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THE CORAL SEA 1942
the first carrier battle
09 10 11 12 13 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
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CONTENTS
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN 5
CHRONOLOGY 9
OPPOSING COMMANDERS 11
The IJN The US Navy
OPPOSING FLEETS 16
The IJN carrier force The US Navy carrier force Orders of battle
OPPOSING PLANS 36
The Japanese plan: The Naval General Staff vs. the Combined Fleet The American plan
THE AFTERMATH 90
FURTHER READING 94
INDEX 95
Limit of Japanese control
USSR Dec 23 Date of Japanese occupation
0 750 1,500km
Kurile
Islands
Peking
Port S E A O F J A PA N
Tientsin Arthur
CHINA KOREA JAPAN
YELLOW Tokyo
Strategic situation, May 1942
SEA Nagasaki
Nanking
Shanghai
EAST CHINA Bonin
S E A Ryukyu Islands Midway Island
Okinawa Islands
Iwo Jima Marcus Island
Canton Formosa
P A C I F I C
Hawaiian
Hong Kong
PHILIPPINES SEA Pearl Harbor Islands
Dec 25 O C E A N
Hainan Wake Island Attacked Dec 7
Bataan Mariana Islands Dec 23
Apr 8 LUZON
FRENCH Manila Tinian Saipan Johnston
INDOCHINA Corregidor PHILIPPINES Guam Marshall
Saigon May 7 Leyte Dec 10 Islands
SOUTH
CHINA MINDANAO Palau
May 7 Islands Truk Palmyra
SEA
Caroline Islands
5
After Pearl Harbor and up until this development rendered the IJN’s pre-war calculations irrelevant. The IJN
the battle of the Coral Sea, was also built for a decisive clash of dreadnoughts for mastery of the Pacific,
the Pacific Fleet’s carriers
but this clash would never occur. However, with its decided edge in aircraft
engaged in a number of raids
on Japanese-held islands. carriers, the IJN could now conduct a war of expansion with the hopes that
The offensive strategy was it could construct an unassailable position in the Pacific.
the brainchild of Admiral King, Japanese expansion in the Pacific was conducted under a plan agreed to
but did little damage to the
by the IJN and Army. This called for a series of sequenced operations
Japanese. Yorktown is shown
here on February 6, 1942, designed to bring key areas under Japanese control in order to construct
returning to Pearl Harbor after the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Once these areas were
the Marshalls–Gilberts raid. consolidated and defended, Japan would be in a good position, according to
This view is taken from the plan, to negotiate a peace with the United States which would be
Enterprise and show’s
Yorktown’s crew at quarters
unprepared and unwilling to pay the price required to remove Japan from
in dress whites as the ship her new conquests. As laid out by Imperial Headquarters, the initial part of
enters port. (US Naval the war was divided into two “operational stages.” The first operational stage
Historical Center) called for the occupation of the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies,
Burma and Rabaul. One of the hallmarks of the early campaigns was the
virtually uncontested success of the IJN’s carrier force or Kido Butai.
Following the Pearl Harbor operation, the Kido Butai was used to cover the
capture of Rabaul in January 1942 and the Dutch East Indies in February. In
April, Japanese carriers moved into the Indian Ocean to conduct a rampage
against British naval forces and shipping.
As the Japanese sought to achieve their first operational stage objectives,
Allied naval forces were unable to stop the Japanese advance. In the first large
6
surface ship action of the war at the battle of the Java Sea, an Allied naval
force was shattered by a Japanese force of similar size demonstrating the
superiority of the IJN’s destroyer and cruiser forces. Not wanting to be totally
defensive, but unable to oppose the massed Japanese carriers, the US Navy
began a series of carrier strikes in the Central Pacific. The first action was
conducted by the carriers Enterprise and Yorktown against the Marshall and
Gilbert islands on February 1, 1942. The Enterprise hit targets in the northern
Marshalls while the Yorktown hit targets in the Marshalls and in the northern
Gilberts. Damage to the Japanese was light, despite the claims of US aviators.
The Enterprise followed with strikes on Wake Island on February 24 and
Marcus Island on March 4, 1942. The first US carrier action with strategic
results was the Lae–Salamaua raid on March 10, 1942, by the carriers
Yorktown and Lexington. Following Japanese landings at these points on the
island of New Guinea, aircraft from the two carriers hit Japanese shipping
Among the Japanese ships
remaining in the area. Again, the Americans made claims of inflicting great suffering damage during
damage, and this time there was some substance to the claims. The damage the Lae–Salamaua raid was
inflicted by the two carriers was sufficient to make the Japanese pause the seaplane tender Kiyokawa
until they could muster a carrier escort for their next move. Thus, the Maru, shown here. The arrow
just visible points to bomb
proposed operation against the strategic airfield at Port Moresby on New damage on the ship. Several
Guinea was postponed until the Japanese could provide their own carriers to floatplanes are also visible.
support the operation. Kiyokawa Maru’s damage
Meanwhile, the carriers Enterprise and Hornet were committed to the prevented her from taking part
in the MO Operation, but her
raid on Tokyo, which was conducted on April 16. Whatever the psychological aircraft embarked on seaplane
results were for American morale or for Japanese fears of further raids on tender Kamikawa Maru.
their homeland, the commitment of half of the Pacific Fleet’s carriers to this (US Naval Historical Center)
7
The March 10 raid by carriers operation meant that they could not respond to the next Japanese offensive
Lexington and Yorktown move in the South Pacific in early May. During the second operational stage,
on Japanese shipping off
the Japanese envisioned further expansion into eastern New Guinea, New
Lae–Salamaua was the heaviest
damage yet inflicted on the Britain, the Fijis and Samoa in the South Pacific. With the Japanese now ready
IJN in a single day in the war. to execute these plans, the unavailability of the Enterprise and Hornet meant
Despite extravagant claims that the commander of the Pacific Fleet could deploy only two carriers to the
by American aviators, actual
South Pacific by the time the Japanese offensive was predicted to begin in
Japanese losses were heavy
enough with an auxiliary early May. With part of the Kido Butai committed to support the South
cruiser, one transport and a Pacific operation, the scene was set for history’s first carrier battle.
converted minesweeper sunk.
The 8,624-ton auxiliary cruiser
Kongo Maru is shown sinking
in this shot taken by a VS-5
Dauntless from Yorktown.
The American raid set in
motion a chain of events
leading to the carrier battle
of the Coral Sea. (US Naval
Historical Center)
8
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CHRONOLOGY
1941
December 7 Japanese carrier force (Kido Butai) attacks Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii, and cripples the Pacific Fleet’s battle
line. No American carriers are in port.
1942
January 23 Kido Butai supports Japanese seizure of Rabaul
on island of New Britain.
February 1 US carriers conduct Marshalls–Gilberts raid.
February 19 Kido Butai raids Darwin in northern Australia.
February 24 The US carrier Enterprise conducts raid on Wake Island.
February 25 to March 10 Kido Butai supports invasion of Java in Dutch
East Indies.
February 27 Battle of Java Sea; Allied surface forces unable
to prevent invasion of Java.
March 4 The Enterprise raids Marcus Island.
March 10 American carrier aircraft strike Japanese naval
forces at Lae and Salamaua on New Guinea.
Further Japanese expansion into South Pacific
halted until IJN can provide carrier cover.
March 26 to April 18 Kido Butai conducts Indian Ocean Raid.
April 16 The carriers Enterprise and Hornet conduct
Tokyo raid. This means they will be unavailable
for operations in the Coral Sea when Japanese
launch next offensive in South Pacific.
April 29 Tulagi Invasion Force departs Rabaul.
April 29 MO Main Body departs Truk.
May 1 MO Carrier Striking Force departs Truk.
May 2 MO Carrier Striking Force unable to deliver fighter
aircraft to Rabaul.
May 3 Tulagi occupied by Japanese.
9
May 3 MO Carrier Striking Force fails in its second attempt
to deliver fighter aircraft to Rabaul; falls two days
behind schedule.
May 4 The carrier Yorktown raids Japanese invasion
shipping off Tulagi.
May 4 MO Invasion Force departs Rabaul.
May 5 MO Carrier Striking Force enters the Coral Sea;
US carriers located south of Guadalcanal.
May 6 1030hrs Japanese flying boat spots US carriers; MO Carrier
Striking Force unable to react.
May 7 0722hrs Shokaku search aircraft reports US carriers south
of MO Carrier Striking Force.
0815hrs US carrier aircraft report two Japanese carriers north
of Misima Island.
0900hrs Japanese strike reaches area of reported carrier
contact and finds only an oiler and a destroyer.
1000hrs Japanese carrier dive-bombers sink a destroyer;
oiler damaged and sinks days later.
1110hrs American carrier aircraft locate and attack the
Japanese light carrier Shoho.
1135hrs The Shoho sinks after massive bomb and torpedo
damage with heavy loss of life.
May 8 0820hrs MO Carrier Striking Force spotted by American
carrier aircraft.
0822hrs American carriers sighted by Japanese carrier aircraft.
0925hrs US carrier air strikes depart.
0930hrs Japanese carrier air strike departs.
1100hrs Yorktown aircraft begin dive-bombing attack on the
Japanese carrier Shokaku.
1105hrs First of two bomb hits on the Shokaku; Japanese
carrier is not sunk but is forced to leave battle.
1118hrs Japanese carrier torpedo planes attack the Yorktown
with no success.
1118hrs Japanese carrier torpedo planes attack the Lexington.
1120hrs First of two torpedoes hits the Lexington.
1121hrs Japanese carrier dive-bombers attack the Lexington
and score two hits. Damage is light.
1124hrs Japanese carrier dive-bombers attack the Yorktown
scoring a single hit. Damage is moderate, but the
Yorktown can continue to operate aircraft.
1142hrs Lexington aircraft attack the Shokaku. One additional
bomb hit is scored.
1315hrs Fletcher decides to retire; TF-17 moves south.
1620hrs Inoue postpones MO Operation.
1952hrs The Lexington sinks as a result of gasoline vapor
explosions caused by torpedo damage.
10
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
THE IJN
The most important figure in determining Japanese naval strategy was
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. Yamamoto was a complex individual known
for his aggressive nature and gambler’s instincts. He had been an early convert
to the rising importance of naval air power and had commanded the carrier
Akagi and then a carrier division. Unusual for an IJN officer, he had spent
significant time in the US between the wars and had first-hand opportunity
to observe and respect America’s tremendous industrial potential. Yamamoto
was appointed commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet in September
1939. Although he was not in favor of going to war with the US, his strategic
concepts helped shape the early course of the conflict. Despite intense
opposition, he was the driving force behind the Pearl Harbor operation. By
early 1942, Yamamoto’s primacy in shaping Japanese naval strategy was
assured. Admiral Nagano Osami, Chief of the Naval General Staff, was the
nominal head of the IJN and should have been its primary figure for shaping
strategy, but the undisputed success of Yamamoto’s Pearl Harbor gamble and
his readiness to threaten to resign in order to get his way made him the real
arbiter of Japanese naval strategy. Despite his opposition to further operations
in the South Pacific, which he viewed as contrary to his preferred Central
Pacific drive in order to bring the US Pacific Fleet to a decisive battle,
Yamamoto grudgingly gave his approval to the attack on Port Moresby and
even contributed a significant proportion of the Kido Butai. This act was to
have massive consequences for not only the Coral Sea battle, but also for the
subsequent battle of Midway.
Vice Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi was commander of the 4th Fleet, also
know as the South Sea Force. He was the former chief of the Aeronautical
Department and was therefore fully aware of the role aircraft now played in
naval warfare. He aggressively pushed to expand Japan’s operations in the
South Pacific and as such, he was the designer of the Japanese operations into
the Coral Sea.
Rear Admiral Takagi Takeo was commander of the MO Carrier Striking
Force. He was promoted to vice admiral during the battle with an effective
date of May 1. Early in his career he was a submarine specialist, but in 1937
transitioned to the surface navy. He gained flag rank in November 1938 and
was appointed commander of the 5th Cruiser Division (which consisted of the
IJN’s four powerful Myoko-class units) in September 1941. In this capacity, he
was the commander of the Japanese covering force that engaged and defeated
11
Allied forces in the battle of the Java Sea on
February 27. By the time of the Coral Sea
operation, he remained as commander of
the 5th Cruiser Division and, when this
force was assigned to the MO Operation,
he also became commander of the Carrier
Striking Force by virtue of the fact that he
was senior to the commander of the 5th
Carrier Division. Because Takagi’s cruisers
were never assigned to work with the IJN’s
carrier force during the early part of the war,
Takagi had no experience with carriers. The
unfamiliarity of Takagi and his staff with
carrier operations led him to delegate full
authority for carrier operations to Hara, the
commander of the 5th Carrier Division.
When it came to the carrier battle phase
of the Coral Sea battle, Rear Admiral Hara
Chuichi, commander of the 5th Carrier
Division, was the most important Japanese
command figure. His fiery nature gave
him the nickname “King Kong.” He was a
surface warfare officer who had gained
flag rank in November 1939. However, in
September 1941, he was given command of
the 5th Carrier Division consisting of the
IJN’s two newest and most modern carriers.
The 5th Carrier Division was assigned to
Vice Admiral Takagi Takeo the Kido Butai and took part in the Pearl Harbor attack and the Indian Ocean
was charged with the most raid. Thus by May 1942, Hara had accumulated a wealth of carrier experience
important role in the MO
in a short time.
Operation as commander of
the MO Carrier Striking Force. Commander of the MO Main Body was Rear Admiral Goto Aritomo. He
He squandered several chances had begun the war as commander of Cruiser Squadron 6 (consisting of the
to deal a devastating blow IJN’s four oldest heavy cruisers of the Furutaka and Aoba classes) and had
to the American carriers
conducted operations against Guam, Wake and Rabaul.
and ultimately failed either to
protect the Invasion Force or The captains of the two primary Japanese carriers present at Coral
destroy the American carriers. Sea were not aviators as was customary in the IJN. Yokogawa Ichihei
After the Coral Sea, he was commanded the carrier Zuikaku and Jojima Takaji commanded Shokaku.
assigned secondary commands
until June 1943 when he was
given command of the 6th THE US NAVY
Fleet (submarines). He was
killed on Saipan in July 1944. The paramount figure behind all US naval strategy during World War II was
(US Naval Institute) Ernest J. King. He began his naval career in 1901 upon graduation from
the US Naval Academy. His early duties featured both surface ship and
submarine billets until he transferred to naval aviation in 1926. He earned his
wings in 1927, and assumed command of the carrier Lexington in 1930. In
1933, he was promoted to flag rank and was assigned to the Bureau of
Aeronautics as its chief. By 1938, he had assumed the rank of vice admiral
and was appointed Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force. Much to his disgust,
his career looked to be essentially over when he was posted to the General
Board (an advisory position seen as a dead end) instead of being selected as
Chief of Naval Operations in June 1939.
12
After a brief period of exile, in January 1941, King’s undisputed toughness
and leadership skills were recognized and he was appointed as the commander
of the Atlantic Fleet. In the command shake-up after Pearl Harbor, King gained
more authority as the Commander-in-Chief US Fleet (COMINCH). In March,
he was also appointed as Chief of Naval Operations, giving him ultimate
authority over all US naval strategy and operations. With this sweeping
authority, he quickly sought to expand the Navy’s freedom of action in the
Pacific, which under the “Germany First” strategy was clearly defined as a
secondary theater. It was Ernest King in his position as COMINCH that drove
South Pacific strategy in 1941 and into 1942, not the commander of the Pacific
Fleet. He was determined to fight for the South Pacific and to begin offensive
operations as soon as possible. He did not think that holding key areas in the
South Pacific dictated that he conduct a passive defense.
The commander of the US Pacific Fleet, effective December 31, 1941, was
Chester Nimitz. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1905 and spent
the bulk of his early career associated with submarines. His calm, determined
demeanor saw him selected over many more senior admirals to assume the
role of Pacific Fleet commander in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor disaster.
13
On April 3, Nimitz was appointed as commander-in-
chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas (including the North
Pacific, Central and South Pacific Areas) in addition
to his duties as commander of the Pacific Fleet. This
meant that Nimitz was responsible for the execution
of King’s plans to launch offensive operations as soon
as possible in the South Pacific region. However, the
new command arrangement was not as clean as it
appeared. King had set it up so that Nimitz exercised
direct control of the Central and North Pacific, but
for the South Pacific he had to share command with
a Commander, South Pacific Area and Force (Vice
Admiral Robert Ghormley). However, by the time of
the Coral Sea battle, Ghormley had not arrived so
Nimitz exercised authority in the South Pacific.
The role Nimitz played in the lead-up to Coral
Sea has been overlooked. After a slow start as
commander of the Pacific Fleet, and subjected to
constant meddling from King, he seemed unable to
assert control of events. By April, things changed.
Now his natural aggressiveness began to assert itself
and he showed no reluctance to take risks. In response
to continued Japanese interest in further expansion in
the South Pacific, he pressed King to deploy a second
carrier to the region. In an April 25–27 meeting with
King, he proposed the bold step of deploying all of the
Pacific Fleet’s carriers to the South Pacific to set up a
major carrier battle. In the end, this bold course of
action was approved, but the second pair of carriers
could not reach the scene until mid-May.
Frank Jack Fletcher in the The most important American naval command personality in the battle
uniform of a vice admiral in was Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. He was a graduate of the US Naval
September 1942. Despite
Academy class of 1906 and his initial experience was in destroyers. In 1915,
criticism from many quarters,
he was the victor at the battle during the US occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico, he was awarded the Medal
of the Coral Sea and the first of Honor. By the onset of war, he commanded Cruiser Division Six, one of
Allied naval commander to the Scouting Force’s three divisions of heavy cruisers. His orders to assume
inflict a strategic defeat on
command of the 12 heavy cruisers of the Scouting Force were interrupted by
the Japanese Navy during
the Pacific War. (US Naval the start of the war. Prior to the war, Fletcher had no experience with
Historical Center) aviation. His attempts to transfer to naval aviation were rejected because
of bad eyesight. Despite his lack of aviation experience, by the time of
Coral Sea, he was one of the US Navy’s most seasoned carrier commanders
by virtue of several months’ experience. In this early point of the war, it
was not unusual for non-aviators to command carrier task forces; in fact,
this remained commonplace up through November 1942. Fletcher was and
remains somewhat of a controversial figure. Both during and after the war,
he was criticized for lack of aggressiveness, most notably during the aborted
relief operation to Wake Island in December 1941 and in the immediate
aftermath of the Guadalcanal landing in August 1942. On balance, it is clear
that Fletcher was not afraid of taking risks, but only those he judged could
exact a greater price from the enemy. It is interesting to note that the only
carrier battle in 1942 that resulted in an American defeat was the only battle
fought under a commander other than Fletcher.
14
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