PAPER

SPEECH ACTS AND INTENTIONALITY

This paper was written to fulfill the requirements of the English Semantic and Fragmatics
course.
Lecturer: Dr. Amin Basir, MA

Compiled by:

Nurmala Dewi (2281030087)

Widi Arta (2281030100)

Syifa Maulida Andawiyah (2281030102)

ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING DEPARTMENT - VI C

FACULTY OF EDUCATION AND TEACHER TRAINING

CYBER SYEKH NURJATI STATE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY CIREBON

2025

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 PREFACE

Praise be to Allah SWT, for it is by His grace that this paper has been successfully completed.
This report is prepared as part of the requirements for the English Semantic and Fragmatics
course. May peace and blessings be upon the Prophet Muhammad SAW, his family, his
companions, and all of us as his followers.

We would also like to express our sincere gratitude to all parties who contributed valuable data
and insights to this paper.

As human beings, we acknowledge our limitations, and we understand that this paper may still
be far from perfect. Therefore, we warmly welcome any constructive criticism and suggestions
for its improvement. We sincerely hope this paper will bring benefits to all readers.

Cirebon, June 9, 2025

The Authors

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 LIST OF CONTENT

PREFACE ........................................................................................................................... 2

LIST OF CONTENT .......................................................................................................... 3

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 4

A. BACKGROUND OF RESEARCH ........................................................................ 4

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .................................................................................... 5
C. AIMS OF THE STUDY ........................................................................................ 5

CHAPTER II: DISCUSSION ............................................................................................. 6

A. PERFORMATIVES AND CONSTATIVES .......................................................... 6

B. FELICITY CONDITIONS .................................................................................... 8
C. ILLOCUTIONS AND FORCE............................................................................... 9
D. CLASSIFICATION OF SPEECH ACT ................................................................. 13
E. INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS AND HISTORY OF SPEECH ACTS ..................... 15

CHAPTER III: CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 20

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 21

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 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND OF RESEARCH

Language is not only a medium for sharing facts or transferring information; it is also
a powerful tool for performing actions. In everyday life, people do more than speak, they act
through language. When someone says “Thank you,” “Sorry,” or “I promise,” they are not just
speaking, but doing something through their words. This understanding forms the basis of
speech act theory, which explores how language is used to carry out real-world actions, often
based on the speaker’s intention.

The idea of speech acts was first introduced by British philosopher J.L. Austin in his
1955 lecture series later published as How to Do Things with Words (1962). Austin argued that
not all utterances are used to describe reality. He made an important distinction between
constative utterances, which state facts and can be evaluated as true or false, and performative
utterances, which perform an action in the moment of speaking. For instance, the sentence “I
name this ship the Queen Elizabeth” is not describing something, but rather enacting the
naming itself. According to Austin, understanding this performative function of language
reveals how deeply language is connected to social behavior.

Austin also introduced the concept of felicity conditions that must be met for a speech
act to succeed. These include having the right context, appropriate participants, and proper
procedures. If any of these are missing, the speech act may be considered unsuccessful or
"infelicitous." For example, saying “I now pronounce you husband and wife” is only effective
when spoken by a person with legal authority during a wedding ceremony. This shows that
speech acts are not only about grammar or vocabulary, but also involve social rules and shared
understanding.

The work of American philosopher John Searle built upon Austin’s foundation by
offering a more systematic explanation of speech acts. Searle introduced the concepts of the
locutionary act (the actual utterance), the illocutionary act (the intended meaning or function),
and the perlocutionary act (the effect on the listener). His most notable contribution is the
classification of speech acts into five types: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives,

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and declarations. Each type represents a different communicative function and helps clarify
what the speaker is trying to achieve through language.

Another important part of speech act theory is the idea of indirect speech acts. In these
cases, the speaker’s intended meaning is different from the literal meaning of the words. For
example, when someone asks, “Can you pass the salt?”, they are not really questioning ability
but are politely requesting something. According to George Yule (1996), indirect speech acts
highlight the strategic nature of communication, especially in cultures where politeness and
indirectness are valued.

In today’s context, the theory of speech acts continues to be relevant across various
fields. In pragmatics, it helps explain how meaning is shaped by context and intention. In
language education, it supports teaching students how to use language appropriately. In cross-
cultural communication, it helps avoid misunderstandings. And in technology, especially
artificial intelligence, it guides machines in interpreting human intentions. Studying speech
acts, therefore, allows a deeper understanding of how language functions not only as a system
of symbols, but also as a means of action shaped by purpose and context.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the difference between performative and constative utterances in speech act
theory?
2. How do felicity conditions and illocutionary force help us understand the speaker's
intention?
3. How are indirect speech acts used in real communication, and what is their historical
background?

C. AIMS OF THE STUDY

1. To describe the concepts of performatives and constatives as introduced by J.L. Austin.

2. To explain how felicity conditions and illocutionary force influence successful
communication.
3. To explore the classification and function of indirect speech acts in various contexts,
along with their historical development.

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 CHAPTER II

DISCUSSION

A. PERFORMATIVES AND CONSTATIVES

J.L. Austin, a British philosopher, introduced the concept of performatives and

constatives as part of his speech act theory. At first, he believed that all utterances were
constatives sentences that describe a situation and can be judged as true or false. For example,
"It rained yesterday" is a constative sentence because it gives information that can be verified.

Later, Austin realized that some utterances do not describe facts, but actually perform
an action. These are called performatives. A performative sentence does something in the
moment of speaking. For example, when someone says, “I promise to come tomorrow,” they
are not just saying something they are making a promise. Another example is, “I now
pronounce you husband and wife,” which actually changes the social status of two people
during a wedding. These utterances are not about truth or falsehood, but about being successful
or unsuccessful (felicitous or infelicitous), depending on the context.

Austin also gave examples to show the difference:

Type Example Explanation

Performative “I promise to come The speaker is performing

tomorrow.” the act of making a promise.

Performative “I now declare you husband This utterance officially

and wife.” changes the status of two
people.

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 Constative “She is reading a book.” This sentence gives
information that can be true
or false.

Constative “It rained yesterday.” This is a factual statement

that can be verified.

Performative utterances usually include performative verbs like promise, apologize,

declare, or request. But they are only effective when spoken in the right context, by the right
person, and in a serious and proper way. For instance, “I fire you” is only performative if
spoken by a boss to an employee. If a child says the same thing, it has no real effect, so the act
fails—it is considered infelicitous.

Austin explained that for a performative to be successful, certain conditions must be met:

● There must be an accepted social procedure.

● The speaker must have the authority to say it.
● The speaker must be sincere and serious.

For example, if a judge says, “I sentence you to five years in prison,” it is a valid
performative act because all the conditions are met. But if a regular person says the same thing,
the utterance fails because the speaker does not have the authority.

Over time, Austin realized that even constative utterances can have performative
functions, which led him to develop a broader classification of speech acts. He introduced:

● Locutionary act: the basic act of producing a sentence.

● Illocutionary act: the speaker’s intention behind the utterance (such as warning,
promising, or requesting).
● Perlocutionary act: the effect the utterance has on the listener (such as persuading or
frightening).

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 Although his initial division between performatives and constatives was later expanded,
it remains an important foundation in understanding how people use language to do things, not
just to talk about things.

B. FELICITY CONDITIONS IN SPEECH ACT THEORY

Felicity conditions are the rules that must be met for a performative utterance to be
successful, or felicitous, rather than failing, or infelicitous. Introduced by J.L. Austin, these
conditions make sure that a speech act (like promising, apologizing, or declaring) is valid and
really does what it intends to do.

There are three main felicity conditions:

1. Conventionality of Procedure

The speech act has to follow a social or official rule. For example, saying “I now
pronounce you married” only works during a wedding ceremony performed by
someone who has the authority, like a priest or a judge.

2. Appropriate Participants and Circumstances

The person speaking must have the right authority to perform the act, and the situation
must be proper. For example, a judge can say, “I sentence you to five years,” but a
normal person cannot do the same and have it count.

3. Complete Execution

The speech act must be done correctly and sincerely. If someone says, “I promise to
help you,” but does not mean it, then the promise fails it is infelicitous.

Here are some examples of when performative acts succeed or fail:

Scenario Successful Failed (Infelicitous) Reason for Failure

(Felicitous)

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 Marriage A priest says, “I A child says, “I No authority
Pronouncement pronounce you pronounce you
married.” married.”

Promising “I swear to tell the “I swear to eat Not a serious or

truth.” (in court) pizza.” (casually) proper oath

Apologizing “I sincerely “I apologize” (while Insincerity

apologize for my laughing)
mistake.”

Naming a Ship Queen names a ship A tourist smashes a No permission or

with champagne bottle to name it authority

Austin also divided failures into two types:

● Misfires: The speech act does not happen because the rules or authority are missing.
For example, a fake officer “arresting” someone.
● Abuses: The speech act happens but is insincere or wrong, like lying or joking. For
example, saying “I promise” without meaning it.

Felicity conditions make sure that speech acts are valid, serious, and meaningful.
Without them, speech acts do not work as intended. This shows how important context,
authority, and honesty are in communication.

C. ILLOCUTION AND ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE

1. Introduction: Positioning Illocution in Speech Act Theory

In speech act theory, language is not merely seen as a tool for conveying information
(descriptive), but also as a means of performing actions (performative). This idea was first
introduced by British philosopher J. L. Austin in his seminal work How to Do Things with

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Words (1962). He argued that when someone speaks, they are not merely forming grammatical
sentences but also performing an action, such as giving a command, making a promise,
warning, or declaring.

Austin divided speech acts into three categories:

1. Locutionary act – the act of producing sounds, words, or sentences with literal meaning;
2. Illocutionary act – the act performed in saying something, such as promising,
requesting, or declaring;
3. Perlocutionary act – the effect or result that the utterance has on the listener, such as
persuading, frightening, or hurting.

Among the three, the illocutionary act is considered the core of communication, as it
directly relates to the speaker’s social intent and pragmatic purpose.

2. Definition of Illocution: The Action Behind the Utterance

Illocution refers to the action performed through an utterance by the speaker. It is not
simply about conveying information, but doing something socially and intentionally through
language. For example, when someone says, “I swear to tell the truth,” the speaker is not only
stating something, but actually performing the act of swearing this is the illocutionary act.

According to John Searle (1969, 1979), an illocutionary act is valid when it fulfills
several conventional conditions, such as:

● The speaker has the intention to perform the act;

● The hearer recognizes the speaker’s intention;
● The utterance follows certain social or institutional norms.

For instance, only someone with authority can validly say “I now pronounce you
husband and wife” with the declarative force of a formal act.

3. Illocutionary Force: The Social Strength of an Utterance

Illocutionary force refers to the type and strength of the social act embedded in an
utterance. It encompasses:

● What the speaker intends to accomplish through the utterance;

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 ● How the utterance is framed linguistically (sentence structure, intonation, modality);
● The social context and the relationship between speaker and hearer.

In Searle’s framework, each illocutionary act carries a particular force that distinguishes
one type of act from another:

● Ordering vs. suggesting vs. warning → all may use imperative sentences, but have
different illocutionary forces.

Force-indicating devices (FID) such as performative verbs (promise, warn), modals

(must, may, should), and intonation, are crucial in identifying illocutionary force.

Example:

● “You must study harder.”

Force = directive (command/strong advice)

● “You could study harder.”

Force = suggestion

The difference in illocutionary force often lies not in grammar alone, but in intention
and context.

4. Comparative Analysis Table

Utterance Sentence Form Illocution Illocutionary Force

“I promise I’ll come.” Declarative Promising Commissive

“Please close the door.” Imperative Requesting Declarative (request)

“I thank you.” Declarative Expressing gratitude Expressive

“I declare this meeting Declarative Declaring Declarative

closed.”

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5. Illocution and Intentionality

Speech act theory is inseparable from the concept of intentionality, because an

illocution can only occur if the speaker has a deliberate intention to perform a social act through
the utterance. This means:

● Without intentionality, there is no illocution.

● Illocution is not merely linguistic, but also mental and social.

John Searle (1983) emphasized that intentionality is not merely about conscious desire,
but also about the direction of mental states toward the world. For instance, the speaker may
want the listener to accept, act upon, or respond to the act.

Example:

● “Please don’t go.” → The speaker intentionally wants the listener to stay
(intentionality), and performs a request (illocution).

Thus, illocutionary force arises not only from sentence form but also from the speaker’s
communicative intent recognized in a given social context.

6. The Role of Context and Interpretation

Because illocution heavily relies on context and interpretation, two identical utterances
may carry different illocutionary forces depending on who says it, to whom, in what situation,
and with what intention.

Example:

● “That’s the door.”

Could be: a factual statement (representative), an indirect request (directive), or even

sarcasm (expressive), depending on context and tone.

This demonstrates that pragmatic competence is crucial to interpret illocution

accurately, especially in cross-cultural communication or second language learning (e.g., EFL
contexts).

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Illocution and illocutionary force are central aspects of speech acts that bring together linguistic
form, social meaning, and speaker intention in a single communicative act. Through illocution,
speakers not only say something but also do something whether commanding, praising,
threatening, stating, or promising. The force of an illocution depends on linguistic devices,
intentionality, and social context. In both pragmatic theory and functional linguistics,
understanding illocution is essential to grasp how language actually operates in real-life
communication.

D. CLASSIFICATION OF SPEECH ACTS

Classification of speech acts is one of the fundamental aspects in the study of

pragmatics, attempting to organize and understand the various functions that utterances can
carry out in human communication. This classification effort not only helps us in analyzing the
pragmatic structure of language, but also in understanding how speakers use language to
achieve certain communicative goals. Since Austin and Searle introduced the concept of speech
acts, various classification schemes have been proposed, each with a different focus and
nuance.

One of the most influential classifications is that proposed by John Searle, who
identified five general categories of speech acts based on their illocutionary force. Searle's
classification includes:

1. Representatives: Speech acts that aim to describe the state of the world, such as stating,
claiming, reporting, or inferring. The speaker commits to the truth of the proposition
expressed.

2. Directives: Speech acts that aim to make the listener do something, such as requesting,
commanding, suggesting, or inviting. The speaker is trying to make the expressed action
happen.

3. Commissives: Speech acts that commit the speaker to a future action, such as
promising, swearing, offering, or threatening. The speaker commits to a future action.

4. Expressives: Speech acts that express the speaker's psychological state, such as
apologizing, thanking, congratulating, or mourning. The focus is on the expression of the
speaker's feelings or attitudes.

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 5. Declarative (Declarations): Speech acts that change the state of affairs in the world
through the utterance itself, such as firing, marrying, baptizing, or declaring war. To be
successful, declarations usually require extra-linguistic institutions.

However, speech act classification does not stop at Searle's scheme. As Kissine (2013)
notes, “the question of speech act classification has been controversial ever since Austin.”
Various researchers have observed that the complexity of human communication often
transcends rigid categories. For example, Marineau et al. (2000) in their study of tutorial
dialogs, found the need to classify speech acts in interactive contexts, which included
categories such as “prompts”, ‘hints’, or “evaluations”, suggesting that classification can be
highly dependent on the domain and purpose of analysis.

Capone (2006) also highlights the complexity of defining and classifying speech acts,
emphasizing that “speech act classifications have often run into definitional problems due to
the fuzzy boundaries between categories and the context-dependent nature of their realization.”
This suggests that the boundaries between categories are often fuzzy and that the realization of
speech acts is highly dependent on the context of the utterance.

Furthermore, Croft (2002) brings a typological perspective of language and cognition

to the discussion of speech act classification, pointing out that “cross-linguistic variation in the
realization of speech acts suggests that a universal classification system may be difficult to
create without considering cognitive and cultural factors.” This implies that speech act
classification is not just a purely linguistic issue, but is also tied to how language interacts with
human cognition and cultural variation. The existence of speech acts is not always universally
manifested in the same form in every language, which adds to the challenge of creating a
comprehensive classification system.

In short, while Searle's classification offers a strong framework for understanding the
basic functions of speech, further research has shown the need for flexibility and adaptation in
classifying speech acts, especially when considering specific contexts, pragmatic nuances, and
differences across languages and cultures. The classification of speech acts is an ongoing effort
to map the rich and dynamic landscape of communicative functions of language.

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E. INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. Indirect Speech
a. Definition

An indirect speech act happens when the speaker says something that seems to have
one meaning on the surface, but actually has a different, deeper intention. In other words, the
form of the sentence does not directly match the intended function. Listeners must infer the
speaker’s real purpose by using context, knowledge of the situation, and social conventions.

Example 1: Request

● Utterance: “Can you close the window?”

● Surface meaning: A question about the listener’s ability.
● Real meaning: A polite request to close the window.

Example 2: Suggestion

● Utterance: “It's getting late.”

● Surface meaning: A simple statement.
● Real meaning: A suggestion to leave or finish an activity.

b. Why Use Indirect Speech Acts?

Speakers often choose indirect forms for politeness or to reduce social pressure. Using
direct commands like “Give me that pen!” can sound rude or aggressive. By using indirect
forms like “Could I borrow your pen for a second?”, the speaker sounds more polite and
respectful.

Special Function:

● Politeness: Indirect speech helps soften requests or criticism.

● Face-saving: It helps maintain the speaker’s and hearer’s dignity (Brown & Levinson,
1987).
● Strategic communication: Indirectness can avoid conflict or allow flexibility in
conversation.

c. Structure of Indirect Speech Acts

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 According to Searle (1975), indirect speech acts contain two layers of meaning:

● Primary illocutionary act: The speaker’s real intention (e.g., making a request).
● Secondary illocutionary act: The literal meaning (e.g., asking a question).

Example:

“Do you know what time it is?”

● Literal meaning: A question about knowledge.

● Real intention: Asking for the time.

Listeners understand the intended meaning based on shared knowledge, social norms,
and context. This process is connected to Grice’s Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1975), where
speakers assume each other is being helpful and relevant.

2. The History of Speech Act Theory

Speech Act Theory is a key part of pragmatics, the study of meaning in context. It began
with the work of the British philosopher J.L. Austin and was later developed further by the
American philosopher John Searle. These two scholars showed that speaking is not only about
saying things, but also about doing things with words. Their work changed the way we
understand language in everyday life.

1) J.L. Austin (1911–1960)

J.L. Austin first introduced his ideas in a series of lectures at Oxford University, which
were later published in the book How to Do Things with Words (1962). He noticed that many
sentences are not used just to describe facts, but to perform actions. He called these
performative utterances.

Constantive vs Performative utterances

● Constative utterances are used to describe the world. They can be true or false.

Example: “The train leaves at 6 o’clock.”

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 This sentence simply gives information about the train. If the train leaves at that time,
the statement is true. If it doesn’t, it’s false.

● Performative utterances are used to perform an action by saying something.

Example: “I name this ship the Queen Mary.”

This is not just a statement. By saying it during a ceremony, the speaker is actually
naming the ship. The action happens through the words themselves.

Austin also introduced the idea that every time we speak, we perform three kinds of
acts at the same time:

a. Locutionary Act – The act of producing the words themselves.

Example: “It is cold in here.”

The speaker says a sentence that talks about the temperature.

Illocutionary Act – The intended function or meaning of the words (e.g., request, warning,
promise).

Example: “It is cold in here.”

Depending on the situation, this could be a request for someone to close the window or
turn on the heater.

Perlocutionary Act – The effect of the words on the listener.

Example: “It is cold in here.”

The listener might get up and shut the window, this is the effect of the speaker’s words.

2) John R. Searle (1932)

John Searle was a student of Austin who expanded and systematized Speech Act
Theory. In his book Speech Acts (1969), he focused on the rules behind speech acts and how
people understand meaning in context.

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 Searle agreed with Austin that language can be used to perform actions, but he added a
clear classification of speech acts based on their function. This classification helps us
understand the different purposes of communication.

Searle’s Five Categories of Speech Acts:

a. Assertives – The speaker expresses a belief about the world.

Example: “Water boils at 100 degrees Celsius.”

This is used to state a fact. The speaker is not asking or commanding, just sharing
information.

b. Directives – The speaker tries to get the listener to do something.

Example: “Could you please close the door?”

Although this is formed as a question, it functions as a request. The speaker wants the
listener to take action.

c. Commissives – The speaker commits to a future action.

Example: “I will finish the report by Friday.”

This is a promise. The speaker is saying what they plan to do in the future.

d. Expressives – The speaker shows their feelings or emotions.

Example: “I’m so sorry for your loss.”

This is used to express sympathy or emotion, not to share information or ask for action.

e. Declarations – The speaker changes a social reality with their words.

Example: “You are fired.”

If said by a boss to an employee, this sentence changes the employee’s job status
immediately. The words perform the action.

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 Searle also studied indirect speech acts in more detail. He explained that often the form
of an utterance is different from its function, and listeners must infer the speaker’s real
intention.

Example: “Can you pass the salt?”

On the surface, this is a yes/no question about ability. But in context like at the dinner
table, the real intention is a request.

Searle showed that we understand indirect speech acts because:

● We know the rules of conversation.

● We understand social context and politeness.
● We expect others to be cooperative in communication (based on Grice’s
principles).

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 CHAPTER III

CONCLUSION

This paper has taken an in-depth look at speech act theory, a fundamental framework in
pragmatics that argues that language serves not only as a tool for conveying information, but
also as a means for performing actions. Starting with J.L. Austin's contribution, we understand
the crucial distinction between constative utterances that describe facts and performatives that
directly carry out actions through the utterance itself. The concept of felicity conditions
introduced by Austin suggests that the success of a speech act depends heavily on contextual
appropriateness, speaker authority, and sincerity, highlighting the social and institutional
dimensions of communication.

John Searle's development of the theory further enriched our understanding by introducing the
concepts of illocution and illocutionary force as the core of communicative acts, where
utterances have specific social purposes and pragmatic goals. Searle's famous classification
dividing speech acts into five main categories-representative, directive, commissive,
expressive, and declarative-provides a systematic framework for analyzing various
communicative functions. However, it should be noted that this classification, as discussed in
the paper, has sometimes blurred boundaries and is highly context-dependent, and can vary
across languages and cultures.

In addition, the discussion of indirect speech acts highlights the complexity of human
communication where the speaker's intended meaning differs from the literal meaning of the
utterance. The use of indirect speech acts is often motivated by factors such as politeness and
communication strategies, allowing speakers to achieve their communicative goals more
subtly. This whole concept, from performatives to indirect speech acts, emphasizes that the
understanding of language lies not only in its linguistic structure, but also in speakers' intentions
and listeners' interpretations in a dynamic social context.

Ultimately, the study of speech acts is an ongoing effort to uncover how language functions as
a means of action and interaction in everyday life, and this understanding remains relevant in
areas ranging from pragmatics to language education to artificial intelligence. This paper
reiterates the importance of looking beyond the words themselves to understand the actions
and intentions behind utterances.

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