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God, Mind and Knowledge
The British Society for the
Philosophy of Religion Series
Series Editor:
Harriet A. Harris, University of Edinburgh, UK
Editorial Board:
Robin Le Poidevin
Andrew Moore
Yujin Nagasawa
Christopher Hamilton
Oliver Crisp
John Taylor
John Cottingham
Brian Leftow
Richard Swinburne
Roger Trigg
Andrew Moore
Regent’s Park College, University of Oxford, UK
© Andrew Moore 2014
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
Andrew Moore has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988,
to be identified as the editor of this work.
Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company
Wey Court East 110 Cherry Street
Union Road Suite 3-1
Farnham Burlington, VT 05401-3818
Surrey, GU9 7PT USA
England
www.ashgate.com
III
Contents
Acknowledgements vii
Contributors ix
Foreword xi
Afterword 187
Index189
Acknowledgements
This book has its origins in a conference organized by the British Society for the
Philosophy of Religion, and most of the chapters it contains are descended from
papers given at it. I am grateful to the contributors for their help in the preparation
of the book, and to Harriet Harris – the BSPR Series Editor – and Robin Le Poidevin
for their help and advice at various stages in its gestation. It has been a pleasure to
work with Sarah Lloyd and David Shervington of Ashgate, and thanks are owing
to them for their encouragement, patience and unfailing helpfulness.
AJM
This page has been left blank intentionally
Contributors
James K. Dew, Jr is the Dean of the College and Associate Professor of the
History of Ideas and Philosophy at Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary.
Anthony Kenny was Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Balliol College Oxford,
of which he then became Master from 1978–89. Later he was President of the
British Academy and Chairman of the British Library. He is the author of some
40 books, mainly on Philosophy.
Andrew Moore is a Fellow of the Oxford Centre for Christianity and Culture,
Regent’s Park College, University of Oxford. He has published widely on topics
on the borderlands of theology and philosophy.
In The Family Reunion T.S. Eliot had his Chorus declare that ‘the circle of our
understanding is a very restricted area. Except for a limited number of strictly
practical purposes we do not know what we are doing; and even, when you
think of it, we do not know much about thinking’. This acknowledgement of
our own ignorance of ‘what is happening outside the circle, and what is the
meaning of happening’ lies at the core of much traditional philosophy – and also
much traditional religion. Philosophy begins in Wonder – in puzzlement, and
amazement. The philosophically inclined find even familiar things very puzzling:
why is there anything at all, and why does it seem to change so quickly; how
do we tell how others feel and think, and why do we suppose that there is a
world beyond our own brief life (whether that world is the one described by
astronomers and palaeontologists, or the one imagined into being by poets and
priests)? Should we, could we, manage to remember that much larger world
even when dealing with everyday affairs (our health and wealth and reputation)?
Maybe, like Eliot’s Chorus, we could be content to ‘understand the ordinary
business of living’ if only those other matters did not keep intruding: ‘we can
usually avoid accidents, we are insured against fire, against larceny and illness,
against defective plumbing, but not against the act of God’, the moment when we
don’t know what to think or do.
The wonder in which Philosophy begins is not just puzzlement: it is also Awe.
Whether or not we find that Awe itself a puzzle, we can acknowledge that it is
a fact: we can be awed by natural beauties, far distances and long ages, really
bizarre occurrences, as well as by unusual courage, self-sacrificial generosity,
delicate engineering and the sound of trumpets. Wonder, amazement, worship is
the root both of Religion and of Science: the impulse to fall silent and admire as
well as the impulse to interrogate and comprehend. How much more marvellous
things seem when we have begun at least to wish to understand them rather than
letting them slip by unnoticed. We seek to understand not merely to get rid of a
nagging puzzlement that things are the way they are (whatever way that is), but
to draw closer to reality. Athenians were wrong to think that Socrates and his
elenchus were destructive of proper piety, of reverence, of the love of beauty.
On the contrary, by revealing our own ignorance and confusion Socrates was
showing the right way: ‘where both the truth and our human teacher (whether that
is Parmenides or Plato) are our friends, true piety is to prefer the truth’, even if
the truth is that we are at a loss.
Any gathering of philosophers, like any gathering of believers, will be filled
with disagreements, mutual confusions, even fierce attacks on error. Only so, it
xii God, Mind and Knowledge
seems, are we ever likely to get clearer even about our own beliefs, let alone about
the world made up of truths (whether those truths are only our mortal opinions or
an eternal vision). A gathering of philosophers (of many different traditions) that
is also a gathering of believers (of many different sects, including the atheistical)
will be yet more argumentative. No single collection of papers will ever fully
reflect the lived reality of such a meeting, but it may still serve to amuse, instruct,
provoke and even perhaps enlighten. Long may the Society – a gathering of
philosophers and theologians, believers and unbelievers – flourish.
Stephen R. L. Clark
President, British Society for the Philosophy of Religion, 2011–13
Chapter 1
God, Mind and Knowledge in Contemporary
Philosophy of Religion
Andrew Moore
1
See, for example, the essays by the atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel in his Secular
Philosophy and the Religious Temperament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
2 God, Mind and Knowledge
Twenty years ago it would have been virtually inconceivable that major funding
for research in religious epistemology would have been offered to, let alone
accepted by, any leading university. But as at least one major British example
illustrates, things are different now and this change of climate is reflected in the
range of topics covered by the first section of the book. John Cottingham proposes
‘a new kind of religious epistemology’ that is based on a fresh understanding of
what kinds of experience are religiously relevant, and in arguing for it he takes up
some arguments of Pascal.2 Cottingham’s argument differs from the two widely
canvassed approaches of reliabilist (or externalist) and internalist epistemologies.
Whereas reliabilist epistemologies hold that for a belief to be warranted it must
have been formed in a reliable way, internalists argue that for a person to be
justified in holding a belief he or she needs to be aware that that belief is justified.
Taking the former route, Reformed epistemology was developed by a group of
philosophers who are in the Reformed tradition of the Christian church – that
is, those Protestant churches particularly influenced by John Calvin.3 It is based
upon human experience but the kind of experiences which ground Reformed
epistemology are clearly identifiable as ‘religious’: a sense of guilt before God, an
awareness that God is speaking to me when I read the Bible, a spontaneous outburst
of praise to God for the beauty of creation. By contrast, Cottingham argues for a
religious epistemology based on experiences that are less clearly identifiable as
obviously or specifically religious.
Reliabilist accounts of religious belief such as Plantinga’s face several well-
known problems (and some new ones developed in this book), not the least of
which is the question, pressed by Richard Swinburne, as to ‘whether [religious
belief] is probably true, given our evidence’.4 Swinburne rejects reliabilist religious
epistemology in favour of internalism because he believes that only its arguments
can meet our epistemic obligations to provide objective evidence which shows
that the belief that God exists is probably true. Given our background knowledge
and the available evidence, the hypothesis that God exists has greater probability
than the hypothesis that he doesn’t. So the existence of God is the best explanation
of the data of human experience.
This is where Cottingham’s distinctive understanding of God comes in. He
does not think that human beings are capable of speculating about the cause of
the cosmos so as to arrive at a quasi-scientific explanation of it. And, he observes,
the Bible sees God’s identity as the Creator as inseparable from a reciprocal moral
obligation under which creatures are placed. So knowledge of God will require
2
Below, p. 21.
3
The key work is Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds), Faith and
Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University
Press, 1983).
4
Richard Swinburne, ‘Plantinga on Warrant’ in Religious Studies 37 (2001), p. 207.
God, Mind and Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion 3
paying attention to our sense that life has, or ought to have, meaning and moral
purpose: ‘the divine call is chiefly heard as a moral and practical as opposed to
a theoretical or purely cognitive one’.5 To consider religious epistemology as a
matter of ‘objective evidence’ – as Cottingham’s title puts it – is too restrictive.
Instead, Cottingham argues that signs of God’s existence are be related to
God’s saving purposes – though we should not expect these signs to be too evident,
otherwise they might restrict human freedom. Such signs occur, Cottingham
argues, where we have an experience in which we seem to have gained epistemic
access to something ourselves and yet which also seems to depend on some
‘gracious bestowal’.6 These are moments where our ordinary experience is
intensified and where we glimpse a pattern to life that transcends us and is not
of our own making. Such experiences may occur through natural beauty, music
or awareness of a moral demand upon us. They may be taken by the believer
to be revelations of God but they are not non-natural, and their occurrence does
not entail our having any special religious faculty or sense apparatus – such as
Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis. These are ‘natural intimations of the transcendent’,
‘natural glimpses of the divine’.7
These experiences have common features with some other kinds of
knowledge – the knowledge that arises from being in love, from participating in
psychoanalysis, or from the appreciation of poetry: they have a self-involving
character. It distorts these kinds of experience to see them primarily as evidential
for they require a vulnerability and a receptiveness on the part of the one who
has them – a willingness to be changed, even. And this means that despite their
natural character, it belongs to these experiences that ‘relevant evidence [of God’s
existence] is available only to insiders in the form of the personal transformation
they themselves experience’.8 Such experiences as these convey a knowledge that
is only available to insiders, but the ‘insider information’ they carry is not the
exclusive possession of a privileged club for it is available in principle to all as
‘part of our ordinary natural human heritage’.9
One objection that it would be hard to lodge against Cottingham’s argument is
that it struggles to give an account of the value of knowledge. Although questions
could be asked about whether the value that we find in such experiences as
Cottingham discusses is inferred, or whether their value lies on the face (as it
were) of the experiences (as it seems to in the cases Taliaferro discusses in his
chapter), since his argument and the experiences he discusses are clearly based
on a Christian conception of God as the one who gives meaning and value to life,
and since the experiences themselves are of life’s having meaning and value, the
knowledge that results from these experiences clearly has value.
5
Below, p. 20.
6
Below, p. 27.
7
Below, p. 29.
8
Below, p. 25.
9
See below, p. 31.
4 God, Mind and Knowledge
10
See Alvin Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’ in Alvin Plantinga and
Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds), Faith and Rationality, pp. 16–93.
God, Mind and Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion 5
them as being genuinely of God. But Charles Taliaferro presents some fresh
arguments for an attitude of ‘critical trust’ towards such experiences. They should
not be accepted uncritically but neither should they be rejected; rather, we should
be – like the Cambridge Platonists – open to the possibility of experience of
the divine as being ‘natural and good’. Also, Taliaferro argues, a priori concepts
of what God can or cannot do, or of what it is fitting for God to do or refrain
from doing, seem to beg the question. But perhaps the one who is disposed to
accept religious experiences as veridical is mistaken to do so, not because the
experiences are, like miracles, a priori massively unlikely or because they entail
implausible concepts of deity, but because the knowledge (or true belief) the one
who has the experience claims to possess is exclusive to him or her and to other
believers. For this reason, Anthony Kenny has argued that a proper intellectual
humility requires us to be agnostic about religious experience, but in his final
section, Taliaferro argues against this view. And even if the believer is warranted
in not adopting the agnostic stance Kenny commends, it does not follow that
he or she is constrained to take pride in the experience or to see it as a personal
achievement.
Taliaferro argues that there is good reason to adopt a stance of ‘critical trust’
towards religious experience, and in doing so he provides an example of the
influence wielded in contemporary philosophy of religion by the evidentialist
objection to religious belief. One – perhaps the – classic version of this objection
in twentieth-century philosophy of religion is posed by Antony Flew in his
contribution to a famous symposium on ‘Theology and Falsification’ that was
published in an anthology which laid the foundation for much subsequent debate.
Influenced by Logical Positivism and Karl Popper, Flew thought that if the content
of a belief is meaningful it must be possible to show what could falsify it – what
would count as evidence against the belief. So he challenges the believer to come
up with some evidence which could falsify religious belief (and hence show that
religious language is meaningful):
Just what would have to happen not merely (morally and wrongly) to tempt but
also (logically and rightly) to entitle us to say ‘God does not love us’ or even
‘God does not exist’? I … put to the succeeding symposiasts the simple central
questions, ‘What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you
a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God?’11
Taking this question and the responses offered to it at the symposium as his
starting point, Gabriel Citron challenges a consensus that underlies both
Reformed epistemology and the epistemology of those who accept that religious
belief must meet the evidentialist challenge. That consensus has assumed that
‘religious belief’ is a logically monolithic category, that it is characterised by a
11
Antony Flew in Antony Flew and Alasdair Macintyre (eds), New Essays in
Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955), p. 99.
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