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ror a period of ~ ~ yean before the pubfialtion of the ftnt volume -of
bi! wn~ lllaW:rplece ~ -.4 ~ ~ (19'12, co-autborm
with Felix Gwarwi), Gi11e& Deleuze explored a Dwn~ af different theories of
the tln(:OQtdOWi. He appears 1IQ have inbabin:d a wnishlng njch~ in French
intellEctual cull:Uf~ ~rf! Piem'! janet's psychology 'Of the UficorOOous 5till
lr.l.d some parity wiUi Sigmund Freud'., Deleuze went poo\OUng in 8. number
of ob!lcurepla<;es, ffilt of aight of we daylight Conr:emJl of ~ culture and
times: 8eTgllOn'll ~ of instinct and memory, JungJaniomi. symbolism,
Bachofen, .em.wis.. (Johann 'Ma.liattl and Hoene \\'rol'lskl). Gustav
Fe<hner's phil~bical fanlallY of the thtt'e Itp of human ~onsdoumc:a
Ludwig Binswanger's theory of !lclrlzophreni:a:drug experimentation, .sortl!t)
. anything but Freud." He ransacked ~ forgotten cranny in modern
thought in ll'earCh of the~ of the unconscious that restore ~nijom.
pmlIlage5, iI'l1theses and d:rat:nas of the mind occluded by Freudian psycho-
anal'YSis. While it is still unclear to me whether he <:Ver mle~ with a single
theQry of the l.1nl':GnSdDU&, till:' 'Written records of hill acunioM do offer U& an
UfuJlually vivid glimpse inside ~me of the foJ:goOel'l warehou.ses of the nine-
teenth. lind tw'entieth<ent'UJ")' ~phy of the ~ The single idea
that unites theBe disparate theories u Ute beliS·~ there ill lIuch a thing 'a&
uncontdous lIWntalil]: the UIlcomK:iouI iI !WIeT lIKtrely the ph}~.
0theT than that, though, one is just aI hi:e1y to find werewolYa, ll()rceret'i.
drug-addiets. al1:iJlrs, h~ ~pires. <:entlurs, perbap «M:I1 . . . .
mandett and gylphii (not to meJiUon chat peculi.ar elui of people known _
'scbiFoph:ren.ia') in ~leuze'l galleries of the utl«I~i004 aa one is to find
ablieWOlUll n~ and h1'sterics..
With A ~ the tim volume of ~ _ ~ De~
(and Gw.u:mri) cenainly played a role. however ~I; in the demise of
Freudian psychoanalysis in intdlecw.al and tb~tk cultnre, .But un1ikr
other critics of Freud, Deletl7At had alwayI intended w repla«;e die Freudian
theory of the WlCI).lU(:!OUS with ~ , mot"~ powerful theory of the unron·
liCi~. Ht; did not Mm.! to ~ or rcdu<:e it, or rep1ac<:, it with '<:ognir:iW:
liC~ence'. To experience a 'fractured "r" (D1l88-91) is to be threa~ed b~ pry-
....hosis, and the J.ocic of the psydlotk ~e c3lUlot be ~ b ~ with such
means.. The novel thing about the contempor;vy world, accooiing l() Deleuze.
is that we:are ~g up to the dest:inalion of the human mind, 'the madndl
2
of the 1IlJbject' (CC ~) that KAnt had tint inadw:rtentlr uncow::red in the The m ~ of DeJeuze'! and Guattari's ~m 4ftd&~iaisunset·
C~,oJ.Pure ~ (and which found a fUrtive. explo..;ive expression in tling: we have :urlved at a hOOorical point where we no longer haw:: religious
H:)lderlw s descnption of the ~c Oedipw. (OK $, 89), \\-'hat Deleure or ll:IOl'a1 protection agallul me madness thai ill inherem to the: human mind.
n~je<:ted in p~~h~ii was iu ongoing inability to &al with the phenom- 'The two volumes of Capit41iJm and Sah:IZDphtmaa.. whiclt :m; necessarily extrava-
f:na of pychom, and i l l the psydloo..:: phenomena that puncttJ.il.te neurosis gant and delirious, are attempts to map out thi! new space, in order to learn
and ,l:he ~ of ~dMduationin general. In ont respect at teast, the 'A.nti- to navigate and control it for a higher (l'W"(I'Qlle Abhough We human being ~
Oedipus IS. the berng that emerge! after me shau~ring of 'Oedipm', For IlOt the 'king of creation" it. is 'the being who jg in. intimate contaCt with the
Lacan (mo~mg beyond F~ud), the Oedipw complex COOSWl'Ull<\l':oes iuelf in profound life of all forms or;ill~, ofbeingl. 'Who is ~ for nen the
the d1$5()lutton ~d depernonali:zation of Oedip~ at CO!OfiW. 'Oedi.pm says: stan and animal life . , . lh~ ('ternal CUllUldian. of the machlnes of the ~rse'
Am I made ~ to tb<' hour wh~ I cease to be~ That i.I the ~d of OedipUJi'! (AO 4). Deleuze ill connected l.O a ~tion of ttlought about the WtConscious
psvcboanalysts - the pm:hoon:al}'51J1 of Oedipm is only compli!'t~ at CokmU!1. which ill older than freud's. and mort: rooted in the pbilollophkJl.1 tradition.
when. he tear!. his face apart. That is the essential moment, whkh ~ his 1''01' Leibna and Schelling, the 1a5k of me human being W';lS to pass through
story us meaning' (yean 1954-5: 214). S1avoj ZiUk writes of dtt 'horror' of the unconscioQUS in order to ~ ful.1 CO!Udo'Wne$$, At one level, &his
Oedipus at Colonw, who 'round himself reduced to Ii kind 1)£ soap bubble proc. iakfl$ pIau duri.ng what LeIhni:l:" Jung and Deleuze a.l1 call 'indmdu-
bum. asunder - a 5Ct<Ip ofthe real, the ]d'toYer of a formle'>5 slimf. without an}' ation', But at another Le¥eJ, it occun a<::TO!lI hwnan culture, in areas we have
mpr;on ~ the symbolk order' (Ziie~ 2001: 21). For L.ac:anian psychoanaJr>i.'l, been condiuoned (by the success of psychoanalysis in the twentieth century)
the Real must be f~r kfPt at a di.stmce, on the other side ofthe symbolic not to \lee all Mte:lo of unoonKious activity. The eni;OWlt:er wim rhe L"l."lUOt1sdous
order. What mun be a'll1)ided m ail Cj)$U is the slide into psychosis. whkh 14 is continually to be kit puahing from the other side of modem cu.ltJlre, nO(
ch~cterized.as the totAlo;JUapse of!JeIf-ref1exi.-e !'>u~tirity. For 2iZek, Hegel just in psychopathology, but in the cinema of the ~"'a:f period. in modem
was right [0 des.crlbe madness <1$ a withdrawal into the 'night of the wwId" music. in occu.ltism and in drug-explonrion. The unC<.msciOUll hal not
although 'bt' all too quickly (;Oli~jYe$ of this withdrawal. as a ~regreSlSiQn" to \lant!ihed at all. we ~ still lost in its jungle. perhaps eve1'l IDilJ'e than before.
rhe level 9f the "anima) soul" ~ embedded in its natural em·irons and deter- New approaches to the Ullronsc:ioWl are needed to ~ the full range of
mined by the rbythm. of~' (Zi.iek.1998: 258). Deleuze mesa oompl.e:telv im inhabitantll.
different VleW ofps)lCboslS. derived fromJung, and <:loaer to Hegersown view: What follows is nQ more than a series of attempted ~ on DeJcw'.es hive
of ideas about the u.noon.sciOWl, I have left as many gates open. and laid out all
"'hat regression brings to the surface cerWnly seems at fmn: light to be slime many different options fm'mterpretari<m, as pos&lbJe. The book could serve all
from the depths; but if one does nor stop short at a !Uperficial evalu,adon a source book. for a reading of ~ on the unconscious, although there are
~ .re-fraine &om paWfig judgment on me basis of a prewliceived dogma, plenty of om.Uisions and probably lotS of o~'eI'Sig;hl8 too, I have ended up
It.will be found that this '!lime' contains not ~reo/ incompatible and a-eati.ng thi:s as inevitable p~ ~ subject, which il£ a fascinating and complex
re,reCted rernnaIlo of e\'eryday life, or incoDwmient and ()~e;:tiollab)e one. and I hope other, better boob are written on il before too lon'll' A lot of
tendendtl$, but 4W.o gfl11U of new Ii&; and vit:I1 posr>ibiHtie8 fur the future. attention is paid here to Dt'"~e'll. early work and influences, upon which
(CW 8: 34)
much light $till needl. to be shed. lhe doctrines of A ~ iU"e roootly
OO1ittlld, ~ beca"USie a dear account of the work is already .available in
In an early. pieu. ~1~11Z1" endonc!sjung's view rhat 'FI'ellwan methodolOHi-e, Eug~ne Holland's l111.mdtu:tibn ttl All~ (Holland 1999), and partir
are appropOiote I.'lwNy fhr ynu.og- neurotics ',dime dillOf'ders :ttc' related to beeaUJe' the book atremptll to UIlCover die theoretka.l bai:kgroWld to that work.
~rsonal remini5cenU5 :lnd. whose problems are about recondfing thermelYet and itll sequel. A ~ Pf.aJ.eaw.
MW the 1'I!6l (Joviug, maki~ Orleselflcw.able, adapting, etA:. L without regard for The book ~ not a general introduction to De1ew:e (or even to Deleuze and
the role of any interior confli.cbl' (SM 1~3). The lcind of ~bopatfwlogies the unconscious), and there is WlfonWlaldyahio little of clinical rele\.-ance
an~ by Fr~ud are tbw primarily WlIOrdel"ll of adapl:aliou, and he ~fu.ted. to heef(', ttl part because Deleuze's approac~ to the unconscious are not
OOUtltenance mar 'there dl'e neurmes of quite another 1.l'pe which ~ ne.arer to restr1<:1ed to pathology. but include '3(tive' approach¢~ (0 &he unconscious
~bo.tis' (ibid.), For Jv.ng and Delewe, Hli pt'Oce5ses ofindividuation invol\le a (an. intOlckarion. magll:').f ~ <:hapu'B are written from a phiJOS()phic:al. not
fundamental p$j'Chotic moment: 'The who.le Cl>UI'Se ofindiYidlDtiQu a diakcri a 'h~a.re' perspectiv«! - although Ihere is c:enainlywork to be done about
cal, arui the: llO'i:alled ·end~ ill the confrom:ation of the egt> with the .emptim~. Deleuze'f and Guawtri'. 'schb!oanalysis' from the latter ~pective. The aims
~ the centre. Here the limit <4 the poaOfe expel"ierice i$ reached: the ~go ()f philOtOpby and plyChiaU1 are difierent., and th~ is no reall<)n why this
dWolvell as the reference-point of~' <lung 197& 259). .should DOt be so .in th~ ~ of the unconscious, whiclt bas its own hbtol)' in
4
and 'sexuality' \\'$ key fOl"Jung, whQ$fl theo~ Dc1eu.ze explicitly affirmed in comprUinr theory of melQ()ry le3ds towards a very di!ferent, rnucb moce
196L In ~ and ~ DeJ.e.w:e develops a theory of the 'synthesis of ccmple.ll., theory of time than the notion of duration,
~ernory' whkh he holds is also a 'synthesis of Eros', In it. Deleuze implies &u
Freud w.all a 'Victim of an illusion about thl!' krWI.1 aetiology of psychopathol- In the &sat OR fM 1 ~ Data oj ~ duration is really defil'led
ogy. Sexual eorttent ill 1IO impon3JU in matw "'fll.U'OSeS ~ it is necei8arllv by succeili:m, ~xJstences referring back to space, and by the power of
futed upon during the proees& of a dA.:e"; shift that 0CCIll'S at a panicularh. novd.ty. repecirion refeJring back to Mauer. But., more profoundly. duration
cnJdal stage of psychological development (adoleK:eflC'e). It is not the C4&l1U dr i& only llWJCession rel.atively~g (we have seen in the same way that it is
plI}'CoopatOOlogy (or. indeed, of the uncQwcious). The iM1thesis of memon: only .indirlsible rebuively). Ducation is ind.ecd ~ mcCeaHon, but i.t is !IO
by Wclf uro.tnes, .ahnost u a b)--product, a specUk 'erotic· function during th~ only Uetauae, more profOundly, it is virtr.I.aJ ~ the '~tence with
procC3~ of individu3) psychological development. Elsewhere rn: polnt8 OUt iuelf of all the ~IJ. all the tensions, all tht' degrees of contraaion and
that many other disorders, Nch u schimpbrenhl.. rnanic.~ression. Of the relaxation. (860}
neuroses of ~ in their tb.inia and above. are Mt cauaed bf Il!xual
problel:Wl, ahbough sexuality might play a role in mem. Deleuze'~ account of :Ddeum by nO means ignores the notion of duration. but he sees it u the
lleXUality is non-Freu.dlan &om the beginning. Moreover, Deleute', first work ~ to Bergson's philOllOphy rather than its «:ntre. 8efun: it leads to
on sexuality occur:red in the context of theories of ~ and his main inilu. memory. it tint leads to what will be the key concept of Deleuze'~ revision of
etl<ei were Bergson and Jung. in conjunction with anthropological theories Kant's 1ran&cendentidA.estbetic. the notion o£ 'mwmve difference', &18 aue.
from Malinowski and Hume, Fr-eudWu have gone to great lengtlu to distin. as Berp:m Siil}'5 in the ~ that taking dum100 seriously tneltN that we must.
guis"h 'Fri8b (drive) nom instintt, but in the beginning Delem.e squarely abandon any theory of mind which con~~ of mental comeRt in Ienns or
situ.a.ta hirnseJt 00 the side of instinct. Prom the out.v!t DeIeu2e Been1& k> have discrete. ~d repre.semations which. ~ indifferent to temporal ehange.
Been the pote'ntial in Bergsoniml fur a non-Freudian refOrmulation of the The conacloQ& mind (in K.mtian renns 'inner sense') is ~talIy dur-
basic themes of psychoart3.lwi.s, lltional. and itl! content5 are therefore millc~if r~nred spaUally.
But what thill meatnJ is that, tnso£ar iIli the mind is duraw:mal It ill. host to a
~ intensi~ - a$ opposed to extensive - form of developmental differ·
Bergson and Duration
entiation. From. ('hlldhood In adulthood, me mind pIl.SlleS through int.emM:
The Ili.mpleu way to begin to di:s$olve Ihe apparent aberration involved in thresholds that etCh ~ entail ~Don of its mnemk contem and
De1etuc's rel'W'tt to ~n /$ to begin wtth. the (act that what is UllUal1y ta1:.en pr.lCtic3l aimt, Hen.ce it !n.a.kelIlIetl.Se tl) begin our investigatiQl\ with DeIeuze' $
to he most central to 'Betgsoni:l$m' - tbe notion 0{ du.ratl~ expounded in refonnubtioo of Bergsonian duration. In his ~nd book, Mo.Jt. ~"" ~
8ergst)n's lint hook. the Euuy OIl tNt 1~ J)<Jt,a fJl ~l'i.llQ (tranllla1.ed (1896). Bergson complete~ re«:>nceptwilizes. his oodoo of duration IlO that it
u r_ t:md..f1me WillI - is a.et'l:S.1ly the mere ponat In a much more inte~g now te!llifies to an ~wei8htof memory, wbile the role of e ~
and profou.nd theory of memory. Dekwe't decillion to entitle his book ness becomes almoet exclusively practical and .Focuied 00 the ~ In the
&pminn is mUll. polemical. insofar as he redefines ~i1at i$ of central mrereu &ury on the ~ Di:It4 of ~ 'bctwe-."el", d'W'atioo i& $imply ideno.
In~.
fied as the fundaulental medium of. .boIogie:alli£e, DurMion it identified
with ~es In general. to the exrenc mat Bergson d<eniea that duration
8ergsoni!ml bas often been J-educed to the following idea: duration is sub- is a feature of the o ~ world. A rough general !lke:b:b of w position can
~, and tonsntutes our intemallife. And h. 1$ true that Bergson had to be gfYen. before we qualify it in cerorin crudal retpeeU. Mental life is .DOl
aprea himelf in this way, at k88t at the OUtaet. But increasingly, he came ~ of dltcreu: ~matfoN. The way mental representatiQJ\J appear
to say !IOD'let.b.ing quite different; the only ~ty is time. non<hrono- is fundamentally aft'ected ~ the form of thea appeatance. The form. of lbeir
logical time grasped in its fuwulaoon, and it .is ~ who :ate intemal to time, appearant'~ is ~ dm:arion. in which teprelentauom are never ~
not the otb« way romI.d.. (C2 82) and ho~MoUt.but hlend m1tJ each otheT, in a 'heremgeneoU$ condnWty'
(~n 1889; 128). Mental r~tatiom must appev a5 part oh develop-
1>eleme's depiction \If the framework towilrds which Berge;on mowed is not ing mental whole, which :is in. one respe<:t enduring (it prolongs the experi-
e.xa(:tly peUorid here. but it is enough to.,-
that the 'nnn-chronOO:lgicaJ t.ime- ences'of the past), and in another respect. open to nmeJEf (the accumulation
refesred to concerns 1llI;mory. for Berpln, oW' memories coexist with oW" of the past in the present means ~t one tends to bring an inc~
present, and ads of memory must be taken a" d1$c1)ntinuoos KlI."tieS lnro a pre- -eomplex mental backgroo.nd to what one expcrimu:t:ll now, which :ma.k.es ~
S(:rved past composed of iJlI Q'Wn stratified formations. Bergson's bizarre but l'ien(:e of repeawd event$ qualitatively difl.eJent ro their put occurrem:et).
The Pat~ (}fTimt 11
10
sl:i:mttlus of !OO uniu, and so on' (Fechner 1800: I, 112; cf, Berg:wn 1889: 60).
Duration and Intensitj· Thf!: :mdacity of Fedm.er's proposa1lies in his enemlon of this law to ~
Bcrgwn '5 theo-ry of duration is bulll on h.i& critique of '~hOph)'lliCll' in the ~1atian be~ stimuli and lIematiom.
tint chapter of his nr'S! boot.. the Ew1:J 1m the J~ lJt:ruI, <if CtmsewtU~. The problem.. as Fechner ~ aI:ready completely :aware, is how me ~
~ 'IO<'"e should t'eC{)UI'ft this critique here, as mu chapter b an absolutely series, the series of ptychical sensation. is to be measure~' ~al lIC<' ~ uruts
fundamfntal building block both in &rgson's wary in general. and in bill of ~n? FedlMf suggested two method! fur identifying the mmuna of a
speculations about the unc;oDllcio~ In the history of psychology, Fechne:r"s change in selUation~ fint one mUllt fi;rId the ~ dtmltol4of a sema.uon , ~
psychopb)"ics is. often held to be me fint attempt 3t a genuineir experimental then go on to \$Glare iu ~ thm1l.«4. A1.I absolute th~okl ideutifieo;
ps)'cno-Iogy. A properly quan'tilatiYe account of mental even~ becom~ the pobu at whKh 11 !1..Ull.ImIOOIl of ~timulibr~ throOtJh (0 ~ aware'
pombJt> for the first lime, in 'Which mental eventS can be math~ror· n~_ By inc.rea:si.ng me rol\,l'l'fle of a sound smrting from zero, one can IQ~U'
related with physical mmuli. By attaCking psychophysic$. Berpon was auaek- me point ;at which it be"wmes audibLe. But me ab601UU' th,rt$hold only gtVC!'S
mg experimenw psyml)ltlJ!Y as it emt.ed at the time. one value' of a semation _ the- iowC$t intemity of a stimulUi at which a 8eJl!la-
Bergson'lI rrWn. tltrgeCl are Gu&tav Fechner (1801-87) andJOJJ.ePb Delboeuf cion "ff'lt (fur eHJnple, the point at which pain ill fint felt on the inaertion of
(1831-00), btu we will focus here on the fonner. In his E~ 6f~ :I pm into the hand). To quantiQtlve~reiaw twO ~ ofimelllliIie$, one m~
( 1860). F«hner had defined psychop~(hJtOOJihJIffJr.) as •the exuct llcienc:e be ~ 10 show a whole range of wrrebtiol\&. F«hner ~ that th~
of the ~ dependent rdatiom of bod)' and llQul Of, tOOr~ generally, of GOuld be' done if one d&(J'oIered the difit:tentkd tbrel>hoId of xmation - the
the material and the mentaL of the phyi;ical and WI; prych~ world6' minimal unit. of cllange which could give me to a sensation (Fedmer 1860:
{Fe&ner 1800: L 7}. Fechner ~ :.t his aim of ~ :l ~thematical )W2). One therefore mu,~t statt: with die identJlkation of the absolure thresh-
account of the ClJI'relaliOftll between ph~..aI stimuli and mental eventi by old. and then gu hac. and identitV w minimum phrH<:al pressu£e ~d
a.ffinning. ~_ofm.emaI and ~ eve.tlU, rather \han attempting a for 'a ~ce to be sensed,
redu<:tI'Ctn of lleIlllauons to phyW:aI evenlll, a6 bad been attempted by the I[ t.hen becomt=a possible 10 use th.eK minima w. thle W3V to mti~te the
Enlifillenment materialist'>. By ~ pi!}'f;ho~ k'llsatlona lQ physic.a.l series of 9C1ilIation. To quote ~n:
e:venl!i. the early modf;rn mauri.alism had Jelt $ensatKmll all mere appearances
or -epipbenomena, and hmce without my SUl.rm of their own. On dJis \'Ie'W a For if we treat :;a a quantity the difference perceJved ITl (ol1lJC~
mathematical relatioMbip ~ n stimulm and senlllUi:on 'Illall neither between the twO M::rl$atiotU which succeed ont' another in the coune of a
polt1ible nor net:e~f. Fechner'i mvatigatiQlU in ptyl:1KJphysia were there continuous inae;ue of ttimulus, if we call the .first senWion S. ~ the
fore intimately rel;tted to hill a.ff'innation of psy<chopbysital parnDelism. Wi! will xcond AS, we 5ha1I have to I;:OtlJider ~ry sensation ail a fum. obtained by
.expJore the COO~l!!S of this ,.,itcm we have C3.l.I:IoI!! to wm to Ft!chncr'~ the addition of the minimum diffett:n€. through which we pass be10re
metaphyllic&. reaming "- (Bergson 1889: (5)
Fecllner argued that while an mcrease in the intensity of a phy:dcal ~im#tw
doe! not produce a one-urone incrt:a3e' in mental ~ the-re II iNtead a With the identifk-ation of minimal differences of sen»itufJn, :a. mailiematical
logarithmit; relatiooship bet\\<UJ\ the twO: O~ series increases geometrically. rehuk1tuhip can apparently be Qt3blillhed between the series of sbmuli and
and the other arithmetically. A logarithmic relationmip ~ n twQ quanti- the ~" of ~nsariOllS. ElH;h quantitati'W: change in Mitnultu pr~ a
tative series allows for increase; in the second series to be proportionally rorrelat.i've quantirativc change: in the' Krles of ~tion>
retath-e to tlli.! quanti.t:ies that already esillt in the fir&l Jerles. ThU6 if t.l:ie aural Of COUl'lll:', it ls intuiti-vely ~ that the ~ of heat wiD 3l«'t: in e m:
Jtimulus of one ringing bell is added to another, the ~ in !lelllWion ill widi the increase in ~perature, but Ber:pm argues that there .are batiic
greater than if one ~Il ie added to ten already rinsing be.. pmbleilil with takklg a mathematical view of (1)15 correl.at.wn. !l.bhough we am
Now, m~urlng intensive in(:~ases in i)bjcr:tive stimuli (for imWIC~, the always ~ when WI' :are ~g hotttr or colder. it would lI«ID that: the
Jnea.lltlrement of $Ound or weight) ~ no pa.rticuhu problem. if ilppropriate t:orre;pondeit~we ntaIIe be~ OW' l;e~ of warmth and the degr«
and nnsiave instruments are avail.ahle. Fedmer baIell hi:tn!elf on a law which of tempt':J.':mJ.re reA on .:onvention. MMeover,.a£e 'degreei' of~n reaIly
be auriburefl to one 4 his ll!!2Chers, E, ft Weoo·, according to which a differ· of the _Dft kind af, ~ of phyIblllti.nluJ~,such u tetnpera.rure? I do not.
ent:e between twO stimuli is aJwa~'5 perceived lIl! equal if il:5 raQ.Q to the lltimuli pass t:hrough two ~ ewx:eMlve ~ft$- but r.:l.th~r through ~ of
remains Ihe same, regardless of changes in die ~te lire. 'For example. an sensation l\'hkh flow into lmitllUlOther. '1'lte mi:st;ake which Fee~ made .•.
addiUol'l of 1 unit to a stimulus ~ d M haYing a mapitude of 100 uni.U WiiIi that he t:J.tttevro in an iJw:'rvall:letwt:'en two lU(:~ve senSlll.lions S 3nd S',
iJ peIa!iwd the: 1WVl.t as an addition of 2 ro a Stimu.tus of 200 units, of:J to a ~1leD the~ is ~ply a ~from OM to the other and not a d~ m the
12
arithmetiod sense of We word' (Bergson 1889: off), Thm sensations jUlIt do this could be explained (as Thnnery suggettll) through appeal to different
not Iee1ll to be meuur:able in the way that itimuJi an. However. 'the no-rel nerve centres and functions in the 00dy. But 8eTpon Do lluggests - and this is
feature in Fechner's 'I.'l"eatment i. that he did Qot consider this difficultv ifts'u1I. his original contribution - that the quality of ilie !ICIlsaQon ill a1Bo crucially
moun~. T.aJUng aci'!:antage oftM fact thnaen.sation wries by sudde~jumps influenced by hftt kmg we're been endunnS the pam. He lIUggests. againat
while the stirn:ulus i:m:reues continuously. he did not helritate to call thee dif. Tannen that time in fact should Mt be ~ a! a homogeneous rna,gnicude.
ferences of semarion by die same name: they are aU, he lIIlf8. ~ differ- but ~r that it should be conMdered to be ~t the root of the h~l~ty
eDce8, since each r:orrespondi to the smallest pm;eptible lntte3lle in the found in the series of $f!n..~ Time. or iWrt2timl., rnak.e$ a dUl~n~nce to ~n
external lltimulus' (Bergson 1889: 64}. But why should the deteTmination of ltlbon. For instance. $(ImedmCll we do not even have to im:reate dae fOrce of th~
the dUterential th1:eshokJ ofaeensat:lon yield a minim.um difference which can pin to make the pain unbearable, we canjust let the illme qWllUity go on for a
go on to be a.ppI:ir:d homogeneously throughout the series of sensation? while looge~ and the ~ of abrm is reached. Thill mdiates that the way
In 1874 jule& 1lwnery began r:o pul>Wb a series of obj«tions to Fechner's the pain feels after live minutes will be coloured by the fut of my having
~oph"*,,whkh already c.ontain certain a&pectll of BerPJn's critiqUt'< He ~ the pain for SO' long, whkh thus influences tbe moment of tmMforma-
wntes: don at wbich tM pain becomes unbelstable.
Berg!!on goes on to make three imporwn inferences at this junmtre. which
The ewen.tiaI <:ba.rn.e:temtk of direaly men'urablc dimemlons is ~ in fAct oontribute toWards a. definition of .duration'. First. each ~ n of
wh~ IS added. such wa;( ~i:hing mcreasea, is of the ~ exact kind pain implies the tragel:lllll of a preceding jJerie~. whicb mwt be endured in
3$ that which was aIn:ady there: length, sur&.ce lUl.d time are cliJneQliions of order to get to the p~t pain- We CiUlIlo( mis3 OUt any of. the smge$, A
thi$ kind. If we add one length to another, bach of them are of the same kind ~nwion in time of incmuing pain ill ~ in me: 3trict sense that it ill
and es&enct: and their ll'WllS are also of the same Lind. Directly measurable e:Jtpe:rlenced ali a who.1Ie, and must include an itIl p~ The pain is 'swollen
di.men$bons n«essariIy have this quality, because ntcasurement iuelf by the whole of its past' (Bergson 1889: 15'), A boiling point cannot be
requiret that dimensions of the ume kind be comparable. (Thnnery l875: reached at once; a certain speed cannot be reached lrlchout passing through
1019)
all the other speeds, however qukldy. Stwnd, o'ery lltrics of changes is pUll(;-
mated at various points by ~ at 'Which a tran$COrmaUon OCCUJ'll. So we
8ul:, ~~t'> 'Thnnery. if one is holding a warm ol:!iec[ in one:'s hand and 111 heat could iJldeed plot a. ~ of ch2ngCll during which there ~ only regular.
inCJ"e3S6, then the original semation of heat i$ going to be of :it different land quantitative changes chat can be p16U'led on a gnph. But ~ 'WOUld onlJ be
to the later sematlon of pam (Heidelberger 2004: :!OO). The fact that dle'mere differences of ~ wheR:u what Fechner has not accountm for are the
inC1'~ in sti:mulus ~ ditTerent nervel inl7'<Jduces heterogeneity into possible differences in liM or 1Iatim1 between sensat:ioo&. While Water til
the s.enes of !ensaUOIl5. HoJN)gencity in the :If.lnes Qf lIlimuJi lIhould therelbre coming to the boil tluil degrees of temperature can be measured quw:lLitii.tively
not automatically be ~ected upon the series of sen«atkms. from 0 «1100 degrees t:entigrade; but at 100 degrees. an '~-ent' happens: the
~ cites Tannery's o~eclion$ (which abo include the ~ectiop that water ~ m MIUn' and !lWU to turn into liteM1. Similarly, the <ieKent of
fleft.Sadoo differenrla.ls are IDefflly c:onw:ntinnal) but gt\'M on to develop criti- the lCJJlper.iltUre of water «) 0 degrees signifies a cbangr in 1Ulb.Ire: ~ ,
omm of his own. He aH:s WI to ~ dre sensation of pain caused bv a J)eJeo:l;e willoill these distinCtive poinrs ~ The third c~risticof
~prick (Bel'QllOn 1889: Md). On the h)pOthesis of p1ychoph)'SiaU ~ duration folIOWll from the fim. two, Once such .3. plateau hu been reached,
Ie1tsm. we should predkt that if we apply a slowly but continlJOUlly inCl1l'asing there is a complete change in the way the e1emenl:!l ~ relate to GIll!
amount of fhf()('; on d:1c pm. then we will fed a pain that muellllle$ in paralleL another, The whole utuation cbange1l at 0 and 100 degrees, Ice. liquid and
But what happel1$ " dm.t ill certain points threahol& are read1ed. when the steam all behaff In difrerent ways, ~n if the same suh8wu:e is inmwcd.
pain goes from being, (or inatrmce, merely natice2ble, «1 being nther irbome, water. Thus wr ~ transformation, there is a. change in 1M ~ meaning
to ~ ~ .and then excruciating. There are qualitative leapa in the- that ..'hat happellll nat happens OIl new ~fmI!l.
feeling of pam, thr~QId$ of tr'anlIfornwion. whc::re a change in nature C1lItlC$ lbese auributet of duration mqest a ~ conception d ~ in gt!neraJ,
about in the quality of the pain. Thm may indicate that the aeries of ~ which Bergson will now argue should be ~ lind divided up ~ndy to
baa its uwn thresholds, which .ve relatively autonOQlOWl of the &t.ilDuJHeriea. ~. The classic dyad between spau and time is misleading, lilI it per:made$ us
The ~ of lICmations of pain. for instance. may have mfernal, relative thresh- that there ill something in cammon between the two. Kant, foc instance, rhOllttht
o~ which ca.n:tlf,K be deduced from phy3kllogical stbnu.llWon. Tht.' pain we are 'P"Ce and time shared f!.I:lilCdy abe same formld ~t.erisd0l: acmaJ infinity
feeling :It anyone pain t aumot be simply analysed inro the addi'lion of homo- and homogeneity (K:ant 1782/1787: A23/B38). Berp>n, on the adler hand. is
geneotlll quantities of pain, an 5laCke<l up indii&:rently upon each other. Now D.ying that the forms of ~ and .pa<:e Ilhould be oompIetdy diitinguishoo. By
15
ascribing it spedal kind of 'heferogeneous continuity' to time, Bel"lP0n is nor thouglu: on the threshold model of intemive difJmmu. To say that 'the expres-
just saying mal there ~ UO boundaries between ~h ttn~p¢~l ~mem (Kant 00n. "difference of intensity" ill " tau«ology' (DR 222) is an exaggeration.
wouM agree, and say that the ~ gon foe space :ll5 an inftniM, h~_
magnitude). His point 11 that the type of di.ffi:rentiation appropriate to
inllofar as diey ~ muat he di$tinct .from the kind of differentialiOl'l .appro-
\hi. tJe(;3,U!!e Deleute himself abo spelb out otMr, ide-d!, forms of <:U«eren~ - but
nCYenhele6s be shO'l'>1i dw duration and intt!.miry at'e imimat.elv related and
produce the ba&k form of di£fefel1ltia.l:inn thr any theol)' of s.en!iadon.
pNtt' to things il1l/lO£v as thry ~ underswod purely $paually and timf'leuly. 8).' 'NQ'lIr. although BerglOfi romeamell.llet!mJ to ,uggest {particularly at the SW1
not ~mng the role' of duration in sensation, psyc.hophvlics ~ an (If C~ E~) that t:lII:1I. »lOiIIIo\mt, by 'Virllle of taking place in duration,
abstract, spatialiled account of sensation. This, for Bergson, ill w n:al Cl1\1M!' of 1nVQl\'es tomething lU'.!W ()C. in Delew;ian tfrllU, lhat any repetition invo~ a
tnt' jna.d~ of p.n\:hophysicli. ~), Delew.e :leel! that It is not nece~ to (:ommit oneself to Ihit
DeIeuze's emphasil on the pallIling of intellJi"1! mreshol& clarifie!> 8eJWlOll"to eul'eJIlepmition. There are stretches of eltpl:.oena: when nothing mw:h
~nce on the 'indivbibility' of duration and thtrrefore of human experi· happens (in the C~ books he calls these 'anr-instaxulJ-whllJeVer', mst<mJs
ence. Bergson )(lffietimes t:a.lb in 11 Rornmti.-; WlIy abcIw iht: 'indivisibility' of ~). The $tll:m!J point of Bergson's ~t about duration u that
duration (thu& pladng the ducaOOn3l-a«OWlt of human experience in an enduring a ;renf;won or experience can al J(jlR.I' puillt gh"t' rl.$t' to lit cbange in
abs,~t Qp}>QSition with the lIcientific one, which 'murden to dissect').' nature, and that thii property requU:es that we abandon any notion of time
In the way. DergltOfI' $ conclusIDn is that the n::t\.lm> of phwical quantity and articulated in tellrnl of the accred()n of discrete. homogeneolB interval& {<".g.
sensate quality are en~ly ~ ; '!:he fucl t& that there is no point of dock time).b Such mremoJds of I.f'9JUformBoon are fairly frt'.quent in expe:n.-
contaCt benl'een the un~x~n<kd and the emend.ed, between quality and ence. and in the &sa, Bergson gives a number of desl.:ripoQruI of dm:sho1d&
quantity' iBerpm J889: 7{)~. The idea proposed by Kant, that there 1$ a thal puncl:ll.al.l.': emotions {e.g. QpJ~ionsof desire and angu). However. th~
l<pecial .kind of 'in~ rn:at>"Ilitude', wh~re sensatiQns can IX'.' more or ~ thr5lolds are ob'fim:DIy not tilOOUDtered at every moment (wbkb '!'<'OUId ~
intense, ill r~ by Bergson. If 'w~ distinguish IWO kinds of quantity. the ODe ~)hen::nt, as it would ~Judf: the mdU1'rJ1Iaot' a particular state). In Oelew.·
intensive, whicb admil!> only of a '"more o.rleM", the other extenNft'. wbicb i.an terms, the repetition of a type of event does nor oJ:wo:p In'f{)l.e ~"
]en(b itself to me~t:'mel1t, we are not fu from siding with FC'clmer and the Furthermore, if Ihis. Is the reason that d ~ g~erares the new. then dri&
pIl'YCbophyllidm, rc,r, » won iii a thing is acknowledged to be <:apable of mod~ tht'standard, over>$\mplhul; itl~tlltion of Bergaon'$ in.simence
mcrel1lle and decrease. it seem! natumll'O au by how mUlh it deaeallCtl or br tlw. duration Implies novelty, It i& not that the 1Wll i5 ceasdeuly prodlXed by
how mlU';h it nu:re31.iell " . , Either, then, !!iellW:lon is pure quality. or, if it ~ :il. the m.et'e fact of duration. 7 It it rather that the new i& produt:ed ~ dartltllm
magnitude, we ought to try to me/lSl,.Ire it' (72). 11.M:- notion of intentky iii a is lIw 't'elUdt:fur 'nten.m~ ~
cOI1:fuRd concept, 'silWl.tod <l.t the ~t;tlon of two iltreams' (7~), e:xten:me Durtiion hall the property of ~ inl1!mi~ Ihn:3bol.dli. of In1n5fonnation,
quantity and the kind of sell:5e(l multiplkity W~ e~perienc:e in COnsciolWle.. but each ilwance of such :il thr~oldseems w mec US back to the thing that
Del.euz.e's a.n:a.Iy$i$ shows tbaf du.radon !t more lItrtcd1 'relatively indiviu'ble' is being lIefllled or experienced. The im.eMive pmpl:rties of me experience
(B 60; d. DR 2~7), in that. each nap (r<ming (Wef a threshold involves a refer back to prope:rtits of die thing. which ~ m~ in the 5eft!le dw they
change in ItlllUre (and therefure ill indivisible), hut tha( ~ may n~ .are internal or irltrin&ic:, all opposed to exremal Of !/deCondary. For in!KllDce, me
less be many U".wernm of thresholds. r. Delf:)JZIjI wan~ to show, arrer ~ event, experience of ~g trapped in a yeUow room would thus ha'lo'e singularities
how BergoJOn du:I not fully undentand the Implications of the conttprion of particillar to it it might. be optic:a!ly ~timulating at first, but at a «rtain point I
dur3Uon he wall brtngUlg lnw existence; me job of the commmWol' is to might glaTt to fuel naUM'OUlL In the Ci'1Umll boob ~ re~C1 a few time!! tel
make these unp1icat:iOIl8 Upl1clt In the ~ (Jon Ihe J~ lmItI fI/ Colt· Goethe'$ theory of {;Glour, which state:! that when tlJe ~ of oolOllr! are
~ Berg$on bimlle'lf had couched hii critique of J.l8TCboph",iaI paraJ- lnt~ Ibey often produce a trat1$fortna6on= yeUow ~ ~ of ted
k.l.i&rJ:l 311 a ~ of the nQtion of intellllity. which he takelIm imply c:hangell around IL So there might be :ill $Om of uptiol effectl; produald by being $I:Ucl;.
in degree, me3!l'Ut'ed in hQm~ne:QUS quantity. In the scholastic nQrion of in a yellow rooM long enQugh. Tht'n" vrold till» be diiferenDal thrt:sholds
imemtry, &ull active in Kant'. philOllOphy, degrt:e5 of inteti$ky AR saki \0 be proper to me exclusive re.:eptiDn of ~ colour yellow. Repeated stimulation
CQfll:inuow and homogeneO'l.B. 'fime is not held to make anv difTerenct' to the by the wlour yellow would have its own ~t nf &ingularitie5. After haYing been
gradual Increa3e in inrensitv of the colour red. But fM Dele~ Bergson's locbd in a yeUow :room once in my life, the repnitWn at a later point of me
'lotion of dur:.ldon helps in fiIct to indicate d\e trUe fonn and nature ofmten- expt:'ricnce might geneGW:: ~ty. and then, depending oli how many tim~
'ity (DR 239). ff1're follow thmugh ~rg'llOn" line oftbought, l'IIe 'r~r it ~ repea.tl':d. panic, AJthough ~ ~ltie6 would be generated within
at rh(' beart ofdumrion the lmplicatlNJ or<ler of intentiity' (DR 239). ~ form my body in the room. they are mO'f'e properly auributed to dle room itllelf. A
of differentiation revealed by dumtion ~hOW$ that intemity mUllt i~ be Yellow Room 1herefm:~ ba:s. lou 0"'1\ intensive firld. dilierent in kind to the
16 The Patiwlogits of Tmu 17
lmenaiti¢s generawd by a. White Room. Dcleuze nplidtly takes the roncept of 3lJ the external wurld, 1llere is 110 mote re:uon tQ tay 'that the past e.f&t::es
duration to gi:\'e a«:ess ro 'thing3 themsel.'\u' (see, for instance. D1 2.!J), and i1Jdf as 500n 31 perceived than there is to mpPMe th(ll: maleJial obJecu cease
COD$dOl.J.llly plays on lhe mtLItipie meanings of me lI!iOTd 'intensity': rortaphY"" to ex.Ut when we (;ea8Ir. to peTCen.e them' (Bergson 18'9& 142). The unper-
ical, duratioml.l and affective. ceived external workl i8 ;;malogous tn !.he unperceived pasL More mongly,
We already lee Deleuze ~ .a. compromise ~ Berpon and Bergson goes 110 far all to claim thai: it l:$ the past that truly is, Put e<rents may
Fechner. Bergsonian ~ U. ~own ro conceal ~Iy me differential appear sterile and powetlesa,. while our pt"eie1lt seems malleable and open to
thremol.di :identified by Fechner, but now extracted from their abattact, homQ- continual redireaion. Bur onee an event is done. it is fixed. It is photo-
ge.ueous fhun~rk. Thus, although thresholdJI - wh.ether they be of pain or graphed, and if it can change iu significance due to future interpretatiom. it
!Ioen1lOry qu.aDtit5 - are embodied in malXtrlal bodie$.. Ihcse thresholds au- only ~ e ucannot be eJ.":il.lIed~ the pur. has the a.ttrlbute of permanence which
reached on condirloo that their transformation, are I!Rdtmd. H, :iU'o Kam.li3}'S in. t.h.irWmi Iinre Plato have atl::l'ibntt!d 10 the nolion of 'being'. The present. 01\
the First Analogy. the pase.age of time em only be measured by UIl.lI!ling a the ot:her hand, is w fleeting and impossible to pin down th3t it does not have
penmment substance lU the backdrop to change'S in ~ Bergson mm.."6 the right to be ll3id ro be.
hew I.be nature of ph~caJ aubltanccs can be modulated 1:, time all duration, Led by the logic of me concept of dumriun, Bergson is led to the same con,.
It was Bergson '5 reali.zaticn that dur.won implies the pl'aer¥ation of the clWlion that haunted a number of the most signitic:ant thinken of die day,
past whidl ftm:ed him to modify hilildentifu:ation of duration with ~ among them Freud art<l Nietzsehe~ 'in the menw reakn, there is no annihiJ..
~ If duration i& only possible on condition that t:he palIt ill preserved, rhen, ~' (el. Nletu<;he 1911: t# 588). Pertlaps it i~ thevertiginow fJlllCination with
Bergson rellJ:izc:s, be mwt radically modifv his theory that eonsciOUlness is me mil; thoupt thar llepa:rate& our age lIO r:adically from Betp>n's, Nothing th.u
primary site ofduration. The past is preserved by memory, but at anyone time, was e'm' in the human mind can ~ leave it. Pan of the reatIOO why Berpon
the vast m~orir.y of memories mUlit relide outside oonsc::ioumess. But if and Nlet:u;(;h~ are more impon.:mt £han Freud for ~ is that thf:' fOrmer
du.ration i& the prolonptkm ofthe past inro the present. and yet memories are twO IQ)' t.I:"Ile5t to this thought, to the pointofddirlum. BergJon's meoryofme
mOll! of the time not ~ then me durational nat:'Ul'e of me mind only
past, and NterDc.he's meorv or me eternal rerum, hom e3rpre6& in their di&:r·
indirectly concenll consclol.lllfte4 Memory. the lite of uncomcioll!!. mental ent (and, Deleuze conacnds, ultimately complemencary) wa~'$. the impfu:-
representations. now bears the ~igbt of duration. From now on. the role of mOlU at both the psychological and etJric:al level!., of this one thought: that if
wnsciolMle!Jl! will be restricted. and will in fact not ~ directly conn.&ted with npenencell are lost to our present, the past is not lost to the mind. Deleuze's
dw-ation at all, The function of consciowness is nthCT to fix itBclf to the jnJ:JJmt. rotlttiburion iB lO identifY Bergson as the philosopher who provided the most
that is, ro the ~ Here we begin to see the con~a:, albeit quite ace.. pc-:r:ful alJUmf:DU to back up mal thnught; this ia why Mtater f1M Memm) is
dental and via a completely independent route. with freud: oonsci:QUllfleSll the central ~nt of Bergsonlan phibsophy for Ddcuze, Furthermore, if
now b«omes ill ~ phenomenon, concerned with the 'exigencies of the 'gre:ate$t weight' that Niet.l:lKhe encounters in the dJought of the t:t.ernal
life' •which ronspirea to ronc.eal. ~ deeper, UllI."OnsOOUS root! proper to the return ia tbe thought dw. tJlJ the pa!t is preserved, then Deleu.re'$ ~
buman mind. Bergson plunges into 'the unblguities v.mch $Uffound the seetm to be to show how &erp:tn's argumentl about the p3Sl all<> help to
problem of the UllCOl1lCious', iUld he ~ arguing th4lt 'the idea of an incmIJe this 'weight' - to the point that liberation from the burden of me past
tUl~ ~ is dear, despite ~t prctiudice' (Berpon 1896: through me affirmation of the et:ernlII return becomes a necessity.
14!). ~.! theory of memory is the mangeS(, most coun¥:el'-in~part of
his philosophy, and for the casual reader of Ddeuze (perhaps inrrodu.ced to
The Past his work through A~). it cannOt but: be surpri!ring to find a contem-
porary philosopher defending it so energetically. .But lleJetl.Il:: c.a.rries on
When 'We are indoors, we assume that the world outside carries on ~g defending the meory well aftI:t: A~ and it fom1& ~ backbone of
unperceived. We assume that there is an ~1iYe serles of event!! occurring in ~ 1(1985).1 The proposition that the pastil. rat all the ext.emal world
the external world, whicll hall nothing to do with us, However, Berp:Jn is already enough to give us a jolt. Realitj· appean to !JPiIl out f1'Iff the confine.
suggetltll thou it is not eklough to dose the CI.I.'t'tains and ,.,indOWll, liO detach of the present moment; surely a Iil.Daq ;., aIbot? Yea. of course the praent is
on~lf from th~ eve~ ~ent to which one spend$ one', daylight ~ BetgKm r~ U$ - but th3t doell not mean it hall a monopoly on
houn trving to adapt, to succeed in escaping 'reality'- We do$e ounclves otl JfC'JliIj, which might be something quite' different. h it. a priori true that only
from ext:et'l1a1. o~tive reaHry only for another, inner curtain to open. Once what ill aetttally bappening am be said to Im'e reality? 1:& the past then nothing
the world of the senses is dimin.iJhed,. one tnrountert that «Jurr ~ world, but a: figment of the imagimttion? But, we ,,-ant to lnsit.t, th~ past is dead and
the past. In Berpon's gothic philO6Opby of memory. the past .. at.least as real 8UJ1C; there is notbillg we can db about it. Berp.m relIpOl:Ida: it DI2Y be dead,
]8
19
but ir is not gonr-_ Withom the preset"V3tlon of the past, there would be no writing.;) to thaI of the \Ul(OI'lA(:I(tw. Bergson ulUm~tely :iwl~ [\0;(1 di£fer~rIl
~relligent action in the present. nor the ability to distinguish rnere imagina. t:ouceptions of the unconscitlW. Ofl<! ofwhich can claim to be ontological, the
tIOn from memo'l' The p3St is completely real, says Bergson: in (act, reality ather psychological. Afttor ,taring fhal in Bergson t:Mre is a "ps}"Chological
~igbt be ~ with grcluer :.wurance to the past than to &he- pretelu. which unco1l3cious. dilltinct fr(Jffi the ontological Wlconscious' {B il}, Ddeuze says
1lI forever ltl, flight, alw'ays ~lipsed by lUi imntincm negation. Why, then, we that 'there is no contradktion between t:lteMo two descriptions of lWO distinct
protest ~t ~ ethereal Frenchman, does not the past flood anto the present. unconsdousllesses' (B "2). Whether Deleuu is saying here that there are two
mcapacnanng and choking it, if it is more real than the present? &rg~on is kinds of unconscious which exist separ.ttely, (Jr, on the other hand. that there
~ppable: welL in fuct Ir d.oesfiOmet:imcs in certain pathological C3U$, and if are different 'levels' of the same Wlcons<:iou..., we will have to examine later. In
It does not for most othen. that is beCO\use t~· are able w inkibittheir aware. thi$ chapter we will be fQl;using 'On the: 'ontological unconscious' which
ness of the past. The paM. Bergson cont::Judes, is unconscious_ Deleuze claims that Berg$on uncovers in his theory of memory. This uncon-
The route of BergllOn and Janel intO the notion of the unconsciOIlS wa.s scious 'corTCspond$ to a memory that is pure, virtual, impassive. inactive, in
through the notion of memw-y. The more they had rcflen~d on the condi. iJMlf (ibld.). LikeJung's ar'(:he~ypaI unconscious, this Bergsonian ontological
tions fO: ~~, ~ more .Irey $lIW psychopatholoS' as resulting from unconscious has an autonomy of its own, and is not produced through repees-
failures U\ the inhiblOOn of memory. It was thi$ line of research which m:a({t" 51on.
them impervious to Freud's se"ua1 ~&ion theory of the lmoonsciou:s when In ,\1I2tt.eT a7Ul .~ (1896) Bergson stared that trurh about 'latent' menlla.!
it ~pearM.Alth.ou~ Freud is often held to have ~li( radlcilly change<! lhe .'ltat~ is that they are 1J~ past states. There are two types of memories:
self.1IIlag'e of bumantty thr<iugb his discovery of the unoomdous. for Deleuze. mechanical habit 'memories' and proper memories of individual e\-enls. 9 If a
the ~ian diJoo\tery Qf the reaJuy of the past i3 more fat-reachirlg in its mind can retain mental traces of past events, then it remains permanently at
tran~tlOn of n.ur self-image as hllman subjects.. As a phiJ050pher. me risk ofthe caprkious reproduction of Ih<!se traces, whenever it cncoWlrers
Bergson 5 rec:oncepuon Qf ~tivu)" enco~ a toW vision of tI)(' something resembling or contiguous with its wrmer perceptions. There is ;\
hwnan mind whkh is inevitably wider in scope than FTtud'~ work, which 'spontaneity' that must be attributed to the memory trace, which 'is as capri-
~~ ~ecetlS3rily tedlered ro its origins in the study of psychopathology. But cious in ]'('producing as jt is f.:lithful in presernng' (Bergson 1896: 88). By
at III ~OIJl1St that Freud does D<;t happen to be a pbil\W,)ph~r by training or threatening, mOTOOVei, to mingle- past images ~'ith present ones, of load the
mc;\ t1.on, The 11UlJtods by, which B.erg$on and freud <fu<:over their -Sepat".t.Ie mind with painful1mageli. memolY risb unbalancing the mind when all the
thoonc$ of the unronsclQUS are completel}' dUtiner. Freud discovers thto lauer needs to do, practkally speaking, is to perfonn its functionll for the
unconscious by in£e~g its extstenc~ on the basis of the theory of ~ he purp~ oflldaplation, and retaiD 'auenlkm to life' (Bergson 1896: 175). The
COrtW'ucts after omen.mg patientl5 exhibiting 'exces.sivdy Intense' l~~' h' differeru:e in kind between perception and memory can mw be identified in
, "'--- , . ~ an 15
clinIC. neud s method g<>e$ from d,.namk rep~on ro the l1Dconsci0u5; ~ termS of the presence or absence of 'acti'iry'. "TIre adualii:t of our perception
shape ofthe W1OOIlsciow is in£err~ from Ihe dfecu uf reprt'.IllIQn. f11l1 notion ~ in irs adiz-lty. in the movements which prolong it, and Tlot. in Its greater
of ~e unconaci.oUll is thus 'rclati\-e' to the pnx-ess of repr~ and the cri. inten!i.ty; the past is only idea. the present n ideo-motor, .. The past is essen·
tenon of wha.t must be rept'~ from COraciQUSQe5S. [( Freud ~ discover t:iafh.. !Aat iJ.'hKh am tUlltmger . .• By misundemanding this dJaracteri5tic of the
what the au.rse of Ttpression is. then, it follow'S, he will know th~ i"Jature Qf ule past, [~l become incapable of making a real distinction between it and the
unconlCious..
present, i.e., that which is aain( (68-9),
Bergson. on the other band, discovers his own theory of the uncoruscious- In' eramining this theory, and Deleuze's own IDe of it, we- will be faced with
based on the notion ~ the 'pure past' or .~ memory' _ through philoso- some difficUlt ~ c:lurices. The first choke concerns the staM of
phy. After ~on.mucung the implications of the pr~OI:l of the past in the fhenry. Wlur kind of rhecry is st! Ddeu:ze explkitly broacll~ this queuion,
memorr· ~e ill th~n led to <!eduu- &vm there that th~ «'al. yel ~irtual, 'pure hut it rums out that his suggesrions raise more problems than l.Il.ey answer. _~
memones mu,ft m tum be 'repreue<t' in normal psychology; if theY arc not. we have mentioned already, Deleuze describes pure memory ll'l 'onrologi.cal',
th.en psychopathology must result. Ibm ~rp:m'$ diso:m:ry of dte uncon A as opposed m .psychological', Hi5 main cba.racreriz.ation of the difference
!JC10\l1l proo:eds in the rcvene direction from Freud's. \\<'here.as Freud goes between Ollrology and psychology o~un in am passage:
from psy<:h()?athol~ to thf' ~tulation of the unconscio~, 8erg$on goa
from t~e philosophIcal postular.e of the un~onscioU$ to psyclu)pathology. In What Bergson calls 'pure memory' (~Jmil bas no ps-;.-chological exi&-
~~ De~ sugge$~ that rhi$ procedurt;' a1Iows Bergson to discover a renee. This is why It is Gilled ~ iNl;tive. and UJl(OO$(Wll$. AU th~
dinu: llIIlQn of the unoonscio\lS which is occluded from Freud's vi$ion, pro-
wordll are daDgCfOl.l:5, in particular, the wurd 'unconscious' whkh, since
ct'!ediug as be does frt)rn the cQnl;cpt of repression (or ddence in his earl~' Fteud, has become imepardhle from an etpecially clI'emYe and actM
20 /Nkw.e and ~ U~ 21
psychololPw e~ce. We will haM: occll!ion to compare th~ Freudian shaped around an ~-iiC.OJD'tularing ontotogi<:al memmy. nII.hB' cb:m vice
uncot'it(iQUS with the ~Lan. silu:e ~n b:lmBelf 1'D.1Ide ~ Wlnpar- versa. Wherever interiorized duration arises. rime pushes through and invem
!son. We mwt nevertheless ~ clear ar th~ point that Berp;m does not ~ the :f:abrk of £he l.IIliverse, so that matrer mullt now be talum as che ~pe- at
the word 'Uf)(onscious' to denou: a psychological reality outside e.oDICiOUlr temporal becoming, r:a.ther than dmf: being dependent on ma.tter. In ~
Ile$$, btu (0 denou: a n¢n-psycho~ol reality - being as it is in itself. Strictly .llft4 ~ Delruze :make.e the Kantian point that 'It llUCceuion of inst.anlll
~, the ~ is the present. Only che pr~t is 'pSJlChologi. does nat cODllliture I:i.u:If: my more than it ~ it to disappear; it indi0.rt:5
cal'; but the past i! pure ODh:Jlogy; pure memory has only ontoIogkalsigni{· only iu constantly aboned moment of binh. Tune- is ~r.ed only in the
lumre. (B 56) orIgina.ry synthesis which operates on the repetition ofinsranu' (DR 70). At
Ute moment that the ~ 't1I1.iverae invert! itleJl :md int.eri.orizea itself
The dai.m to ontological nacus appean to rest on two attributes of 'pure vittually, it (starting with lbe bl':ilin) beoomes maped armmd time, :rather than
memories'. Fillst, Bergson ill arguing that ~ m~t9t male a di8.tinctlon bet~ vice ~. there is an ascent, through the involution of W1ualit¥- to iW
'pure memories' [~n~], that. is, m~ as they are in tbemaelres entird>' new order of validity, bcycmd the order of actual &cL
prior to their being brought to c:oruao~,and metnoriea as they are 'actu- 'Ihe emergence of memory tlI:rou.gh the wne of indetermination opent up
alized' and ~ t to consdoumeu in the ~ of memory iUclf; tht:sre a ~or mteriori2ed d ~ whkh peoceeds I'D evolve in tension with
latter are 'memotJ"imagel' [i~~). Hence pure memories have an the more ~neralizing tendencies of inwllige.oce. Accmding to Deleuze, the
.~ an 'ifHudf' stat1JS, unlike 'memol)'-imagt:s'. which lit> we will see,
j i$$ue here is not ultirn:ittcly whether memories can or cannot be localized in
are ~ to the- context in which they are acm:alized. But this is not sufficien~ the brain. Even if Ihey could be I.ocaJ.iwj in MUt'Ofial connections, char. would
to make them 'ontological' In any substantial !leMll! of the tErm. 1Cl Hence the aWlle~ aside the fact that 'lrir.b the i ~ of difference (the partiCU'-
soecond attribute of pure :memoria would seem to be the key one;- that. lit> paat. tar memories), a new relationship ~ which mwi be articulated in tcJ1Dll of
thete pure memories have :.l pem:umence which is granted to no other vinualiJ:y and actuality, Memariell are preserved in 1M ""'fill, and muM there-
phenomena. Aa Dekuze ~, 'the only equi:¥aJent thesis is Plato'3 noO.QI'lof fore ilIlDlehow coulat with the attenbon to present reality that a~ my
Remi.ni&cence. Remlnilcence aho afli.ntt.a a pure being of the past, .a being in COIUclOUlIllesli. 1"Iti!i reJatiomhip requires a. diflen:nt fuunework fur ~
itllclf of the. pau, an ontoi~cal Memory th.tt i!. capable of serving :all the foun- than does the evolubonary process in ~ .
dation fur the unfolding of time. Yet apln. a PIatoni<: 1mpi.r.ttion maUs itself In w twentieth (mtury, man)' phUotophm in !he post·Kantlan trad.idon,
profoundly felt in.Berpon' (B 59). Sartre pemaps being the gm.u M:ampJe, insiBted on treating the mind M a 'for
Deleuze'li actual explanation of how this 'ontological metnQry' is posiible will iudi' beca.\J$e of the ~ qf ~ beyond the- ~ of the
appeallO U1lnlKendent.al ground" rather than ontological cf;;dms in the saiet pb),ical. Following Kant, amsclOlU.Rea mwt be taken as: irnplicitk' Jlelf..
Rme. By the time of ~ N ~ Ddeuu li ~xpticitly describing
ll
wnKiow.. In "J"h,s ~ of SFit Hegel says that OOmciowlnellill is
Bel'glOn's theory of memory in tellllS of'mmscendental synthesis' ~ 'What do we implldtly self<onscious bea;we acta of a:mlICioUli cognition implicidy ~
mem in speaking of a pure, a f1'rio"pmt., the past in genellli or as such? If ~ to a:i~ which allow us to know mat we are knowing, think that ~ iiln
mra ~ is a great boo.... it is perllap!: because Bewpon profoundly explol'ei;! thinking, etC. 'Hence'. Hegel SII}'S. 'it is something that goes be,ond limi.u, and
the domain of this ~ndental 8}'uthesJs of a pure pw and dillCovered all its since thete limits are its own, it is sotnetb1ng that goes beyond itself (lUgd
constituti'ile paradOJ«:3' (OR. 81), The danger of tiWng Deleu:!e at his word 1807: !ill. "Ibts double t.ilUlKendence (w objectS and to self) means that
when he de5Cribes the past as 'ontological' is that if we taU tNll thought 1.0 hs oonsciol.l.ll'l.eSll mUlit be taken as fundamentally ftw~ In dfect, San:re goes
conclusion we MIl end up with a weird spiritualist Plawnillm, with pure on to radi~ HeceI's claim about the relation between conxiOUSlleM and
memories all omologially fundamf:ntal entities. But !here JeemI to be lKitJre- ~ , Sa.rtre inren that thk m.elUlS that o o ~ Q ooIy as
thing mOTe complica~ going on.. t::'O'en in Janet's Strllnge dream of a paleo- ~ 'beingfur-iuelf" iUpure 'lad:of'bdng' [~d.] (Sal:ue 1943;
~ which would allow one to 'trawl' into ~ past. u 85).n On the other side of the subject there i3 being ~ the world of
For BeTpon and Janet, th~ human being is 3D organism that I:tappe.ta to , non<ONcioul objects or phyaka1 Mates, In and for which theTe is no ttan-
have ~ complex enough to open up a 'zoo of indetl:m:lination' llCendenre. In ~ia sense. chen, being. pure immanenu-; it '1.$ what it is', as
(Berpm 18%: st} in itll brain. which permlt$ the maperWon of habitual opposed to Ir.m.Icendau:.e, which 'is what it is not and is nor wbar it is'. Human
relIGtion and the apptaI to put experience. 1':bts cerebl:1ll rone of indetenn1- beings thUll cannot be tre'llted in strictly evolutionary rerms because of their
nation heoomes the 'pp' 01' 'in~rval' throlJlh wbkb duration enten, pr0-
ceeding to take charge of the~, turning it inside aut. T:u:ne llurges into
~ brain. changing everythmg. so that now it is tlu: brain which ~
capacity fur co~.
But in TIu.F.ooltl.tMm of~ (publiahed five yean befoR Same's &i:fIg
~) Janet argues that the explanation for the absence C1C nothingnelll8
4.
that distinguWJ.eS }wman romooWlnes.s is 1a besought, quite llpeoncall:y, in rionan' .a:c.eOUDl.. and evc::n with r.endenciei in Nieu:u;be's. work. [n a note from
memory, not in con~i\l\W1es!lin geneTat 'Th¢iQaI of memory h to triumph
0\'eT ab,ence and it is ttl'" strugglf' .ag-.rimt absence which cha:racrerises
nr.mory' (Janet 1928: 221), The appe.u (~ memory at drill point i5 more
1886-.7, Nietzsclle m.akes the remark that memory must be a -late' phenome-
non, 'imofiIr as here the drM to mm equal RenU already to have been
Nbdue<J; difterentiation i$ p~' (Niewehe 1967; # 501), The point is
c.umpJe-x I.han dIe appeaJ to comdousneu, all memory itself is It compl~lt the same as 8etgKtn'$:: (he d~ntiation of.m.emories it; necessarily in tension
function, having Doth oonscwU!$ eM unconsciom as~Cl.$. Bergson, Janet and with ocher ~ ~ bkltogial tendencies in the human organism, Even if
Dele~ are performing a delicate balancing act ntre.l...ik-t Freud, the\' think. the dllrerentbJion of memorW ~an be counk'd on iu own tel'IIlll as an
it i.Il wrong to dillringuish human b¢inp from animalll on thte basi$ of the con- ad.a~ function, an eqU2ll.y bnporCUlt question concerns the compensations
sdoume. of the fonner. ConsdOl.lMeJ$ itself is not. ~ilat ditltinguisb~ us from and adjustments that would :D'ille At a con6equence within the mind, I~ The
animaa; the post-Kandan psycbological tradition (led by Wundt) had ~ady B.elgsGnian-Delewian hypoth~$ is that a new thre,hotd is fea(:h.ed with the
mca!eded in tlhiUling down COIl!lCiOUllneS$ to attenoorL But (or D('!'le~ and interioriza.tion of memory, and that the mind undug()C$ a change in n~.
hi! 0lIf'll I:radition. Freud in turn ill wrong to il'mll'oe th21 a theory of mind un.W Once the e'*Olutionary path ~ the pre$¢rvation of dilf~rentiated
therefore tQmmit itself to 'the task of tracing aU the ~tiesof our ~tiom mem<:Jri.e, is taken. a. new, fundamentalllelf-reWic>nship is permitted to arise
back 10 ~ ~ ' (SE 1: ~t R:nher, the notion of the unoonseiou.!' within the mind. This self-relationship is not in ~ one of inhibition or
should be explained in another v.ay. '111eidea of an u~iow~ reprelSion (as on the Freudian model), bllt is primmlyone of ~
)1$ dear, despite eurrem pre-judice' (Bergson 1896: 142). Wh.uhas been ruislt.ed The need fOT repression mayari$e {IS a ~of w pn!lW)' tum toward$
by both Freud and the pO,t-Kantian tradition is how it it w ~tUp ~ the actuali.zation of the virtual in 'pJfd1k re~LiI:kln', Jt is the ·in~<
'ffUmWry and CDtlSdm.tJ attirr..tU.m which s.e parat.es human bei.J:tg1l &om the: Te.1iI! of of memory that ~omell possible in compln organmns that lets them apart
the animal W<H'ld, On the one tmnd, .mE'JIlt:lrieg ~ the deYeJoprnents from other .anitnJlI!. "The more complt!x a S}'S'em. the more the ~ ~
that cake plac.e in dtlfation, and bttome pot.entlaUy .ac~ fur £Ot1$clOUII- to impUcfJlifm appear within it' (DR 255). M~mQry, [w Delem.e, is an eumple
ness. But on the oW.~r hand, cOflK'ioUsness - as an adapUw: function _ IKlW - perhaps the privileged example - of how the pliysiod and ~ogItal~
gain$ a new function, as it mU51 now t:Iid.ualize (II" inAihit th~ virmaHv subsistent .~m constitution ofli,,'lng bemlP can beCOflle radi<;a)ly <ilt~', 'Complex
me-monell. The conseql.len<:e: of the mteriorizaoon of the p~ ~ th~ emer- ~m$ incteafi.nlly fend to interiorise their £omUmth'e ~ . • The
gence ofa new relationship ~l.ween actual and virtual Deleuze anKulates this mlm! the difference on whkh the' system depend$. .. interi,omed in the
relationship .in 1eJ'Dl3 of tht! c<m<xp:l$ of ·differen.ce' and 'reperi.cion'. phe.l1omenon, the more J:\':petioon finds il!elf in~erio:r. the lev it d~nd$. un
Feom Ikotcuze', penpecdl'e, then, Berpon misimerpret.s his own Temlts. As external rondiuoo$ which are supposed to etlS\U'(' the reproduction {If' me
we havt' ilCltn, lklt"l,I;re h~lf £ametimes loob ambiwtlent about. the real "a.me" dilft:,reneel' (DR 2&6). U»e 'incerkJrintion' involved in nvrnory if. the
5f3tm of Berpon'J theory; h~ Ja}!l that his method is lit ona 'more than a fundamental oondinon of the ~ m of 'p;ychic sy*ms', because
deKIiption of ~~'t! and feu (in appean.nce) tban a transcendenral repetition only beeome5 truly 'interior' OIl (OIIdition that memory i,$ pouible,
analysis' (1)1 36/4{»). In ~Um and ~ 4 M ~however (more The dilfeTeac:e between 'material' :md'spiritual' repetition depend! on the
~ Ulan the 1956 arocb \\.1lkh are Mill under the speD of &rgson's theory of pn."$4!.'QU' f)(~ '~n lhe- ~'O repet.itions..1he material and the spiri-
organk ~ and i.nlftin(:~), DeIWl'C'iiI effort is to CODvt"I1 Bergsoniim into tual, t.berIe it it \'tit ~ce-. The fonner is, a repetition of Sll(:C(:ll8M:
3. tl'aJ'tSCe~w pltilOHOphy, ThUl the bMue it not about whether memories
independent *Jemen~ or 1nlilQRl:S; the lat~r is ll. repetition of the Whole Oil
can «hl4lI:p (or 'ontolugially') mbsist outSide of the brain. 8erpm beli.l:'lJes ~ coesildnl ~h1 ... Spirimal repeUtion unfolds in the being in iuelf
thar. 'cQnttmlporary psyeboJ(~ is seding to get away from •. , anatnmical of the p:ut' (DR. 84).
schemes' {Bft'gson 1908: .116). !Wwewr, if one adheres to a tr.lm..~ndental hprellllion dOt'S not produce the unconscious, no more than it is tiu: final
reading of.8erg1liOn. one can in fll£t 3VQid potential conIIkt with nel.lJ"mcience_ fom1 of the rdationship be~ actual and virtual, On thi! point, Ddeu.ze
The point b¢comes not to defend th~ Immateriality of ~re memorieli, but [0 ~Qf all ~ lhat. the proce5S of indhidw,uon comprises an 'unconsciQllS
shO"N how the compl~x bcain ~comell orpnized around 3 piaticular appren~lp' (PS 14) which eulminal4!$ ill a final integration of consciour
. problem' whkh can no longer even be! red\Ked In a problem of adapution. I1(i'; :and the uncof!.li'ciQU$. arut by virtue (If It! 'i!lteriorization of difference',
In Bergsonism, the problem of temperdl $yJuhem develops: into a mOTe' the indi\.iduation of mind u a.l1lO undentood a, !be \'ebicle fOr the coming t6
complex problem: how the virtual and 3£tluJ are to (:~ml in the same bh> self<ons.ciowmeu of the whole of life, In a !«:'markable pa.uage from Berp:m.
togi<:'.aJ entity, His most powerful point is thal thf< relatianllhip of WtuaJity :.and ism (to which we return in cha.pter 6). Oelwu d~lleribes how
acmality must Mvt" iu own. autonomous fOnn. and amOOl be reduced to
material: catlSality. In this sense, his theory is \:-ompati1:>k- with lane~'t> e'I01u-
I
24
in man, and only in man, me actual bewmes adeqwe ro the virtual. It multiple recepUoDi of the j3iDe idea.. Freud beg.m by making the d.isti.ncrion
could be lI8id that man is c:apabk of rediscovering aU the levels. all the bet'wetn memory and perception in pt.m:J.y neurologial r.enm. only going on
degrees of expansion r~) and contral:1ion that coemt in the virtual to remove this IDllt'erlal bMi$ afru TIu l~ t7j1Jrlrrms. For NietzllChe the
Whole. As if he weR capable of all the ~ 3nd brought about in himtelf thought of the pr~n of the past W'll.f both a mystical md :an ethical
ItlC~S5i'vety ellf.!I'ydriug that, elsewhere, can only be embodied in di&rent fhought. Th~ thought of the etf'rna.I return firlIt appc-ared as a m~ lntu--
species , .. man h apable of scrambling the phmes, of going beyond his own trion of the preservation and return of trn: put an iIdinllC number of ril:nea,
plane as his own coodition, in order tinally to expreM naturing Nawre, (B 1(6) but NietzEhe immediately emacted the ethical signilicancc of this lho.t:
the thoopt that the past. is pretefVl::'d and will rem.rn b.ecomes 'the gre:uest
It is completely to miss the point to be pul off by the word 'man' or 'human' weight', whicb demands that _ ~OOTcapacitielllhJ' ~ Can the past
here; none of mil> u 'anthropomorphit'. 'Humanity' JUS(. hllppoe:m to be the be ~Ded? Deleuze su.ggesu dt~ the syntheds of time internally points
;q>ecies in QIIU' world that has internalized time through the development of lOW'.U'dIt the problem dw he calJs 'repeddon\ which he repcesenta all a kind
memory, Other species could do the WIle under certain conditions, and of ot'dea.l, an experience of terror and freedom (DR 19). Ddeuze (Opes with
probably have done and will do the same, in d.i&J'ent region., of the universe. the diarp made aptwt Bergson'$ theOJ:'ies of time by the existe1\Uallsu br
It ill futile to think that tOIDJ*!x life forn:J.s on other "'Orids will live subitan- oonwnding thilt if 8etpon's theaty of time does not ~ a completely theo-
tWly different (better?) 'UvcJ than our own. The problems they encounter will rized aaowu of the role of death, then it nevertheless prmides an important.
be more 01' k$a. the same, because the synthe!lis of time is a fundamental, uni- new bam fur a re-d\inking ofhwnan finitude. The finitude implied in human
versal invariMu, with a finite &elt of raodet. This is not to say th;u: modifi.catiolUi temporality ~ obscure without a full accmmt of how humm memory
in the theory of ~poraI synth_1Yil1 not aJ:ways be poaible - Dele'll2le ]a pre,. pre8el"ml the past. and DeJ.euze mOWll that Bcrpon'. theory of memory might
occupied with Just 8UCb ~0Il$ - but what make$ Rant'" Copemlam even provide the dearest basi. to UI'ldentand the NO stakes implied itl the
rerolution S() monumental ~ his uncovering of a lew!'l of funda.mental, ttan- exilt£ndal.ist theme of repetition. For KieBqaard and Hefdtgger. repetitian
setmdentll. anal)'sis ",-him bokh for mi., finitE ~ Any being which both has ill the act that allows a human being to embrax:e the fact that lib ~tiQrul are
senses and thinb "''ill have (:0 wgan.ln: their data ilirough nonrr.aIiYe articula. DOt determined, wbether br an ellIlimtiaJ llaturC or by the pasr:.. We finally
tions 'fNbich function ftw that being mrourh the synthesis of time. \l\'berever <x>mront the emptine.s of the future and our respoDiihiliry for OW'" actions
there is inteligent life, it will be organized in temporalllfl'tbes6 only by affum.ing our past as radially rontingent. WhateVer happened to me
Perhaps ~ than any other recent pbiloliopher. Deleuz.e has insisted 011 in the past, I accept it as my respoosibiliry, I can do otherwille now, and there-
demonslnuing the C\dl extent to which thl:! Copernican ret'Olution has mrned fore I CQuld ha.\~ done ~ then. 1 now sanctify the realiz.\tion of the
tM: uni\1erSe imide out. It ill not just Wat time 'lx«~ grO\mded In me concingenq of my past by an affinnalion of its conimgencr- In Nietzltdte's
su~ea: 'Time is nat the intAmor in WI, hut JUSt me opposite, the interioritY in tenns, re'pC'tition is a 'willing~' (NietDche IBM, 'Of Redemptioo') ,
which we ~, in which we :rmwe. live and change. Serpan ill much d03er [0 rhat finally frees one to will forwards.
Kant than he himself think.~: Kant dclined time as the form of inrc.rklrity, in JI DeI¢uze is right, then as the process of inr.eriorization contir:l'oes in the
the ~nse that we are intenuu to lime' (C2 82) . .Berg5on QpeDi up memorv's evolution of~, rhe ~ure of lime might writ inreDiify rorrespoodingly,
Pandora's box. the eontmt.s flying ow to 0CCUJlf the en'li.re mind, vanishing It is no wonder. then. that many today want 10 abandon ship, to affirm crude
Into depths of mental life which were hitherto unknown. By virtue of opening furms of mateJ:'ialism or Oarwiniml, and simply tul'n their baeb on the
up the domain of m~ry SO that if f1(JW threab:D5 to dwarf the present, d.emand$ of temporality, Btu 311 the parable ea:rs. what it, some day or night. a
Bergson in tum ratcheQ up the ethico-tetnporal problem, making demon weJT. to "teal af'tI!r them into their loneliesllonelineJ6 and llay to &bem;
KieIt.egaam'. and Nietl8Che's ~ all the more tmdrcl.l.lllYel1mb1e. How 'Thil Uk all )'OU now live it _ h~ lived it" you will hawe tQ live onu more
can tJIl t!J« be n-willed? and inllUlDt!r.\b1e limn. more .• : (NJeuxhe 188i: '*' 541), So tha-e ia no real
It hali al.reaitr been noted that the ida 1hat the past is JH'ClI'em:rl l.n Its akernativ<-..: we mUlL am.strl.ld the paleoscope.
entirel.)' had become $01nething of an occult o~on in fi~~ Europe.
The tact that the !aI:De klea appears in NietDche, Freud and Berp:m at moTe
or less the !lame time ~l$ that an unconscious, oo.ti«:live current was at 1b.e Actual and the VIrtUal
work during this period, being pkked LIp on by thin.lr.er; from nuny intellec- In DeIeuR. the distinction between the actual and the vir1:ua1 tends 10 taU
tual traditions. .. ill not i:mmediatdy de:ll1" what hilItorieal or sociological over from the diKinction ~ cQllSdousn_ and the unOO1l8doos. Thu
methodology would be adeq'Wlte for tUticuIa.t:ing mu uncotW:ious current. distinction goes beck to l..eibni7.'s ,'W:rD ~ 1m the Hu'l'll4'n ~ his
Moreover. a theon:tkaJ ovetdetermination n~ remits from melle critique of ~ empirldsm. Its fint target i$ Locke's ide2. that !he mind is
Tlu Patlw. fJFTiml 27
26
,
;
reality there would be no repetition, because Iea!it¥ ill only in the mometl'l.
If the world, i1utead ofbemg 'beauly, were nothing but equally large unvar-
~ bouldeJ'$, there would still be no repetition. TbroUgbout eternity, in
of the !1und.
every moment, 1 would tee :l boulder. but ~ would be rtG quettioll :as to
l, L
whelher it ';\Q$ the same ont: I had geefi before. (Kierkegaard 1843a: 111)
""nen ideality and realiry touch each other, ~ repetition occun. ",'hen,
for elCllmple, I llee something in me moment. ideality en~1'5 in and will
explain t.hal: it is a repetition. Here u. the contmli(.1ion. lor that ,mien is, Is
abo in another mode. Tb3.t thC' enemal is, chat I lee. but in the same Instant
I brl:ng itinto relarion with lOIl'lemlng tha1 :aliso U, lIOm.ething that is the I!oiUItC
and that abo will explain that the odlo i:s the wne. Here U a redoubling',
here it is a ~ of repetition. Ideality and reality therefore collide Ul
whaL medium? In time? lbat is indeed an ~ty, r.n eternity? That is
indeed an Ullpo8$i.bUity. In what then? In c~as - there is the c0n-
tradiction. (Ibid,)
Where can mil .collision' take p13oe? It cannot take place in time, bc:caus.e the
repetition is the ..ery condition of polISl"b11ity of appreh~~ time. But.it
c:antiot a1Io take pbt:e in eu:mh:y, as there would be no ~ m ~rnit'r. l3\
effect, ~ wouid be back with the boulders floaling in sp8U. except the
boulden would now tOOaot :M monads in an eternal ()I'der. The concept of
't'epeUlfon' thUll ~ a paradoxical ~ an on~\ink or fold,
lnvaginared (as we saw eaiier) in the hUttWl brnin. .
But if the concept of ~ ~ going tel be the tundmnenW smtbeslS of
time, 1heI1 ~ M!Jctm to be a prublem. as the presence of III repetition impl~
that an ori.giMl ftID~t is being repeated. But if repetition l:t;. sup~ to be
'*
the ba8.ic svnrhe'a:b of time. then it conl:nldictory fi) po&it :L tint moment 'in
time' ~ me !lVDthesis iuelL We !lecm to 'W bad; with the probk:m 1mpicit
in Kant's 'S}'1lth~ of apprehension'; it is boW. necellll3!Y and impQ~ib1e to
30
con~ive of a tint manifold or multiplicity 'in. itself'. This problem can be r hold that the I~ q/mDliMliJm is 'l<M'r~tq iJu ~ qf~
1lO1ved if we p<1l!it that the fulSt moment is ~ a ~ The norion of tUm; II as ~~ lltim u: For wppolle recolleclion iJ not created at the
repetition would only become coos.l$(ent if the $CX:ond moment could be a llaine moment as pel'ception: At what moment will it begin to exist? , , , The
repenriQu of the tint. while ,imu~1y the first I'OOment il:!lelfwouJd be more we rcllect. the more impossible it l& to ilna.gine ;my way in which tbi!'
I':oncei~ ~ a ful:Ure repetition, due to its preservation, 11lere IDlJ.$t be a 6nl rew11ection can Mise af tt i5 not creatro step by ltep with the perc~on
moment, a iyDthesis of pre;ervation, where events are preserved independ' 1t'Je1f (Berpon 1908~ 128; cited inB 12.';)
ernly of their ~ n:prodUttion. 8f giving priority to the notion of
repetition, it ~ as if D ~ is charging Kanl with h3ving omin-ed a more In otherwomll. ~ acwal present is rome how dOUbled by a vUmal 'shadow'
originary moment:from this accoum {)f the 'Yllthe.si!! of 'reproduction', for if of i~, which enables It to be re-Qcwal.i.red as the past It will ha!ve betln, f.ach
a reproduction is to be po&5ibJt, then t:h&t requires thal, the ti.m' rnotnent mCL'S!. 3CtuaJ image, he sa}'!!. must be taken to have U3 OU'1l virtwll afterimage. which
haW' bc:en ~ Before the $]lldresi!! Qf reproduction, rhere lll'U)l be .. enableli it ro be re-itCtualil:ed as the pa:<t of thai acrullJ moment,
svm.he.sis of ~n3tiot.t. HQW can a teproduction rwill thm Yanooed past
moment unJe$$ me moment was ~y prepared fur pJt:Serwtion at the Ifwe tak~ \hi! direcoon to its limit, ~ an ~ w;rt the acw.a1 image i:tIelfbas
point of ilJ ~hitlg: a virtual image whicb c:on~ndi to it like a double or II re~tiun. In
In order JOr a pIBl moment to be reproduced. it must ha'\'e been rocordeO 8ergsonian turrll!, the real o~ is re6ected in a mirror~ as in the
fOT reproduction 31 me moment of to pa,sing, For Ddeuze. Bergson is the Qne l'irtuaJ object which. from lUi side and IdmultaneOU!ly, envelops or ~
conlemporary thinker who has tahn up thill thou~tU'r lind submitt«l t() m the rea!: there is a '~nce' bet:ween the twl:). Th~re is a form3lion of an
cOlJllrequenCA'$: that 'an (:owciousne.5, tbc:n, is memory - ~ and image with t'WQ ilidea. actual au virtuill. It is as if an image in a JniJ:T(Jr, a
accumulation of the palIf in me present' (8erp>D 1919: 5). In many ofhu phoro or ill postcard CIUI'Ie t() we, aMt.UDOO ~del1C(, and passed imo
early wor'kJ (and beyM:d), Deleme ill to be found wrestling wi.dl a very deep the actual, even if thi.l meant that the actual image retUrned into the mirror
problem, a properly philosophical problem: how doel!i the present piIIi-I into :md rCllwned its place in the postcard or the photo. rollowing a double
the p3$t? How 15 t:he pa61 wnstituri!!d 4$ past? Delcu:r.e pnxeed1 to find th~ In<1Vement Qf tibcmrlon and captur«, «(;2 68-)
problem in NieUllChe. ProWlt and Freud, l3mOng othen;. But as we have seen,
Derpon ~ the phOOsopher who 8CJC1l, into the qtrelldon of the ~n of the Dc!'lewe presenn this argument a number of timN, and a detailed anal~ {}f
plMt and pr~ in most detail. hili varioua presenatarlons would be de&ir:t.ble, but (:atmot bt! made here. n The
It is not enough, he chatge:l, to say Ihar. the past ill con&kuted as such aftIlr a .metaphor of the photograph ill helpfuL th('IUgb, It is a5 if a phorograpb is
new prl!:Sl.'nt has taken its place. as then thf' $Cope of that p:;ut would be 'l:2ken by memory. :l luminous imprint of real1ty, WhOfe oontent can only be
re:luic(~d to what it sipilled for the: following present: ~ d and interpreted later. EvetUll can happen which will h<l'le 6ignifK:ance
fm-U& at~ point in the Wt:lJ:re, but Me ar~ tlftl:~of this significance- in
rn
:\a;oroing to the point oCviewin \ldtich L:un placed. Qr the centre inle1:eSt and direcdy afur me prel!ent. Nevertfl.elc§, the event ha.s happened. and that
which I ("boose. I dividI: ~~rday differently. dilK:overing 5e'\'erai 'rery diffier- it 1ulppmMl will haunt US '!'then we realize later what it meant. Somet:ime$ a
ent llene5 of situations or stati!:$ in it. ... Scores of ~ of ~g are magnifyin, gJas.i will be 1ll!!eesaaJ."Y in Qrder to dilw::ern the ligns of future fate
polll!.ible, no spten1 correspond! with joinl.'J of reality- What right nave we. in die phot:.ogr;lph. BlJt, liIfrer l:he ~t, we :ar~ condemJmt to ~ these
then. to suppose that memory cht'lOla one particular system, or that it pb~5 for t.n\Ces of an uncomcioos fine of fau:, MUch has. only become
~ ~icalli.fe into definite perl~ and awaim the end of each period c~ later, when it • too fate. In hts first article on Berpon, Deleuu
in order '(0 ro.I~ up it'$ ilCC(>Unts "¥rim perception? (~rgson 19(18; 129) lll:Utes expUdt the role of the ~ in the constitution oftbe past: 'If the
past had to wai" to bt! no more, it it ~e nor immediately and bencefunh pa!It.
Now, be<::allk the <:OIttent of each pm5CIlt cannot .imply be dellmlled as soon "'1Jtssi In gencra.r. it would fW!!'Vef ~ ,a'bte to ~ome what it is., it would ~
at; the moment hall P~, and beaw.se it :InUit remain open fIX £Utur-e rein- be ,tw pa;IL Th~ Pll;,\l is there'fure the in-iuel( the tb'iconfll::ioU$, or more
terpretation whlle nOI ce-iiI.1Iing (0 be identified as tMt pa$t, _ are forced to prcclJely, as IkrgllOn flaYS> the 'l1frtuaf (Dl 29).
<llISume that th~ put is wmehow formed 'alongdde' the presmt. Bergson'$ gel'gson'& modd ~ma to be a kind of geneI7!lilll'Jd model ofN~1rIft
paratioxical rewlution. according to Deleuze. is thai '00 ~nt ~ t:'l'tr or •deUrred action'. rooted ill the comtitucion of t.i.me itJelt', Freud tllIDed to
p~ 'WeI:'eit fiQt past Mat ~ lIaIDe ume" » it u. present .. _'1"be past is con~m the mode) of trauma in order to undemand why it Wti ~ representati.onll
poran«,iUS with. the pretent that it 'C»fl$' (DIlSi}. Or as l\erp;!n b.imleH puts it: in particular which were r~ into me unrnn...4cious. 'If fll} ~ experi-
ence oc:curs during the period of ~ immaturity and the memory of it is
arolllled during or lifter maturity, then the memory will h:l\'e 3 b.r stronger 'direct or ~lldentalpr~wionof~·. Deja w thus t~ to a lruth
e.xcit.:lwry etieet than W ~enee did at the time it h~ed; and thi$ i5 at the ~dentalle'ilel:that 'each pre.ent goe:lJ bad to itll'elf tor returns to
~ in the- me:mt:irD.e puberty has lmmefl$ety it}~d the capacity of the iuelf'j M past- (B 59).
sexualapparatDldor reaction' (SE~: Hi7). 111:..., infantile 1lex:wU ttamna had a l)e.le\Ue goes on Hi suggest that the experience of deji w II in £aA:[ one C1f
'deferred etfect\ beQus.e at W t:ime of the t:nlUJ:na. teXUa.tity W3i In an W'lde- the coodiUotUl £or the enletgeJlce of aut:Ol:lOUlOUS ~ Like He~L
veJcped form, lIO the ~ significance of the event was not und.e.,(t!Od; but Deleuze Goa nnt believe that thought ill IOII)ethm.a
nan.wral or proper to
()l1ce puberq had been patQed. th~ m~eet belatedly 11".aIiz.es the .dicance human bein~ rather somethinl must lint force us fA) thto.k. Fint lID intemive
of me memory. and now beeo.roe; bellieged by a meIDOry it ill powerleu to diiferenCe u llefll!ed wt.W:b 'move'il the llOul. "perplexes" It - in other ~
alm:aCL freud 'W33 rotced to abwtdon this model fur a white OllCC.e he bad forc.es it. w po&e a ~m' (DR ).40). An intetUlive dlR'Shold:ill ~ and
begun w affinD the existence of in&ntite kXI.IaHty, which undel"l'Dined it:; Vtoe cannot appeal to p~experlenc~whelp decipber it. becauee a'OSII&nt
nevertheles., it retl.It'm in the caM of the ~ Man, wiIh me Ckdipl..l$ oompla the tbredlold takes u.s beyond habitual ~ of $en&lltioo, 9ut be<:au.",
as the mediating conduct« u.t ll.1l0W5 the deferred ~t to ~ a more there are no~"a1 metnQI'ietI or COIl£e:pU lA) help UlI. De1euze ~ that
powerful alfet:t. What b tuiking about Bergscm'$ genera.liled model of what happens ilnl is that we are thrown bal:k on the -very ground ofour ability
deferred action is that the requirement for a. spedfk mediaUng conductor to svnthe1iize experience: the pure past. The pure past pressa in on ~ ~
appears to ~i!lh, 8ecawe Berpoo has no au to g.rbul for aay specific aet» of cognl;tive lndetennim.cy,. There is thw an im.ttledi:ate tendency CO ideruify
logical agent in ~o1ogy(1l'l:lCh as ~ y in Freud), in effect he 00et problems Of questkIM 'with singullr objta.s of 11 ~ndental Memory' (DR
nOt ne~d an account of hQW specific e\.-enu U'IlJme a belated tolticlty, The 140),
comparison ~ith NQt;~ Ii thw u1~ m1s1eadmg. For ~n, Dc:koNze suggcm dw Platonic :mamneMll. or recoUection might have its tr'3.D.
psychoparholosY annot be ex:~d on the basil of the deferred a.et::i(IQ of !Cen4enw groWld here. In the A.frM, PlaiD ~IS that what. ill deJ<rlbed WI
particular eiilrly events. Although hilil colleague Janet will ~ the role of '1e:aming' it reallr the recollection of IruW that have been fi:Jrgottm, becaUM:
actUal traumatic events., (in line with th~ eariv Freud. of the 'seduction theory'. one em neither learn what one already knO'i!llJ, nof' learn what one dod not
bUt withOUt his restriction tn~ trauma), the ~ oft.rauro.a iI. rooted already know (b" how ec.ndd one recognize ill ~ or even know \\'hat if)
in the ensuing diidoadon in the temporal. stl.'UCtUre of th~ mind.I~,even look C{n?'). Knowing i& Wrd"ore recQlle<:1ion, lnllOfar all me eternal Ide~ are
if there is no actual trauma, lhere is. a pathological oriencuion built into the only partiaDy figured .in my empirieaf ~ we ent.'OunW. rh.e P'ta~ expe-
.~tu:re of temporality. Rerpon inttDd~ a theory of ~'IWW which rience of knowing' must be somewhat akin to an experience of deja. vu. The
J)ele~ take, up all the' fuundaIion [or II lbeory of th¢ a.utonomOlJll p4Pws of Ftatonl.st will. experience their own cognil:i~ a£tMty as a reconecbWl of a
the mind: 'a p.1lhology of repelilion' (DR 290). previous. (onte:m~ Qf an ~ Ide-.I, DelelJ.te is ~ting that tltiJ
The pure layer of the past must iu.elf be immediately 'furgotttm' all the Platonizlng moment it in fAa a. necessary detour in the morement dw goet
needs of the present are entirely p~l:k. In the abon term, we ot'tly need itom inten!ity to thought- We think: I ~ ~ hmtlwJtn, but I can't ~member
to nmlember what is of immediate use in the lubsequent tnotnenf.l, Under when, it's OUt of reach . _ What Deleum calls a 'transcendental memory" now
~onnar drCW'lWlmces, theTdbre, till., 'double imctiptiQn' of'fl3lK and pr~nt emeraes, preei:ldy because orthe $l'nleture of thot ~on of the p!iStJUil
tt not experienl:\:'d as lltKh, because our attetuinn is directed ~ the outlined:
Cwure. But if this fatter condition is ~ded (due to &ilu:re6 in attending to
the present), then:a ce.rWn, par.ut0XlCid 'ntemOr'V oftbe prescot' takes place: 'tramcendental memory ... grasps that tdUch &om the ootlld can only be
dliji ~, We ~x.perlence this present a. ak~ f>4Jt (Bergson 1008). Th!:ja VI.l, recalled, even the first rtm.e: Dol a contingent past. but. the being 01 the put
Betpon ~ only makes ~ if we ~ that the past is coratiwted all all lI'UCh lind tIw: pav. of every tnne. In mil mmne!', the f~n t.bing
past at. the lIRI'ne lime a& the praerlL The Berponian notion of c:ieji vu appeiV5 in penon t£l. the nwemory whkh essentially apprebend.ll it. It doet
provides Deletu.e with a para.di~ e.u.m:ple of'traslKmdema.1 empiricism'. not address memoty ~Ut addreuing the forgetting witlnn mellwry. 1."be
1ran.scendenWJy spealing, 'our actuaJ ~nee •.. whilst it i& UllmUed m memorandum here is hom unrememberable and immemorial ForpttlnC is
lime, dut>1k:.a.t.a itself aD along with a \'iI'n.lal e:Urence. a miI':ror-lmage. Every nO longer il corningent Incaparity separating US ftom a memory ~ is
momem of our life prell!nG two upetts. it U attual and virtual. perception on itself contil'l:goent: it exiII!!I- within efteflCial meJnm;r :as. though if: 'Ne1'\e the 'nth'
the onc side .and memory on the Other. Each moment oflife is split up all and ~r of snemory with regani to ib own limit or to dw: which em only be
when it ill pcilli~ Or rather, it (;onsJsl$ in this very Iplinhlg' (Berpon 1908: f~(ORI4())
1M). .But if the fu~ted direction of a>gnition iII~, 'we can
be<'A)IDe ronlldous of mil duplkating', <md experience what Delftaze ~alls a
Ddeuu and 1M Cfnromcious
Thii recoliecriYe moment ~ the ~ from intenlllty to thought Tet3.tn$-it no longer a funf;uon of the pilf{, bw. a function of tht' future. It ill n6t UK>
5t.rO-;g power ovet' the S~ect of the ~trental experience. It is alwa.}'!\ 1'nemQt)' of sensibility, but of thewill It is not the memory of ~ bur of
possible dIal one can gel stud at the sLagt! of recollet:tion. and not mak~ dIe words. It is the faculty of promllJing, commiunent w the futu.re, ~mory of
m~~ to thQught..Kif.~d's entire contribution to the theory of T~petitiOI1 the future itself. Remt'Illber the promise that bai been made is not recalling
a.nses. from the diagn~ of probkml internal to it Me of mcnwrv or remmis- that it was made at a panicu1ar past :montent. but that une mWlt hold to It at
«!1KL. '
a future moment This is p~~ty the se1ectM: o~ of culture; forming It
man ea.pable of promising aJ'ld thus of making me of the future, a free and
powerful man. (NP 1M)
1'he neurotic, it would seem, i5 the one wbo remahu unable to tum the passive
memory iruo an 'active' memory. De1ew'.e :makes it dear that be does not
believe that this symptom of ~'11Iimlem~ as me necessary result of an
external ll3Wna. 'Th~re ill DO need fuI' him. to have experienced an ~
exciwion. Thill may happen, but it is not nccc:saary' (NP 115). 'Thill appem to
~ the di,tinaion betweell ~ man of ~ and the ~gn indi·
vidual a matter of constitution. One eith~r 'suffe~ from re_~ences' or O'ne
can 'attively forget' .
acknowledge
of haragos
in Fig her
The as played
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12 recognition afternoon
linear
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Grant Resolute
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in vivid he
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POVERTY grows I
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Literary
of one
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484
tattle only
fels■bbséggel
experience of technical
the it the
being
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father
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bulwark
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lordship
swore in
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seems
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was
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and a
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like old
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saying prohibitions
This following
it
prattle go
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as progress
Master endured
have
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by not
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the
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concentrated pondered flashed
father tremulous in
aa
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