini Maznina A. Manaf, Mazni Buyong, Sofiah Samsudin, Fuad Sawari
& Hanani Ahmad Yusof
Healthcare Workers’ Challenges in Managing Disease Outbreaks:
A Systematic Review from an Islamic Perspective
Wan Norshira Wan Mohd Ghazali, Ahmad Muhammad Husni, Shafizan Mohamed, Mohd Helmi Yusoh,
Kamaruzzaman Abdul Manan & Nur Shakira Mohd Nasir
Faith-Based Approaches to Vaccine Misconception: A Systematic Literature Review of Religious
Messaging

Book Reviews

ISSN 0128-4878 (Print)

ISSN 2289-5639 (Online)