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Who’s to Blame for Greece?
Who’s to Blame for Greece?
Austerity in Charge of Saving
a Broken Economy

Theodore Pelagidis
NR Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, USA and Professor of Economics,
University of Piraeus, Greece

and

Michael Mitsopoulos
© Theodore Pelagidis and Michael Mitsopoulos 2016
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2016 978-1-137-54919-8
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this
work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2016 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN 978-1-349-58058-3 ISBN 978-1-137-54920-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137549204
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.


To Elli, Mark and the new baby boy who has arrived the same
month as the book! (T.P.)
To Georgia and our daughter Veronica (M.M.)
Contents

List of Figures and Tables xi


About the Authors xv

1 Introduction 1
Part I The “Party Period” before the Crisis
2 The Costs and Benefits for Joining a Common
Currency with Emphasis on Weaker Member States:
The Pre-Crisis Debate 7
2.1 Potential sources of conflicts/costs:
de-synchronization of business cycles 7
2.2 Demand disturbances and trade 10
2.3 Responses to labor market rigidities 11
2.4 Shortage of money stocks for the peripheral countries 14
2.5 External imbalances 15
2.6 The effect of a monetary union on trade
between member states 16
2.7 Ten years of EMU (2000–2009):
convergence or divergence prevailed? 18
3 Greece before the Crisis: The Critical Years
in Domestic Politics 25
3.1 The discussion in the Greek Parliament ahead of the
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 26
3.1.1 References to the strategic advantages of EMU
membership and issues that relate to the common
currency area and the chances of success of the
country in it 28
3.1.2 References to the impact on employment 31
3.1.3 References to the impact on the macro-environment 31
3.1.4 References with regard to institutions, structural
reforms and the role of the state in the economy 31
3.1.5 References with regard to tax evasion
and tax reforms 34
3.1.6 References with regard to the issue of fiscal
consolidation 34

vii
viii Contents

3.2 Various other debates and key speeches in the Greek


Parliament during the term of the government that
brought the Maastricht Treaty for ratification
by the Greek Parliament 35
3.2.1 The role of Greece in Europe and the chances
of success 38
3.2.2 Employment and education 40
3.2.3 Growth enhancing structural reforms, privatizations,
and infrastructure projects and the role of the state
in the economy 40
3.2.4 Fiscal stabilization 45

4 IMF and EU Reports on Greece 56


4.1 IMF reports during the accession period (’90s) and
the 2000–2009 “golden years” 56
4.1.1 Assessment of the EMU accession 59
4.1.2 References to labor market policies 60
4.1.3 Recommendations for structural reforms
in product markets and professional services
and the content of these 62
4.1.4 References with regard to fiscal consolidation
and the content of the related initiatives 64
4.1.5 References to the reliability of statistics/extra-
budgetary expenditure items 68
4.2 The implementation of the conditionality program:
fiscal consolidation and the issue of spending cuts
vs revenue increases 68
4.2.1 Research with regard to the policy mix
of fiscal adjustments 74
4.2.2 IMF progress reports on the Greek
Conditionality Program 77
4.3 European Union bodies’ reports and decisions 80
4.3.1 Annual country specific recommendations
by the Council, and European Commission
recommendations to the Council 81
4.3.2 The decision to admit Greece to the euro area 85

Part II Greece’s Free Fall 2010–2013


5 The Troika Period Reconsidered 93
5.1 The Greek public finances and debt: a brief overview 93
Contents ix

5.2 The run up to the memorandum 101


5.3 What the memorandum initially provided 101
5.4 Implementing the memorandum as of
September 2011 and the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy 103
5.5 Incentives and unraveling the impasse 107
Appendix to Chapter 5: OECD structural indicators in
key network industries 110

6 Assessing the Intentions of the Government(s) since the


Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 117
6.1 The 1990–1993 program, design, and implementation 117
6.2 The 2010 program: design, implementation,
and comparison with the 1990–1993 approach 118
6.3 The “internal devaluation” fallacy of 2010–2012 123
6.4 The other side of the internal devaluation
fallacy – the approach to the labor market
deregulation during 2010–2012 127
6.5 The lack of a strategy to enhance growth – in Greece
and in Europe 136
6.6 The private sector death-trap: undermining the
financial sector, jeopardizing macroeconomic stability,
and questioning the European future of the country 139
6.6.1 The Private Sector Involvement (PSI) 140
6.6.2 Euro area exit 145

Part III Looking Ahead


7 Greece: Why Did the Forceful Internal Devaluation
Fail to Kick-start an Export-Led Growth? 155
7.1 Introduction 155
7.2 Employment 156
7.3 Wages and earnings 159
7.4 Labor cost indexes and exports 181
7.5 Conclusions and further remarks 192
8 Giving Greece a Chance to Succeed 195

9 How to Design a Closer and More Democratic Union 205


9.1 The compromise of the euro area: common monetary,
national fiscal, and structural policies 205
9.2 Evaluating the current structure of powers and
democratic mandates 206
x Contents

9.3 How changes in the structure of the democratic


mandates can secure a “closer and more
democratic” Union 209
9.4 The role of European parties 215
10 Conclusions 218

Afterword 225
The Greek Bail-out Drama: Is This Time Different? 225

Author Index 228


Subject Index 230
List of Figures and Tables

Figures

2.1 McKinsey presentation of lack of adjustment


mechanism in euro area 12
2.2 Labor migration in key economic areas 13
2.3 Intra-EU and intra-euro area shares of export on
total export of the two groups respectively 17
2.4 Divergence of current accounts within the EMU 19
5.1 Net revenue, primary expenditure, and interest expenditure
of Greek central government budget 94
5.2 “Interest cover” of Greek general government 96
5.3 OECD structural indicators in key network industries 114
5.4 OECD PMR indicator: Greece and average of
euro area countries that are also OECD members 115
6.1 Public and private sector employment to
population ratio, 2013 125
6.2 Tax wedge in Greece, 2014 128
6.3 Self-employed to employees ratio, 2014 130
6.4 Compensation per employee, 2014: gross compensation,
including all Social Security Contributions and value
of benefits, thousands of euro per year 131
6.5 Annual gross compensation per employee, including
all Social Security Contributions and benefits: thousands
of euros per year, 2013 132
6.6 Personal income tax (PIT) and Social Security
Contribution (SSC) revenue as % of GDP, 2012 133
6.7 Share of employment by company size class, 2013 134
6.8 Gross monthly basic wage per employee (including only
employee Social Security Contribution) per company size
class, euros per month 134

xi
xii List of Figures and Tables

6.9 Full-time employees, employed per company size class 135


6.10 Public finances structure: key revenue and expenditure
items 2013 General Government budget (billion euros) 137
7.1 Employment and unemployment (thousand of persons) 156
7.2 Total employment to population ratio: euro area and Greece 157
7.3 Employment in government and pensioners/former
government employees: 1,000 employees/pensioners 158
7.4 Compensation of employees for total economy
(% of GDP) 159
7.5 Compensation of employees, corporations (% of GDP) 160
7.6 Compensation of employees, Greece (% of GDP) 160
7.7 Compensation of employees (% of GDP, total economy
minus corporations) 161
7.8 Average gross wage per day, euros 163
7.9 Average gross wage per day (% YoY change) 164
7.10 Number of employees 165
7.11 Employment and basic salary (% YoY change) 166
7.12 Labor cost index: market activities 168
7.13 Nominal compensation per employee (thousands of
euros annually) 169
7.14 Administrative cost and gross wages and salaries of
private sector (% of GDP, 2003) 171
7.15 Regulation of product markets and corporate wage bill
(% of GDP, 2013) 172
7.16 Profit before tax to sales: non-financial corporations –
limited companies and partnerships or equivalent
legal form, 2008 173
7.17 Profit before tax to total assets: non-financial
corporations – limited companies and partnerships or
equivalent legal form, 2008 173
7.18 Distribution of employees insured at IKA per bracket
of gross monthly wage. Companies with up to 24 insured.
Full-time employment only 176
7.19 Distribution of employees insured at IKA per bracket
of gross monthly wage. Companies with 25–249 insured.
Full-time employment only 177
List of Figures and Tables xiii

7.20 Distribution of employees insured at IKA per bracket of


gross monthly wage. Companies with over 250 insured
employees. Full-time employment only 177
7.21 Distribution of employees insured at IKA per bracket
of gross monthly wage. Companies with up to 49 insured
employees. Part-time employment only 178
7.22 Deviation of pay in sector and provisions of sectorial wage
agreements in Greece for the year 2009. Difference of sector
minimum wage from basic national agreement. Euros 180
7.23 Real unit labor cost. Total economy, performance relative
to the rest of former EU-15 181
7.24 Stock to sales and road haulage regulation, 2008.
Non-financial sector private and public limited companies 182
7.25 Journeys and regulation of road freight haulage.
National transport, all own account and for hire trucks 183
7.26 Taxes on electricity for industrial use. Consumption “C”
in the 20,000 MWh<C<70,000 MWh band 184
7.27 Excise tax. Euro per unit. 2014. Consumption for
industrial use 185
7.28 Labor and energy costs as % of all costs for key energy
intensive industries 185
7.29 Exports of energy intensive and non-energy
intensive goods, Greece. Quarterly data 186
7.30 Exports of energy intensive and non-energy
intensive goods, Greece. Quarterly data 187
7.31 Exports of iron and steel products, Greece and Portugal 188
7.32 Exports except mineral fuels for Greece and Portugal.
Quarterly data 189
7.33 Exports of textiles, yarn, fabrics, apparel, clothing,
and accessories. Greece and Portugal 190
7.34 Interest rates, national difference with euro area average.
Loans to non-financial corporations 191
8.1 Deposits and financing from Greek MFIs 196
8.2 Interest rates on Greek government debt and on corporate
loans, non-financial corporations (NFC), 2009–2014 198
8.3 Debt to GDP ratio. Euro area countries, 2014. Loans
issued by MFIs and government debt 199
xiv List of Figures and Tables

8.4 Non-performing loans as a % of all loans and


unemployment, Greece 200
8.5 Accumulated provisions by Greek main
financial institutions 201
9.1 Mandates and powers of European bodies.
Current state of 2012, does not include co-decision 207
9.2 Moving in parallel mandates and powers 209
9.3 Mandates and powers of European bodies.
Proposed structure 211

Tables

4.1 Fiscal measures foreseen by the MoU and actually


implemented, according to budgeted numbers, by
the Greek government. Mid-April 2010 70
4.2 Fiscal measures foreseen in 2011 Medium Term
Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) for Greece, June 2011,
and item-by-item sum of measures immediately
legislated for implementation 71
4.3 Indicative 2011–2012 statements by officials and opinion
leaders that may have contributed to the fear of markets
about an impeding exit of Greece from the euro area 73
5.1 Macroeconomic indicators, billions of euros 95
5.2 Finances of general government 98
About the Authors

Theodore Pelagidis is a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings


Institution, USA, and Professor of Economics at the University of Piraeus,
Greece. He has also been a NATO scholar at the Center for European
Studies at Harvard University, USA; an NBG fellow at the London School
of Economics, UK; and a Fulbright professorial fellow at Columbia
University, USA. He has also served as an advisor to the International
Monetary Fund in the Independent Evaluation Office, USA.

Michael Mitsopoulos holds a PhD in Economics from Boston University,


USA. He is an economist at the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises,
Greece, and has taught at the University of Piraeus and the Economic
University of Athens, Greece. He has published in academic journals and
is the co-author with Pelagidis of Understanding the Crisis in Greece: From
Boom to Bust (2011) and of Greece: From Exit to Recovery? (2014).

xv
1
Introduction

The strategic failures in the approach to deal with the problems of the
Greek economy, namely the disproportionate internal devaluation of
the private sector and the tax base with respect to the milder internal
devaluation of the government expenditure, has certainly taken place
in the context of a country that was asked to undertake one of the most
difficult adjustments made by any country and through a deal that
appeared to be ignoring important warning signs (Mitsopoulos and
Pelagidis, 2011, 2012; Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, 2014). Essentially,
the 2010 and onward sequential deals amounted to agreeing with the
political leadership and the administration of an economy that has
been turned by the former into a quasi-soviet economy at the fringes
of free markets that they will tear down the bureaucracy that has been
established for over 30 years, while being offered the cash and support
to keep operating largely in a “business as usual” environment.
It is within such a context that there were few apparent efforts to shift
the balances in favor of the productive sector of the economy as a neces-
sary precondition for success. The lack of such an effort has been paired,
after 2010, with a number of other unfortunate policy choices, both
by the Greek government and by the creditors – the IMF, ECB, and the
European Commission. These have further burdened the prospects of
the private sector even as they kept the profligate state on life-support for
at least three years. In particular, these are (a) the gradual entrenchment
of macroeconomic imbalances as a permanent situation, (b) the delayed
PSI, and the large PSI of October 2011, as outlined in the respective
Euro Area Summits statements, and (c) the uncertainty that stems from
tying the European prospects of the whole of Greece with the insuffi-
cient willingness of the government to implement the agreed program.
Overall, the above have managed to add to the private sector of the
1
2 Who’s to Blame for Greece?

economy, in addition to the burden of persisting fiscal problems and


competitiveness deficit, the impact of a full-blown liquidity crisis. So,
the question that springs in mind after all this policy failure is identi-
cal with the title of this book: Who’s to Blame for Greece, and, more
importantly, what lessons for the future can we learn from the failures
of the past?
In this context, the first part of the book sets the theoretical con-
text in which Greek policymakers, politicians, and the public opinion
matured the decision to adhere to the single currency. In this setting,
in Chapter 2, we briefly present the relevant debate in the literature
concerning the costs and benefits of joining a currency union. This is
necessary to examine the impact of the fundamental discussion that
took place 20 years ago in the country, on the costs and benefits of get-
ting rid of the drachma and join the euro area as well as to understand
both the constraints and the opportunities that Greece’s economy has
faced since 2010.
In Chapter 3, we elaborate and analyze for the very first time in the
relevant literature, material that reviews what economic theories and
narrative shaped the understanding of Greek policymakers and politi-
cians about costs and benefits for Greece to join the single currency.
We then match this narrative with the declared policy strategy, and its
implementation, by the government that introduced the Maastricht
Treaty for ratification, in order to investigate the extent to which its
conviction that Greece could succeed to enter on equal terms as a con-
structive member country was well-founded.
In Chapter 4, we examine the IMF Director’s, and supporting staff,
reports on Greece from 1990 on, as well as the European Council
recommendations to Greece and the preceding European Commission
recommendations to the Council. We present these in order to place
them in context with the key issues raised in Chapter 3, as well as with
the recent developments in Europe and the country.
The central aim of the second part and originally of Chapter 5 is
to reconsider the troika period, focusing especially on the first three
years of the program, where the adopted policy is supposed either to
have failed or/and faced significant headwinds. We initially focus on
the Greek public finances and debt. We analyze conditions that led
to the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and we present an
analysis on what it initially provided. We follow the implementation of
the MoU and the fiscal strategy involved in it. We focus in particular
on the equilibrium between the opposition to reform and the nexus of
state sponsored privileges in the country. In the end, this analysis, and
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