POLITICAL THEORIES & REVIEWS

POLITICAL VISION 2025

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Between Task Platforms and People's Diplomacy: A Critical

Response to Leticia Rodríguez García
REFRAMING GULF ROLES, POPULAR RESISTANCE, AND THE IR3 PARADIGM

BY OSAMA S QATRANI

Author’s Note

This paper is not intended as a correction, critique, or rebuttal of Dr. Leticia Rodríguez
García’s excellent research. On the contrary, I would like to acknowledge and commend
her valuable contribution and scholarly effort in addressing such a complex and
significant topic. My response represents a complementary perspective—written from the
standpoint of a scholar of international relations rooted in the Arab and Eastern context.
The aim is to foster academic dialogue and provide an “outside-the-box” reflection on
certain aspects of her analysis, exploring alternative angles that may enrich the debate
and bring us closer to a more holistic understanding.

QATAR ANTE LA CUESTIÓN PALESTINA: APOYO Y MEDIACIÓN By Leticia Rodriguez

Mediation Under Pressure

Qatar’s Alternating Roles (Support & Mediation)

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Introduction
I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Leticia Rodríguez for her insightful academic
contribution analyzing the positions of the Gulf States and Iran regarding the Palestinian
question. Dr. Rodríguez is affiliated with the University of Granada’s Faculty of Political
Science and Sociology, where she is pursuing her doctoral research, and has also served as a
visiting researcher at Georgetown University in Qatar. Such Western scholarship, which
seeks to engage with the full complexity of the Arab scene, remains rare and therefore
especially valuable. At the same time, certain methodological and analytical dimensions
could be further enriched by broadening the framework to encompass: (a) the distinction
between regimes and societies, (b) a reconceptualization of so-called “actors” as platforms
assigned tasks within a supra-regional architecture, and (c) the integration of public opinion and
popular pressure—what I call people’s diplomacy—as a decisive constraint on normalization.

1. Resistance as a Civilizational Continuum

While the book recognizes certain historical dimensions, it does not sufficiently emphasize
the significance of resistance as a continuous force at the popular level. Comparative history
demonstrates that the Arab–Islamic presence in al-Andalus endured for nearly eight
centuries, yet resistance never disappeared.1 It re-emerged under different names and
forms: some movements were violently suppressed, others forced into exile or
imprisonment, but the underlying spirit of defiance persisted until the final fall of Granada
in 1492.2 This historical parallel underscores that resistance in Palestine cannot be reduced
to a single organization or leadership. Rather, it constitutes a cultural, civilizational, and
generational phenomenon—one that renders purely political settlements or elite-driven
bargains ineffective and ultimately unsustainable. 3

1 Fletcher, R. (1992). Moorish Spain. University of California Press.

2 Watt, W. Montgomery (1965). A History of Islamic Spain. Edinburgh University Press.
3 Khalidi, R. (2020). The Hundred Years' War on Palestine. Metropolitan Books.

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2. From 'Actors' to 'Assigned Tasks': Platforms of Supra-Regional Engineering

Building on the literature on small states and external alignment (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006;
Kamrava, 2013), Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are best read not as fully
autonomous actors but as task platforms embedded in a U.S.-led supra-regional system. By
task platforms I mean state nodes whose policy latitude is constrained by supra-regional
alignment; as external pressures shift, roles rotate among hosting, mediating, and
containing (e.g., the role of Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar and the time-bound relocations of
Hamas’s political bureau—Amman → Damascus → Doha in 2012; renewed location
discussions in 2023–24). These relocations were less about shifting loyalties than about
task rotation dictated by changing alignments.4 The continued presence of major U.S.
military installations, notably Al-Udeid, underscores Qatar’s function as a pivotal node
within this engineered security architecture5.6

3. People's Diplomacy: Public Opinion and Boycotts

Echoing debates on transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) and digital
diplomacy (Bjola & Holmes, 2015), this paper advances the notion of people’s diplomacy,
where grassroots activism and public opinion consistently operate as decisive constraints
on elite normalization. Empirical evidence demonstrates that top-down normalization
initiatives consistently collide with widespread popular resistance. Survey data from the
Arab Barometer ((2024, Wave VII; multi-country MENA sample) indicates high levels
of boycotts and donations in support of Gaza.7 Complementary findings from Pew
Research Center and Gallup polls (2024–2025) reveal a marked decline in support for
Israel, particularly among younger demographics in the United States and Europe. 8 Mass
mobilization on university campuses and sustained boycott campaigns—targeting corporations such
as McDonald’s—further illustrate that normalization lacking popular legitimacy remains inherently
fragile and politically unsustainable9.

4 Fawaz A. Gerges (2013). The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World. Cambridge University Press.
5 Christopher M. Blanchard (2014). Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service Report.
6 See U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports on Al-Udeid Air Base and the U.S. basing posture in Qatar; SIPRI Arms

Transfers Database (Qatar entries, 2010–2024) on procurement dependence; and International Crisis Group (2024) on the
relocation and external positioning of Hamas leadership.
7 Arab Barometer (2024). Public Opinion Survey on Normalization and Gaza.
8 Pew Research Center (2025). How Americans View Israel and the Israel–Hamas War; Gallup (2025). U.S. Support for Israel’s

Military Action Hits Record Low.

9 Crowd Counting Consortium (2025). University Protests and Boycott Movements; BDS Movement Reports (2024).

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4. Timeline of Hamas Political Bureau Relocations

The relocation of Hamas’s political bureau provides a clear example of how “task platforms”
are rotated in response to shifting regional and international dynamics:

• 1990s: Political offices were established in Jordan, but mounting tensions with the
Jordanian government eventually forced their closure. 10

• 2000s: The bureau was subsequently relocated to Damascus, which became the
principal base for Hamas leadership during this period. 11

• 2012: In the aftermath of the Syrian conflict and deteriorating relations with the
Assad regime, the leadership shifted to Doha, where Qatar assumed a central role as
host and mediator. 12

• 2023–2024: Continued regional and international pressures have prompted

discussions about diversifying or relocating elements of the bureau to alternative locations . 13

10 Milton-Edwards, B. & Farrell, S. (2010). Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement. Polity Press.
11 Hroub, K. (2000). Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Institute for Palestine Studies.
12 Gerges, F. (2013). The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World. Cambridge
University Press.
13 International Crisis Group (2024). Hamas and Regional Geopolitics: Evolving Dynamics.

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5. Evidence of Supra-Regional Pressure

The regional roles of Gulf states are not primarily self-determined but shaped by continuous
supra-regional pressures:

• Military presence: The extensive U.S. military footprint, including bases such as Al-
Udeid in Qatar and other facilities across the Gulf, provides Washington with direct
operational leverage over regional security dynamics. 14

• Arms trade: According to SIPRI, the Middle East consistently ranks as the world’s
largest arms-importing region, with the United States supplying the majority share.
15This dependence reinforces U.S. influence through both military procurement and

training programs.

• Economic instruments: Conditional aid packages, energy agreements, and large-scale

investment projects operate as tools of inducement and control, shaping policy
alignment and constraining autonomous decision-making. 16

14 Blanchard, C. M. (2014). Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service.
15 SIPRI (2025). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
16 Kamrava, M. (2013). Qatar: Small State, Big Politics. Cornell University Press.

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6. Operationalizing IR3: A Practical Framework

For the paradigm of International Relations 3 (IR3) to move beyond theory and become
actionable, it must be grounded in institutional and technological mechanisms that translate
principles into practice. The following five instruments are proposed:

1. Transparent Data Platforms — Open-access systems for tracking humanitarian, economic, and
security indicators, reducing disinformation and enhancing accountability. 17

2. Civic Participation Hubs — Structured spaces that institutionalize the role of youth, NGOs, and
academia in negotiation processes, thereby embedding societal legitimacy in diplomatic
outcomes. 18

3. Accountability Metrics — Quantifiable benchmarks of success and failure (e.g., humanitarian

access, prisoner releases, reduction of violence) to evaluate mediation efforts. 19

4. Soft Enforcement Tools — Linking economic privileges, trade benefits, and investment flows to
compliance with humanitarian and ethical standards.

5. Protection Cards for Fragile States — Conditional guarantees (economic packages, temporary
security assistance) offered to host states, contingent on adherence to agreed norms.

Together, these mechanisms aim to transform IR3 into a functional architecture that
integrates transparency, inclusivity, and enforceability.

17 Bjola, C. & Holmes, M. (2015). Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. Routledge.
18 Keohane, R. & Nye, J. (2001). Power and Interdependence. Longman.
19 Paris, R. (2014). At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge University Press.

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7. Addressing Gaps in Rodríguez’s Chapter

This response highlights three areas where Rodríguez’s otherwise valuable chapter can be
further enriched:

1. Re-conceptualizing Gulf Roles — Rather than treating Gulf states as fully

autonomous actors, they should be re-classified as platforms for assigned tasks
within a supra-regional order largely shaped by U.S. strategic priorities. 20

2. Embedding Empirical Evidence — Incorporating survey data (e.g., Arab Barometer)

and boycott campaigns underscores the limits of elite-driven normalization,
demonstrating the decisive role of public opinion and grassroots mobilization. 21

3. Advancing IR3 as a Practical Alternative — By proposing an actionable IR3

framework, this paper offers a pathway beyond the shortcomings of IR2 diplomacy,
grounding international mediation in transparency, inclusivity, and accountability. 22

20 Blanchard, C. (2014). Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service.
21 Arab Barometer (2024). Public Opinion Survey on Normalization and Gaza.
22 Bjola, C. & Holmes, M. (2015). Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. Routledge.

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Conclusion

This response seeks to complement, not contest, Rodríguez’s chapter (Rodríguez, 2025, ch.
VI). We read Qatar’s shifts—such as the 2017 blockade context and the post–7 Oct 2023
phase—not as changes of loyalty, but as task rotation within a U.S.-led supra-regional
system where nodes alternate functions (hosting, mediating, containing). At the same time,
public opinion acts as a real constraint: Arab Barometer (2024) and related polling show
limits on top-down normalization—what we term people’s diplomacy.

Taken together, task platforms above and people’s diplomacy below narrow the space
for elite bargains alone. Practical steps follow: clarify criteria for role-switching; guarantee
humanitarian access with published safeguards; use public-facing dashboards to surface
cross-border preferences; and require independent, real-time verification of digital
claims. In short, our frameworks converge: Rodríguez maps what happened; we specify
how it is organized and under what constraints it is likely to recur.

My aim is not to replace Rodríguez’s framework but to enrich it with complementary

dimensions—ensuring that her important contribution continues to stimulate broader debates

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References
1. Arab Barometer. (2024). Public Opinion Survey on Gaza and Normalization.
2. Pew Research Center. (2025). How Americans View Israel and the Israel–Hamas War.
3. Gallup. (2025). U.S. Support for Israel's Military Action Hits Record Low.
4. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (2025). Trends in International
Arms Transfers, 2024.
5. Crowd Counting Consortium. (2025). University Protests and Boycott Movements.
6. Council on Foreign Relations / Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2024). Hamas Leadership
Relocation History.
7. Congressional Research Service. (2024). Reports on Al-Udeid Air Base and U.S. Gulf
Security Strategy.

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