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The Rise of Corpor ate Religious Libert y
The Rise of Corporate Religious
Liberty

Edited by Micah Schwartzman

Chad Flanders
and Zoë Robinson

1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of
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You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The rise of corporate religious liberty / edited by Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, Zoë Robinson.
  pages cm
Includes index.
ISBN 978-0-19-026252-5 ((hardback) : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-19-026253-2 ((pbk.) : alk. paper)
1. Freedom of religion—United States. 2. Corporation law—United States. 3. Corporations—
United States—Religious aspects. 4. Corporations, Religious—Law and legislation—United States.
5. Hobby Lobby (Firm) 6. Religious pluralism—United States. I. Schwartzman, Micah Jacob, 1976-
editor. II. Flanders, Chad, editor. III. Robinson, Zoë editor.
KF4783.R57 2016
342.7308'52—dc23
2015020690

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

Note to Readers
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the
subject matter covered. It is based upon sources believed to be accurate and reliable and is intended
to be current as of the time it was written. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not
engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional services. If legal advice or other expert
assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Also, to
confirm that the information has not been affected or changed by recent developments, traditional
legal research techniques should be used, including checking primary sources where appropriate.

(Based on the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the

American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations.)

You may order this or any other Oxford University Press publication
by visiting the Oxford University Press website at www.oup.com
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Contributors xi
Introduction xiii
Chad Flanders, Micah Schwartzman, and Zoë Robinson

Part one | From Religious Liberty to Freedom of the Church

1. Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience 3
Kent Greenawalt

2. The Jurisdictional Conception of Church Autonomy 19

Steven D. Smith

3. The Freedom of the Church: (Toward) An Exposition, Translation, and Defense 39

Richard W. Garnett

4. Religious Corporations and Disestablishment, 1780–1840 63

Sarah Barringer Gordon

5. W
 hy Churches (and, Possibly, the Tarpon Bay Women’s Blue Water Fishing Club) Can
Discriminate 77
Lawrence Sager

6. Religious Organizations and the Analogy to Political Parties 103

Chad Flanders

Part two | From Freedom of the Church to Corpor ate Religious

Liberty
7. Hobby Lobby: Its Flawed Interpretive Techniques and Standards of Application 125
Kent Greenawalt

v
vi Contents
8. Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby 149
Elizabeth Pollman

9. Hosanna-Tabor after Hobby Lobby 173

Zoë Robinson

10. Lessons from the Free Speech Clause 193

Frederick Schauer

11. Religious Institutionalism—Why Now? 207

Paul Horwitz and Nelson Tebbe

Part three | Hobby Lobby ’s Implications

12. The Campaign against Religious Liberty 231
Douglas Laycock

13. B
 argaining for Religious Accommodations: Same-Sex Marriage and LGBT Rights
after Hobby Lobby 257
Robin Fretwell Wilson

14. Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective 285

Christopher C. Lund

15. Healthcare Exemptions and the Future of Corporate Religious Liberty 305
Elizabeth Sepper

16. Of Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby’s Puzzling Footnote 37 323

Frederick Mark Gedicks and Rebecca G. Van Tassell

Part four | Challenges to Corpor ate Religious Liberty

17. Some Realism about Corporate Rights 345
Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman

18. Religious Exemptions and the Limited Relevance of Corporate Identity 373
Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle

19. Freedom of the Church and Our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the Social
Contract 399
Robin West
 Contents vii
20. Change, Dissent, and the Problem of Consent in Religious Organizations 419
B. Jessie Hill

21. The New Religious Institutionalism Meets the Old Establishment Clause 441
Gregory P. Magarian

22. Religion and the Roberts Court: The Limits of Religious Pluralism in
Constitutional Law 465
Mark Tushnet

Index 479
 Acknowledgments

This book originated with a conference hosted by the DePaul University College
of Law. We thank the DePaul College of Law Center for Church-State Studies for sup-
porting our conference and for providing additional funding to facilitate work on
this volume. We also acknowledge the support of the St. Louis University School of
Law and the University of Virginia School of Law.
We have benefited greatly from discussions with our many contributors and with
numerous colleagues at our home institutions. We also thank the original conference
participants, including Susan Bandes, Zachary Calo, Caroline Corbin, David Franklin,
John Inazu, Andrew Koppelman, Brian Leiter, Jacob Levy, Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli,
James Nelson, and Paul Weithman.
For excellent research and editorial assistance, we are grateful to Jeff Bowling, Matt
Brooker, Claire Condro, Clint Cowen, David Crockett, Antonio Elias, Charles Gamper,
Carrington Giammittorio, Jared Kelson, Jad Khazem, Sarah Mitchell, Lea Patterson,
K. Ross Powell, Rachel Wade, and Julie Wolf from the University of Virginia School of
Law; Eric Langston, Kristi Mankowske, Samantha Odyniec, and Angela Oldham from
the DePaul College of Law; Katherine Garceau from the University of Chicago Law
School; and Nilda Vassalo and Joe Welling from the St. Louis University School of Law.
Micah Schwartzman gives special thanks to Leslie Kendrick and to Solly, Abie,
and Susie.
Chad Flanders is grateful to Lindsey Ehret, and to his parents.
Zoë Robinson is thankful to Michael Robinson and to Georgia, for the little gifts
of time to work on this project.

ix
 Contributors

Chad Flanders is Associate Professor of Law at the St. Louis University School of Law.
Richard W. Garnett is Paul J. Schierl/Fort Howard Corporation Professor of Law,
Concurrent Professor of Political Science, and Director, Program on Church, State
and Society at Notre Dame Law School.
Frederick Mark Gedicks is Guy Anderson Chair and Professor of Law at Brigham
Young University Law School.
Sarah Barringer Gordon is Arlin M. Adams Professor of Constitutional Law and
Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Kent Greenawalt is University Professor at Columbia Law School.
B. Jessie Hill is Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
Paul Horwitz is Gordon Rosen Professor of Law at the University of Alabama School
of Law.
Douglas Laycock is Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of
Religious Studies at the University of Virginia, and Alice McKean Young Regents
Chair in Law Emeritus at the University of Texas at Austin.
Christopher C. Lund is Associate Professor of Law at the Wayne State University
School of Law.
Ira C. Lupu is F. Elwood and Eleanor Davis Professor Emeritus of Law at George
Washington University Law School.
Gregory P. Magarian is Professor of Law at Washington University School of Law in
St. Louis.
Elizabeth Pollman is Associate Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
Zoë Robinson is Professor of Law at the DePaul University College of Law.

xi
xii Contributors
Lawrence Sager is Alice Jane Drysdale Sheffield Regents Chair at the University of
Texas School of Law.
Frederick Schauer is David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at
the University of Virginia School of Law.
Richard Schragger is Perre Bowen Professor of Law at the University of Virginia
School of Law.
Micah Schwartzman is Edward F. Howrey Professor of Law at the University of
Virginia School of Law.
Elizabeth Sepper is Associate Professor of Law at Washington University School
of Law.
Steven D. Smith is Warren Distinguished Professor of Law and Co-Executive Director
of the Institute for Law and Religion and the Institute for Law and Philosophy at
the University of San Diego School of Law.
Nelson Tebbe is Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School and Visiting Professor of
Law at Cornell Law School.
Mark Tushnet is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
Robert W. Tuttle is David R. and Sherry Kirschner Berz Research Professor of Law
and Religion at the George Washington University Law School.
Rebecca G. Van Tassell is a Law Clerk for the U.S. Court of Appeals.
Robin West is Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy at Georgetown
University Law Center.
Robin Fretwell Wilson is Roger and Stephany Joslin Professor of Law and Director
of the Family Law and Policy Program at the University of Illinois College of Law.
 Introduction
Chad Flanders, Micah Schwartzman, and Zoë Robinson

Most of the chapters in this book began as presentations at a conference on reli-

gious institutions held a few years before this book’s publication. In terms of the
relationship between law and religion, that was ages ago. Some of our contributors,
to be sure, speculated about what the case of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, as it was styled
on its way up to the Supreme Court, might hold, and scholars were already grappling
with some of the themes that the case would bring front and center.1 But like other
landmark Supreme Court cases, Hobby Lobby has now become a symbol for some-
thing larger—about the role of corporations in constitutional law, about the role of
religion in the United States, and about the confluence of the two.
This book is about the rise of corporate religious liberty in American law. Hobby
Lobby is the start of something, but it was also the culmination of a growing move-
ment of legal scholars, who advocated for what might be called a “corporate turn” in
law and religion. Of course, the term “corporate” has many meanings. Here we use it
both generally to describe any organized body of people—groups, associations, and
organizations—and, more specifically, to refer to those entities that have incorpo-
rated under the law.2 Another way to describe this turn is to emphasize the rights of
religious institutions. Some of our contributors refer to this movement as the “new
religious institutionalism.” Whether we talk about corporate religious liberty or

1
723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “corporate” variously as “united in one body,” “[f]‌orming one
body constituted of many individuals,” and “[o]f or belonging to a body politic, or corporation, or to a
body of person,” but also its noun form as a “large company, a corporation.”

xiii
xiv Introduction
religious institutionalism, however, the central focus of this book is the development
of the law, and the scholarship surrounding it, as courts moved initially to protect
churches and affiliated organizations and, from there, to recognizing the rights of
for-profit corporations.
While the Hobby Lobby litigation was proceeding, our original conference on reli-
gious institutions focused on another case recently decided by the Supreme Court.
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 3 a Lutheran church
had fired one of its schoolteachers, Cheryl Perich, after she threatened to file suit for
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Court faced the ques-
tion whether churches and affiliated organizations, such as religious schools, could
assert a “ministerial exception,” preventing application of antidiscrimination laws to
their decisions about who can serve as a religious leader in their communities. In a
unanimous decision, the Court affirmed the existence of a constitutionally grounded
ministerial exception. The Justices agreed that “the text of the First Amendment
itself … gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”4 Moreover,
the Court held that when those rights involve an “internal church decision,” such as
the hiring and firing of ministers, the government may not interfere with them, even
to apply otherwise neutral and generally applicable civil rights laws.
Hosanna-Tabor was a significant victory for religious institutions, and was imme-
diately recognized as such. But it was not clear how far the constitutional protections
recognized by the Court would extend. The case left open important questions about
which organizations are protected by the ministerial exception. The Justices also
expressed a range of views about who counts as a “minister.” But the larger ques-
tion emerging from Hosanna-Tabor was whether the Court would find that the First
Amendment protects only churches and affiliated organizations, or whether it would
be possible for other types of entities, including nonprofit and for-profit corpora-
tions, to assert rights of religious freedom.
It did not take long for the Supreme Court to answer this question and to move
from protecting churches to protecting corporations more generally. Two years after
deciding Hosanna-Tabor, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,5 the Court declared
that a for-profit corporation could assert a right to religious free exercise under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).6
The facts of Hobby Lobby are by now familiar. A large business that purported
to operate according to religious principles, or at least to reflect the religious faith
of its owners and directors, challenged the “contraception mandate” of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act,7 which requires employers to provide free access
to contraception as part of their health insurance coverage. As a threshold matter,

3
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
4
Id. at 706.
5
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
6
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b).
7
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
 Introduction xv
the Court determined that closely held, for-profit corporations count as “persons”
under RFRA, which means that they can assert its protections just as any natural
person would. The Court also held that the contraception mandate imposed a “sub-
stantial burden” on the corporation’s exercise of religion. RFRA requires the govern-
ment to show that any law imposing such a burden must be the “least restrictive
means” of achieving a “compelling interest.” Applying this test, the Court held that
while the government may have a compelling interest in promoting women’s health,
the contraception mandate was not the “least restrictive means” of achieving it.
Hobby Lobby was thus entitled to a religious exemption from regulations requiring it
to pay for contraception to which it objected on religious grounds.
Hobby Lobby reflected—and expanded—the Court’s jurisprudence with respect
to religious activities within groups, associations, and organizations. But it also
reflected an interest in the constitutional rights of business corporations. In this
sense, Hobby Lobby may be seen as the religious counterpart to the Court’s contro-
versial decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 8 which held that cor-
porations are protected by the freedom of speech in challenging campaign finance
regulations. In recognizing the free exercise rights of corporations, Hobby Lobby may
have broader implications for corporate law and, more generally, for how we think
about the moral and legal status of corporations, including whether they count as
“persons” for purposes of asserting various rights. Thus, although much of this book
is focused on matters of religious liberty, it is also important to address the business
side of Hobby Lobby. In explaining the rise of corporate religious liberty, we need an
account of how religious liberty extends not only to groups, organizations, and asso-
ciations, but also to commercial enterprises, including large for-profit corporations
like Hobby Lobby.

1. From Individual Liberty to Freedom of the Church

To see how corporate claims of religious freedom have risen in prominence, we can
start with the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith,9 which has
been severely criticized for undermining the constitutional free exercise rights of
individuals. In the decades preceding Smith, the Court had applied a stringent form
of judicial review to laws that burdened religious free exercise, whether directly or
indirectly. But in Smith, the Court rejected that standard of review. It held that indi-
viduals are not entitled to exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws
that only incidentally burden religious beliefs and practices. Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia held that to allow each person to follow his religious beliefs in violation
of a general law would be “to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”10 In

8
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
9
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
10
Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879)).
xvi Introduction
announcing this rule, however, Justice Scalia noted an exception for a line of cases
involving religious authorities deciding matters of theological controversy, especially
in church property disputes. The state, he said, could not take sides in disagreements
over religious doctrine, for example, by choosing one interpretation of a religion’s
sacred texts over another.11
Across the political and ideological spectrum, the Smith decision was widely viewed
as a catastrophe for religious freedom. But some saw hope in the form of claims on
behalf of religious institutions. If churches and other religious organizations were to
be free from judicial scrutiny in controversies over religious doctrine, then perhaps
new and possibly more expansive claims for religious freedom could be built on that
foundation. In particular, the ruling in Smith did not seem to foreclose what had been
recognized previously in lower courts: a so-called “ministerial exception” that gave
houses of worship wide latitude in hiring and firing their religious leaders.
In the aftermath of Smith, scholars of law and religion focused increasingly on the
rights of religious institutions and not merely on those of religious individuals. In devel-
oping theories of institutional liberty, they drew on a diversity of sources. Perhaps most
importantly, Catholic theology has long held that the “church” has a special status in
society. Appealing to the doctrine of libertas ecclesiae, or “freedom of the church,” some
argued that in matters of internal governance, the state should be strongly deferential
toward the church. Related to this Catholic emphasis on the freedom of the church is
the Calvinist doctrine of “sphere sovereignty,” according to which governmental and
religious institutions have independent domains within which to exercise their respec-
tive authority. Building on this idea, some scholars outside the Catholic tradition argued
that while the demands of church and state might occasionally intersect, making for
hard choices, each institution ought to be treated as sovereign within its own sphere.
At the limit, the argument that churches are “autonomous,” or that religious insti-
tutions are “sovereign,” is one about legal jurisdiction. Under this view, the church is
analogous to a separate nation, so that dealing with a church is not a matter of apply-
ing domestic law, but rather of negotiating with an independent sovereign entity.
The church deals with its citizens on its own terms and with its own laws, and if, for
example, the United States wants to apply its law to the church, it must approach
the church as if it were petitioning, say, France or Mexico, for extradition of a fugi-
tive. This is the extreme instance of deferring to churches in their self-governance.
Within their sphere or jurisdiction, churches and their laws are sovereign or supreme.
Proponents of freedom of the church found their views vindicated to a surprising
extent by the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor. As noted above,
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the First Amendment gives “special solicitude
to the rights of religious organizations.”12 This use of the phrase “religious organiza-
tions” was more than a little surprising. The text of the First Amendment, after all,

11
Id. at 877.
12
132 S. Ct. at 706.
 Introduction xvii
refers to “religion,” not to individuals or organizations. It does not specify whether
it is concerned with the solitary believer, the church, or the corporation. For the
Court to single out religious organizations appeared to validate the idea that Smith
left open the possibility of recognizing institutional or corporate liberties, even as it
largely foreclosed the free exercise rights of individuals. Those scholars who advo-
cated for the ideas of libertas ecclesiae, church autonomy, and sphere sovereignty had
good reason to give Hosanna-Tabor a warm reception. More than any prior decision, it
provided a legal foundation for their views.

2. From Freedom of the Church to Corpor ate Liberty

As the changes in law and religion described above were unfolding, on a seemingly
separate track, another area of First Amendment law took its own corporate turn. In
Citizens United, the Supreme Court upheld a challenge to campaign finance regula-
tions that turned in part on whether corporations have the power to “speak,” such
that their voices, like those of natural persons, are entitled to protection under the
Free Speech Clause.13 Relying on an earlier precedent, the Court ruled that corpo-
rations can indeed speak and that audiences have an interest in hearing their con-
tributions to political discourse. The Court’s decision freed corporations to make
campaign expenditures with the same constitutional protections afforded to natural
persons.
Citizens United set off a fierce debate about the metaphysical, moral, and legal
status of corporations. Are corporations “persons” who can exercise moral and legal
rights? Or are they merely aggregations of individuals, or otherwise useful legal fic-
tions? These questions, which so dominated Anglo-American jurisprudence a century
ago, re-emerged as matters of central concern in debates about the First Amendment.
Thus, when numerous for-profit corporations asserted that they are “persons”
within the meaning of the RFRA and therefore entitled to its protections, it was no
surprise that their claims generated intense controversy. The businesses challenging
the contraception mandate, including Hobby Lobby, responded to skepticism about
their claims by noting that the Obama Administration had already approved religious
accommodations for nonprofit corporations. The focus of litigation shifted from
whether a corporation could “exercise” religion in any meaningful sense—hardly
anyone doubted that a church could do so—to the more specific question whether
for-profit corporations could assert claims of religious liberty.
Ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby, the Court held that corporations are indeed “per-
sons” within the statutory meaning of RFRA. In explaining the majority’s reasoning,
Justice Alito described the idea of corporate personhood as a legal fiction, whose
purpose is “to provide protection for human beings.”14 Corporations are not persons

13
588 U.S. 310 (2010).
14
Hobby Lobby 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
xviii Introduction
in the sense of having their own rights and interests, but are rather legal forms and
structures used to secure the rights and interests of natural persons assigned various
legal roles associated with the corporation. Thus, in his brief, one-paragraph analysis
of corporate personhood, Justice Alito took sides in a debate about the metaphysical
status of corporations, including those that are religiously affiliated. They are not
“real” or independent entities, he seemed to suggest, but instead are reducible ulti-
mately to the beliefs, values, and interests of the people who compose them.
But can something similar be said about churches? Are they, too, merely legal
forms? Are they aggregations of their members, or are they greater than the sum
of their parts? Must religious organizations represent the rights and interests of
their members, or can they assert claims on their own behalf? Such questions will
undoubtedly linger for some time, not only because there are competing conceptions
of corporate personhood but also because, for better or worse, those conceptions are
widely thought to have significant normative and legal implications.
Hobby Lobby was a statutory case, it is important to note, whereas Hosanna-Tabor
was decided on constitutional grounds. But some important concepts and ideas run
through both cases. Religious liberty is not only a matter of what individuals believe
but also of what they believe in groups—whether in churches, nonprofits, or busi-
nesses. As a matter of federal law, and in many states, religious liberty extends to
the actions of those groups as well, even when those actions conflict with neutral
and generally applicable laws. More than two decades after the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Employment Division v. Smith, the law of religious free exercise has turned
in a corporate direction. The rights of religious groups are expanding statutorily
under RFRA and constitutionally under the First Amendment. These corporate enti-
ties may not win every challenge they raise, but they have succeeded in establishing
standing to assert religious claims and have demonstrated the power of framing reli-
gious liberty in corporate terms.

3. Questions about Corpor ate Religious Liberty

The corporate turn in law and religion—from individual liberty to freedom of the
church, and from freedom of the church to corporate liberty—raises numerous theo-
retical and practical questions. While not meant to be exhaustive, what follows are
some of the main questions addressed in this book.

(i) What Justifies Corporate Religious Liberty?

An account of corporate religious liberty must explain why corporations—including

groups, associations, organizations, businesses, and so forth—and not only individ-
uals, ought to have the power to assert rights of religious free exercise. What is it
about corporations that warrants ascribing rights to them—if indeed they can have
rights at all? Are corporations moral actors with principles, values, and interests dis-
tinct from those of who compose them? Or should we think of corporations as having
 Introduction xix
rights that derive from, and perhaps represent, those of individuals? Moreover, even
if the ascription of rights to corporations can be justified, why should religious groups
deserve “special solicitude” (to borrow the Supreme Court’s phrase)? Why should
they receive rights and privileges not afforded to many other nonreligious expressive
associations, including political parties, universities, social clubs, and other groups
within civil society? Theories of church autonomy, and more broadly, corporate reli-
gious liberty, are designed to answer such questions by providing moral, political,
legal, historical, and theological arguments for ascribing special rights to religious
organizations. These arguments are, of course, contested and controversial, but any
assessment of the rights of religious organizations requires some understanding
of them.

(ii) To Whom (Or to What) Does Corporate Religious Liberty Apply?

A doctrine of corporate religious liberty must include an account of the subjects

to which it applies. Some cases will be easy. Hosanna-Tabor dealt with what many
consider the “core” example of a religious organization: a church. But Hobby Lobby
involved an organization that was closer to the periphery: a closely held, for-profit
corporation—an entity that many assumed was not entitled to assert free exercise
rights. What, then, defines a religious organization? Perhaps it is possible to spec-
ify criteria for identifying the corporate entities that are entitled to assert religious
claims. If not, another approach might be to protect those activities that express or
promote religion, regardless of the type of entity that undertakes or facilitates them.
The decision whether to adopt various criteria for determining which organizations
are religious, or instead to focus on religious functions rather than religious entities,
may have significant implications for the shape of legal doctrine.

(iii) What Is the Scope of Corporate Religious Liberty?

Another way of putting this question is to ask: What falls within the “internal
affairs” of a religious organization? In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court indicated that
while the state could regulate “outward physical acts,” it could not interfere with
“internal church decision[s]‌.”15 But what does this contrast mean, or more pointedly,
what is “inside” a church or other religious organization such that the state cannot
regulate it, and what is “outside”? The idea of “internal church decisions” could be
limited to the facts of Hosanna-Tabor, which involved the hiring and firing of reli-
gious leaders or “ministers.” But of course, the category of internal affairs might
extend well beyond such matters. Perhaps a church cannot be liable for any deci-
sion that involves how it applies religious doctrine to its members, so that a person
could not sue a church for being injured during a worship service, for instance. The

15
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
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