ON" THE PLATONISM OF ST.

AUGUSTINE'S
QUAESTIO DE IDEIS
11E influence of Platonism on the philosop·hy of St.
T Augustine is a \vell-established fact of the books. St.
Augustine has perhaps been his own best commentator on this
phase of his intellectual development (cf. Oonfessions-, VII,
9 ff.).. It was the libri Platonici more than any other pagan
writillgs which prepared hirn intellectually for accepting the
teaching of the Christian Ohurch. In another work, soon after
his conversion, this debt to Platonism is expressed in the words:
"The Platonists with the change of a very few words and
opinions would become Christians " (De vera relig., 7). St.
Augustine here simply recorded what had happened to hirnself ;
and though he modified later, in his official capacity of abishop,
some of his earlier views as being too intellectual, he always
remained, philosophically, a firmly rooted and deeply convinced
Platon.ist.
As such he laid the foundation for the new intellectual era
\vhich he inaugurated. "The philosophy of St. Allgustine," as
one recent writer puts it, "whatever its origins-for it would
not be difficult to find traces of most of his arguments and beliefs
in more ancient statements-was to determine the problems,
and iIl part even the conclusions, of a thousalld years of philos-
opherB." 1 This, too, is a matter of record; and it is no exag-
geration to speak of St. Augustine as the true Father of that
Christian civilization which came to the rescue of the slowly
disintegrating ancient \vorld. N or would it he correct to limit
his infiueIlce to the thousand years of what is commonly known
as the Middle Ages.
As that eivilization, however, took on form and grew into the
structure '\vhieh has lasted into our own days, a great part of

1 R. McKeon, Selections trom }JfedievaZ Philosophers, New York, 1929,

p.3.
16
 On the Platonism of St. Augustine}s U Quaesltio de ideis}} 17

the legacy of St. Augustine consisted in the Platonic tradition

which was transmitted through his works. All the " Augustin-
ians" during the following centuries were more or less
" Platonists" and vice ve1"sa. The Augustinian element was
preserved through Alcuin, AnseIm, Bernard of Ohartres, Hugo
of St. Victor, St. Bonaventura, Eckhart, Tauler, to Giordano
Bruno, Kepler, and other men who finally brought to an end
the historical development originating ,vith Augustine. Its
importance, therefore, call hardly be exaggerated.
Platonism is to be found in all the works of St. Augustine.
For the following discussion "\ve have chosen one of the briefest,
but perhaps most condensed expression of it to be found in the
writings of Augustine, and shall attempt to carve out of its sub-
stance some of the larger features of what may be called the
" Platonic tradition."
In this attempt it will he ohserved that no reference is made
to N eoplatonic works from which-as is weIl known-St.
Augustine received most of his" Platonic "training. This is
done with the purpose of focusing more sharply on what may be
called the "Platonic tradition" as against the "philosophy of
Plato." It is, I think, possible to show that, regardless 01 "rhat
we today consider the correct interpretation of the philosophy
of Plato (and it is unnecessary to call attention to the dis-
agreement among eminent scholars on this point), the Platonic
tradition, though originating \vith Plato, is both different from
and simpler than the philosophy of Plato. It is this Platonic
tradition rather than the philosophy of Plato which was reen-
forced hy N eoplatonism and N eopythagoreanism, and thus came
to be of the utmost importallce and influence on the Iater history
of ideas in the western world. N ow it may be both helpful and
legitimate to trace it back to its original sourc€', hecause the
Platonic tradition probably had already found its way into
European thought, via Alexandria (Philo) and Rome (Oicero),
long before it was set up as an independent system by Plotinus,
2
18 Hans Meyerhoff

Porphyry', and Proclus. The PIatonie tradition, then, can be

followed through the entire history of western philosophy,
science, and literature; the philosophy of Plato, on the other
hand, has been dead since Plato himself taught it (if he ever
did teach a coherent system), and has only recently been revived
by the results of modern classical scholarship.
If this view is adopted, a rather important conclusion can
be drawn from it: To know the philosophy of Plato it is neces-
sary to know all that Plato said and taught, without regard to
that :vvrhich history attributed to him, and then to subject his
works to the most minute scrutiny with the precision-tools of
modern. scientific research; however, to know what influence he
exerted on the history of ideas, philosop,hical, religious, scientific,
and literary, is to know much 1ess about Plato himself and much
more about what history thought him to have said and taught.
It almost seems safe to say that the Platonic tradition (as against
the philosophy of Plato) would have established itself as it did,
if the 1N'orld. had never known anything of Plato's works at first
hand except the Phaedo and the Timaeus, with perhap-s an
additional second-hand knowledge of the Sy'mposium and
Republic.
The following translation and analysis of St. Augustine's
Quaest~io de ideis may serve to clarify the meaning of this
so-called Platonic tradition. I believe it could be shown that
its essential features can be formulated quite definitely (in
contradistinction to the philosophy of Plato, where such a clear
formulatioll can apparently not he achieved), and then he traced
through the intellectual history of Europe as, so to speak, the
hereditary strain contributed by Plato. This has not been
attempted in the present study. It would be presumptuous to
\believe that all the features of the Platonic tradition are con-
fained in or can be elicited from this little tract of St. Augus-
fine's. It must suffice to bring to light some of its essential
~octrines and to suggest others.
 On the Platonism of St. AugustineJs U Quaes,tio de ideis JJ 19

In referring hack to Plato, with whom St. Augustine admit-

tedly had no direct acquaintance, except for the Timaeus, we
may also ~e ahle to show that the mediation of N eoplatonism,
through which St. Augustine did receive most of his "Platon-
ism," only served to throw into focus what must have already
been the generally accepted heritage of Plato in so far as it can
be found in his original works. Secondly, I think, it can be
said that the "Platonic tradition" sometimes asserted itself
over and against the form given to it by the N eoplatonists, and
thus kept alive certain ideas, found in the original Plato, which
otherwise might have been lost in these later systems (cf. below
sections8, '€).
The Quaestio de ideis which forms the basis for our discussion
is the 46th in De diversis quaestionibus 83 Ziber un,us. This
work is a literary reflection of conversations concerning philo-
sophical and religious problems which took place between St.
Augustine and his brothers after his return to Africa. The
loose notes "\vere later collected into a book.
Only the second part of the Quaestio is translated, from a
Venice edition of 1731. The :first part has been omitted hecause,
although very interesting, it is not of strictly philosophieal
significance. It is concerned primarily with the origin of the
name" idea," and the importance of Plato as the inventor of
the name. St. Augustine does not admit that Plato was more
than that, for if there really are such things as are designated
by that name, they must have existed before Plato and must have
been known to other men regardless of their name; for without
them nobody could never have attained wisdom: "Tanta in
eis (sc. ideis) vis constituitur, ut nisi his intellectis sapiens
nemo esse possit."
The following translation has been divided into sections,
designated by Greek letters, according to what seem natural
breaks in the thought. Each section is followed by a com-
mentary which attempts to de:fine some of the characteristic
20 Hans M eyerhoff

features of what was called the "Platonie tradition" with

reference to Plato's own works. The attempt does not aim,
it must be repeated, at being exhaustive, either wit~ regard to
the Platonism in St. Augustine or with regard to the chief
elements in the Platonic tradition. It is merely a suggestion
of the directions in which either topic might be pursued further.

11
(a) For "ideas," therefore, we may say in Latin "forms" or
" species," in order to translate literally. But if we should
call them rationes, we deviate from the proper way of
interpretation. For rationes are called in Greek AoyoL, not
"ideas." If anybody, however, should want to use that
word, he will not go astray from the matter itself.

The primarily linguistic discussion of the first paragraph is

thus carried over into the second where St. Augustine sets out
to deal with the "matter itself." We need not be detained by
the distinetions introdueed between laia~ and Aoyol. in the Greek,
and the formae~ species~ and rationes in the Latin translation.
It would 1>e a matter for the philologist to decide what im-
portance, if any, should be attributed to this differentiation.
St. Augustine himself obviously did not think much of it, and
was hardly competent to engage in philologieal distinetions and
derivations ; for no matter whether his knowledge of Greek was
as small and limited as some writers believe 01' wider and more
thorough as some others hold, it was certainly not sufficient for
philological purposes. Besides, he was interested in the seman-
tical relation between the word and the thing so designated,
and ready to settle on any name so long as they all referred to
the nature of the thing itself to be investigated.

(ß) For ideas are certain primary forms (principales formae)

or patterns (rationes ) of things, abiding and unchange-
able, not created, and therefore eternal and f~~v~~J!!e_
 On ihe Pla,ionism of Si. AugusiineJs (( Quaes:iio de ideis JJ 21

same, contained in the divine mind; and whereas they

themselves do not come into being nor perish, everything
which can come into being perish, and everything which
does come into being and perish, is said to be formed
according to them.

The "matter itself" is now suddenly stated directly and

comprehensively in form of adefinition of the nature of the
ideas, iorms, or rationes. The definition itself can be dividecl
into three parts: (1) ideas are eternal, uncreated, and unchange-
able, (2) ideas are contained in God or the mil1d of God, and
(3) everything is created according to the ideas. These three
points almost exhaust the " doctrine of ideas" in the Platonic
tradition. In order to complete this definition of the nature of
the ideas, it would only be necessary to add that (4) they
represent the absolute truth, and (4) that the nature of every
created thing is determined by the degree to which it partakes
in the ideas.
Both of these last points are later mentioned by St. Augustine
(below sections Y, €, 7J), so that, all in all, he gives here as
complete an account of the " doctrine of ideas " as one can find
in any other ancient seeondary source.
In referring back to Plato we cannot but notice that a con-
sistent and systematie exposition of a "doctrine of ideas" is
not to be found in the Platonic writings as a whole. (The
seventh letter, where it is perhaps expressed most fully and
systematically, cannot with certainty be cOl1sidered one of his
philosophical works.) We find here, I think, perhaps the elearest
example of the contrast between what we have called the
Platonic tradition and the philosophy of Plato. It is now
probably definitely established by authoritative Plato scholar-
ship, in opposition to the views of J. Burnet and A. E. Taylor,
that the " doctrine of ideas," in some form or another, constitutes
apart of the genuine teachings oi Plato; but it is not at all settled
by the various authorities in what form, and how it is to be
I 22 Hans Meyerhoff

interpreted. Strictly transcendental interpretations (Inge)

clash "\vith realistic, bon sens ones (Ritter, Shorey); and there is
a host of others rangin.g hetween the two extremes.
All these difficult and intricate problems are conspicuously
absent in the Platonic tradition in whieh is recorded what the
ancient, medieval, and modern world took to be Plato's "philoso-
phy of ideas." Beginning with Aristotle, i. e., almost during the
lifetim.e of Plato himself, and, in spite of the sceptical develop-
ment of the Aeademy, in spite of the Peripatetic and Stoie
admixtures, eontinued by Oicero, Philo, and finally Plotinus,
Plato's " doctrine of ideas " entered into the intellectual history
of the West as meaning prineipally two things: (a) There is a
sharp division hetween the intelligible world of ideas and the
visible vvorld of things, the latter being only a copY of the
former, an.d (h) the only true objects of knowledge are to be
found in the intelligible world of ideas.
There a]~e numerous corollaries to these two prineipal theses,
all of which together form the vast body of the Platonie tradition,
and so~me of whieh are brought out in the Quaestio of St.
Augustine. We roust now examine more carefully the impliea-
tions contained in St. Augustine's definition of the nature of the
ideas.
(1) The predieates " eternal," " abiding," "unchangeable"
are the saDle "royal" attributes which ean be found in Plato
whenever he characterizes the nature of the absolute essences
which are the true objects of knowledge, and have remained the
proper attributes for any later characterization of the world of
ideas. .Proof of this, as far as Plato is concerned, ean he found
in any one of his dialogues. It is interesting to note that these
predieates are derived chiefly from the eharacteristics attributed
\to mathematical objects. Mathematics became for the whole
IPlatonie tradition, the prototypes of absolute truth and eternaI,
~ncorporeal existence. More will be said about this latter (cf.
~ection €).
 On the Platonism of St. Augustine~s U Quaestio de ideis n 23

The setting up of such an eternal realm of absolute truth had

two far-reaching consequences in the Platonic tradition of the
later Christianized world. It supplied the foremost apriori
arguments for the proof of (1) the existence of God and (2)
the immortality of the soul. Both applications are to he found
in St. Augustine. Plato, of course, had only introduced it in
the Phaedo to prove the immortality of the soul together with its
pre-existence. St. Augustine remained undecided as to the
origin of the soul, but his proof for the immortality of the soul
rests firmlyon the PIatonie arguments in the Phaedo derived
from the eternal, unchangeahle realm of truth to which man can
gain access only through his soul. 2 Likewise the arguments in
book 11 of De libero arbitrio for the existence of God derive all
their cogency from the knowledge of this true reality, the guaran-
tor and source of which can be none other than God. And in
complete conformity with the PIatonie tradition, the certainty
of the existence of such a world is demonstrated by the evidence
a.vailable to us through mathematics and the highest ethical and
aesthetic values (cf. De lib. arb., 11, 8, 9 l\{cI{eon's translation).
The procedure has been the same for the whole Platonic tradi-
tion: through mathematical and value judgments we are led
from the empirical world to a different kind of existence and
knowledge, which now, in its turn, can become the apriori
prenlise for the solution of all problems beyond the scope and
competence of empirical knowledge.
It is impossible to trace he1'e the subsequent history of this
metaphysical logic. Weshall later return to the knowledge
problem as such (cf. below sections€, '). But I think it is
prohably safe to assert that any apriori argument for the
existence of God and / or immortality of the soul in what came
to be known as the Augustinian trend in medieval philosophy,
e. g., (Boethius), Anse1m, Hugo of St. Victor, the SchooI of

2 E. Gilson and Ph. Boehner in Die Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie

claim that St. Augustine knew and used Plato's arguments in the Phaedo.
24 Hans Meyerhofj

Chartres, Bonaventura, and the German Mystics, was ultimately

based on this separation of the two Platonic worlds, the one,
eternal, unchangeable, and forever true, the other temp'Üral,
changing, and deceptive, and on man's extraordinary position
in bet\VeerL them. 3 N or did modern philosophy essentially alter
this conception (cf. Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, et al.).
( 2) The characteristic Christian version of the "doctrine
of ideas" has been said to consist in making the ideas part of
God's :mind or intelligence, whereas for Plato the Creator and
the archetypes of creation were separate. Thus we are told by St.
Augustine as the second part of his general definition that " the
ideas are contained in the divine mind." It will be best to defer
discussion of this point until later when it is again taken up- by
Augustine more fully, and ,vhen we may be ahle to show that the
germs for this peculiarly Christian twist oi the Platonic theory
of ideas are also to be found in Plato rather than in al1Y other
philosophie system of the ancient world.
(3) The PIatonie tradition breaks forth again undiluted in
the last point of the definition. That God, the cause oi the
world, fashioned the world after the eternal p'atterns is so weIl
kno,vn froJn Plato's Ti1naeus that it needs no specific docu-
mentation (cf. Tim., 29, 30). Perhaps because of the wide
knowledge of the 1'irnae-lls in the later ancient world, the original
Platonie tradition here seems to assert itself against the N eo-
platonie version of it in which the separate act of creation, as
found in the Timaeus, was discarded in favour of the continuollS
creative emanation oi the highest p,rinciple.
Here it is weIl to be exact: The Ti1naeus has given rise to
two differerLt interpretations of the nct of ereation. That there
should l)e c:reation at all is due to the inherent goodness oi the
Creator who cannot help overflowing with goodness and fertility.

3 For an illustration of this in the Theologica Platonica of Ficino, see

Paul O. Kristeller, Journal 0/ the History 0/ Ideas, I, 3, pp. 301-8.

 On the Platonism of St. A ugustine s (( Quaestio de ideis
J
JJ 25

But that there should be the particular creation of this world

is due to the "eternal pattern" to which the Oreator looked in
making it. N eoplatonism tended to disregard this second point
(which here reappears through the Ohristian tradition in St.
Augustine) and completed the suggestion of the overflowing
fecundity of the highest Good into a vast metaphysical structure. 4
It is, of course, no accident that the other part of the Platonic
version of creation should have been revived by a Ohristian
philosopher for it is obviously more in accord with the story of
creation in Genesis. The N eoplatonic version of creation by
emanation, on the other hand, could never be successfully
absorbed into the main body of Ohurch doctrine, and was
frequently the cause of bitter conflict (cf. Giordano Bruno).
One important corollary folIows: This world, though but a
copy of the true reality, is still the "fairest of creations"
and the Oreator the "best of all causes" (Tim., 29). This
conclusion already reached by Plato is reinterpreted by St.
Augustine, to whom it meant the deliverance from Manichean-
ism. There could be no evil in a world created after the eternal
forms of truth and beauty in the mind of the Oreator, who
Himself is absolute truth and beauty. This world, then, is,
as iar as copies can go, the best of all possible worlds; and God
is vindicated, because evil cannot be a positive, real thing, hut
only a negative concept, a la.ck of goodness. According to St.
Augustine's own words (Oonfessions, VII, 8), the Zibri
PZatonic'i freed hirn from the heresy of the Manichees to whom
evil was a real, independent principle in the world. The Zibri
PZaton,ici, of course, are the writings of the N eoplatonists.
The unreality of evil, however, follows already from both
premises of the Platonic tradition as contained in the Timaeus:
there would have been no creation without the absolute goodness

4 Cf. A. O. Lovejoy's T'he Great Ohain 01 B'eing where the emanative

creation of Neoplatonism is thoroughly explained and traced to its roots

in Plato's RepubUc and Timaeus.
26 Hans Meyerhoff

of the highest principle; and, secondly, the actual creation was

performed in the image of the eternal pattern of absolute truth
and goodness.
The result of all thiswas an attitude of ambivalence toward
this world., in which the feeling of " otherworldliness " usually
won out in the end. Though evil was thus banished from this
world as unreal, the " beauty and goodness " of this world could
shine hut poorly in comparison with the world beyond where the
pure essen.ces were enthroned. This world was and remained
but a copJr, and as such always inferior to the world of whicb
it was a copy. Man's gaze, it followed, must, therefore, be lifted
up to the world beyond (TO €7r€'K€l,va), especially as he is exalted
above all other creatllres in being capable of such avision.
These irnplications are in complete harmony with the text of
St. Augustine's Ql1,aestio, which continues:

(y) But the soul can only behold them (i. e., the ideas) as a
rational soul, i. e., with that part by which it excels, with
the mind itself and reason as if with a face and its inner
intellectual eye. And not each and every soul can be said
to be capable of such avision, but only that which has
been holy and pure, and which has kept the eye itself with
which it beholds these things healthy, pure, and unblem-
ished, i. e., similar to those things which it aspires to
behold.

This passage marks the transition from the metap'hysical

definition of the ideas to the epistemologieal question of how
they can be known. According to Ritter it is impossible ever to
separate Plato's ontology from his epistemology and vice versa;
both are only different aspects of the same thing. 5 Whether or
not this view must be accepted for the philosophy of Plato, it
has certainly been true of the Platonic tradition. From the
metaphysical assertion of an independent world oi true reality

6 Cf. Constantin Ritter, Platofl" 11, 3, 26, Muenchen 1923.

 On the Platon,ism of St. Augustine's (( Quaes,tio de ideis" 27

it followed that any true theory oi knowledge must he concerned

only with the objects of this true existence, just as any good
theory oi knowledge must necessarily lead to the assertion of
such a true reality. This premise then gave rise immediately
to several far-reaching speculations as to (1) how this knowledge
oi the true reality can be attained, and (2) what kind of creature
man must be in order to be capable oi attaining this knowledge.
Traditionally, the first of these two questions has been known
as epistemology, the second as psychology 01" anthropology.
St. Augustine has something to say regarding both in the manner
oi the Platonic tradition.
We must now again take up the different views contained in
the above section separately. First, however, it should be
pointed out parenthetically that this branch of the Platonic
tradition owes very much to the expert grafting oi the N eo-
platonists. It was they primarily who developed into a full-
grown theory of knowledge what had been hut a suggestion and
" manner of speech" in Plato. N onetheless, it may be interest-
ing to see how its origins do go b'ack to Plato himseli, and how it
thus hecame quite legitimately an integral part of the PIatonie
tradition.
St. Augustine's remarks nlay again be divided into three
parts: (1) Only the rational part oi man's soul can behold (i. e.,
know) the ideas (i. e., the true obj ects of know~edge ) . (2) N ot
every rational soul can know the truth, but only that which is
pure and uncontaminated by the body. (3) Knowledge of the
ideas is a kind oi vision by the soul' s inner eye. The first two
of these propositions are iairly simple and easily understood;
the last one is more difficult and intricate.
(1) The division oi the human soul into different parts is
perhaps the most common and popular idea oi all ancient
psychology. It marks the beginning oi what we criticize in
modern terms as "faculty psychology." Aseparate" soul"
28 Hans Meyerhoff

was attached to each of the recognized " faculties " of the human
organism. Even the materialists invented different kinds of
soul-atoms for the different functions they were to perform in
the body. For every non-materialistic philosophy the twofold
or threefo.ld division of the soul was a universally accepted ideal
It was perhaps given its fullest and best expression by Plato
in the Republic (cf. IV, 441; VI, 504) ; it was taken over by
Aristotle (cf. Nicomachean Ethics, I, 13; VI, 2), anel con-
tinued to be part of the stock in trade of practically all ancient
and m.edieval psychology.
In the ~Platonic tradition, and as much in St. Augustine, the
"doctrine of the rational soul" has several important corol-
laries : Generally speaking, it serves to introduce the cosmic
dualism of the two worlds of existences, eternal and temporal,
into the human sphere. It is here seen repeated in the sharp
separation of the soul from the body. The soul, or more exactly,
the rational soul is declared to be the earthly representative of
the world of true being, sharing in all of the latter's illustrious
qualities; the body, on the other hand, is but part and parcel
of the inferior substance of the copy world. Two more specific
points follow immediately:
First, the rational soul must be immortal. Thus we reach
by a different approach the same result as above (cf. section ß).
If theworld of eternal truths and values can only be revealed
to us by reason alone, reason, or the rational soul must sha.re
somehow in the nature of these eternal verities, for like can
only be perceived by like. All this, of course, follows directly
from the Phaedo, and is repeated by St. Augustine and the whole
Platonic tradition in every definition of the nature of the soul
and in every proof of its immortality (cf., for example, De
immortalitltte animae, 2, 4; De lib. arb., 11, 8.) We need make
but one addendum here when speaking of the soul properly : Not
all the " souls," not all the psychic events are on the same level.
Conseqttently, not all of them share immortallife, but some ~lil_-
 On the Platonism 0/ St. J
A ugustine s' " QuaeSltio de ideis JJ 29

<lie with the body. In fact, the rational part of man's soul is
Ibxalted both over the body and all the other psychic processes in
Ithe body, because it alone can behold the eternal essences and
thus becorne immortal itself. A similar distinction between a
mortal and an immortal part of rnan's soul was already fore-
shadowed in the Timaeus: "And they (i. e., the helpers oi
creation), imitating Him (i. e., the original Creator-God),
received from Hirn the immortal principle of the soul; and
around this they p,roceeded to fashion amortal body, and made
it the vehicle of the soul, and constructed "vithin the body a SOlll
of another nature which was mortal, subject to terrible and
irresistible affections" ('1'im., 69).
Secondly, all true knowledge, i. e., knowledge of the true
world nlust come to us through the rational soul or reason.
This, however, is further qualified by the stipulation that

(2) only " pure" reason can ascend to the realm oi essences.
St. Augustine who probably knew the above passage from the
Tin~aeus did not restrict the "terrible and irresistible affec-
tions" to the mortal part of the soul only. N or did Plato do so
in the Phaedo, as we shall see presently. St. AugustinH knew
too weIl from the anguish and trihulatiolls accompanying his
own mental growth that the inmost recesses of the mind itself
were not safe against these" terrible and irresistible affections "
of the body. And this conflict within the human being became
the mirror of the cosmic struggle between the higher and lower
realms oi heing.
The idea of moral purification ( KdlJap(ilS) was central in
N eoplatonism, through ,vhich it passed into Augustine. But
it was apart oi the Platonic tradition long before Plotinus
(cf. Philo), and it had heen reenforced by Ohristianity, where
it was present from the very hegil1ning. 111 Plato it is perhaps
expressed most fully in the Phaedo (65 ff.), but it is also present
in other dialog'ues such as Phaedrus~ Rep'ublic~ Symposiu1n.
~·o Hans Meyerhoff

Only the pure soul, freed from the attachment to the body, Plato
teIls US, can pass "into another place, whieh like herself is
invisible, pure, and noble, and on the way to the good and wise
God" (}'haedo, 80); only the pure soul can behold the pure
essenees of the other world and thus beeome a philosopher in
this one (Phaedrus, 250; Rep., VII, 518). And" what is
purification but the separation of the soul from the body"
(Phaedo, 67) ~ For it is proved "by experience that if we
would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the
body--the soul in herself must behold things in themselves"
(ibid." 66). The N eoplatonic moral Kd.8apats can thus easily be
shown to have its origin in Plato's own words. Hence, it was
only natural that this strong current of the Platonic tradition
should. merge with the equally strong current originating in
Christianity (St. Paul).
(3) Purification of the soul is, therefore, necessary in order
to attain the vision of truth; for only the pure soul can ex-
perience ,,: the beatific vision" beholding the absolute essences
"shilling in pure light" (Phaedrus, 250), and, finally, the
" universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of
light, and the lord of light in the visible world; and the
immediate source of reason and trllth in the illtellectual" (Rep·.~
VII, 617). Thus Plato. How this illumination theory of
knowledge and " light-metaphysics" (in the words of Clemens
Baeumker) was developed and eompleted by Plotinus is another
important chapter in the Platonic tradition to which we can only
allude.
This tinle it goes bacl{ to the great allegory of the eave in
the seventh book of the Republic. Briefly, it rests upon an
analog~y bet\veen the physical sun as a source of light and sight
in the sensory world and the idea of Good as the source of truth
and heauty in the intelleetual world. Onee having established
this analogy Plato does not tire of using the same terminology
 On the Platonism of St. Augustine's U Quaestio de ideis)) 31

for the two entirely different processes of perception; and ever

since then perception of the eternal truths has been an illumi-
nation from within (just as perception of external things
depends upon illumination from without) to all those who
accepted the irreconcilable dualism oi the two worlds. How this
theory of illumination ,vas passed on to later antiquity through
Philo and the Gnostics and to the Middle Ages through St.
Augustine, who had encountered it in its most flourishing form
in Plotinus, was studied most thoroughly by Olemens Baeumker. 6
(cf. also below sections €, {.)
Accordingly it meant to St. Augustine and to the whole
PIatonie tradition another sharp dualism in the theory of per-
ception. There was (1) corporeal vision, whereby are seell
physical things, and (2) intellectual vision, whereby are seen
not thIngs physical, but the absolute truth. St. Augustine also
acknowledged a third kind of perception, spiritual vision,
whereby are seen images in memory and imagination; but for
our purposes only the first two are important. 7
The same is true for Plato. Visual-minded, like all Greeks,
he calls sight the "keenest and most wonderful of all senses "
(Phaedrus, 250; Rep., VI, 50'7), but for the true knowledge
"the rational principle oi our soul" must always be called in
to correct sense impressions and sense illusions (Rep., X, 602,
603). Only the secolld kind of perception, then, is free from
error both for Plato and St. Augustine, because it is communion
with absolute truth itself. But the soul can achieve this absence
of error and this communion with truth only when she " returns
into herself " and " reflects unhindered hy bodily affections upon
the region of purity and eternity" (Phaedo, 79). For, again,
like can only be perceived by like: J ust as "the eye is most

6 Cf., Witelo, Muenster, 1908, p. 360 ff.

'[ For a discussion of St. Augustine's theory of perception, see Dom
Cuthbert Butler's part on St. Augustine in Western Mysticism, London,
1927.
3'2 Hans Meyerhoff

like the sun" so "the soul is like the eye: when resting upon
that on ",vhich truth and being shine, the soul perceives and
'understands and is radiant with intelligence" (Rep., VI, 508).
In other ,vords, " pure light," "the immediate source of reason
and truth in the intellectual world," for Plato the " idea of the
Good," für St. Augustine "God," will only be revealed to the
pure soul, unalloyed by the affections of the body.
How this communion of the pure soul with the ultimate source
of truth and light must be understood, St. Augustine never
explained elearly. We shall return to this subject more specifi-
cally helo"\\"', but we shall not be able either then or now to do
full justice to this problem which is one of the most intricate in
the philosophy of St. Augustine and the whole Platonic tradition.

(8) What religious man, however, imbued with true religion,

would dare deny, nay not confess, that everything which
exists, i. e., everything which is contained in its kind with
its proper nature so that it exists (has individual exist-
ence), was created by God the Creator, and that every-
thing alive lives through the same Creator, and that the
universal safety of things and the order by which that
which changes keeps its temporal course with certain
regularity and measure is contained in and ruled by the
laws of the highest God' When this is established and
granted, who then would dare say that God had made
everything irrationally' If this cannot be truly said or
believed, it only remains that everything was made ration-
ally. And man not by the same form (ratione) as the
horse. Everything, therefore, was created according to
its proper form.

If w"e heretofore dealt with certain apriori elements in the

metaphysies and epistemology of the Platonic tradition which
all followed from the assertion of an independent intelligible
world of ideas, the argument now changes and certain aposteriori
reasons are adduced to prove, first, that God is the Creator of
 On the Platonism of St. Augustine~s (( Quaestio de ideis n 33

this world, and, second, that the world is rational, i. e., subject
to ]aw and order.
Both propositions are proved by the same line of aposteriori
arguments. St. Augustine calls attention to three points: (1)
the existence of individual life, (2) the "universal safety of
things," and (3) the order observable in all temporal changes.
Before examining these propositions more thoroughly we
should mention that the above passage touches upon a central
problem in Augustine's philosophy to which we can give no
attention at all in this study. The creation of the world by God
and the inherent rationality and goodness of this world is known
immediately and ,vithout any argument by faith. It is the
starting-point for all later rational arguments: " What religions
man, imbued with the true religion, would dare deny, nay, not
confess. . . ." All later arguments can only go heyond this
article of faith in so far as the " credo" should be followed by
an "ut intellegam." 8
For the understanding, then, the following a .p'Osteriori proofs
will fortify and deepen the original faith. The general points
mentioned next can really all be subsumed under the general
heading of the "harmony of the universe." This idea again
is not typically Platonic; it ,vas apart of the whole Greek
tradition in science and philosophy. But it so happened that it
becanle particularly attached to the PIatonie tradition as against
the later ancient and medieval scientific theories, where the
original living, spiritual" harmony of the spheres" gradually
ossified into mathematical cycles and epicycles. We know this,
because the men at the beginning of the Renaissance inaugurat..
ing a new era of science and philosophy were inspired by the
harmonice m'llndi kept alive by the Platonic tradition in medi-
eval philosophy.
8 For St. Augustine's doctrine of fides and ratio cf. M. Grabmann's essay

in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, 11, p. 35 ff., where the footnotes and

quotations refer to a full bibliography on the subject.

3
3'4 Hans Meyerhoff

It might weIl be said that the Timaeus was written with no

other intention than to prove the inherent goodness and rational-
ity of the created world, both apriori as a copy of the world of
true reality, and a p'osteriori as exemplifying order, law, and
perfection in each of its appearances. There are numerous pas-
sages in other works of Plato's where the motions and the
changes of the universe are exalted as rational because circular
and uniform (cf., Tim., 38; Theaet., 153; Statesman" 269,
270 ; Laws, VII, 822); and this idea was taken up and repeated
by alllater Greek philosophy. It was, of course, derived from
motions of the heavenly bodies which stood for the most perfect
visible embodiment of the ultimate principle (ratio) in the
universe. If this last statement, on the other hand, was taken as
the inartic'l1late major premise, as it actually was, it could then
be shown a, prriori how the IDotions oi the heavenly bodies could
be nothing else hut circular, and how circular motion, therefore,
IDllSt he the most perfect form of motion. This may serve as
another example of how so-called scientific theories in Greek
philosophy, apparently based on aposteriori, empirieal evi-
dence, are ultimately derived from certain apriori beliefs or
axioms. (Something similar could be shown above with regard
to the hum.an soul.)
There is a passage in the Theaetetus in which Plato, celebra-
ting motioll and referring to the "golden chain of Homer,"
says of the universe that " so long as the heavens go round in
their orbits" all things human and divine are and are preserved,
but if the~y were chained and their motion ceased, then all
things would be destroyed" (Theaet., 153). St. Augustine's
brief reference to the " universal safety of all things " reechoes
this idea o:f the preservation of all existence as long as the
universal IIJlotions continue in their course. We have here the
physieal aspect of the metaphysical theory oi the " Great Ohain
of Being." Physically, it is anchored in this theory of the
motions of the heavenly bodies "preserving all things human
 On the Platonism of St. Augustine~s U Quaes:tio de ideis n 35

'and divine," metaphysically, it is anchored in the idea of the

Good or the Oreator (cf. Rep'., VI, 509 ff.; Tim., 29, 30).
In this later form it will occupy us again later (section E; cf.
also section y). Thus not only law and order are exemplified
by the regularity of change, but also permanence and duration
despite the appearances. The structure of the world as a whole,
in spite of all formations and transformations, is preserved
and "remains safe." So much about this physical side of the
metaphysical principle.
There are two points in this section which have nothing to do
with the harmonice m,undi, but raise further questions con-
cerning the nature and function of the ideas. For we learn now
that: (1) there are different forms (ration,es) for different
classes of things, and that (2) individual existence, though
subsumed under its genus, is due to the " proper nature of each
thing" created hy God. For the moment we shall only dis-
cuss (1). (2) which has to do with the idea of participation
will concern us later when it is repeated by St. Augustine
(cf. section€).
The insistence upon separate forms for the different genera
of things, C" man," "horse") suggests again, as in the con-
ception of the personal Oreator-God, an adherence to a PI atonie
tradition somewhat different from the form it took in orthodox
N eoplatonism; for although the N eoplatonists recognized fully
the forms as the rational principle for individual existences,
their conceptions of emanation and the universal soul tended to
emphasize a universal reason, one all-pervading rational prin-
ciple, at the expense of the individual forms. N ow the leading
thought behind the Augustinian expression of the Platonic
tradition is just that there is more rationality in the world
than one universal nous (Stoics) or one Universal Soul, that
each sep,arate class of existence has its own rational ground,
and that no exception can be made to this rational scheme of
things, not even für the case of "hair, mud, and dirt." All
 Hans MeyerhofJ

this only sharpens the original contention that the intelligible

world contains the essences of all the existences in the visible
world to the efI'ect that different essences correspond to the
different genera. In fact, sometimes, the essences do not stand
for anything but the genera reached by a process of abstraction.
This idea, present in Plato, later hecame dominant in Aristotle,
who thereby hoped to eliminate the duplicity of worlds which
he had criticized in Plato. For it has not yet been explained
how the individual thing comes into existence by participation
in the universal. When we shall finally try to do so, it will
appear that there are not only forms for the different classes of
things, hut that the world of essences is an exact replica of the
world of sense, a separate form corresponding to each and every
individual thing.

(€) Where, however, could these rationes be thought to exist

except in the mind of God' For He did not look at any-
thing lying outside Hirnself, so that He might shape His
ereation according to it. To believe such a thing is sacri-
legious. If now the forms of all these things, created and
to be created, are contained in the divine mind, and if
nothing can be in the divine mind but the eternal and
unchangeable, and if Plato called these primary things
"ideas," they are not only ideas, but they are true, be-
cause they are eternaland because they remain the same
and unchangeable. Through participation in them it
happens that everything is what it is and how it is.

This section is, for the greater p·art, recapitulation. It can

again be conveniently divided into three parts: (1) the ideas
exist in the Inind of God (cf., supra ß), (2) thH ideas are the
truth, because they are eternal and unchangeable (cf., supra ß),
and (3) every created thing owes its existence to participation
in the ideas (ci. supra ß, y).
As to (1) we can reier to our discussion above. It was, of
course, impossible for the Christian tradition' to place the ideas
 On the Platonism of St. AugustineJs U Quaestio de ideis JJ 37

anywhere else hut in God. We may, however, add that this

all-inclusiveness of the idea oi God in the Christian version of
the Platonic tradition was, in a way, anticipated by the PIatonie
view of the all-inclusiveness oi the idea of the Good in the
Republic (ibid., VI, 508 ff.) or the Demi"llrgus (the personified
idea of the Good) in the Timaeus (ibid., 29 ff.).
In the RepubliC' this first principle, the idea of the Good, is
defined as being " not only the author ofknowledge to all things,
hut of their being and essence" (Rep., VI, 509), or " as the
immediate source of reason and tl'uth in the intellectual world "
(ibid., VII, 517); and context and terminology (" author,"
" source") seem plainly to suggest the creative and generative
power of the Good, which is thought of as still higher and more
powerful than any of the rationes derived from it. Für though
the author of being and essence, "the Good is not essence, but
far exceeds essence in dignity and power" (Rep., VI, 509).
The similarity with the Chl'istian outlook on the wol'ld and
its creation becomes even more striking when we refer to the
Timaeus. It is so striking that I shall give a Ionger quotation:
" Let me tell you then vvhy the Creator made this world of genera-
tion. He was good and the good can never have jealousy oi
anything. And heing free fronl jealousy, he desired that all
things should be as like himself as they could be. This is in
the truest sense the origin oi creation and oi the world, as we
shall do weIl in believing the testimony of wise men: God
desired that all things should be good and nothing bad, so far
as this waSt, attainable" (Tim., 29, 30). It is not far from
this statement to the testimony of some other wise and inspired
men who accompanied their account of the cl'eation of the world
with a sevenfold " and God saw that it was good." N or is it
surprising to see St. Augustine refel' to this testimony of Plato's
specifically in another wol'k: " What else is to be understood by
that saying dul'ing the act of creation: 'God saw that it was
good,' hut the approval of the work accomplished according
3'8 Hans' Meyerhoff

to the pIal} or art (artem) which is the wisdom of God.

And Plato goes even further by saying that God rejoiced when
he had conlpleted the whole of the world" (De eiv. dei, XI, 21;
the reference in Plato is to Tim., 37). This" principle of
fecundity or plenitude," as A. O. Lovejoy calls it/ according
to whieh the Good generates existence out of the abundance and
ftlllness of its own nature, was indeed a helpful concept for
the Christian Creator-God of whom it was also said that He
created everything out of Himself or nothing-so long as the
actual act of creation was not lost sight of as it happened in the
N eoplatonie development of this Platonic idea. This close
similarity of the two views may have beß'n one of the reasons
why, of a11 the Platonic dialogues, only the T'imaeus never
quite disappeared behind the intellectual horizon of the western
world, and thus became the most powerful factor in the Platonic
tradition of later antiquity and the Middle Ages.
As to (2) we need not add anything. It may be recalled
how the attributes "eternal," "unchangeable," ete., were
characteristic for the description of the absolute truths to be
found in the invisible, intelligible world of true being, and
how this view has always been connected, in the whole Platonic
tradition, with an interp,retation of mathematics and moral and
aesthetic values peculiar to all Platonizing realists. St. Augus-
tine, w'ho was not especially mathematically-minded, always
calls on. mathematical and value judgments as the most perfeet
mirror and example of absolute truth (cf., De lib. arb., 11, 8);
mathematies which embodies this truth, because it deals with
eternal, ineorporeal, immutable entities. "For the thought of
man, for example, does not abide in that incorporeal and un"
changeable reason (ratio) of a square figure as that essence
(again: ratio) itself abides" (De irin., XII, 23). This sug-
gestion must suffice; to write a full account of the importance
of this view of mathematics and ethics for the PIatonie tradition
goes beyond our purpose here.
9 Cf., op. eit., Cambridge, 1936.
 On the Platonrism, of St. Augustine's U Quaestio de ideis" 39

And now finally (3) a word about "partieipation." It is

here stated in the direet language of the Phaedo (100), but was
already foreshadowed by the remark in the last seetion, that
individual existence involves both membership in a genus and
a eertain proper nature of its OWll.
" Participation," it is probably safe to say, was never brought
to a final solution in the philosophy of Plato. We, need but
remind ourselves of the many serious attempts whieh show
Plato himself wrestling with the problem, the most intricate
of his system, if system it was that he taught in his school and
works. If the diffieulties arising from the theory were thus
never wholly resolved in the philosophy of Plato, it is obvious
that the Platonie tradition on this question was even more·
vague and varied; for it might be said to be a l.~w about the
spread of ideas that they vary proportionally to the distance
from and the force at the point of origin.
" Partieipation" is usually mentioned in the same breath
with "reeollection," for both doetrines originate in the same
Platonic dialogue. But eompared with the central position of
" partieipation " in the Platonie metaphysies and epistemology,
" reeolleetion " can only be called peripheral. It is a neat way
of explanation, but it is not essential. N onetheless, it too
roust be eonsidered a p,art of the Platonie tradition, and it also
appeared at first in St. Augustine (Sol., 11, 20; De quant. an.~
20}, but was later abandoned, heeause the preexistence of souls
whieh it implies would have been in sharp disagreement with
Augustine's doctrine of original sin. 10
"Partieipation," however, is of a different eharacter. It
is essential to any attempt to eonstruct a metaphysics or theory
of knowledge in a, dualistic philosophy after the PI atonie
pattern. Thus it is quite proper that St. Augustine should have
included it here in the Quaestio de ideis, nor are we surprised

10 Cf., Ueberweg-Baumgartner, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie,

11, p. 162.
40 Hans M eyerhoff

to find references to it in other works (cf., De civ. dei, XII, 2;

De quant. an., 13, 22).
The solution of this problem for St. Augustine seems to have
consisted :in the kind of duplication of worlds or existences
which Aristotle criticized so severely as one of the chief weak-
nesses in the Platonic theory of ideas (cf., Metaphysics, A,
99Gb). "Te have seen that the essences or genera have their
habitat in the incorporeal world of true reality or in the mind
of God; but it now turns out that each individual thing has two
modes of existence, one physical as a created thing, one intel-
lectual in the divine rnind. For in addition to class membership
individual existence is characterized and determined by propria
quadal1~ 1U~t'ura; and this "specific nature," just as formerly
the " general nature," can, of course, only be contained in and
derived froln God. Hence the individual thing exists twice:
qua natural and qua re; qua natura eternally in the mind oi
God, qua ~re as a finite object of this world. 'rhis is quite
definitely said to be true for individual men. "My idea is that
at the creation oi man there was in Hirn the idea only of man
generally, but that in the cycle oi time the idea oi each indi-
vidual with all the varieties distinguishing men irom another,
lives in that pure truth. This I grant is very obscure" (St.
Augustine, Ep., XIV, 4). It seems implied für all individual
things in the section above, and is also suggested in other works :
" All thing8 are together therein (i. e., the Word of God) by
way oi principle and unchangeably; not only those things
which are now in this whole creation, but also those which have
been and those which shall be" (De trin., IV, 1, 3).
In this way the duplication is completed without causing
St. Augustine much philosophical embarrassment. For hirn,
as a religions, person, it ""vas only natural to store within God
everything that exists and all that can be thought. 'Historically,
this developnlent of the " doctrine of participation " is interest-
ing, because it completes the absolute separation of the two
 On the Platonism of Bt. AugustineJs (( Quaestio de ideis JJ 41

worlds, and whether or no Aristotle was right in his criticism

of the philosophy of Plato, he did anticipate correctly what its
fate was to be in the Platonie tradition.
All this does not yet shed a final light on the question of
how knowledge of the partieular and universal essences is
possible. In order to gain greater elarity on this point, we
must return onee more to the " theory of illumination."

(t) But the rational soul, among those things which were
created by God, is superior. to everything else. It is closest
to God when it is pure; and to the degree with which it
clings to Hirn in love it is diffused in some way by Him
with that intelligible light and beholds illumined those
rationes, not through corporeal eyes, but through its own
principle by which it excels all else, i. e., its intelligence;
and through the vision of them it becomes most beautiful.

On the three points raised in this seetion, (1) the superiority

of the rational soulover any other ereation, (2) the demand
for p,urity, and (3) the theory of divine illumination, the second
one is simply a reeapitulation, and was diseussed above (cf.
section y). As to (1) it suggests the idea of a hierarehy of
beings eulminating in the rational soul as the most perfeet of
all created substanees. This is an immediate eonsequenee from
the proposition that we ean have aeeess to the other world of
true reality only through the rational soul. The idea of a
hierarchy of existenee was as mueh Greek as it was Platonie.
In the human organism it was expressed in the tripartite
division of the soul (cf., seetion )'); on the cosmic level it was
expressed by the great harmony and "ehain of being" eul-
minating in the idea of the Good (cf., seetion 8). As. a purely
physieal theory the idea of a hierarehy of beings probably
exerted greater influenee on subsequent history as apart of the
Aristotelian tradition than as apart of the Platonie.
There remains to be eonsidered the "theory of divine illumi-
nation" as theory of knowledge. Wehave already frequently
42 Hans Meyerhoff

referred to the metaphysical basis for this epistemological

theory', but we have not yet been able to state its exact cognitive
implications. N or will the above passage help us much to do
so. N-eedless to add parenthetically that this point in itself is
central to the philosophy of St. Augustine and the Platonic
tradition, and that numerous full-Iength treatises have been
written Oll the subject. 11
What is striking in this as in any other description of the
" intellectual vision," beginning with Plato himself, is its vague-
ness and lnetaphorical way of exp·ression. It must be remem-
bered that the whole theory is metaphorical in its very name,
for the vision here spoken of is a metaphor taken from the
corporeal -vision of the eyes. "The truth unchangeable shines
like the sun in the soul," says St. Augustine someplace else
(De gen. C'. Manich., I, 43), and the expression could be lifted
literally from the pages of the Republic or the Phaedo.
The neeessary vagueness in all these metaphorical descrip-
tions also breaks through in our passage above: "The soul is
diffused in, a certain 'Lvay (quodam modo) by that intelligible
light. . . .," But the "way" is not defined any more specifi-
cally. There is no definite answer as to the nature of this
diffusion here or at any other place of St. Augustine's writings.
"There (i. e., in the intelligible world) is seen the brightness
of the Lord, not by any vision corporeal or spiritual, but by
sight so far as the human mind is capable of it, hy God's
grace. . . ." (De gen. ad litt., XII, 26.) Or," the highest
spiritual state of the soul in this life consists in the vision and
contemplation of Truth, wherein are joys and full enjoyment of
the highest and truest Good, and a breath of serenity and eter-
nity, such as certain great and incomparable men have descrihed
in soml~ measure (italics mine), who, we believe, have seen and
see such things" (De quant. an., 74, 76) 12 "Olinging to God

11 Für literature see lvI. Grabmann, op. cit., p. 30.

12 Further quotations given by Dom C. Butler, op. cit., p. 23 ff.
 On the Platonism, of St. Augu.stine~s U Quaestio de ideis n 43

in love," "God's grace" are mediators to the knowledge of the

highest and truest Good.
Again we must return to the allegory ,of the cave (Rep'.,
VII ff.) where the road is shown which leads upward to the idea
of the Good, but, only with " great effort" (517); and here we
must add the great speech of Socrates in the Symposium, where
the same road upwar~ is traversed, in a poetic fashion, under
the guidance of "love" (€PW~). And in this ascent from the
"gold and garments," from "fair boys and youths," from
" forms of speech and knowledge " to the last object in the scale
of loves: "beauty absolute, simple, separate, and everlasting"
(Symp., 211), there lies another irreconcilable division of
worlds. The" doctrine of ideas" demands not only separation
of heing from becoming, truth from opinion, soul from body;
it also furnishes a justification for the distinction between
" earthly, corporeal" and heavenly, spiritual" love.
But what now can we finally say of the " illumination theory "
as a theory of knowledge ~
We ean only say that it is a mystical rather than a logical
theory of knowledge. The word " mystical " here sinlply stands
for the fact that the last secret of knowing the world of truth
cannot be revealed in words or by reason, but is transmitted to
the soul in avision ,vhich can only he described "in some
measure" or "in a certain way." It seems rather futile to
debate whether or not this position of St. Augustine should be
interpreted as ontologism, as so many writers have done; 13 and
it is also known that St. Augustine later somewhat modified his
original metaphysical Platonism. The above quotations are all
taken from works written shortly after his conversion. But no
less an authority than J. Marechal is quoted by Grabmann as
saying in a study on " La vision de Dieu au sommet de Ia con-
templation d'apres Saint Augustin," that in this immediate

13 Für conflicting views see ~I. Grabmann, op. cit.

44 Hans Meyerhoff

perception oi the divine ideas "nous voguons dans les eaux

platoniciennes." 14
DOIU (Juthbert Butler in his study on three phases of
" WesterIl Mysticism" emphasizes the difference between what
he calls "Platonism " and " genuine mysticism " in St. Augus-
tine. His objective is to prove that what began as " Platonism "
in St. Augustine developed into a "genuine mysticism," the
first of its kind in the Western world. This is true only in so
far as it neglects the element of genuine mysticism in the whole
Platonic tradition, and the elelnent of mysticism for the final
solution of the problem of knowledge which ,vas already present
in the philosophy of Plato. 15 Plato, to be sure, prescribed a long
and arduous intellectual preparation for the highest vision
through arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and dialectics (cf.,
Rep., VII;, 524 ff.) ; but the intellectual preparation alone is not
su:fficient "to raise the eye of the soul to the universal light."
"After a long period of common life" the final truth is
generated :LIl the soul" suddenly like a light kindled, like a blaze
leaping from a spark" (Cf., Ep., VII; also, above, Symp., 211).
But again, whatever the interpretation of Plato's works, the
mystical theory of knowledge by illumination \vas present in
the philosophical atmosphere of the later ancient world as apart
of the Platonic tradition long before St. Augustine; certainly
since I>hilo Judaeus. Here again, however, as with the whole
broad eurrellt of Platonism which St. Augustine absorbed in his
thinking and works, he is responsible more than anybody else
for directing it into new channels, namely those of the Christian
civilization, and transmitting it to the further development of
these ideas in the German l\Iystics, the Franciscan School, St.
Bonaventu.ra, Giordano Bruno, and others.

U The work itself I do not kno"\v.

15 Cf., :Friedlaender, Platon, Berlin and Leipzig, 1928.
 On the Platonism of St. Augustine's (( Quaes,tio de ideis )) 45

('1J) These rationes J as has been said, may be ealled ideas, or

forms, or speeies, or rationes ; and it is granted to many
to eall them by whatever name they please, but to a few
only to see what is the truth.

The end leads back to the starting-point (cf. supra, section

a). The name matters little as long as we seize hold of the 8ub-
stance of the things. Here as then the names are mere trifles,
for "why should we dispute about names when we nave
realities of such importance to consider" (Plato, Rep.,
VII, 533) ~
The truth in every such mystic theory of knowledge is re-
vealed only to the select few who have successfully withdrawn
from the outward activities and faithfully worked on the
"ascent of the soul into the light of the intellectual world."
The Republ1:C speaks frequently of the rarity of the genuine
lovers of wisdom (cf., VI, 466, 499, etc.), which is not sur-
prising in view of the severity of the tests required for their
qualification. All mystical theories oi knowledge must neces-
sarily be restricted to a few "initiates." And all theories of
knowledge based on the illumination theory of the Platonic
tradition are ultimately and essentially mystical. And again
support may be found in Plato's own manner of speech: "For
'many,' as they say in the mysteries, ' are the thyrsus hearers,
hut few are the mystics,'-meaning as I interpret the words
'the true philosophers.' "
HANS MEYERHOFF
University 0/ Gali/ornia,
Los Angeles, Gal.