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The Policy Partnership Presidential Elections and
American Democracy 1st Edition Bruce Buchanan Digital
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Author(s): Bruce Buchanan
ISBN(s): 9780415947602, 0203516486
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 1.16 MB
Year: 2004
Language: english
THE POLICY PARTNERSHIP
Presidential Elections and American Democracy
Bruce Buchanan
ROUTLEDGE
NEW YORK AND LONDON
Published in 2004 by RoutledgeFalmer 29 W 35th Street New York, NY 10001
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data for this book is available from the Library of
Congress
References 107
Index 115
Preface
The presidency was neither designed nor expected to act in concert with the American
people. The Framers intended Congress to represent and express the popular will, but
those intentions were dashed, and the presidency democratized, by disputes over policy.
Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, moved by widespread public outrage at
perceived abuses of power, led mass movements that captured the executive and
legislative branches and as a result forced major changes in the presidency, electoral
politics, and national policy.
These developments also spawned a new and different kind of relationship between
the presidency and the people. Born of anger, rooted in policy, formalized by elections,
the relationship dates to 1800 but has been extended and elaborated in fits and starts, and
in ways large and small, ever since. The upshot is that contemporary presidents—still the
only nationally elected officials charged with protecting the broadest public interest—can
credibly echo Andrew Jackson’s original claim to be the direct representative of the
people.
The popular link behind that claim not only greatly increased the power of the
presidency, as is often pointed out; it also increased the potential for popular influence.
Ordinary citizens would, from time to time, have reason to think of themselves as
partners in joint ventures with presidents and therefore entitled to some voice in setting
the direction of national policy. Nor are the prospects for popular influence entirely
reliant on the voluntary beneficence of particular presidents. The electoral system gives
voters the leverage to influence policy. The need for votes forces candidates to respond
when public expectations are clear. That creates opportunities for policy understandings:
election to office in return for responsiveness to voter concerns. In the theory of
democracy, elections exist precisely to give citizens the means to compel leaders to
accommodate their interests. Those interests are served or thwarted by what government
does or does not do, which is a good working definition of policy. If voters cannot
influence what government does, then what is the point of democracy? That is why, in
the end, the central questions of democratic politics come down to the relationship
between popular electoral choices and public policy (Ginsberg 1976, 41).
In the real world of contemporary political practice, however, the design increasingly
leaks around the joints, diluting if not trumping the prospects for citizen influence.
Presidential candidates treat elections as power struggles, not as debates on the issues,
and that frequently clouds the policy implications of electoral choices. The fixed four-
year presidential term of office creates delays in accountability and gives presidents
freedom to act with limited fear of electoral reprisal for broken campaign promises or
unpopular decisions. The mass public rarely unites to demand presidential attention to
clear majority policy agendas. Much of the time, people are content to simply defer to the
policy guidance and leadership offered by the president and other leaders (Brody 1991;
Zaller 1992). To make matters worse, many potential voters are losing interest. The
decline of voter turnout in presidential elections since 1960 signals a growing public
indifference. As turnout has dropped, feelings of political obligation and citizen duty
have waned. Meanwhile, elected officials have grown more assertive. Researchers now
find evidence of “a decline in democratic responsiveness at the very top of American
national government” (Shapiro and Jacobs 2000, 2), and of elite dominance so pervasive
that the very idea of public influence on policy seems largely mythical (Dye 2001).
These developments suggest the need for taking stock. What has become of the policy
relationship potential created by presidential elections? To what degree do contemporary
candidates and presidents take into account voter policy wishes before and after
elections? What is the nature and extent of the influence that voter participation can have
on policy? What are the prospects for reversing the trends—increased citizen indifference
and decreased elite responsiveness—that diminish the chances for policy partnerships?
These are the questions addressed in this book.
My interest in such questions was inspired by the historic democratization of the
presidency that I just touched on, and by the idea of a special reciprocal relationship
between citizens and presidents that is sometimes associated with it (Buchanan 1987).
My interest was reinforced by an involvement in three large-scale studies of candidate,
media, and voter interactions during the 1988, 1992, and 1996 presidential election
campaigns, all sponsored by the John and Mary R.Markle Foundation. The results of that
research forcefully demonstrated the large gap between ideal and reality in presidential
politics and the very limited prospects for improvement (Buchanan 1991; 1996; 2004).
That made me a realist. But I am still of the opinion that presidents and citizens can and
should come to terms, at least on the big questions, before policy is enacted. In the old
dis-pute over whether democracy wants voters to help set policy or simply to judge the
results of policies set by their representatives, I lean toward the former. I will make no
argument here for utopian transformations, for naïvely unrealistic levels of civic activism,
or for a return to some golden age that never really existed. But I continue to believe that
the tradition behind the presidency-public relationship, as well as the imperatives of good
stewardship at the political system level, invites a continuous effort to improve the health
of the policy relationship at the center of the world’s most visible representative
democracy. That is why it is important to ask what it would take to foster something even
just a little bit better than a strictly minimalist, “Schumpeterian” version of representative
democracy at the presidential level in America. I use the six chapters that make up this
book to work toward that goal.
The “something better” that is worth seeking is a situation in which presidents and
citizens more often reach agreement on the most important national problems and their
solutions before policy is enacted. Such agreement is made possible by the incentives
created by elections. Before asking how to achieve more, however, we must first study
how much and what kind of voter policy influence there is now. Chapter 1 examines key
characteristics of the twelve presidential elections between 1956 and 2000, and it
uncovers evidence showing that election-related citizen influence on national policy,
although very limited, does in fact exist. What is more, close examination of case
histories shows that it takes different forms in different elections, depending on the
dispositions of the candidates and the state of the voters in varying political
circumstances. This prompted the typology that is sketched with statistics, charts, and
brief examples in the opening chapter and fleshed out with more elaborate case analyses
in the three chapters that follow, each of which explicates a different kind of voter policy
influence.
Chapter 2 offers examples of direct influence, which arises when majorities know
what they want and make clear to elected officials that they expect to get it quickly.
Chapter 3 examines what I call anticipatory influence, which is exerted when candidates
and/or presidents let their own expectations of how voters might react influence their
choices of proposals and policies. Chapter 4 details examples of legitimizing influence,
which voters may enjoy when candidates and/or newly elected presidents believe that
they cannot hope to succeed in Congress without public endorsement of their proposals.
My explication of the varieties of voter policy influence through an examination of
cases is an important part of what I have to offer, but the purpose of this book is not just
to sketch a typology. The typology is actually a means to another end: clarifying the
options for increasing voter leverage.
If constitutional change is ruled out (I do not propose it here), then increasing voter
policy influence necessarily means strengthening the existing sources. As we will see, the
potentials for enhancement vary. For example, anticipatory influence, though it will
remain a necessary part of the citizen influence equation, by its nature cannot be
strengthened. Unlike the other types, it makes no demands on voters (that is, it requires
no prior voter learning, nor consensus on policy, nor any particular show of participatory
zeal). For that reason, it is best understood as democracy’s “default option.” As such, it is
a valuable constraint on leaders. By itself, however, it can yield no more than the
Schumpeterian minimum—influence that must rely exclusively on politicians’ fear of
expected electoral reprisal to be effective. Because no prior consultation of voters’ actual
as opposed to their imagined policy preferences is required, there is no built-in need to
come to terms with voters on policy before it is enacted.
Direct voter policy influence, on the other hand, most closely approximates the
democratic ideal of ensuring voter input on policy before it is enacted, but it is also rare
and difficult to achieve. As the cases in Chapter 2 will suggest, it usually emerges only in
response to crises. To make it a regular noncrisis feature of the voters’ civic portfolio
would require special effort. The surest way to do it is long and hard: instill in a new
generation more proactive and aggressive ideas about the meaning of civic duty
(Buchanan 2004). Legitimizing influence has more immediate promise, as it emerges
from a relationship between presidents and publics that can be forged during election
campaigns (see Chapter 4), but it too is rare as well as highly unpredictable. To make it
less so would require something other than a program of citizen education.
What I propose, then, is a way to strengthen both direct and legitimizing influence by
combining them and making them less dependent on chance or circumstance. My
proposed method involves reviving and updating the idea of the policy partnership. This,
too, is a difficult option; neither a quick fix nor a panacea. Given the limits imposed by
the structure of the American electoral system and by the incentives of presidents and
publics, however, there is no better way in the near term to strengthen the public hand.
Of course, that which strengthens voters may weaken presidents, prompting the latter
to resist. Why, for example, should presidential candidates risk staking out potentially
controversial policy positions and asking voters to endorse them when it is often easier to
get elected by downplaying or sidestepping policy? And why should new presidents
bother to invoke the support of the people for their agendas when what really counts are
the votes in Congress, which can often be had without a show of popular support? The
last three presidents to run on big, clear policy agendas—Lyndon Johnson, Ronald
Reagan, and the second George Bush (whose cases are reviewed in Chapter 4) suggest
some answers.
Each of these leaders ran on a substantive platform, and after the election each
invoked his victory and its implication of voter policy endorsement as leverage in
Congress. Each claimed, in other words, to have achieved a policy mandate from the
American people. Their claims show what partnerships can give presidents—political
leverage—and also what can be in it for voters—a form of recognition and policy
influence—that is the most voters can hope to achieve outside of crisis circumstances.
This potential for mutual benefit is what makes it more feasible here than elsewhere to
ask how to expand the voters’ share of influence. It invites a search for the lessons of
these three “claimed consent” cases and other recent political experiments (most notably
that of Ross Perot in 1992) to pull together the elements of a plan for the future.
In Chapter 5, therefore, I examine the preconditions for successful policy partnerships.
The core of the partnership idea is presidents campaigning on an agenda and asking the
electorate to mandate the agenda with their votes. Because so few presidents have been
willing to try this, however, outside help is needed to nudge them along. I propose new
agents and actions that can generate voter consensus on top policy problems and motivate
candidates and presidents to offer solutions. To make this happen requires the
orchestration of direct influence.
Late in Chapter 5 and more extensively at the end of Chapter 6, I use political fiction
to show how my plan can work. Fictional candidates are pressured to suggest and debate
long-term solutions to real-world problems they would have preferred to avoid: the
viability of Social Security and the accessibility and affordability of health care. Here is
where my proactive vision of the policy partnership is most clearly illustrated.
Such speculation necessarily takes us well beyond the case histories in Chapter 4,
because nothing fully like what I have in mind has yet occurred. The real presidents who
sought policy understandings with voters offer a prototype. Would-be reformers can use
this prototype to construct possible futures, as I do. But only the presidents and
electorates to come can truly extend the limits of the possible.
Chapter 1
A Typology of Voter Influence
Presidential elections are rich with implications for democracy in America. Not only do
they permit the selection and retention of the peoples’ choice for president, they also
allow the public to express its policy preferences. While modern electoral studies have
much to say about presidential selection, they have very little to say about the impact of
the vote on policy. If the raison d’être of democracy is to permit ordinary citizens to
influence what government does, then that is a serious oversight. The policy questions
that most affect voter interests usually arise and are sometimes vigorously debated during
presidential campaigns, but do those who take the trouble to vote in presidential elections
actually influence policy?
Realignment theorists (e.g., Burnham 1970; Key 1955; Schattschneider 1960;
Sundquist 1983)—that is, the people who study the shifting patterns of voter party
allegiance throughout American history—are convinced that, in some cases at least,
voters do influence policy. These theorists argue that all major shifts in partisan support
set new directions for national policy. Indeed, the most widely recognized realigning
elections—1800, 1824, 1860, 1896, and 1932—are all associated with passionate issue
debates resolved by decisive presidential votes. Other critical elections of the distant past
had clear policy consequences as well. For example, the 1864 election had almost as
much impact on the fate of slavery and the shape of the postwar Union as the outcome of
the Civil War itself (Waugh 1997).
As this example suggests, presidential elections that occur during national crises
invariably feature debates about how to resolve those crises. The major political parties
and their presidential candidates become associated with sharply different proposals, and
voters settle the argument in ways that may also alter the balance of partisan power
(Campbell et al. 1960, 74–76). Seen this way, it is policy that drives politics, not the other
way around. That is, partisan realignments are politically significant mainly because they
are brought about by shifts in voters’ policy preferences (Chubb and Peterson 1985, 3–
25). In such cases, voters help to set policy because they exercise their influence before
policy is adopted.
Some empirical evidence exists (e.g., Ginsberg 1976) to support the realignment
theorists’ contention that several crisis elections in the distant past did actually force
changes in policy, but most of the small store of interesting and relevant empirical
research has been published more recently. A study by Patricia H.Conley (2001), for
example, presents evidence in support of the argument that presidential elections do serve
as signals of the popular will, and that the interpretation of election outcomes has a
significant impact on policy change. The “mandate” is conceptualized as the perceived
probability that voters will side with the president’s policy views in the next election. The
hypothesis is that, when this probability is high, legislators will accommodate
presidential proposals; when it is low, they will resist. Examining data from the forty-
The policy partnership 2
three elections between 1828 and 1996, Conley finds that presidents tend to claim
mandates when such factors as their percentage of the electoral vote and the number of
the president’s partisans in Congress encourage it. When these factors are marginal,
mandate claims depend on the level of agreement between the executive and legislative
branches. If agreement is within reach, a “bargained” mandate is possible. When
agreement is improbable, presidents do not declare mandates.
As noted, Conley’s model focuses on the “preferences and perceptions of the
politicians who must set the policy agenda” (2001, 22). American politicians will respond
to what the people want; since what they want is rarely perfectly clear, however, voter
influence is almost always based on perceptions and assumptions, cued by fairly standard
indicators (e.g., margin of presidential victory, degree of policy emphasis in the
campaign, the clarity of policy differences between the winner and the loser, policy and
partisan support for the winner in Congress, the characteristics of newly elected members
of Congress, etc.). Perceptually filtered voter influence is indirect but still potentially
significant. If members of Congress think the people have spoken in support of a
president’s agenda, they are much more likely to support it. It is not surprising, therefore,
that Conley finds that presidents who score well on these variables experience greater
legislative success, at least during their first year in office (2001, 74–75). Voter policy
preferences therefore matter, especially when they are expressed through elections, “the
major and most pertinent opportunity for politicians to take the pulse of the electorate”
(Conley 2001, 14).
Another recent study makes the point that the size of the election victory also
influences the policy ambitions of the victor. Ragsdale and Rusk (1999, 98) find, for
presidents between 1953 and 1996, that the larger the margin of victory, the greater the
number of positions presidents take on legislation before Congress. Put another way, the
larger the victory, the greater the tendency to seek to influence and share credit for
legislation. Ragsdale and Rusk also find, however, that when all Congressional roll-call
votes on which the president has taken a position are included in the analysis (i.e., not
just first-year votes), the greater the margin of electoral victory, the lower the success rate
on Capitol Hill. They conclude that “while major electoral victories increase presidents’
legislative activity, they do not translate into legislative success” (1999, 110). This is
undoubtedly because high-margin victors take so many more positions on roll-call votes.
The greater the number of positions taken, after all, the more opportunities there are for
defeat. Ragsdale and Rusk imply as much when they say, “[n]ot unexpectedly, the longer
the president has been in office, the lower his success rate.”
Taken together, the studies conducted by Ragsdale and Rusk and by Conley show not
only how empowering to presidents is the sense that they have the people behind them,
but also how important it is, from the president’s perspective, to strike while the iron is
hot. Lyndon Johnson said it best: “You’ve got to give it all you can that first year.
Doesn’t matter what kind of majority you come in with. You’ve got just one year when
they treat you right and before they start worrying about themselves” (quoted in
McPherson 1972, 268).
A final strand of relevant scholarship uses an ever-expanding body of survey research
to probe the extent to which public opinion can be shown to influence elite policy choice
in general, with no special emphasis on isolating the influence uniquely attributable to
elections. The major synthesis of this entire body of research shows a significant cross-
A typology of voter influence 3
time relationship between voter policy preferences on the one hand, and the policy
actions of elected officials on the other (Page and Shapiro 1992). The most recent
summary of the latest research, however, concludes, as noted in the Preface, that while
public opinion was quite influential in the past, it has been decidedly less influential of
late, with current evidence showing that the mass public’s influence on policy has
declined sharply (Shapiro and Jacobs 2000; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).
Obviously, the available research evidence is neither abundant nor conclusive. Still,
the studies yield an interesting mix of results. There is past evidence of voter policy
influence, but this influence is in decline. Presidents are empowered by evidence of
popular support, but its policy value to them may be short lived. The studies also reflect a
truism that, for the purposes of this book, is well worth making explicit: the chances for
voter influence on national policy are highly dependent on presidential agency. Voters
have few other ways to affect what the national government does except through the
efforts of presidents. To be sure, there are times when one party or coalition in Congress
may be more responsive to a major part of the electorate than is a president, but it will
always be easier for voters to forge policy understandings with a single chief executive
who has campaigned on an agenda and established a relationship with the electorate than
it is to do so with aggregations like parties or coalitions. Typically, it is the president, the
only nationally elected official, and thus the most plausible spokesperson for the
electorate as a whole, who deals with the relevant groups in and outside Congress. As a
practical matter, therefore, if voters are to have much influence, they need presidents.
Presidents also need voters, however, both to get elected in the first place and to add
democratic legitimacy to their policy claims in the aftermath of Election Day. That gives
voters real leverage, especially right before and right after elections. The question is
whether—and, if so, how—voters actually use that leverage. The uncertainty surrounding
how to gauge the will of the people makes it an open question as to whether presidents
are responding to or manufacturing the popular will at any given time. That is why so
many surrogate indicators of public preferences are used. Murky and uncertain though
the contract may often be, however, there is an undeniable potential for reciprocity, a
policy partnership, built into the electoral connection between presidents and the people.
The project described here began as an effort to clarify the nature of that potential. It
does so by examining the metrics and qualities of a broad spectrum of recent elections to
sort out and describe how the president-public policy interaction works now. The aim is
to identify, define, and better understand the voter policy influence created by
presidential elections. The project begins with numbers but ultimately does not rest on
them. As we will see, it soon becomes necessary to move beyond the numbers to a more
qualitative interpretation of actual cases. The following discussion offers an overview of
both the quantitative and qualitative findings that prompted a typology of influence.
Subsequent chapters flesh out most of the case particulars and justify the typology.
The policy partnership 4
Data
To test this proposition, we begin by juxtaposing two sets of empirical evidence: “the
most important problem facing the nation,” identified by the largest percentage of voters
just before the election, on the one hand, and voter turnout on the other. This is done for
each of the twelve elections since 1956. The percentages are shown in Table 1.1.
TABLE 1.1 Voter Participation and Policy
Consensus, 1956–2000
Voter Participationa% Top Policy Problem % Supporting
Voting Age Population Top Policy
Problemb
1956 59.4 War Threat/Suez/Foreign Policy 48
1960 63.06 Build Bomb Shelters “Overwhelming 71
majority says Russian relations the
primary problem”d
1964 61.92 International/Cold War Problems 46
1968 60.84 Vietnam 51
1972 55.21 Vietnam 27
Inflation/Cost of Living 27
1976 53.55 High Cost of Living 47
1980 52.56 High Cost of Living/Inflation 60
1984 53.11 Threat of War/International Tensions 30
1988 50.11 Budget Deficit 23
1992 55.09 Economy/Jobs/Deficit 81
1996 49.08 Economy/Jobs/Deficit 34
c
2000 51.2 Education 18e
a
Source: Federal Election Commission, unless otherwise indicated.
b
Source: Gallup Polls, 1956–2000, unless otherwise indicated. Latest available pre-election survey
dates vary from year to year.
c
Source: Curtis Gans, Committee for the Study of the American Electorate.
d
Source: Gallup, 1972:1676. Gallup did not report specific number. Bomb shelter number included
as a surrogate.
e
Source: Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll, November 1–2, 2000.
The “most important problem” data provides a measure of the salience of a particular
issue or issue-set to the public; that is, how important does the public think the issue is. It
does not measure what the public wants done about the issue, a separate question that will
be addressed when relevant in later case discussions. For present purposes, we represent
The policy partnership 6
the “most important problem” percentages as a reasonable indicator of the extent of voter
demand that the government formulate a policy to address a particular issue or problem.
How should we interpret the demand numbers in Table 1.1? Note that they are based
on the coding categories chosen and reported by Gallup analysts in their summary
publications (e.g., Gallup 1972). Sometimes Gallup coders lump related issue concerns
together into one omnibus measure. In 1992 and 1996, for example, that measure was
“Economy/Jobs/Deficit.” As Gallup “year in review” essays included with the poll results
in their publications make clear, such combinations reflect considered judgments that,
while different respondents empha-sized different specific dimensions of the problem, the
underlying economic unity was widely recognized and acknowledged in the political
discourse of the time. Thus, while some 1992 observers may have seen “creating new
jobs” and “fixing the deficit” as different and even competing problems, many influential
economists then and now see them as compatible and closely related. For example, one
prominent argument is that to reduce the federal budget deficit is to lower long-term
interest rates. That in turn reduces the cost of capital, stimulating both productive
investment and job creation. Influenced by such economic thinking, candidates and
media then and now often treat such specifics as “jobs” and “the deficit” as constituent
parts of a family of closely related economic problems. What is more, the linkage was
and is sometimes recognized by the poll respondents. It therefore seems reasonable to
interpret the 81 percent figure for 1992, for example, as indicative of widespread public
demand that the government give economic problems priority attention.
As noted earlier, voter turnout is sometimes interpreted as a measure of the strength of
voter interest and/or concern for the issues at stake in particular elections, and we use it
that way here. If a national problem can be shown to have sparked mass anxiety in
context, and if turnout increases significantly in the same year that policy consensus
increases, then elevated turnout may well be a consequence and thus a plausible indicator
of elevated policy concern. Figure 1.1, which uses the numbers in Table 1.1 to plot the
cross-time (1956–2000) relationship between problem consensus and voter turnout, helps
to make this point. The figure shows that problem consensus is much more volatile than
turnout, and it was much more often lower (nine times) than higher (three times) in the
past twelve elections. In two of those higher cases, 1960 and 1992, an increase in
problem consensus was accompanied by an increase in turnout. Did the mass concern
with problems increase turnout in those cases? In Chapter 2 we argue that the answer was
“yes.” Both years featured widespread voter policy anxiety, as well as other turnout
drivers (a close and exciting race in 1960; and the salesmanship of Texas billionaire
H.Ross Perot in 1992). Why did turnout decline slightly in the third example of an
elevated problem consensus, 1980? My suspicion, explained in Chapter 4, is that the
anxiety sparked by the cost of living and inflation was real, but its impact on turnout was
mitigated by campaign-season ambivalence toward Ronald Reagan and his controversial
economic proposals.
PT Index Construction
If our start-point proposition is correct, we should find that voters have the most policy
influence when the combination of policy problem consensus and turnout is at its highest.
Testing this expectation requires that we rank the elections in these terms. Table 1.2
A typology of voter influence 7
presents combined problem consensus and turnout (PT) rankings for the sample of twelve
elections.
Analysis
Our strategy for isolating the difference that policy consensus and turnout make for voter
policy influence is to maximize the PT variance by comparing only the lowest and
highest cases on the PT scale. Whatever the influence variance in the middle-range cases
might be, if our proposition is true we should find maximum influence in the highest PT
cases and minimum or no influence in the lowest.
The two most highly ranked elections in Table 1.2 are 1960 and 1992. The two lowest
are 1988 and 1996. The election of 2000, tied for last place with 1988, is for various
reasons a special case and is taken up in detail in Chapter 4.
Do the highest PT elections generate more voter policy influence than the lowest? To
answer this question, we must first identify a scheme for measuring influence. I argue
that the influence attributable to electoral participation is best measured by the extent to
which significant policy action that closely follows an election can be plausibly linked to
voter priorities recorded just before the election. Relevant evidence is shown in Table 1.3,
which compares the major postelection policy action of the two highest PT elections—
1960 and 1992—to the two lowest—1988 and 1996.
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