Face Of Time

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Face Of Time

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 Face Of Time

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.
no provisions to be had but what were supplied from the fort by
water; in which condition we could not have continued long, but
must have retreated into the fort with disgrace. I therefore desired
Admiral Watson to assist me with five or six hundred seamen,
principally for drawing the artillery and carrying ammunition, which
he readily complied with; and, about three o'clock in the morning, I
marched out with nearly my whole force, leaving only a few
Europeans, with two hundred new-raised bucksarees, to guard our
camp. About six, we entered the enemy's camp in a thick fog, and
crossed it in about two hours, with considerable execution. Had the
fog cleared up, as it usually does, about eight o'clock, when we were
entire masters of the camp without the ditch, the action must have
been decisive; instead of which it thickened, and occasioned our
mistaking the way. I avoid troubling you with the particulars of this
undertaking, as they are fully set down in my journal of military
occurrences."
Clive had wished to avoid hostilities, from a desire not to hazard the
advantages which had been obtained, and from the great disparity
of numbers. While his force consisted of one thousand three
hundred and fifty Europeans and eight hundred sepoys, that of the
enemy exceeded forty thousand men; but, in the situation in which
he found himself placed, he had no option betwixt the attack he
made and a disgraceful termination of the enterprise. His was not a
mind to hesitate under such circumstances. He instantly formed his
plan to surprise the Nabob's camp, by marching at three o'clock in
the morning to make his first effort against a train of heavy artillery,
and, after spiking them, to push for the head-quarters of the prince:
but his little army, after penetrating through the multitude of its
opponents, became, at daybreak, so enveloped in thick fog, that the
road was missed; and when the fog cleared, Clive, who found
himself at a distance from the point of his intended attack, had to
sustain a very sharp action with a part of the Nabob's army, in which
he lost, besides two field pieces, one hundred and twenty Europeans
and one hundred sepoys, a great proportion of his small force.
Though the success of this attack, owing to the accident of the fog,
was not so complete as it otherwise would have been, all the effects
upon which Clive had calculated were produced. The alarmed Nabob
left the town next day, and encamped on a plain within sight of the
English troops. Preparations were making for another attack; but
Suraj-u-Dowlah made overtures for peace, and Clive was too anxious
for that object not to attend to them, though advised to the contrary
by Admiral Watson; who, in a private note, written in the strong
language and with the characteristic bluntness of a British seaman,
expressed serious doubts of the Nabob's sincerity, and
recommended another attack. "I am now fully convinced," the
Admiral observes, "the Nabob's letter was only to amuse us, in order
to cover his retreat and gain time till he is reinforced, which may be
attended with very fatal consequences. For my own part, I was of
opinion, that attacking his rear when he was marching off, and
forcing him to abandon his cannon, was a most necessary piece of
service to bring him to an accommodation; for till he is well
thrashed, don't, Sir, flatter yourself he will be inclined to peace. Let
us, therefore, not be overreached by his politics, but make use of
our arms, which will be much more prevalent than any treaties or
negotiations. In order to this, I have sent Captain Speke to talk with
you on this subject. I think, too, it might not be amiss, were you to
consult some of your own officers on the same occasion. You will
pardon the liberty I take on this particular, when I assure you, I will
do the utmost of my endeavours to assist you."
Clive was not induced by this advice to depart from the course he
had determined to pursue. He anticipated that what had passed
would dispose the Nabob to peace; and he dreaded that, by driving
him to despair, he might hurry him into an alliance with the French
at Chandernagore, whose European force was nearly equal to the
English, and who had just heard of the breaking out of war between
the two nations in Europe. The events proved he was not mistaken
in his conclusion as to the probable conduct of Suraj-u-Dowlah. That
prince no longer hesitated to sign a treaty, by which he restored the
English at Calcutta to all the privileges they had formerly enjoyed
under the imperial firman, or mandate, gave up the villages he had
seized, permitted their merchandise to pass custom-free, agreed to
their fortifying Calcutta, allowed them to establish a mint, and
engaged that all goods taken from their factories should be restored,
and that money compensation should be given for such as were
damaged, plundered, or lost.
This treaty was concluded on the 9th of February, and three days
afterwards the Nabob entered into another agreement with Clive, by
which the English engaged to look upon the Nabob's enemies as
their own, and to grant him any aid in their power.
Various opinions were formed of the policy of this peace. Clive, in a
private letter to Mr. Payne, Chairman of the Court of Directors, points
out, with great force, the grounds on which he acted.
"If I had only consulted the interest and reputation of a soldier, the
conclusion of this peace might easily have been suspended. I know,
at the same time, there are many who think I have been too
precipitate in the conclusion of it; but surely those who are of this
opinion never knew, that the delay of a day or two might have
ruined the Company's affairs, by the junction of the French with the
Nabob, which was on the point of being carried into execution. They
never considered the situation of affairs on the coast, and the
positive orders sent me by the gentlemen there, to return with the
major part of the forces at all events; they never considered that,
with a war upon the coast, and in the province of Bengal at the
same time, a trading company could not subsist without a great
assistance from the government; and, last of all, they never
considered, that a long war, attended through the whole course of it
with success, and many great actions, ended at last with the
expense of more than fifty lacs of rupees to the Company.
"Believe me, Sir, I have constantly had this consideration in view,
and my conduct has been always regulated agreeably to it. I can
further say, I never undertook an expedition attended with half so
many disagreeable circumstances as this: the natural jealousy
subsisting between sea and land service has given me much
uneasiness; I have suffered many mortifications; the independent
power given me by the gentlemen of the committee at Madras has
created me many enemies; and, lastly, that attention which, by my
public station, I owe to the interest of the Company, in preference to
that of private individuals, has not passed by unreflected upon. I am
a very considerable sufferer myself; and I can affirm with great truth
and sincerity, that I have left no means untried with the Nabob,
when the Company's interest was not immediately concerned, to
induce him to consider the unhappy people at Calcutta, and he has
often promised to do it.
"Nothing harsh, ungenerous, or uncharitable shall fall from my pen;
at the same time, in justice to the Company, I cannot avoid
expressing my concern at the future prospect of their affairs, after
the obtainment of such honourable and advantageous conditions. Do
but reflect, Sir, that most of the gentlemen in power are become
bankrupts by the unfortunate loss of Calcutta. This consideration, I
must confess, added to their apprehensions of being dismissed the
service, has often induced me to wish the gentlemen of Madras had
taken the entire management of affairs into their hands, till the
Company's pleasure was known.
"It cannot be expected that the princes of this country, whose
fidelity is always to be suspected, will remain firm to their promises
and engagements from principle only. It is, therefore, become
absolutely necessary to keep up a respectable force in this province
for the future. How far this is agreeable to the Company's
circumstances, you, Sir, are the best judge. I shall only add, there
never was such attention paid to the advice of military men at
Calcutta as was consistent with the safety of the place when in
danger—a total ignorance of which was the real cause of the loss of
Fort William.
"Our design upon Chandernagore is uncertain. I cannot yet fathom
the Nabob's sentiments; the French having in a manner refused a
neutrality this day offered it. As the expedition has so far advanced,
I have given it my opinion to proceed and invest the place; and, if it
should happen, at last, that the Nabob is really against taking it, to
accept the neutrality, and make merit of doing it at his request and
in obedience to his order, by which means he will be convinced of
our friendship and power at the same time.
"I shall conclude this letter with submitting my conduct to your
opinion. It would have required greater abilities than I am master of
to reconcile and satisfy so many different interests. If I have erred, it
has not been with design; whenever that can be made to appear, I
shall very deservedly forfeit the good opinion and favour of the Court
of Directors, to whom I owe every thing."

FOOTNOTES:
[69] This vote is dated the 6th of Feb., 1754. With that delicacy
and tenderness to the feelings of his old commander, Colonel
Lawrence, which he always manifested, he objected to receiving
this mark of distinction, unless a similar present was made to that
officer; which was done accordingly.
[70] December, 1754.
[71] Severndroog, another fort belonging to Angria, had been
taken a few months previously by Commodore James, of the
Bombay marines.
[72] Feb. 13, 1756.
[73] Vide Lieutenant-Colonel Clive's evidence, Reports of the
House of Commons, vol. iii., and Ives's Voyage, p. 82.
[74] Vide extract of consultations, Fort St. David, June 20. 1756.
[75] Orme, vol. ii. p. 88.
[76] A war was at this time expected between England and
France.
[77] It is to be observed, that though the French gave upon this
occasion their support to the pretensions of their favourite Nabob,
yet Mahommed Ali was not at that time acknowledged by Salabut
Jung, then subadar of the Deckan, his immediate superior: and it
was only at the peace of Paris, in 1763, that he was
acknowledged by the French government.
[78] Aliverdi Khan died on the 9th of April, 1756; and Suraj-u-
Dowlah, having been nominated successor, mounted the throne
without opposition. The name of this prince was Mirza Mahmud,
but he is best known by his title of Suraj-u-Dowlah, which means
"the sun of the state."
[79] The person the Nabob alluded to was Kishendass, the son of
the late Dewan of the Nabob of Dacca, who visited Calcutta on
his way to Juggernaut; and as he was strongly recommended to
Mr. Drake, the President of Calcutta, by Mr. Watts, the chief of
Cossimbazar, on account of services rendered by his family to the
Company, he was treated with kindness and attention.
[80] The outposts of Calcutta were attacked on the 18th of June,
1756.
[81] Orme, vol. ii. p. 78.
[82] Mr. Drake.
[83] Captain Minchin.
[84] Vide Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii. p. 144.
[85] Mr. Mill, by his quotation from Seir Mutaquerin, and his
observations upon the former state of prisons in England and
India, appears desirous not only of palliating the guilt of the
Nabob and his servants, but of throwing a share of the blame
upon the unhappy sufferers: "Some search," he observes, "was
made for a convenient apartment, but none was found; upon
which, information was obtained of a place which the English
themselves had employed as a prison, and into this, without
further inquiry, they were impelled. It was unhappily a small ill-
aired and unwholesome dungeon called the Black Hole; and the
English had their own practice to thank, for suggesting it to the
officers of the subadar as a fit place of confinement."—Mill, vol.
iii. p. 149. Though I refrain from commenting on the tone in
which the author quoted treats this memorable catastrophe, I
must directly question the justice of the conclusions he has drawn
from his own premises. Assuredly the use of a room of twenty
feet square, with two small windows, as a prison for one, two,
three, or ten prisoners, can be no justification for forcing, at the
point of the sword, 146 captives into this inadequate space; much
less for keeping them there, when their sufferings became so
dreadful, and the death of almost all certain.
[86] The "Cumberland" seventy-four had Sir G. Pocock's flag on
board.
[87] The "Marlborough" Indiaman carried a large proportion of
the troops and stores.
[88] A village on the left bank of the river Hooghly, twenty miles
in a straight direction below Calcutta, but more than double that
distance by water.
[89] Situated on the left bank of the river Hooghly, ten miles
below Calcutta in a straight line, but double that number by the
windings of the river.
[90] This officer (afterwards the celebrated Sir Eyre Coote)
commanded a company of H. M. 49th on board the flag ship.
[91] The grenadier volunteers and sepoys had been pushed as
near the fort as they could be, under cover, to be ready for an
assault. The remainder had been halted in a hollow plain, to
intercept the garrison in the event of an attempt at retreat. No
enemy was believed to be near, except in the fort of Budge-
Budge. The consequence was a surprise, the bad effects of which
were only remedied by Clive's presence of mind and courage. He
has been censured for not using more precaution; but having
only landed seven days, and being ill, he must have depended
upon others for intelligence, and he justly complains of their want
of it. The nature of the country, however, is such, as to offer to
almost any numbers the power of concealing their advance.
It has further been stated, that "if the enemy's cavalry had
advanced and charged at the same time that the infantry began
to fire, it is not improbable that the war would have been
concluded on the very first trial of hostilities."—Orme, vol. i. p.
124. In answer to this remark, there is one single fact to be
stated;—the thick jungle which concealed the approach of the
infantry was impervious to cavalry, who had no means of
advancing except through openings, where they must have been
seen, and the possibility of surprise defeated.
[92] Vide Ives's Voyage, p. 102.
[93] Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Clive to select committee, of
date 20th of January, 1757.
[94] Clive's letters to the Governor of Madras, 8th January, 1757.
[95] vol. ii. p. 126.
[96] Major Kilpatrick and Captain Eyre Coote commanded the
King's and Company's troops. The naval armament was
commanded by Admiral Watson.
[97] It is with pain I read, in the page of a modern historian, the
following passage[98]:—"The English were very desirous to make
their peace with that formidable ruler (Suraj-u-Dowlah); but the
capture of Hooghley, undertaken solely with a view to plunder,
had so augmented his rage, that he was not in a frame of mind to
receive from them any proposition." I rejoice to state, I have
hitherto searched in vain for the facts that could warrant so
unqualified an imputation upon the fame and reputation of
Admiral Watson, Colonel Clive, and the other naval and military
officers, detached in command of the force employed on this
occasion; and, until proof is produced of their having been
actuated by the sordid motives here ascribed to them, I cannot
give credit to the unsupported opinion of any author, however
respectable.
Orme states, that Suraj-u-Dowlah was exasperated at the capture
of Hooghley (as, no doubt, such a despot would be at any
operation which implied a defiance of his power by a nation he
had contemned and injured); but that clear and able historian, to
whom his country is so deeply indebted for a minute narration of
the facts connected with the early establishment of her power in
India, has not one word in his page that can justify the opinions
Mr. Mill expresses as to the motives of their attack.
I have the sincerest personal respect for Mr. Mill: I admire his
accuracy, his industry, and indefatigable research; but our
conclusions from the same premises often differ most widely. In
this work, I shall have frequent occasion to claim that liberty of a
free expression of my sentiments, which he so properly uses
towards those who have written on the same subjects as himself.
This will oblige me to question some of his assertions and
opinions, which, however positive and unqualified, appear to me
neither supported by arguments nor borne out by facts. I am
aware of my own defects, and have laboured to amend them; I
also acknowledge that early impressions, and the occupations of
my life, may give a bias to my judgment: but no human mind is
free from prejudices, and those of the closet author are not the
fewest in number, or the easiest to be subdued. With a full sense
of my own disadvantages, I confess that I am not convinced, by
the laboured and metaphysical preface to Mr. Mill's History, that
local knowledge, and an acquaintance with the languages, habits,
and characters of the nations of whom I, and others similarly
circumstanced, have treated on this and other occasions, are
disqualifications for the tasks we have attempted. At all events,
our efforts may be useful in collecting facts for more critical and
philosophical historians. Though we do not withhold those
opinions which our experience has led us to adopt, our chief
purpose is to inform—theirs to speculate. We are satisfied if we
can lay before our readers a true picture of the scenes we
describe. They have what they deem a higher object; and the
facts of their volumes are often rendered subservient to the
propagation of their general principles and abstract theories.
[98] Mill's British India, vol. ii. p. 128.
[99] Letter to the Hon. G. Pigot, Esq. and Select Committee of
Fort St. George, dated Camp, Barnague Plain, January 28. 1757.
[100] Dated Camp, on Barnague Plain, 1st February, 1757.
[101] Jugget Seit, here alluded to, was at the head of a great
banking-house, and, from his immense wealth and credit, had
much influence in the country.
 CHAP. IV.
The attack of Chandernagore had been strongly recommended to
Clive's attention (A. D. 1757) by the government of Madras; and it
was evident that, while the French kept so strong a force at that
settlement, the safety of Calcutta must be endangered whenever its
garrison was weak, or the Nabob of Bengal chose to contract an
intimate alliance with our European enemy. This danger was at the
moment much increased by the success of Bussy. That leader, alike
remarkable for his sagacity and courage, after rendering the greatest
services to the Subadar of the Deckan, Salabut Jung, and obtaining
in reward a large grant of territory, had become an object of such
jealousy to the prince whom he had placed on the throne, that an
effort was made to destroy him and his party.
Not only were all the chiefs of the Deckan summoned to aid their
prince in effecting this object, but the Mahrattas, also, were called
in. The French general took possession of a palace called the
Chahar-Mahal, within the city of Hyderabad, where he sustained a
memorable siege against this combined force; and on being
reinforced by a party from Pondicherry, commanded by M. Law, he
ultimately triumphed over his numerous assailants, and Salabut Jung
was obliged to confirm all the grants he had before made to him.
These included the fruitful provinces of Masulipatam, Vizagapatam,
and Ganjam, which he was now engaged in settling; and his
comparative vicinity gave credit to the daily reports that he was on
his march to Bengal with a force, the numbers of which had been
greatly exaggerated.
Whatever might be Bussy's intention, it was sufficiently obvious that
he possessed the power of forming a junction[102] with the French
force on the Ganges; and it was equally obvious, that such a
junction would be ruinous to the English interests.
These considerations recommended the immediate attack of
Chandernagore; but many and serious objections presented
themselves to that measure. These were the strength of the French,
the weakness of the English force, and the fear of producing a
rupture with the Nabob, who was known to be most adverse to such
an attack.
Clive, alluding to the expressed sentiments of Suraj-u-Dowlah on this
subject observes, in the postscript of a letter (under date of the 1st
of March, 1757) to Mr. Watts, the resident at the Nabob's court:—
"The admiral and myself are determined not to be guilty of a breach
of faith in attacking Chandernagore, contrary to the expressed order
of the Nabob."
But at the same time that he communicated this resolution, Mr.
Watts was instructed to make every effort to obtain the consent of
Suraj-u-Dowlah to the prosecution of this measure.
The necessity of this operation appeared more urgent from
intelligence obtained, that the Nabob was carrying on secret
intrigues with the French, and from the declaration of the latter, that,
however willing to enter into an armistice in Bengal, they had no
power to pledge themselves for its observance by the government of
Pondicherry, or by those acting under its orders. The remembrance
of Dupleix's disavowing the authority of La Bourdonnais to ransom
Madras, and the position of Bussy, acting under an authority superior
to that of the government of Chandernagore, made Admiral Watson
very reluctant to sanction an engagement so liable to be broken,
whenever it should suit the convenience of the enemy. Clive
endeavoured for a period to overcome the Admiral's scruples, from
an impression that, should the Nabob join the French, the English
force in Bengal was too weak to maintain a protracted contest; and
so far from expecting aid from Madras, the superiority of the French
on the coast of Coromandel urgently required his early return to that
Presidency.
Intelligence of the occurrence of hostilities between France and
England had been received; but the official declaration of war did
not reach Admiral Watson till the first week of March. That officer,
understanding that the Committee still continued apprehensive of
the bad consequences likely to result from the attack of
Chandernagore, wrote[103] to Clive as follows:—
"If the Nabob should not give his consent to our attacking the
French, I will desist, provided the gentlemen of the Committee
strongly represent to me that it will be more for the Company's
interest that I should not undertake any thing against the French;
for, as the declaration of war is an order to all officers under the King
to distress the enemy as far as it is in their power, the Committee
here should take it upon themselves the concluding a neutrality; but
I will take upon me to give my word, that I will not commit any
hostility against the French here, unless the Governor-General and
Superior Council of Pondicherry will not consent to a neutrality within
the Ganges."
Admiral Watson had for some time carried on a correspondence with
the Nabob, from which it appears that he was as anxious as Clive to
convince Suraj-u-Dowlah it was for his interest and safety, as well as
for that of the English, that Chandernagore should be attacked. "The
ready obedience," he observes in one of these letters, "I paid to
your desire, in not attacking the French, will, I persuade myself,
convince you, that nothing but the strongest necessity could make
me again apply to you on that subject. I beg you will give your most
serious attention to what I am going to say. Immediately on the
receipt of your past letters, I not only gave over thoughts of
attacking the French, but invited them to enter into a treaty of
neutrality, and to send people to settle the terms; but judge what
must have been my surprise, when, after they were in some manner
settled, the French deputies owned that they had no power to
secure us the observance of the treaty, in case any commander of
theirs should come with a greater power after my departure! You are
too reasonable not to see, that it is impossible for me to conclude a
treaty with people who have no power to do it; and which, besides,
while it ties my hands, leaves those of my enemies at liberty to do
me what mischief they can. They have also a long time reported,
that Monsieur Bussy is coming here with a great army. Is it to attack
you? Is it to attack us? You are going to Patna. You ask our
assistance. Can we, with the least degree of prudence, march with
you, and leave our enemies behind us? You will then be too far off to
support us, and we shall be unable to defend ourselves. Think what
can be done in this situation. I see but one way. Let us take
Chandernagore, and secure ourselves from any apprehensions from
that quarter; and then we will assist you with every man in our
power, and go with you, even to Delhi, if you will. Have we not
sworn reciprocally, that the friends and enemies of the one should
be regarded as such by the other? And will not God, the avenger of
perjury, punish us, if we do not fulfil our oaths? What can I say
more? Let me request the favour of your speedy answer."
Subsequent to the despatch of this letter, the accounts received from
Moorshedabad completely satisfied the Admiral of the Nabob's
insincerity. Suraj-u-Dowlah, while he delayed the execution of the
engagements he had entered into with the English, intrigued with
French agents, and detached a body of men to reinforce the
Governor of Hooghley, which it was fully believed was meant to aid
the neighbouring garrison of Chandernagore.
This intelligence caused the Admiral to address him in a style
calculated to put an end to all further evasions:—"I now acquaint
you," were the concluding words of this letter[104], "that the
remainder of the troops which should have been here long ago (and
which I hear the Colonel told you he expected), will be at Calcutta in
a few days; that in a few days more I shall despatch a vessel for
more ships and more troops; and that I will kindle such a flame in
your country, as all the water in the Ganges shall not be able to
extinguish. Farewell! remember that he who promises you this never
yet broke his word with you or with any man whatsoever."
Suraj-u-Dowlah appears to have been alarmed at this
communication; to which he replied in two notes, one dated the 9th,
the other the 10th, of March. In the first, he endeavours to excuse
himself for his want of punctuality in fulfilling his engagements with
the English. In the second, he gives, though in general terms, that
permission which had been so long desired, to attack
Chandernagore. "You have understanding and generosity," he
observes: "if your enemy, with an upright heart, claims your
protection, you will give him his life; but then you must be well
satisfied of the innocence of his intentions; if not, whatsoever you
think right, that do."
Mr. Watts, Resident with the Nabob, had communicated to the
Committee the fullest evidence of that prince's intrigues with the
French; and, in his letter to Clive of the 1st of March, he asserts that
he had advanced them one lac of rupees; and gives his opinion that
the capture of Chandernagore is quite indispensable for the security
of the English.
Mr. Watts's letter to the Committee closed (as appears by a letter
from Mr. Drake to Clive) in the following words: "If you have not
concluded with our enemies, I am persuaded you may attack
without being under any apprehensions from the Nabob." In another
letter to Clive, of the 10th of March, the Resident observes, "This
serves to enclose a copy of my letter to the Committee, by which
you will observe the Nabob has given his verbal consent for
attacking Chandernagore."
In a letter of the 11th of the same month, Mr. Watts states, that the
Nabob desired him to inform Colonel Clive that if he attacked the
French he would not intermeddle.
The receipt of these letters, and the arrival of reinforcements from
Bombay, led to the attack of Chandernagore being ultimately
determined upon. The negotiation for an armistice, which was far
advanced, was broken off. The letters subsequently written by the
Nabob[105], retracting his assent to this measure, were deemed an
indignity; and the very ground which he urged, the expected
advance through Cuttack of Bussy, was considered an additional
reason for hastening the siege.
Clive commenced operations by land, and displayed his usual
judgment: but the early fall of this settlement must be chiefly
ascribed to the daring boldness and admirable skill and intrepidity of
Admiral Watson, and to the valour of those under his command.
Few naval achievements have excited more admiration; and even at
the present day, when the river is so much better known, the
success with which the largest vessels of this fleet were navigated to
Chandernagore, and laid alongside the batteries of that settlement,
is a subject of wonder. The Kent and Tiger, with the flags of Admirals
Watson and Pocock on board, were the only vessels engaged.[107]
They were so close, that the musketry from the tops and poop were
most annoying to the enemy, who behaved with great gallantry,
keeping up a heavy and destructive fire: nor did they offer to
capitulate till their batteries were a heap of ruins, and all their guns
dismounted.
Though the outworks of Chandernagore had been taken by Clive, no
breach had been made on the land side; but, while the battery guns
and mortars opened upon the town, the troops were pushed
forward, and, from the tops of the houses adjacent to the wall, kept
up a galling and destructive fire; which, as it increased the loss of
the French, no doubt hastened their surrender.
We cannot give a better account of the immediate causes which led
to the attack of Chandernagore, than in the words of Clive in his
report to the governor of Fort St. George.
"I acquainted you," he observes, "that the neutrality with the French
was not likely to be concluded. I continued encamped on the same
ground; and, on the 7th instant, received a letter from the Nabob,
desiring me to join against the Affghans, the van of whose army was
attempting an irruption into this province. Accordingly, I began my
march the next morning; and, thinking it a convenient opportunity to
prevail on him to suffer us to take Chandernagore, I wrote him word
of our having endeavoured to conclude a neutrality with the French,
but that the Director and Council were not vested with proper
powers for that purpose; that, whilst we were engaged at a distance
assisting him against his enemies, the French, joined by Monsieur
Bussy, might make an attempt on Calcutta; and that therefore I
should wait off Chandernagore, in hopes of receiving his leave to
attack it. Accordingly, on the 12th I encamped at the back of it,
within a mile of the fort; and on the 13th the Admiral received a
letter from the Nabob, the purport of which was, that we might act
as we pleased with respect to the French; and, having intelligence at
the same time that the troops he had sent to their assistance were
withdrawn, I summoned the place to surrender that night; but,
receiving no answer, the next morning I attacked their western
battery, which they defended very briskly the whole day, but at night
abandoned it. A detachment I sent about noon to the southward
took post in a garden near the fort, and within some of their
batteries. The loss they had sustained at the western battery, and
the apprehension of their retreat being cut off by our detachment,
made them likewise desert that night all their works to the
southward; among the rest, a strong half-moon on the river side,
mounting heavy metal, and a battery of three guns playing down the
channel, both which must have annoyed our ships greatly in their
passage up. The batteries to the northward were all quitted at the
same time.
"On the 19th, the King's ships got to the Prussian gardens, about a
mile from the fort; but it was the 23d before they attempted to pass
the vessels which had been sunk by the enemy, opposite to the half-
moon. They weighed at daybreak, and in less than an hour were
abreast of the fort. A thirteen-inch mortar of ours, with several
cohorns and royals, had played incessantly the whole night; and
when the ships weighed, we opened two batteries very near the
walls, one of four pieces of cannon, the other three, all twenty-four-
pounders; and kept a continual discharge of musketry from the
adjacent houses. In short, the fire from the ships and the shore was
so great, that they capitulated in three hours. A copy of the terms
granted them is enclosed. You will observe the surrender is made to
Admiral Watson; but common report will be just in publishing how
great a share the land forces had in this conquest!" Clive, in his
evidence before the House of Commons, states, "that Admiral
Watson's fleet surmounted difficulties which he believes no other
ships could have done, and that it was impossible for him to do the
officers of the squadron justice on that occasion."
In a private letter[108] to Mr. Pigot, written upon the same occasion,
Clive observes, "I make no doubt but the forces are impatiently
expected at Madras. It is a very great blow that has detained them—
no less than the attack and taking of Chandernagore; of more
consequence to the Company, in my opinion, than the taking of
Pondicherry itself. It was a most magnificent and rich colony; the
garrison consisted of more than five hundred Europeans and seven
hundred blacks, all carrying arms; three hundred and sixty are
prisoners, and near one hundred have been suffered to give their
parole, consisting of civil, military, and inhabitants. Nearly sixty white
ladies are rendered miserable by the loss of this place. However,
nothing has been wanting, either on the Admiral's part or mine, to
render their condition supportable: their clothes, their linen, and
every thing have been suffered to go out.
"I must refer you to the Committee's letter for many particulars. I
fear I shall not be able to send a list of military and artillery stores
by this conveyance, which are very great, and will abundantly supply
Calcutta. By the Nabob's letters, you will find of what a wavering and
pusillanimous disposition he is. However, I am in hopes this last
stroke will fix him. He has already performed almost every article of
the treaty; paid Mr. Watts the three lacs of rupees; delivered up
Cossimbazar, and all the other factories, with the money and goods
therein taken. The gentlemen write from thence, that little or
nothing is wanting.
"Our stay till August, which is now become unavoidable, will, I hope,
settle every thing here in the most advantageous manner for the
Company, and perhaps will induce the Nabob to give up all the
French factories. This will be driving them out root and branch. I am
well informed, without Chandernagore, the Islands must starve, and
Pondicherry suffer greatly. My inclinations always tend towards the
coast; and I hope to be with you, with a very considerable force, in
September. The lateness of the season makes the passage now very
uncertain; and the length of it would certainly cause the loss of a
great part of our forces.
"It was with great reluctance Mr. Watson consented I should sign the
articles of capitulation, though drawn out in his name,
notwithstanding it was impossible the fort could ever have been
taken without our assistance.
"We attacked the enemy six or seven days before the ships, and
drove them from eleven batteries, one of them by the river side, of
very heavy metal, under which were sunk four or five ships and
vessels to prevent the passage of the squadron, which could never
have been effected without mastering that battery. We erected one
of five[109] twenty-four-pounders within a hundred yards of the
south-east bastion, and another of three twenty-four-pounders
within a hundred and fifty yards of the north-east bastion; besides
which, we manned all the tops of the houses, and kept up such a
fire of musketry, that the enemy could not appear either on the
ramparts or bastions, by which means the fire was insignificant to
what it would have been."
From this letter, and from one he wrote to Mr. Mabbot, the Chairman
of the Directors, there can be no doubt that Clive's intention was to
return to the coast as early as he could, and that he expected
everything would be settled by September, when the season would
be favourable for that voyage; but the jealousy and alarm of the
Nabob at the rising power of the English were greatly increased by
the fall of Chandernagore; and his character and past actions gave
no security against his intrigues and hostility, unless overawed by
the presence of a superior force, and the establishment of a
commanding influence at his court. The President of the Committee
at Calcutta was unequal to the duties now performed by Clive; nor
was there one officer in Bengal upon whom these could devolve with
the slightest hope of preserving, much less of improving, the
advantages that had been obtained.
Placed in such circumstances, Clive, though he had received
repeated orders to repair to Fort St. George, was not therefore
exempted from the duty of exercising his judgment as to the course
which it was best for the general interests of the Company that he
should pursue; and he had to balance against that obedience which
he owed, and was anxious to pay to his superiors, the imminent
danger which his departure from Bengal would produce. The attack
of Chandernagore had been indispensable to give security to the
English against an European enemy: but the very success which had
attended their arms upon this and other occasions was likely, with a
prince of Suraj-u-Dowlah's character, to involve them in a further
and more extensive scene of hostilities.
This Clive foresaw before that operation commenced; and, writing to
the Committee at Calcutta upon this subject, he observed, "If you
attack Chandernagore, you cannot stop there; you must go further.
Having established yourself by force, and not by the consent of the
Nabob, he by force will endeavour to drive you out again." In a
private letter to Mr. Pigot, written a month after the fall of the French
settlement[110], he gives a vivid description of the Nabob's character,
and of the motives and feelings which he supposes to agitate his
weak and vacillating mind, at a period critical both for himself and
for the Company's establishments in Bengal.
"The most of the articles of the peace," he observes, "are complied
with; yet, from the tyranny, cowardice, and suspicion of the Nabob,
no dependence can be had upon him. No consideration could induce
him to deliver up the French: it is true he has ordered them out of
his dominions, and they are at some distance from his capital; but
he has retained them secretly in his pay, and has certainly written to
Monsieur Deleyrit and Bussy, to send men to his assistance. One day
he tears my letters, and turns out our vakeel, and orders his army to
march; he next countermands it, sends for the vakeel, and begs his
pardon for what he has done. Twice a week he threatens to impale
Mr. Watts: in short, he is a compound of every thing that is bad,
keeps company with none but his menial servants, and is universally
hated and despised by the great men. This induces me to acquaint
you there is a conspiracy going on against him by several of the
great men, at the head of whom is Jugget Seit himself, as also Cojah
Wazeed. I have been applied to for assistance, and every advantage
promised the Company can wish. The Committee are of opinion it
should be given as soon as the Nabob is secured. For my own part, I
am persuaded, there can be neither peace nor security while such a
monster reigns."
"Mr. Watts and Omichund[111] are at Moorshedabad, and have many
meetings with the great men. The last letter I received from Mr.
Watts, he desires that our proposals may be sent, and that they only
wait for them to put every thing in execution; so that you may very
shortly expect to hear of a revolution which will put an end to all
French expectations of ever settling in this country again. The
Patans, who were coming this way, have been pacified by a sum of
money, and are returning to their own country. Had they approached
near, every thing would have been overset in this country, from
three fourths of the Nabob's army being against him. It is a most
disagreeable circumstance, to find that the troubles are likely to
commence again: but the opinion here is universal, that there can
be neither peace nor trade without a change of government."
When Chandernagore was taken, Clive's next object was to root out
the French from this quarter of India. This appears from all his
letters, public and private. It was, as he repeatedly states, his
confirmed opinion, that the English and their European rivals could
not have coexistence, as political powers, in India; and both had
gone too far to be able to recede. The superiority was, therefore, to
be decided by the sword; and on this ground, he deemed it to be his
duty to follow up the success which had attended the British arms,
by the pursuit and capture of such of the European enemy as yet
remained in Bengal.
The corps under the command of M. Law, when joined by the
deserters and French officers, and men who had broken their parole,
or escaped from Chandernagore, amounted to only a hundred
Europeans and sixty sepoys; but they were, notwithstanding his
protestations to the contrary, protected by the Nabob, who evidently
looked to them as auxiliaries in a war which he anticipated with the
English.
The hopes with which the French continued to feed him, and in
which they themselves probably indulged, of receiving
reinforcements from Bussy through Cuttack, were not of a nature to
be treated with neglect. The great plan formed by Dupleix, and
executed by Bussy, of establishing a paramount power and influence
in the Deckan, had, to a great degree, succeeded; and though
commercial considerations had, during the short interval of peace in
Europe, led to an opposite policy, which condemned the whole
system pursued by the French governor as one of irrational
ambition, and irreconcileable with the interests of the French
company, the moment war with England occurred, prudential
resolutions were forgotten, and every preparation was made to
establish the French supremacy in India. Godeheu, who succeeded
Dupleix, and who, at first, appeared only anxious to abandon all his
predecessor had gained, now sought to preserve and improve every
advantage which yet remained, as the result of former measures.
Bussy was promised early support, and directed to maintain the
possessions ceded to France, which extended six hundred miles
along the coast of Coromandel, and Orissa, from Moodappely south,
to the pagoda of Juggernaut, north.
Under such circumstances, nothing appeared more likely, than that
this able and enterprising officer should have reinforced his
countrymen in Bengal: and the probable consequences of a party of
any strength co-operating with the Nabob, were of a character that
justified all the jealousy and alarm which Admiral Watson and Clive
entertained upon this subject; and quite authorised them in those
decided measures they adopted for the permanent security of the
British factories and territories in Bengal and Bahar. To have stopped
short—much more to have left the country—before this important
object was accomplished, would have been to cast away the fruits of
their success, and to have uselessly wasted all the blood and
treasure that had been already expended in this memorable
expedition.
That these were the sentiments of Clive at this period, is proved by
the purport of all his letters, public and private; and these afford
strong evidence that he by no means contemplated success as
certain. In a letter (dated the 11th of March) to Mr. Orme, who was
his agent at Madras, he requests him to remit his money to Calcutta,
to be sent to England, as "the times were dangerous." Such facts
are important, as they prove, that the measures he found himself
compelled at this period to adopt originated in a sense of duty, and
not in that spirit of ambition, and desire of wealth and personal
aggrandizement, which have been stated by some as the chief, if not
sole, motives of his conduct at this remarkable epoch of his life.
I have already spoken of the designs of the French, and the means
they had of carrying them into execution. I shall now examine how
far they were likely to be aided by Suraj-u-Dowlah.
Aliverdi Khan, the grand-uncle and predecessor of the reigning
Nabob, had protected those European factories which he found
established under the authority of firmans, or mandates, from the
emperors of Delhi. He gained an increase of revenue by the duties
on that commerce which the enterprise of these foreign merchants
encouraged; and he taxed the wealth they accumulated, by making
them give to him or his officers occasional presents, and by
compelling them to contribute their portion of the sums he had so
frequently to pay the Mahrattas, to purchase either exemption from
attack, or the retreat of their predatory bands from Bengal. The
sums thus levied were, during Aliverdi's government, not
immoderate; and the policy of that able prince made him so vary the
time of his demands, that they came at distinct periods, and under
different pretexts, upon the different factories: for though, no doubt,
fearful of the union of the Europeans settled in his country, he was
sufficiently acquainted with their national jealousies to know, that
nothing but a dread of ruin, operating at the same moment upon
them all, could lead them to combine in any effort to oppose his
demands.
His grand-nephew, Suraj-u-Dowlah, was of a very different character
from Aliverdi Khan. The latter, trained amid the vicissitudes of
fortune, showed, in every measure he adopted, that he merited the
throne which he had usurped. His successor, cradled in prosperity,
came into power without an effort, and evinced, in every action, a
weak and feeble mind, that had no objects but those of self-
gratification, which he sought by means that were usually as cruel
and unjust, as they were arbitrary and violent. This prince early
showed that he owned no check upon such dispositions but that of
personal fear: his cowardice fully equalled his presumption, and both
were excessive. In looking round for objects of plunder after he
ascended the musnud, or throne, the English settlements at
Cossimbazar and Calcutta attracted his peculiar attention, on
account of the reputed wealth, not only of the Europeans, but of the
natives who had settled under their protection. The injuries and
cruelties he had, in the prosecution of this object, inflicted upon the
nation and upon the individuals whom he had wantonly attacked,
were of a nature which a mind like his could not believe would ever
be forgotten or forgiven. The disgrace he had sustained, in being
obliged to fly before the British arms, and to purchase peace by
concessions and a partial restitution of plunder, rankled in his breast;
and, alarmed at a power he had hitherto contemned, he sought the
alliance of the French, whose co-operation he now regretted he had
not earlier obtained.
The government of Chandernagore had so far conciliated him, that
they refused to join the English in their efforts to compel him to
make reparation for his injustice and oppression; though the
armistice which they desired was offered them as the reward of their
adopting a cause which, had commercial considerations alone
regulated their proceedings, was obviously that of every European
settled in Bengal. But Suraj-u-Dowlah well knew that other feelings
actuated both the English and French, and that each desired the
total expulsion of the other from his territories. Acting upon this
knowledge, and with that deep exasperation which belongs to the
wounded pride of a despot, he secretly courted the French, to
avenge himself on those by whom he had been defeated and
humbled. He at first sent aid to Chandernagore. His subsequent
assent, imperfect as it was, to the attack of that place, was only
extorted by the fear of the moment; and it was retracted almost as
soon as given. He still cherished hopes that the French garrison
might repel their enemies; but their early surrender, and the whole
character of the attack, particularly the tremendous fire of the men-
of-war, filled his mind with a mixture of dread, and irreconcileable
jealousy and hatred, towards a nation who, in a few months after he
had exulted in his triumph over their defenceless factory, had
established themselves in his country, in a position which already
caused the native princes and chiefs to view them as the future
arbiters of India.
The British commanders were, no doubt, at this period prepared to
consent to any settlement, which gave them indemnity for the past,
and security for the future, rather than incur the hazards of war, at a
moment when they could, in case of reverse, expect no succour: for
the very force by which it must be carried on was urgently required
on the coast of Coromandel. But the mind of Suraj-u-Dowlah was
quite incapable of comprehending the nature and force of such
grounds of action. He probably thought they would act as he would
have done if success had favoured his arms: perhaps he still rested
on his own strength, and the hopes held out by the French.
Whatever were his motives, so far from showing a disposition to
pursue a course which might lead the British authorities to confide in
him, he hurried on to the adoption of every measure that could
produce a contrary impression; and, in a very short period
subsequent to the fall of Chandernagore, it became quite obvious,
that his continuing Nabob of Bengal was irreconcileable with every
prospect of peace to the English settled in that country; and that the
departure of the fleet, and a very considerable proportion of the
troops, for Madras, would be the certain signal for renewed
hostilities. But the immediate causes of the war, which terminated in
the dethronement and death of this ill-fated prince, must now be
stated.
The sentiments Clive had formed of the Nabob's character and policy
have been fully given in his letter[112] to Mr. Pigot, already quoted.
The proofs that his conclusions were just are to be found in various
documents, but particularly in the letters from Mr. Watts[113], and in
the communications made by the Nabob to the French officers Bussy
and Law, some of which were intercepted at the time, and others
found after the battle of Plassey.
Before Chandernagore was taken, accounts of the Nabob's overtures
to Bussy had been sent by Mr. Watts, the correctness of whose
statements was corroborated at that period from other quarters, and
their truth subsequently confirmed, by the copies of the letters being
found at Moorshedabad.
In a letter to Bussy, about the end of February, the Nabob
observes[114]: "These disturbers of my country, the Admiral and
Colonel Clive (Sabut Jung[115]), whom bad fortune attend! without
any reason whatever, are warring against Zubat ul Toojar[116] (M.
Renault), the governor of Chandernagore. This you will learn from
his letter. I, who in all things seek the good of mankind, assist him in
every respect, and have sent him the best of my troops, that he may
join with them, and fight the English; and if it become necessary, I
will join him myself. I hope in God these English, who are
unfortunate, will be punished for the disturbances they have raised.
Be confident; look on my forces as your own. I have wrote you
before for two thousand soldiers and musqueteers under the
command of two trusty chiefs. I persuade myself you have already
sent them, as I desired; should you not, I desire you will do me the
pleasure to send them immediately. Further particulars you will learn
from M. Renault. Oblige me with frequent news of your health."
In another letter, written in the end of March, the Nabob adds: "I am
advised that you have arrived at Echapore. This news gives me
pleasure: the sooner you come here, the greater satisfaction I shall
have in meeting you. What can I write of the perfidy of the English?
They have, without ground, picked a quarrel with M. Renault, and
taken by force his factory. They want now to quarrel with M. Law,
your chief at Cossimbazar; but I will take care to oppose and
overthrow all their proceedings. When you come to Ballasore, I will
then send M. Law to your assistance, unless you forbid his setting
out. Rest assured of my good will towards you and your Company;
and to convince you of my sincerity, I now send purwannahs
(orders) to Deedar Ali, and Ramajee Pundit, and to Rajaram Singh,
that, as soon as you may enter the province, they may meet and
lend you all possible assistance, and not, on any pretence, impede
your march, both at Cuttack, Ballasore, and Midnapore."
Copies of these letters had been seen at the time of dispatch by
Cojah Wazeed, who had communicated their contents to Mr. Watts;
and this intelligence was corroborated by the fact that servants of
the Nabob, in charge of an elephant and jewels for M. Bussy, had
passed Ballasore; and by the protection given to M. Law, who,
notwithstanding his professions to the contrary, was retained in the
service of Suraj-u-Dowlah.
That prince at first seemed not to oppose the surrender of this small
party of the French to the English; he afterwards pretended to
banish them from his dominions, and they marched from
Moorshedabad for Patna, but in consequence of a note[117] from the
Nabob, M. Law remained at Rajhmahal, the manager of which
district had been directed to supply him with money, and to aid him,
in every way he could, until Bussy's approach.
The Nabob by these acts, by his positive refusal to allow the English
to proceed up the river, by his non-performance of some of the
articles of the treaty, and by his advancing a part of his army to
Plassey, had placed himself in a position hostile to the Company: but
he artfully desired to throw the odium of renewed hostilities upon
the English. He complained of the continuance in the field of the
troops under Clive, and of the fleet's lying off Chandernagore. If the
British commanders would return to Calcutta, or leave the river, he
would, he said, withdraw his advanced corps from Plassey, and
remain on friendly terms, as he would then be convinced that the
object of the English was commerce, not war! This was the purport
of several communications; but every day brought proof of their
insincerity, and shewed that the Nabob's sole object was to lull them
into a fatal security, till, from the departure of their force and the
arrival of his French allies, he could accomplish his design of
extirpating them from his dominions.
An intercepted letter[118] from M. Law to the chief of one of the
lesser French factories, afforded, of itself, proof of this fact, had any
been wanting: but the indiscretion of the Nabob was too great to
allow him to conceal his designs; and a number of the chief nobles
and ministers of his government, who had long been discontented
with his rule, perceiving what must early happen, sought the alliance
of the English, concluding that they must desire the dethronement of
a prince whose continuance in power was incompatible with their
existence.
One of the chief causes that had hitherto kept the Nabob in check,
was the dread of the Affghân conquerors of Delhi: but news had
arrived of their prince Ahmed Abdalla having returned to his own
country, and its effects were soon visible in the threatening language
and conduct of Suraj-u-Dowlah towards the resident, who now
earnestly recommended Clive to lose no time in decidedly attaching
himself to the party already formed against the Nabob. In one
letter[119] Mr. Watts observes, "Jugget Seit, Runjutroy, Omichund,
and others, in short all degrees of persons, are persuaded he (the
Nabob) will break his agreement, and attack us whenever he is
disengaged, or our forces weakened by your leaving us and the
departure of the men-of-war, or whenever he can be assisted by the
French."
The resident commences a letter, written two days after the one
quoted, with the following strong expression: "The Nabob will not
keep his agreement. This you may depend upon." He mentions that
Suraj-u-Dowlah himself publicly speaks in this tone; but adds that
three fourths of his army were his enemies.
The most serious of all the dangers with which the English were
threatened at this period, was the expected arrival of Bussy, of
whose real movements they had no correct intelligence. We find a
letter, under date the 14th of May, A. D. 1757, from Mr. Drake,
Governor of Calcutta, to Colonel Clive, which states: "The report that
has so long been rumoured of M. Bussy's march into this province is
now verified, by advice from the Ballasore factory of the 10th
instant, certifying that M. Bussy was advanced five days on this side
Cuttack, with seven hundred Europeans and five thousand sepoys."
This was the very circumstance, the probability of the occurrence of
which had constituted the chief ground on which the Admiral and
Clive had urged the Nabob to give them substantial proof of his
friendly disposition, by abandoning wholly all connection with their
enemies. Admiral Watson, in his correspondence with him, had
insisted strongly upon this point. Alluding to the Nabob's frequent
evasions upon this and other subjects, the Admiral writes in his
letter[120] of the 19th of April, "I observe in your letter the following
particulars, viz. That for my satisfaction, and according to our mutual
agreement to look upon each other's enemies as our own, you have
expelled M. Law and his adherents from your dominions, and given
strict orders, &c. &c. My brother, Mr. Watts, who is entrusted with all
the Company's concerns, always writes me the particulars of your
intended favours towards us; but I have never found that what he
writes is put into execution; neither do I find that what you wrote
me in your letter, dated the 1st of Rajub (22d of March), is yet
complied with. You therein assured me that you would fulfil all the
articles you had agreed to, by the 15th of that moon. Have you ever
yet complied with them all? No.—How then can I place any
confidence in what you write, when your actions are not
correspondent with your promises? Or how can I reconcile your
telling me in so sacred a manner you will be my ally, and assist me
with your forces against the French, when you have given a
purwannah to M. Law and his people to go towards Patna, in order
to escape me, and tell me it is for my satisfaction, and in observance
of the mutual agreement, you have taken this measure? Is this an
act of friendship? Or is it in this manner I am to understand you will
assist me? Or am I to draw a conclusion from what you write? or
what you do? You are too wise not to know, when a man tells you
one thing, and does the direct contrary, which you ought to believe.
Why then do you endeavour to persuade me you will be my friend,
when at the same time you give my enemies your protection, furnish
them with ammunition, and suffer them to go out of your dominions
with three pieces of cannon? Their effects I esteem a trifling
circumstance, and as far as they will contribute to do justice to your
people who are creditors to the French Company, I have no
objection to your seizing them for their use; for money is what I
despise, and accumulating riches to myself is what I did not come
out for. But I have already told you, and now repeat it again, that
while a Frenchman remains in this kingdom, I will never cease
pursuing him: but if they deliver themselves up, they shall find me
merciful, and I am confident those who have already fallen into my
hands will do me the justice to say, that they have been treated with
a much greater generosity than is usual by the general custom of
war."
Clive, in several letters to Mr. Watts, written immediately after the
fall of Chandernagore, urges the surrender or expulsion of the
French, as an indispensable condition of the Nabob's continued
friendship with the English. Every artifice was used by Suraj-u-
Dowlah to evade compliance with this urgent and repeated demand.
He first pleaded the debts due by the French to his subjects:—he
was told, that the property of their Company could be made
responsible for such debts. He next stated the loss of revenue to the
Emperor, from duties paid on their trade:—this duty[121], he was
told, had been estimated at 60,000 rupees, and would henceforward
be paid by the English. Driven by these propositions from every
ground of evasion, and not yet willing to declare openly his real
intentions, the Nabob publicly directed the march of M. Law towards
the dominions of the vizier of Oude, but with no design, as has been
before shown, that the French should leave his territories.
During the siege of Chandernagore, Roydullub, the principal minister
of Suraj-u-Dowlah, had been sent, with a considerable body of men,
to occupy an entrenched camp at Plassey. This armed force, which
was meant to awe the English into attention to the Nabob's wishes,
was not only continued after the French settlement was taken, but
was reinforced by a party under the Bukhshee[122] (or commander
of the army), Jaffier Ali Khan, and the future intentions of the Nabob
were almost publicly proclaimed, when his officers not only
prevented the passage of a few sepoys up the river to Cossimbazar,
but stopped the supplies of ammunition and stores necessary to
restore that factory to its former state.
These orders, Mr. Watts wrote Clive, the Nabob's officers were
commanded to enforce, by cutting the noses and ears of every one
that attempted to pass the stations where they were posted.
Such a state of affairs could not continue long. The important events
of which they were the prelude will occupy the next chapter; but
before we enter upon the narrative of them, it will be useful to take
a concise view of the nature and construction of the power of Suraj-
u-Dowlah, as well as the reputation and influence of his principal
leaders and officers: for without such knowledge it is quite
impossible to understand, much less to judge, the conduct of Clive in
those wide scenes of intrigue, war, and negotiation, into which he
was at this period compelled to enter, or else to abandon his half-
executed enterprise.
 FOOTNOTES:
[102] The distance of the northern part of the country ceded to
Bussy was not two hundred miles from Calcutta, through Cuttack.
[103] Admiral Watson's letter, dated March 6th, 1757.
[104] 7th March, 1757.
[105] Mr. Scrafton, in a letter to Mr. Watts, dated the 20th of
March, 1757, written by desire of Colonel Clive, observes, "The
ten[106] letters received from the Nabob yesterday are sufficient
evidences of his irresolution and variable disposition. Besides
these letters, one Mutrumul, whom the Nabob mentions as a
person in whom he has great confidence, has been here. The
chief purpose of his embassy seems to be to act as a mediator, if
peace is to be effected between the French and us; but, if not, it
should appear the Nabob will trouble himself no more about it. At
all events, things no longer remain upon the Nabob's
determination. The ships and batteries will all begin to play at
daybreak in the morning; and two days will, at the utmost, decide
their fate."
[106] Sic: query, two?
[107] Owing to the anchor of the Kent not holding, she drifted
from her appointed station to that fixed upon for the Salisbury,
close to the south-east bastion; and the latter vessel was,
consequently, thrown out of action.
[108] 29th March, 1757.
[109] Called a four-gun battery in Clive's report to the Governor
of Fort St. George, p. 194.
[110] 30th April, 1757.
[111] Omichund was a native agent employed by Mr. Watts. A full
account of this person will be given hereafter.
[112] Vide p. 199.
[113] Mr. Watts continued through this period Resident at the
Nabob's court at Moorshedabad.
[114] Reports of House of Commons, vol. iii. p. 221.
[115] Sabut Jung (which signifies "daring in war") is the title by
which Clive is to this day known among the natives of India.
[116] Zubat-ul-Toojar, the title of the French chief, means "the
essence or excellence of merchants."
[117] The following is the translation of the note from Suraj-u-
Dowlah to M. Law: "I send you ten thousand rupees for
expenses. Remain quiet at Rajhmahal. When M. Bahadre, &c.
come on this side Cuttack, I will then send for you."
Parliamentary Reports, vol. iii. p. 221.
[118] The following is a copy of this letter: "Je viens de recevoir
une lettre du Nabob, par laquelle il m'ordonne de retourner à
Muxadabad. Il vient, dit-il, se joindre à nous, pour tomber sur les
Anglais. J'ai reçu aussi une lettre du Sieur Çhangeau, qui me
donne d'assez bonnes nouvelles. Je suis surpris, que vous ne
m'avez pas écrit; car je ne puis croire que vous soyez tout-à-fait
ignorant de ce que se passe. J'envois M. de Sinfray au Nabob,
avec lequel il est chargé d'entrer en négociation. Il a ordre de
rester à notre loge. Comme il est votre ancien, vous aurez la
bonté de le reconnoître pour chef, et de lui obéir en cette qualité.
Peut-être irai-je bientôt vous trouver."
[119] 26th April, 1757.
[120] Ive's Voyage, p. 149.
[121] The particulars of this offer are in a letter from Mr. Walsh to
Mr. Watts of the 11th April, 1757, written by order of Colonel
Clive.
[122] Bukhshee, literally means "Paymaster;" but that office is, in
native armies, almost invariably associated with the station of
commander-in-chief.