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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 1st Edition
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Title Pages

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume

4
Jonathan Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656417
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.001.0001

Title Pages
(p.i) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion

(p.iii) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4

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Title Pages

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Editorial Board

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume

4
Jonathan Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656417
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.001.0001

(p.ii) Editorial Board

ROBERT AUDI, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
KEITH DEROSE, YALE UNIVERSITY
HUGH MCCANN, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
BRADLEY MONTON, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
GRAHAM OPPY, MONASH UNIVERSITY
ELEONORE STUMP, ST LOUIS UNIVERSITY
LINDA ZAGZEBSKI, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
TED A. WAREIELD, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

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Editor's Introduction

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume

4
Jonathan Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656417
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.001.0001

(p.vii) Editor's Introduction

This is the fourth volume of the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion series.
As with earlier volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non‐
sectarian and non‐artisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion.
This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy
over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged
as an identifiable subfield within this time frame along with other emerging
subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This
volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best
work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including top
philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersection with
issues in the philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series
provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in
our disciplines, while at the same time inviting greater interest in the work
being done in the philosophy of religion.

Included in this volume is the winning essay in the first Younger Scholars Prize
in Philosophical Theology, awarded annually by generous support from the
Ammonius Foundation. The winning essay is Dennis Whitcomb's “Grounding and
Omniscience,” and congratulations are extended to Professor Whitcomb and
thanks to the Ammonius Foundation for making the prize possible.

Jonathan L. Kvanvig (p.viii)

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List of Contributors

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume

4
Jonathan Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656417
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.001.0001

(p.ix) List of Contributors

Yuval Avnur
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Scripps College.
Daniel Bonevac
is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas, Austin.
William Lane Craig
is Research Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology.
Neal Judisch
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma,
Nor-man.
Shieva Kleinschmidt
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern
California.
Christian Miller
is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Wake Forest University.
Paul K. Moser
is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University, Chicago.
Duncan Pritchard
holds the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh.
Meghan Sullivan
is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.
Dennis Whitcomb
is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Western Washington
University. (p.x)

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In Defense of Secular Belief

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume

4
Jonathan Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656417
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.001.0001

In Defense of Secular Belief

Yuval Avnur

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.003.0001

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter discusses the idea that, even if there is no evidence or argument in
favour of belief in the external world or religious belief, there is a pragmatic
justification for believing in the external world but not for religious belief. It
turns out that, ultimately, this pragmatic approach is not satisfying. However, as
Austin (1956) famously noted, justifications have had more than their fair share
in philosophy. Accordingly, alternative strategies are considered that appeal to a
defence — which need not necessarily involve a justification — of our belief in
the external world. This chapter considers a defence that appeals to an
exemption. The various versions of this strategy, including Strawson's attempt
on behalf of Hume and Wittgenstein, are not entirely satisfying. It then considers
excuses that are not pleas for exemption. It offers a Hume-inspired, ‘natural’
excuse for our belief in the external world. This excuse constitutes a much better
defence of our belief in the external world than any similar excuse for religious
belief, so the secular criticism of religious belief is cleared of inconsistency. This
solution is independent of any appeal to epistemic justification.

Keywords: religious belief, secular inconsistency, secular criticism, external world, pragmatic
justification, Austin, Hume, Strawson

Many secular critics hold that religious belief is worthy of criticism because
there is no evidence for any religious doctrine. But secular critics themselves
hold beliefs for which there is arguably no evidence. In order to avoid the charge
of inconsistency, secular critics must establish that their own belief is more
defensible than religious belief. Recent epistemology focuses on justification as
the primary notion available in defense of belief, and this aggravates the

Page 1 of 23
In Defense of Secular Belief

problem. Once some alternative evaluative notions come to light, with the help
of Hume and J. L. Austin, a satisfying solution emerges.

I. The Problem for Secular Consistency1

Secular critics of religion have made various accusations against religious
believers. One is that there is sufficient evidence that religious doctrine is false,
so religious belief goes against the evidence. Another, different accusation is
that, since there is no evidence for religious doctrine, religious belief goes
without evidence, and this constitutes an intellectual flaw. Let us focus on this
second criticism, which Plantinga (1983) has called ‘the evidentialist objection’.
Presumably, there is a general principle behind this criticism: it is an intellectual
flaw to believe something substantive about the world in the absence of any
good evidence.

Even granting that there is no evidence in favor of religious belief, there is a

problem for this secular criticism of religious belief. Arguably, we all believe
something substantive about the world in the absence of good evidence: that
there are external objects that roughly resemble and cause our sensory
experiences. Call this the ‘belief in the external world’. In the more recent
literature, this is often formulated as the belief that we are not victims of a
massive deception. In some variation or another, this is a belief that we are all
inclined to hold, but for which, according to the infamous skeptical argument
(summarized below), there is no good evidence. If such skeptical worries are
taken seriously, the reflective secularist might well wonder, “Should I be
agnostic not only about religious claims, but also about the external world?”
Unless this is addressed, secular critics appear hypocritical. They criticize
religious belief on grounds that, arguably, apply to their own belief as well. Call
this ‘the problemfor secular consistency’.

(p.2) One might refuse to take skepticism about the external world seriously.
Surely dismissing skepticism about the external world is more reasonable than
dismissing agnosticism about religion! But this reaction misses the point. The
challenge is to show how this reaction is not just a defenseless appeal to dogma.
Why is skepticism about external objects crazier than agnosticism about
religion? Why are the two beliefs not on a par, if neither is supported by
evidence?

A more reflective reaction is to take the skeptical claim seriously enough to

reject it on some philosophical ground: either there is good evidence that there
are external things that cause and resemble our experiences, or, despite the
absence of such evidence, belief in the external world is epistemically justified
anyway. Clearly, this requires some philosophical maneuvering and, potentially,
some pricey theoretical commitments concerning the nature of evidence or
epistemic justification. Hume famously summed up the difficulty with this:

Page 2 of 23
In Defense of Secular Belief

“It is a question of fact, whether perceptions of the senses be produced by

external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined?
By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here
experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything
present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience
of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is,
therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.” (Hume 1975, p. 153)

The idea is that there can be no a priori evidence, or argument, that our
experiences are produced by external objects that resemble them, since,
generally, there can be no a priori evidence for substantive (and contingent)
truths about the external world. On the other hand, no a posteriori or
experiential evidence can possibly be found, since it is the veracity of such
experiences that we are attempting to support. We never experience a
connection between experience and reality. To be sure, many philosophers have
attempted to solve this problem, either by offering an a priori argument,
permitting experience to provide evidence for experience's veracity, or allowing
that some beliefs are epistemically justified even in the absence of any good
evidence. But—setting aside the possibility that similar maneuvers are available
to the religious believer in response to the charge that there is no good evidence
for religious doctrine—the availability of various anti‐skeptical solutions should
not diminish our interest in the problem for secular consistency, for two reasons.

First, many secular critics of religious belief simply do not accept any of the
attempted anti‐skeptical solutions. The skeptical problem is a traditional
philosophical paradox precisely because many philosophers find the various
attempts at a solution unsatisfying. One might conclude that the only secular
critics of religious belief who can avoid the problem for secular consistency are
those who accept some solution to the skeptical problem, since only they can
explain how they are not being inconsistent. But if this is the case, then it is
news worth establishing carefully, since it leaves many secular philosophers and
almost all secular non‐philosophers with no solution to the problem of secular
consistency. In order to establish this surprising news one must settle whether
the problem for secular consistency can be solved without appeal to any (p.3)
solution to skepticism about the external world. So there should be interest in
settling this question.

Second, it would be better for those who believe that skepticism about the
external world can be refuted if there were a decisive, additional solution to the
problem for secular consistency. For the various solutions to skepticism about
the external world are often inconsistent with each other, so each one is
generally controversial even among anti‐skeptics. Why not seek another, less
controversial solution to the problem for secular consistency on which all secular
philosophers can agree? A solution to the problem that is neutral among the
various competing anti‐skeptical views would allow us to address the secularist's

Page 3 of 23
In Defense of Secular Belief

problem without leaving many other secularists behind or introducing

controversial epistemological claims.

Accordingly, I propose to set aside, for the purpose of addressing the problem
for secular consistency, any direct objections to skepticism about the external
world. This entails setting aside the claim that our belief in the external world is
epistemically justified while religious belief is not. By doing this we approach the
problem in the least controversial way possible, and make it maximally difficult
to solve the problem for secular consistency. All the more impressive, then, if we
can still solve it.

Below, I discuss the idea that, even if there is no evidence or argument in favor
of either belief, we have apragmatic justification for believing in the external
world but not for religious belief (section II). It turns out that, ultimately, this
pragmatic approach is not satisfying. However, as Austin (1956) famously noted,
justifications have had more than their fair share in philosophy. Accordingly, I
consider alternative strategie s that appeal to a defense—which need not
necessarily involve a justification—of our belief in the external world. I consider
a defense that appeals to an exemption (section III). The various versions of this
strategy, including Strawson's attempt on behalf of Hume and Wittgenstein, are
not entirely satisfying. So I then consider excuses that are not pleas for
exemption (section IV). There, I take my cue from Austin's account of excuses,
and, again, Hume. I end up offering a Hume‐inspired, “natural” excuse for our
belief in the external world. This excuse constitutes a much better defense of our
belief in the external world than any similar excuse for religious belief, so the
secular criticism of religious belief is cleared of inconsistency. This solution is
independent of any appeal to epistemic justification.

II. Pragmatic Justification

Let us say that a defense of a belief is an attempt to mitigate some criticism of
that belief. The secular criticism of religious belief is epistemic—that it is an
epistemically unjustified belief—where ‘epistemic’ denotes evidential,
probabilistic factors that relate directly to the belief's truth. The problem is that
similar criticism appears to apply to our belief in the external world. The
challenge is to show how the latter is more defensible in the face of epistemic
criticism than the former. We are ignoring any defense of belief in the external
world that challenges the claim that it is epistemically unjustified. But what,
aside from an appeal to epistemic justification, could constitute a defense
against epistemic criticism?

(p.4) One idea is to offer a pragmatic justification. To borrow an example from

Austin (1956), suppose that someone drops the tea tray. Suppose you criticize
her for dropping the tea tray, and she replies that she did so in order to prevent
an emotional storm from breaking out. She is thereby defending her action by
offering a pragmatic justification for it: dropping the tea tray prevented a

Page 4 of 23
In Defense of Secular Belief

greater harm. Perhaps a similar sort of justification applies to our belief in the
external world?

The most straightforward way to pursue this strategy is to appeal to “Simple

Pragmatism”:

If you have something to gain, such as survival or happiness, from

believing p, then that justifies belief in p.

Since belief in the external world is conducive to survival and happiness on

earth, Simple Pragmatism may seem like a promising strategy for defending
belief in the external world.

However, there are two reasons to reject Simple Pragmatism as a solution to the
problem for secular consistency. The first concerns the role that belief in the
external world must play in this justification. Simple Pragmatism establishes
that our belief in the external world is pragmatically justified only if we first
assume that our belief in the external world is true. If we leave it open whether
there is an external world at all, we leave it open whether there is any advantage
to believing that there is one, since it may be the case that, for example,
seeming to step in front of what seems like a moving truck will not decrease our
chances of survival, since there may be no external object to hit us. In other
words, the claim that the most efficient way to pursue our aims is through
attempted physical manipulation of the environment depends crucially on
whether there is an external world.

That the appeal to Simple Pragmatism assumes the truth of the belief it is
supposed to defend is problematic for two reasons. First, we are assuming that
there is no evidence or epistemic justification for believing in the external world.
So the appeal to Simple Pragmatism in this case rests on an epistemically
unjustified assumption. It seems that, when offering a pragmatic justification,
you must have evidence that the pragmatic justification holds. If you drop the
tea tray and, in your defense, claim that had you failed to do so, aliens would
have invaded, we would not accept your defense, since we think you have no
evidence for that claim. Second, if we accept that a defense for a belief can
assume the truth of that very belief, then we must accept there is an equally
good pragmatic justification for religious belief. Consider a God who rewards
believers and punishes non‐believers. Simple Pragmatism provides a justification
for this belief as well as it does belief in the external world. Since a solution to
the problem for secular consistency requires that there be no equally good
defense of religious belief, the appeal to Simple Pragmatism is unsatisfactory.

So far I have discussed the first reason for rejecting the appeal to pragmatic
justification: the role that belief in the external world plays in its own pragmatic
justification is problematic. The second reason for rejecting the appeal to
pragmatic justification is that it is unsatisfying to defend our belief by any kind
Page 5 of 23
In Defense of Secular Belief

of pragmatic justification given (p.5) that the criticism is epistemic; offering a

pragmatic justification is a non‐sequitur. For illustration, suppose that you
criticize me for committing an immoral act, such as stealing from a friend. If I
attempt to defend myself by noting that there was great practical advantage for
me in attaining the stolen goods, that may not satisfy you, since it does not
address the flaw you are criticizing. The flaw in question is moral, not
pragmatic.

When considering the problem for secular consistency, we are imagining being
criticized for believing without epistemic justification. To defend such a belief by
noting that there is some other, non‐epistemic advantage seems to miss the
point. For, to believe something without evidence remains a problem for one's
epistemic status even if there is some other advantage to believing it. So even if
some version of the defense by pragmatic justification could be made to look
unique to belief in the external world, the question remains why the secular
critic does not apply epistemic criticism evenhandedly.2

For these reasons, pragmatic justification is not a satisfying solution to the

problem of secular consistency. Still, the idea that belief in the external world is
in some sense indispensable remains plausible, and one suspects that this must
be relevant to why the secular critic of religion holds this belief. The problem is
that appealing to the indispensability of the belief as a justification does not
provide a convincing defense.

III. Exemption
We are searching for a defense—a way to mitigate criticism—of our belief in the
external world. We are setting aside defenses that appeal to epistemic
justification, and in the previous section it was argued that defenses that appeal
to pragmatic justification will not do. J. L. Austin (1956) remarked that
justifications have received more than their fair share in philosophy. Accordingly,
let us explore alternative ways of defending our belief. This section examines the
idea that one is exempt from epistemic evaluation in the case of belief in the
external world, since the belief is “out of our hands.” Such a defense would not
be a justification.3

Recall Austin's example of dropping the tea tray. Notice the difference between
the following two defenses: “She did it in order to prevent a greater
harm” (justification) (p.6) versus “She did it because a wasp stung
her” (exemption).4 The former cites a consideration in favor of dropping the tea
tray, while the latter does not. Instead, it attempts to undermine criticism by
claiming that the action being criticized was out of the dropper's hands, not up
to her, or something she could not help. Perhaps it follows that the evaluation of
the tray dropper that lead to the criticism is not applicable. Presumably, the idea
is that such evaluations apply only to acts that are “up to” the agent. So, that it
was “out of her hands” exempts her from evaluation.

Page 6 of 23
In Defense of Secular Belief

Perhaps it is “out of our hands” whether we believe in the external world, and,
although this does not constitute a justification (either epistemic or pragmatic),
it does constitute an exemption. In order to evaluate this very rough idea, we
must consider what “being out of our hands” amounts to, and how this is
supposed to provide an exemption from specifically epistemic evaluation.

In what sense is it “out of our hands” to believe in the external world?

Presumably, being “out of our hands” is not equivalent to being involuntary.
Many philosophers hold that every belief is involuntary, and it may be tempting
to think that being involuntary entails being exempt from evaluation. It would
follow from this that all beliefs are exempt from epistemic evaluation. This is
both implausible and, in any case, unhelpful for solving the problem for secular
consistency. It is implausible because, clearly, it is sometimes appropriate to
criticize someone for believing something from an epistemic point of view (i.e.
taking considerations such as evidence and probability to bear on the criticism).
It is unhelpful because it would also count against the secular position that we
are attempting to defend. For the secular position we are defending wishes to
criticize religious belief from an epistemic point of view. In any case, insofar as a
general involuntarist exemption applies to all beliefs, it would also apply to
religious belief, since religious belief is, of course, a belief. So this is not a good
way of showing that our belief in the external world is more defensible than
religious belief.

A different way for a belief to be “out of our hands” is for it to be unresponsive

to the sorts of considerations that sway other, more ordinary beliefs. This
account of “being out of our hands” is attractive because it may well apply to
belief in the external world, and it may seem to provide an adequate ground for
an exemption. This is the strategy pursued by P.F. Strawson (1985). He regards
Hume and Wittgenstein as ‘Naturalists’ who claim this sort of exemption for
belief in the external world:

“They have in common the view that our ‘beliefs’ in the existence of body
… are not grounded beliefs and at the same time are not open to serious
doubt. They are, one might say, outside our critical and rational
competence … ” (p. 19)

Many other beliefs are open to serious doubt, so being not open to serious doubt
may be unique to our belief in the external world. And if belief in the external
world is not open to serious doubt, no considerations can supplant it, so it is in a
good sense out of our hands whether we believe it.

(p.7) Hume and Wittgenstein, even on Strawson's account, offer two different
versions of this proposed exemption. Let us consider the Wittgensteinian version
first. Strawson's Wittgenstein has it that foundational ‘bedrock’ beliefs, such as
belief in the external world, are beyond justifications and criticisms, since we

Page 7 of 23
In Defense of Secular Belief

must take some groundless belief as a starting point if we are to participate in

the activity of evaluating beliefs at all. The groundless belief in the external
world, an example of what he calls a ‘certainty’, plays a special role in our lives:

“358. Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to
hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life …

359. But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond
being justified; as it were, as something animal.” (Wittgenstein 1969)

He goes on to suggest that in any system of belief, one must take some belief as
a starting point, and the starting point determines the form of life of the believer.
Any such belief must in principle be groundless or beyond justification, since it is
a starting point.5 We might add that such a belief is also beyond epistemic
evaluation, so that being a starting point constitutes an exemption.

Does the foregoing exemption solve the problem for secular consistency? It
seems not. For the question arises, Why does this provide exemption only for
belief in the external world as the starting point, and not any other beliefs taken
as starting points? If one takes both belief in the external world and religious
belief as independent starting points, is one thereby exempt from evaluation of
both beliefs? And if one takes only religious belief, rather than belief in the
external world, as a starting point, is one's religious belief exempt? If the idea of
a starting point is to afford us a solution to the problem for secular consistency,
these questions must be settled.

One might suggest that, since only one starting point is necessary in order to get
a web of belief started, and since everyone believes in the external world, belief
in the external world is the only starting point that is exempt from epistemic
criticism. Those who take on beliefs that are additional starting points (i.e.
groundless beliefs), such as religious beliefs, are doing something unnecessary
or extra, so the extra beliefs’ starting‐point status does not constitute an
exemption. This suggestion might be tempting, but it lacks imagination. One
could take belief in a benevolent, non‐deceiving deity as one's only starting
point, and argue on that basis for the external world: God would not have made
us to have experiences unless they are generally accurate (as Descartes argued,
minus his arguments for God's existence, since in this scenario the existence of
the non‐deceiving God is a groundless starting point).6 So it is not the case that
everyone (p.8) who believes in the external world must take the external world
as a starting point. Religious believers could get by with only one starting point,
just as the secularist does. The question remains why the exemption applies only
to the external world, and not to religious belief.

Hume is more explicit about the features of belief in the external world that
make it unique. Humean Naturalism, on a Strawsonian reading, is the view that
belief in the external world is recalcitrant in a way that other beliefs are not.
Page 8 of 23
In Defense of Secular Belief

Nature has instilled in us the belief in the external world, so that no application
of reason or assessment of evidence can ever lead us to abandon it. The belief is
simply part of how we are built. If this is true, then it seems to be a promising
exemption: our belief is something we are stuck with, not something any
reasoning can affect or eliminate.

“Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to

judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing
certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their
customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder
ourselves from thinking, as long as we are awake, or seeing the
surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad
sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total
scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavoured by
arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted
in the mind, and rendered unavoidable.” (Book 1, Part 4, Sec 1)

“Thus the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even though he
asserts that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule
he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, though
he cannot pretend, by any arguments of philosophy, to maintain its
veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteemed
it an affair of too great importance, to be trusted to our uncertain
reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to
believe in the existence of body? but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be
body or not? That is a point which we must take for granted in all our
reasonings.” (Book 1, Part 4, Sec 2)

Strawson's reading of Hume emphasizes the idea that belief in the external
world is unavoidable (italics are from the original):

“[Hume's] point is really the very simple one that, whatever arguments
may be produced on one side or the other of the question [whether there
are external objects], we simply] cannot help believing in the existence of
body.” (11)

“[Skeptical arguments] are to be neglected because they are idle;

powerless against the force of nature, of our naturally implanted
disposition to belief.” (13)

“These unavoidable natural convictions [in the existence of body] … are

ineradicably implanted in our minds by nature.”7

(p.9) What follows from this, on Strawson's reading, is that the question of
justification cannot apply to our belief in the external world:

Page 9 of 23
In Defense of Secular Belief

“[Hume's] point… is that arguments, reasonings, either for or against the

skeptical position, are, in practice, equally inefficacious and idle; since our
natural disposition to belief, on the points challenged by the skeptic, is
absolutely compelling and inescapable; neither shaken by skeptical
argument nor reinforced by rational counter‐argument. Where Nature thus
determines us, we have an original non‐rational commitment which sets
the bounds within which, or the stage upon which, reason can effectively
operate, and within which the question of the rationality or irrationality,
justification or lack of justification, of this or that particular judgment or
belief can come up.” (39)

This is why Strawson sees Hume as deeming this belief to be “outside of our
rational competence.”

In order for this to solve the problem for secular consistency we must add that,
in contrast, reasoning and assessments of evidence can affect religious beliefs.
In other words, religious beliefs are not unavoidable. This is plausible given that
many former believers have dropped their belief in response to argument, and
many of us have never held any religious belief in the first place.8

Here, then, is a potential solution to the problem for secular consistency. Belief
in the external world is unavoidable—resistant to change by any reasoning or
assessment of evidence—while religious belief is not. A belief's being
unavoidable exempts it from reasonable epistemic evaluation.9 Therefore, it is
unreasonable to criticize belief in the external world, and the same exemption
does not show that it is unreasonable to criticize religious belief.

Unfortunately, there are reasons for dissatisfaction with this solution to the
problem of secular consistency.

One problem is the assumption that being unavoidable exempts a belief from
epistemic evaluation. It is not generally true that being unavoidable constitutes
exemption from evaluation. For example, if one is naturally clumsy, then it may
be unavoidable that one walks ungracefully. But it is still the case that one walks
ungracefully. The features that determine whether one walks gracefully do not
presuppose that one can avoid lacking those features. Likewise, the features
that determine whether a belief is epistemically justified concern the likely truth
of the belief. The claim that a belief has such a feature need not presuppose that
one could have avoided forming that belief. So, like (p.10) a walk that
unavoidably lacks grace, a belief can unavoidably lack epistemic qualities. At any
rate, we have not been presented with any reason to reject this intuitive claim.10

One might suggest that it is unreasonable to evaluate an unavoidable belief, not

because the features relevant to evaluation presuppose that the belief is
avoidable, but because the only purpose of evaluation is reform, and an
unavoidable belief cannot be reformed. The problem with this suggestion is that
Page 10 of 23
In Defense of Secular Belief

the purpose of evaluating belief in the external world, in the context of the
problem for secular consistency, is not to decide whether to believe in the
external world. Rather, it is to see whether, in criticizing religious belief, we are
successfully picking out a flaw that is unique to religious belief, or whether,
instead, we are merely picking out a flaw that our own belief in the external
world has as well. The purpose is to compare, not to reform.11

Furthermore, evaluation can lead to reform of the sort that is the goal of our
evaluation. Even if our belief in the external world is unavoidable, our attitudes
about the belief depend on our evaluation of the belief. In reaction to epistemic
evaluation, we may become reasonably convinced that our belief in the external
world lacks epistemic credentials, such as being supported by evidence. This
could reasonably lead us to take less seriously epistemic criticism of other
beliefs; it leads to humility. (This point was recognized by Hume in section 12 of
the Enquiry, where he prescribed his “mitigated” skepticism.) Our lack of
humility in criticizing religious beliefs is precisely the point of the problem for
secular consistency. Since evaluation of belief in the external world can
reasonably lead to a relevant change in attitude, and since the purpose of
evaluation is to determine whether this change in attitude is reasonable, it
seems perfectly reasonable to consider epistemic evaluation, regardless of
whether the belief being evaluated is unavoidable.

To sum up: Since it is unclear why a belief's unavoidability entails its exemption
from epistemic evaluation, Strawson's Humean exemption, as it stands, does not
provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of secular consistency.

IV. Excuses
In the previous section I argued that Strawson's Wittgensteinian and Humean
exemptions do not provide a satisfying solution to our problem. Still, something
about Hume's original idea seems promising. Belief in the external world is in
some way more central to our natural situation, it is a very human thing to
believe, and this could be a part of a defense against criticism.

Consider again the wasp sting example. She drops the tea tray and we criticize
her for it. She answers “But a wasp stung me!” On the interpretation given in
the previous section, she is claiming to be exempt from evaluation. But there is
an alternative (p.11) interpretation of the example. Imagine the defendant
putting the plea like this: “I apologize, but I was distracted and moved by this
wasp sting.” We could understand her as accepting that she did something
wrong, or bad, or less than ideal, and this is why she apologizes. So she is not
offering an exemption. Still, she is offering the wasp sting as a way of mitigating
the criticism. In other words, she is offering an excuse.

Austin's example concerns an action, not a belief. But anything that can be
criticized may be defended by excuse, since an excuse is simply an attempt to
mitigate criticism without appealing to justification or exemption. Thus, even if
Page 11 of 23
Other documents randomly have
different content
 Agriculture - Book Review
Third 2025 - College

Prepared by: Teaching Assistant Garcia

Date: July 28, 2025

Test 1: Interdisciplinary approaches

Learning Objective 1: Study tips and learning strategies
• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Learning Objective 2: Current trends and future directions
• Case studies and real-world applications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Learning Objective 3: Case studies and real-world applications
• Best practices and recommendations
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Learning Objective 4: Research findings and conclusions
• Research findings and conclusions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Learning Objective 5: Study tips and learning strategies
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 5: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Note: Problem-solving strategies and techniques
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Key terms and definitions
• Case studies and real-world applications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Key Concept: Current trends and future directions
• Experimental procedures and results
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Practice Problem 8: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Historical development and evolution
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 9: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Definition: Learning outcomes and objectives
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Module 2: Critical analysis and evaluation
Important: Current trends and future directions
• Practical applications and examples
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 11: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Key Concept: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Definition: Case studies and real-world applications
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 13: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Example 13: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Learning outcomes and objectives
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Research findings and conclusions
• Assessment criteria and rubrics
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
[Figure 15: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Definition: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Practice Problem 16: Literature review and discussion
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Note: Research findings and conclusions
• Assessment criteria and rubrics
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Important: Problem-solving strategies and techniques
• Current trends and future directions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Remember: Literature review and discussion
• Key terms and definitions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Quiz 3: Comparative analysis and synthesis
Remember: Study tips and learning strategies
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Example 21: Research findings and conclusions
• Best practices and recommendations
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Remember: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Current trends and future directions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 23: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Practice Problem 23: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Definition: Theoretical framework and methodology
• Literature review and discussion
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Ethical considerations and implications
• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 26: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Definition: Current trends and future directions
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Note: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Example 28: Assessment criteria and rubrics
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Remember: Critical analysis and evaluation
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Introduction 4: Key terms and definitions
Definition: Study tips and learning strategies
• Historical development and evolution
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 31: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Note: Practical applications and examples
• Research findings and conclusions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Note: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Literature review and discussion
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Practice Problem 33: Case studies and real-world applications
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 34: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Key Concept: Historical development and evolution
• Best practices and recommendations
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Research findings and conclusions
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Historical development and evolution
• Interdisciplinary approaches
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Important: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Best practices and recommendations
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Note: Theoretical framework and methodology
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Case studies and real-world applications
• Interdisciplinary approaches
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 40: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Practice 5: Problem-solving strategies and techniques
Definition: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Assessment criteria and rubrics
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Best practices and recommendations
• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Note: Study tips and learning strategies
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
[Figure 43: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Important: Critical analysis and evaluation
• Interdisciplinary approaches
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Practice Problem 44: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Critical analysis and evaluation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Example 45: Assessment criteria and rubrics
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Remember: Key terms and definitions
• Literature review and discussion
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Example 47: Historical development and evolution
• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Example 48: Historical development and evolution
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Important: Case studies and real-world applications
• Research findings and conclusions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
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