9/8/25, 1:10 PM [ G.R. No. 125948.
December 29, 1998 ]
360 Phil. 852
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 125948. December 29, 1998 ]
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE PATERNO V. TAC-AN,
BATANGAS CITY AND ADORACION C. ARELLANO, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CITY TREASURER OF BATANGAS,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 36801, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Batangas City, Branch 84, in Civil Case No. 4293, which dismissed petitioners'
complaint for a business tax refund imposed by the City of Batangas.
Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387, as amended, to
contract, install and operate oil pipelines. The original pipeline concession was granted in
1967[1] and renewed by the Energy Regulatory Board in 1992.[2]
Sometime in January 1995, petitioner applied for a mayor's permit with the Office of the
Mayor of Batangas City. However, before the mayor's permit could be issued, the respondent
City Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on its gross receipts for the fiscal
year 1993 pursuant to the Local Government Code.[3] The respondent City Treasurer
assessed a business tax on the petitioner amounting to P956,076.04 payable in four
installments based on the gross receipts for products pumped at GPS-1 for the fiscal year
1993 which amounted to P181,681,151.00. In order not to hamper its operations, petitioner
paid the tax under protest in the amount of P239,019.01 for the first quarter of 1993.
On January 20, 1994, petitioner filed a letter-protest addressed to the respondent City
Treasurer, the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Please note that our Company (FPIC) is a pipeline operator with a government
concession granted under the Petroleum Act. It is engaged in the business of
transporting petroleum products from the Batangas refineries, via pipeline, to
Sucat and JTF Pandacan Terminals. As such, our Company is exempt from
paying tax on gross receipts under Section 133 of the Local Government Code of
1991 x x x x
"Moreover, Transportation contractors are not included in the enumeration of
contractors under Section 131, Paragraph (h) of the Local Government Code.
Therefore, the authority to impose tax 'on contractors and other independent
contractors' under Section 143, Paragraph (e) of the Local Government Code does
not include the power to levy on transportation contractors.
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"The imposition and assessment cannot be categorized as a mere fee authorized
under Section 147 of the Local Government Code. The said section limits the
imposition of fees and charges on business to such amounts as may be
commensurate to the cost of regulation, inspection, and licensing. Hence,
assuming arguendo that FPIC is liable for the license fee, the imposition thereof
based on gross receipts is violative of the aforecited provision. The amount of
P956,076.04 (P239,019.01 per quarter) is not commensurate to the cost of
regulation, inspection and licensing. The fee is already a revenue raising measure,
and not a mere regulatory imposition."[4]
On March 8, 1994, the respondent City Treasurer denied the protest contending that
petitioner cannot be considered engaged in transportation business, thus it cannot claim
exemption under Section 133 (j) of the Local Government Code.[5]
On June 15, 1994, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City a
complaint[6] for tax refund with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondents City of Batangas and Adoracion Arellano in her capacity as City Treasurer. In its
complaint, petitioner alleged, inter alia, that: (1) the imposition and collection of the business
tax on its gross receipts violates Section 133 of the Local Government Code; (2) the
authority of cities to impose and collect a tax on the gross receipts of "contractors and
independent contractors" under Sec. 141 (e) and 151 does not include the authority to collect
such taxes on transportation contractors for, as defined under Sec. 131 (h), the term
"contractors" excludes transportation contractors; and, (3) the City Treasurer illegally and
erroneously imposed and collected the said tax, thus meriting the immediate refund of the tax
paid.[7]
Traversing the complaint, the respondents argued that petitioner cannot be exempt from taxes
under Section 133 (j) of the Local Government Code as said exemption applies only to
"transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation by hire and common
carriers by air, land and water." Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the term
"common carrier" which refers solely to ordinary carriers such as trucks, trains, ships and the
like. Respondents further posit that the term "common carrier" under the said code pertains
to the mode or manner by which a product is delivered to its destination.[8]
On October 3, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, ruling in
this wise:
"xxx Plaintiff is either a contractor or other independent contractor.
xxx the exemption to tax claimed by the plaintiff has become unclear. It is a rule
that tax exemptions are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer, taxes being
the lifeblood of the government. Exemption may therefore be granted only by
clear and unequivocal provisions of law.
"Plaintiff claims that it is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act
387, (Exhibit A) whose concession was lately renewed by the Energy Regulatory
Board (Exhibit B). Yet neither said law nor the deed of concession grant any tax
exemption upon the plaintiff.
"Even the Local Government Code imposes a tax on franchise holders under Sec.
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137 of the Local Tax Code. Such being the situation obtained in this case
(exemption being unclear and equivocal) resort to distinctions or other
considerations may be of help:
1. That the exemption granted under Sec. 133 (j) encompasses only common
carriers so as not to overburden the riding public or commuters with taxes.
Plaintiff is not a common carrier, but a special carrier extending its services and
facilities to a single specific or "special customer" under a "special contract."
2. The Local Tax Code of 1992 was basically enacted to give more and effective
local autonomy to local governments than the previous enactments, to make them
economically and financially viable to serve the people and discharge their
functions with a concomitant obligation to accept certain devolution of powers, x
x x So, consistent with this policy even franchise grantees are taxed (Sec. 137)
and contractors are also taxed under Sec. 143 (e) and 151 of the Code."[9]
Petitioner assailed the aforesaid decision before this Court via a petition for review. On
February 27, 1995, we referred the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for consideration
and adjudication.[10] On November 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered a decision[11]
affirming the trial court's dismissal of petitioner's complaint. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1996.[12]
Hence, this petition. At first, the petition was denied due course in a Resolution dated
November 11, 1996.[13] Petitioner moved for a reconsideration which was granted by this
Court in a Resolution[14] of January 20, 1997. Thus, the petition was reinstated.
Petitioner claims that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that (1) the petitioner
is not a common carrier or a transportation contractor, and (2) the exemption sought for by
petitioner is not clear under the law.
There is merit in the petition.
A "common carrier" may be defined, broadly, as one who holds himself out to the public as
engaged in the business of transporting persons or property from place to place, for
compensation, offering his services to the public generally.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person, corporation, firm
or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public."
The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:
1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public
employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation
of goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;
2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;
3. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted
and over his established roads; and
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4. The transportation must be for hire.[15]
Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that petitioner is a
common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e.
petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons
indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and transports the
goods by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not
exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals[16]
we ruled that:
"The above article (Art. 1732, Civil Code) makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a
'sideline'). Article 1732 x x x avoids making any distinction between a person
or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the 'general public,' i.e., the general community or population,
and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment
of the general population. We think that Article 1877 deliberately refrained
from making such distinctions.
So understood, the concept of 'common carrier' under Article 1732 may be seen to
coincide neatly with the notion of 'public service,' under the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements
the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code. Under Section 13,
paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, 'public service' includes:
'every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the
Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether
permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any
common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle,
either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever
may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service,
steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop,
wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system gas,
electric light heat and power, water supply and power petroleum, sewerage
system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting
stations and other similar public services.' "(Underscoring Supplied)
Also, respondent's argument that the term "common carrier" as used in Section 133 (j) of the
Local Government Code refers only to common carriers transporting goods and passengers
through moving vehicles or vessels either by land, sea or water, is erroneous.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the definition of "common carriers" in the Civil Code
makes no distinction as to the means of transporting, as long as it is by land, water or air. It
does not provide that the transportation of the passengers or goods should be by motor
vehicle. In fact, in the United States, oil pipe line operators are considered common carriers.
[17]
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Under the Petroleum Act of the Philippines (Republic Act 387), petitioner is considered a
"common carrier." Thus, Article 86 thereof provides that:
"Art. 86. Pipe line concessionaire as a common carrier. - A pipe line shall have
the preferential right to utilize installations for the transportation of petroleum
owned by him, but is obligated to utilize the remaining transportation capacity
pro rata for the transportation of such other petroleum as may be offered by others
for transport, and to charge without discrimination such rates as may have been
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources."
Republic Act 387 also regards petroleum operation as a public utility. Pertinent portion of
Article 7 thereof provides:
"that everything relating to the exploration for and exploitation of petroleum x x
and everything relating to the manufacture, refining, storage, or transportation
by special methods of petroleum, is hereby declared to be a public utility."
(Underscoring Supplied)
The Bureau of Internal Revenue likewise considers the petitioner a "common carrier." In BIR
Ruling No. 069-83, it declared:
"x x x since [petitioner] is a pipeline concessionaire that is engaged only in
transporting petroleum products, it is considered a common carrier under
Republic Act No. 387 x x x. Such being the case, it is not subject to withholding
tax prescribed by Revenue Regulations No. 13-78, as amended."
From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that petitioner is a "common carrier" and,
therefore, exempt from the business tax as provided for in Section 133 (j), of the Local
Government Code, to wit:
"Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government
Units. - Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the
following :
xxx xxx xxx
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged
in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air,
land or water, except as provided in this Code."
The deliberations conducted in the House of Representatives on the Local Government Code
of 1991 are illuminating:
"MR. AQUINO (A). Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, we would like to proceed to page 95, line 1. It states : "SEC.121
[now Sec. 131]. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
Government Units." x x x
MR. AQUINO (A.). Thank you Mr. Speaker.
Still on page 95, subparagraph 5, on taxes on the business of transportation. This
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appears to be one of those being deemed to be exempted from the taxing powers
of the local government units. May we know the reason why the transportation
business is being excluded from the taxing powers of the local government
units?
MR. JAVIER (E.). Mr. Speaker, there is an exception contained in Section 121
(now Sec. 131), line 16, paragraph 5. It states that local government units may not
impose taxes on the business of transportation, except as otherwise provided in
this code.
Now, Mr. Speaker, if the Gentleman would care to go to page 98 of Book II, one
can see there that provinces have the power to impose a tax on business enjoying
a franchise at the rate of not more than one-half of 1 percent of the gross annual
receipts. So, transportation contractors who are enjoying a franchise would be
subject to tax by the province. That is the exception, Mr. Speaker.
What we want to guard against here, Mr. Speaker, is the imposition of taxes
by local government units on the carrier business. Local government units
may impose taxes on top of what is already being imposed by the National
Internal Revenue Code which is the so-called "common carriers tax." We do not
want a duplication of this tax, so we just provided for an exception under
Section 125 [now Sec. 137] that a province may impose this tax at a specific rate.
MR. AQUINO (A.). Thank you for that clarification, Mr. Speaker. x x x[18]
It is clear that the legislative intent in excluding from the taxing power of the local
government unit the imposition of business tax against common carriers is to prevent a
duplication of the so-called "common carrier's tax."
Petitioner is already paying three (3%) percent common carrier's tax on its gross
sales/earnings under the National Internal Revenue Code.[19] To tax petitioner again on its
gross receipts in its transportation of petroleum business would defeat the purpose of the
Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated November 29, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36801 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 90-94.
[2]Decision of the Energy Regulatory Board in ERB Case No. 92-94, renewing the Pipeline
Concession of petitioner First Philippine Industrial Corporation, formerly known as Meralco
Securities Industrial Corporation , (Rollo, pp. 95-100).
[3] Sec. 143. Tax on Business. The municipality may impose taxes on the following business:
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xxx xxx xxx
(e) On contractors and other independent contractors, in accordance with the following
schedule:
With gross receipts for the preceding Amount of Tax Per Annum
Calendar year in the amount:
xxx xxx
P2,000,000.00 or more at a rate not exceeding fifty
Percent (50%) of one (1%)
[4] Letter Protest dated January 20, 1994, Rollo, pp. 110-111.
[5] Letter of respondent City Treasurer, Rollo, p. 112.
[6] Complaint, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 51-56.
[7] Rollo, pp. 51-57.
[8] Answer, Annex "J", Rollo, pp. 122-127.
[9] RTC Decision, Rollo, pp. 58-62.
[10] Rollo, p. 84.
[11] CA-G.R. SP No.36801; Penned by Justice Jose C. De la Rama and concurred in by
Justice Jaime M. Lantin and Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro; Rollo, pp. 33-47.
[12] Rollo, p. 49.
[13] Resolution dated November 11, 1996 excerpts of which are hereunder quoted:
"The petition is unmeritorious.
"As correctly ruled by respondent appellate court, petitioner is not a common carrier as it is
not offering its services to the public.
"Art. 1732 of the Civil Code defines Common Carriers as: persons, corporations, firms or
association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both,
by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.
"We sustain the view that petitioner is a special carrier. Based on the facts on hand, it appears
that petitioner is not offering its services to the public.
"We agree with the findings of the appellate court that the claim for exemption from taxation
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must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. The present understanding of the concept of
"common carriers" does not include carriers of petroleum using pipelines. It is highly
unconventional to say that the business of transporting petroleum through pipelines involves
"common carrier" business. The Local Government Code intended to give exemptions from
local taxation to common carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving
vehicles or vessels and not through pipelines. The term common carrier under Section 133 (j)
of the Local Government Code must be given its simple and ordinary or generally accepted
meaning which would definitely not include operators of pipelines."
[14] G.R. No. 125948 (First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.)-
Considering the grounds of the motion for reconsideration, dated December 23, 1996, filed
by counsel for petitioner, of the resolution of November 11, 1996 which denied the petition
for review on certiorari, the Court Resolved:
(a) to GRANT the motion for reconsideration and to REINSTATE the petition; and
(b) to require respondent to COMMENT on the petition, within ten (10) days from notice.
[15] Agbayani, Commercial Laws of the Phil., 1983 Ed., Vol. 4, p. 5.
[16] 168 SCRA 617-618 [1998].
[17]
Giffin v. Pipe Lines, 172 Pa. 580, 33 Alt. 578; Producer Transp. Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 241 US 228, 64 L ed 239, 40 S Ct 131.
[18]Journal and Record of the House of Representatives, Fourth Regular Session, Volume 2,
pp. 87-89, September 6, 1990; Underscoring Ours.
[19] Annex "D" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 101-109.
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