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 COLD
PEACE

Avoiding the New Cold War

MICHAEL DOYLE
 For
Leah Maeve Jurek
in hope that her generation will
live in peace
 Contents

INTRODUCTION From Cold War to Cold Peace

Part One
A NEW COLD WAR?

CHAPTER ONE Defining Cold War

CHAPTER TWO Cold War II?

Part Two
THE SOURCES OF CONFLICT
CHAPTER THREE Superpower Systems, Hegemonic Transitions, and
Multidimensional Polarity
CHAPTER FOUR Corporatist, Nationalist Autocracies
CHAPTER FIVE Liberal, Capitalist Democracies

Part Three
DISTANT MIRRORS
ITALY, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 1920S TO THE 1930S

CHAPTER SIX Italian Fascism and American Politics

CHAPTER SEVEN Japanese Militarism and American Policy

Part Four
COLD PEACE

CHAPTER EIGHT Future Scenarios

CHAPTER NINE Four Bridges to a Cold Peace

Afterword and Acknowledgments

Notes

Index
COLD
PEACE
 Introduction

From Cold War to Cold Peace

It is now increasingly clear that the post–Cold War era is over. This makes
me remember with nostalgia that wonderful day in 1988 at the UN General
Assembly when the Cold War began to end, the day when Mikhail Gorbachev
declared human rights were not just Western (as they were seen to be during
the Cold War) but human and global.1 The Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact
crumbled, and then the USSR collapsed and Russia began to democratize.
And, in 1989, young Chinese erected a statue of liberty in Tiananmen
Square,2 heralding the possibility of a liberal “spring” spreading to the other
Communist great power.
The early 1990s were hopeful times but also times of missed opportunity.
I share some of the sad irony expressed by the great Cold War novelist,
David Cornwell (pen name John le Carré), who said in 2001 that the right
power lost the Cold War, but the wrong one won it.3 In 2020, le Carré
elaborated through a 1990 comment of the character he identified with,
George Smiley: “One day, history may tell us who really won. If a
democratic Russia emerges—why, then Russia will have been the winner.
And if the West chokes on its own materialism, then the West may still turn
out to be the loser.”4 Le Carré hoped for a peace without victors in a newly
constructed international order. Unfortunately, we entered an era of US
unipolarity mixed with much arrogance.
Russia descended into populist and, later, autocratic kleptocracy, and
Eastern Europe fled west into dependency on NATO and the European
Union. China succeeded in borrowing the market while holding democracy at
bay.
Today, in the emerging new cold war, we are paying the price for a
failure of creativity in the 1990s. And, it is more serious than it appeared just
a few years ago; it is more dangerous than just traded insults. Ukrainians
today are bearing the costs as they valiantly attempt to defend their national
independence.
Instead of marking the end to strife over ideology and the start of an ever-
growing international liberal order of peace and cooperation or a return to a
classical multipolar balance of power, the post–Cold War era is being
followed by a new cold war. This is a war—so far, cold—among great
powers and between clashing systems of government. It is characterized by
industrial competition, information subversion, and cyber warfare.
None of this has escaped the politicians. President Biden concluded his
first news conference of 2021 with these words: “I predict to you,” he told
reporters, “your children or grandchildren are going to be doing their
doctoral thesis on the issue of who succeeded: autocracy or democracy?
Because that is what is at stake.”5
This new geopolitical world has grave implications for the curbing of
climate change, the promotion of human rights, and the protection of national
security. Citizens around the world need a more concerted effort to manage
global security tensions and a more careful but determined human rights
strategy, both adapted to these times and designed to ensure that the post–
Cold War era transcends the war in Ukraine and turns into, at least, a cold
peace.
For the United States, such an effort must include much more careful and
coherent diplomacy with both Russia and China, aimed at establishing a
détente that is based on a mutual nonsubversion understanding. It must also
instigate substantial reforms in domestic policy aimed at establishing
resilience and reinforcing a more egalitarian order. Enhancing liberal
security, promoting prosperity, and supporting human rights calls for
reasserting international rule-of-law principles, reaffirming existing
alliances, addressing domestic inequalities in some liberal democracies, and
improving trade regimes—all are necessary to foster conditions for better
times in international relations.
Fortunately, while there is a danger of a cold war, there is no danger of
replaying the Cold War. Cold War II is unlikely to be as extreme as Cold War
I. Three factors weigh against escalation. The first is a rational appreciation
of the likely costs of a cold war between the United States and China. One
need only recall that China has had an economic growth rate more than twice
that of the United States, a GNP close to that of the United States, and a
population three times that of the United States. The second is an
unprecedentedly large global common interest in mutually dependent
prosperity and protecting the planet from environmental deterioration. The
third is that Russia and China are authoritarian, not totalitarian. Putinism is
not Stalinist Communism, Xi-ism is not Maoism, and no one is a Nazi.
Yet the United States, Russia, and China are unlikely to establish a
“warm” peace, such as that enjoyed within Western Europe or between
Europe and the United States and its other allies.
None of the powers are unusually aggressive. In recent years, the United
States did invade Afghanistan and Iraq (the latter on the basis of very faulty
intelligence) and intervened with allies in Libya and Syria. Russia invaded
Georgia and Ukraine (twice). China asserts territorial claims over the South
China Sea and demands sovereignty over self-ruling Taiwan.
The deeper source of global conflict is defensive. The United States and
its allies do not want to impose democracy by force.6 They want to make “a
world safe for democracy” in which national security is affordable, elections
are secure, markets are free, and in which human rights remain an ideal.
China and Russia do not seek to impose autocracy for its own sake. They,
correspondingly, seek “a world safe for autocracy” in which governments are
free to have or not have elections and human rights, markets and information
are subject to state direction, and no one outside the government questions
state policy. Both sides are threatened because those two visions (both
systemic, so-called milieu goals) are incompatible, unless both sides agree
to difficult compromises.
Restoring the prospect of diplomatic accommodation will be difficult
after the shock, war crimes, and severe retaliatory sanctions generated by the
invasion of Ukraine. But even the worst wars end. Cold War détente
followed the war in Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Cold war strife can develop into a compromise, a cold peace détente, if a
nonsubversion pact can be implemented; that is, if neither side attempts to
attack the political independence or territorial integrity of the other. Critical
debates over promoting national interests and human rights should remain
permissible, but they need to be accompanied by negotiations over cyber
conflict, industrial competition, Ukraine, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.
The United States needs to develop a defense in depth: protecting the
democratic process against cyberattack and launching a New Deal to address
the domestic inequalities that fuel subversion in contemporary democracies
(like the attempted putsch on January 6, 2021, in Washington, DC).
In this book, I will paint a picture of the dangers of a new cold war that
we are approaching. Although the tensions between the United States and
China and Russia are dominating world politics, we should not assume that
they are the only source of insecurities, and I will identify them as well.
I will outline the definitions and contours of the emerging new cold war
in Part One of this book. In Part Two, I will argue that like the original Cold
War, this is a deeply structured conflict, both internationally and
transnationally. Inspired by the logic of bipolarity and of hegemonic
transition internationally, some (most notably Graham Allison) have warned
of a new “Thucydides Trap,” wherein a rising power challenges slipping
powers, and war resolves the rivalry. Transnationally, the conflict is a
domestically driven political rivalry between social and political systems,
with each having supported subversive domestic transformation. The new
technologies of cyber warfare and information war are enabling conditions,
but what is important today is the weaponization of those technologies in a
deadly rivalry.
The conflict reinforces itself. Some notable American statesmen, the late
Senator John McCain prominent among them, have identified a new cold war
in Russian subversive threats. They have called for an alliance of
democracies to confront those threats. What the McCain analysis misses are
the ways in which the United States has threatened Russia and China with the
advance of NATO eastward and a post–Cold War declared military strategy
of global predominance. I am not unsympathetic to the value of better
coordinating the democracies. In the later 1930s, eloquent (but ineffective)
pleas were made to unite them, but today, the threat from the autocracies is
neither sufficiently extreme nor appreciated enough to sustain a fully united
response. And the policy differences among the democracies preclude tight
coordination across the broad spectrum of issues that would be needed for a
formal, institutionalized alliance.
Others cite just the factors McCain neglects and describe an aggressive
Western campaign against Russia and China that the Russians and Chinese
have simply been defending themselves against by creating buffer zones in
Ukraine and Georgia and the South China Sea. These strategists underplay
the internal drivers of nationalism, corporatism, and autocracy—and the
connection among the three—that drive foreign campaigns for prestige and
resources by those powers. The new autocracies employ state power in
international corporate competition and cultivate external enemies to validate
the need for internal oppression.
In considering these domestic drivers of conflict, I will make distinctions
among forms of corporatism (including the kinds imposed by the state through
planning and those arising from below in various forms of cronyism) and
among forms of nationalism and autocracy. I will also explore how these
interrelate and make, in varying ways, stable relations between them and the
varieties of capitalism, liberalism, and democracy immensely difficult.
The new cold war that I describe would be clear were it not for the US
2016 election. Donald Trump was not the root cause but an anomaly in this
conflict. Indeed, the new cold war would be clearer and more
confrontational had Hillary Clinton become president with her commitments
to human rights, democracy, and global markets. Although Trump’s style,
personality, and preferences resembled no contemporary leader as much as
they did Vladimir Putin, the Trump-Putin bromance was no guarantee of
cooperative US-Russia relations. Trump is an exacerbating force in this new
cold war because of his militarism, instability, and unpredictability. Now
with President Joe Biden in office, these global divides between democracy
and autocracy have become clearer, and President Biden has not de-
escalated the new cold war but instead driven it forward.
 In Part Three, I explore the new cold war’s important historical
analogues. Contrary to some pundits, I explain that Putin is not Stalin, Xi is
not Mao, and no one today is Hitler. Yet I will also highlight that there are
important links between twentieth-century Fascism and twenty-first-century
“corporatist, nationalist autocracy.” There are fascinating links between the
ideology and policies of Putinism and the ideas and policies of Mussolini in
his attacks on Ethiopia and intervention in the Spanish Republic. As
MacGregor Knox has argued, Mussolini tried to seize military glory and
expand his foreign control in order to support his campaign to build a
domestic Fascist state. There are even important links between the strategic
environment and choices made by the Japanese military regime of the 1930s
and the environment confronted and policies chosen by President Xi Jinping
in China today. I do not say that we are about to replay World War II. Nuclear
deterrence, geoeconomics, and other differences are vitally significant. But
we have much to learn from the circumstances the statesmen of the Interwar
period faced and the mistakes they made.
In Part Four, I will provide evidence that another cold war is not
inevitable and outline vital compromises that can make a cold peace viable.
However, the domestic structural roots of the conflict make it unlikely that
the United States, Russia, and China will establish a “warm” peace, such as
that enjoyed within Western Europe or among Europe and the United States,
Canada, Australia, and Japan.
The Cold War cost $11 trillion (1990 dollars) in US defense spending
alone. Though “cold” by and large between the superpowers, it helped
produce 14 million casualties in proxy wars and stimulated conflicts.7 Our
concern today is what the new cold war means not only for global security
but also for a more humane world in which human rights and the planet can
be protected. My claim clearly is that these are not good times for global
security, world prosperity, environmental resilience, or human rights.
I will thus conclude by suggesting that we need a more concerted effort to
manage global security tensions by developing compromises and common
ground on climate, cyber relations, Ukraine, and Taiwan. The United States
and its allies need new thinking in order to design a more careful but
determined human rights strategy adapted to these times, in hopes of fostering
the conditions for better times in which competition is waged if not in entente
at least in détente, in a cold peace, replacing a looming cold war. In a cold
peace, no great power attempts to subvert the political independence or
territorial integrity of another. That is not the world we are in today, where
both are challenged. Basic security is at risk, and human rights are on
defense.
The world can evolve from a cold war confrontation to a cold peace
détente if the major powers implement a nonsubversion pact. Critical debates
over promoting national interests and human rights should remain
permissible, but they need to be accompanied by negotiations over Crimea
and the South China Sea. Détente may encourage a more moderate policy
from Russia and China, but expectations there need to be limited. In the
meantime, the United States needs to protect the democratic process against
cyberattack. It also needs to cultivate a more centrist and responsible
leadership. But because the rise of white nationalism backing President
Trump is associated with the erosion of the middle class, the United States
and other liberal countries will need to launch something like a New Deal to
address the domestic inequalities that fuel populism in contemporary
democracies.
In the end, we must understand the threat of a new cold war and take
measures to curb it, lest we burden a new generation with a long twilight
struggle of arms races and missed opportunities to address global challenges.
Above all, we must strive for a détente in which covert operations directed
against domestic political institutions and vital infrastructure are taken off the
table in the name of mutual survival and global prosperity. This book is an
invitation to begin that project.
 Part One

A NEW COLD WAR?

 IN 2021, AS US TIES WITH RUSSIA
and China came under increasing strain after the surge in Russia-based
cybercrimes and in human rights violations by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), a NATO summit adopted a more united stance against the “systemic
threats” to the “rules-based international order” posed by Russia and China.
NATO merged the two states as a dual threat to the NATO alliance once
focused almost exclusively on the USSR/Russia. The G7 nations, including
the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Japan, Italy, and
Germany, met days later and similarly criticized China for abuses relating to
Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. After the NATO and G7 summits, Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian responded that the Western
nations were “deliberately slandering China” and added: “It is fair to say that
the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the
new era is all-dimensional and all-weather. . . . Sky is the limit for down-to-
earth China-Russia cooperation.” When the G7 discussed the US evacuation
of Afghanistan, China and Russia provocatively called for accountability for
the harms inflicted by the US military on Afghan civilians. When China
perceived increased coordination between India and the United States, it
called them “enemies.”1
 CHAPTER ONE

Defining Cold War

The possibility of an emerging new cold war is grabbing the attention of

statespersons and scholars. Former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger
said the United States and China were in the “foothills of a Cold War” and
warned that the conflict could be worse than World War I if left to run
unconstrained. “That makes it, in my view, especially important that a period
of relative tension be followed by an explicit effort to understand what the
political causes are and a commitment by both sides to try to overcome
those,” Kissinger told a session of the New Economy Forum. “It is far from
being too late for that, because we are still in the foothills of a cold war.”
Kissinger also noted: “Everybody knows that trade negotiations, which I
hope will succeed and whose success I support, can only be a small
beginning to a political discussion that I hope will take place.”1
“The Cold War is back with a vengeance, but with a difference,” UN
secretary-general António Guterres declared, explaining: “The mechanisms
and the safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no
longer seem to be present.”2 H. R. McMaster, the second strategic guru of the
early days of the Trump administration, heralded an emerging geopolitical
struggle. In a speech previewing the Trump administration’s new National
Security Strategy (discussed later), he invoked warlike images of the current
order with “threats to liberty and freedom” from terrorist groups, the
“revisionist powers” of China and Russia, and the “rogue regimes” of Iran
and North Korea as akin to the threats that the United States and its allies
previously encountered from “fascism, imperialism, and communist
totalitarianism.”3 And eminent scholars of international history, such as
Lawrence Freedman, describe a “New Cold War” characterized by
“[a]ssassination attempts, cyber-attacks, military interventions—Russia is
once again playing a deadly game with the West. Yet beneath the bravado is a
nation riddled with insecurities.”4 Voices from the Progressive Left have
added their perspective, as did Michael Klare in a clarion piece in The
Nation in which he highlighted the mutually provocative nuclear use
doctrines of Trump and Putin, their return to Cold War–style nuclear
technological racing, and the declaration by Xi that he has no term limit.5
Cold War Sovietologist Robert Legvold reluctantly came to the view that
the rising tensions between Russia and the United States following the crisis
in Ukraine amounted to a Return to Cold War. He added that both elements
of his thesis “that the deterioration in relations amounts to a cold war and that
each bears responsibility . . . will stir strong dissent.”6 But in a well-argued
study, he nonetheless declared that the evidence bore his conclusion out. He
then traced how the deterioration in relations came about. This book agrees
with him but finds a broader realm of tension, including with China, and
explores the deeper political, economic, and social roots of the new cold
war divide.7
Others, of course, have disagreed. The president of the right-wing
Hudson Institute (Kenneth Weinstein) rejects the label of “cold war” as
applied to US-China relations, noting the good personal chemistry between
Trump and Xi and the immense economic costs of such a conflict.8 Others
imaginatively formulate new labels, including “Hot Peace” (Michael
McFaul, former US ambassador to Russia) and “Cool War” (Noah Feldman,
international legal scholar), both evoking the genuine ambiguities that shape
the emerging rivalry.9
Secretary of State Antony Blinken also rejected the label “new Cold
War,” but his subsequent remarks sounded like a rallying cry for another long
struggle. He said he saw the relations between the United States and China as
“complex”—reflecting a mix of aspects. He noted “adversarial aspects . . .
competitive aspects . . . cooperative aspects—all three.”10 But of course, the
US-Soviet Cold War was also complex: adversarial, competitive, and also
cooperative (as extensive arms control treaties and nonproliferation treaties
attested). Blinken continued his remarks by assuring the public that America
will engage China “from a position of strength,” will mobilize allies, and
will sustain the rivalry between democracies and autocracies highlighted by
President Biden in his April 2021 address to Congress. He reaffirmed US
policy in an important address at George Washington University in May
2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine: “Even as President Putin’s
war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term
challenge to the international order—and that’s posed by the People’s
Republic of China. China is the only country with both the intent to reshape
the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military,
and technological power to do it. Beijing’s vision would move us away from
the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over
the past seventy-five years.”11

Importantly, as will be developed in later chapters, the conflict is deeply

rooted. It is not a temporary detour in the march to an “end of history”
characterized by global liberal peace. It is not simply a matter of competing
presidential egos pitting Putin against Trump or Biden, and both against Xi.
Most significantly, it does not just reflect a reemerging diplomatic adjustment
of a classical multipolar great power rivalry, a new geopolitical bipolarity
between the United States and China or the travails of a unipolar world
dominated by the United States.
Instead, like the original Cold War, this is a deep conflict between social
and political systems, not just a rivalry over regional military predominance
in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or the South China Sea. The new cold
war is a transnational political rivalry, with both the United States and
Russia-China supporting domestic disruption or transformation. The new
technologies of cyber warfare and information war are enabling conditions,
but what is important today is the weaponization of those technologies in a
deadly rivalry. But that then raises the question of how it differs, to the extent
it does, from other forms of international relations.
We need new labels for the world we are entering. The traditional
options are illustrated in Table 1. If “war” is an effort to undermine political
independence and territorial integrity, “peace” is the mutual acceptance of
each other’s political independence and territorial sovereignty sometimes
associated with a “security community,” “cold” is non-armed conflict, and
“hot” is armed, kinetic conflict, then the possibilities given in Table 1
arise.12
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