A/HRC/60/CRP.

5
16 September 2025

English only

Human Rights Council

Sixtieth session

Plundering a Nation: how rampant corruption unleashed a

human rights crisis in South Sudan
Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan
A/HRC/60/CRP.5

Preface
1. South Sudan is once again on the brink of catastrophe. By mid-2025, the Revitalized
Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (“the Revitalized
Agreement”) lay in tatters, as the country spiralled into renewed conflict marked by aerial
bombardments by the South Sudan Peoples Defence Forces (SSPDF), arbitrary political
detentions of key opposition leaders, as well as armed clashes between signatory parties, and
former allies. Killed, displaced and starved, civilians are bearing the brunt of the human rights
crisis, while violence by SSPDF in populated civilian areas signals a return to full-scale war.
Prospects for a credible and democratic leadership transition have been severely
compromised, even as the grave failure of State responsibility and international inaction
precipitate a preventable humanitarian emergency, marked by renewed famine alerts.
2. The political unravelling of 2025 is entirely engineered: a culmination of seven years
of deliberate undermining of the Revitalized Agreement, whose core provisions political
leaders have consistently failed to implement. Critical reforms, particularly the public
financial management, accountability, and security sector reforms, have been neglected;
despite their potential to consolidate the transition, curb corruption, and de-incentivize the
violent competition and pillaging of national resources that has long characterised South
Sudanese politics. This inaction is a calculated strategy of predation and systematic
mismanagement of governance, designed to enrich narrow elite interests and entrench power
through the plunder of the country’s resources.
3. South Sudan’s political economy is constructed around an entrenched rent-seeking
patronage network, through which elites convert public resources into private power,
depriving citizens of their most basic rights. Although the 2018 Revitalized Agreement
promised structural change, it has barely dented this architecture of extraction. Factional
elites continue to deploy armed violence to capture revenue streams, weaponize State
institutions and silence dissent. The ensuing cycle of grand corruption aided by total impunity
has produced a devastating humanitarian and human rights crisis. As the Commission shows,
today’s crisis is a direct extension and outcome of entrenched networks and practices,
including devastating violent competition over who controls national wealth.
4. Resistance to establishing and deploying the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF; the new
national army to be formed under the Revitalized Agreement), and the failure to develop a
coherent national security doctrine, have fomented the latest wave of armed violence and
associated human rights violations. While more decisive tactical steps – such as the timely
deployment of the NUF – might have averted the recent clashes in opposition-affiliated areas
like Nasir Town and other parts of the country, the deeper structural problems remain. At the
core lies a profound unwillingness by elites to share political power and responsibility or
pluralize the political space. Reneging on the security commitments, including timelines
envisaged by the peace agreement, they refuse to undertake genuine security sector reform
and re-orientation of the security sector. Locked in a zero-sum competition for power and
control of resources and territory, South Sudan’s elites continue to pursue partisan political
ends, mobilizing and exploiting ethnic differences and tensions. They deliberately undermine
the prospects for sustainable peace and the protection of civilians – in clear violation of the
Government’s international human rights and humanitarian law obligations.
5. After losing major oil revenues during 2024 owing to the conflict in Sudan, and
reeling from the adverse impacts of fiscal mismanagement and corruption, South Sudan
entered 2025 in a significantly weaker economic position. Instead of using its limited funds
to meet basic needs of citizens, the Government prioritized spending on political and military
elites and sidelined the opposition groups. As a result, many more people could no longer
afford essential goods or access to essential services like food, healthcare, and education –
deepening inequality, and violating the State’s duties and obligations under international
human rights law.
6. In this context of reduced revenue, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in
Government (SPLM–IG) has maintained its control of State resources, tightening its grip on
the public purse, while deliberately starving the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

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in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) of funds and influence.1 In South Sudan’s patronage-driven

political economy, cash buys allegiance, and the Government has continued to outspend its
rivals. Through this lens, the expanded conflict in 2025 is best understood like every flare-
up before it: as a struggle over the country’s resources and the power they confer.
7. A critical component of the transitional arrangements under the Revitalized
Agreement is the adoption of a permanent constitution. Through a genuine consultative and
inclusive process, this would define the social contract for South Sudan, and establish the
foundational pillars of the rule of law and for the protection of human rights. National
elections would then be conducted on the basis of that constitution. Constitution-making is
critical for addressing the longstanding nation-building deficit, while also providing legal
clarity on the systems of government, the structure of national political leadership, and as a
basis for building a culture of constitutionalism. From a conflict prevention lens, the
mismanagement of the legal and political dimensions of constitution-making, electoral
processes and leadership renewal risks deepening existing divisions, and entrenching long-
term instability.
8. Regional instability is also increasingly undermining the fragile transition. South
Sudan’s strong political and economic historical ties to Sudan have made it acutely
vulnerable to the fallout from its northern neighbour’s ongoing conflict, with Sudanese
conflict parties vying for allies among South Sudanese elites and communities. South Sudan
is already hosting refugees and displaced populations from the Sudanese conflict, placing
additional strain on resources. Uganda – a close historical ally of the SPLM, and a key
guarantor of the Revitalized Agreement – has also become embroiled in the ongoing violent
internal political contestations and power struggles, seemingly in disregard of its
responsibilities under that Agreement. Without sustained and constructive regional
engagement, principled mediation and constructive national leadership, committed to
implementing the transitional roadmap, South Sudan risks being further drawn into the wider
political and economic conflict in the region.
9. South Sudan’s crisis starkly confirms the relevance of the analysis and findings of this
report, which expose the workings and grave human rights impacts of a political economy
driven by rapacious predation, rampant corruption, violent competition, and wilful neglect of
the rights and wellbeing of current and future generations, all of which are increasingly
entangled with regional conflict dynamics and political economies. Confronting these
multiple dimensions, though challenging, is essential, if the devastating cycle of impunity is
to be broken, and South Sudan’s transition, as envisaged in the Revitalized Agreement, is to
be salvaged.

1In the first half of 2025, this has included an SPLM-IG campaign implemented by security forces to forcibly dismantle checkpoints
on roads and rivers, which constitute a significant source of illicit revenue for SPLM/A-IO.

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Contents
Glossary of terms ................................................................................................................................................................ 6
Summary, key findings and recommendations ................................................................................................................... 8
I. Mandate and methodology........................................................................................................................................ 15
A. Mandate .............................................................................................................................................................. 15
B. Purpose and scope .............................................................................................................................................. 15
C. Methodology ...................................................................................................................................................... 16
II. Legal framework ................................................................................................................................................ 19
A. International human rights law ........................................................................................................................... 19
B. International criminal law................................................................................................................................... 21
C. Corruption and human rights under international law ........................................................................................ 22
D. Human rights responsibilities of businesses ....................................................................................................... 24
E. Domestic law of South Sudan ............................................................................................................................ 24
F. Laws in the region and other jurisdictions .......................................................................................................... 26
III. Context ............................................................................................................................................................... 27
A. Underdevelopment ............................................................................................................................................. 27
B. Endemic economic crisis .................................................................................................................................... 28
C. Dependencies and debt risks .............................................................................................................................. 31
D. Humanitarian aid dependency ............................................................................................................................ 33
E. Impunity ............................................................................................................................................................. 34
F. Peace endangered ............................................................................................................................................... 36
IV. Government revenues ......................................................................................................................................... 38
A. Oil Revenue ........................................................................................................................................................ 38
Key figures ............................................................................................................................................................... 38
Historical linkages between oil and armed conflict .................................................................................................. 39
Infrastructure and operators ...................................................................................................................................... 40
Declining production and revenue ............................................................................................................................ 41
Diversion and corruption .......................................................................................................................................... 43
Harms to health and the environment ....................................................................................................................... 46
B. Non-oil revenues ................................................................................................................................................ 47
Underdevelopment and corruption limiting the tax base .......................................................................................... 47
Collections outsourced to Crawford Capital Ltd. ..................................................................................................... 48
Personal income tax .................................................................................................................................................. 52
South Sudan Revenue Authority ............................................................................................................................... 54
V. Government spending and use of available resources ........................................................................................ 55
A. Distribution of spending in budget processes ..................................................................................................... 56
B. ‘Oil for Roads’ off-budget diversion scheme ..................................................................................................... 57
C. On-budget diversions ......................................................................................................................................... 61
D. Lack of oversight ................................................................................................................................................ 63
VI. Economic, social and cultural rights impacts of corruption ............................................................................... 64
A. Right to food....................................................................................................................................................... 65
B. Right to health .................................................................................................................................................... 68

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C. Right to education .............................................................................................................................................. 71

D. Rights of children ............................................................................................................................................... 74
VII. Gendered human rights impacts of corruption ................................................................................................... 75
A. Gendered deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights ........................................................................... 75
B. Chronic marginalization of gender mandates ..................................................................................................... 76
VIII. Conclusions and recommendations .................................................................................................................... 78
A. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................................ 78
B. Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................. 79
Annex: Response from the Government of South Sudan ................................................................................................. 88

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Glossary of terms
Law and policy instruments
CEDAW: UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women.
CRC: UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
ICESCR: UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Revitalized Agreement: 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the
Republic of South Sudan.
SDGs: UN Sustainable Development Goals.
Entities
Joint operating companies: consortia operating and managing oil production in South Sudan.
NUF: Necessary Unified Forces (the national army to be formed under the Revitalized
Agreement).
OPP: Other Political Parties, a Revitalized Agreement signatory and Transitional
Government member.
SPLM/A-IO: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition, a Revitalized
Agreement signatory and Transitional Government member.
SPLM-IG: Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Government, a Revitalized Agreement
signatory and the largest Transitional Government member.
SSOA: South Sudan Opposition Alliance, a Revitalized Agreement signatory and
Transitional Government member.
SSPDF: South Sudan People's Defence Forces.
The Hybrid Court: Hybrid Court for South Sudan, to be established under Chapter V of the
Revitalized Agreement, alongside the Reparation Authority and the Truth Commission.
The Reparation Authority: Compensation and Reparation Authority.
The Truth Commission: Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing.
Terms
Cost oil: a provision of South Sudan's oil Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements
that govern the joint operating companies, specifying how operating and capital expenses can
be recovered. While this mechanism caps the expenses consortia can recover, it has priority
claim over profit oil, which the Government shares in to a greater extent than the consortia.
National budget for ministries and government entities (or, the regular national budget): the
budget component for core government functions and services, after significant off-budget
allocations in the overall national budget, and not subject to regular oversight and control.
Non-concessional loan: a financial arrangement extended on commercial, market-based
terms, without the preferential interest rates, grace periods, or repayment conditions which
are features of concessional loans.
Off-budget: transactions and financial practices that circumvent the official budget process.
Oil-backed loan: typically a commercial loan to the Government on non-concessional terms,
for which the country's future oil revenue is used as security.
Oil cargo: a quantity of South Sudan's crude oil transported as a single shipment, lifted at
Port Sudan (the Government’s oil cargoes are 600,000 barrels, as per its current practices).
Oil pre-payment: the Government’s practice of requiring an oil buyer to make a 70 to 80 per
cent prepayment on an oil cargo at the time of it being awarded, rather than the more standard
30 to 60 days after lifting the cargo at Port Sudan.

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Oil pre-sale: the Government’s practice of taking an upfront payment in exchange for a
commitment to allocate future oil cargoes in service of that debt.
Parallel exchange rate: the informal currency exchange rate that more accurately reflects the
true market value of the South Sudan Pound for unofficial transactions, free from the artificial
restrictions of the Bank of South Sudan's official exchange rate.

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Summary, key findings and recommendations

10. This Conference Room Paper examines patterns and instances of human rights
violations associated with corruption and related crimes in South Sudan. It has been issued
by the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan in fulfilment of its mandate from the
United Nations Human Rights Council, which requires it to report on the situation of human
rights, clarify responsibility for violations of human rights and related crimes, and to provide
recommendations to prevent deterioration of the situation, with a view to its improvement.
Drawing primarily from information independently gathered by the Commission, this paper’s
main purpose is to identify the circumstances of corruption and economic crimes connected
to human rights violations, and to assist the Government of South Sudan by providing
recommendations, with a focus on its economic, social and cultural rights obligations.
11. Since 2017, the Commission’s work has included reporting on the human rights
impact of successive severe economic crises, systemic government corruption and economic
mismanagement, and human rights violations associated with the plundering of the country’s
natural resources, including those occurring in the contexts of armed conflict and associated
harms to the environment. In September 2021, the Commission issued a thematic Conference
Room Paper on human rights violations and related economic crimes: it concluded that
systematic grand corruption severely undermines government capacities to meet human
rights obligations, with direct and devastating consequences for South Sudanese lives, for
peace, and the country’s development.
12. To date, none of the Commission’s extensive recommendations to address corruption
and related economic crimes have been implemented by the Government. Corruption has
been further entrenched, by massive off-budget diversions of oil revenue and the privatization
of non-oil revenues collections, diverting more available resources from government
services. Given the current context, the results of the Commission’s ongoing monitoring are
reflected in this additional paper on the theme, drawing primarily from targeted meetings and
interviews conducted from between 2022 and 2024, government data, and related materials,
supplemented by information in the public domain.
13. This paper pays special attention to South Sudan’s obligations under the United
Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to
which it acceded on 5 February 2024. In particular, the paper highlights the Government’s
duty to progressively achieve full realization of the rights to food, health, and education:
these rights are not only fundamental to human dignity, but also indispensable to the survival
and wellbeing of the population, and they must be respected, protected and fulfilled by the
Government. These rights are further reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), reinforcing South Sudan’s commitment to international development and human
rights standards, under which the Government is obliged to direct maximum available
resources toward fulfilling these rights. This key principle also informs the broader frame for
addressing the full range of human rights, all of which are indivisible, interdependent, and
interrelated.
14. How South Sudan collects and allocates public revenues is thus central to meeting the
State’s human rights obligations. Patterns of corruption and financial mismanagement
identified by the Commission—while not exhaustive—are emblematic of a broader and
systemic crisis. Moreover, these failures have direct implications beyond economic, social,
and cultural rights; they also violate civil and political rights, including, triggering repression
and conflict-related violations, while impeding access to justice. The misuse and
misappropriation of public funds invariably undermines the entire framework of rights
protection, and entrenches poverty, inequality, increasing State fragility.
Country context
15. Upon gaining independence in 2011, South Sudan emerged from decades of brutal
civil war with Sudan, burdened by a legacy of protracted and divisive armed conflict,
entrenched militarization, authoritarianism, violent internecine divisions, systemic State
repression, and chronic underdevelopment and poverty. While these historical legacies
bequeathed a deeply fractured and heavily militarised foundation for the State, the continued
entrenchment of inequality, systemic governance mismanagement, and worsening human

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rights crisis that continues to plague South Sudan 14 years after independence are attributable
to the predations and failures of ruling elites. These include their violent struggles for control
over national resources, enabled by a culture of impunity, deliberate sabotage of institutional
reforms, and endemic grand corruption.
16. The Commission calculated that from 2011 to 2024, the Government generated more
than $23 billion from oil exports and received at least $2.2 billion in oil-backed foreign loans.
Despite this vast revenue, its use remains almost entirely opaque: all parts of the country
remain underdeveloped, with basic government services and core functions missing or
severely deficient institutions are hollowed out; most people live in extreme poverty and
acute hunger; and health and development indicators rank amongst the worst globally.
Women and children bear the brunt of these conditions and disproportionately suffer the most
appalling life outcomes. These outcomes are not accidental. They are the direct results of the
nation’s wealth being captured and plundered by a small, corrupt elite: predatory actors who
siphon public resources for personal gain. Meanwhile, the State has effectively outsourced
its obligations to foreign donors, who now still spend more than the Government to address
basic needs. This support, while critical, is unsustainable and woefully inadequate.
17. Systemic corruption and impunity in South Sudan have become a single self-
reinforcing system. Institutions responsible for upholding the rule of law and ensuring
accountability are intentionally denied the basic financial, human and technical resources
required to operate effectively. The result is a hollowed-out governance system in name only,
where public institutions are unable or unwilling to serve the public interest. In September
2024, the transitional period was again extended, for another two years, and the first national
elections postponed again, officially citing “severe funding constraints”. Yet between 2022
and 2024, government revenues nearly reached $3.5 billion. Only a fraction of this was used
for transitional priorities; the remainder is largely unaccounted for, evidently stolen.
18. South Sudan has adopted a raft of anti-corruption laws, national policies and
commitments under the Revitalized Agreement, but none have been enforced. Like the
State’s failures to address international human rights law commitments, this is not a matter
of capacity: it’s a deliberate lack of political will. The persistent failure to act against
corruption, mismanagement and elite looting and plundering reflects entrenched interests that
benefit from the status quo. Unless meaningful enforcement begins, the country’s political
and economic transition will not just stall – it will unravel with grievous consequences for
the South Sudan’s people.
Key findings
19. The absence of transparency and accountability in the collection, management and
allocation of government revenues in South Sudan has facilitated the systemic
misappropriation of significant amounts of the country’s wealth by a narrow elite. This has
entrenched widespread deprivation among the general population, who live in conditions of
extreme poverty and food insecurity, with minimal access to essential government services,
and without the protection of their economic, social, and cultural rights. The diversion of
public funds – underpinned by entrenched corruption, patronage networks and near-total
impunity – constitutes a fundamental barrier to the realization of human rights and the State’s
fulfilment of its international obligations. These governance failures have become structural
drivers of inequality, political grievance, and recurring conflict, in violation of both domestic
constitutional duties and South Sudan’s obligations under international human rights law,
including the ICESCR.
20. South Sudan’s extensive natural and financial resources have been persistently
mismanaged, with government revenues systematically diverted at all stages – collections,
budgeting allocations, disbursements, and expenditure – away from essential public services,
and toward political elites and entrenched patronage systems. This deliberate redirection of
State resources constitutes a breach of the Government’s legal obligations under both
domestic law and international human rights law, including its duty to utilize the maximum
available resources for the progressive realization of rights under the ICESCR. The result is
a chronic failure to deliver basic services to the population, contributing directly to the acute
and deteriorating humanitarian and human rights crises, in which women and children suffer
disproportionate impacts. They bear the brunt of this deprivation, and the discriminatory

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impact of resource misallocation. This underscores the urgent need for accountability and
systemic reform.
21. The following patterns in government revenue collections and expenditure, and the
corresponding human rights impacts, are identified in this paper, illustrated with specific
examples.
22. On the context and circumstances of corruption and human rights violations (Part III):
a) South Sudan’s average Gross Domestic Product per capita is now just a quarter
of what it was at independence. Its Human Development Index ranking has declined to 192
out of 193 countries, underscoring the Government’s sustained neglect of the economy and
essential public services. More than four million South Sudanese remain displaced either
internally or as refugees. Although subsistence agriculture is the main source of livelihood,
the agricultural sector is acutely underdeveloped, leaving the country dependent on food
imports. A deepening economic crisis, primarily driven by government mismanagement,
continues to erode access to basic needs and entitlements.
b) Foreign donors continue to outspend the Government to support the
population, yet humanitarian aid remains woefully inadequate and fails to keep pace with
rising needs. Since humanitarians declared 2023 “the worst crisis since independence,” levels
of acute hunger have risen sharply.
c) Under article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and related jurisprudence, States have a positive duty to mobilise, manage
and deploy its “maximum available resources” — through equitable revenue collection and
transparency, accountable public expenditure — which is central to fulfilling its obligations
to respect, protect, and fulfil the full spectrum of human rights owed to their population.
South Sudan has manifestly failed to fulfil these international law obligations.
23. On the generation of available resources (revenues collected; Part IV):
a) Since 2011, the Government has reported oil-related inflows exceeding $25.2
billion: approximately $23 billion in revenue and $2.2 billion in oil-backed loans, without
providing any audited account of their use.
b) The unregulated and chaotic exploitation of South Sudan’s oil fields has
gravely undermined the State’s fiscal capacity to generate revenue. Persistent neglect of
infrastructure, the routine under-pricing of oil exports and systemic misappropriation of
public revenues through entrenched corruption reflects a pattern of deliberate misgovernance
and dereliction of fiduciary duty by those in positions of authority.
c) Oil production zones are flashpoints of conflict and gross human rights
violations, where corporate negligence is enabled by weak State oversight and enforcement,
which contribute to contamination of land and water, with disproportionate health impacts
on infants alongside the rest of the population.
d) South Sudan’s non-oil extractive sector is emerging as a new frontier for
corruption through revenue diversion. Most mining activity is informal or illicit, and
payments to corrupt officials are not recorded, and kept off-book.
e) A politically-connected company, Crawford Capital Ltd., captures an
inordinate share of non-oil revenues through irregular government 'e-services’. Under a 2019
agreement, Crawford retains a 75 per cent profit share of taxes it collects, an arrangement
extended in 2024 to an unlawful levy applied to tax-exempt humanitarian agencies, that
forced the suspension of critical food aid.
24. The South Sudan Revenue Authority has been complicit in Crawford’s schemes and
is implicated in additional diversions of non-oil revenues, in clear violation of articles 9 and
10 of the UN Convention against Corruption.
25. On the use of available resources (revenues spent; Part V):
a) Oil constitutes the primary source of government revenue, yet less than half of
its total value is allocated to essential services. Instead, a disproportionate share is absorbed

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by oil transfers to Sudan, debt repayments, opaque ‘special projects,’ and losses stemming
from mismanagement.
b) An estimated $2.2 billion has been channelled through the ‘Oil for Roads’
programme, an off-budget scheme widely condemned as a vehicle for corruption and political
patronage. The entire scheme is characterized by non-transparent opaque procurement
processes, uncompetitive contracting, and the channelling of public funds to politically
connected companies owned by political elites – notably Benjamin Bol Mel who was
appointed a Vice President in February 2025. Despite its stated infrastructure purpose, few
roads have been constructed. From July 2021 to June 2024, oil revenue directed to ‘Oil for
Roads’ amounted to around 60 per cent of the total money disbursed to national government
ministries and entities. Following the February 2024 shutdown of the main oil export pipeline
(resumed by May 2025 at reduced volumes), the Government allocated 100 per cent of
remaining oil entitlements to this scheme. Although the ‘Oil for Roads’ scheme was formally
excluded from the 2024-2025 national budget passed in November 2024, a similarly opaque
allocation for agriculture projects suggests that the practice of off-budget diversions will
continue: contravening principles of transparency, accountability, and the State’s
international law obligation to direct maximize available resources to the realization of
human rights.
c) Most ministries and government entities tasked with essential government
services are grossly underfunded. Between July 2020 and June 2024, the Ministry of Gender,
Child & Social Welfare spent $3.7 million, or a mere 0.1 per cent of the Government’s total
on-budget expenditure. Civil servants remain underpaid, and often unpaid, and little if any
money is reaching core services.
d) Budgetary decisions overwhelmingly favour institutions led by SPLM-IG,
close to executive power. From July 2020 to June 2024, the Ministry of Presidential Affairs
overspent its allocation by 584 per cent (nearly six times its allocation, at $557 million), while
critical sectors suffered: the Ministry of Health received just 19 per cent of its allocation (less
than one fifth, at $29 million), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security received
only 7 per cent (less than one-tenth, at $11 million).
e) Key financial oversight institutions are complicit in misappropriation.
Meanwhile rule of law institutions and accountability mechanisms are deliberately defunded
and stripped of independence, rendering them unable to combat the entrenched corruption.
f) Despite oil revenues comprising 85 to 90 per cent of total income, the
Government has failed to invest in diversifying the economy. Agriculture and non-oil sectors
remain underdeveloped. The constitutionally-mandated Future Generation Fund meant to
reserve oil wealth for the future has not been funded as required under domestic law as well
as intergenerational equity principles.
26. On the emblematic impacts on economic, social and cultural rights, and on the rights
of women and girls (Part VI and Part VII):
a) The majority of South Sudanese remain unable to access sufficient food, with
children suffering the most severe consequences. Acute food insecurity has considerably
worsened since independence in 2011; 76 of the country’s 79 counties were projected to
experience crisis-level hunger or worse by mid-2025. Despite the severity of this
humanitarian crisis, the Government allocated only 0.4 percent of total ministerial and
government entity expenditure to the two ministries responsible for agriculture, food security,
livestock, and fisheries over four consecutive national budgets (2020–2024). This sustained
pattern of underinvestment constitutes a violation of South Sudan’s obligations under article
11 of the ICESCR, which obliges States to utilise the maximum of their available resources
to progressively realize the right to adequate food, particularly for vulnerable and
marginalised groups including children.
b) South Sudan is facing one of the most severe public health crises globally.
Approximately one in 10 children die in infancy, with 75 per cent of these deaths deemed
preventable. Access to healthcare remains extremely limited: the few available health
workers are chronically overburdened, underpaid, and lack the essential medicines and basic
supplies required to deliver even minimal care. Notwithstanding these urgent and systemic

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deficiencies, government budget allocations reflect a stark misalignment with the State’s
public health obligations. In the 2022-2023 national budget, for example, greater funding was
allocated to the Presidential Medical Unit than to the combined community, public,
secondary, and tertiary public healthcare system. This pattern continued in the 2023-2024
fiscal year, where reported expenditure on “medical expenses” for the Office of the President
was comparable to the Ministry of Health’s total expenditure that year. These disparities
underscore a failure by the Government to prioritize the right to health, in breach of South
Sudan’s obligations under article 12 of the ICESCR, which requires States to take deliberate,
concrete, and targeted steps towards ensuring access to essential and quality healthcare for
all.
c) Education outcomes in South Sudan remain alarmingly poor, with an estimated
school enrolment rate of just 37.6 per cent at the primary level and 5.2 per cent at the
secondary level. Girls are disproportionately underrepresented, and women experience
significantly lower literacy rates. Even where schools do exist, they are grossly underfunded,
and many teachers remain unpaid or inadequately supported. Public expenditure patterns
reflect this neglect: across four successive budget years under the Transitional Government,
the Ministry responsible for higher education – accessible to few – received more than double
that of the Ministry responsible for schools. This misallocation contravenes South Sudan’s
obligations under article 13 of the ICESCR, which requires States to prioritize universal
access to free and compulsory primary education, and to ensure equitable educational
opportunities at all levels.
d) The Government’s persistent and systemic neglect of the population’s rights to
food, health and education constitutes not merely a failure of public service delivery: it is
emblematic of a deeper governance crisis marked by entrenched structural discrimination
and a deliberate disregard for economic, social and cultural rights. These omissions amount
to sustained breaches of South Sudan’s international law obligations and reflect a pattern of
State conduct that perpetuates cycles of poverty, marginalization and misery.
e) The deprivation of economic, social and cultural is deeply gendered. The
human rights impacts of systemic corruption are disproportionately borne by South Sudan’s
women and girls, including education, healthcare and maternal support, in flagrant violation
of its obligations under domestic law and international human rights law, particularly the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
and the ICESCR. These failures contribute directly to South Sudan’s ranking among the
worst globally for women’s literacy and maternal health. The exclusion and neglect of half
the population gravely undermines national development, entrenching cycles of inequality,
poverty, and structural discrimination.
f) South Sudan’s children are also disproportionately impacted by the country’s
systemic corruption, which constitutes a direct assault on their rights, survival and future
prospects. Rampant misappropriation of public resources has translated into some of the
world’s highest rates of acute malnutrition, preventable childhood illnesses and deaths. The
widespread denial of access to primary education, and the unlawful diversion of revenues
earmarked for the Future Generation Fund mandated by legislation, further amplify the
State’s abdication of its obligations. This sustained and systemic pattern of predation on the
rights and welfare of children violates South Sudan’s obligations under the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC). Corruption not only erodes childhood, but also entrenches
intergenerational cycles of poverty, marginalization and underdevelopment.
27. The Government of South Sudan has persistently and flagrantly violated its binding
obligation under article 2 (1) of the ICESCR, to deploy the maximum available resources
towards the realization of economic, social and cultural rights. Instead, powerful State
institutions have been systematically instrumentalized to divert and misappropriate national
wealth for the enrichment of political and military elites. The large-scale misappropriation
and diversion of oil revenues constitutes not only a betrayal of the population and a violation
of the State’s international human rights obligations. This is undermining State capabilities
to ensure the equitable distribution of national wealth, to fulfil the economic and social rights
of the population, as well as to mobilize and utilize the maximum available resources to
progressively realize rights such as health, education, and adequate living standards.

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28. Mechanisms for transparency, oversight and accountability in public finance are either
non-existent or deliberately dismantled. Grand scale corruption has flourished in an
environment of total impunity, enabled by the hollowing out of institutions responsible for
enforcing the rule of law and accountability institutions including anti-corruption bodies,
auditing authorities, and prosecutorial bodies. These institutions are chronically underfunded,
politically compromised, and stripped of their authority, or meaningful independence. In
contexts such as South Sudan, where oil revenues constitute the primary source of income,
the absence of public oversight mechanisms and the entrenchment of opaque financial
practices enable corruption and directly violate core good governance principles of
transparency and accountability. The Government’s persistent failure to combat corruption
and to disclose public financial information severely impairs the population’s right to access
information, participate in governance, and benefit from essential services. This failure not
only exacerbates structural inequality and systemic deprivation, but also amounts to a
deliberate denial of economic, social, and cultural rights, and constitutes breaches of binding
international legal obligations.
29. South Sudan’s persistent and deliberate non-compliance with its international
obligations under the ICESCR exposes it to scrutiny and review by global and regional
accountability and treaty bodies. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, which monitors implementation of the Covenant, may issue severe concluding
observations highlighting South Sudan’s failure to direct maximum available resources
toward realizing rights as well as its failure to ensure effective anti-corruption safeguards and
accountability measures. In egregious cases, persistent failures of governance may also
engage the attention of other UN bodies, including the Human Rights Council and the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, especially where there is evidence of deliberate
malgovernance and State-engineered dysfunction resulting in widespread harm and
suffering. Furthermore, where corruption, plunder and misappropriation of public resources
intersect with and fuel conflict, mass displacement, and deprivation, such conduct may also
fall within the purview of complementary legal frameworks such as the UN Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC), or regional mechanisms such as the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights. Continued impunity for large-scale economic crimes that
directly impact human rights may also strengthen support for future claims before
international accountability bodies, or fact-finding missions examining structural violence
and State responsibility.
30. South Sudan’s political leaders have consistently failed to demonstrate any genuine
political will to serve or protect citizens, or to fulfil even the State’s most basic obligations–
including the population’s most fundamental needs essential for dignity and survival. Instead,
the country has been captured by a predatory elite that has institutionalized the systematic
looting of the nation’s wealth for private gain. While a small group of powerful actors pillage
and loot the country’s wealth and resources, enriching themselves, the State has effectively
abdicated its sovereign responsibilities to its population, outsourcing critical services — such
as the provision of food, healthcare, and education to international donors. This abandonment
of duty has left the population at the mercy of volatile and insufficient humanitarian aid.
Grand-scale corruption is not incidental, keeping South Sudan in turmoil, it is the engine of
South Sudan’s crisis, fuelling State collapse, institutional paralysis and human misery. The
Government must be compelled to break this cycle through a demonstrable commitment to
address the population’s most essential socio-economic needs, to restore public trust, and to
foster accountable governance and the rule of law – critical for peace and human rights. The
Commission’s specific recommendations are directed at supporting the Government to meet
its binding constitutional and international law obligations, which it has thus far chosen to
neglect.
Key recommendations
31. The Commission's detailed recommendations to the Government of South Sudan
identify actions to implement obligations under international human rights law, in line with
domestic laws and policies, including the key measures summarized as follows:
a) Immediately re-orient budget processes and public spending to address the
economic and social rights of the population - most urgently for the rights to food, health and
education, as per the State's obligations under the ICESCR; this must be accompanied by

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meaningful investments in rule of law and oversight bodies to effectively combat corruption
and protect the full range of human rights.
b) Urgently address the systematic corruption and financial mismanagement
which undermine the State's ability to address the human rights of South Sudanese, including
by fully implementing Chapter IV of the Revitalized Agreement (on resource, economic and
financial management), and enforcing the anti-corruption provisions of domestic laws, which
include measures to identify, remove, dismiss and bar from public office individuals who are
implicated in grand corruption.
c) Combat systemic mismanagement and corruption in oil and non-oil revenues
streams by cancelling illicit and corrupt contracts, auditing oil production and sales, and
instituting lawful, competitive, credible and transparent public procurement processes. End
the off-budget diversions exemplified in the 'Oil for Roads' scheme and corrupt outsourcing
of revenues collections, ensure revenues are transparently recorded in national budgets, and
safeguard oil resources through contributions to the Future Generation Fund and other entities
as required under domestic law.
d) Invest meaningfully in diversifying South Sudan's economy: develop
agriculture and other sustainable non-oil productive sectors, end the extreme dependency on
finite oil resources, and initiate an economic strategy to reduce vulnerability to commodity
shocks and which supports inclusive and rights-based development.
32. The Commission's detailed recommendations to other stakeholders include:
a) To international partners, including States Members and organs of the African
Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the United Nations: situate anti-
corruption and human rights norms as central to engagements with the Government of South
Sudan, ensure that assistance enables and requires necessary reforms - while also avoiding
entrenching the existing corruption, lack of accountable governance and associated human
rights violations - including by pursuing available political, legal, and organizational
accountability mechanisms.
b) To private sector actors in South Sudan: conduct heightened human rights and
corruption due diligence, as part of the responsibility to respect human rights, and prevent
complicity in human rights abuses or violations, and grand corruption.

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I. Mandate and methodology

A. Mandate

33. The United Nations Human Rights Council established the Commission on Human
Rights in South Sudan in 2016 in its resolution 31/20, for an initial period of one year. The
Council extended the mandate for another year in resolution 34/25, requesting the
Commission to continue to monitor and report on the situation of human rights in South
Sudan, to make recommendations, and provide guidance on transitional justice. The Council
has subsequently extended the Commission’s mandate, each time for an additional year, in
its resolutions 37/31, 40/19, 43/27, 46/23, 49/2, 52/1, 55/1, and most recently 58/1 of 2 April
2025.2
34. The Council has requested the Commission “to determine and report on the facts and
circumstances of, to clarify responsibility for, violations and abuses of human rights and
related crimes,” and to “make recommendations to prevent further deterioration of the
situation with a view to its improvement.” In fulfilment of the Commission’s mandate, this
paper responds to these requests with a focus on violations of socio-economic rights, which
are directly linked to corruption and related economic crimes.
35. The current members of the Commission, appointed by the President of the Council,
are Yasmin Sooka (Chair), Barney Afako and Carlos Castresana Fernández. Members of the
Commission have conducted 13 visits to South Sudan, most recently in February 2025. The
Commission is supported by a Secretariat based in Juba, South Sudan.
36. The Commission extends its gratitude to the Government of South Sudan for
facilitating its visits, and for the cooperation extended to its Secretariat. The Commission is
also grateful for cooperation received from other governments, particularly in the region, and
from United Nations entities for logistical and related assistance. The Commission thanks all
those who have shared their experiences, expertise, or analysis, without whom its work would
neither be possible nor meaningful.

B. Purpose and scope

37. In its September 2021 paper, entitled “Human rights violations and related economic
crimes in the Republic of South Sudan,”3 and in earlier and subsequent reporting between
2017 and 2024, the Commission has found that political corruption and linked patronage
systems have severely undermined government capacities to meet human rights obligations,
endangered peace processes, and directly fuelled armed violence and associated gross human
rights violations. Further, the Commission has noted that government commitments to
address corruption have not been matched with accompanying political will and concrete
action, deepening impunity for crimes, eroding trust in government, and contributing to the
deteriorating human rights situation. All these findings remain true, and since the
Commission’s last thematic paper on economic crimes, corruption has further entrenched,
with worsening impacts seen in widespread deprivation across the country. None of the
Commission’s related recommendations have been duly taken up by the Government. Given
this context, the Commission has developed this additional paper on the theme.
38. This paper is issued to assist the Government and other stakeholders to identify
mechanisms and corrective measures related to corruption and diversion, which constitute
and drive human rights violations, and undermine peace prospects. The objectives are to: 1)
determine the facts and circumstances of human rights violations, corruption, and related
crimes in the generation of government revenues, and where these revenues are directed; 2)
highlight impacts of human rights violations associated with corruption; and 3) make
recommendations for addressing corruption and the associated human rights violations.

2 See https://www.ohchr.org/cohrsouthsudan.
3 A/HRC/48/CRP.3

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39. The applicable legal framework is detailed in Part II of this paper, after which the
Commission’s investigations and analysis are presented in four main areas:
a) The context, circumstances and situation of corruption and human rights
violations, including the structural drivers and human rights impacts (Part III).
b) The generation of government revenues, from oil and non-oil sources, which
are the available fiscal resources to fund government functions and services (Part IV).
c) The use of available resources by the Government, for which patterns and
trends are identifiable in budgeting processes, including off-budget diversions (Part V).
d) The human rights implications of how the Government allocates, spends and
otherwise directs revenues on the development and functioning of government institutions,
focused on economic, social and cultural rights impacts, which are emblematic of
implications for fulfilling the range of human rights (Part VI), and also focused on the
gendered impacts of the corruption (Part VII).
40. Part VIII reflects the Commission’s detailed conclusions and recommendations,
drawing on the findings of this paper, and making reference to findings of its other reporting.
41. As noted above, special attention has been given to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – which South Sudan acceded to on 5 February 2024.
Beyond economic, social and cultural rights, many of the Commission’s findings have direct
implications for the full range of human rights, including civil and political rights, notably
access to justice, and rights codified in human rights treaties specific to women, and children. 4
42. This paper does not purport to reflect the full scale and prevalence of human rights
violations associated with corruption and related crimes in South Sudan, and their
associations with widespread predation, armed violence and conflict. Incidents have been
included that illustrate distinct patterns and trends, enabling conclusions on the drivers of
violations and crimes, and informing recommendations on what is required to address them.
The Commission’s findings on economic, social and cultural rights – within resource
constraints – are emblematic of the broader patterns of an immense crisis. These findings
also serve as a barometer of the political will that exists, and that which is needed, to fulfil
the range of human rights.

C. Methodology

Standards and sources

43. This paper has been prepared in accordance with established United Nations fact-
finding methodology and international standards, consistent with the Commission’s mandate.
It is based on the Commission’s independent collection and verification of testimonies,
documentation, and other forms of evidence. The analysis draws primarily from targeted
meetings and interviews conducted in South Sudan and seven other countries between late-
2022 and late-2024, supplemented by government records and financial data obtained by the
Commission.
44. The Commission has adopted a “reasonable grounds to believe” standard of proof,
consistent with its body of reporting, and guidance for United Nations commissions of
inquiry.5 This standard requires that findings are based on corroborated facts, or information
that would satisfy an objective observer that the violation, abuse, crime, or other act has
occurred.6 In this paper, findings are only included where the Commission was satisfied that

4 The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights makes no distinction between civil and political rights with economic, social and
cultural rights – all are treated on equal footing. The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme on Action on human rights affirms that
human all rights are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.
5 See “Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Guidance and

Practice”, 2015, https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/policy-and-methodological-publications/commissions-inquiry-and-fact-

finding-missions. See also “Realizing human rights through government budgets,” 2017,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/special-issue-publications/realizing-human-rights-through-government-budgets.
6 While the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard of proof is lower than that required to achieve a conviction in criminal

proceedings, in many cases it is sufficiently high to justify further investigations. For further discussion, see A/HRC/48/CRP.3.

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this standard of proof has been met, after obtaining a reliable body of information, consistent
with other material, upon which a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would believe
that the incident or pattern of conduct had occurred.
45. The main focus of this paper is on the State’s obligations under international human
rights law. Beyond such violations, many of the patterns and conduct detailed in the paper
involve violations of other laws, and criminal conduct for which individuals may bear
criminal responsibility under laws of South Sudan, and in some instances for international
crimes. Individual examples examined in this report are accordingly based on at least one
credible direct source of information – such as a direct witness of or participant in the conduct
– which was independently corroborated by at least one or more credible source(s) of
information.
46. The Commission is at all times guided by the principles of confidentiality, ‘do no
harm,’ and witness protection. Information identifying witnesses and sources has been
omitted, some details are omitted where sources are at particular risk of potential harm, and
a coding system designed to further protect individuals at risk has been used to reflect sources
in the footnotes.
47. The Commission engaged with a range of individuals and institutions who were able
to provide information based upon their direct knowledge, contextual knowledge, or as a
source or lead of corroborating information. The Commission collected and preserved
detailed statements, gathered confidential testimony, conducted meetings, participated in and
observed relevant forums and events, visited government offices and businesses in South
Sudan and in numerous other jurisdictions. The Commission also had access to
documentation, and witness testimony and analysis contained in the publications or
submissions of the United Nations, research institutions, and human rights organizations.
These materials were supplemented by the gathering of information in the public domain,
including through open-source investigations. The findings draw upon these investigations,
and reference materials previously gathered or reported by the Commission which support
the identification of patterns and trends.
48. For this paper, the Commission provided an advanced draft to the Government of
South Sudan on 17 July 2025, inviting it to respond to the findings and recommendations.
On 11 September 2025, the Commission received the Government’s response, which is
reflected in full in the annex to this paper.
Challenges, limitations and approaches
49. The investigation of the economic dimensions of human rights violations is complex.
The distinct challenges such investigations pose are heightened in South Sudan, where public
information is affected by the repression and reprisals against journalists and other
individuals who report or comment on corruption, transparency and access to information on
government activities is extremely limited, and the reliability of reported government data is
an issue.7
50. Given the irregularities, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in government revenue and
budget data, any analysis of South Sudan’s economy and public financial management must
acknowledge the limitations of dealing with this information, particularly regarding
accuracy. The Commission has previously reported on the Government’s deeply flawed
budgeting and expenditure processes. 8 The issues this presents includes that much of the
accounting is ‘off-budget,’ and that few government offices receive or spend their actual
budget allocation, among other issues. 9 Nonetheless, government budgets and execution
reports are indicative of priorities, and the degree to which the needs of the population are
acknowledged, and the extent to which the Government is dedicating the maximum available
resources to meet human rights obligations.
51. In this paper, the Commission has primarily conducted budget analysis in United
States dollars, except where otherwise indicated. There are several reasons for adopting this

7 See A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 280 and A/HRC/55/CRP.6, paras. 69, 76-79, 88, and 90.
8 A/HRC/52/CRP.3, paras. 285-286.
9 For example, in the 2022–2023 fiscal year, only three of 91 government agencies spent within 20 per cent of their allocated budget.

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approach. In addition to the primacy of the dollar in South Sudan, for pricing and transactions,
government revenue is almost exclusively derived in dollars.10 Beyond this role of the dollar,
the local currency has depreciated so significantly and consistently that one fiscal year cannot
be reasonably compared to another in local currency; thereby, analysis in dollars facilitates a
fair comparison. This rate of depreciation, however, induces errors in the conversion: for
example, the value of a budget allotment in South Sudan pounds (or South Sudanese pounds,
prior to the name change) at the start of the fiscal year is not be the same as the dollar value
of that allotment at the end of that year, with the currency depreciating more than 100 per
cent in some years. For this reason, the exact timing of budget execution induces errors in
each fiscal year.11 The Commission has sought to counteract this problem by converting local
currency budget values to dollars at the parallel rate in the month the budget was approved. 12
52. Although the Government conducts its transactions using its official exchange rate
and not the parallel rate, the official rate is artificially manipulated (as detailed in this paper)
and does not reflect the real purchasing power in an import-dependent economy where prices
are largely tied to the dollar, with currency depreciation becoming imported inflation. For the
Commission’s analysis, this was not a problem during the 2021-2022 and 2022-2023 fiscal
years, as there was little difference between the official and parallel rates. However, in 2020-
2021 and 2023-2024, the difference was large and diverted significant funds. The
Commission thereby adopted the parallel exchange rate for its analysis, which more
accurately represents the true value of spending, while also quantifying the sums lost to those
persons and institutions with privileged access to both exchange rates, in the maintenance of
the artificial Government rate.
53. The figures presented in this paper adopt current dollars (that is, dollars unadjusted
for inflation). For historical analysis of the entirety of the Government’s oil revenue and
official development assistance over its 14-year history, the Commission has adopted
constant December 2024 dollars. Analysis of the entirety of historic oil inflows is included
to capture for a reader in 2025 what the total value of oil inflows has been, so these can be
contrasted with development and other indicators during that time. Adjusting historic flows
for inflation more accurately represents this value. In adjusting these figures to constant
December 2024 US dollars, United States Government data has been used as a reference
point; specifically, Consumer Price Index data from its Bureau of Labor Statistics. Regardless
of the location of dollar-denominated transactions, the United States is the sole issuer and
monetary authority of the US dollar, and its domestic inflation rate is the most appropriate
measure for assessing changes in the currency’s real value over time (the purchasing power
of the dollar is determined by economic conditions and monetary policy within the United
States, irrespective of the geographical location in which the dollar-denominated transactions
take place).
54. Another challenge is the Government’s inconsistent approaches to including
commitments in the official budget or as ‘off-budget’ direct transfers. One example is the
‘Oil for Roads’ scheme, which in some years appears as ‘Capital Expenditure’ under the
Ministry of Roads and Bridges, in other years appears as ‘Other Mandatory Expenses’, or as
‘net acquisition of non-financial assets’, and sometimes is omitted entirely. For this reason,
the Commission dealt with ‘Oil for Roads’ exclusive of the Ministry of Roads and Bridges,
removing it from any of our budget analysis. Furthermore, where there was conflicting
information about money allocated to ‘Oil for Roads’ between the dollar-denominated
Ministry of Petroleum information and local currency-denominated Ministry of Finance and

10 The oil revenues and the taxation of humanitarian and international workers’ salaries in dollars.
11 The Commission has converted budget figures at the average official rates from the Bank of South Sudan, across each fiscal year,
unless we specifically state we are using the parallel rate. However, the exact timing of the budget disbursements within a fiscal year
mean the true US dollar value could be -17 per cent to +63 per cent for fiscal year 2020/2021, -8 per cent to +16 per cent for 2021–
2022, -17 per cent to +31 per cent for 2022–2023, and -2 per cent to +3 per cent for the first half of 2023–2024.
12 This crystalizes the value of the allocation at the time it was confirmed, regardless of what happens to the currency throughout the

year. For currency conversion of government spending, where the Ministry of Finance and Planning has published quarterly budget
execution reports, the Commission has converted expenditure at the average parallel exchange rate for that quarter. Where quarterly
reports are not available, conversion at the average parallel exchange rate for the fiscal year has been adopted; this increases the size
of possible currency conversion errors, due to the timing of the transaction during the year and the rate of depreciation.

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Planning information, the dollar-denominated information from the Ministry of Petroleum

has been adopted.
55. Further inconsistencies are found in production levels and oil marketing from the
Ministry of Petroleum. For example, figures in its reports to the international community and
presented in public forums are inconsistent with information on the Ministry’s website. The
Ministry also presents generalized figures on ‘Cost Oil’ 13 percentages, which do not appear
to reflect actual operating expense levels, and impact government oil entitlements. Other
conflicting data includes inconsistent representations of the same figure across different
Ministry of Finance and Planning publications, and conflicting non-oil revenue collection
data from publications of the Ministry and the South Sudan Revenue Authority.

II. Legal framework

56. Corruption is a human rights issue: by diverting national resources, corruption
deprives the State of resources for fulfilling core human rights obligations; it also acts as a
driver of other violations and related crimes, including in armed conflict where looting and
pillaging may amount to conduct constituting war crimes under international criminal law.
57. For this paper, the Commission has conducted its work in reference to laws and policy
frameworks applicable in South Sudan, primarily the State’s obligations under international
human rights treaties, particularly the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. Consistent with the Commission’s paper of September 2021, particular focus
is paid to the rights to food, health and education. These are among the Covenant rights which
are indispensable to the wellbeing, survival and dignity of the population. Further, these are
the three covenant rights South Sudan identified in March 2024 as its priorities for the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): SDG2, zero hunger; SDG3, good health and
wellbeing; and SDG4, quality education. (The Government’s two other priorities are also
directly connected with the attainment of these goals and directly impacted by the findings
in this paper: SDG13, climate action; and SDG16, peace, justice and strong institutions).
58. This legal and policy framework detailed below identifies and examines six main
sources of law and policy: international human rights law; international law and authoritative
guidance and policy on corruption and human rights; international criminal law, domestic
law of South Sudan; relevant laws in the region and other jurisdictions, and principles on
business and human rights. Among other applicable international instruments, of key
relevance is the 2003 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, and the African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights. Attention has also been given to South Sudan’s
domestic laws, and to key aspects of commitments under the 2018 Revitalized Agreement,
particularly Chapter IV on Resource, Economic and Financial Management. Tailored to the
context of South Sudan, if comprehensively implemented its provisions can make a critical
contribution to addressing the economic dimensions of armed conflict, human rights
violations, and underdevelopment.14

A. International human rights law

59. International human rights law obligations binding on South Sudan flow from the
United Nations Charter, international human rights treaties, including African Union human
rights instruments, and customary international law.
60. South Sudan is a State Party to several of the principal United Nations human rights
treaties. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, were both acceded to in 2015. On 5 February
2024, South Sudan acceded to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the

13
For further discussion of operating expenses, and cost oil versus profit oil, see paras. 142 and 143.
14As recalled by the Human Rights Council in its latest resolution extending the mandate of the Commission, the Revitalized
Agreement constitutes a binding commitment upon all signatories to protect human rights. See A/HRC/RES/55/1, preambular
paragraphs.

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Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 15 These treaties are complementary,
and the rights they codify are universal, indivisible, interrelated, and interdependent. 16 Each
human rights treaty creates specific duties for States Parties to respect, protect and fulfil the
human rights codified therein.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
61. The ICESCR is of particular relevance to this paper, as it imposes specific obligations
on the State to direct the maximum available resources toward the fulfilment of the rights
codified therein.17 These include: the right to an adequate standard of living, including the
rights to food, water, and housing; to adequate sanitation; to the highest attainable standard
of health, including the right to sexual and reproductive health, especially for women and
girls; to just and favourable conditions of work, enabling a decent living; to adequate social
security; and to access education, among others. Many of these rights are further elaborated
in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Human Rights Council,
including the right to water and sanitation,18 and the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable
environment.19 Rights under ICESCR also form essential elements of the ‘2030 Agenda’ for
Sustainable Development (the Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs). Additionally,
through the concept of the ‘Human Rights Economy,’ the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights has identified that strengthening the fiscal self-reliance of
governments is an important part of fulfilling these obligations, including through actively
tackling corruption.20
62. Under ICESCR, South Sudan is duty-bound to take immediate and tangible steps “to
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively full
realization of the rights recognized.”21 This extends to all the rights enshrined in the treaty,
including the right to food (as part of the right to an adequate standard of living), and the
rights to health and education. Proactive economic and technical steps include legislative,
judicial, administrative, budgetary, and other measures. The term ‘progressive realization’
reflects an acknowledgment of constraints that can exist for States due to the limitations on
available resources. A measure of the State’s adherence to its obligations is thereby the use
of its available resources, including how revenues are collected and budgets allocated and
executed, alongside indicators of the enjoyment of these rights. 22 How governments collect
and utilize revenues for this purpose is central to the realization of these rights, and the full
range of obligations codified under international human rights law.
63. Authoritative commentary from the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights elaborates on the State’s obligations regarding the rights to food, health and education.
For example on the right to food, the Committee has stated that: “States have a core obligation
to take the necessary action to mitigate and alleviate hunger […] even in times of natural or
other disasters.”23 On the right to health: “States are obliged to ensure that the right to health
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind” and that especially vulnerable or

15
Human rights treaties to which South Sudan is a State Party also include: the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture; the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict; and Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the sale of children child prostitution and child pornography; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
16 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July 1993, para. 36. A/CONF.157/23.
17 These rights flow from the treaty and the authoritative commentaries of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

South Sudan’s accession in February 2024 was accompanied by accession to its Optional Protocol, which creates a procedure in which,
inter alia, the Committee can conduct inquiries and recommend measures.
18 A/RES/64/292 (3 August 2010) and A/HRC/RES/15/9 (6 October 2010).
19 A/76/L.7, 26 July 2022.
20 See “Human Rights: A Path for Solutions. Vision Statement offered by the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker

Türk – 2024,” section 3.

21 “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation,

especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”
ICESCR, article 2(1).
22 While international cooperation is encouraged, a lack of assistance cannot justify insufficiently allocating available resources to

implement obligations; the State has the primary duties to respect, protect and fulfil rights.
23 General Comment No. 12, “The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant),” E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999), para. 6.

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marginalized groups are not excluded from access to health services. 24 On the right to
education “…States parties have immediate obligations in relation to the right to education,
such as the “guarantee” that the right “will be exercised without discrimination of any kind”
(art.2 (2)) and the obligation “to take steps” (art. 2 (1)) towards the full realization of article
13... Such steps must be “deliberate, concrete and targeted” towards the full realization of the
right to education.”25
64. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has clarified that if
significant numbers of the population are deprived of the most essential foodstuffs and
services, such as access to primary health care and basic education, the State is prima facie
in violation of its obligations, unless every effort was made to dedicate its available
resources.26 Retrogressive measures are generally prohibited, such as laws, policies or
practices which worsen or otherwise deliberately undermine the protection of rights under
the treaty.27
65. Furthermore, international human rights standards require that States ensure
transparency, accountability, and participatory decision-making in the management of public
finances. General Comment No19 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
underscores that effective resource utilization entails not only adequate revenue generation
but also transparent and equitable budgeting processes.
African Union human rights instruments
66. South Sudan is also a State Party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, and its Protocol on Human and Peoples’ Rights of Women in Africa (the ‘Maputo
Protocol’).28 These instruments incorporate a range of obligations and rights, including in
economic and social spheres. In particular, article 21 of the African Charter of Human and
People’s Rights establishes that “All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural
resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people”. Article 22 of
the Charter further guarantees that “All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social
and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. States shall have the duty, individually or
collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development”.
67. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights29 has underscored the State’s
duties to properly manage and allocate available resources to meet its human rights
obligations, including service provision.30 Further, under the African Charter, African Union
Member States must guarantee the independence of courts and enable effective access to
remedies – this reaffirms general principles of international law, included in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 31

B. International criminal law

68. Individual criminal responsibility may arise when violations of international human
rights law by the State, and human rights abuses by non-State actors, amount to crimes under
international law. Alleged perpetrators may include members of government, non-State
armed groups, as well individuals involved in business operations. For example, protections
of the right to food, which the State is duty bound to respect under human rights law, are also

24 General Comment No. 14: “The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the Covenant),” E/C.12/2000/4
(11 August 2000), para. 30.
25 General Comment No. 13: “The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant),: E/C.12/1999/10 (8 December 1999), para. 43.
26 See for example, General Comment 3 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 10.
27 “…[A]ny deliberately retrogressive measures… require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by

reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.”
CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 9.
28 The African Charter was ratified by South Sudan on 23 October 2013. The Maputo Protocol was acceded to on 7 June 2023. As of

July 2025, South Sudan was not yet a State Party to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. See
https://www.acerwc.africa/en/member-states/ratifications.
29 Established under article 30 of the African Charter.
30 See A/HRC/48/CRP.3, paras. 69—70.
31 African Charter, Article 26.

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found in international humanitarian law, codified in the four Geneva Conventions and its
three Additional Protocols, to which South Sudan is a State Party. Interference with the right
to food during armed conflict, such as through wilful depravation of food to a civilian
population, may amount to a war crime, for which an individual or individuals will bear
criminal responsibility; it will also likely be a violation of the State’s related human rights
obligations to respect or protect. Of particular relevance are Common Article 3 of the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and articles 14 and 18 of Additional Protocol II, which prohibit
conduct in armed conflict which amounts to cruel and degrading treatment, or outrages upon
personal dignity of the civilian population; this includes the starvation of civilians or
rendering useless objects indispensable for their survival in armed conflict. The Commission
has previously noted that the term starvation should be understood to extend to the
deprivation or deliberate or arbitrary denial of food, including through the diversion of
humanitarian assistance.32
69. Notably, in South Sudan, the war crime of pillaging and violations of Common Article
3 are included as offences under article 4 of the draft statute of the Hybrid Court to be
established with the African Union, under Chapter 5 of the Revitalized Agreement. Such acts
are also likely to constitute crimes under the existing domestic laws of South Sudan.

C. Corruption and human rights under international law

70. The direct connections between corruption and human rights have been recognized by
all political bodies of the United Nations, and by the African Union, including in specific
reference to South Sudan.
71. In its resolution on South Sudan on 29 April 2024, the United Nations Security
Council highlighted “the detrimental effect of corruption and misuse of public funds on the
ability to provide services to its population,” and stressed that economic reforms are essential
for the political transition, and to meet the humanitarian needs of the population. 33 In a
subsequent resolution on South Sudan on 8 May 2025, the Security Council, inter alia, called
“for the use of a single Treasury account and the required audits, reviews and additional tools
for an oil marketing system that is open, transparent, and competitive and roots out corruption
so that the South Sudanese public may benefit from the country’s oil wealth”, while
recognizing “the detrimental effect of corruption and misuse of public funds on the
transitional government’s ability to provide services to its population, and further stresses the
need to enhance good economic governance to ensure effective national revenue collection
and anti-corruption structures in order to finance implementation of regulatory framework
essential for a political transition, and the humanitarian needs of the population.”34
72. The United Nations General Assembly has made successive resolutions and
statements on corruption, including a landmark political declaration adopted in June 2021. 35
The Group of African States spearheaded the adoption of a General Assembly resolution in
November 2023 to promote international tax cooperation, including to curb illicit financial
flows and corruption.36 That resolution refers to the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which
in turn references the right to development, stresses the centrality of combatting corruption
to enable the effective mobilization and use of domestic resources, and recognizes the
important roles of civil society and media in anti-corruption efforts.37
73. The Human Rights Council has also recognized the negative impacts of corruption on
human rights, including through a series of resolutions adopted since 2013. 38 Further, the

32 See A/HRC/45/CRP.3, paras. 34—38. The starvation of civilians is prescribed as a war crime in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court; while South Sudan is not a State Party, experts have concluded this may constitute a codification of customary
international law, as noted above.
33 S/RES/2729 (2024), para. 6.
34 S/RES/2779 (2025), para. 6.
35 A/RES/S-32/1.
36
A/C.2/78/L.18/Rev.1.
37 “Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development,”

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2051AAAA_Outcome.pdf, paras. 1 and 20.

38 See for example A/HRC/RES/23/9 and A/HRC/RES/53/17.

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Council has identified corruption as an obstacle to achieving the ‘2030 Agenda’ for
Sustainable Development, and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Of the SDGs
declared by the Government of South Sudan in March 2024 as a focus, SDG16, ‘Peace,
Justice and Strong Institutions,’ includes the commitment to ending all forms of corruption. 39
A Council Advisory Committee, on the issue of the negative impacts of corruption on the
enjoyment of human rights, recommended in 2015 that the Universal Periodic Review
process in the Council include an examination of corruption as a cause of human rights
violations.40 In November 2021 in its national report for the Review, the Government
identified legislative and institutional measures taken to combat corruption, referring to
provisions of the Revitalized Agreement.41 At the review’s conclusion, the Government
rejected several specific recommendations to strengthen these measures. 42
74. United Nations human rights treaty bodies have also identified corruption in South
Sudan as a major human rights concern, and an obstacle to the State’s compliance with its
human rights obligations. Separate assessments of South Sudan, by the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women in November 2021, and the Committee on the
Rights of the Child in October 2022, found that State revenues which should be used to
provide services to women and children are instead diverted toward corruption. 43
75. The negative impacts of corruption and related economic crimes on human rights are
well established, particularly for governments’ provision of basic services. In situations of
widespread extreme poverty, corruption not only affects a person’s economic and social
rights, but also their civil and political rights, and ultimately their right to life.
76. Corruption also fuels conflict and instability by exacerbating grievances felt by the
groups or communities excluded in the allocation of resources. This undermines the rule of
law, increases poverty, facilitates the illicit use of State resources, and provides financing for
armed conflict. The nexus between illicit wealth and political or military power has
contributed to instability and inhibited peace processes in South Sudan, thus incentivizing
the resort to violence by groups excluded from distributions of wealth. Given this, the
implementation of obligations under anti-corruption and related legal instruments can also
strengthen the State’s compliance with its international human rights law obligations.
77. As a State Party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC),
South Sudan is obliged to institute legislative and judicial reforms to criminalize corruption
and related economic crimes in domestic law.44 Such measures to combat corruption must
always comply with international human rights law, to avoid the potential to cause further
violations, particularly of fair trial rights in domestic justice systems. 45
78. In 2004, the African Commission issued a declaration calling upon African Union
Member States to tackle “corruption, misuse and direction of financial resources” as part of
“an obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, the minimum essential levels of
each of the economic, social and cultural rights contained in the African Charter.” 46 The
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption was signed by South

39 SDG 16.5: “Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.” See https://mofp.gov.ss/?p=9845.
40 Final report of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on the issue of the negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment
of human rights, A/HRC/28/73, para. 53.
41 A/HRC/WG.6/40/SSD/1, para. 12. The review was undertaken from late 2021 to early 2022.
42 A/HRC/50/14/Add.1, para. 4.
43 Separate assessments of South Sudan, by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in November 2021,

and the Committee on the Rights of the Child in October 2022, found that State revenues which should be used to provide services to
women and children are instead diverted toward corruption. CRC/C/SSD/CO/1, para. 12. CEDAW/C/SSD/CO/1, para. 9. Other treaty
bodies are likely to examine corruption.
44 Accession by South Sudan on 23 January 2015. All five countries sharing an international border with South Sudan are also States

Parties to UNCAC. In a country appraisal in December 2022, UNCAC’s implementation review group noted that no cases had been
reported to illustrate South Sudan’s effective implementation of its obligations, and a series of measures were recommended to improve
anti-corruption efforts. CAC/COSP/IRG/1/4/1/Add.71 (19 December 2022). South Sudan is a State Party to the Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, which requires the criminalization of corruption offenses in domestic law, including to combat money
laundering, under article 6.
45 See Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, A/HRC/28/73, para. 11.
46 Pretoria Declaration on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa (adopted by the African Commission at its 36th Session)

December 2004. For further discussion, see A/HRC/48/CRP.3, paras. 58—63..

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Sudan in 2013 but is yet to be ratified. 47 In 2016, South Sudan also joined the East African
Community, whose organs include the East African Court of Justice, which has served as a
forum for South Sudanese to challenge human rights violations. 48

D. Human rights responsibilities of businesses

79. While the protection of human rights is the primary duty of the State, third party actors
including companies and investors carry responsibilities to respect human rights throughout
their business operations. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights outlines the State duty to protect human rights, the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights, and centrality of access to remedy. Corporate complicity in human rights
violations and abuses can arise when the conduct of a business enables, exacerbates, or
facilitates wrongful conduct. As part of the responsibility to respect human rights, businesses
must avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts, address these impacts
when they arise, and more broadly to take steps to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts which
are linked to their business activities, even when the business has not contributed to those
impacts directly. In addition to respecting human rights, businesses are responsible to ensure
that persons affected by their activities have access to remedy, including through effective
non-judicial grievance mechanisms. Corporate responsibility is particularly important in
contexts where access to remedy is limited in the domestic system, and where there is a
heightened risk of business activities being associated with human rights violations or abuses.
80. In many jurisdictions, companies and individuals operating in South Sudan, and
associated with violations or abuses, may encounter reputational, regulatory and even
criminal exposure in their country of domicile or citizenship, for instance for acts of bribery,
corruption, or for war crimes.49 Companies and individuals involved in business activities in
South Sudan may incur criminal or civil liability in foreign jurisdictions for unlawful acts,
including breaches of environmental and other regulatory frameworks, information reporting
requirements, and anti-corruption and anti-money laundering laws. Furthermore,
international criminal law and emerging jurisprudence in foreign courts have expanded
prospects for individuals to be held accountable for unlawful conduct in the context of
business operations in South Sudan, including the aiding or abetting of relevant crimes. 50

E. Domestic law of South Sudan

81. The domestic laws of South Sudan derive authority from the 2011 Transitional
Constitution.51 It enshrines a ‘Bill of Rights’ which includes positive obligations for the
Government, including duties to provide free primary education, health care and emergency
services, among other rights. Based on a decentralized system of governance, the Transitional
Constitution broadly indicates that the provision of basic services is the remit of the ten states
of South Sudan, whose exclusive executive and legislative powers include: social welfare;
pre-school, primary and secondary education; population policy and family planning; and the
provision of health care, including hospitals and other health facilities. Health policy and the
‘delivery of public services’ are among the areas listed as ‘concurrent powers’ shared
between states and the national government.52
82. The Transitional Constitution affirms that natural resources, specifically petroleum
and gas, are owned by the people of South Sudan, and managed by the national government

47 South Sudan’s accession to the treaty is incomplete, despite the Revitalized Agreement including a government commitment to
completing the process. See further A/HRC/48/CRP.3, paras. 69—70.
48 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, chapter 8.
49 For example, under Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act, the United States’

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and under provisions against bribery of foreign officials in many States’ criminal codes. “See
below/above” references to be updated with specificity upon finalization of the report.
50 In a landmark case in Sweden, two individuals are being prosecuted in a trial under the principle of universal jurisdiction, for alleged

complicity in war crimes committed in the territory of South Sudan when it was part of Sudan and they were CEO and Director
(Swedish and Swiss citizens, respectively) of an extractive Swedish oil industry. See above, para-X.
51 A Permanent Constitution has not yet been adopted, but this is required under the Revitalized Agreement.
52 Chapter III. See also Schedules A, B and C, which are to be read with applicable constitutional provisions.

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for the population’s benefit.53 A chapter on revenue lists sources for both the national and
state governments, and mandates that five per cent of net national oil revenue be allocated to
the oil producing states.54 The national government is required to allocate national wealth in
a manner enabling each level of government to discharge its duties.55 Further, the Transitional
Constitution provides for the establishment of a Civil Service Commission, and an Anti-
Corruption Commission whose members hold investigatory and prosecutorial powers. 56
Senior public office holders are expressly prohibited from receiving remuneration or taking
employment from any source other than government.57
83. South Sudan has numerous laws that directly address corruption and related economic
crimes, and which provide requirements for transparency and accountability in governance,
including for the financial management of revenues. Acts of corruption were proscribed as
criminal offences in legislation passed soon after independence, such as in the 2012 Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Act.58 Another key source of law is the
Anti-Corruption Act of 2019 (its amendment was promulgated on 23 December 2023,
following the review called for in the Revitalized Agreement).59 The Anti-Corruption Act
refers to provisions of the Penal Code which proscribe corrupt acts as criminal offences, and
provides further offences such as where public officials fail to report corruption. The Act also
elaborates functions and powers of the constitutionally enshrined Anti-Corruption
Commission. Separately, the Appropriations Act addresses financial mismanagement in
budget execution, making it an offence to engage in or promote practices intended to
overspend government budget allocations. Given the lack of a functional judiciary and Anti-
Corruption Commission, immediate prospects for effective enforcement of these laws are
remote, and fair trials are highly unlikely; nonetheless, these laws define the scope of lawful
conduct.
84. The 2012 Petroleum Act specifies that the government shall manage petroleum
resources on behalf of the people of South Sudan (the owners) to contribute fully to economic
prosperity and human development, shall be managed in an ethical, efficient, transparent and
accountable manner, with the people benefiting equitably and the value of petroleum
resources maximized to be converted into lasting benefits for current and future generations.
The 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Act specifies how revenues from this national
resource must be allocated. The 2011 Public Financial Management and Accountability Act
(since amended), prohibits the government from engaging in non-concessional loans.60
85. Chapter IV of the Revitalized Agreement, on ‘Resource, economic and financial
management,’ opens with a pledge for political leaders and relevant stakeholders to ensure
transparency and accountability in governance, including to “establish effective leadership
and commitment in the fight against corruption.”61 This includes the commitment that leaders
implicated in corruption shall be held accountable and barred from holding public office. 62
As part of implementing Chapter IV, six institutions are identified that shall be established,
and 12 laws are listed to be subjected to review as part of the implementation of the

53 Section 173. See also A/HRC/40/CRP.1, para. 657—660.

54 This consists of a “two per cent allocation to the states” and “three per cent to the communities.” See sections 177-179. The Auditor
General has concluded that there was not satisfactory evidence that this obligation has been adhered to by the Government (see para.
200 and fn. 349). See also A/HRC/48/CRP.3, para. 86.
55 See section 169, and in particular section 169(6).
56 Sections 143 and 144.
57 Section 120(1).
58 The 2012 Act proscribed money laundering and other related economic acts considered criminal offenses, listing corrupt practice

and theft amongst the predicate offences for money laundering crimes. The Act was amended in 2024, but the Commission was
unsuccessful in its efforts to obtain a copy from the Government, so it was not clear if these provisions proscribing acts of corruption
had been retained in the amended legislation presently in force. (This reflects a broader issue with the limited availability of and public
access to legislation in South Sudan; this compromises the principle of legality, which is a recognized general legal principle, requiring
that law needs to be fairly certain, predictable and thereby capable of being respected).
59 Assented to by the President on 21 December 2023.
60
Section 39.
61 Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. It also includes a requirement for an environment impact certificate to be used for any project in South

Sudan, under section 4.9.2.

62 Section 4.1.2.

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commitments.63 Most of these required reviews of laws have not yet been completed. On 21
September 2024 the Transitional Constitution was amended, to extend the transitional
arrangements of the Agreement by another two years.64

F. Laws in the region and other jurisdictions

86. All States are duty-bound under international law to combat corruption and related
crimes. Domestic laws in other jurisdictions that address money laundering, bribery and
related economic crimes can be tools to combat corruption, empowering authorities to direct
seizures of money and property located within their jurisdiction, when assets are suspected
or found to be proceeds of crime. 65 Under such laws, acts of corruption in South Sudan can
potentially be criminally prosecuted in other jurisdictions, or appropriate civil penalties
imposed.
87. All five countries sharing borders with South Sudan are States Parties to United
Nations and African Union treaties on corruption and crime. Among them, Kenya and
Uganda have introduced domestic measures to implement international obligations. 66
Accordingly, the governments of these countries could undertake prosecutions and other
interventions to counter illicit financial inflows from South Sudan, which constrain the
country’s development, fuel instability, and finance conflict. However, the governments of
Kenya and Uganda are yet to deploy anti-money laundering provisions with respect to
citizens of South Sudan moving proceeds of corruption across borders. As noted in this paper
(see paragraph 116), authorities in jurisdictions including Australia and the United Kingdom
have taken legal actions against South Sudanese officials on suspicion of economic crimes,
mostly focused on freezes, seizure or forfeiture of assets.
88. Several sanctions regimes, imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, and
several States, are in effect for designated individuals and entities associated with South
Sudan. Of the national jurisdictions implementing sanctions, the United States Government
for example has sanctioned South Sudanese individuals under its Global Magnitsky Act
targeting human rights abusers and corruption, as well as its South Sudan sanctions program
and related laws.67 Other States have also passed ‘Magnitsky style’ legislation,68 and targeted
financial sanctions are increasingly used to seek extraterritorial accountability for human
rights violations. The United Nations Security Council enacts a broad range of enforcement
actions, overseen by the South Sudan Sanctions Committee, 69 which includes an arms
embargo, a travel ban, and assets freeze.

63 This list includes the Anti-Corruption Act, the National Audit Chamber Act, the Public Finance Management and Accountability
Act, the Petroleum Revenue Act, the National Revenue Authority Act, as well as the Petroleum Revenue Management Act. For an
analysis of the banking regulatory system, see A/HRC/48/CRP.3, annex II.
64 See “South Sudan: extension of transitional government will compound dire human rights crisis if leaders do not change course -

UN experts,” 25 September 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/09/south-sudan-extension-transitional-government-

will-compound-dire-human.
65 An act of corruption in South Sudan can constitute a predicate offence for money laundering crimes, meaning that individuals bearing

responsibility may be prosecuted or subjected to penalties abroad. For South Sudanese holding dual citizenship, they may be subject
to investigations and prosecutions in their other country of nationality for acts in South Sudan. For further discussion of jurisdiction in
such cases, see A/HRC/48/CRP.3, para. 70.
66 Including laws that introduce or strengthen disclosure obligations for companies, further articulate criminal conduct in the context

of corruption and related activity, and in the case of Uganda, whistleblower protections.
67 This is in addition to its dedicated sanctions programme for South Sudan, and restrictions on United States nationals and entities

under its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. See also A/HRC/48/CRP.3, paras. 93-95.
68 For example, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, certain European Union Member States (and the EU itself). See

https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/global-magnitsky-sanctions
69 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan.

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III. Context
89. The acts of corruption, economic crimes and government fiscal decisions detailed in
this paper – and the accompanying human rights impacts – are indicative and illustrative of
the context of patterns of predation and economic mismanagement since the country’s
independence. This section presents an overview of this context, highlighting key figures,
patterns and illustrative cases focused on five core themes: a) underdevelopment; b) endemic
economic crisis; c) dependencies and debt risks; d) impunity; and e) peace endangered.

A. Underdevelopment

90. At independence in 2011, South Sudan inherited the status of a Least Developed
Country. Since then, more than $52 billion has been directed to the country in combined oil-
related inflows to the Government, and in international official development assistance, at
approximately $25.2 billion and $27.5 billion, respectively (adjusted for inflation). 70 Yet
nearly 14 years later, all parts of the country remain visibly poor and underdeveloped, and
the country ranks around the bottom in all global development indicators: South Sudan’s
Human Development Index has steadily declined, ranking at 192 out of 193 countries in
2025;71 average Gross Domestic Product per capita is one quarter of what it was in 2011; 72
life expectancy is at global lows; 92 per cent of the population are estimated to live in poverty
(with two-thirds of the population in extreme poverty);73 and women and children are
disproportionately represented in figures reflecting the appalling health outcomes – including
in infant and maternal mortality rates which are among the worst in the world. These dire
indicators represent the scale and gravity of the human rights and humanitarian crises.
91. The World Food Programme and United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) declared
2023 as South Sudan’s “worst humanitarian crisis since independence.”74 Acute food
insecurity then worsened in 2024, and 7.69 million people were projected to face crisis levels
or worse by 2025.75 Overall displacement figures have not improved since the signing of the
2018 Revitalized Agreement: 2.3 million South Sudanese are internally displaced in their
country and 2 million live as refugees in the region; while South Sudan also hosts around
500,000 refugees from neighbouring countries.76 Millions of displaced persons are fearful or
reluctant to return home, with key reasons being trauma, armed conflict and violence,
challenges of reestablishing livelihoods, insecurity, and the lack of access to basic services.
These figures of millions of people in need have increased over successive years, with around
three quarters of the population deemed to be in critical need of humanitarian assistance – a
staggering 9 million people.77

70 Adjusted for inflation at December 2024 dollars. On the $25.2 billion figure, this is comprised of $23 billion in oil revenue and $2.2
billion in outstanding oil-backed loans, calculated by the Commission based on analysis of government data: budgets and budget
execution reports of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, and oil production and marketing reports, and annual reports of the Ministry
of Petroleum. The analysis starts at independence in July 2011 and ends in December 2024. On the $27.5 billion figure, for the period
2011 to 2022, World Bank data on ODA was used: $19.7 billion (or $24.85 billion adjusted for inflation as constant December 2024
dollars). For 2023 to 2024, as World Bank data on ODA was not yet available, UN OCHA data for reported humanitarian funding only
was used: at $1.313 billion in 2023 ($1.362 adjusted), and $1.316 billion in 2024 ($1.322 adjusted). Based on historic data, final ODA
for 2023 and 2024 is likely to be approximately 25 per cent higher than the figures reported by UN OCHA.
71 The HDI is a measure of development outcomes focused on life expectancy, knowledge, and living standards. The HDI ranked South

Sudan at 187 of 192 countries assessed in 2011 (0.408 on the index), 187 of 189 in 2017 (0.388), and 192 of 193 (0.381) in the latest
data, which was published for 2022. https://hdr.undp.org/data-centre/human-development-index.
72 Declining from $1,660 to $421. International Monetary Fund data, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/.
73 World Bank, “South Sudan Economic Monitor,” seventh edition March 2025, , https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-

release/2025/03/13/world-banks-afe-south-sudan-economic-monitor-urges-swift-and-sustained-reforms. “Republic of South Sudan

South Sudan Poverty and Equity Assessment,” June 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/12/10/new-report-
reveals-that-poverty-and-vulnerability-remain-endemic-in-afe-south-sudan.
74 https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000157757/download/, page 3.

https://www.unicef.org/southsudan/media/10331/file/South-Sudan-Country-Programme-2023-2025.pdf, page 3.
75 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification System, “South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September - November

2024 and Projections for December 2024 - March 2025 and for April - July 2025,” November 2024, https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-
country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1158829/?iso3=SSD.
76 OCHA, “South Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot,” September 2024. See A/HRC/55/26, para. 58.
77 Comparison of South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plans for 2019 and 2024.

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92. Most of the population lack access to functioning schools, health facilities,
courthouses, roads, and other basic essential services such as water and improved sanitation.
Basic public infrastructure is missing or in dire condition. Electrification is extremely limited,
and the user costs are at global highs;78 internet penetration and telephone networks also
remain accessible to few.79 While agriculture is the primary livelihood activity and arable
land is extensive, South Sudan is a net importer of food, highly dependent on food production
in neighbouring countries and food aid delivered by humanitarians. 80 Mechanized agriculture,
irrigation and flooding prevention infrastructures are limited and most activity is subsistence-
based.81 Cattle raising is mostly transhumant and its great potential is underdeveloped. Access
to credit for livelihood and enterprise activities is unavailable to most, the banking sector is
undeveloped, and economic crises are endemic. The private sector is small and mostly
informal, there is a small non-oil extractive sector, and no sizeable industry. Persistent armed
conflict and insecurity, widespread corruption, the absence of rule of law, and other
difficulties of life and trading constrain business activity and development. Formal
employment is limited outside of posts in government, diplomatic missions, and
organizations funded by international development assistance; even this income is
precarious, subject to fluctuations in government payments or aid disbursements, and
currency depreciation, while access to scarce jobs can be highly political and contested. For
much of the population, the main economic asset is cattle: ownership and grazing rights are
major violence flashpoints, and great cultural significance is attached to cattle, including in
its use in dowries exchanged for women and girls in marriage.
93. While women and girls bear a disproportionate burden of agricultural labour, they are
typically denied access to land ownership including through inheritance, and rarely have
decision making roles in their communities.82 Women are underrepresented in formal
employment, where sexual and other forms of gendered harassment are common. 83 Female-
headed houses are common due to conflict and insecurity, including the killing or
disappearance of spouses, and where children have been born from rape when the mother
was unmarried or has subsequently been abandoned by her spouse.84 These women and girls
can carry higher work load burdens given the accompanying heightened financial
responsibilities. Low social status attributed to women reflects and is a major contributor to
the country’s underdevelopment.

B. Endemic economic crisis

94. The severe macroeconomic crisis which emerged in the first half of 2024 is the latest
aggravation of South Sudan’s endemic economic crisis since independence. 85 Signs of
economic stress were visible in the second half of 2023, when the Government suspended
foreign debt repayments and public sector salaries,86 and currency depreciation accelerated
in December 2023, as detailed below. Then in mid-February 2024, government revenues
were impacted by a significant interruption to oil exports. This shaped the economy’s
deterioration throughout 2024. Extreme poverty levels and humanitarian needs further
increased, as did the Government’s susceptibility to seeking new foreign loans, even further

78 Electrification is very limited, and few people have access to electricity. There is a high reliance on expensive fuel-powered
generators, and studies rank the country in the top ten most-expensive for electricity costs. https://data.worldbank.org/,
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/cost-of-electricity-by-country, https://www.cable.co.uk/energy/worldwide-
pricing/.
79 See A/HRC/54/CRP.6, page 19.
80 According to the Ministry of Agriculture, 80 per cent of South Sudan’s land is arable but only 3.4 per cent is cultivated; other

government figures estimate cultivated land at 5 per cent. Documents and reports on file.
81 South Sudan report to UNFCCC, 2018, page 58. The World Bank estimated in 2019 that 92 per cent of South Sudanese are self-

employed (predominantly in agriculture), with 90 per cent of the labor force meeting the criteria of vulnerable employment. UNESCO
South Sudan Education Sector Analysis and World Bank/ILOSTAT 2019.
82 CEDAW/C/SSD/CO/1, para. 44.
83 See for example A/HRC/54/CRP.6, pages 19-20.
84
A/HRC/49.CRP.4, para. 158.
85 The independence period has seen recurrent economic crises, with negative effects on the human rights of an already vulnerable

population. See for example A/HRC/40/CRP.1, paras. 137-138.

86 R7349927, Ministry of Petroleum oil cargo data, R5800816

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 A/HRC/60/CRP.5

eroding the value of future oil sales.87 Consistent with past patterns, currency depreciation
drastically inflated the prices of food and basic commodities, which were already difficult to
access for much of the population.88
95. The interruption of oil exports from February 2024 was the outcome of the armed
conflict in Sudan, where some of the oil pipeline pumping stations used for South Sudan’s
oil exports were left without sufficient diesel to circulate heating oil, due to dynamics of the
conflict.89 This led to damage to one of South Sudan’s two oil-exporting pipelines, decreasing
the temperature of the crude, causing it to gel, and creating a blockage that forced South
Sudan to shut down its Dar Blend production. At the time, Dar Blend accounted for the
majority of the Government’s oil exports. The pipeline damage cost the Government between
60 and 65 per cent of its oil revenue, based on production levels at the time: equating to
around $80 million per month, at February 2024 prices. 90 (Around one year later, by early
February 2025, Dar Blend production had partially resumed; and by May 2025, initial new
oil cargoes pumped through this pipeline had been exported). 91
96. Although Government officials publicly attributed deteriorating economic conditions
to the partial shutdown of oil exports, a range of other important factors contributed to the
crisis. The depreciation of the South Sudan Pound had already started before the oil pipeline
shutdown: losing 30 per cent of its value between December 2023 and February 2024. 92 A
major factor was the Government’s monetary financing (releasing new money into
circulation by borrowing from the Bank of South Sudan – the central bank). International
Monetary Fund analysis indicates the strength of the South Sudan Pound is much more
closely tied to the Government’s monetary financing than it is to oil revenue receipts, with
the Fund estimating that a 1 per cent increase in reserve money equates to a 1 per cent
currency depreciation.93 Between December 2023 and the pipeline shutdown in February
2024, the Government had increased its overdraft with the central bank by 44 per cent (or
$298 million), causing the exchange rate to depreciate by 30 per cent, as noted above. By
September 2024, the Government had more than doubled its overdraft with the central bank
from the start of December 2023, for a total of $693 million. 94
97. An outcome of this extreme depreciation is that more physical currency is required to
represent the same value in dollars, which caused a scarcity of South Sudan Pound notes in
circulation, hindering financial transactions at multiple times in 2024 and 2025. The
Government responded by seeking multiple emergency, expensive deliveries of new
currency, and placing restrictions on amounts of cash that can be withdrawn from banks.
Neither action solved the underlying problem, while restrictions on bank account use further
erodes public trust in the banking sector (the Government still has not repaid foreign currency
deposits it previously seized during times of financial difficulty, dating back to 2015). 95
98. There were other signs of economic distress before the oil pipeline shutdown,
indicated by the extreme fiscal measures taken by the Government in the second half of 2023.
In August 2023, the Government had suspended long-term debt repayments, and in October
2023 suspended public sector salaries. This was despite significant oil revenues being
generated: for the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 fiscal years, ranking as the fourth- and fifth-
largest inflows in the country’s 13 fiscal-year history.96 The extreme fiscal measures, despite
the availability of such resources, indicates spending decisions were the largest contributors

87 Oil buyers need increasingly large returns to justify taking on the increasing risk of financing the Government of South Sudan with
oil-backed loans. These large returns come in the form of repayment terms that are highly unfavourable to the Government, which
reduces the amount of money South Sudan receives for its future oil sales.
88 See for example A/HRC/40/CRP.1, para. 128 and A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para 281.
89 R6215667, R3606062, R3717532.
90 A/HRC/58/27, para. 91.
91 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-11/china-national-petroleum-resumes-crude-production-in-south-sudan.

Government documents, on file.

92 Exchange rate data, on file.
93 International Monetary Fund, Third Review Under the Staff-Monitored Program with Board Involvement, Annex II. Money Supply,

the Exchange Rate, and Prices in Republic of South Sudan.

94
Calculated by the Commission based on the parallel exchange rate from Bank of South Sudan data, on file.
95 R7972660, Bank of South Sudan Circular No. BoSS/DBO/001/24, on file with the Commission, R1126158, R7846512, R8330410,

R7381341
96 Based on the Commission’s analysis of government data from 2011 to 2024.

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to the economic decline in late 2023. Such fiscal management leaves little buffer room for
external shocks, like the pipeline shutdown that followed in early 2024.
99. In March 2024, a government response to the extreme depreciation was to reintroduce
the gap between the official exchange rate and the parallel rate, which creates significant
losses for many participants in the economy while creating opportunities for some to profit
off the difference.97 This undid one of the only public financial management successes the
Government has achieved, which was previously commended by the Commission. 98 The
reintroduction of this gap further diverts significant government revenue to elites. The
Commission estimates that in the 2020-2021 fiscal year, the national finances lost $395.8
million to maintaining this gap. The losses for 2021-2022 and 2022-2023 had shrunk to $16.8
million and $20.8 million, respectively, once this gap was closed. Then in 2023-2024,
maintaining this gap diverted another $341.8 million which could have been spent on
measures to improve the economic situation, such as paying public service salary arrears:
which has been a recurring problem significantly impacting on services, with some civil
servants owed around one year of salary payments as of October 2024.99
100. Additionally, and significantly, the severe governance crisis in which State
institutions have little money to pay staff and perform core functions already existed before
2024, so cannot be reasonably attributed to the economic crisis nor to the partial oil export
shutdown. During the six-month period preceding the economic deterioration that emerged
in early 2024, from July to December 2023, nearly 50 per cent of total expenditure under the
national budget for ministries and government entities was executed by just two ministries at
the centre of political power and patronage networks: $136.3 million by the Ministry of
Finance and Planning (excluding transfers to other parts of Government), and $106 million
by the Ministry of Presidential Affairs. A further $375 million was directed in this period to
‘Oil for Roads.’ It was in this context that the Government aggressively restarted monetary
financing in late 2023, triggering the extreme currency depreciation. When the economic
crisis emerged, no steps were taken to reprioritize spending patterns in order to address the
needs of the citizenry. Drawing from the Petroleum/Oil Revenue Stabilization Account was
not a remedial option because the Government has not complied with legal requirements to
pay into it (see paragraph 200).
101. The extreme currency depreciation in 2024 also increased the cost of aid delivery by
humanitarian organizations. As humanitarians are generally required to convert funds for
local currency in-country expenditure at the official rate, they lose the purchasing power of
the gap between this and the parallel rate. In 2024, this gap was at its largest on 29 July,
exceeding 180 per cent (1,591 to the dollar at the official rate; 4,475 at the parallel rate). At
that time, converting donor funds at the official rate could have cost humanitarian
implementers up to 64.5 per cent of the money earmarked for providing aid, for instance in
the context of cash transfers to beneficiaries.
102. Systems of unaccountable governance, corruption, and patronage networks are
structural causes of the endemic economic crisis since South Sudan’s independence.
Corruption and mismanagement of the national finances contributes to and increases the
potential for such crises, including failures to build stabilization funds able to respond to
shocks, and the systematic revenue diversions from core governance functions. 100 These
factors also fuel elite competition for money and power, creating major flashpoints for
political violence and conflict. At the same time, the lack of investments in human

97 In a process called “round-tripping,” this diverts government revenue converted at the official rate, as well as the money international
donors and aid organizations bring into the country – directly privatizing this donor money for elite interests. Of the funds the
Government spent in the 2023-2024 fiscal year, approximately $342 million was lost to those with beneficial access to the
Government’s official exchange rate. This is more than the combined expenditure of 81 of the 85 Government ministries and spending
agencies with outturns in 2023-2024. Some ministries and government entities reported no outturns in 2023-2024, such as the Public
Procurement and Disposal of Asset Authority, the Judicial Services Commission, the Health Care Support Fund, the Universal Access
Fund, the Health Care Support Fund, and the National Public Health Institutes.
98 A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 295.
99 While information on status of arrears payments between November and December 2024 was unclear and contested at the time of

reporting, the problem had persisted. In February 2025, Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel publicly promised that timely payments
would be made; this did not appear to have happened by late April 2025.
100 Including non-compliance to fund the Petroleum/Oil Revenue Stabilization Account (see para. 200), and apparent resistance to

redirect revenue allocations toward services and salaries from ‘Oil for Roads’ (see Part V, section B).

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development and basic infrastructure, and the mismanagement of available resources, has
continued to shrink the overall pool of national wealth – potentially intensifying the
contestation over access to it. The extreme dependence on oil also increases the potential for
crises and exacerbates impacts.

C. Dependencies and debt risks

Oil dependency and associated debt risks

103. The Government has recognized that South Sudan is “the most oil-dependent country
on earth,” making it highly vulnerable to oil market volatility. Armed conflict in the country
and the region threatens physical oil infrastructure and includes violent contestation over
access to the resource and revenue.101 Based on government data, oil exports represent 85 to
90 per cent of the national revenue.102 The Commission’s analysis of government data found
that from July 2011 to December 2024, the Government reported generating more than $23
billion from oil exports.103 Additionally, during this period the Government received at least
$2.2 billion in outstanding oil-backed foreign loans,104 bringing the total estimated oil-related
inflows to at least $25.2 billion.105
104. Mounting public debt is impacting on South Sudan’s national finances: in the 2022-
2023 fiscal year, the servicing of loans equated to 26 per cent of the total national budget
made available for government ministries and entities, before the Government ceased making
repayments in the second half of 2023.106 In May 2024, a senior legislator suggested the
2024-2025 budget would need to be financed by loans and the Minister of Finance confirmed
in September 2024 the Government was seeking loans to fund the budget deficit. 107 Most of
South Sudan’s debt is accrued from expensive and predatory commercial loans backed by
future oil sales, and the Government has increasingly faced litigation in investor-State dispute
mechanisms and foreign courts for defaulting on such loans. In February 2024, the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes found South Sudan liable to repay
more than $1 billion for one loan, the funds from which were largely stolen in the 2012-2015
Letters of Credit corruption scandal.108 In a separate case in the United Kingdom in May
2025, a High Court judge found South Sudan owed $657 million to the African Export-
Import Bank (Afrexim), for three loan facilities originated in 2019 and 2020. 109 The Court

101 See for example Republic of South Sudan, “First National Adaptation Plan for Climate Change,” 2021, page 39.
102 In 2022-2023, oil represented 85 per cent of national revenue reported in government budget data, and in 2023-2024, oil represented
88 per cent of reported national revenue. However, in both fiscal years there are significant discrepancies and irregularities in the
reporting of both oil and non-oil revenues, which put the accuracy of these proportionate figures in doubt. In particular, there appears
to have been underreporting of total non-oil revenues, which means that oil revenue as a proportion of total national revenues may be
artificially inflated in these figures. For instance, the Commission identified that non-oil revenue may have constituted up to 17 per
cent of total national revenue in 2023-2024, rather than the 12 per cent implied in the figure attributing 88 per cent of total revenue to
oil. For the fiscal year 2024-2025, oil revenue may have reduced to represent approximately 75 per cent of national revenue, based on
average historic collections and current levels of Nile blend production, and assuming that no Dar blend production and continued
current levels of Nile blend output.
103 See para. 90 and fn. 70.
104 Loans to be repaid with oil or oil revenues. Figures unadjusted, due to uncertainties on when loans were sourced.
105 Budget documents of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, oil production and marketing reports of the Ministry of Petroleum, and

external debt stock take for the Ministry of Finance and Planning, on file. Government information on the debt status is unreliable,
with many data fields left blank and not all creditors contacted in a debt audit supported by the United Nations Development Program.
Experts believe actual debt is higher.
106 Ministry of Petroleum data indicates that 23 per cent of national oil revenue from January 2022 to July 2023 was applied to loan

repayments, or $632.9 million of $2.8 billion. On file. 2023–2024 budget execution information, on file. R1408174
107 Transitional National Legislative Assembly’s First Deputy Speaker. https://thedawn.com.ss/2024/05/28/finance-minister-asked-to-

seek-funding-for-2024-25-budget/. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-25/south-sudan-pins-hopes-on-oil-
resumption-for-1-6-billion-budget
108 Taken from the Qatar National Bank between 2012 and 2018. https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/qatari-bank-wins-billion-

dollar-award-against-south-sudan, https://sudantribune.com/article285519/.
109
The Government did not engage with or attend the Court proceedings, submitting no alterative version of events to Afrexim’s
claims, which the Court ultimately adopted. In this case, the Government had already made $226.6 million in repayments on a total
principal of $656 million. Therefore, for the use of $656 million, the Government owes Afrexim no less than $883.6 million, plus 13.5
percent on the remaining $657 million judgment. Documents on file.

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also determined that the outstanding balance will accrue an additional 13.5 percent interest,
from January 31, 2025.110
105. These cases highlight risks associated with such loans, particularly in the context of
the government mismanagement and corruption. When the south was part of Sudan,
increasing foreign debt in the context of interrupted oil production significantly contributed
to economic crises and food insecurity.111 While South Sudan is a young country with limited
debt relative to its debt-distressed neighbours, given the limited lifespan of oil exports and
the patterns of taking non-concessional loans, it also risks accruing an unmanageable debt
burden.112
106. Although the Government had purportedly suspended debt repayments in the latter
half of 2023, the United Nations Panel of Experts found that during this time the serving
Minister of Finance and National Planning had negotiated an oil-backed loan of $13 billion
from a company registered in the United Arab Emirates.113 The Commission gathered further
information alleging involvement in this deal of Ashraf Seed Ahmed Al-Cardinal, a
sanctioned Sudanese national who the Commission has previously identified as receiving
corruption payments from the Government of South Sudan.114 The reported loan would
eclipse any long-term financing the country has previously undertaken, and could encumber
at least 17 years of South Sudan’s oil production. In May 2024, the Minister of Cabinet
Affairs denied the national cabinet had any knowledge of the loan.115 By the end of 2024,
the status of the loan remained unclear, and information shared with the Commission
indicated it was unlikely to be realized. Given this lack of transparency, and the corruption
associated with the national finances, loans run the risk of being diverted and squandered,
leaving future governments with hefty bills.116 This risk was highlighted by the Pan African
Lawyers Union in a separate case involving South Sudan, filed in the East African Court of
Justice in June 2024.117
107. A lesser albeit significant aspect of South Sudan’s national finances in recent years
has been the International Monetary Fund’s ‘Rapid Credit Facility,’ with the Government
accessing three disbursements in the period 2020 to 2023. Successive audits undertaken as a
condition of these disbursements found several problems, including: irregularities in the use
of funds; money missing in financial statements; irregular and unauthorized transfers
including to the South Sudan Revenue Authority;118 and public procurement processes which
do not follow legal requirements or provide agreed deliverables (such as medical supplies, in
the case of the 2023 disbursement).119 The resort to International Monetary Fund assistance
to fund basic service delivery – and the apparent presence of corruption, diversion, or at best
mismanagement of the funds – is symbolic of the Government’s reliance on and abuse of
international assistance. Amidst the deteriorating economic situation, in early 2024 the
Government sought a fourth round of assistance from the Fund. 120 This would be its largest
yet, but is unlikely to be offered in the near future, given South Sudan had not met

110 https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2025/1079.html. Documents on file. These judgments again decrease the money
South Sudan can receive for future oil sales. While Afrexim could have won a default judgment due to South Sudan’s refusal to engage
with the proceedings, they requested summary judgment, to help their enforcement of the order in other jurisdictions. This indicates
Afrexim’s interest in pursuing South Sudan’s assets to recover the debt. The country’s oil buyers take note of this and require additional
discounts to justify the additional risk. As South Sudan makes oil lifters prepay for its cargoes, these judgments increase the risk that
an oil buying company prepays for a cargo only to have it seized as part of the enforcement of these judgments. M-100631, M-100636.
111 See Human Rights Watch, 2003, page 110.
112 Africa is the only continent where public debt is growing faster than GDP. The global evidence is that loan repayments detract from

services investments. UNCTAD, “World of Debt,” 2024, page 7. A/HRC/20/23, para. 3.

113 The Panel reported that the then-Finance Minister Bak Barnaba Chol appeared to have signed documents with Hamad Bin Khalifa

Department of Projects, a UAE-registered company. S/2024/343, paras. 185-188.

114 R4726294.
115 https://www.eyeradio.org/dr-lomuro-denies-allegations-govt-signed-13-billion-uae-loan-deal/.
116 On 13 June 2024, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights highlighted that almost half the world’s population have

governments which spend more servicing debt than on service delivery. https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-
speeches/2024/06/high-commissioner-address-unctad60-global-leaders-forum.
117 The Pan African Lawyers Union in its case filings cited risks of resource-backed loans as “an inter-generational economic

complication which will affect… children and grand-children and other future generations.” PALU press release, 24 June 2024.
118 Until 2023, called the National Revenue Authority.
119 South Sudan National Audit Chamber reports, on file.
120 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-29/oil-rich-south-sudan-seeks-250-million-from-imf-to-spur-growth.

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benchmarks required by November 2024, and strong opposition from the United States.121
Future funding would likely be contingent upon South Sudan successfully completing a ‘staff
monitored program,’ which the country has been unable to do so far. 122

D. Humanitarian aid dependency

108. South Sudan’s risk of dependency on foreign aid was apparent at independence, and
donor dependency has since entrenched.123 Official development assistance directed at the
country between 2011 and 2024 amounted to at least $27.5 billion. 124 Most of this money is
humanitarian aid intended to address the unmet basic needs of the population, and does not
pass through the Government, which most foreign donors do not trust to spend their
assistance. For 2024, the humanitarian sector set a target to provide “some form of
humanitarian support” to six million people, leaving a gap of three million in need receiving
nothing.125 Even then, only around two thirds of funding requirements that year were reported
as committed or disbursed by donors.126 South Sudan’s population is heavily dependent on
foreign assistance, while the Government has abandoned even its most essential duties to the
humanitarian sector.
Graph 1: trend of increasing humanitarian aid needs and dependency, 2011 to 2025 127

10
Millions of People

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

109. More than ever since independence, humanitarian aid does not meet needs of the
population. The costs of providing aid have increased: commodity prices and transportation
costs are rising, affected by currency depreciation128 and the war in Sudan, and the significant

121 In October 2022, the United States policy changed to officially oppose international financial institution funding to South Sudan.
The United States proactively implemented this opposition, issuing demarches to other members of the International Monetary Fund
Executive Board, instructing them to vote against future funding. The strength of this opposition, and South Sudan’s failures against
required benchmarks, means new (particularly, large) funding is unlikely in the near future. R8763574. See A/HRC/52/CRP.3, fn. 420.
122 R8114320.
123 See for example “Special Report: in South Sudan, a state of dependency,” Reuters, 10 July 2012,
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE86909Y/.
The Commission reported in April 2023 on the October 2022 official change in United States government policy to officially oppose
international financial institution funding to South Sudan.. The strength of this opposition, and South Sudan’s failures against the
required benchmarks, means new funding, particularly large funding, is unlikely in the near future
124 See para. 90 and fn. 70.
125 OCHA, South Sudan: Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024 (Issued November 2023)
126 See https://fts.unocha.org/countries/211/summary/2024 (data as of 10 February 2025).
127 Data complied based on the Commission’s analysis of United Nations humanitarian appeals and consolidated response plans for the

period 2011 to 2025. Note that for 2013 and the period from 2015 to 2025, the number reflects the total identified “people in need”.
For several preceding years, the “people in need” figure was not applied or used uniformly in these documents, therefore the figure has
been adopted based on: total people requiring food assistance (2011); calculation of the number of identified beneficiaries (2012); and
“people at risk” (2014). While this methodological approach is imperfect for specificity, it nonetheless demonstrates the trend.
128 Insecurity on South Sudan’s roads means a lot of cash is transported by air. As South Sudan’s highest denomination note is 1,000

South Sudan pounds, a depreciation from 1,000 pounds per US dollar to 5,000 pounds per US dollar necessitates a five-fold increase
in the weight required to transport the same value in foreign currency.

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losses in currency conversions at the official rate, as highlighted above. 129 Meanwhile many
donors are reducing and reprioritizing aid. The global funding outlooks for humanitarian
assistance are worsening, and further significant reductions in the aid money available for
South Sudan are emerging. In the 2024-2025 fiscal year, the three leading donor countries to
South Sudan signalled or implemented significant cuts to global humanitarian and
development assistance, including the United States Government, which contributed 54.3 per
cent of total reported humanitarian funding to South Sudan in 2024.130 These factors, and the
redirection of aid from South Sudan to other crises, have come as costs of delivery are rising,
leaving humanitarian organizations with less resources and diminished purchasing power at
the same time that the needs in South Sudan are increasing.131 Displacements and lost supply
routes from Sudan further strain this system. 132 Donor fatigue is visibly intensifying among
major development partners, as their representatives air frustrations at not seeing
contributions augmented by the Government, and call upon authorities to increase spending
on basic services.133 Senior humanitarian leaders in the country have made similar appeals. 134
Even in this context, of the total 2024–2025 national budget for ministries and entities passed
in November 2024, the Government allocated less than one per cent to the social and
humanitarian affairs sector.135

E. Impunity

110. Entrenched and systemic corruption on a grand scale infects nearly every part of
government in South Sudan – previous findings of the Commission remain unchanged.136
The pattern of diverting government revenues for private gain and sectarian interests dates
back to the pre-independence period, including during the Interim Period of autonomous
government of 2005 to 2011.137 South Sudan is viewed as the world’s most corrupt country,
according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. 138 The Africa
Integrity Indicators initiative rates the country at zero out of 100 for investigating allegations
of corruption in government.139 The pervasiveness of corruption is experienced or witnessed
in everyday life, and has been acknowledged by the most senior political leaders, including
in public forums.140
111. Although in South Sudan constitutional and domestic law prohibit individuals
involved in corruption from holding public office, 141 there are corrupt officials throughout
government. Where rare prosecutions have occurred, case selection and penalties have
appeared politically motivated and subject to executive interference. Furthermore, this paper
shows that the biggest government procurement contracts have gone to persons already
associated with corruption, consistent with practices identified in the Commission’s past
reporting. As is the case for even the most serious crimes under domestic and international

129 The armed conflict in Sudan for example has meant humanitarians have lost the ability to bring commodities into South Sudan from
there, which has significantly increased the costs of food aid distributions in South Sudan’s northern states, particularly when expensive
air assets have been used to access the hardest to reach communities.
130
In 2024, UN data indicates that Germany had contributed 6.8 per cent of the total, the United Kingdom Government 6.2 per cent.
The other big donor, albeit not a country, was the European Commission, at 9.8 per cent. It is worth noting that not all Member States
may consistently report such contributions, so there may be variances between figures published by the UN and actual figures.
https://fts.unocha.org/countries/211/summary/2024
131 A/HRC/49/78, para. 48. A/HRC/52/26, para. 24.
132 A/HRC/55/26, paras. 60-62.
133 A statement in September 2023 by a group of major donors stated that the international community had provided more US$ 1 billion

that year alone. https://ss.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-humanitarian-aid/.

134 https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/humanitarian-agencies-south-sudan-forced-reduce-aid-amidst-funding-

crisis-and-aggravated-humanitarian-situation
135 Divided amongst six government entities, and excluding the allocation to a “Humanitarian and Emergency Fund’ introduced in the

2024-2025 budget, which remains opaque. Commission’s analysis of government budget data.
136 A/HRC/43/56, para. 33, A/HRC/48/CRP.3, para. 9.
137 See A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 282.
138 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024.
139 Based on the assessment/data for 2024, under the indicator “In practice, allegations of corruption against senior level politicians

and/or civil servants of any level are investigated by an independent body.” https://www.africaintegrityindicators.org/data
140 Corruption scandals and high-level acknowledgements of them date to the Dura saga in 2008, and post-independence with ‘Letters

of Credit’ scandal. A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 282. See also De Waal, 2014, page 358.
141 See Part VII.

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law,142 officials accused of corruption often stay in office or return after a suspension, often
ranked higher. Furthermore, notoriety for involvement in corruption has presented no barrier
to being appointed to government posts at the highest levels. This was highlighted in
February 2025 by the ascendancy of Benjamin Bol Mel to Vice President: Economic Cluster.
He was appointed by the President despite being known and sanctioned for acts of corruption.
Therefore, the situation of widespread impunity becomes an invitation for public officers to
continue expanding their corrupt practices.
112. The Commission has reported in detail on the absence of an independent and properly
functioning judicial system throughout the country, resulting from failures of leaders to
commit to and allocate available resources toward its development. The chronic lack of
funding presents opportunities for, and also facilitates practices of, corruption; in 2022–2023,
the judiciary received less than one per cent of the total national budget,143 and in 2023-2024
this dropped to below 0.1 percent. The Government has neither earmarked nor disbursed
funding for the establishment of the three transitional justice institutions envisaged under the
Revitalized Agreement: the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (the Truth
Commission); the Compensation and Reparation Authority (the Reparation Authority); and
the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (the Hybrid Court). This failure undermines the
implementation of binding obligations under the peace agreement and signals the lack of
political will to advance truth, justice, and accountability in order to achieve sustainable
peace in South Sudan.
113. South Sudan is required to guarantee the effective realization of victims’ rights to
truth, justice, and reparation – in line with its international law obligations, the UN Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law,144 and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (the ‘Joinet/Orentlicher Principles’).145
114. In September 2015, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, sitting at the
level of Heads of State and Government, called for a full range of transitional justice
measures to address the situation in South Sudan, including the establishment of a Hybrid
Court.146 Furthermore, the 2019 African Union Transitional Justice Policy provides a
framework and reference point enjoining States to adopt a holistic transitional justice
approach to prevent impunity, promote human rights and build inclusive societies, among
others.147 The African Union has specific responsibility under the Revitalized Agreement for
the establishment of the Hybrid Court and advancing transitional justice in South Sudan.148
115. While in November 2024, the Government enacted legislation to establish the Truth
Commission and the Reparation Authority, in accordance with Chapter V of the Revitalized
Agreement,149 the creation and implementation of the Hybrid Court, mandated to be
established by the African Union in collaboration with the Government of South Sudan
remains stalled. These three complementary transitional justice institutions are mandated to,
interdependently: investigate and establish the root causes and circumstances of conflicts in
South Sudan; identify and pursue accountability for individuals responsible for human rights

142 For instance, the Commission has identified senior government officials implicated in serious crimes under international law who
have not been independently investigated or prosecuted let alone held accountable. See for example A/HRC/52/CRP.3, section II.
143 See A/HRC/55/26, para. 66.
144 United Nations General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross

Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, A/RES/60/147 (16
December 2005), principles IX and 12–23.
145 United Nations, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity

(commonly known as the Joinet/Orentlicher Principles), E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (8 February 2005), Principles 1, 19, and 31.
146 African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué, 547th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State And Government, in New

York, USA, 26 September 2015, PSC/AHG/COMM.1 (DXXVII), section 22(i),

https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.547.comm.south.sudan.26.09.2015-.pdf. See also S/2016/328, paras. 6—10. The commitment of
the African Union to establish a Hybrid Court for South Sudan was included in the 17 August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of
the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, section 3.1 (reaffirmed in Chapter V of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement).
147 See https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36541-doc-au_tj_policy_eng_web.pdf.
148 See 2018 Revitalized Agreement, including sections 5.1 and 5.3 For further information on the involvement of the African Union

on transitional justice in South Sudan, see for example A/HRC/45/CRP.4, paras. 40—43.
149 See also A/HRC/58/27, paras. 85—87.

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violations, international crimes and other serious crimes under South Sudanese law; provide
reparations to victims; recommend legal and institutional reforms to prevent recurrence; and
lead local and national reconciliation and healing efforts. The Truth Commission, the
Reparation Authority and the Hybrid Court, therefore, provide significant avenues to
investigate past violations, pursue accountability, provide reparation, and initiate institutional
measures to combat systemic corruption and economic crimes in South Sudan.
116. In the region, in Kenya and Uganda, the Commission observed that anti-money
laundering laws and evidence available to authorities are sufficient to investigate economic
crimes related to human rights violations in South Sudan, with a view to effective
prosecutions. Yet to date, no such prosecutions appear to have been initiated in either
jurisdiction.150 Insider information shared directly with the Commission indicates that
although officials possess significant evidence of money laundering, investigations and
prosecutions are not pursued against South Sudan’s political elites, for fear of damaging
diplomatic relations and lucrative export trade.151 Further abroad, authorities in jurisdictions
including Australia and the United Kingdom have taken legal actions against South Sudanese
officials on suspicion of economic crimes, mostly focused on freezes, seizure or forfeiture of
assets.152
117. Separately, in a landmark case in Sweden, two former executives of Lundin Energy
AB are on trial for allegedly aiding and abetting war crimes perpetrated by Sudanese armed
forces and allied militia against civilians between 1997 and 2003.153 Lundin Energy AB was
a Swedish oil company that operated in Unity State during the armed conflict when the
territory was part of Sudan. The accused are charged with supporting war crimes allegedly
conducted on their behalf in the context of developing oilfields and related infrastructure.
The trial is being conducted on the basis of universal jurisdiction, which under Swedish law
enables the prosecution of international crimes in cases where the crime has a link to Sweden;
one of the indicted individuals is Swedish, and the company the two accused worked for was
also based in Sweden. The prosecutors have also proposed that the company be penalized.
This case highlights the alleged role of businesses in crimes related to human rights violations
and presents the potential for South Sudanese victims to pursue accountability in foreign
courts, including for ongoing violations.154

F. Peace endangered

118. Since the Revitalized Agreement was signed in September 2018, its key processes and
reforms have systematically been unfunded or underfunded by the Government. This reflects
the obfuscations of key political leaders in advancing peace and human rights, and the
prioritization of corruption and diversions of government money over its implementation.
The deliberate, chronic lack of government funding to peace processes and institutions has
undermined the Agreement and directly led to a series of extensions of its transitional
arrangements. On 26 April 2025, amidst the unfolding of the current crisis including the
arbitrary detentions of SPLM/A-IO political and military leaders and escalating armed
violence involving main parties to the Agreement, Minister of Cabinet Affairs Martin

150 The Human Rights Committee in concluding observations, expressed concern in 2023 about undue interference with the judiciary
and corruption in it in Uganda, and in 2021 noted that in Kenya the effective prosecution of corruption is limited. CCPR/C/UGA/CO/2,
paras. 38-29 (on Uganda), CCPR/C/KEN/CO/4, paras. 6-7 (on Kenya).
151 R4361825.
152 Australian Federal Police seized property in 2018 in possession of the family James Hoth Mai, on the basis it had been acquired

with proceeds of corruption. A legal challenge by his family to recover the assets was unsuccessful. Hoth Mai is the incumbent Minister
of Labor. In 2020 the incumbent Minister of Cabinet Affairs, Martin Lomuro, had assets seized on suspicion of corruption in the United
Kingdom, where related legal proceedings are pending.
153 https://www.domstol.se/nyheter/2023/08/trial-commences-in-case-regarding-complicity-in-grave-war-crimes-in-sudan/. See also

A/HRC/40/CRP.1, paras. 678-680. The accusation relies, among other facts, on the deployment by Khartoum of Sudanese army forces
to the south of the river Bahr el Ghazal in order to protect Lundin’s oil fields and displace civilian population of the area. The
deployment south the river was a violation of the previous ceasefire agreement signed by the government of Omar Al Bashir with the
South Sudanese insurgent forces, and triggered new fighting, causing many civilian casualties. The trial’s end is expected in mid-2026.
154 The case was pursued by prosecutors following the work of civil society actors who conducted research and advocacy on the

situation, particularly the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS). See https://unpaiddebt.org/ecos/. For the time being, victims’
reparations claims have been rejected in the trial by the Court, reserving for them the possibility of making separate civil claims.

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Lomuro presented a proposal for yet another roadmap to be drafted on timelines and
processes to implement its provisions.155
119. In February 2020, the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity was
established, following a lengthy ‘pre-transitional’ period. Its term was to end by late 2022,
accompanied by the adoption of a permanent constitution and the establishment of an elected
government. Yet in August 2022, with the key tasks unaccomplished, timeframes were
extended by two years under a ‘Roadmap,’ with the country’s first elections postponed to
December 2024. Progress continued to stall, with available finances persistently diverted. For
example, in June 2024 it emerged that $10 million allocated to the critical processes of
constitution-making, the proposed establishment of a National Human Rights Council, and
others was redirected via the Minister of Cabinet Affairs to ‘special projects’ under the
Presidency.156 In an appearance before legislators, Minister Lomuro indicated the President
had authorized the disbursements; he soon backtracked on these comments but did not clarify
the apparent funds diversion.157At the time, members of the institutions tasked to lead
constitution-making and electoral processes had been publicly calling for funding and even
their own salaries, as the timeframe narrowed for the completion of key tasks. By September
2024, such critical tasks had not progressed, and parties to the Revitalized Agreement
announced another two-year extension to its transitional arrangements.
120. In the September 2024 document further extending the transitional governance
arrangements under the Revitalized Agreement, “severe funding constraints” were cited as
the cause of the delays, without any reference to systematic diversion of resources. However,
the Commission calculated that during the period of the previous two-year extension from
August 2022, government revenues likely reached $3.5 billion, mostly from oil exports. 158
Little of this money was directed toward implementing the key tasks committed to under the
Revitalized Agreement, including forming and deploying the Necessary Unified Forces (the
new national army), preparing for the country’s first ever elections, and funding initiatives
for recovery from conflict – most of this money appears unaccounted for. While the need for
financial accountability and the reprioritization of government resources is emphasized in the
text for the latest extension, this rings hollow without evidence of newfound fiscal prudence.
The patterns of diversions since continued, including the deliberate government strategy to
deprive of funds the institutions and processes required under the Revitalized Agreement,
making implementation of its core provisions unachievable, and directly fuelling conflict.
121. Peace in South Sudan is endangered by the obfuscations, delays and corrupt diversions
of national wealth from implementing the Revitalized Agreement. This has deprived the
country of critical mechanisms and processes for addressing the cyclical conflict and
systemic impunity, including for the three transitional justice mechanisms required to support
national recovery and stability. Without meaningful budgetary allocations, these mechanisms
cannot become operational or effective. Tackling revenue diversion and losses in revenue,
and the reprioritization of public expenditure, must translate into concrete support for the
transitional justice programme. Mere rhetorical commitments alone are insufficient: the State
is legally obligated to ensure that these institutions are adequately and predictably resourced.
Failure to do so not only violates victims’ rights, but also perpetuates impunity – and
jeopardizes prospects for sustainable peace.

155 In a press conference the Minister presented a document entitled, “Strategic Response of the Revitalized Transitional Government
of National Unity (R-TGoNU) to the Nasir Incident and Reinvigoration of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict
in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). (Date of Incident: 4th March 2025, Location: Nasir County, Upper Nile State).” See its
section 6.6: “Roadmap Development: Draft a comprehensive roadmap outlining timelines and processes for resolving contentious or
delayed articles in the R-ARCSS, ensuring inclusivity and enforceability.” On file.
156 The Cabinet Affairs Minister indicated to legislators that the President authorized the disbursements. He soon backtracked on this

but did not clarify the apparent diversion. Documentation produced in the Transitional National Legislative Assembly in June 2024
flagged an alleged withdrawal from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs accounts of more than $1 million to ‘NAS peace implementation.’
Documents on file. Video on file, 6 or 7 June 2024.
157 Minister of Cabinet Affairs Martin Lomuro, video on file, 6 or 7 June 2024. “Lomuro retracts remarks on alleged special projects

account in office of President,” The Dawn, 11 June 2024, https://thedawn.com.ss/2024/06/11/lomuro-retracts-remarks-on-alleged-

special-projects-account-in-office-of-president. See also https://www.eyeradio.org/dr-lomuro-admits-to-diverting-peace-funds-to-
special-projects/ and https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/cabinet-minister-dr-lomuro-refutes-diverting-peace-funds-for-
other-projects.
158 Analysis of government data. See A/HRC/58/27, para. 8.

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IV. Government revenues

122. The collection of government revenues is central to the fulfilment of human rights
obligations, as a primary determiner of the fiscal resources available for government budgets.
As part of the State duty to direct maximum available resources toward fulfilling human
rights, decisions and practices for revenue mobilization and collection need be designed to
maximize revenues. This may include harnessing feasible income from the exploitation of
resources, with due regard for population health and environmental sustainability,159 and
requires the effective management of available resources, including by combatting corruption
in revenue collection. Maximizing revenue is especially critical where failures to do so would
contribute to depriving a population of the most essential foodstuffs and services.
Concurrently, revenue generation that deliberately or predictably impacts negatively on
human rights, such as where pollution negatively affects public health, is considered as
retrogressive and a human rights violation.160
123. This section of the paper first examines oil in South Sudan – constituting around 85
per cent of total revenues – with Part A focused on: key figures; background of oil and armed
conflict; infrastructure and operators; declining production and sales; diversion and
corruption; harms to health and the environment. An examination of non-oil revenue follows,
building on the Commission’s paper of September 2021 and reflecting subsequent
developments, with Part B focused on: underdevelopment and corruption limiting the tax
base; collections outsourced to Crawford Capital Ltd.; personal income tax; and the South
Sudan Revenue Authority.

A. Oil Revenue

Key figures
124. Oil exports are the source of approximately 85 per cent of government revenues. 161
This is despite production levels of South Sudan’s oil declining significantly since
independence, primarily due to government mismanagement and armed conflict. As noted
above, the Commission calculated that from July 2011 to December 2024, oil exports from
South Sudan generated more than $23 billion in government revenue.162 At least another $2.2
billion in outstanding oil-backed loans were received in this period,163 bringing total
estimated oil-related inflows to at least $25.2 billion.164 (These figures do not account for oil
revenue to the SPLM/A Southern Government during the Interim Period from 2005 to
2011).165 An eventual end to oil production in the country is envisaged in domestic law, and
government forecasts have estimated that existing production will have reduced to almost

159 In line with sustainable development, while mitigating harms to population and environment which may give rise to human rights
abuses by corporate actors and violations of the State’s human rights law obligations.
160 Under international human rights law, the State must demonstrate the necessity of such a measure, and that it has been introduced

after careful consideration of alternatives; and affected persons have the right to effective remedies.
161 Oil accounted for $1.64 billion of $1.94 billion of Government revenue in the 2022-2023 fiscal year: the last full fiscal year with no

oil production interruptions. Budget data, Ministry of Petroleum sales data, South Sudan Revenue Authority collection data. In 2023-
2024, oil accounted for $1.60 billion of $1.81 billion in reported revenue (including non-oil revenue collections that were almost
certainly manipulated downwards).
162 See para. 90 and fn. 70.
163 Loans to be repaid with oil or oil revenues. Figures unadjusted, due to uncertainties on when loans were sourced. The true figure is

likely significantly higher than $2.2 billion as of May 2025, as there had been legal rulings against the Government for being in default
to two lenders (Qatar National Bank and African Export-Import Bank), for a combined total in excess of $1.6 billion. The Government
also has outstanding facilities with and obligations to other lenders, such as China Export-Import Bank, and several oil buying
companies.
164 Budget documents of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, oil production and marketing reports of the Ministry of Petroleum, and

external debt stock take for the Ministry of Finance and Planning, on file. Government information on the debt status is unreliable,
with many data fields left blank and not all creditors contacted in a debt audit supported by the United Nations Development Program.
Experts believe actual debt is higher.
165 Figures exclude international financing institutions financing since 2011, including over $340 million from IMF.

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nothing by 2035.166 However, there are many variables involved in such forecasts, and the
actual time horizons are unknown.

Historical linkages between oil and armed conflict

125. For more than four decades, oil has dominated the political economy of violent
contestation, political factionalism, corruption and human rights crises in the territory of
South Sudan. Prospectors first found oil in southern Sudan in the late 1970s. In 1983, the
Government of Sudan abolished the south’s autonomous status gained through the 1972
Addis Ababa Agreement and asserted central control over oilfields then under early
development. This sparked a civil war from 1983 to 2005, characterized by gross human
rights violations and abuses.167 In the southern oil zones, civilians experienced forced
displacement and accompanying atrocities employed by all sides of the internal armed
conflict as tactics to control oilfield territories and revenue potential. Due to persistent
conflict-related interruptions, oil production only started in earnest in 1997 and was
accompanied by intensified violence in oil zones until around 2002. Ethnic dimensions to the
resource competition, violence, atrocities, and southern factionalism emerged and were
inflamed and fomented by the central authorities in Khartoum.168 Several oil companies,
particularly from Europe and North America, were allegedly implicated in human rights
abuses.
126. By August 1999, a pipeline from the southern oilfields to the Red Sea had been
completed. The first crude oil exports were shipped, the International Monetary Fund lifted
restrictions imposed on Sudan, and oil wealth flowed to Khartoum, soon doubling Sudan’s
total national revenues. Peace talks restarted in July 2002, and by 2003 the major SPLM/A
factions had reunited. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement marked a formal end to
the north and south conflict although tensions and occasional hostilities continued between
the two sides. The Agreement provided for an interim, semi-autonomous government in the
south, wealth sharing, and for the referendum of 2011. SPLM/A formally took on governance
functions and oversaw the new oil revenues, with Southern Sudan entitled to 50 per cent of
revenue generated from southern oil. Since mid-2005, all southern governments have been
led by SPLM/A under the leadership of Salva Kiir, deputized for most of this period by Riek
Machar, who later established the SPLM/A-IO.
127. Upon independence in July 2011, South Sudan inherited ownership of southern oil
infrastructure, which had previously constituted most of the oil assets in Sudan. In January
2012, South Sudan shut down oil production in a revenue dispute with Sudan, and in mid-
2012 members of the two countries’ armed forces clashed in borderland oil zones, threatening
a new war.169 In September 2012, the two States agreed a Transitional Financial Arrangement
(essentially an oil revenue sharing agreement) as part of their Cooperation Agreement.170 Oil
exports resumed in June 2013 with revised revenue sharing agreements in place. Yet the
disruption had triggered an economic crisis and increased internal political tensions, while
the number of people requiring food aid had doubled.171
128. Against this backdrop, in December 2013 armed conflict started in Juba and spread
throughout the country, continuing until 2018. Oil production ceased in Unity State while it
continued at lower levels in Upper Nile State. After a peace agreement inked in 2015 faltered,
most of the main conflict parties signed the Revitalized Agreement in September 2018. Oil
zones were focal points of intense battles, forcible displacement of civilians, and gross human

166 Ministry of Petroleum and Mining Market Report, July 2011-January 2012. And Ministry of Environment and Forestry, “Initial
National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” 2018. South Sudan. National
communication (NC), page 7.
167 The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) opposed southern oil production during this period. The authorities in

Khartoum saw oil as a means to address economic crises and fund internal wars, and sought control over the oilfield zones by fomenting
divisions, and arming aligned southern forces and northern militias.
168 For example in 1997, the central government inked an agreement with southern military leader Riek Machar, that included provisions

on protecting the oil production (he had first split from SPLM/A in 1991).
169
See International Crisis Group, “Oil or Nothing: Dealing with South Sudan’s Bleeding Finances.” 6 October 2021,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/305-south-sudan-oil_0.pdf
170 This was implemented after an implementation matrix was agreed to in March 2013; then the oil started flowing.
171 OCHA, “Humanitarian Snapshot: November 2012,” December 2012.

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rights violations and abuses, particularly in Unity, where ethnic tensions again intersected
with violent contestation for territorial control.172 Since then, oilfields and states hosting them
have remained highly militarized and volatile sites of armed conflict, human rights violations,
and increasingly widespread acute hunger.173 Revenue diversion from government budgets
continues to finance and fuel armed conflict, undermining peace prospects and resulting in
human rights violations and abuses. This includes its apparent application by SPLM-IG to
incentivize and reward defections from its opponents.174 Overall, the diverted oil money is
used to lubricate precarious patronage networks of political-military elites.175

Infrastructure and operators

129. South Sudan’s oil assets and infrastructure consist of fields and pumping stations in
the northern border states of Unity State and Upper Nile State. 176 From each state, an
underground pipeline runs crude oil to Sudan’s capital Khartoum, where the two pipelines
converge and run parallel to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, for shipping to international markets.
Three ‘joint operating companies’ operate and manage the oil production in South Sudan: in
Unity, the Greater Pioneer Operating Company (GPOC) and the Sudd Petroleum Operating
Company (SPOC), both producing ‘Nile Blend’; and in Upper Nile, the Dar Petroleum
Operating Company (DPOC), producing ‘Dar Blend’. As detailed in the Commission’s
previous reporting, the majority shareholding companies in these consortia have been from
China, India or Malaysia, all partnering with the State-owned Nile Petroleum Company
(Nilepet).177 In August 2024, Malaysia’s Petronas announced its exit from all three consortia,
and initiated international arbitration proceedings against the Government; Petronas claims
the Government wrongfully blocked its sale of shares to Savannah Energy PLC for more than
a year then expropriated its assets.178 (As of June 2025, the arrangements for and status of
any expropriation by the Government was not yet clear).
130. South Sudan’s Dar Blend pipeline carries production to Port Sudan from Upper Nile
State, which emerged from the 2013 to 2018 armed conflict as the country’s largest oil
production centre; these oil exports stopped after pumping operations were affected by the
armed conflict in Sudan, as detailed above. Sudan declared force majeure on its oil cargo
delivery obligations in March 2024, and DPOC stopped producing Dar Blend as its storages
approached capacity.179 Sudan lifted the force majeure in January 2025,180 after the
Government of South Sudan announced agreements had been made with the warring parties.

172 As noted by this Commission and by the African Union Commission of Inquiry.
173 Administrative control remains contested and boundaries have been remapped, as political-military elites seek access to oil revenues
earmarked for local communities, including in the Ruweng Administrative Area of Unity State, established in 2020. See also
A/HRC/40/CRP.1, para. 647. More recently, in June 2024 subcontractors of a consortium producing oil in northern Unity State again
resorted to evacuating employees, following armed clashes. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/several-killed-3-oil-firms-
shut-in-ruweng-unity-violence.
174 In a recent example, the defection of the top SPLM/A-IO commander for Unity State in October 2023 directly led to violence and

increased insecurity. A/HRC/55/26, paras. 34-36. Documentation produced in the Transitional National Legislative Assembly in June
2024 flagged an alleged withdrawal from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs accounts of more than $1 million to ‘NAS peace implementation.’
See also A/HRC/40/CRP.1, paras. 653-656.
175 This dates back to the Interim Period before independence. See Alex de Waal, “When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: brute causes

of the civil wat in South Sudan,” 2014, African Affairs, 113/452, pages 347-369. Joshua Craze, “Pay day loans and backroom empires:
South Sudan’s Political Economy since 2018,” October 2023, HSBA / Small Arms Survey Briefing Paper.
176 Ministry of Petroleum and Mining Market Report, 2011-2012.
177 As of 2024, before Petronas announced their exit from the consortia, the GPOC shareholders were: China National Petroleum

Company (CNPC, 40 per cent), Petronas (30 per cent); the India-based Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC, 25 percent); and
NilePet, the Nile Petroleum Corporation (5 percent). SPOC shareholders were: Petronas (68 per cent); ONGC (24 percent); and NilePet
(8 percent). DPOC shareholders were: CNPC (41 per cent); Petronas (40 per cent); NilePet (8 per cent); Sinopec (6 per cent); and South
Sudan Tri-Ocean (5 per cent). A/HRC/40/CRP.1, paras. 643-635. A/HRC/48/CRP.3, annex III.
178 Agreed between the companies in December 2022, the proposed sale had been valued at up to $1.25 billion. https://www.savannah-

energy.com/application/files/3916/8664/5640/2022-12-11-South-Sudan-SPA-Announcement-FINAL.pdf.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-08-26/malaysia-s-petronas-sues-south-sudan-over-abandoned-oil-fields. R9657578,
R8843012, R1506131, R9546009.
179 Memo from the Sudan Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, “Subject: Declaration of Force Majeure,” 16 March 2024, on file. South

Sudan’s waxy oil requires pipelines to be heated to prevent gelling, with pumping stations powering the heating. In February, restricted
oil flow was detected in the DPOC pipeline after conflict-associated diesel fuel shortages affected operations at pumping station four,
60 kilometres north of Khartoum. Once diesel fuel was delivered, an attempt to clear the restriction apparently created new problems
requiring more time to repair.
180 https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-lifts-force-majeure-oil-port-sudan-2025-01-06/.

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Dar Blend production did not reach the marine terminal in Sudan until around the end of
April 2025.
131. It was unclear if production levels would ever fully recover; when production resumed
after past shutdowns, some wells were capped for no longer being economically viable. 181
Petronas’ exit from South Sudan has further destabilized the oil sector. While the
Government assumed Petronas’ share of the oil production entitlement, they were unable to
cover Petronas’ proportional share of the restart expenses. 182 As a result, these costs were
absorbed by the remaining foreign partners in the joint operating company, delaying the
resumption of the Dar Blend production. Furthermore, the Oil Exploration and Production
Sharing Agreements specify that all of the joint operating company partners are required to
contribute financial and human capital proportionate to their equity shareholding. However
South Sudan has been unable to match the scale of Petronas’ larger ownership stake and
former commitments.183 This has deepened the Government’s reliance on foreign partners to
bridge the operational gap, further skewing operational control, and subjecting the country to
disadvantageous revenue distributions. This structural imbalance undermines South Sudan’s
permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, as recognised under UN General Assembly
Resolution 1803 (XVII),184 which affirms that the right of peoples and nations to freely
dispose of their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of national
development and the well-being of the people. The impact is evident: following the
production restart in early 2025, four of the first five Dar Blend cargoes were allocated to the
foreign partners for ‘Cost Oil’ recovery—substantially reducing the State’s immediate fiscal
benefit, and eroding its economic self-determination.185
132. In the first half of May 2025, drone attacks attributed to the Rapid Support Forces
damaged oil infrastructure in Port Sudan, illustrating how South Sudan’s oil production still
faces ongoing security risks and challenges associated with armed conflict and possible
export disruptions.186

Declining production and revenue

133. Oil production levels in South Sudan have declined since independence, in a trend
projected to continue.187 Beyond conflict-related interruptions, oil revenue has been impacted
by the lack of investments in infrastructure which are necessary to increase efficiencies in
production, and to protect against significant harms to health and the environment in the oil
zones.188 At the same time, there has been a lack of meaningful efforts to diversify revenues
away from fossil fuels, necessary to decarbonize the economy and enhance its resilience.
Overall, this lack of investment in oil infrastructure reflects the gross government
mismanagement of the resource.
134. A significant part of the government mismanagement of oil resources are oil-backed,
non-concessional loans taken from commercial lenders, and advance payments from oil
traders (pre-sales). In addition to creating a mounting debt burden on the national finances,
these costly loans contribute to a reduced market and lower prices for oil exports. Recent
arbitration judgments against South Sudan for failing to repay these loans have also increased
the risk associated with buying South Sudanese oil, reducing the amount the Government
receives for the same cargo (see below). This was contemplated by drafters of the 2011 Public
Financial Management and Accountability Act, under which the Government was expressly

181 R4276168.
182 R5723815, R7904004.
183 R1481540, R6332124.
184 UN General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, "Permanent sovereignty over natural resources."
185 R5218300.
186 The Commission reviewed a letter from the Republic of the Sudan Ministry of Energy and Petroleum to the South Sudan Ministry

of Petroleum, which appears to be authentic, reporting damage to pumping station five which is used to export South Sudanese oil.
Document on file, dated 9 May 2025. See also https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/6/explosions-huge-fire-in-sudanese-city-of-
port-sudan and https://www.cityreviewss.com/south-sudan-resumes-oil-exports-after-rsf-attack-in-port-sudan/.
187 South Sudan’s maximum monthly production entitlement in 2011 was 2.5 times greater than what it was in 2023. Ministry of

Petroleum and Mining Market Report, July 2011-January 2012. Ministry of Petroleum production and marketing data for 2023.
188 R3683488, R6604270

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prohibited from borrowing non-concessional loans.189 The practice of taking non-

concessional loans has violated this provision.190
135. Since 2012 when the Government sought financing after shutting down oil
production, long-term and non-concessional financing on oil cargo pre-sales have reduced its
revenue for specific cargoes. For loans, this results from contractual arrangements with
extremely favourable terms to lenders, including significant discounts on oil cargoes. For
advance payments, information gathered by the Commission indicates the Government has
agreed to terms which allow the oil traders to choose which month’s mean oil price to use:
the month of lifting, the previous month, or the following month.191 The Commission
calculated, for example, that such price selection may have cost South Sudan more than $7.6
million on just its August 2024 cargoes. Long-term arrangements can enable even more
advantageous discounts to oil traders. For example, in a recent 12-month period, the
Commission identified one company appearing to save $30 million in payments (then
equivalent to more than one month of non-oil revenue); another company appeared to save
$60 million from the benchmark value during the same period. 192
136. An additional problem related to the oil-backed loans and advances is the
Government’s compromising of its tender process for oil sales, further reducing revenue
potential. While the tender process sets the price of an oil cargo,193 a government authority
confirmed to the Commission that before a winning bidder is assigned, relevant ministries
must coordinate to consider the Government’s long-term obligation schedules.194 Given this,
bidders understand that although a tender sets the price of a cargo, it does not determine
which company takes ownership.195 This creates uncertainty, as oil traders have little way of
increasing their likelihood of winning operationally-important cargoes. A corporate
complaint shared with the Commission was that this makes a mockery of the tendering, as
companies without capacity to perform are able to submit high bids, increasing the price of
the cargo, and thereby the costs of competitors, disincentivizing bidding, reducing the pool
of buyers.196
137. A related disincentive for bidders has been instances where the Government re-awards
a cargo already assigned to a company.197 Companies have reported the winning bidder losing
significant money from such cargo re-awarding, including losses incurred from arranged
shipping vessels.198 One affected company claimed that its advance payments199 were then
converted by the Government into a long-term financing arrangement, without prior
consent.200 In such scenarios, companies also face the opportunity cost of not having directed
their investment elsewhere. An outcome of these issues, and other challenges including the
risk of exposure to force majeure, is a reduced pool of companies willing and able to bid,
which depresses prices. For willing buyers, these risks are converted into significant

189 2011 Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, section 39: “Terms of Foreign Borrowing: Subject to the provisions of
the Constitution, the Government shall only borrow and/or guarantee foreign loans that are on strictly concessional terms, as may be
defined by the regulation issued under the provisions of this Act.”
190
While there is nothing to indicate that section 39 of the 2011 is not still applicable, this conclusion must be read with the caveat that
a 202 Act amending the 2011 Act is not publicly available and was not shared with the Commission despite requests to authorities, and
its currently applicable provisions are thereby unclear. Nonetheless, the practice of taking non-concessional loans predates the 202
amendments to this Act.
191 R6830390. As previously reported, a government practice to access quick cash is to request an advance payment of 70 to 80 per

cent of the cost from the companies lifting South Sudan’s oil. A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 291.
192 R3374136. Calculations based on government budget and revenue data, and Dated Brent crude oil prices during that period,

September 2023 to August 2024 (the most recent month of data available at the time of analysis). The companies which received the
largest cumulative discounts during this period were the South Sudan-registered Trinity Energy (saving $30 million), and the UAE-
based OESA Trading DMCC which is formerly known as Addax Energy (saving $60 million).
193 Excluding the $1.50 pre-payment discount, and any additional discounts tied to previous financing arrangements
194 R3514078. An exception is where oil traders making advance payments choose which month’s mean price.
195 R8468214
196 R8421419
197 R6302467, R9874838, R9198678, R3041794
198 R7256039, R9820029
199
The Commission has previously reported on the Government’s practice of requiring 70-80 per cent advance payments, in return for
a $1.50 per barrel discount. This practice violates the insurance of some buyers, further reducing the available pool of bidders, resulting
in a further reduction in the final price achieved. A/HRC/52/CRP.3 para. 291
200 R3195382.

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discounts on what they pay South Sudan, further reducing how much the oil benefits the
South Sudanese.
138. Due to the issues detailed above, as well as increasing geopolitical risks, companies
report facing increasing problems in securing trade financing and insurance for purchases of
oil cargoes from South Sudan.201 Several traders of South Sudan’s oil suggested that new
entrants to this market can no longer secure trade financing.202 This also reduces the number
of firms who can bid to those who either can afford to pay for the cargo outright without
financing, or those willing to take on an unrelated loan; both of which carry accompanying
risks, detailed above. These risks limit potential buyers and create larger discounts on prices,
further reducing government revenue. The Commission’s review of oil cargo discounts
estimated a loss to South Sudan of over $390 million from the benchmark price in the period
from January 2022 to December 2024, or almost $4.2 million per 600,000-barrel cargo.203
139. These increasing risks – combined with the Government’s increased resort to cash and
oil advances since the February 2024 shutdown – continue to decrease the amount of money
South Sudan earns from its cargoes. In 2023, the Commission reported that South Sudan’s
oil selling practices cost the country about $4 per barrel, which included a $1.50 discount the
country offered for buyers pre-paying for the cargo at the time of award, not lifting.204 In the
2023-2024 fiscal year, this average discount increased to $7.36, reflecting desperation for
finance, partly induced by the partial export shutdown and also the seizure risk for a pre-paid
cargo after the Qatar National Bank judgment205 -- both in the first quarter of 2024. Then
from July to December 2024, this average discount increased to $10.70 per barrel, on an
average benchmark price of about $78 per barrel.

Diversion and corruption

140. There is an extreme lack of effective oversight and accountability for decision-making
on how South Sudan’s oil resources generate revenue, and on how it is allocated and spent
(see below). The Anti-Corruption Commission, government auditors and the judiciary are all
severely under-resourced, while the better-resourced Transitional National Legislative
Assembly has not yielded effective oversight. This enables the systemic mismanagement of
oil and its corrupt diversion. The resort to oil-backed loans and advances is one aspect of
arrangements and mechanisms which contribute to diversion and inefficiencies, causing
significant losses to government revenue, and often breaking domestic law.
141. In this context, and with such a large proportion of government revenues coming in
as individual transactions worth tens of millions of dollars each, with limited oversight,
opportunities for diversion can arise through requesting oil companies re-route a transaction
or simply the misreporting of data. Even small adjustments to recording the numbers of oil
barrels lifted, or the price received, can create large amounts of unaccounted money, which
the Commission has previously identified. The Government’s many incidences of conflicting
economic data suggests significant revenue diverted, likely to corruption.
142. The manipulation of cost recoveries for the oil producing consortia has presented
another opportunity for corrupt, off-budget diversions. ‘Cost oil’ is a mechanism included in
the oil Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSAs), which entitle consortia
partners to recover the operating expenses incurred each month. Subject to a cap of 40 to 50
per cent of that month’s total production,206 ‘cost oil’ has primacy over profit sharing (‘profit
oil’),207 and thereby has the priority claim on billions of dollars of South Sudan’s oil. 208 In

201 Including armed conflict in Sudan and insecurity in the Red Sea for the tankers loading oil. Advance payments can also violate
some companies’ insurance policies. R5804857. R1957327, R9994731, R7085583, R1141335.
202 R6176654, R1900470, R1927203.
203 From the Dated Brent mean of month market price. Based on available Ministry of Petroleum marketing data.
204 A/HRC/52/CRP.3 para. 291.
205 See para. 90 and fn. 70.
206 Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements specifying varying percentages across oil fields and by production levels.
207
In which the Government has a share of between 70 and 75 per cent.
208 These figures vary depending on the joint operating company, oil field, and the monthly production level. Capital expenditure costs

are recoverable over four or five years, while operating expenses are fully recoverable in the period they incur. If the recovery exceeds
the cost oil cap, then the recovery rolls over to the next period.

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‘cost oil,’ the joint operating company partners have the largest share, while the Government
of South Sudan takes the majority of profit oil.
143. In available data, the Ministry of Petroleum calculates the cap on ‘cost oil’ as being
45 per cent and being reached every month, yet this is inconsistent with more credible oil
production information from government and corporate sources. 209 Concurrently, the same
Ministry has acknowledged that vast amounts classified as ‘cost oil’ have been non-compliant
with the cost recovery arrangements in place.210 The Commission’s analysis of Ministry data
calculated that from 2015 to 2019, total ‘cost oil’ charged by and received across the consortia
appeared to exceed the real operating expenses by $578 million.211 The most recently
available data set, from 2021, shows the overpayments continuing. These discrepancies
indicate government acquiescence in diverting oil money to the consortia, which in all the
cases, in addition to the Chinese, Malaysian and Indian majority partners, include the State-
owned NilePet.212 ‘Cost oil’ also includes the expenses of South Sudanese businesses that
subcontract to the joint operating companies. Presenting ‘cost oil’ as maxed out also reduces
the amount of oil revenue the Government accounts for in financial documents. This is a
significant diversion of available resources from government budgets to the ostensible benefit
of NilePet, the foreign partners, and joint operating company subcontractors. All this raises
questions about who in fact financially benefits from the manipulation and artificial increase
of ‘cost oil’.
144. Another contributor to South Sudan’s significant oil revenue losses has been Sudan’s
inland lifting of crude oil as payment in-kind for the transit, transfer and processing of that
oil, as well as the Transitional Financial Arrangement between governments of the two
countries. On 3 April 2023, the Commission reported that the Government of South Sudan
claimed to have met its obligations under the Transitional Financial Arrangements, but that
Sudan continued to lift oil, amounting to overpayments under this arrangement.213
Government figures shows that inland lifting in excess of the agreed transit, transfer, and
processing fees continued in the 2022-2023 fiscal year; the outbreak of armed conflict in
Sudan in April 2023 further complicated these arrangements, and the prospects for
reconciling any overpayments. In November 2023, the Minister of Petroleum presented the
value of these overpayments at more than half a billion dollars and claimed that Sudan
continued to lift oil that it was not entitled to.214 Prior to the conflict in Sudan, the Transitional
Financial Arrangement appeared to be used in part as a vehicle to divert revenue to political
elites entwined across both countries. Precarious new dynamics have emerged since the
conflict-related damage to the pipeline, including opaque financial deals and transfers
involving South Sudan and Sudan, where the pipelines traverse territories controlled by the
main Sudanese warring parties.215

209 R8189959.
210 For instance, in a government audit, for which the vast figures have not been accepted as fact, but nonetheless indicate the potential
scale of the irregularities, as well as official recognition of these. ‘Cost Recovery Audit Findings’ for the period of 9th July 2011 to
31st December 2021, presented by the Ministry of Petroleum.
211 The Ministry of Petroleum published annual reports from 2011 through to 2021, which detail operating expenses. The Commission

conducted its ‘cost oil’ analyses of those figures, contrasted with claimed production amounts and ‘cost oil’ allocations, to assess how
‘cost oil’ may be operating. Any potential calculation errors are derived from inaccuracies in that published data. The Ministry of
Petroleum ceased publication, or at least public release, of its annual petroleum reports that include ‘cost oil’ and operating expense
information, after May 2021.
212 Note too that in addition, Tri-Ocean which holds 5 per cent of DPOC is from Egypt.
213 A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 292. The recuperation of this has been further complicated by the conflict in Sudan. The Commission has

seen a May 2022 contract for $25 million of sorghum that the Sudan would supply to South Sudan, to be distributed as subsidized
sorghum to Northern Bahr El Ghazal, which the UN Panel of Experts wrote about extensively in its 2023 Interim Report. See
S/2023/922, annex 6. Despite this being a reconciliation between two governments, it was fulfilled by a private company, Klean and
Klear Services Co. Ltd,, with the sorghum overvalued by approximately 30 per cent, or $7.5 million. In another scenario, the
Government has also provided subsidized sorghum to Warrap state in 2023. The Commission has on file the final report of the Warrap
State Ministerial Management Committee for Dura Distribution. This program, in the president’s home state, saw sorghum and cash
go missing, with opportunities for diversion at every step of these repayment-in-kind processes.
214
The Minister also claimed that between March 2022 and October 2023, Sudan had taken $645.8 million of oil it was not entitled to,
and that after having reconciled $136.1 million of this amount, the balanced owed was $509.6 million. Ministry of Petroleum
Presentation to the Public Financial Management (PFM) Oversight Committee, by Puot Kang Chol, 23 November 2023, on file.
215 R3560322.

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145. Yet another diversion scheme emerged in January 2023, involving the private
company Crawford Capital Ltd. (“Crawford”), when the Ministry of Petroleum issued a
directive introducing a fee on purchases of oil from South Sudan. 216 As detailed below,
Crawford has emerged as a central player in a range of corruption schemes and diversion
mechanisms involving non-oil revenue collections, and its ownership composition is
connected to seniormost political elites in South Sudan (see paragraphs 153 and 165). In this
scheme involving Crawford taking oil revenue through an ‘e-Crude Accreditation Permit’
mechanism, foreign companies lifting oil onto ships in Port Sudan have to apply online and
pay 0.3 per cent of the cargo’s market value, through eGovernment Services
(https://mop.eservices.gov.ss).217 Payments started in September 2023 after a subsequent
directive informed oil consortia the fees were effective immediately. 218 On direction of the
then-Deputy Commissioner General of the National Revenue Authority,219 the fees are
directed to the payment processor for Crawford, which is the private company implementing
government ‘e-services’ with the Ministry of Information, Communication Technology and
Postal Services (ICT and Postal Services).220 Documents gathered by the Commission show
that the Minister of ICT and Postal Services, Michael Makuei, had proposed the 0.3 per cent
fees to the Minister of Petroleum in August 2022, and in November 2022 both ministries
agreed to implement the fees through ‘e-services.’221 Contractual arrangements specify that
Crawford receives 75 per cent of the money from these fees; while the Ministry of ICT and
Postal Services receives 25 per cent, which does not appear to go to the national government
budget. (For further detail on this arrangement, and the corporate ownership of Crawford, see
paragraphs 154 and 155, and graph 3).222
146. From the Commission’s analysis of crude oil export data in the first month of
payments alone (September 2023), Crawford likely received approximately $1.1 million, and
the Ministry of ICT and Postal Services approximately $368,000 (see graph 2, below).223
Based on oil production levels and international benchmark prices at the time, Crawford
stood to gain $9.6 to $11.5 million per year, and the Ministry, $3.2 to $3.8 million. 224 The
fact that the private company that facilitates the online processing receives 75 per cent of the
fee, while the Ministry in whose favour the fee is instituted receives 25 per cent, cannot be
justified, and is an indication of bribery of government officials by the beneficiary private
company, and the resulting abuse of public office. Moreover, oil companies report that traders
have reduced their bids on South Sudan’s oil by 25 cents per barrel, to adjust for the new fee
and not to suffer themselves its impact in the final price.225 The permit has not increased the
cost per cargo that buyers pay, but formally diverts oil revenue to private accounts and the
Ministry of ICT and Postal Services.

216 Directive of 10 January 2023. Authorities in Sudan were notified on 6 February 2024. Documents on file.
217 The implementation contract of 4 November 2022 specifies that “all the Crude Oil Off-takers to pay a fee of 0.3 per cent of the
value of the crude oil cargo benchmarked against the international brent price as per the day of application through its MOP’s automated
system on (www.mop.eservices.gov.ss).” On file.
218 The Ministry’s directive was issued on 29 August 2023, soon after receiving advice on the payment arrangement from the National

Revenue Authority on 18 August 2023. Documents and correspondence on file.

219 Africano Mande Gedima, who later served as Commissioner General of the South Sudan Revenue Authority. In October 2023, the

Transitional National Legislative Assembly changed the name of the National Revenue Authority to the South Sudan Revenue
Authority.
220 To the Capital Pay Client Trust Account. Capital Pay is part of Crawford and takes additional processing fees.
221 Correspondence of 18 August 2022 and documentation of 4 November 2022, on file.
222 Although the initial contract indicated a 65 per cent share to Crawford, the subsequent references to profits are for it to receive 75

per cent, with the other 25 per cent going to the Ministry of ICT and Postal Services.
223 Calculations made from government data, incorporating volume and brent price.
224 Based on annual oil production levels of 50 million to 60 million total barrels, and an average oil price of $85.
225 R1410842, R3661955, R4438096.

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Graph 2: ‘e-Crude Accreditation Permit’ first month payment estimates, September 2023

Lifting Volume Brent Min. of Crawford

JOC Shipper Information Capital
Date (bbl) Price
Revenue Revenue
05 – 06 Sep DPOC 600,000 RSS $91.25 $41,063 $123,188
08 – 09 Sep DPOC 600,000 Joint Marketing $91.85 $41,333 $123,998
456,000 Joint Marketing $32,558 $97,675
14 – 15 Sep DPOC $95.20
144,000 NilePet Share $10,282 $30,845
16 – 18 Sep GPOC 600,000 RSS $95.55 $42,998 $128,993
GPOC 600,000
21 – 23 Sep Joint Marketing $93.70 $71,663 $214,988
SPOC 400,000
22 – 23 Sep DPOC 600,000 Joint Marketing $93.99 $42,296 $126,887
GPOC 150,000
26 – 28 Sep RSS $94.46 $42,507 $127,521
SPOC 450,000
29 – 30 Sep DPOC 600,000 RSS $95.86 $43,137 $129,411
$367,837 $1,103,506

Harms to health and the environment

147. In the oil zones, there have been significant harms caused to population health and the
environment, including birth deformities, due to poor infrastructure and the lack of effective
environmental pollution management and enforcement of regulations.226 The government
mismanagement, and the underinvestment by authorities and consortia, exacerbated by the
multiple production shutdowns, have left the country’s oil infrastructure poorly maintained.
The absence of effective government regulatory bodies, and the lack of environmental
safeguard enforcement, has enabled certain companies to the apply cheaper operational
approaches – to maximize profits at the expense of protecting public and environmental
health.
148. Poorly maintained infrastructure is prone to ruptures that let pipelines fill with water
and corrode, causing oil spills that can mix with community water sources. Beyond oil spills,
negligence and money-saving approaches are also evident in the handling of produced water
– an oil extraction byproduct. The Commission noted that oil consortia continue to use
cheaper, less effective, and riskier methods of pollution management than what is
technologically available and economically viable.227 Cheaper methods increase pollution
risks, especially in these flood prone areas where ‘storm event overflows’ can see produced
water mixing with flood water, spreading the contamination and impacts. The Commission
has previously reported the presence of heavy metals in the Nile River and waterways
associated with the pollution in Unity and Upper Nile states. Pregnant women and children
are particularly affected by pollution exposure, which can be directly attributed to devastating
birth defects in some areas.228 These are just some of the human rights impacts of the
government mismanagement, the cost-cutting and negligence among oil producing consortia,
and the broader underinvestment. It seems clear that the Government is violating its duty “to
ensure that developmental and environmental needs are met in a sustainable, fair and
equitable manner,” as well as the “fundamental obligation of adopting preventive measures,”
and is failing to apply the precautionary principle.229

226 For communities, this compounds unaddressed legacies of human rights violations and abuses associated with the presence of oil,
including forced displacement, and decades of militarization. See A/HRC/40/CRP.1, para. 666.
227 Instead of investing in the most effective but more expensive available methods of handling produced water, the JOCs store
produced water in open-air evaporation ponds that pass the water through reed beds which naturally extract most of the contamination.
This process is unmanaged for some of the JOCs, which increases the risk of oil-related water contamination, with the consortia not
investing in oversight of the process which adjusts production to rainfall levels to prevent storm event overflows. R3708734. Yet most
open-air ponds do not have effective linings, such as high-density polyethylene, that would seal them and prevent chemical and crude
from seeping into the water table. See also A/HRC/48/CRP.3, annex IV.
228 A/HRC/48/CRP.3, para. 84 and annex IV.
229 Articles III and IV of the African Convention on Natural Resources.

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149. Dating back to 2013, a series of government investigations have confirmed links
between the oil operations and harms to health.230 In October 2023, the Minister of Health
said recent tests pointed to such pollution as a cause of birth deformities. 231 Members of the
Transitional National Legislative Assembly again discussed this problem in April 2024. 232
Yet despite more than ten years of such official findings and acknowledgements,
environmental standards are not enforced, oil consortia have not adhered to environmental
standards, and affected populations lack access to effective remedies,233 enabling the
pollution and human rights consequences to continue. The Commission previously reported
on an oil pollution case brought by lawyers in the East African Court of Justice, suing the
Government for $720 million.234 While the Commission understands that in 2021 a settlement
of just $1 million was agreed upon, it was unclear if the settlement funds made it to the
affected communities.235
150. The effects of pollution from the oil industry are exacerbated by climate change and
flooding events, increasing the risks of contaminants spreading. Since 2019 in Unity State,
which hosts the Sudd wetland, communities have experienced successive years of unseasonal
flooding, and the number of people affected rose significantly during flooding in 2024. 236
This affects vulnerable populations, with the impacts felt most acutely by children.237 Climate
shocks are regarded as a leading contributor to the acute food insecurity faced by around half
the country’s population,238 disproportionately affecting Unity and Upper Nile states.
Changing weather patterns also increase the prevalence of diseases such as malaria. 239 The
Government depends on revenue from fossil fuels that cause climate change yet fails to invest
in adaptation and modernization of infrastructure, and to provide humanitarian assistance for
those affected.

B. Non-oil revenues

Underdevelopment and corruption limiting the tax base

151. South Sudan has the lowest non-oil revenues to GDP ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa.240
This reflects its underdevelopment and lack of productive economic activity: legacies of
decades of conflict and neglect, which have been greatly exacerbated by poor governance
and grand corruption. The lack of productive agriculture, the scarcity of medium and large
enterprises, and an absence of significant industry all diminish the possible tax base from
businesses and wage earners; these factors contribute to and reflect poverty, affecting 9 in 10
residents of South Sudan.241 The revenue potential from the country’s non-oil extractive
resources is mostly unrealized, because so many of the mining and logging operations are
conducted informally or illegally, with a combination of quasi-legitimate royalty payments
and off-the-books kickbacks to authorities staying off government budgets.242 As noted by

230 A/HRC/48/CRP.3, paras. 7-8. On its website, the Ministry of Petroleum has also included an acknowledgement, that the “petroleum
sector historically caused a loss of grazing land, soil and water contamination as well as other health risks in and around oil-producing
areas.” https://www.mop.gov.ss/hse (accessed June 2024).
231 https://www.eyeradio.org/some-tests-show-oil-pollution-linked-to-birth-defects-says-yolanda/
232 https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/parliament-summons-3-ministers-over-oil-pollution
233 For further details on attempts at seeking remedies, see A/HRC/48/CRP.3, annex IV.
234 A/HRC/48/CRP.3 Annex IV, para 16
235 R9537139.
236 The Sudd also extends into Jonglei State and part of Lakes State. In 2024, heavy rains combined with controlled water releases from

Lake Victoria in Uganda have raised the White Nile River levels. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-
sudan-floods-snapshot-5-september-2024.
237 UNICEF, The Climate Crisis is a Child Rights Crisis: Introducing the Children’s Climate Risk Index, 2021. A/HRC/49/78, para.

51. A/HRC/52/26, para. 27. A/HRC/55/26, para. 39.

238 See Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)_, 6 November 2023.
239 See also Médecins Sans Frontières, “The health effects of climate change in Old Fangak,” 28 November 2023,

https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/photos-health-effects-climate-change-old-fangak.
240 International Monetary Fund, Republic of South Sudan: 2023 Article IV Consultation, and First and Second Reviews under the

Staff-Monitored Program with Board Involvement-Staff Report.

241 World Bank, “South Sudan Economic Monitor,” seventh edition, March 2025.
242 IR-100049. Since 2018, the Commission has reported on contestation over these resources fueling armed conflict, and human rights

violations and abuses. Resource-rich Greater Equatoria is particularly affected. A/HRC/37/CRP.2, para. 70. Among many associated

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the Commission in its September 2021 paper,243 information on non-oil revenues lacks
transparency, and this remains the case. The patterns of misappropriation, corrupt
procurements, money laundering and fraud detailed in that paper continue to divert non-oil
revenues from government budgets. So too does the theft of personal income tax, mainly
sourced from the dollar-denominated salaries of humanitarians.244. Further, the introduction
of digitized tax and duty collections, implemented by a politically connected private
company, has created new corruption mechanisms and involved increased predation on
humanitarians.

Collections outsourced to Crawford Capital Ltd.

Single source procurement for digitization of collections
152. In late 2019 South Sudan began a migration toward digitized systems for the
assessment and collection of taxes, customs duties and related non-oil revenues. In its paper
of September 2021 the Commission noted having observed the prevalence of manual systems
in government offices for non-oil revenue collections, and suggested that electronic systems
may be more effective at preventing leakages and fraud.245 While digitization presented an
opportunity to address diversion and corruption in revenue collections, the Commission
found that ‘e-Services,’ implemented through private company Crawford Capital Ltd.
(“Crawford), have instead facilitated organized corruption and predation, resulting in further
revenue diversion.
153. Crawford is a company with political connectedness exemplified by the breadth of
government institutions involved in facilitating increasing State capture. Government entities
facilitating Crawford’s new contracts and fees have included the Ministry of Information
Communication Telephone and Postal Services (ICT and Postal Services), the National
Communications Authority, the National Security Service, the Ministry of Finance and
Planning, the South Sudan Revenue Authority, the Ministry of Petroleum, the Ministry of
Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs,
the office of the Vice President of the Services Cluster, and the Transitional National
Legislative Assembly. The ownership of the company includes individuals connected with
elite political patronage networks, as detailed below.
154. In November 2019, Crawford was contracted as the exclusive provider for ‘e-
Government Services,’ in a partnership with the Ministry of Information, Communication
Technology and Postal Services (ICT and Postal Services) under its minister Michael
Makuei.246 The Ministry and the National Communications Authority were among the
institutions which lobbied for contracting Crawford. Government correspondence gathered
by the Commission shows that in October 2019, the Ministry of Finance and Planning had
approved a single sourcing procurement, noting “the National Security concern attached to
the project.”247 The approval followed written advice from Akol Koor Kuc, then-Director
General of the Internal Security Bureau (ISB) of the National Security Service, in which he
proposed that Crawford “should work in partnership with the ISB ICT Department since they
are aiming to create huge databases and integration of services that can be accessed online.”248
In addition to the corruption concerns, the nature of the intelligence service’s involvement in
the single-source procurement process suggests that ‘e-Services’ are also likely to be used
without any consideration for personal data protection to facilitate unlawful State
surveillance of citizens, an established tactic of repression in South Sudan.249

human rights impacts, illegal operations increase the vulnerabilities of the communities living in resource-rich areas, and of the workers
in these operations, who include children. A/HRC/55/26, para. 57.
243 A/HRC/48/CRP.3, para. 87.
244 A/HRC/55/26, para. 81.
245 A/HRC/48/CRP.3, paras. 163-164.
246 Contract, on file.
247 Correspondence to the Ministry of ICT and Postal Services, October 2023. On file.
248 Correspondence to the Minister of ICT and Postal Services, September 2023. On file. See also A/HRC/54/CRP.6, paras. 32-27..
249 See “Entrenched repression: systematic curtailment of the democratic and civic space in South Sudan, 5 October 2023,

A/HRC/54/CRP.6. The Commission has noted that in addition to revenue collections there have been plans to extend Crawford’s
operations to the administration of South Sudan population data, including birth registration, passport applications, and a ‘National

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155. Under the 16 November 2019 contract arrangement between Crawford and the
Ministry of ICT and Postal Services, 75 per cent of the ‘eServices’ profit share goes to
Crawford, and 25 per cent to the Ministry (as for ‘e-Crude Accreditation Permit’ fees; see
paragraphs 145 and 146).250 That contract arrangement, reviewed by the Commission,
purports to exempt Crawford from paying taxes during the first ten years of ‘eServices’
implementation, including corporation tax, import tax, and value added tax. Documents
reviewed by the Commission show that Crawford proposed the Ministry should “be the face
of the project,” while the company remained in the background but still retaining majority
shares.251 Crawford has since entered into similar arrangements with other government
entities.
Other ‘e-Services’ money-making corruption mechanisms
156. In late 2020, the Ministry of Interior launched an online portal to enable ‘e-Visa’
applications for entry to South Sudan, and to facilitate visa fee payments.252 The Commission
identified that the website set up by Crawford uses the same ‘e-Citizen’ platform developed
by Webmasters Kenya for use by the Government of Kenya. 253 Although Crawford did not
build the platform software, nor significantly customize it for South Sudan, it nonetheless
takes 75 per cent of the profits it generates. This is highly lucrative for Crawford. Regular
visa fees for citizens of most countries start at $100 for one month and rise to $350 for six
months of multiple entries.254 Crawford’s payment processing subsidiary Capital Pay Ltd.,
also charges an additional service fee of $20.16 on top of their 75 percent profit share for the
$100 visa. While the lack of available arrivals data makes the total monetary sums difficult
to quantify, the arrangement evidently diverts significant revenue from the Government to
Crawford.
157. A November 2020 contract with the National Revenue Authority to be its ‘e-Tax’
collector also gives Crawford a legal entitlement to 2 per cent of all digitally assessed taxation
in the country.255 This figure is highly inflated, for example, commercial banks report
receiving just 0.5 percent for collecting, storing, and transporting physical cash revenues to
the central bank. Based on ‘eTax’ collection estimates, Crawford likely receives more than
$5 million per year, increasing by 35 to 40 per cent annually if trends continue. 256 Further,
the Commission received information that in late 2023, after a change in the Commissioner
General of the National Revenue Authority, commercial banks collecting non-oil revenues
were instructed to deposit collections into accounts controlled by Crawford, rather than into
National Revenue Authority accounts, as required by law.257 Persons with direct knowledge
of this arrangement, including bankers, indicated that Crawford representatives make
irregular withdrawals from these accounts, before remitting revenues to the Authority,
exceeding their contractually allowed, although inappropriately high, 2 per cent retention.258
Despite banks processing and managing the collections on behalf of Crawford, including its
withholding percentage, the Commission understands that they have not seen the eTax
contract directing them to withhold those collections for Crawford’s benefit. 259
158. In January 2021, the Ministry of Health inked an agreement with Crawford after the
company proposed it adopt a ‘unified electronic certificate’ for COVID-19 tests, then
mandatory to exit the country. The Ministry granted a license that the company then used to
claim $6 per test conducted in South Sudan, while its subsidiary Crawford Laboratory Ltd.
got involved in running tests. Ensuing dysfunctionality in the system’s roll-out led to an

Identity Card.’ This raises human rights concerns about the introduction of such digital systems, particularly related to privacy, personal
data protection, and unlawful surveillance. Documents and correspondence, on file. See also: https://crawfordcapital.africa/#project
and https://www.eservices.gov.ss (accessed January 2025).
250 Different share arrangements are specified in some contracts with other government entities, as discussed below.
251 Letter from Director General of National Communications Authority to Minister of Information, on file.
252 Of the Ministry of Interior. https://www.evisa.gov.ss/.
253 R9818464.
254 Or for United States citizens, $160 for one-month and $500 for a three-month multiple entry visa. Payment processing fees are

added.
255 On file.
256
Based on National Revenue Authority data.
257 2016 National Revenue Authority Act, section 38. See also S/2024/343, para. 170
258 R4612369, R3504519.
259 R2443973, R2465394.

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examination by a government taskforce, which found that individuals associated with

Crawford had misrepresented themselves as National Revenue Authority officials, and
recommended that Crawford refund the fees it had collected (it appears this did not
happen).260 Despite the failed performance administering the electronic COVID certificate,
soon after the Ministry of Health contracted Crawford Laboratory Ltd. to support its Ebola
disease preparedness. In October 2022 an advance payment of $10 million was agreed, to be
paid into an account managed by Crawford.261 Its performance providing the contracted
goods and services is unclear. Moreover, the $10 million represents more than 80 per cent of
what the national Ministry of Health claimed as its total expenditure for that entire 2022–
2023 fiscal year.262
159. In the first half of 2024, a reckless government tax scheme involving Crawford,
designed in 2023, caused fuel shortages that impeded vital humanitarian aid and other
operations. The Commission identified that Minister Michael Makuei wrote to the Minister
of Petroleum on 2 February 2023, stating it was “imperative” that the Ministry of Petroleum
“utilizes the already established E-Government System and implement the ‘Refined product
Accreditation Permit’. More than one year later this was implemented: on 22 April 2024,
then-Minister of Trade and Industry William Anyuon Kuol ordered that all petroleum product
imports immediately required an ‘ePetroleum Accreditation Permit,’ accompanied by
payment of a 3-cent levy on every litre of petrol.263 Moreover, the order stated that existing
“Government exemptions are not applied on the ePetroleum Accreditation Permit”.
160. Among other exempt entities, United Nations organs broadly resisted this new tax,
given the illegality, and implications of making such payments. 264 The uncertainty left fuel
destined for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations stuck at border and transit points. As
fuel reserves depleted, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator said on 28 April that
food aid air drops to remote areas had paused, noting “it is vital that our limited funds are
spent on saving lives and not bureaucratic impediments.” 265 The fuel shortages also led to
UNMISS reducing peacekeeping patrols.
161. Then on 3 May 2024, the Ministry of Finance and Planning reaffirmed that
exemptions remained valid for petroleum imports.266 By June, World Food Programme air
operations had fully resumed. Yet the Commission observed some organizations
experiencing problems reestablishing regular fee-free imports, and the issue had not yet been
fully resolved as of early 2025. The timing of the ‘ePetroleum Accreditation Permit’
implementation came soon after the partial oil export shut down from February 2024, fuelling
speculation about the impetus for this measure; but as highlighted above, the scheme had
been planned well prior to the pipeline shutdown. The Ministry of ICT and Postal Services
had lobbied for it, then Crawford energetically implemented, allegedly including in efforts to
directly collect the new fees from the companies importing oil from Kenya. 267 Overall,
Crawford has implemented and profited from illegal taxes on goods destined for the United

260 Representatives of Capital Pay, Crawford’s payment processor, were said to have harassed persons doing tests. National Taskforce
on COVID-19: Report on the Genesis of the Six Dollars Charge Imposed on COVID-19 Private Laboratories from September 6th 2021
to December 26th 2021; Investigation Committee, 17 December 2022.
261 Government correspondence and contractual information of September and October 2022, on file.
262 South Sudanese pounds 7.6 billion, converted at the October 2022 official rate of SSP 615 to the dollar.
263 Before this order a fee had been pegged at 5 per cent. “Ministerial Order No:5. 2024 A.D. for the implementation of E Government

Tarriff and E Product Accreditation,” 22 April 2024, RSS/MT&I/J/12/22-04-2024.

https://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/caselawreport/?id=288797. Several sources of law provide tax exemptions to the United Nations,
international and national non-government organizations, and diplomatic missions. These include the 2009 Taxation Act and its 2016
amendments, the 2016 Non-Governmental Organizations Act, and the Status of Forces Agreement between the Government and the
United Nations Mission in South Sudan. https://www.eyeradio.org/diplomats-voice-concern-over-trade-ministrys-e-petroleum-permit-
policy/.
264 This would include necessitating cuts, for example to the provision of humanitarian aid to populations in need.
265 https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/humanitarian-partners-south-sudan-call-government-urgently-remove-
new-charges-impacting-delivery-humanitarian-assistance.
266 Ministry of Finance and Planning, Ministerial Order, ref: RSS/MOFP/J/M/05/2024/017.
267 The Minister of ICT and Postal Services appears to have spearheaded efforts to integrate government e-Services with the Kenya

Pipeline Company. Correspondence on file. On 3 May 2024, a Kenyan court issued an order of temporary injunction against Crawford
for, inter alia, illegally collecting fees for petroleum products destined for South Sudan. “Ogelo v Crawford Capital Limited; Kenya
Pipeline Company Limited & another (Interested Parties) (Civil Suit E007 of 2024) [2024] KEHC 5303 (KLR) (3 May 2024) (Ruling),”
on file.

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Nations and humanitarian actors, hindering the delivery of aid and the United Nations
Mission in South Sudan’s execution of its mandate. Given the above experience and broader
context, there have been concerns about new bureaucratic impediments to humanitarian and
related operations.268
162. Imports of goods to South Sudan from 2024 were also hampered by a separate new
‘Electronic Cargo Tracking Note’ tax imposition of $300 per importing truck. Despite being
related to trucking physical goods into South Sudan, this is another e-Government Service
revenue, and its imposition caused cargo bound for South Sudan to pile up at the Port of
Mombasa, resulting in delays still impacting imports in 2025. 269 Concurrently, Crawford has
benefitted from tax exemptions, as noted above.
Beneficiaries of the corruption
163. Revenues from collections through ‘e-Services’ are not indicated in national
government budgets. In May 2024, a senior finance official said 19 revenue-generating
institutions were not remitting money to centralized authorities, as required. 270 An example
of this appears to be the 25 per cent of e-Government service profit share to the Ministry of
ICT and Postal Services collected by Crawford. As a result of the lack of transparency on
financial flows through ‘e-Services,’ how other government ministries and entities benefit
from involvement in digitized collections is unclear. What is clear is that Crawford has used
political connections to exert pressure on government officials, and the resulting abuse of
office to gain an increasing number of revenue-generating government contracts, without any
credible public procurement process. Through this, they have undermined and unlawfully
usurped functions of the South Sudan Revenue Authority271 – including passing public tax
collection through private bank accounts, subject to diversion – and privatized public revenue
at levels not seen in any legitimate public-private partnership. Representatives of Crawford
have also been found to misrepresent themselves as Revenue Authority officials while
collecting fees and taxes.272
164. The extremely high take of Crawford from its collection of non-oil revenues, as well
as its poor performance, lack of added value, and role in delaying critical imports which has
obstructed the activities of international peacekeeping, diplomatic, and humanitarian
missions in South Sudan, while enjoying tax breaks, all reflect the lack of credible
procurements. Moreover, Crawford’s inception in ‘e-Services’ and its continued growth
result from government decisions, involving certain senior officials encouraging or
permitting illegal conduct. All this indicates that the company has powerful political
connections and associations. The Commission gathered information on Crawford’s
elaborate corporate ownership structures. On paper, there appear to be at least seven
individual shareholders, with three primary shareholders; yet Crawford’s financial
beneficiaries extend further and include political elites and their close relatives.273
165. The Commission produced a detailed chart of Crawford’s ownership structure. On
paper, Crawford Capital Ltd appears to have been formed by Garang Mayom Kuoc Malek,
the son of a former Deputy Minister for Transport and Member of Parliament for Twic

268 New government guidelines on tax exemptions signalled on 19 August 2024, considered to disproportionately affect humanitarian
organizations, were also considered as being likely to lead to further import delays and fuel shortages. A Ministry of Finance and
Planning notice to diplomatic missions, the United Nations and all non-governmental organizations outlined the new procedures for
requesting exemptions. “Subject: National Tax Exemption Board Resolutions,” 19 August 2024, RSS/MF&P/J/OUP/8.
269 In March 2024, the then-Minister of Finance and Planning imposed an Electronic Cargo Tracking Note (ECTN), creating another

eGovernment services tax. The imposition of a tax of $350 per imported truckload caused cargo to pile up at Mombasa in Kenya. After
temporarily suspending the order due to the halt in imports, the Government reintroduced the ECTN in April, revised to $300 per
truckload, as per an order of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
270 Minister Agok Makur Kur. https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/19-institutions-to-blame-for-south-sudans-economic-woes-

minister
271 A government taskforce and a Kenyan court both found Crawford falsely representing as the Revenue Authority.
272 As found in 2022 by a government taskforce, see para. 158. And by a Kenyan Court in 2024, see fn. 267.
273 On paper, Garang Mayom Kuoc Malek owns 95% of Crawford Laboratory Limited, 68% of Crawford Capital Ltd, and 61.2% of

Capital Pay Ltd. The second-largest shareholder in this corporate group is Jeremy Gisemba, a Kenyan, who owns 26% of Crawford
Capital Ltd and 23.4% of Capital Pay Ltd. However, these shareholdings are subject to change, as Ruey Majok Guangdong previously
owned 50% of Crawford Capital Ltd, at the time of the company’s incorporation. The Ugandan company implementing the ‘electronic
cargo tracking Note’ as a South Sudan eGovernment service is owned by Charles Michael Mbire and two of his daughters.

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County, and Ruey Majok Guandong the son of South Sudan’s Ambassador to Turkey.274
However, it is likely linked to more senior political elite, based on consistent reporting from
numerous, confidential sources. These two same primary individuals behind Crawford –
Garang Mayom Kuoc Malek and Ruey Majok Guandong – have a longer history of forming
companies with politically-connected individuals and operationalizing Government
structures and institutions in service of that company. For example, documentation obtained
by the Commission from the South Sudan Business Registry shows Garang Malek and Ruey
Guandong formed Air Afrik Aviation Limited with President Salva Kiir’s son, Mayar Salva
Kiir, in 2013.275 Other family members of political elites are also understood to be the
beneficiaries of corrupt government procurements and associated businesses, including
Crawford Capital Ltd. The Commission has developed a list of individuals who warrant
further investigation for their roles in economic crimes. 276
Graph 3: Ownership overview of Crawford and related companies

Personal income tax

166. Personal income tax is the main source of non-oil government revenues; however, the
tax base is very low, given that few residents earn a living wage, with 92 per cent of the
population living in poverty.277 Little personal income tax revenue is derived from
government employees, whose salaries are low and often delayed or unpaid. Therefore,
personal income tax revenue is primarily derived from the dollar-denominated salaries of
residents employed in non-government organizations, international organizations, and
diplomatic missions.278 Of the $286 million in non-customs and related non-oil revenues
reported for the 2022-2023 fiscal year in national budget data, primarily collected in dollars,
personal income tax constituted 87 per cent;279 World Bank estimates put this figure as higher,

274 As of May 2025, Majok Guandong Thiep’s X profile (formerly known as Twitter) also lists him as permanent representative to the
UNEP and UN Habitiat. See https://x.com/majokguandong.
275 On file. IR-100061.
276
This list of names, with links to information collected and preserved, forms part of the Commission’s archives.
277 World Bank, “South Sudan Economic Monitor,” seventh edition March 2025.
278 R6819284, IR-100046.
279 At the time of writing, a breakdown of non-oil revenue by tax for the 2023-2024 fiscal year was not available.

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at almost 94 per cent.280 This large percentage highlights the limited generation of business
profits and associated taxation in South Sudan, reflecting the non-profit nature of the
country’s economy.281 It also highlights problems in tax collection, with business profits in
South Sudan positively correlated with levels of political-connectedness, and therefore the
larger companies are more likely to receive tax exemptions.282
167. Authorities in the national and state governments share duties for personal income tax
collections and the national government is also required to transfer revenue to states. State
governors typically exert significant control over the money from these transfers, and that
from state-level collections. The Commission received consistent information that state
personal income tax revenue can amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars each month. 283
Because the main tax base is employees of humanitarian organizations, state governments
receive more money in parts of the country with the worst humanitarian conditions and
largest humanitarian presence. Instead of serving population needs, vast sums are
misappropriated. This implicates governors, consistent with theft patterns in revenue
transfers to oil producing states, and kickbacks from illegal extractive industry.
168. The Jonglei State finances emblematically illustrate the misappropriation of personal
income tax. Jonglei hosts some of South Sudan’s largest humanitarian operations, responding
to the widespread acute hunger, armed violence and conflict, and the lack of basic services.284
Unlike in several neighbouring states where a lot of unaccountable money reaches authorities
through oil revenue transfers, or apparent kickbacks from illegal extractive industries, in
Jonglei the major source of money appears to be taxing humanitarians. Amounting to millions
of dollars annually, this has evidently not gone to core government services, or to addressing
the basic needs of the population. Successive teacher strikes and related protests have taken
place there over diminished and delayed civil servant salaries.285
169. In August 2022, the Jonglei State legislative assembly passed a vote of no confidence
against the Finance Minister, for not producing government budgets and refusing to answer
questions about where personal income tax revenue was directed. 286 Then-Governor Denay
Jock Chagor retained the Minister, who still did not present a budget for parliamentary and
public scrutiny.287 In May 2024, the President dismissed Denay Jock Chagor as Governor; he
had held the post since July 2020. For part of his tenure, the State Revenue Authority was
headed by Thai Kher Chagor, reportedly a relative of Denay Jock Chagor; he was removed
from this post in July 2024.288 Following the removal of Denay Jock Chagor and Thai Kher
Chagor, the new Governor published figures on personal income tax collections, amidst
public criticism and debate about diversions and the lack of transparency. The Deputy
Governor, from a different political party and effectively a political rival of the Governor,
soon responded with conflicting data. The two respective datasets suggested that state
personal income tax collections were in the range of $190,000 to $450,000 per month. 289
While these figures have not been verified, they indicate a possible range of between $8.7
and $20.7 million of personal income tax potentially collected by Jonglei authorities during
the nearly four-year tenure of Governor Denay Jock Chagor. During that time, no state budget
was delivered, and expenditures were not reported. This lack of transparency in state budget

280 “South Sudan: Building Non-Oil Revenue Mobilization” World Bank Group presentation at the National Economic Conference,
September 2023.
281 Government budget data for fiscal year 2022-2023, on file.
282 See discussion of Crawford Capital Ltd, paras. 152—165. See also S/2020/1141, Annex XIV.
283 R4690658, R4714901, R7414574, R3935855.
284 Women and children (both girls and boys) are disproportionately affected by this situation. This is reflected in stark terms in the

widespread abductions of women, girls and boys which has continued without an effective government response, as detailed in the
Commission’s reporting. See for example A/HRC/55/26, paras. 28—33 and 44—51.
285 Including in 2024. See also A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 3.
286 Abraham Riek Yuek. https://www.voaafrica.com/a/jonglei-lawmakers-vote-impeach-finance-minister-/6698079.html
287 State governments have claimed the budget cannot be prepared before passage of the national budget is passed, which determines

state budgets, and the national government is always late. More significantly, a budget creates a paper trail and increases transparency,
which is resisted. Further, reporting on personal income tax revenue may also have implications for what a state receives from the
national government, also disincentivizing transparency.
288 https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/jonglei-state-revenue-chief-suspended. R6698610
289 See https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/jonglei-governor-reveals-his-monthly-budget-and-expenses, and

https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2025/01/11/jonglei-officials-feud-over-expenditure/

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and expenditure processes are strong indicators of grand corruption and are not unique to
Jonglei State.

South Sudan Revenue Authority

170. The South Sudan Revenue Authority (formerly the National Revenue Authority) was
first constituted around early 2018 and was operational by 2019, initially taking positive steps
in transparency, including regular publications of revenue collections data. 290 Yet this
progress was stymied in August 2019, when its leadership was dismissed. 291 The Commission
has previously reported on subsequent irregularities and illegalities involving the Authority,
including indications of misappropriation and diversion, including in its arrangements with
Crawford Capital Ltd.;292 the Commission’s recommendations, such as to regularly publish
collection figures, do not appear to have been adopted.
171. The Authority’s publication of collection data is sporadic and often contradictory. The
Commission identified significant discrepancies between non-oil revenue collection figures
from the Authority and the Ministry of Finance and Planning: in one fiscal year for instance,
this was over $90 million, creating significant potential for leakage and corruption.293 Beyond
such discrepancies, non-oil revenue collection reports show signs of manipulation that would
enable significant revenue diversions. For example, the Commission’s review of government
data for the 2023-2024 fiscal year identified that the Authority had forecasted non-oil revenue
collection of SSP 245.3 billion, yet through the first half of the fiscal year, the Authority had
already collected almost three-quarters of this figure. This stronger-than-forecast
performance continued the upward trend of increasing non-oil revenue collection since the
Authority became operational (see graph 4, below). However, government data reported that
this trend had reversed in the second half of that fiscal year, during which time collections
were just 37 per cent of the amount collected in the first half. This would represent a complete
collapse in the country’s tax base, if true, and a total reversal of the country’s progress in
increasing non-oil revenue collections. Given that there is no reasonable explanation for this
significant drop in non-oil revenue collections between the first and second halves of 2023-
2024, the change most likely reflects misreporting of tax collections that exceeded the start-
of-year forecasts: if the collection trends from July to December 2023 had continued from
January to June 2024, this could have amounted to over $120 million of collections diverted.
Graph 4: Reported non-oil revenue collections, January 2021 to June 2024

50 $40
Millions (USD)
Billions (SSP)

40
$30
30
$20
20
$10
10 Unexplained
drop in
- $- reported
Oct-21

Oct-22

Oct-23
Apr-21

Apr-22

Apr-23

Apr-24
Jul-21

Jul-22

Jul-23
Jan-21

Jan-22

Jan-23

Jan-24

collections,
indicating
diversion
South Sudan Pounds (Left)
Forecasted Collection (Extending Prior 6 Months Average)
US Dollar Conversion (Right)

290 Established under the 2016 National Revenue Authority Act, its name was changed in late 2023 (see fn. 118).
291 A/HRC/48/CRP.3, paras. 145-150.
292 A/HRC/48/CRP.3, paras. 151-160 and 182. In April 2023, the Commission commended increased transparency in non-oil revenue

collections, yet this progress has since stalled, and even reversed. A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 295.
293
For the 2021-2022 fiscal year, National Revenue Authority documentation shows SSP 80.5 billion, or $186.5 million, while the
Ministry of Finance and Planning’s budget for 2022-2023, detailing final outturns for the 2021-2022 fiscal year, reports just SSP 39.7
billion in non-oil revenue, or $92.2 million. Similarly, non-oil revenue figures from the South Sudan Revenue Authority for the first
half of 2023-2024 differ significantly from what the Ministry of Finance published in its budget execution reports for this period.

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172. Additionally, the majority of non-oil revenue is collected in US dollars, as it is off the
foreign currency salaries of NGO and international organization workers (the Authority
collected personal income tax from such employees who reside in Juba, the capital).294
Therefore, somewhere after the tax collection in dollars but before the South Sudan Pound
distribution from the Ministry of Finance and Planning, non-oil revenue collections have
been converted from dollars to pounds at the official rate, privatizing the difference between
parallel and official rates, somewhere between the Crawford accounts with commercial banks
to the Bank of South Sudan and the Ministry of Finance and Planning. This difference in
rates reached a peak of 181 per cent on 29 July 2024, which means converting $20 million in
non-oil revenue to South Sudan Pounds at this time would have privatized almost $13
million, passing on only a true value purchasing power of $7.1 million. Such diversion could
partly, but not fully, explain the drop in non-oil revenue collection from January to June 2024.
173. The Authority has also increased the percentage of collection it withholds for its own
operations. Budget data indicates that in the 2022-2023 fiscal year, the Authority was
withholding 8 per cent, then 10 per cent in 2023-2024, then 14.5 per cent in the fiscal year
2024-2025 budget.295 There appears to be no oversight of these retained funds.296 The
Commission has on file evidence of irregular withdrawals from this retention account, as
recent as January 2025, unrelated to the functioning of the Authority. 297 This money is in
addition to the high budget allocation and running costs of the Authority, making it one of
the best-funded government entities.298 The significant withholdings taken by the Authority
and the high budget disbursements to it are irregular practices. So too is the Authority’s
permissiveness in allowing representatives of Crawford to collect and hold revenues in
company bank accounts, which has no lawful justification and appears to have enabled
significant theft, fraud and corruption. Additionally, there has been an apparent demand on
banks to deliver non-oil revenue collection to the Authority’s headquarters in cash, which is
another irregular practice with no practical or commercial benefit, likely unlawful and a
mechanism to facilitate diversions of cash.299 In this context, the African Development Bank
awarded an additional $8.6 million grant to the Authority in June 2024, after previous funding
to help establish the Authority.300

V. Government spending and use of available resources

174. Beyond the generation of government revenues, how money is used is the next critical
step affecting the fulfilment of human rights. In managing government budget allocations
and spending, every effort must be made to maximize the use of available resources for the
fulfilment of human rights, as part of the State’s international law obligations. Budget
allocations must thereby be both appropriate and adequate, and expenditures should align to
allocations. Where off-budget funds outside regular budget processes and oversight are used,
spending must conform with the overall obligation to maximize the use of available resources

294 In practice, in Juba personal income tax is collected by the South Sudan Revenue Authority, rather than by the Central Equatoria
State Revenue Authority.
295 The original 2016 National Revenue Authority Act mandated that the Authority could withhold 2 percent of collections for two

years, then 1 per cent for a further three years, all for capacity building.
296 In November 2024, President Kiir appointed Simon Akuei Deng the Commissioner General of the Authority; it is understood that

Akuei Deng had worked at ARC Resources Ltd and also worked under Benjamin Bol Mel at the South Sudan Chamber of Commerce.
R2868050.
297 Payment advices on file with the Commission.
298 Across the three fiscal years from 2020 to 2023, the Authority received $55 million from the government budget (due to
conflicting data, it is unclear how much of the Government’s 2023-2024 outturns went to the Authority). In the Ministry of Finance
and Planning’s budget execution report for the first half of this fiscal year (December 2023), the Authority received SSP 26.2 billion,
or $24.1 million at the parallel rate ($25.1 million at official rate). However, in the 2024-2025 budget, which includes final outturns
for 2023/2024, total outturns for the Authority were SSP 7.65 billion, or $4.7 million at the parallel rate ($6 million at official rate).
299
The 2016 National Revenue Authority Act, section 40.(2)(a) directs collections to be credited to appropriate accounts with the Bank
of South Sudan. R2674121, R6250231.
300 https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/african-development-bank-group-approves-86-million-grant-boost-non-

oil-revenue-mobilization-south-sudan-71851

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to fulfil human rights, and the most essential needs of the population must be the main
priority.
175. This section of the paper identifies practices and patterns in government spending,
drawing from the Commission’s investigations and budget analysis, focused on four areas:
a) distribution of spending in budget processes; b) off-budget diversion to ‘Oil for Roads;’ c)
diversions of institutional budgets; d) lack of oversight.

A. Distribution of spending in budget processes

176. An overall examination of government budget allocations and spending across budget
years illustrates government priorities. Excluding oil-related transfers to Sudan and
repayment of long-term debt obligations, South Sudan’s national government budget over
the first four years of the Transitional Government had two main portions: one for the ‘Oil
for Roads’ program operating off-budget, with the remainder allocated to the budget for
government ministries and entities. Overall, most oil revenue is not allocated to the budget
for government ministries and entities,301 as illustrated in the below charts providing a high-
level overview of government expenditures for the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 fiscal years.
177. In 2022-2023, which is the most recent full fiscal year before the Dar Blend oil
pipeline damage changed the dynamics of national finances, only 36 per cent of the value of
the country’s oil entitlement made it to the national budget. The other 64 per cent went to the
combination of Sudan’s inland oil lifting as payment in-kind for transit, transport, and
processing fees; lost revenue impacts of long-term mismanagement; servicing foreign debt
(all detailed in the above section); and diversion to ‘special projects.’302 The Commission’s
analysis of data from preceding years found that this distribution is consistent with a pattern
of off-budget diversions.303
Graph 5: South Sudan’s use of oil revenue, fiscal year 2022–2023

Sudan transfers, ‘Oil for Roads,’

$630m $600m

Long-term
Regular budget support, Debt repayments, mismanagement
$874m $224m losses, $118m

178. In 2023-2024, the first full fiscal year since the armed conflict sparked in Sudan in
April 2023, South Sudan’s Government reported no transfers to Sudan for transit, transfer,
and processing of oil, or the Transitional Financial Arrangement. While conflict-related
damage to Sudan’s oil infrastructure reduced Sudan’s inland lifting of South Sudanese oil
before reaching Port Sudan as payment-in-kind, the Commission gathered documentation
indicating that the Government was still transferring funds to actors in Sudan, although the

301 The oil revenue entitlement amounts to approximately half of the country’s total oil production.
302 South Sudan’s oil cargoes sell at significant discounts to the global benchmark. Government missteps, past and present, are
responsible for the majority of this discount. See paras. 135—138.
303 That year, $1.57 billion was received in oil revenue: $81.4 million was lost to long-term mismanagement, $361 million allocated to

loan repayments, and $518 million to ‘Oil for Roads’. Of what made it to the national budget, $695.2 million was from oil and $186.5
million was non-oil revenue. Ministry of Petroleum oil marketing data.

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details are opaque and the transfer fees have not appeared in government data, indicating
funds may have been sourced from an off-budget diversion such as the ‘Oil for Roads’
program. Additional changes to the national expenditure in 2023-2024 from previous years
include the Government suspending repayments of long-term debts just one month into that
fiscal year, and the $342 million lost to maintaining a gap between the official and parallel
exchange rates, which emerged in the second half of the fiscal year.
Graph 6: South Sudan’s use of oil revenue, fiscal year 2023–2024

‘Oil for Roads,’

$778m

Long-term
mismanagement
losses,
$153m

Regular budget support, Exchange rate gap losses, Debt repayments,

$1.1b $342m $95m

179. In the 2024-2025 national budget approved late in November 2024, ‘Oil for Roads’
was removed, yet a comparable un-itemized allocation ostensibly for agriculture projects was
included, which indicates ongoing off-budget diversions (see paragraph 194).

B. ‘Oil for Roads’ off-budget diversion scheme

180. Touted as South Sudan’s signature infrastructure investment, the Crude Oil for
Infrastructure Initiative ('Oil for Roads') has been the highest single recipient of government
revenues over successive years: by the end of 2024, $2.2 billion of oil revenue had been
dedicated to it. In 2023-2024 (the most recent full fiscal year), the Government allocated
$778 million to ‘Oil for Roads,’ while the combined budget allocation to the rest of the
national government that year was $1.1 billion.304
181. In September 2018, ‘Oil for Roads’ was announced during a visit to China by the
President of South Sudan, whose office has direct purview over the program’s finances and
implementation.305 A Chinese State-owned enterprise, the Export-Import Bank of China,
provided initial financing, and a $736.5 million contract was awarded to Shandong Hi Speed
Nile Investment & Development Co. Ltd. in a single-source procurement. The Government
initially announced that 10,000 oil barrels per day had been allocated for repayments, later
signalled this would increase to 30,000 barrels, and eventually committed its full entitlement
of Nile Blend exports from Unity State.306 Despite this funding commitment, Shandong Hi
Speed Nile Investment & Development Co. Ltd. stopped construction on the first road after
laying just 63 kilometres, citing lack of payment from the Government of South Sudan. 307
182. In 2020, the Government started issuing ‘Oil for Roads’ construction contracts to
companies owned by or associated with Benjamin Bol Mel, a South Sudanese national (at

304 This is calculated at the parallel rate, as per the above methodology. Spending at the official rate would total $1.44 billion, with
$342 million of that lost to the gap between official and parallel exchange rates
305 https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/south-sudan-to-pay-foreign-road-constructors-in-crude-oil
306
After transfers to Sudan. https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/south-sudan-allocates-10-000-bpd-of-oil-to-chinese-road-
constructors. From 2020 through 2022, the Nile Blend entitlement was approximately 18,000 barrels per day. This increased to
approximately 21,000 barrels per day in 2023 and then 26,000 barrels per day in 2024.
307 Auditor General Report on Juba to Terekeka Road, May 2020, on file with the Commission.

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the time, Bol Mel was associated with corruption allegations for which he had been
sanctioned in 2017 by the United States Government; in February 2025, he was appointed as
a Vice President of South Sudan – see below).308 By late 2023, Bol Mel-affiliated companies
– including ARC Resources Corporation Ltd. (or African Resources Corporation Ltd. /
ARC), Winners Construction Co. Ltd., and Save Nation Ltd. – held at least four ‘Oil for
Roads’ contracts to build inter-city roads (a fifth contract covered urban road rehabilitation
and construction in and around Juba).309 Although the inter-city roads contracts were valued
at between $6.4 billion and $8.8 billion for the construction of 2,757.77 kilometres of road,
the Commission identified that three of the contracts overstated the length of these roads,
thereby overvaluing them (satellite analysis indicates the actual length of road to be
constructed was around 2,333.5 kilometres).310 There had been no credible public
procurement process for these contracts.
183. There are several key indicators that ‘Oil for Roads’ money has been used to divert
significant revenues to an off-budget fund used by SPLM and in the Presidency, beyond the
deliberate lack of transparency introduced by creating a ‘special project’ outside government
budgeting and oversight processes. 311
184. A significant indicator is the limited amount of road constructed compared to the
scope and valuing of contracts. This is apparent in specialist geospatial analysis of the road
network prepared for the Commission by UNOSAT, the United Nations Satellite Centre. By
comparing program contract information with this geospatial analysis of imagery ranging
from mid-2024 to early 2025, the Commission found that less than 5 per cent of the inter-city
roads contracted to Bol Mel-associated companies had been completed to industry standards
in the region: just 105.6 kilometres of paved and painted road had been completed, out of
2,333.5 kilometres of actual road length required.
185. Another indicator of diversions to corruption is the extreme over-valuing of the roads
under contract by Bol Mel-affiliated companies: on a cost-per-kilometre basis, ‘Oil for
Roads’ contracts cost double the industry standards in the region; they over-value the total
number of kilometres per road under contract; and where roads have been built, they are often
two-lane roads when the contract is for a four-lane road. Furthermore, many roads were not
constructed to industry standards (neither paved nor painted), in which case the poor quality
has meant their deterioration has been rapid, significantly impacting negatively on safety,
speed, and general drivability even just one year after construction.
186. The scheme’s Presidency-directed budget priority is another significant problem.
Despite the above issues, and even after the Dar Blend export shutdown in February 2024
significantly impacted the national finances, ‘Oil for Roads’ still received priority over all
other government spending. After the Dar Blend shutdown, ‘Oil for Roads’ went from
consuming between 35 and 40 per cent of the Government’s oil revenue, to 100 per cent,
from March to June 2024. Even with this level of funding, and despite being entitled under
industry standards to receive significant mobilization payments for construction (see below),
Bol Mel-affiliated companies appear to have had difficulties paying staff and

308 In 2021, the United States Government also sanctioned two companies affiliated with Bol Mel – ARC Resources Corporation Ltd
and Winners Construction – which are said to be owned, directly or indirectly, by Bol Mel. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-
releases/sm0243. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0523.
309 In addition to these four contracts for inter-city roads, ARC Resources Ltd. entered a fifth ‘Oil for Roads’ contract to rehabilitate

and construct 85 kilometres of urban roads in and around Juba – the “Rehabilitation of Urban Roads in Juba and Luri Roads Network”
contract – which included the 9.1 kilometres connecting Juba to Luri (the urban roads to be constructed under this contract, which are
relatively limited compared to the urban roads, were not analyzed by the Commission, which instead focused on the construction of
inter-city roads). IR-100049.
310 The variance of $6.4 billion to $8.8 billion depends on whether two- or four-lane roads were constructed, as the contractual

information obtained by the Commission does not specify the number of lanes required for all of the contracted roads. This 2,333.5
kilometres of roads would be valued at approximately $3.9 billion, at a fair market value, based on the current distribution of two- and
four-lane construction visible from satellite imagery analysis initiated and reviewed by the Commission. However, even roads
contracted for four-lane construction can end up as two-lanes, as was the case for 37 per cent of the Juba-Bor road. Satellite imagery
analysis of the two- and four-lane distribution, that is emerging from construction to date, would indicate an actual total contract value
of approximately $8.2 billion for the four inter-city contracts (after removing the valuing of road which would not have been constructed
because the length was exaggerated). This figure could change depending on final widths of road construction.
311 From February to June 2024, the Government made over $310 million available to ‘Oil for Roads,’ while not paying any public

service salaries.

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subcontractors.312 Consistent and credible reports point to payments being delayed or

deferred, causing significant financial strain, especially on subcontractors who lease
equipment.313 None of these issues hindered Bol Mel’s political ascendancy.
187. To date, the road constructed between Juba and Bor is the sole example of an ‘Oil for
Roads’ project being constructed between two points as envisaged. However, except for the
fact that this road was built, it encapsulates all the above-described problems the other
contracts have suffered. Like other contracts, the Juba—Bor road contract was extremely
overpriced, being costed at more than four times that spent around 2012 on a similar length
of road between Juba and Nimule.314 (In a more recent comparison, roads built in UNMISS
bases by local contractors were also significantly cheaper, showing that construction supplies
and equipment do not incur the dramatically high costs found in ‘Oil for Roads’ contracts). 315
188. Another problem with the Juba—Bor road, which is equally damning as an indicator
of public procurement fraud, is that the contractual terms that the Ministry of Roads and
Bridges have presented overstate the length of the road by almost 40 per cent. The Juba—
Bor road spans 180.56 kilometres while the contract had put it at 250 kilometres, significantly
artificially inflating the total contract.316 Similarly, despite the contract calling for 250
kilometres of four-lane highway, the actual road is comprised of 113.8 kilometres of four-
lane road and 66.76 kilometres of two-lane road. The result being, although government data
indicates that the contract for this road with ARC Resources was for $1.036 billion, the
Commission calculated the actual value once constructed to be approximately $333.9
million.317 Finally, while the road is drivable from Juba to Bor, only 105.58 of the 180.5
kilometres of road laid appears to have been completed to the standard that would warrant
payment under industry standards; that is, fully paved and painted.318
189. Problems with ‘Oil for Roads’ were evident before construction activities, starting
with the extreme overvaluing of contracts that were awarded to companies affiliated with Bol
Mel – then already associated with corruption allegations, as noted above. The average cost-
per-kilometre of four-lane road was priced at $4.15 million, which is around double the
standard cost in the region. By the Commission’s calculations of fair market contract rates,
by early 2024 ARC Resources would have been entitled to approximately $369.5 million for
work conducted under inter-city ‘Oil for Roads’ contracts (plus up to an estimated $106.3
million for the Juba roads rehabilitation contract, for a total of up to $475.7 million). 319 The
$369.5 million value for work done under the inter-city roads contracts accounts for the

312 R1726431, IR-100049.

313 R5121743, R9151568, IR-100049.
314 Funded by USAID. USAID Office of Inspector General Follow-Up Audit of USAID/South Sudan’s Road Infrastructure Activities.

That road’s deterioration is attributed to a lack of maintenance, identified when constructed as a need for authorities to address.
Regarding the Juba-Nimule road constructed around 2012, industry pricing standards show that road construction costs in 2020/2021
when the Juba—Bor contract was signed were only 8 per cent higher than in 2012 (Road Construction Index, on file with the
Commission). Excluding the costs lost to the non-performing subcontractors, the Juba-Nimule road cost $894,000 per two-lane
kilometre in 2012. This is in line with the market rate for road construction costs in East Africa, as reflected in the estimate of between
$800,000 to $900,000 by Uganda’s Auditor General in 2015 (The Auditor General of Uganda found that “in the East African region
where costs for constructing a 2 lane highway with similar pavement structure as Kampala-Entebbe Expressway range between
USD800,000 to 900,000 per km. If the higher figure is multiplied by 2.3 to accommodate 4 lanes with a median the cost is USD
2,070,000 per km.” Report of the Auditor General on the Financial Statements of the Uganda National Roads Authority for the Year
Ended 30th June 2015., on file with the Commission). Applying the same Road Construction Index cost modifier, road construction
costs were 9 per cent higher in 2020/2021 than they were in 2015. In 2020 dollars, this equates to $872K – $981K per two-lane
kilometre, or $2.25 million per four-lane kilometre. Bol Mel’s contracts indicate the average cost of a four-lane road is $4.15 million
per kilometre (Ministry of Roads and Bridges information on file with the Commission).
315 Constructed in Juba from 2020 to 2023 for an average cost $440,000 per two-lane kilometre. These are cheaper than those required

for highways, due to reduced traffic, but still need to be built to withstand heavy vehicles.
316 The 180.5 km between Juba and Bor is comprised of 132.5 km of four-lane road and 48 km of two-lane road.
317 Based on regional standards and the length of road built, including a 3.6 per cent profit margin, as per industry guidelines (see:

AECOM, “Spon's Civil Engineering and Highway Works Price Book 2025,” 39th edition, 2025).
318 The remainder of the road is not fully paved and painted, as required under industry standards.
319 Based on 195.79 kilometres of inter-city road that was paved and drivable – of which 105.6 kilometres were built to industry

standards warranting full payment for completion – as well as an 85 kilometre contract to maintain and upgrade Juba’s roads and
connect to Luri, where the President is understood to have a farm (as geospatial analysis is ineffective to monitor the status of Juba
road maintenance, and ARC Resources Ltd. has constructed the road to Luri, the Commission includes the full value of this contract
as earned by ARC in its calculations, in an effort to provide the government and ARC with the benefit of the doubt).

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195.79 kilometres of paved road that is drivable – not necessarily completed to industry
standards, which would include features like signage and lane markings.
190. Evaluating ‘Oil for Roads’ contractual performance against industry standards, only
the completed 105.58 kilometres would warrant payment for road fully constructed, totalling
just $183 million. However, the ‘Oil for Roads’ contracts include mobilization payments due
to companies when construction commences, with 10 per cent being standard in the region.
Satellite imagery analysis shows evidence of mobilization for all four inter-city contracts,
which would trigger those payments. As a result, under industry standards, Bol Mel-affiliated
companies would likely be entitled to $681.8 million in total: 60 per cent of which would be
for mobilization payments, rather than road completed.320 Two of these four inter-city
contracts likely entitled to mobilization payments show no evidence of sufficient work to
warrant payment for the construction itself. This large proportion owed for mobilization
payments highlights the importance of corruptly over-valuing the total contract – in both
dollars-per-kilometre but also in the number of kilometres under contract – as the higher the
total amount is, the higher the 10 per cent mobilization payment. The Commission has also
documented that mobilization has been done by subcontractors which Bol Mel has failed to
pay.321
191. The Commission’s analysis found that from 2021 to 2024, an estimated $2.2 billion
was disbursed to Bol Mel-affiliated companies (calculated based on an extensive examination
of government oil revenue and national budget data).322 This is in stark contrast to the $475.7
million entitlement for drivable road, or the $681.8 million (which includes mobilization
payments that are likely fraudulent, because they have been calculated on the basis of
overvalued contracts, which are then not fully implemented). That disbursed money is more
than three-times what would be owed to include those mobilization payments, it is almost
five-times the value of the paved and drivable road (not meeting industry standards), and 12-
times the value of the road completed to industry standards. The bulk of this enormous sum
has not gone to constructing roads, which in many areas of the limited construction that has
occurred, does not meet industry standards.
192. As the largest sole recipient of government oil revenue, ‘Oil for Roads’ has diverted
vast sums from the budgets of ministries and spending entities responsible for core services.
Rather than going to the national budget or to actual road construction, most of the $2.2
billion dedicated to the scheme appears to have instead passed through Bol Mel. More than
$1.7 billion of this is unaccounted for if the physical state of road construction is considered,
with these monies remaining available to political elites as an off-budget fund.323
193. The significant political rise of Bol Mel since 2020 has coincided with his position in
‘Oil for Roads’, and his close links to the Presidency, which oversees the program.324 Bol
Mel was appointed by the President as Senior Presidential Envoy on Special Programs in
December 2022, and as SPLM’s First Deputy Secretary-General for Political Mobilization
and Organization, in March 2023. On 10 February 2025, the President appointed Bol Mel as
Vice President: Economic Cluster,325 then on 20 May 2025, the President (who serves as
Chairperson of the SPLM) appointed Bol Mel as the SPLM’s First Deputy Chairperson. 326
194. Although ‘Oil for Roads’ was removed in the 2024-2025 national budget, government
data shows money was directed to the scheme prior to that budget being approved in
November 2024; separately, a comparable un-itemized allocation in the budget which is

320 Including the $106.3 million for the Rehabilitation of Urban Roads in Juba and Luri Roads Network contract
321 R3352314, R8066909, IR-100049.
322 Ministry of Petroleum oil production and marketing reports. Ministry of Finance and Planning budgets and budget execution reports.
323 R4410122, R3606985, R9274393, R6685681, R6648778, R4856107, R1881764, R6049360, R7250367, R9223458.
324 Bol Mel is also understood to hold the rank of Lieutenant General in SSPDF. R8513354, R1203662, R5890245.
325 Republic Decree 50/2025, announced on SSBC evening news on 10 February 2025. Under the transitional governance arrangements

codified in the Revitalized Agreement, South Sudan has five Vice Presidents (one First Vice President and four Vice Presidents), each
with purview for one of the five 'cabinet clusters.' In addition to the economic cluster, the other clusters are: governance; services
delivery; infrastructure; and gender and youth.
326 SPLM Order 7/2025, announced on SSBC evening news on 20 May 2025.

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ostensibly for “agricultural sectoral projects” suggests that off-budget diversions will
continue.327

C. On-budget diversions

195. Beyond the off-budget ‘Oil for Roads’ diversion, the Commission found significant
irregularities in the management of the national budget for government ministries and
entities. Such patterns were identified by reviewing budget allocation and expenditure data
from July 2020 to June 2024: the four full fiscal years of the Transitional Government. 328
196. Successive years of budget data shows extreme overspending in the government
institutions closest to political power, paid for by the under-execution of core government
services.329 The Ministry of Presidential Affairs for example spent almost six-times its budget
allocations from July 2020 to June 2024 (584 per cent, or $557 million spending). In this
same period, the Ministry of Health spent less than a fifth of its allocation (19 per cent, or
$29 million), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security less than one-tenth (7 per
cent, or $11 million).330 These comparisons further illustrate funds being systematically
diverted toward centres of political power. Relatedly, the Ministry of Higher Education,
Science and Technology also deserves closer scrutiny, as it appears as the highest wage
paying ministry and consistently in the top ten spending entities of the regular national
budget.331 Many of its beneficiaries are well-connected elites close to centres of political
power.332 Across the budgets reviewed, $156 million went to the Ministry of Higher
Education, Science and Technology; compared to a far lower $78 million to the Ministry of
General Education & Instruction (see below).333
Graph 7: Government on-budget expenditure, 2023-2024

Ministry of
Presidential Ministry of
Affairs, $198m Defence, $188m
Ministry of Finance Eighty other
and Planning (less government entities,
transfers), $302m $296m Police, $49m Prisons, $44m

327 A/HRC/58/27, para. 95. Government data shows that oil revenue continued being directed toward the ‘Oil for Roads’ during the
first quarter of the 2024-2025 fiscal year (July to September 2024), prior to the passage of that year’s national budget in November
2024, in which the scheme was removed. At the time this paper was finalized, data for the second quarter of 2024-205 was not yet
available.
328 Fiscal years 2020-2021, 2021-2022, 2023-2024 (first two quarters; third and fourth quarters were unavailable).
329 July 2020 to December 2023 allocations and expenditure broadly aligned, with a 104 per cent execution rate.
330 The Commission analyzed national budget execution data from July 2020 to December 2023. Another point of comparison is the

National Police Services, at 289 per cent, with the Anti-Corruption Commission at 38 per cent. At the national budget level, overall
allocations and expenditure broadly align, after the Oil for Roads diversion.
331 Analysis of 2021–2022 and 2022–2023 budget data. $170.4 million on salaries.
332
For example, prior to his appointment as Finance Minister in August 2023, Bak Barnaba Chol was an Assistant Professor at the
University of Juba.
333 Yet still, unpaid salaries have reportedly been a problem for staff at public universities, and in April 2023 the President had directed

that the arrears be addressed.

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197. The Commission also identified that the dominant ruling party benefits
disproportionately in budget allocations and executions, further reflecting the gravitation of
funds toward centres of political power. SPLM-IG ministries are allocated more than
SPLM/A-IO ministries, and in the transitional governance arrangements have spent almost
six times SPLM/A-IO ministries – a variance not explained by agreed portfolio distribution
ratios.334 Across the four completed budgets and across the politically-aligned ministry
distributions, the ministries and entities led by SPLM-IG figures in general receive and spend
more of their allocations than those headed by members of other parties to the Revitalized
Agreement (SPLM/A-IO, SSOA, Former Detainees, and OPP). In the first four fiscal years
of the Transitional Government, the combined expenditure of the SPLM-IG national
government ministries and entities was almost four times the total spend of those led by the
other parties – a difference also not explained by the distribution of these offices under the
Revitalized Agreement ratios.335 The difference in opportunities to earn and spend resources
in ministries and government entities may in part explain the high frequency of defections to
SPLM-IG from other parties. Another pattern is misappropriation and abuse of ‘use of goods
and services’ spending. This nebulous budget item accounted for more than half of regular
budget spending over the four budgets reviewed, at $1.9 billion. 336 The Ministry of
Presidential Affairs spent $431 million of its $557 million outturns on the ‘use of goods and
services’ from July 2020 to June 2024. Government personnel reported routine misuse of
‘goods and services’ for personal financial gain and salary supplements, by drawing ‘medical
expenses’ typically involving travel abroad, or undertaking ‘official travel.’ 337 In the 2022-
2023 fiscal year for example, there was a reported total spend of $67 million on ‘medical
expenses,’ of which $31 million was spent in offices of the Transitional National Legislative
Assembly. In the same period, $59 million was reported under ‘official travel,’338 mostly for
a lump sum ‘daily subsistence allowance,’ which appears inflated to incentivize travel for
individual financial benefit. Total travel spending that year amounted to the combined spend
of 76 government entities, including those responsible for agriculture and food security,
health, and the administration of justice.339
198. Paired with a lack of transparency or due oversight, let alone accountability, all this
facilitates diversion, misappropriation and other forms of corruption. Budget expenditure
reports show this: for example, in 2023-2024, the Presidency’s spending on ‘vehicles’
equated to more than double the Ministry of Transport’s total spend that year. Such vast
discrepancies appear to be facilitated by the nature of everyday budget execution, which
centres on ad hoc disbursement approvals of funds in the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
The Commission identified a practice whereby the Ministry approves direct requests for
‘urgent’ disbursements to individuals, institutions and companies. Disbursements are made
without due justification or compliance with procedures, involving large cash payments to
government officials for vague costs.340
199. Furthermore, revenue has not been directed to the Future Generation Fund, meant to
ensure the country’s oil wealth can be available for future generations. Envisaged in the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it was constitutionally-enshrined in 2011.341 The 2013
Petroleum Management Act requires that 10 per cent of oil revenue go to the Fund. 342 Despite

334 In the Revitalized Agreement, SPLM-IG is allocated 20 national ministries, SPLM/A-IO, nine, and SSOA, three.
335 From July 2020 to June 2024, ministries of SPLM-IG spent $2.5 billion, SPLM/A-IO $435 million, and SSOA $166 million, Former
Detainees $42 million, and Other Political Parties $18 million.
336 Overall in 2023–2024, ‘Use of Goods and Services’ accounted for $630 million (including ‘official travel’), amounting to 57 per

cent of total expenditure against the national budget that fiscal year.
337 R9245475, R4872350, R7101529, R5522085.
338 The Commission has focused on 2022–2023 for this particular analysis because at the time of publication it was the most recent

fiscal year for which expenditure data was available covering the entire year.
339 Including the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security; the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs;

the Ministry of Water Resources & Irrigation; the Ministry of Gender, Child, and Social Welfare; and the Judiciary, among others. The
comparison between total travel expenditure with the combined expenditure is for illustrative purposes, to reflect its scale and the
impacts on other national budget areas. Generally, the travel expenditure will be acquitted under the budget of the institution of the
persons travelling.
340
Documentation for the fiscal year 2022–2023, on file with the Commission.
341 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, section 5.7. 2011 Transitional Constitution, section 178(3).
342 After the transfers to oil-producing states. Law requires that after the anticipated depletion of oil reserves, the money is to be remitted

to a consolidated fund, named the National Petroleum Wealth Fund. 2013 Petroleum Management Act, sections 9(1c) and 42(1).

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government claims of transfers to the Fund since 2021, the account to receive revenue was
only opened in 2022,343 and data on transfers since appears highly irregular.344 If revenue
transfers had been made according to the law, the Fund would have received $2.3 billion to
date, which would have also been accumulating interest.345 The conduct of government
institutions and officials indicates that the prospects for adherence to the legal obligations to
develop the Fund are not promising. In June 2023, the then-Finance Minister announced that
the Government would not be honouring its obligation to service the Fund; stating that, “the
future generation can take care of themselves. Our grandfathers never took care of us.” 346
200. The Government has also not complied with a requirement under national law that
another 15 per cent of oil revenue be directed to a Petroleum/Oil Revenue Stabilization
Account.347 If it had, more than $3.4 billion should have been available to endure the partial
oil shutdown of 2024, and to address salary arrears and other governance crises. 348 Separately,
South Sudan’s Auditor General has concluded that there was not satisfactory evidence that
the national Government has complied with the legal requirement that five per cent of net
national oil revenue be allocated to the oil producing states (Unity State and Upper Nile
State).349 These transgressions mean that up to 30 per cent of oil revenue that is meant to have
been set aside – for future generations, to endure economic crises, and for oil producing states
– has instead been squandered, in violation of the Government’s obligations under South
Sudan law.350

D. Lack of oversight

201. Public financial management oversight is meant to be core to the mandate of

Transitional National Legislative Assembly. Under the Revitalized Agreement, this includes
receiving and considering reports from the National Audit Chamber on government revenues
and expenditure, and reviewing and passing national budgets. Although the Assembly
receives financial reporting and plays a role in deciding how finances are used, it has not
addressed the patterns of corruption and diversion in the budget. While at times members
have publicly scrutinized government spending, (see paragraph 119), overall, the institution
continues approving government budgets despite the diversions.
202. The governance problems outlined in this paper show the ineffectiveness of oversight:
illustrated by the Ministry of Presidential Affairs spending $103 million more than its
allocated $15 million in the 2022-2023 fiscal year (an offense under the Finance Act), then
proceeding to spend $168 million more than its 2023-24 budget allocation. National
government budgets are also delayed several months each year, with passage of the budget
occurring after the fiscal year it authorizes has already commenced: parliament only passed
the 2024-2025 national budget in November 2024.
203. From the Assembly’s reconstitution in May 2021 until June 2024, government budget
execution reports indicate the Assembly has spent $107.7 million. With over $59 million of
this in 2022–2023, the TNLA was the fourth-best funded institution in that fiscal year, trailing
only the ministries of Finance and Planning, Presidential Affairs, and Defence. Despite this

343 At the Bank of South Sudan, according to the Ministry of Finance and Planning. A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 289.
344 For instance the first quarter budget execution report for 2022–2023 claimed a transfer of South Sudan pounds 34.4 billion, but the
end of fiscal year report claims a transfer of just 8.6 billion.
345 Commission’s analysis of budget data, indexed to dollar inflation.
346 Speech by Hon. Dier Tong Ngor, Minister of Finance and Planning, at South Sudan Oil & Power, 14 June 2023.
347 Transitional Constitution, section 178(2) and the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (2013), section 9(1). Referred to in the Act

as the Petroleum Revenue Stabilization Account, this is also referred to as the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account, or “ORSA.” Analysis
of budget execution reports and annual petroleum reports, on file.
348 Dollar calculation, based on analysis of oil revenue data since the Act was promulgated on 10 November 2013.
349 This consists of a “two per cent allocation to the states” and “three per cent to the communities.” See sections 177-179. The Auditor

General has concluded that there was not satisfactory evidence that the Ministry of Finance and Planning fully complied with the 2013
Petroleum Revenue Management Act in allocating and transferring these funds, that it was unclear how transferred money was utilized,
and that records provided do not present an accurate record of how revenue shares due to these areas were provided between 2011 and
2020. “Report of the Auditor General: on the accounts of 2 per cent and 3 per cent share of net oil revenue of oil producing states and
communities, for the period 2011 to 2020,” 22 March 2021. See also A/HRC/48/CRP.3, para. 86.
350 Comprised of 15 per cent for the Future Generation Fund, 10 per cent for the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account, and a total of 5

per cent for the oil producing states.

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large budget, the members told the Commission that their salaries – approximately $600 per
month in 2023 – were regularly delayed. Since 2023, these salary arrears have exceeded a
full year, and salary levels had not been recalculated to account for the extreme currency
depreciation in the first half of 2024.351 There are more elements to members’ remuneration
than salary, however. Members are entitled to tax exemptions, accommodation allowances,
sitting allowances, and recess allowances. This is in addition to an allowance of $30,000 per
year to travel abroad for medical treatment and a $50,000 ‘car loan’.352 The allowances also
are not regularly paid, if at all. This calls into question the accuracy of the Assembly’s budget
records, which purported to spend South Sudanese Pounds 23.5 billion on medical expenses
in 2022–2023, or around more than $55,000 per Member.
204. There appears to be very little oversight in how the Assembly spends its budget, which
is the seventh-best funded institution over the life of the Transitional Government. The
Commission has been told by individuals with first-hand knowledge that the leadership
controls the millions in the goods and services budget.353 The Commission gathered credible
information showing money going missing in the course of infrastructure initiatives, poor
procurements, diversions and irregularities.
205. The Commission has reported before on South Sudan’s Anti-Corruption Commission
being evicted from its offices in 2022 due to lack of rent payment. From July 2020 to June
2024, the Anti-Corruption Commission received less than $200,000, or 31 per cent of its
allocated budget and 0.01 per cent of the country’s total budget during this period. Another
accountability entity, the National Audit Chamber, received 31 per cent of its budget, or 0.09
per cent of the country’s total expenditure, during the same period. The Auditor General has
also expressed frustrations about lack of resources, access to information, and lawmakers not
tabling his audits. The government has also resisted pressure to implement the establishment
of a Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Authority.

VI. Economic, social and cultural rights impacts of corruption

206. The extreme government neglect of the population’s rights to food, health and
education reflects a deep and pervasive governance and human rights crisis. Fulfilling these
rights forms part of core obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which South Sudan acceded to on 5 February 2024, as noted
above. These are also Sustainable Development Goal priorities identified by the Government
in March 2024: SDG2, zero hunger; SDG3, good health and wellbeing; and SDG4, quality
education.354 Furthermore, public service provision by the Government – specifically
including health and education – are expressed commitments of the parties under the
Revitalized Agreement.355
207. The direct connections between government spending and fulfilment of the rights to
food, health and education reflect broader patterns of mis-prioritization and corruption,
impacting the full range of human rights. To highlight the impacts of the generation and use
of available resources by the Government, this section examines budget allocations and
related expenditure. Key relevant government budget allocations and spending patterns are
identified, followed by an examination of the associated human rights impacts, for each of
the three identified rights: Part A) on the right to food; Part B) right to health; and Part C)
right to education. In Part D, the impacts on women and children are examined.

351 R5623637, R5166820.

352 R4181253, R4643507
353
R3427584, R1500341. For a long time this was around $1 million each month, although this appears to have changed with currency
depreciation.
354 https://southsudan.un.org/en/265978-south-sudan-launches-discussions-first-voluntary-national-review-sdgs.
355 Chapter III, in particular section 3.1.2.

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A. Right to food

Government spending
208. Government budget allocations to ministries responsible for food security are
extremely low, and the two main responsible ministries persistently spend far less than their
allocation, as they do not receive the promised funding. The Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Security is meant to improve the lives of South Sudan’s majority rural population through
increasing agricultural productivity,356 and sits in a sectoral cluster with the other key ministry
for food security, the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries. 357 With international support, both
ministries have developed national policies designed to improve food security. 358 Across the
four national budgets reviewed by the Commission, covering July 2020 to June 2024, the
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries received only 20 per cent of its budget allocation,
amounting to 0.09 per cent of total regular budget expenditure. The Ministry of Agriculture
and Food Security received just 7 per cent of its allocation in that period, or 0.3 per cent of
total spend of the national budget for ministries and spending entities. The gap is vast between
allocation and reported expenditure, both as a percentage of the regular national budget, as
well as in comparison to the regional commitment of a 10 per cent allocation. 359
Graph 8: Agriculture and food security national budget allocations and expenditure

10%
8.4%
8%

6%

4% 2.9% 2.9%
1.9%
2%
0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.2%
0%
2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024

Budget Allocation Reported Expenditure Regional Commitment

209. In addition to the above two ministries, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and
Disaster Management has the primary responsibility in government for the coordination of
food aid and other humanitarian assistance. It also has oversight of the Rehabilitation, Return
and Rehabilitation Commission, which has a close interface with non-government
organizations, and has often played an obstructionist and predatory role, rather than an
enabling role, for the provision of food and other assistance. 360 These institutions share the
‘social and humanitarian affairs sector’ budget allocation with four other entities, including
the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare. 361 In the 2023-2024 fiscal year these six
entities spent a combined total of $12.8 million, or just 1.16 per cent of the budget for

356 A/HRC/49/78, para. 54. S/2021/365, paras. 60-66.

357 The natural resources and rural sectoral cluster also includes the Land Commission, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, and
the Ministry of Wildlife Conservation and Tourism. 2023-2024 national budget, on file.
358 Including the 2021 Revised National Development Strategy for 2021 to 2024, and the 2016 Comprehensive Agriculture Master Plan

which was developed by these ministries with the Ministry of Environment and Forestry.
359 At the first National Economic Conference held in September 2023, organized by the Ministry of Finance and Planning on direction

of the President, its resolutions included a commitment to direct oil revenue to increase budget allocations for agriculture to 10 per
cent, in alignment with commitments of African Union Member States. “Resolutions of the National Economic Conference,” 4 to 10
September 2023, page 1, and resolutions 37 and 38. African Union, “Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa,” July
2003, Assembly/AU/Decl.7 (II).
360 There 2016 Non-Government Organizations Act and the 2016 Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Act are the two key laws

related to the regulation of non-government organizations, while the National Security Services perform an outsized role in practice.
The Commission has previously reported on the lack of clarity on key aspects of their functions and interface with each other.
A/HRC/54/CRP.6, paras. 120-121.
361 And the War Disabled, Widow and Orphans Commission, the Ministry of Culture, Museum and National Heritage, and the Ministry

of Youth and Sport.

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ministries and government entities. The largest proportion of this, almost $8 million, went to
the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. However, consistent with
other ministries’ use of public funds, despite the ministry having a mandate “to formulate
policies, coordinate disaster management, and humanitarian assistance,” 93 per cent of the
Ministry’s spending in 2023-2024 was on ‘supplies, tools and materials’ under the ‘use of
goods and services category;’ during this period there was no reported spending on ‘disaster
management,’ ‘early warning system,’ and ‘planning & coordination.’
210. Another significant governance failure related to the right to food is the unaccountable
diversion of government humanitarian and food assistance, which dates back to the Interim
Period of 2005 to 2011 before independence.362 In an illustrative case during the present
Transitional Government, Humanitarian Affairs Minister Peter Mayen was dismissed in
November 2022 amidst reports that tens of millions of dollars in government assistance for
flood response had been misappropriated; beyond this dismissal, no further action was
taken.363 Also in recent years, the Commission gathered documents on government sorghum
distributions in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State in 2022 and Warrap State in 2023 that show
food and money continuing to go missing. 364 In this context, successive humanitarian
ministers have attended international forums, lobbying for increased donor funding toward
South Sudan’s food and hunger crises.365 In the 2022-2023 fiscal year, the combined funding
of the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management and the Ministry of
Gender, Child & Social Welfare was more than doubled by the $6.5 million reportedly
directed to the men’s national basketball team.366
211. Furthermore, a Special Reconstruction Fund committed to in the Revitalized
Agreement to support the return and reintegration of displaced persons has not been
established. Just 0.005 per cent of the 2023-2024 national budget for ministries and
government entities was allocated to the Fund, far short of the required sum stipulated in the
Agreement, and it does not appear to have been disbursed for its establishment.367
Human rights impacts
212. In South Sudan, an estimated 7.7 million people face acute food insecurity classified
at crisis levels or worse – more than half the population.368 In 33 of the country’s 79 counties,
the food insecurity crisis in mid-2025 is projected at ‘emergency’ levels, one tier below the
classification for a famine declaration; ‘risk of famine’ warnings were issued for Nasir and
Ulang counties in Upper Nile State.369 Among children, 2.3 million are estimated to be
acutely malnourished, most of whom live in states worst affected by violence and conflict. 370
In June 2024, the Food and Agriculture Organization with the World Food Programme
warned that “in South Sudan, the number of people facing starvation and death will almost

362 In the ‘Dura Saga’ of 2008, vast sums of money directed for food purchasing were stolen.
363 The extrabudgetary funds were to support over 1 million people affected by funding. A/HRC/52/26, para. 27.
364 Warrap State-Kuajok State Ministerial Management Committee for Dura Distribution, “Comprehensive Report on the Dura

Distribution – Warrap State,” 18 May 2023, on file. R3194606. See also S/2023/922, annex 6.
365 Including in late 2023 at the 28 th Conference of the Parties to the International Framework Convention on Climate Change. SSBC,

1 December 2023. See also A/HRC/55/26, para. 63.

366 In June 2023, which appears to have been directed separately from the Youth and Sport ministerial budget.

https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/government-approves-6-5m-to-support-basketball-team. The Government also

reportedly directed millions in additional funding in 2024 for participation in the Olympic games, with this funding presenting an
opportunity for elites to profit from official travel and Daily Subsistence Allowance.
367 The allocation appears far less than 20 per cent of the $100 million commitment made under article 3.2.7 of the Agreement. See

A/HRC/55/26, para. 59.

368 Updated IPC projection for the period April to July 2025. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a multi-partner

initiative that sets global standards for food insecurity and famine classification. See Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
(IPC), “Acute food insecurity and malnutrition analysis, April 2025 – July 2025” (update), 12 June 2025, page 1,
https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_April_July20
25_Report.pdf.
369 IPC projected in November 2024 that 63,000 people would be facing ‘catastrophe’ (famine). Projection for the period April to July

2025. See Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), “Acute food insecurity and malnutrition analysis, September 2024 –
July 2025” 18 November 2024, page 1. IPC in June 2025 issued updated projections, including the two famine risk warnings. Ibid.
370 Ibid. As well as Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, the worst affected places were Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states – of the latter

three states, the only counties ranked at the lower ‘serious’ level of acute malnutrition are Maiwut and Pochalla which border Ethiopia
and have a significant humanitarian presence.

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double between April and July 2024, compared to the same period in 2023.” 371 These
devastating figures of suffering are situated in a trend of deterioration since independence, as
shown below in graph 9, which projects this trend as continuing.
Graph 9: Percentage of the population facing high acute food insecurity, 2011 to 2025 372

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

213. Food insecurity in South Sudan is driven not only by conflict and climate shocks; it is
also driven by a deepening economic crisis that makes food and basic commodities
unaffordable for millions of people without assets, income, or access to credit. Even
households with income cannot keep pace with soaring costs. According to the International
Monetary Fund, any depreciation of the South Sudan Pound is fully passed on as food
inflation within six months, at a one-to-one rate. This depreciation is itself directly linked,
also at a one-to-one rate, to the Government’s practice of increasing the supply of money in
circulation, through monetary financing. In practice, the Government’s official policy
choices are fuelling inflation and directly driving up the cost of food for South Sudanese,
trapping families in a cycle where government action itself intensifies hunger.373
214. Another factor in food insecurity is the persistent armed violence and associated
displacement.374 South Sudan has a long history of food aid being instrumentalized for
political and military objectives: in its appropriation as loot to incentivize or reward violence,
to sustain armed forces, and to diminish opponents, including through immiserating civilian
populations. The Commission has documented armed forces and militias aligned to all the
main conflict parties as carrying responsibility for such forms of interference with the right
to food, which can constitute a war crime.375
215. For displaced persons, the barriers to returning home are great, from reestablishing
livelihoods to the risks of violence. Many therefore relocate or remain where access to
assistance is available. This includes South Sudanese who told the Commission in 2023 that
they choose to endure life as refugees in the region, despite food aid reductions there. 376 In

371 FAO and WFP, “Hunger Hotspots: FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity, June to October 2024 outlook,” 5 June 2024,
page 8, https://www.wfp.org/news/hunger-hotspots-report-famine-looms-gaza-while-risk-starvation-persists-sudan-haiti-mali-and.
372 Apart from the dotted line included by the Commission to highlight the trend, this graph draws from the Commission’s review of

Integrated Food Classification data covering 2011 to 2025, and the Commission’s inclusion of its own forecast based upon current
trends. High levels of acute food insecurity incorporate phases three to five of the IPC’s classification framework: Phase 3, high acute
food insecurity; Phase 4, emergency; and Phase 5, catastrophe.
373 International Monetary Fund, Third Review Under the Staff-Monitored Program with Board Involvement, Annex II. Money Supply,

the Exchange Rate, and Prices in Republic of South Sudan.

374 A/HRC/52/CRP.3, paras. 91-103. A/HRC/55/26, paras. 23-27 and 39.
375 Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 establishes as prohibited conducts in any conflict, including

those not of an international character, the cruel and degrading treatment as well as outrages upon personal dignity of civilian
population. Article 8(2)(c) of the Rome Statute establishes as international war crimes the serious violations of article 3 common of
the Geneva Conventions. (While South Sudan is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, expert studies have concluded this may constitute
a codification of existing customary international law: ee “‘There is nothing left for us’: starvation as a method of warfare in South
Sudan,” A/HRC/45/CRP.3, paras. 35 and 148).
376 A/HRC/55/26, paras. 60-61.

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addition to the conflict and displacement, which often intersect with climate change and
environmental events,377 the country cannot feed itself because of the historic lack of
government investments in food security, particularly to develop improved agricultural
productivity and access to markets (see paragraphs 92, 196 and 208).
216. The Government has deferred the emergency response to the worsening food crisis to
the international humanitarian system, which is funded by foreign donors and mostly
delivered by the South Sudanese staff of agencies and organizations. In the context of global
funding shortfalls highlighted above, in April 2023, the World Food Programme reported
having received less than half of its funding request for the country. This led to closures of
several food distributions points, significant reductions in people reached with assistance,
and cuts to the volume and frequency of rations. Such cuts continued in 2024 and then
deepened in 2025 due to significant shifts in aid global funding.378 Transportation costs have
increased further linked to the closure of northern access routes due to the war in Sudan.
South Sudan also remains one of the most dangerous places in the world for aid workers. 379
Furthermore, the Commission has documented systematic looting of food aid warehouses
and distribution sites, carried out with impunity by armed forces, groups, militias, and
criminals.380 Illegal taxation by armed forces and groups present further risks and costs, and
remain unaddressed.381

B. Right to health

Government spending
217. Government funding to the health sector has declined since at least 2011, when the
health sector had been allocated 4.2 per cent of the national budget.382 In the 2023-2024 fiscal
year, the health sector allocation had reduced to 2.5 per cent of the total national budget for
ministries and spending entities, and then its reported spend amounted to less than 0.7 per
cent of total expenditure.383 Averaged across the four full fiscal years of the Transitional
Government’s national budget for ministries and government entities, 4.6 per cent of the total
was allocated to the health sector, and then its expenditure amounted to just 0.9 per cent of
the total. These figures fall drastically short of policy targets, public health needs, and
regional commitments, including the 15 per cent target committed to by African States in the
Abuja Declaration.384 This downward trend is despite the Ministry of Health setting

377 For example, in May 2024, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation warned of upcoming torrential rains, and flooding linked
to significant increases in water released from Lake Victoria, which is upstream. “Updates on the need for emergency preparedness
and response to upcoming flooding and torrential rains,” 6 May 2024. On the climate, see A/HRC/46/56, para. 48, A/HRC/49/78, para.
51, A/HRC52/26, para. 27, A/HRC/55/26, para. 39.
378
https://reliefweb.int/attachments/a10ad340-0226-4291-ad75-55d1cc5a7d6e/WFP-0000150845.pdf, page 2.
379 See also “Why is South Sudan so dangerous for local aid workers?” The New Humanitarian, 5 June 2024,

https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2024/06/05/why-south-sudan-so-dangerous-local-aid-workers
380 See for example A/HRC/52/CRP.3, paras. 91-99 and 170.
381 A/HRC/52/CRP.3, paras. 297-298. See also Ken Matthysen and Peer Schouten, “Checkpoint economy: the political economy of

checkpoints in South Sudan, ten years after independence,” International Peace Information Service and Danish Institute for
International Studies, 10 December 2021.
382 Further, in a 2013 policy paper, the World Bank found that government budget expenditure for health had been in decline since

2006, which is after the SPLM formally took on governance functions in the south under autonomy arrangements. The Bank also found
that there would not be meaningful gains in health and education if expenditure patterns were not changed. “Public Expenditures in
South Sudan: Are They Delivering?”, February 2013,
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/171651468302965354/pdf/774290BRI0Econ00Box377296B00PUBLIC0.pdf.
383 2023-2024 budget data, on file. An exceptional anomaly to this steady decline was during the COVID-19 pandemic when the

national government received direct international assistance for the health sector.
384 Under the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan from 2005-2010 the health allocation reportedly hovered at around 4 per

cent of its budget. “Health Sector Development Plan, 2012-2016,” January 2012, pages x and 25. On the continent, in 2011 the Abuja
Declaration set a target allocation of 15 per cent of a State’s annual budget, and committed African States to “…take all necessary
measures to ensure that the needed resource are made available from all sources… (and) efficiently and effectively utilized.” “Abuja
Declaration,” OAU/SPS/ABUJA/3, African Summit on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other related infections diseases, April 2001,
article 26.

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successive targets to increase the proportional budget allocation for health, in the range of 10
to 15 per cent.385
Graph 10: health sector funding as a proportion of South Sudan’s national budget

12%
9.5%
10%

8%

6% 5.0%

4% 2.7%
2.3% 2.5%
2% 1.1% 0.7%
0.4%
0%
2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024

Budget Allocation Reported Expenditure

218. Budget limitations are highlighted in the key government health instruments, which
have been the 2012 to 2016 Health Sector Development Plan, the 2016 to 2026 National
Health Policy, and the 2023 to 2027 Health Sector Strategic Plan – all developed with
international support.386 The Ministry of Health is the main government health institution, 387
and in its 2024 to 2027 plan the Ministry costed what is required to scale-up essential
universal health coverage to 65 per cent of the population. 388 Yet, the 2023-2024 budget
expenditure on health would have funded just 2.3 per cent of the costings in that plan in year
one of this scale-up scenario, and even less in subsequent years. 389 Even for a “business as
usual” scenario also costed by the Ministry, present budget allocations persistently fall far
short. This gap between the Ministry’s costings and its budget disbursements is
extraordinarily high: the Government’s expectation, if any, is that others will cover the
shortfalls and health services for the public.
219. Of the limited government resources which are allocated to health, vast amounts never
reach the sector, let alone the population, consistent with broader patterns of diversion. 390
Looking beyond budget allocations to examine reported expenditure, the funding shortfall
increases dramatically, as noted above. In the four full fiscal years of national budgets for
Transitional Government national ministries and entities, Ministry of Health outturns were
just 19 per cent of its total allocation;391 this extremely low spend is in stark contrast with that
of separate special health funds directed to centres of political power. Illustratively, 2022-
2023 national budget data indicates that more money went to the Presidential Medical Unit
that year than to the combined government spend on community, public, secondary, and

385 The Ministry of Health’s “Health Sector Development Plan, 2012-2016: ‘One maternal death is one too many’”, of January 2012,
envisaged the allocation rising to 10 per cent of the budget by 2015, “contingent upon confirmation by the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning.” In the “National Health Policy, 2016-2026,” the Ministry raised this to 15 per cent, referring to the Abuja
Declaration. By July 2023, the Ministry revised the target to 10 per cent by 2027, in the “Health Sector Strategic Plan 2023-2027.” The
South Sudan Doctor’s Union appealed for the downward funding trend to be reversed, and called for the health sector’s allocation to
rise to 20 per cent. South Sudan Doctor’s Union, “Submission on the health sector budget allocation.”
386 Another is the 2023 to 2027 South Sudan Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) Master Plan.
387 Allocated and receiving close to the entirety of the health sector’s lines in the national budget. In 2023-2024 budget documents the

sector also included the Drug and Food Control Authority, the HIV/AIDS Commission and the South Sudan Medical Council. A
‘Health Care Support Fund’ noted in the budget did not receive an allocation.
388 Costings issued by the Ministry of Health to implement the 2023 to 2027 Health Sector Strategic Plan provide financing estimates

to scale up essential universal health coverage based on three scenarios: 1) maintaining current levels of services, 2) scaling up service
coverage to 65 per cent of the population, and 3) scaling up to 90 per cent. For scenario two, $324.5 million was calculated as needed
in year one the plan, and $423.4 million in year two. Then $342.1 million in year three, $372.5 in year four, and 350.4 in year five
(total five-year cost $1.81 billion).
389 The 2023-2024 national budget approved in August 2023. would only address estimated costs for the 2023-2027 national masterplan

to address neglected tropical diseases, and cover nothing else.

390
See also A/HRC/52/26, paras. 80—81.
391 In other terms, the Ministry’s target allocation for 10 per cent of the national budget is 14 times what the sector health actually got

in 2022/2023; while the regional commitment of the Abuja Declaration is 21 times this amount. 2022-2023 budget execution date, on
file. See A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 285.

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tertiary health care. Continuing this pattern, 2023-2024 budget data reported “medical
expenses” for the Office of the President comparable to that spent on the entire Ministry of
Health during the same period. In another point of contrast, in the 2022-2023 fiscal year, the
Government had spent 69 per cent more on likely foreign medical expenses of individuals in
patronage networks than the total spent by the Ministry of Health over the first 42 months of
the Transitional Government.392
220. Spending patterns of the Ministry of Health further impact on the reach of services: in
2022-2023, the Ministry spent twice as much on vehicles as on salaries, and nothing on
pharmaceuticals, while its October 2022 contract with Crawford Laboratory Ltd for Ebola
preparedness represented over 80 per cent of the Ministry’s total spend that year (see
paragraph 158); then in 2023-2024, the Ministry spent 93 per cent of its funds on ‘Support
Services – Administration & Finance.’393 This shows that beyond the problem of low funding
allocations and disbursements, the Ministry’s spending patterns do not appear to reflect a
prioritization for providing health services to the population, which further explains the dire
population health.
Human rights impacts
221. South Sudan’s population is enduring an extreme public health crisis. In addition to
the protracted and deteriorating humanitarian crisis, the country has the second lowest rate
of universal health coverage globally.394 Early deaths are staggeringly common: 10 per cent
of children die before reaching the age of five, and the average life expectancy at birth has
not significantly moved since 2011, at around 55 years.395 Women and girls are more likely
to die from causes related to pregnancy than anywhere else in the world, reflecting the
compounding effects of gender discrimination and the lack of reproductive health care. 396 Up
to 20 neglected tropical diseases are endemic.397 So too is malaria, with an estimated 2.8
million cases reported in the country for 2022.398 Measles outbreaks are common, while HIV,
sexually transmitted infections, tuberculosis and hepatitis are all highly prevalent. 399 Poor
sanitation and limited access to clean water are major contributors to diarrhoea, persistent
cholera outbreaks and the spread of communicable diseases: estimates are that only 12 per
cent of rural households have access to improved sanitation, and that 61 per cent of the total
population practices open defecation.400 Acute malnutrition also contributes to poor health
outcomes. Low immunization rates and the lack of access to health services are directly
correlated to the high incidence of preventable deaths, and the low life expectancy at birth.
The general conditions of children, and pregnant and lactating women, are especially
precarious and they suffer disproportionately from the lack of access to services. An
estimated 75 per cent of child deaths are due to preventable diseases. 401
222. In the Commission’s interviews with doctors and health officials in state capitals in
2023, they described working on an ‘emergency setting’ without adequate or reliable salaries,
medicines, basic supplies and infrastructure.402 In rural areas, community leaders reported
needless infant and maternal deaths for a lack of basic training of local midwives, and
pregnant mothers being unable to afford transport to clinics, including $10 motorbike taxi
journeys.403 For survivors of rape and other forms of sexual violence, who experience horrific

392 From July 2020 to December 2023.

393 Predominantly on ‘supplies, tools, and materials’ and ‘infrastructure and land’ unrelated to the above-mentioned healthcare-related
mandates. The remaining 7 per cent was spread across ‘Community and Public Health’, ‘Human Resource Development’,
‘Pharmaceuticals and Equipment’, ‘Planning Coordination & Monitoring’, and ‘Secondary/Tertiary Health Care’.
394 Ministry of Health, 2023, page 11.
395 Commission’s analysis of data from the Human Development Index.
396 “Trends in maternal mortality 2000 to 2020: estimates by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and UNDESA/Population

Division: executive summary,” page 4, https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240069251.

397 19 according to the Ministry of Health; 20 according to WHO. Ibid, 2023 to 2027 South Sudan Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs)

Master Plan, page i.

398 World Health Organization, “World malaria report 2023,” page 7.
399 WHO 2022 Annual Report for South Sudan, pages 15 to 16. The Global Tuberculosis Report for 2023 states that it causes 227

deaths per 100,000 people in South Sudan, which is among the highest rates in the world.
400
UNESCO, page 37.
401 UNICEF, “Humanitarian needs overview: South Sudan,” November 2019, page 3.
402 R9811701, R1548246, R4512623.
403 A/HRC/55/26, para. 53.

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physical and psychological harms, access to health care is practically non-existent.404 Where
the health and justice systems interface, resource and coordination problems may cause
further trauma; the Commission has identified the ‘rape kits’ are used where there are no
facilities to store samples, making this invasive procedure painfully redundant.405 Of the
survivors of rape and other forms of sexual violence during 2024 who were interviewed by
the Commission, nearly all had not had access to adequate health care; some who sought
emergency care received none, including in cases where they were told that health workers
or medicines were unavailable.406
223. Broader underinvestment in the country’s infrastructure also impacts on fulfilling
health needs. Persistent power outages affect hospitals and the operation of their limited
equipment.407 In most of the country, medicine is either not available or access to it extremely
limited; where roads are inaccessible, costs of transporting medicine by air are prohibitively
high. At numerous government health facilities visited by the Commission during 2023, staff
and officials said they rely heavily on donor support yet still have extremely limited supplies,
resources and training opportunities.408
224. A health sector performance review in 2021 found systemic failures in meeting the
vast majority of government targets set for developing health systems and providing health
services.409 In 2023, a World Bank document noted that the “health system is characterized
by fragmentation and minimal Government engagement.”410 The South Sudan Doctors’
Union has identified challenges of low salaries contributing to low motivation and poor
attendance by government employees, noting that most health professionals leave their duties
at public hospitals to supplement income at private facilities.411 Low budgets, a lack of
regulations, and mismanagement by authorities were among the other challenges identified
by the Union. Low human resource capacities and retention rates in the Ministry of Health
itself present key challenges, alongside the Government’s significant ongoing dependence on
partners to provide health services, with most of the existing health services still coming
through assistance from foreign donors.412 The lack of government investment goes far in
explaining the dire state of the health system and access to services.

C. Right to education

Government spending
225. The Government’s funding allocations and expenditure on education fall far short of
its commitments and obligations. Under domestic law, universal primary school education is
free and compulsory, and the Government must allocate 10 per cent of the total national
budget to general education.413 Primary and secondary education is in the Ministry of General
Education and Instruction’s portfolio, shared among national and state governments. Its main
policy is the 2017 to 2027 National General Education Policy. 414 By February 2026, the

404 When care is available, survivors face significant economic and social barriers inhibiting their access to it. A/HRC/49/CRP.4, paras.
132-156.
405 As reported by the Commission in early 2024, at multiple health clinics the Commission identified the use of rape kits to collect

bodily fluids from victims of crimes. Because forensic capabilities and storage facilities do not exist, samples are soon disposed of and
so are lost as evidence for criminal cases. A/HRC/55/26, para. 40.
406 A/HRC/58/27, para. 61.
407 R4284958. A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 281.
408 R5409052, R2400967, R5270132, SB to add more references here such as to EES.
409 See Ministry of Health, “Health Sector Strategic Plan, 2023-2027,” page 8.
410 In November 2023, in a project document contemplating $359 million in international financing for health services and projects in

South Sudan. Of the $359 million total operation cost, $117 million would be financed by the World Bank Group, with the remainder
financed by non-World Bank trust funds.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099111523135537100/P18138507b53df0a0b5ac052a85ce4cab7.
411 South Sudan Doctor’s Union, “Submission on the health sector budget allocation,” 21 July 2023.
412
“WHO in South Sudan,” 2022 Annual Report, page 30.
413 2011 Transitional Constitution, section 29(2). 2012 General Education Act, Article 15(b).
414 See also the 2017 to 2022 General Education Strategic Plan, the 2020 National Inclusive Education Policy, and the 2023-2030

National Teacher Education Policy.

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development and adoption of an action plan to implement the right to free and compulsory
primary education will also be required.415
226. The General Education Ministry spent just 1.5 per cent of the total 2023-2024 national
budget for ministries and government entities.416 This stands in stark contrast to the relative
overfunding of the Ministry of Higher Education (see paragraph 196). The General Education
allocation falls far short of the 10 per cent required under domestic law, and of the 15 to 20
per cent benchmark for SDG4, ‘quality education’.417 Expenditure patterns show that these
allocations are not fully disbursed, further diminishing the money available for schools. 418
This funding is then depleted even more by a corrupt disbursements system whereby
payments pass through multiple national and state government offices, largely transferred in
cash. Theft and diversion along the way results in end users claiming to have received less
than what the national Ministry of Finance and Planning claims to have sent.419 While state
governments are also required to fund primary education, revenue diversions there are also
widespread, and little such funding appears to reach education budgets. In addition to most
of the national education budget going to higher education, these conditions further explain
why money does not reach the schools.
Graph 11: General education in national budgets: required by law, allocated, received 420

14% 12.3%
12%
9.9%
10%
8%
5.2% 5.6%
6%
4% 2.9% 2.8%
2.1% 1.5%
2%
0%
2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024

Budget Allocation Reported Expenditure Legal minimum (Education Act)

227. The Commission calculated that to serve all school-age students, South Sudan would
require around 127,660 teachers for a ratio of 50 teachers per student, which should cost
approximately $53 million in salaries.421 This is more than triple the amount the national
government reported transferring to the states for general education in 2022-2023, which was
to cover all costs, from teacher salaries to supplies and infrastructure. Most money reaching
schools instead comes in official development assistance; donor and government officials
told the Commission such money is also subject to diversion. 422
Human rights impacts
228. Most South Sudanese have not enjoyed the right to education. An estimated 2.6
million children aged six to 17 are out of school, impacting their childhood experience. 423

415 Under article 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social Cultural Rights, this is required two years after a State has
joined the treat. South Sudan became a State Party in February 2024.
416 As highlighted in para. 196, in comparison higher education received more than double the funding of general education over the

course of the four national budgets reviewed by the Commission.

417 The 2015 Incheon Declaration includes 15 to 20 per cent of total public expenditure as the global benchmark. For the
implementation of SDG4, its text “urge(s) adherence to the international and regional benchmarks of allocating efficiently at least 4 –
6% of Gross Domestic Product and/or at least 15 – 20% of total public expenditure to education,” para. 14.
418 2021/2022 and 2022/2023 budget data, on file.
419 A/HRC/55/26, para. 81.
420 Data for the Ministry of General Education and Instruction (excluding higher education and other entities).
421 Salaries at a level of the country’s current GDP per capita, which is still insufficiently low. Calculated based on the figure of

6,383,000 school-aged children in 2024 including pre-primary, primary and secondary (UNESCO, page 31) and the ratio of 50 to 1
cited as South Sudan Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies (UNICEF, 2012) in the UNESCO document and the most
recent GDP per capita being $417, from World Bank.
422 This has included the United Kingdom Government’s Girls’ Education South Sudan program, and other projects which include

incentive payments to top-up teacher salaries, including that of the European Union. R3315408. R6658766.
423 UNESCO, page 7.

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Less than 2 in 5 primary-school aged children are enrolled: the United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF) estimates enrolment rates at 37.6 per cent in primary and 5.2 per cent in
secondary schools.424 A child born in 2021 was expected to complete just 4.9 years of
schooling on average, or 2.5 years when adjusted for quality.425 Girls are underrepresented in
all areas of education, reflecting the low social status accorded to women. 426 The lack of
education for children also limits their potential as adults to participate in society and
contribute to national development. Adult literacy rates are estimated to be only 30 per cent
among females and 56 per cent among males, or 43 per cent across both sexes.427 Literacy is
significantly lower in rural areas, where some school teachers have not completed primary
education themselves.428 These extremely low rates of education cause a range of cascading
problems for the country, including for national development, for labour force potential, and
particularly for the status and human rights of women and girls.
229. In interviews with families, teachers and government officials, the Commission has
noted patterns in their explanations of why basic education remains out of reach for most. In
the states, senior officials told the Commission in 2023 that budget allocations are rarely or
never disbursed in full, and that schools often receive nothing at all. Most schools have
limited physical infrastructure: the Commission has observed school overcrowding, the
absence of water and toilets for students, and children sitting idle because a lack of teachers
meant that no instruction was taking place.429 Furthermore, primary and secondary teacher
salaries are inadequate and unreliable. All this also exacerbates a heavy reliance on donors
to support the most basic supplies, infrastructure, and in some cases incentive payments for
teachers.430 Where families are compelled to contribute money to supplement salaries or run
the schools, this can present an education barrier for students. Even where schools do operate,
the high prevalence of acute hunger, child labour, costs and fees, and distance are among the
range of further barriers to school attendance.431 In conflict-affected areas, schooling is
severely disrupted by violence and displacement, and in parts of the country, unaccountable
armed forces continue to occupy schools and recruit children.432 In 2021, a government
survey identified armed conflict and teacher shortages as being the primary reasons for
schools not being operational.433 These challenges persist, severely disrupting and often
ending children’s education, illustrated in the Commission’s investigations in Western
Equatoria during 2024.434
230. An associated but more significant factor in low school enrolment rates is the de-
prioritization of general education in government budgets, a problem flagged by UNICEF in
2019.435 As detailed above, the trend is that spends on general education in the national budget
has been diminishing. As previously reported by the Commission, on 6 February 2023,
President Kiir directed the Ministry of General Education and Instruction and the Ministry
of Finance and Planning to implement a policy of free primary and secondary education (free
and compulsory primary education was already required under law).436 On 23 February 2023,
the Minister of General Education and Instruction announced the release of the first tranche

424 UNICEF, “South Sudan Country Programme 2023–2025”, (January 2023), p. 14.
425
UNESCO, page 102.
426 See A/HRC/55/26, para. 55.
427 Government of South Sudan and UNESCO, “Education Sector Analysis, South Sudan,” 2023, page 38. While datasets vary, this

figure is broadly consistent with other data.

428 Ibid. 2017-2027 National General Education Policy, page 13.
429 IR-100049.
430 The Government’s 2020 to 2024 National Action Plan for Children (launched in 2022) identifies under-resourcing as a major

impediment to implementing the 2008 Child Act. Other entities including treaty bodies have highlighted this, with commensurate
recommendations. R5878631. R2406719.
431 For those who have the option, pursuing education in neighbouring countries tends to be preferred. Many income-earning families

send their children abroad, and many of the formal income earners have studied abroad themselves.
432 Of the commanders and public officials the Commission has identified as responsible for grave violations against children, none

have been disciplined or punished. A/HRC/55/26, para. 56. See also African Union Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child, “Report on the advocacy mission for the ratification of the African Charter on the rights and welfare of the child,” May
2023, paragraph 16.
433 Ministry of General Education and Instruction, “National Education Census Report Summary,” 2021, page 6.
434
A/HRC/58/27, para. 71.
435 UNICEF, “Education budget brief, South Sudan, 2019-2020, page 3.
436 Republican Order No. RSS/RO/J/04/2023. 2008 Child Act, article 14(1). And under the 2011 Transitional Constitution and since

February 2024 as part of the State’s obligations under ICESCR.

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of a “capitation grant” for schools, saying this would be accompanied by grants paid by its
partner, the United Kingdom.437 Announced in the context of public demands for school
teachers to be paid, this announcement seemed to amount to just one-sixth of the existing
government commitment to primary schools at the time.438 Teachers and other education
professionals told the Commission that the free education directive had not been matched
with increased resources for schools. Instead, in March 2023 the Minister of General
Education and Instruction began issuing warnings that public school administrators and
teachers who charged fees would be arrested and face prosecution.439 In multiple states,
schoolteachers were detained or fired for demanding their salary arrears.440 By late 2024, the
Commission identified that the 2023 presidential directive had still not been accompanied by
requisite funding increases for general education, and strikes and absences by unpaid or
underpaid teachers were continuing.441

D. Rights of children

231. The government neglect of and resource diversion from economic, social and cultural
rights disproportionately affects children and their wellbeing, in terms of the scale of negative
impacts, the immediacy, and the long-term consequences. Failures to invest in developing
agricultural productivity, to address the structural drivers of armed conflict and in effective
security, and in mitigating and responding to humanitarian crises are major reasons that an
estimated 5 million children require humanitarian assistance – and infant mortality rates are
among the worst globally. Acute malnutrition threatens the lives and development of many
children, and most child deaths would be preventable if immunization and services were
available. Most children do not attend school because they do not exist or are otherwise
inaccessible. Adequate services are not provided in general, and the barriers to access are
even greater for girls than boys, as detailed below, and for children with disabilities who
require specialized support. All this neglect impacts experiences of childhood as well as their
future potential as adults.
232. The insecurity, conflict and lack of rule of law make children extremely vulnerable in
a variety of contexts to exploitation and abuse – which is often gendered. Across the country,
Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare officials have told the Commission they cannot
implement their child protection mandate due to the chronic under-resourcing.442 Since 2019,
the Commission has highlighted government under-resourcing also impairing initiatives to
address the use of children in armed forces. The National Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration Commission is not properly funded, and some traumatized boys and girls
released from armed forces end up returning to forces or to criminal gangs, because they
lacked adequate support for reestablishing their lives.443 Nearly all social protection in South
Sudan is funded by foreign donors rather than the Government, as highlighted above.
233. South Sudanese children will inherit the consequences of the diversion, theft, gross
mismanagement and waste of the country’s oil resources. If current trends continue, when
they reach adulthood their next generation of children will also face a human rights crisis.
The Future Generation Fund envisaged for the country’s post-oil production period will be
empty, the available government resources already squandered, and human rights prospects
bleak.

437 At the time, the SSP 1 billion equated to less than 50 cents for each of the country’s school aged children. RSS/MoGE&I/OM/J/1/1,
on file.
438 R9446906.
439 https://cityreviewss.com/goverment-warns-public-schools-against-collecting-fees-from-learners/ SSBC, 28 March 2023.
440
A/HRC/55/26, para. 54.
441 A/HRC/58/27, para. 72.
442 A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 226.
443 A/HRC/52/CRP.3, para. 223-239. A/HRC/55/26, para. 56. A/HRC/58/27, para. 69.

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VII. Gendered human rights impacts of corruption

A. Gendered deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights

234. Economic empowerment of women is fundamental for the growth and development
of South Sudan. However, economic challenges limit women’s advancement. Most women
are not economically independent, impeding their access to basic services. In addition,
corruption and economic crimes disproportionately harm women and girls by deepening
existing gender disparities. Misappropriation of public resources and persistent governance
failures are acutely reflected in the State’s neglect of its domestic and international law
obligations to women and girls, particularly in the gendered barriers to food, health and
education. Systemic inequalities, deep rooted patriarchy, and poor governance impacts
women and girls negatively, depriving them of basic economic access and opportunity.
Moreover, discriminatory customary laws prevent women from inheriting land and property,
which are essential for starting entrepreneurial ventures.
235. Structural inequalities, entrenched patriarchy, and weak public investment continue
to undermine the rights and opportunities of women and girls in South Sudan. For example,
the chronic underfunding of primary education — when combined with patriarchal norms
that prioritize boys — has resulted in girls disproportionately withdrawn from school and
forced into early marriage, resulting in high rates of child marriage among South Sudanese
girls.444 The endemic economic crisis has led to an increase in cases of child and forced
marriages and an inflation of “bride prices” in South Sudan. In this context, the lack of
primary education funding contributes to families making discriminatory decisions about
their children’s participation in the school, resulting in a higher illiteracy rate amongst girls
and women. This has long-term consequences, further depriving women and girls from
political participation and economic independence. The ongoing economic crisis –
compounded by acute food insecurity, currency depreciation, rising food prices and the
destruction of livelihoods – have further marginalised women and girls.
236. The State’s persistent failure to design and fund targeted interventions that keep girls
in school entrenches structural discrimination and perpetuates women’s low social status in
society. Inadequate access to health care – compounded by existing harmful discriminatory
practices –violates women’s right to health,445 including sexual and reproductive health, and
drives South Sudan’s persistently high rates of maternal and infant mortality which rank
among the worst globally. The right to health extends beyond health care facilities and
encompasses underlying determinants such as access to safe water, sanitation and a healthy
environment, areas in which women and girls in South Sudan shoulder a disproportionate
burden of the work. These deficits flow from the Government’s consistent failure to adopt a
rights-based approach to policymaking and budgeting. Essential services such as health,
education and justice are relegated to under-funded humanitarian projects instead of being
treated as a State priority.
237. Women and girls bear a disproportionate burden of agricultural and informal labour
in South Sudan yet are routinely denied access to land ownership including through
inheritance, and are excluded from decision making roles and processes in their
communities.446 The barriers to participate in income generating markets for women are
significant, ranging from their role as primary caregivers, high illiteracy rates, and lack of
formal employment opportunities and access to financial benefits. Between 50 to 80 per cent
of women are involved in small scale businesses like selling charcoal in the local market to
make their daily ends meet.447 Despite their central role in subsistence and the local economy,
women remain underrepresented in formal employment, where they frequently face sexual
harassment and other forms of gender-based abuses.448 Conflict and insecurity including the

444 See A/HRC/40/CRP.4, paras. 27-34. A/HRC/58/27, para. 73.

445 The right to health includes essential elements of availability, accessibility, acceptability, quality, participation and accountability.
See https://www.ohchr.org/en/health.
446 CEDAW/C/SSD/CO/1, para. 44.
447 See https://africa.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2025-01/south_sudan_country_gender_equality_profile_0.pdf.
448 See for example A/HRC/54/CRP.6, pages 19-20.

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killing or disappearance of male family members have led to a rise in female-headed houses,
in which women are compelled to carry higher work load burdens given their heightened
financial responsibilities.449 UN Women have reported that 60.2 per cent of the South
Sudanese women are involved in agricultural labour, however, their access to productive
assets is limited due to the low literacy and lack of female agricultural extension workers.450
The low social status assigned to women is both a consequence and a driver of South Sudan’s
chronic underdevelopment. Compounding this exclusion, women lack access to essential
economic tools such as microfinance services, credit loans, and other financial services that
could empower women entrepreneurs, increase self-reliance at grassroots level, and enhance
women’s greater socio-economic status. Low social status, stigma, exclusion and gendered
discrimination in many of its forms are also faced by gender diverse persons;451 although their
experiences and human rights challenges are different and diverse, there exist commonalities
in the gender-based harms of corruption on their human rights.
238. Gender-based and conflict-related sexual violence inflict deeply traumatic, physical,
psychological and reproductive harms.452 Survivors interviewed by the Commission have
consistently described their lack of access to essential healthcare, and struggles to re-establish
livelihoods and access other basic services.453 The Government’s ongoing failure to allocate
and disburse resources to address these critical needs constitutes a deliberate abdication of
its domestic and international law obligations to ensure sufficient and equitable access to
health and justice. This sustained neglect amounts to a violation of the rights to life, dignity,
and effective remedy, particularly for victims of conflict-related human rights violations and
abuses. The absence of functioning social and economic support systems severely limits
women's access to livelihood opportunities, increasing food insecurity, financial instability,
and heightened protection risks. Conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls
remains pervasive and widespread in South Sudan, with devastating and long-lasting
consequences for survivors, families and communities. 454 In contexts of armed conflict and
insecurity, such violence is driven by the collapse of functioning State institutions and the
corrupt misappropriation of public resources, particularly within the security sector.

B. Chronic marginalization of gender mandates

239. The Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare is mandated to implement laws and
policies relating to the rights of women and girls, 455 including coordinating responses to
conflict-related sexual violence.456 Yet it remains politically sidelined and critically
underfunded. In 2023-2024, the Ministry received less than 0.1 percent of the national
budget, of which only 12 per cent was actually allocated and disbursed. Ninety-six per cent
of reported expenditure that year went to ‘Support Services – Administration & Finance,’ i.e.
administrative overheads, with negligible investment in programs or staff salaries. Despite
repeated international calls including by the Human Rights Council to strengthen and
adequately resource the Ministry, its 2024-2025 national budget allocation declined even
further, reflecting the Government’s sustained neglect of women’s rights.457
240. Nearly all social protection in South Sudan is donor funded. Reprioritizations by key
donor countries in early 2025 indicate that such assistance is likely to further decline

449 A/HRC/49.CRP.4, para. 158.

450 https://africa.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2025-01/south_sudan_country_gender_equality_profile_0.pdf
451 The UN Independent Expert on sexual orientation and gender identity, mandated by the Human Rights Council, has noted that “the

term "gender-diverse" is used to refer to persons whose gender identity, including their gender expression, is at odds with what is
perceived as being the gender norm in a particular context at a particular point in time, including those who do not place themselves in
the male/female binary.” https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/ie-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity/struggle-trans-and-
gender-diverse-persons.
452 R6890494. R5554786. R4514243. R1966377 . R8055957
453 A/HRC/58/27, para. 61.
454
See “Conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls in South Sudan,” 21 March 2022, A/HRC/49/CRP.4.
455 A/HRC/55/26, para. 42.
456 A/HRC/55/26, paras. 38-40. See also A/HRC/40/CRP.4.
457 A/HRC/58/27, para. 67.

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significantly.458 This underscores the urgency of national initiatives to fund social protection,
particularly those targeting women and girls. These initiatives will remain ineffective unless
adequately resourced, and while most existing laws addressing gender inequality remain
unimplemented. For example, as outlined in the Revitalized Agreement, the Ministry of
Gender, Child, and Social Welfare has developed the Women Enterprise Development Fund
Bill intended to enhance economic empowerment for women. 459 As of 2025, the Bill is still
with Ministry of Gender and is yet to be presented before the Parliament for its approval.
Although, even if enacted, the Bill is unlikely to receive sufficient budgetary allocations for
implementation, unless entrenched patterns of budgetary neglect and diversion are
reversed.460 The national budget should prioritize allocating funds for women in business and
agriculture and direct oil revenue for operationalizing the Women Enterprise Fund.
241. The absence of a functioning and gender-responsive justice system is a major driver
of the impunity and discrimination which fuel gendered human rights violations. There is no
effective legal enforcement mechanism to uphold the rights of women and girls. A weak and
corrupt justice system intensifies the trauma experienced by survivors of sexual violence and
harmful practices. The Commission observed that the police frequently failed to record cases
of conflict-related sexual violence cases; and in some instances, survivors who reported
crimes were asked to pay to open a case against their perpetrators. Justice institutions
including specialized police units and ‘One Stop Centres’ remain critically underfunded and
understaffed.461 The lack of judges and the non-payment of prosecutors’ salaries and basic
operational shortfalls make access to justice nearly impossible for many victims, further
compounding their trauma and reinforcing their structural marginalization.
242. South Sudan acceded to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women in April 2015, however, many provisions remain
unimplemented due to lack of political will and inadequate budgetary allocations necessary
to ensure the protection and empowerment of women. South Sudan’s Second National Action
Plan on Women, Peace and Security (SSNAP-II), although validated in March 2023,462 is yet
to be launched or implemented. Addressing gender inequality requires a multi-pronged
strategy, including legal, economic, social and cultural reforms. Although such reforms could
promote a more equitable distribution of resources and power, they remain stalled because
they are perceived to threaten the entrenched interests of those in power. This resistance
perpetuates cycles of impunity, corruption, systemic government mismanagement and gender
discrimination which disproportionately impact the lives and human rights of women and
girls in South Sudan.463

458 This situation dates back many years and has been persistently highlighted by the Ministry. See Ministry of Child, Gender and
Social Welfare, “National Social Protection Policy Framework, Annual Report 2020,” July 2021.
459 Section 4.15.1.5 commits the Government to establish a Women Enterprise Development Fund.
460 Institute of Social Policy and Research, the Community Empowerment for Rehabilitation and Development, and the Government

of the Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan National Budget Analysis Report for the Year 2023-2024,” September 2023, https://ispr-
ss.org/assets/files/2023-10/2023100665200922f3945.pdf.
461 See A/HRC/49/CRP.4, paras 135 and 223. A/HRC/55/26, paras. 39 and 40. A/HRC/58/27, para.101(i).
462 https://southsudan.un.org/en/225217-south-sudan-validates-second-national-action-plan-women-peace-and-security.
463 A/HRC/55/26, para. 4.

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VIII. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

243. Grand scale corruption has concentrated South Sudan’s national wealth into the hands
of a few, reflecting the State’s capture by unaccountable elites. A leading cause of the
immense human suffering and misery among the population, corruption has directly
endangered peace processes, undermined democratization, and caused preventable deaths. It
has also exacerbated the violent armed contestation for power and resources which drives
gross human rights violations and now imperils the transition itself. Extreme underfunding
of services and core governments functions renders institutions unable to perform, while
foreign donors spend more than the Government to address basic needs, reflecting the
population’s utter neglect by political leaders.
244. The Commission in its previous reporting has identified this grand political corruption
as a major driver of human rights violations. The systematic theft and diversions of
considerable government revenues have fuelled armed violence and associated atrocities.
This has also severely undermined government capacities to fulfil human rights, evident in
the lack of basic services. In its September 2021 paper, the Commission called for a
transformation of this corrupt political culture, and a reorientation of government spending
toward fulfilling human rights, most urgently for the most basic needs. The Commission
recommended a series of political, legal and governance measures to restore trust in
governance and promote social cohesion. Nearly four years later, none of these extensive
recommendations have been duly adopted by the Government, including reform
commitments under the Revitalized Agreement.
245. Although South Sudan inherited underdeveloped status upon independence and armed
conflict has severely disrupted institution building and services, corruption now best explains
the dire state of the economy, and the increasingly immense human rights and humanitarian
crises. The Commission calculated that the Government received at least $25.2 billion in oil-
related inflows since independence in 2011, including over $8 billion in oil revenue since the
Revitalized Agreement was signed in 2018 (adjusted for inflation at December 2024 dollars).
This significant revenue stands in stark contrast to the absence of public infrastructure and
basic services, unpaid government salaries affecting teachers through to soldiers, an endemic
economic crisis, the deliberately underfunded peace process, and deteriorating human rights
and humanitarian crises. Fourteen years after independence (and nearly seven years under
the present peace agreement), all parts of South Sudan remain visibly poor and
underdeveloped, the country ranks at the bottom in global development and public health
indicators, and increasing acute hunger and extreme poverty levels afflict most of the
citizenry.
246. In this paper, the Commission’s findings show that corruption has further entrenched
under South Sudan’s Revitalized Transitional Government. The judiciary has remained
deprived of financial and functional independence, the legislature deprived of independence
and failing to perform oversight functions, while political power has concentrated in a few
institutions, mostly in the Presidency. More than five years since the signing of the
Revitalized Agreement, public accountability commitments remain unfulfilled, the Anti-
Corruption Commission is effectively defunct, and media face strict censorship and attacks
for reporting on corruption. The Transitional Government has been completely
unaccountable for gross financial mismanagement and corruption, and its term has repeatedly
been extended: it was to end in 2022, and is presently due to run until late 2026, when long-
delayed elections are scheduled. In September 2024, parties to the Agreement justified the
latest extension by citing “severe funding constraints” impeding implementation; despite
government revenues approaching $3.5 billion in the prior two years, mostly from oil.
247. The Commission identified that gross mismanagement and corruption have reduced
oil and non-oil revenue potential, with money lost to government budgets equating to profits
for politically connected individuals and companies such as Crawford Capital Ltd., at the
same time undermining public and business trust in nascent taxation initiatives. Revenue
diversions off-budget are systematic and blatant, exemplified by the ‘Oil for Roads’ program.

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On-budget practices show further diversions to centres of political power and patronage
networks, at every possible step of allocation and spending, paid for by cuts to core
government services and functions. The Commission’s examination of government spending
on the rights to food, health and education shows that obligations to fulfil human rights are
completely neglected, in violation of the State’s obligations under the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – with the population left to resort to insufficient
and unsustainable international assistance. This pattern of abuse of available resources
extends to all governance areas, including the woefully inadequate implementation of the
Revitalized Agreement, severely endangering peace prospects.
248. Government spending patterns, in particular corrupt diversions of available resources
from fulfilling human rights obligations and peace agreement commitments, reflect an
egregious form of State capture. Instead of corruption being punished, individuals implicated
in corrupt acts receive government contracts for their businesses, are retained as public
officials, and even promoted to seniormost State positions. This collusion in corruption at the
highest levels is reflected in the deliberate absence of all forms of accountability for
systematic diversions from core government functions and services, enabling a few
individuals and patronage networks to benefit financially; paid for by immense suffering
amongst the citizenries. International law obligations, constitutional provisions, legislation
and government policies to combat corruption are neither respected nor enforceable because
the institutions mandated to uphold the law are deliberately debilitated.
249. A core aspiration of South Sudan’s peoples for self-determination was to no longer be
shackled by extreme violence, marginalization and poverty. Yet through grand scale
corruption the country’s elites have engendered violence and utter neglect of citizens. The
deteriorating conditions and prospects for South Sudan are the consequences of systematic
predation, greed, and zero-sum political mentalities. A political transformation is urgently
needed to reorient government priorities toward fulfilling human rights, and addressing
political fractures, violent conflict, and fostering sustainable peace. This can only be achieved
by addressing the grand scale government corruption, which requires improving transparency
and accountability in all aspects of fiscal management, and most immediately standing-down
corrupt officials and overhauling budget processes and priorities.
250. Corruption is killing South Sudanese: preventable deaths from illnesses are due to
available resources being diverted from government services, while violence and conflict
fomented by contestations over the shrinking pool of wealth from oil and other resources cost
lives. Unless it addresses corruption meaningfully, the Government will not be able to meet
the most essential needs of South Sudan’s population, or its range of international human
rights law obligations, nor prevent the escalation of armed conflict.
251. To pull the country from the brink and to reset it on a path toward enduring peace and
development, the government must make the eradication of corruption, especially the
diversion of revenues, its top priority. This would require a necessary shift in political
mentalities, and a commitment to fulfilling the aspirations of the people of South Sudan.
Next, the Government must guarantee spending toward fulfilling its obligations towards the
population under human rights law, and the commitments within the Revitalized Agreement
to address corruption and mismanagement of resources. If these measures are not vigorously
pursued, the human misery will continue, and South Sudan will risk failure.

B. Recommendations

252. The Commission recommends that the Government of South Sudan, to catalyse the
urgently required shift toward serving the peoples of South Sudan:
(a) Reject corruption and predation: embrace a transformative political and nation-
building agenda that prioritizes and directs resources towards respecting, protecting and
fulfilling the human rights of South Sudanese – and which reverses the patterns of effectively
outsourcing core service delivery to foreign donors.
(b) Immediately reorient budgeting processes, allocations, and spending patterns
to prioritize the realization of the full range of human rights, in line with obligations under

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international, regional and domestic laws – including spending reductions for ministries and
entities that do not serve immediate public interests and needs.
(c) Advance the transition by cutting obstructive corruption, waste and diversions,
and allocate sufficient revenue to implement priority tasks in the Revitalized Agreement,
ensuring these are fully funded and in a timely manner, including for credible constitution-
making, transitional justice and electoral processes, alongside proper graduations and
deployments of Necessary Unified Forces.
(d) End impunity for corruption, by promptly implementing the commitment
under the Revitalized Agreement to dismiss and bar from public office individuals
responsible for corruption, and hold them accountable by fair, lawful and transparent actions
under domestic law which are guided by human rights norms.
(e) Address the rights of women and girls as a national priority, directing political
and fiscal resources to implement domestic and international human rights law obligations.
(f) Review the detailed past and present recommendations of the Commission to
address violations of international human rights law associated with corruption, alongside
the extensive recommendations of this and other United Nations political and human rights
bodies – none of which have been duly implemented.
253. The Commission recommends that the Government of South Sudan, to address the
underdevelopment, humanitarian and human rights crises:
(a) Most urgently, direct maximum available resources toward addressing the
population’s basic needs, with special attention paid to the immediate needs of women and
children – particularly for the rights to food, health and education – which are core obligations
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Sustainable
Development Goals national priorities.
(b) Increase budget allocations and spending by government entities with
mandates to address the widespread acute food insecurity crisis and address their patterns of
extreme underspending resulting from corrupt off-budget diversions to elites.
(c) Reverse patterns of defunding and deterioration in the public health sector –
and the abdication of core State obligations to foreign donors and financiers – by
progressively aligning budget allocations and spending with government health plans,
funding targets, and regional standards – while prioritizing investments in safe water,
improved sanitation, and disease prevention measures nationwide; a core element of this is
ceasing wholly unjustified and frequently abused expenses charged to ‘medical travel’ by
political elites, not subject to basic auditing and accountability principles, and which should
instead be invested in public health.
(d) Cease and reverse practices that violate domestic law obligations to fund core
government services, including by adhering to the requirement to direct 10 per cent of the
national budget to general education (primary and secondary schools).
(e) Meaningfully invest in diversifying the economy, particularly to support and
develop agriculture (including irrigation and drainage infrastructure), livestock and fisheries,
and other sustainable non-oil productive economic activity, alongside investments in
electricity and other critical public infrastructure.
(f) Cease any actions or measures which infringe on the population’s access to
essential humanitarian assistance, including retrogressive measures that impede the delivery
of life-saving aid, such as unlawful taxation schemes and arbitrary access or other restrictions
on humanitarian organizations; and lawfully protect peoples in need from such acts by non-
State actors, including private companies.
254. The Commission recommends that the Government of South Sudan, to foster political
and fiscal accountability:
(a) Alongside urgently addressing the population’s basic needs, concurrently
prioritize investments in independent rule of law and accountability institutions – particularly
the judiciary and including the Anti-Corruption Commission – which are indispensable to
protect the range of human rights, foster accountability in governance, and effectively combat

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grand corruption – as per the State’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the regional and international anti-corruption treaties, and under
domestic law.
(b) Urgently prioritize full implementation of reforms under Chapter IV of the
Revitalized Agreement (on resource, economic and financial management) as a fundamental
part of addressing financial constraints, and institute the requisite structural reforms to
address the endemic economic crisis and its harms.
(c) Prioritize ending the grand corruption and theft of revenues by holding
responsible officials accountable and ensure public transparency and effective oversight –
including for the un-itemized “agricultural sector projects” allocation in the 2024-2025
national budget, which risks going to off-budget diversions.
(d) Make all laws, policy documents and budgets publicly accessible in a timely
manner – particularly those relating to resource-management and accountability publicly –
to enable transparency and foster accountability in governance.
(e) Cease the unlawful censorship, harassment and attacks against persons who
report credible allegations of government corruption – which amount to human rights
violations and embolden perpetrators of corruption by silencing scrutiny.
(f) Join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), starting by
issuing a public statement of intention to become an implementing country, and take other
requisite steps including through engagement with companies and civil society stakeholders.
255. The Commission recommends that the Government of South Sudan, to enable
adherence with international human rights law in the generation and use of available
resources:
(a) End systematic mismanagement and corruption patterns in the generation of
both oil and non-oil revenues, including corrupt and chaotic oil sales practices, the off-budget
diversion patterns exemplified by the corrupt ‘Oil for Roads’ scheme, and the corrupt
outsourcing of revenues collections to Crawford Capital Ltd.
(b) Shut down corruption patterns and schemes in non-oil revenue collections
which undermine public trust and the credibility of taxation initiatives, including by
introducing transparency to the collection and use of personal income tax.
(c) Cancel illicit and corrupt government contracts, audit oil sales and production,
and institute lawful, competitive and credible public procurement processes.
(d) Cease and rectify irresponsible and illegal economic management and fiscal
practices which fuel the endemic economic crisis and facilitate opportunities for corruption,
including by reforming harmful policies and practices of the South Sudan Revenue Authority
and the Bank of South Sudan identified in this paper.
(e) Address the extreme dependency on finite oil resources, end the resort to
expensive oil-backed loans and pre-financing oil cargoes which risk accumulating an
unmanageable debt burden for future generations, develop and enforce regulations to protect
the environment and public health in the oil-producing zones and sites of non-oil extractive
industry operations, and initiate a long-term economic decarbonization strategy to reduce
vulnerability to commodity shocks and support inclusive rights-based development.
(f) Ensure all oil revenues are transparently recorded in the national budget and
safeguarded for future generations, including by rectifying illegal diversions from the Future
Generation Fund and Oil Revenue Stabilization Account, and prioritizing payments to these
accounts, while also responsibly disbursing mandatory contributions to oil-producing states
– as required under domestic law.
(g) Eliminate vague or non-itemized budget lines vulnerable to systemic
misappropriation, and reduce expenditure under nebulous budget lines that are subject to
systematic misappropriation – as part of this, national budgets should be submitted for review
to the legislature for due consideration prior to the commencement of the fiscal year, and
proposed budgets should fund specific programs and activities within government ministries

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and entities, and legislators must exercise effective oversight to end the practice of
government ministries and entities appropriating uncommitted funds.
(h) Match government policy commitments with concrete budget allocations and
disbursements and hold officials responsible for non-compliance and corruption.
(i) Professionalize and digitize budget execution, denying any ‘ad hoc’ or ‘urgent’
funding requests, commit to executing budgets as allocated, and prevent large overspends or
underspends, including through improving public transparency.
(j) Ensure adequate and lawful budget allocations, timely disbursements, and
accountable spending for all government ministries and entities – including by addressing
the inadequacy and unreliability of public sector salaries and fostering and enabling effective
and accountable legislative oversight of budgets.
(k) End off-budget diversions facilitating corruption, exemplified in the ‘Oil for
Roads’ scheme and other diversionary mechanisms, bring all revenues under and enable
effective oversight by legislators, the judiciary and the public.
256. The Commission recommends that the Government of South Sudan, to address the
gendered human rights impacts of corruption:
(a) Develop and implement gender sensitive and gender responsive economic
policies: expedite the establishment of the Women Enterprise Development Fund Bill, to
empower and enhance women’s participation in economic activities, including agriculture,
and allocate and disburse sufficient budget for the Fund to support women entrepreneurs;
enhance livelihood opportunities for women and focus on protection to women and girls
displaced due to conflicts, and floods; develop initiatives to foster economic growth by
launching financial schemes such as micro credit loans to promote and empower businesses
owned by women; develop and implement policies on income-generating activities and
provide subsidies for girls and women seeking education and health services.
(b) Recognize that economic crimes and corruption disproportionately affect
women, girls, and marginalized groups on the basis of gender; recognize the need to conduct
research which includes an analysis of both direct and indirect gendered harms, such as: loss
of livelihoods due to stolen social grants or nepotism in public employment; increased unpaid
care work or school dropout due to diversion of resources from health or education–; forms
of gender-based exploitation linked to access to State services or resources.
(c) Integrate gender expertise and sensitivity in investigations and accountability
processes: appoint and meaningfully engage gender experts in the design, operations and
oversight of investigative, prosecutorial, and accountability mechanisms; integrate gender-
sensitive indicators and analytical tools to identify and address hidden or normalized
gendered corruption practices; adapt prosecutorial and judicial processes address the specific
risks, needs and vulnerabilities of women, girls, and all individuals, regardless of gender
identity or expression, including through trauma-informed and survivor-centred approaches.
(d) Ensure inclusive participation and representation: guarantee meaningful
participation of women and girls as well as all individuals, regardless of gender identity or
expression, especially those from marginalized or affected communities, in all stages –
design, implementation, and monitoring – of anti-corruption and redress processes; establish
gender parity or quotas where appropriate on oversight bodies, commissions of inquiry, and
reparation committees; use community-based and culturally appropriate consultation
processes that enable women’s voices to be heard without fear or stigma.
(e) Address gendered harms through targeted reparations and redress; design
reparations that directly respond to the gendered nature of economic harm, including:
compensation for income loss due to systemic exclusion or abuse; restitution of land or assets
where women were dispossessed; livelihood restoration and vocational training for women
whose economic agency was undermined; include symbolic measures that publicly
acknowledge the specific harms women suffered due to economic crimes and corruption.
(f) Prevent gender-based corruption: recognize and where appropriate criminalize
forms of corruption with a gendered dimension, such as sextortion, in national anti-corruption
laws and policies; promote gender-responsive budgeting, procurement, and auditing as tools

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to expose and prevent discriminatory resource allocation; require regular gender audits of
public institutions to identify and correct systemic practices that enable gendered corruption;
protect women witnesses; develop and implement robust, gender-sensitive protection
mechanisms for witnesses who report economic crimes and corruption; acknowledge that
women and girls and gender diverse persons face unique threats – including sexual violence,
reputational harm, and economic reprisals –and require tailored support, including
psychosocial care and safe housing; ensure legal aid and accompaniment services are
available to women and gender-diverse persons participating in accountability or reparations
processes.
(g) Promote legal and institutional reform review and amend laws, policies, and
institutional practices that enable or ignore gendered corruption or exclude women from
justice and redress: harmonize national anti-corruption efforts with international human
rights standards, including CEDAW UNCAC, and Sustainable Development Goals 5
(Gender Equality) and 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions).
(h) Adopt an intersectional, transformative justice approach: recognize that
gendered economic harms are often compounded by class, age, disability, gender diversity,
and displacement; design responses that do not merely compensate individual losses, but seek
to transform the structural inequalities and power relations that allowed corruption and
economic exclusion to flourish; engage in public education and community empowerment
efforts that promote long-term gender justice, economic equality, and accountability.
257. The Commission recommends that the Government of South Sudan, to enable
accountability and the prevention of economic crimes through transitional justice:
(a) Establish and operationalize the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and
Healing, the Compensation and Reparation Authority, and the Hybrid Court for South Sudan
– institute concrete budgetary measures, including ring-fencing a percentage of oil revenue
to fund the full, independent, and sustained functioning of the Truth Commission and the
Reparation Authority.
(b) To ensure that these mechanisms are credible, independent and effective, and
align with internationally recognized norms and standards for transitional justice, they must
be robustly designed, properly established and adequately resourced with:
(i) Comprehensive mandates and investigative strategies, supported by sufficient
technical expertise and financial resources, to examine patterns of economic crimes
and their linkage to recurring cycles of conflict, gross human rights violations and
atrocity crimes, including those documented in this report.
(ii) Specialized expertise and gender-sensitive approaches to analyse and identify
appropriate remedies for the gendered dimensions and impacts of economic crimes,
and their disproportionate effects on women and girls, while paying attention to
intersecting vulnerabilities related to age, ethnicity, disability, and displacement.
(iii) Measures for the meaningful inclusion and participation of victims and
affected communities to ensure the design of effective reparations, which respond not
only to individual losses, but also to collective grievances and transform the structural
inequalities that enable corruption, economic exploitation and crimes as well as socio-
economic marginalization.
(iv) Institutional capacity and legal authority to identify, trace and recover assets
derived from corruption and economic crimes with a view to establishing a credible
and victim-centred reparation fund.
(v) Expanded mandates for the Hybrid Court and Truth Commission to cover
grand corruption, illicit financial flows, and embezzlement of public funds, especially
where they are linked to serious human rights violations and conflict-related abuses;
this should include the authority to prosecute economic crimes that may constitute or
contribute to international crimes, including crimes against humanity and war crimes
where deprivation, looting or plunder leads to mass displacement, starvation, or
systemic deprivation of rights.

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(vi) Coordination mechanisms between the three transitional justice institutions to

allow for the sharing of information, victim testimony, and evidence between truth-
telling, accountability, and reparations processes; this should include formal referral
pathways from the Truth Commission to the Hybrid Court for prosecutorial follow-
up.
(vii) Powers for the Truth Commission to investigate systemic corruption and
patronage networks, including the looting of oil revenue and diversion of public funds,
and to publicly name those implicated in economic crimes that undermine peace and
human rights.
(viii) Guarantees that recovered assets are transparently redirected to reparations
programmes for victims, particularly those affected by the misappropriation of
resources intended for basic services such as food, health, education, and housing.
258. The Commission further recommends that the Government of South Sudan through
its State institutions, in addition to the core recommendations outlined above, take the
following measures to address findings on corruption presented in this paper, including:
To the South Sudan Revenue Authority:
(a) Cease demands of commercial banks to send physical cash to the Authority’s
headquarters, which seems to serve no other purpose than facilitating cash diversion.
(b) Increase the regularity and reliability with which it publishes non-oil revenue
collection figures, as well as publishing its collection in US dollars (where collected in that
currency) and the final amount made available to the Ministry of Finance and Planning, in
South Sudan pounds.
(c) Instruct commercial banks to hold non-oil revenue collection in a government-
controlled bank account, and enforce this instruction as required by law, and not the accounts
of Capital Pay and Crawford Capital Ltd.
To the Ministry of Petroleum:
(d) Resume the publication of oil production and marketing information.
(e) In coordination with the Ministry of Finance and Planning, work to reduce the
discount oil lifters require for South Sudanese cargoes by ceasing the 30 to 60 day advance
payment practice, and return to the practice of awarding oil cargoes to the company that wins
the tender, and not re-award these cargoes to other parties.
(f) In coordination with the Ministry of Finance and Planning, and the Ministry of
Presidential Affairs, increase transparency around oil-related transfers to Sudan and how
Transitional Financial Arrangement overpayments are being reconciled between the two
countries,
To the Transitional National Legislative Assembly:
(g) Provide timely and effective oversight for national government budgets, ensure
adherence to allocations and disbursements to sectors and funds required by law, and enable
this through demanding accountability for expenditure and ensuring public transparency in
these processes.
(h) Eliminate the Ministry of Petroleum’s 3 per cent withholding of oil revenue.
(i) Present the Auditor General’s reports in the Legislature and make these
publicly available.
(j) Using oversight authority, facilitate the National Audit Chamber’s improved
access to information and data required to effectively execute its mandate.
(k) Request the National Audit Chamber conduct an audit of the Transitional
National Legislative Assembly, making any and all required documentation available, to
fully account for expenditure since 2020.

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To the Transitional National Legislative Assembly, in coordination with the Ministry of

Finance and Planning:
(l) Eliminate all South Sudan Revenue Authority withholding of its non-oil
revenue collections, allowing this money to flow to the National Revenue Fund for use in the
national budget.
(m) Increase government salaries to a level that constitutes just and favourable
remuneration ensuring for civil servants and their families a dignified existence and give
public sector wages priority claim on the budget.
(n) In coordination with all government ministries and entities, eliminate the
discriminatory inequality of wages across government institutions, ensuring equal pay for
equal work.
(o) In coordination with the Ministry of Energy and Dams, and the South Sudan
Electricity Corporation, invest in electricity infrastructure to connect more South Sudanese
and reduce the price end users pay, including through investment in solar, hydroelectric, and
wind power.
259. The Commission recommends that States Members of the African Union (AU) and
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD):
(a) Enforce AU anti-corruption norms by publicly denouncing and instituting
prosecutions and asset seizures for South Sudanese officials implicated in grand corruption
and diversion of public resources, consistent with the AU Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption and the AU’s Common African Position on Asset Recovery.
(b) Link all AU and IGAD support for South Sudan to demonstrable progress in
accountable governance, including full establishment of anti-corruption and transitional
justice institutions under the Revitalized Agreement, and adherence to standards under the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
(c) Activate the AU’s peer review and compliance mechanisms, including through
the African Governance Architecture and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), to
monitor South Sudan’s persistent failure to uphold principles of transparency, rule of law,
and people-centred development – with a view to fostering and supporting improvements.
(d) Reject further legitimization of opaque governance by requiring full budget
transparency, cessation of off-budget oil deals, and independent audits of state spending, in
line with Agenda 2063 commitments to good financial governance.
(e) Support independent investigations and asset recovery efforts involving AU
anti-corruption bodies and international partners, ensuring that looted public wealth is
returned and repurposed for the benefit of the South Sudanese people.
(f) Make clear that impunity for corruption and abuse is incompatible with AU
membership obligations, and that continued violations will trigger sanctions, diplomatic
isolation, and continental accountability measures.
(g) Action financial intelligence of South Sudanese money laundering, which is
already in some African government holdings, as well as engaging in new investigations to
uncover and prosecute South Sudanese money laundering within their borders, particularly
for the governments of neighbouring Kenya (which presents an opportunity to demonstrate
the effectiveness of its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing measures) and
Uganda (which presents an opportunity to demonstrate prosecutorial capability to action
financial intelligence information within the Financial Intelligence Authority’s holdings).
260. The Commission recommends that States Members of the United Nations and
international partners:
(a) In accordance with the recognition by the UN and States Members that
systemic corruption is a human rights issue, acknowledge that the misappropriation of public
resources and chronic underinvestment in basic services constitute violations of South
Sudan’s obligations under the ICESCR and broader international human rights law.

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(b) Demand from the Government fiscal transparency, accountability and

reprioritizations, to fulfil human rights law and credibly conclude the transition.
(c) Address the illicit financial flows and money laundering which facilitates
corruption and undermines peace in South Sudan, and threatens regional stability – including
by proactively investigating and prosecuting related economic crimes, in line with
obligations under anti-corruption related treaties.
(d) Mandate enhanced scrutiny through UN mechanisms: including by requesting
the Human Rights Council to mandate an independent expert to investigate the impact of
corruption and resource mismanagement on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural
rights in South Sudan.
(e) Strengthen treaty body follow-up; urge the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights to prioritize South Sudan’s reporting obligations and, where necessary,
issue early warnings or urgent appeals under its mandate due to the scale of non-compliance.
(f) Support independent oversight mechanisms, anti-corruption investigations,
and independent audits, including through civil society monitoring platforms and media
protections.
(g) Condition financial support on transparency and accountability, and ensure
that all international development aid or budgetary support is conditional upon measurable
reforms, including the publication of budget allocations, the reinstatement of audit
mechanisms, and prosecution of high-level corruption cases.
(h) Engage regional accountability bodies, including by calling on the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to examine the extent to which corruption and
public sector failure in South Sudan undermine the rights guaranteed under the African
Charter, particularly the rights to health, education, food, and development.
(i) Target official development assistance in line with the aim to reduce the
population’s aid dependency, and to avoid enabling the Government to abdicate its
obligations, while ensuring any reductions do not trigger a humanitarian catastrophe.
(j) Avoid providing financing or loans assessed as likely to enable the
Government to evade fiscal responsibilities, violate human rights law obligations in the use
of resources, or contribute to an unmanageable debt burden compromising the rights of the
next generations and the country in future.
(k) For private companies domiciled in a Member State’s jurisdiction which are
active in South Sudan, work toward ensuring their activities comply with the laws of all
relevant jurisdictions, including through advice and law enforcement.
(l) Demand from the Government transparency, accountability and
reprioritizations in financial management, for the fulfilment of regional and international
human rights law obligations, and as part of accompaniment for the political transition.
(m) For the International Monetary Fund: tightly condition new funding for South
Sudan upon making significant advancements in public financial management, oil revenue
transparency, and public procurement reforms, including as feasible for low-conditionality
Rapid Credit Facility funds; ensure that any larger Extended Credit Facility funds are only
approved after the successful completion of a Staff Monitored Program that demands
meaningful progress from South Sudan, and that the design of any new Staff Monitored
Program does not succumb to a bias of low expectations, arising from the country’s repeated
failures in previous programs.
261. The Commission recommends that private sectors actors:
(a) Conduct heightened human rights and corruption due diligence across all
subsidiaries, joint ventures, and supply chains connected to South Sudan, in line with the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and relevant OECD Guidelines; identify
and address risks of contributing to conflict financing, human rights violations, or systemic
corruption.

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(b) Prevent complicity in abuse and grand corruption by suspending or terminating

operations and partnerships with local actors—whether public or private—who are credibly
implicated in violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.
(c) Ensure that contractual, procurement, and operational practices do not
contribute to opaque revenue flows, especially those involving State-linked infrastructure or
resource extraction projects (e.g. “Oil for Roads”); require transparency and traceability of
payments and prohibit off-budget transactions.
(d) Strengthen internal governance and accountability by ensuring that boards and
senior leadership are informed of South Sudan-related risks, and by integrating these into
ESG frameworks, legal compliance systems, and public disclosures.
(e) Publicly report on human rights and anti-corruption efforts in South Sudan,
including due diligence measures taken, risk assessments conducted, and remedial steps
adopted. Engage with independent monitoring and transparency mechanisms, consult
meaningfully with civil society and the public, including through support for South Sudan to
become an implementing country of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
(f) Establish or support effective grievance mechanisms accessible to affected
communities, workers, and whistleblowers, and ensure that harms linked to company
operations are remediated.

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Annex: Response from the Government of South Sudan

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