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Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.
 NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan

Implications for the U.S. Drawdown

Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, Robert Stewart, Leila
Mahnad
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.
 This research was sponsored by a private foundation and was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy
Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis on defense and
national security topics for the U.S. and allied defense, foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence communities and
foundations and other nongovernmental organizations that support defense and national security analysis.

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eISBN: 978-0-8330-8594-8

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis.
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 Preface

The U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan may lead to greater instability and a vacuum in that
country. The Islamic Republic of Iran, one the most powerful regional actors in Afghanistan, is
poised to exercise substantial influence there after the U.S. drawdown. In addition, the
drawdown may provide Iran with the opportunity to strengthen ties with other powers involved
in Afghanistan, such as India and Russia. Greater Iranian influence in Afghanistan could help
Iran alleviate economic and political pressures resulting from its nuclear dispute.
At the same time, the election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s president may provide a new
opportunity for greater U.S.-Iran cooperation in Afghanistan, as was the case after the
Taliban’s overthrow in 2001. Both countries have convergent interests in Afghanistan,
including the prevention of Taliban rule. Such potential cooperation will depend on the status
of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, and the state of overall tensions
between the two nations.
This study examines Iran’s historical interests in Afghanistan and its current policies in that
country. The study pays particular attention to key aspects of the Iranian-Afghan relationship,
including Iran’s cultural, political, economic, and ideological ties to Afghanistan. The study
explores the extent and limits of Iranian influence in Afghanistan, including Tehran’s relations
with key Afghan groups and constituencies.
Furthermore, the study analyzes Iran’s relations with regional powers, such as India,
Russia, and Pakistan, in light of the U.S. drawdown. Finally, the study explores the
implications of Iranian influence for the United States as it withdraws most of its combat
forces from Afghanistan.
This research was sponsored by a private foundation and was conducted within the
International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research
Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis on defense and national security
topics for the U.S. and allied defense, foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

communities and foundations and other nongovernmental organizations that support defense and
national security analysis.
For more information on the International Security and Defense Policy Center, see
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp.html or contact the director (contact information is
provided on the web page).
 Contents

Preface
Summary
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

CHAPTER TWO
Iran and Afghanistan: A Complicated Relationship
Close but Not Exclusive Ties with the Afghan Tajik and Shia
Iran’s Political Role in Afghanistan
Iran’s Positive Economic Influence
Iran’s Anti-U.S. Policies in Afghanistan
Iran’s Military Aid to Afghan Insurgents
Challenges to Iranian Influence in Afghanistan
Popular Resistance to Iranian Influence
Water Disputes
Narcotics Challenge
Refugee Issues

CHAPTER THREE
Iran and Other Powers in Afghanistan
Iran and Pakistan
Iran and India
Iran and Russia
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

The China Factor

CHAPTER FOUR
Conclusion and Implications for the United States

References
 Summary

This report examines Iran’s cultural, political, and economic influence in Afghanistan,
especially in light of the U.S. drawdown. Many American policymakers and analysts worry
that the departure of most international military forces from Afghanistan may result in greater
instability there, which can be exploited by foreign powers, such as the Islamic Republic of
Iran.
A state of rivalry between Iran and the United States, exacerbated by tensions over Iran’s
nuclear program, has often meant competition in other areas, including Afghanistan. Tehran has
viewed the decadelong U.S. presence in Afghanistan with anxiety. Iran’s fears of U.S. military
strikes against its nuclear facilities, or perceived American plans to overthrow the Iranian
regime, may have motivated it to provide measured military support to Afghan insurgents
battling U.S. forces and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Iran also actively
opposes the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) being negotiated between Afghanistan and the
United States.
U.S. policymakers may naturally think that Iran will seek to exploit the drawdown and
undermine American interests in Afghanistan. However, the departure of U.S. forces from
Afghanistan, a new pragmatic government in Tehran, and a possible resolution to the nuclear
crisis may provide greater cooperation between Tehran and Washington in Afghanistan.
Iranian objectives in Afghanistan align with most U.S. interests. Therefore, Iranian
influence in Afghanistan following the drawdown of international forces need not necessarily
be a cause of concern for the United States. Much like the United States, Iran wants to see a
stable Afghanistan with a government free of Taliban control, and Iran seeks to stem the tide of
Sunni extremism in the region.
The extent to which Iran would be willing to directly cooperate with the United States in
Afghanistan largely depends on the status of the Iranian nuclear dispute. It is important to note,
however, that even if U.S.-Iran tensions remain, Iran’s activities in Afghanistan are unlikely to
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

run counter to the overall objectives of the United States.

The United States should attempt to cooperate with Iran in countering narcotics in
Afghanistan and encourage efforts to bring Tehran and Kabul to an agreement over water
sharing. Because the Taliban insurgency is largely funded through drug trafficking,
counternarcotics efforts would contribute to Afghanistan’s security. Tensions over scarce water
resources could also fuel instability if left unaddressed.
While many of the disagreements between the two countries appear intractable and
beholden to political interests in Tehran and Washington, combating drug trafficking and
addressing water-usage issues would be relatively uncontroversial and nonpolitical. It could
also lead to increased mutual trust that would benefit broader U.S.-Iran relations. To this end,
 the United States could lend logistical or financial support to the UN-facilitated Triangular
Initiative, which fosters coordination among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in countering the
drug trade. With regards to the Iran-Afghan water dispute, the United States should become
active—through the UN and development organizations—in facilitating a mutually agreed upon
water-usage system.
Iran is hedging its bets in order to be prepared for a variety of outcomes following the
U.S. drawdown. Iran has maintained close ties with Afghanistan’s Tajik and Hazara
populations in order to gain political influence and protect its interests after the U.S.
drawdown.
On the other hand, Iran appears to be open to engaging with the Taliban after the U.S.
drawdown. The extent of engagement will depend on the Taliban’s posture toward Iran and its
treatment of the Afghan Shia.
Iran will continue attempting to build soft influence in Afghanistan, especially in the
realms of education and the media. Iran has been building and buttressing pro-Iranian schools,
mosques, and media centers. Much of this activity centers on western and northern Afghanistan,
in addition to Kabul. Afghan schools have received thousands of Iranian books, many of which
espouse the values of the Islamic republic.
However, Iran will face challenges in winning over the Afghan populace. The Pashtuns,
who are more closely affiliated with Pakistan, remain wary of the Iranians. Meanwhile, many
of the Shia Hazara do not favor Iran’s system of governance. In recent years, Hazara political
parties have made efforts not to be seen simply as Iranian proxies, and are likely to seek
support from Western countries as well.
Although set to remain generally positive, Iran-Afghan relations likely will experience
strain over water disputes and the issue of refugees. Exacerbated by drought, water-sharing
disputes are likely to persist as a significant sticking point between Tehran and Kabul as
Afghanistan’s plan to boost its agricultural sector will lead to increased water usage upstream,
affecting Iran’s supplies. Both countries suffer from a shortage of water, with Iran’s eastern
provinces bordering Afghanistan being particularly water challenged.
In recent years, the status of Afghan refugees in Iran has become a highly politicized issue.
Iran has more Afghan refugees than any other country after Pakistan. As economic conditions in
Iran have deteriorated, Afghan refugees have come to be seen by many as a burden and have
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

been subjected to discrimination and abuse at the hands of the Iranian government. Numerous
protests have erupted in Afghanistan over Iran’s treatment of refugees. Furthermore, Iran has
attempted to use the threat of mass deportation of Afghans as a means of pressuring the Kabul
government to adopt policies favorable to the Islamic Republic.
Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces and ISAF from Afghanistan in 2016, Iranian and
U.S. strategy there will be influenced in large part by the actions of Pakistan, India, and
Russia. As the world’s only superpower, the United States will continue to play an important
role in Afghanistan following the ISAF drawdown. It is important, however, to bear in mind
that U.S. influence there will be determined in large part by its relations with regional actors
 and, in turn, their relations with one another. Iran’s overall interests in Afghanistan align with
the core U.S., Indian, and Russian objectives in Afghanistan: to prevent the country from again
becoming dominated by the Taliban and a safe haven for al Qaeda. Therefore, Iranian
cooperation with regional actors in Afghanistan could serve U.S. interests.
In the event of a nuclear deal, it is prudent that the United States directly engage Iran in
bilateral discussions regarding Afghanistan and pursue joint activities that would serve their
mutual interests and build much-needed trust.
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.
 Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Gary Sick and Paul Miller for their helpful reviews.
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.
 Abbreviations

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

BSA Bilateral Security Agreement
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IPI Iran-Pakistan-India [pipeline]
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
LNG liquefied natural gas
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSRD RAND National Security Research Division
RPG rifle-propelled grenade
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
TAPI Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.
 CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

This study explores Iranian influence in Afghanistan and the implications for the United States
after the departure of most American forces from Afghanistan. Iran has substantial economic,
political, cultural, and religious leverage in Afghanistan. There is a chance that Tehran can use
its influence to undermine U.S. interests, especially if a failure to resolve the Iranian nuclear
crisis leads to increasing tensions between the United States and Iran, including a possible
military conflict.
However, the election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s president and a potential breakthrough
in nuclear negotiations could herald greater cooperation between Iran and the United States in
Afghanistan. Both Iran and the United States share an interest in thwarting the Taliban’s victory
and ensuring a more stable Afghanistan.
Afghanistan faces an uncertain future after the U.S. drawdown in 2016. Kabul is also likely
to receive continued economic and financial support from Washington, including payments to
the Afghan armed forces and the national police.
But Afghanistan’s stability is far from certain. Kabul faces an obdurate insurgency that is
likely to exploit the U.S. and international drawdown. The Afghan government will also face
many economic difficulties in future years. Afghanistan is highly dependent on international
economic aid, and many Afghan businesses profit from U.S. and International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) military activities. Although endowed with great natural and mineral
wealth, Afghanistan has a negligible industrial base. Its exports of fruits, nuts, carpets, and
semiprecious stones are not substantial.1 It appears that the illicit economy in Afghanistan—
especially opium production—is a bigger source of revenue than most (if not all) other
economic sectors.2
There is cause to be worried about Afghanistan’s future economic stability. The 1992
overthrow and subsequent murder of Mohammad Najibullah, Afghanistan’s Soviet-backed
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

ruler, is often attributed to Moscow’s decision to cease financial support to his government as
the Soviet Union began to unravel.3 Najibullah had managed to survive the Soviet troop
withdrawal in 1989 and hold off the Afghan Mujahideen.4 But he could only do so with
substantial Soviet aid. Although circumstances are different now, one can argue that the Afghan
central government is similarly dependent on American and international support. The Western
military drawdown from Afghanistan could weaken the Afghan economy, and ultimately
Kabul’s ability to hold off the Taliban. Afghanistan’s ability to build a more independent
economy will also play a major role in preserving political stability. The economic role of
neighboring countries, especially Pakistan and Iran, is important in this regard.
 However, the biggest problem facing Afghanistan may be political corruption. The Afghan
government is often accused of nepotism, and it is far from certain that Hamid Karzai and his
supporters will completely relinquish power after the 2014 presidential election.5 Technically,
Karzai cannot run again, but there are indications that he is planning to shape the next
government according to his own personal interests. Many Afghans, including those
interviewed by RAND, are highly concerned about the possibility of corrupt and
nondemocratic elections.6 According to a survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2011,
Afghans consider corruption to be the third-biggest problem their country faces, after insecurity
and unemployment.7
Another major problem faced by Afghanistan is the lack of ethnic and religious unity.8 The
Afghan government, although led by Karzai, a Pashtun, is heavily dominated by the Tajik, and
to a lesser extent the Hazara. Whoever succeeds Karzai as president will have to possess the
ability to bridge the gap between Afghanistan’s rival ethnic and minority groups. This may
prove to be more difficult in the absence of substantial U.S. and ISAF military forces. The
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have received extensive training and funding from
the United States and its partners. The United States alone has invested approximately $50
billion since 2002 in developing the ANSF.9
Yet the ANSF is riven by persistent challenges, including ethno-religious divisions and
attrition. A report released in April 2011 states that although the overall composition of the
Afghan National Army reflects the ethnic makeup of Afghanistan, and while approximately 40
percent of the ANSF are ethnically Pashtun, only 3 percent of soldiers are southern Pashtuns,
which has significant implications for the army’s credibility.10 Furthermore, areas with
Pashtun-majority inhabitants, such as southern Afghanistan, are patrolled by non-Pashtuns,
raising the specter of increased violence after the drawdown.
Neighboring powers, such as Pakistan and Iran, tend to favor certain ethnic and religious
minorities over others, potentially exacerbating Afghanistan’s ethno-religious divisions.
Pakistan is known to have strong ties to the Pashtun, while Iran favors the Tajik and Hazara.
India also has closer ties to the Tajik, especially given its history of supporting the anti-Taliban
Northern Alliance. Of course, the picture in Afghanistan is not completely black and white.
Pakistan does have ties to non-Pashtun groups, while Iran and India have tried to cultivate
relations with Pashtun groups, including the Taliban. But the drawdown has the potential to
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

widen Afghanistan’s divisions and invite greater neighboring support for rival Afghan groups.
Iran, in particular, could strengthen relations with the anti-Taliban forces it supported prior
to 2001. And it is not inconceivable that Iran, India, and Russia could reestablish their
previous partnership in support of a new Northern Alliance battling the Pashtun-dominated and
Pakistan-supported insurgency. According to one influential Afghan official, “the old coalition
of India, Russia, and Iran might rise again.”11 This could portend not only more violence in
Afghanistan but also the sort of civil war not seen since the 1990s, when various Mujahideen
groups fought each other for control of the country.12
Although Afghan cities tend to be more stable, future instability in Afghanistan could be
strongly felt in rural areas that are beyond central authority. International economic and
 security assistance has not penetrated rural areas as fully as urban areas, making them more
susceptible to violence after the drawdown.13 According to a former Afghan official
interviewed by RAND, “the development of the country since 2001 has never reached the
village.”14 This view has been corroborated by research conducted by the Asia Foundation.15
Rural areas continue to exist in conditions similar to those during and before Taliban rule.16 In
the absence of a large number of Western troops, the Taliban will attempt to make gains in
much of Afghanistan. And Pakistan could seek to exploit this for its own benefit.
Iran has several major interests in Afghanistan that it wants to protect, but while Tehran
supports a stable Afghan central government, it does not necessarily want a strong Afghanistan
that can challenge its interests. Nor does Tehran want powers such as Pakistan to gain
influence in the region at its expense.
At the same time, Iran does not want a chaotic Afghanistan, or one ruled by the Taliban. So
while the U.S. drawdown provides certain opportunities for Iran, it is not a zero-sum game for
the Iranian government. An Afghan analyst we interviewed put it succinctly: “The Iranians are
smarter than to ask all the Americans to leave, because they know that if all the American
troops pull out, then Afghanistan will completely fall under the control of Pakistan.”17
While Iran will seek to increase its power in Afghanistan, its overall interests will likely
converge with American priorities. This does not mean that Iran will necessarily join the
Western coalition in Afghanistan, or that it will become a partner with the United States. There
may be a sense of competition between the two over Afghanistan. But both Tehran and
Washington could pursue their respective interests in ways that are mutually beneficial. Iran’s
influence in Afghanistan is not limitless, and it is unlikely to dominate its neighbor once the
United States leaves. This provides an opportunity for cooperation rather than zero-sum
competition.
This study examines Iran’s historical interests in Afghanistan and its current policies in that
country, and explores the potential implications for U.S. policy. The research is based on field
interviews in Afghanistan, the use of primary sources in Dari and Persian, and scholarly
research in English. Chapter Two explores Afghanistan’s current situation and its substantial
but complicated cultural, religious, political, and economic ties with Iran. Chapter Three
examines Iran’s relations with other regional actors in Afghanistan, including Pakistan, India,
and Russia. Chapter Four assesses implications for U.S. interests.
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

_______________
1 Victor Mallet, “Afghanistan’s Forgotten Crisis: Its Economy,” Financial Times, May 20, 2013.
2 Michael Nicoletti, “Opium Production and Distribution: Poppies, Profits and Power in Afghanistan,” thesis, DePaul University,
2011.
3 Afghan researcher, interview with the authors, January 4, 2013.
The authors conducted fieldwork in Afghanistan by interviewing Afghan researchers, analysts, political leaders, and former
government officials. All interviews took place throughout Afghanistan and were translated by the authors.
4 World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, May 2012.
5 Jessica Donati, “Afghan President Karzai’s Brother to Offer Him Role If Elected,” Reuters, October 11, 2013.
 6 Former senior Afghan government official, interview with the authors, February 24, 2013.
7 Yama Torabi, The Growing Challenge of Corruption in Afghanistan: Reflections on a Survey of the Afghan People,
Part 3 of 4, Washington, D.C.: Asia Foundation, 2012.
8 Senior Afghan security official, interview with the authors, February 19, 2013.
9 “Report: Afghans Paid $3.9 Billion in Bribes Last Year,” Afghanistan Study Group, February 11, 2013.
10 Sven Mikser, Transition in Afghanistan: Assessing the Security Effort, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, draft general
report, April 8, 2011.
11 Afghan official, interview with the authors, February 21, 2013.
12 Zalmay Khalizad, “Afghanistan in 1994: Civil War and Destruction,” Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 2, February 1995, p. 147.
13 Siegfried O. Wolf, “Post-2014 Afghanistan: Future Scenarios from Structure and Agency Perspectives,” Journal of South
Asian Development, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2013.
14 Former Afghan official, interview with the authors, January 2, 2013.
15 Abdul-Qayum Mohmand, The Prospects for Economic Development in Afghanistan: Reflections on a Survey of the
Afghan People, Part 2 of 4, Washington, D.C.: Asia Foundation, 2012.
16 Senior Afghan security official, interview with the authors, January 2, 2013.
17 Afghan analyst, interview with the authors, January 4, 2013.
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.
 CHAPTER TWO

Iran and Afghanistan: A Complicated Relationship

Iran’s ambitions in Afghanistan should not be viewed as hegemonic. Tehran does not believe
that it can completely dominate its neighbor; instead, it has certain interests to protect,
including securing its eastern border, preserving the flow of water from Afghanistan,
countering narcotics, and dealing with the large Afghan refugee population on its soil. Tehran
is particularly anxious to prevent a total Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the expansion of
Pakistani power. It also does not desire a long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan; Iran
is the only regional power that has actively opposed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)
being negotiated between Kabul and Washington.
The Iranian government has attempted to achieve its objectives through a variety of means.
Iran’s cultural and religious bonds allow it to exercise influence over key ethnic and religious
groups, including the Tajik and Hazara, and their respective political parties. Iran is also an
important economic partner; it has provided Afghanistan with up to US$500 million in
development aid and is one of Afghanistan’s major trading partners. Moreover, Iran maintains
close ties to various militias and armed groups both allied with and battling U.S. forces.
Iran and Afghanistan have much in common: a shared language, deep historical and cultural
bonds, and at times common enemies. The security and stability of one is dependent on the
other. But it would be wrong to assume that their relationship is trouble free. While some
Afghans view Iran as a warm neighbor, and a possible protector, many resent what they
perceive to be Tehran’s heavy-handed interference in their affairs.
Many Afghans—especially the Tajiks, Hazara, and other non-Pashtuns—are particularly
worried about Pakistan and its ally, the Taliban. And while the Taliban is a Pashtun-dominated
political movement, many Afghans, including the Pashtun, are worried about Pakistani
influence in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. It is thus tempting for Iran to view itself as a natural
counterweight to Pakistan, and the protector of Afghanistan’s embattled minorities. After all,
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

Tehran supported Tajik and Shia (Hazara) Mujahideen commanders during the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan, and later provided aid to the Northern Alliance against the
Taliban.1

Close but Not Exclusive Ties with the Afghan Tajik and Shia
The cultural and religious ties between Iran and Afghanistan are strong, and can provide
Tehran with a substantial amount of political leverage. According to a prominent Afghan Shia
leader, “Iran currently has a strong presence in Afghanistan but most of it is unofficial. It all
goes back to culture, customs, and language.”2 Dari, one of Afghanistan’s two official
 languages, spoken by roughly 50 percent of the population, is closely related to Persian
(Farsi), Iran’s official language.3 Most Iranians and Afghans would probably be able to
communicate with each other, depending on local dialects and accents. Moreover, millions of
other Afghans, including many members of the educated elite, have lived and studied in Iran
and are very familiar with the Persian language. Afghanistan’s Dari-speaking Tajiks in
particular may feel a cultural affinity with Iran. Much of western and northeastern Afghanistan,
in addition to major cities like Kabul, is populated by Tajiks.4
Most Afghans, including Tajiks, are Sunni Muslims, whereas Iran’s population is between
90 and 95 percent Shia.5 Nevertheless, a significant portion of Afghanistan’s population,
perhaps nearly 20 percent, belongs to the Shia sect.6 Among them are the Hazara, a much-
persecuted minority group of Asiatic origin inhabiting what is known as the Hazarajat, a region
in Bamyan and surrounding provinces.7 The Hazara are the largest Shia community in
Afghanistan, although there are other Shia groups, such as the Qizilbash, the Farsiwan, and the
Sayyeds.
The Hazara, who have traditionally looked to Tehran for religious and political guidance,
have emerged as important social and political actors in Afghanistan since the 2001 overthrow
of the Taliban. Hazara politicians occupy important government posts in Kabul, and are likely
to retain them after the U.S. drawdown. Karim Khalili, the Afghan vice president and leader of
the Hazara Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, is likely to play an important role in the post-2014
government. The Hazara, who suffered heavy discrimination at the hands of the Taliban, have
also become more explicit in the expression of their Shia faith. Public processions marking
Shia holy days, once forbidden under the Taliban, have become much more common on the
streets of Kabul and other cities.8
Many of the Hazara and other Afghan Shia sympathize with Iran, much more so than with
Pakistan, for example. One Afghan Shia leader stated: “Looking at the past, we can see that
Iran hasn’t really played any role in insecurity or destabilization of Afghanistan. On the other
hand, you can see that Pakistan is not willing to have a stable Afghanistan by its side. From the
time of Jihad until now, Pakistan has played ninety percent of the role in destroying the
infrastructures of Afghanistan.”9
Iran is likely to use its ties with the Hazara (and other Shia) to exercise influence in
Afghanistan. According to one source, up to 55 members of the parliament are Shia and may
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

have connections to Iran.10 Many Afghan Shia leaders also feel a personal religious affinity
with Iran.11
Nevertheless, the Iranian government has also courted Pashtun groups, including the
Taliban. Iran has long maintained a relationship with Gulbeddin Hekmatyar’s Pashtun-
dominated Hezb-e Islami. Hekmatyar sought refuge in Iran from 1996, when the Taliban took
over Kabul, until 2002, when Iran expelled Hekmatyar from the country.12 And it is likely that
he has received some amount of Iranian support in his battle against U.S. forces and ISAF in
the past decade.13 An influential Afghan told us that Afghanistan’s “ex-ambassador to Iran was
also a previous member of Hezb-e Islami and was so close to the Islamic Republic that we all
know about the bags of money that he was receiving.”14
 The Iranian government has also engaged in political discussions with Taliban
representatives. Moreover, Taliban delegations have visited Tehran as part of Iranian-
sponsored peace talks.15 Although Iran views the Tajik and Hazara as being its best
interlocutors in Afghanistan, it nevertheless views the Pashtun and even the Taliban as
important to its overall strategy.
There may be a recognition among some elements in Iran that today’s Taliban, although not
friendly toward Iranian interests, is nevertheless not the zealous and fanatic Taliban of the
1990s.16 If anything, the Taliban and the Islamic Republic share a common foe, the United
States. Tehran may realize that the Taliban is likely to be a major factor in Afghanistan after the
U.S. drawdown. Therefore, it makes sense that Iran is hedging its bets and not entirely relying
on its traditional Shia and Tajik partners. As one influential Afghan told us, Iran is “confident
of the conditions to an extent. Even if the Taliban comes to power, Iran has a way to deal with
the Taliban.”17
The Islamic Republic, although wary of the Taliban, has not allowed religious and
ideological issues to interfere with political expediency. Tehran has historically worked with
non-Shia groups throughout the Middle East and Muslim world; although Iran maintains close
ties to Shia and related groups, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah (and the Allawite regime in
Syria), it nevertheless does not use sect as a decisive factor in its political calculations.

Iran’s Political Role in Afghanistan

Iran viewed Afghanistan as important to its national security even before its 1979 revolution.
Iran’s last monarch, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, worried about the spread of communism in
Afghanistan and provided economic and military support to various Afghan parties. The
Islamic Republic, which replaced the Iranian monarchy, shared similar concerns.
Iran’s revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was opposed to Soviet
domination of Afghanistan and was a proponent of the spread of the Islamic Revolution under
velayat-e faghih (rule of the supreme jurisprudent).18 The Shia ulema of Afghanistan at the
time espoused a range of views on the role of religion in government, and Tehran provided the
most support to the groups that followed Khomeini’s line. Several Afghan Shia groups based
out of Iran developed into Afghanistan’s Hazara-dominated Hezb-e Wahdat political party.19
However, the Islamic Republic, distracted by internal unrest and Saddam Hussein’s 1980
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

invasion, was not able to devote much attention or resources to its eastern neighbor. The
Afghan Mujahideen, dominated by Sunni groups, received more support from Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, and the United States, although Iran did help organize and direct Afghan Shia
Mujahideen forces.20
Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan increased after the Soviet departure and the fall of the
Najibullah government in 1992.21 The war with Iraq ended in 1988, allowing a more stable
Iran to spend resources to spread its influence in Afghanistan.22 From 1992 to 1996, Tehran
backed several Mujahideen groups fighting for control of Afghanistan, particularly Kabul. Iran
not only supported the Burhanuddin Rabbani government in Kabul at the time but was also
 simultaneously providing assistance to Hezb-e Wahdat, which was occasionally engaged in
armed struggle with the central government, thus demonstrating Iran’s flexible approach to
Afghanistan.23 After the Taliban’s relatively rapid victory in 1996, Iran backed what came to
be known as the Northern Alliance (or Northern Front): an Afghan opposition movement
composed of militias centered on Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara strongmen from northern
Afghanistan.
Iran’s relations with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan were often tense, if not outright hostile. The
Taliban, heavily influenced by Wahhabi religious doctrine emanating from Saudi Arabia,
viewed Shia-dominated Iran as a heresy.24 The Taliban’s persecution of Afghan Shia,
particularly the Hazara, further complicated relations between Tehran and Kabul.
The Islamic Republic views itself as a protector of the Shia “downtrodden,” and felt
particularly chagrined at the Taliban’s oppression of the Hazara.25 The Taliban’s August 1998
massacre of the Hazara and murder of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e Sharif brought relations to
a new low. In response to the murders and other provocations, Iran amassed tens of thousands
of troops along its border with Afghanistan.26 It appeared that the Islamic Republic was poised
for an invasion of its eastern neighbor.
Iran and the Taliban never came to direct blows. But Tehran may have been more
convinced than ever before that the Northern Alliance was its best bet. Along with Russia and
India, the Islamic Republic became one of the main supporters of the anti-Taliban movement.
All three countries were unified in the belief that a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic
government in the region would have a negative impact on regional security and stability,
limiting trade and investment in the newly independent Central Asian states.
The 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan provided Iran with an opportunity to expand its
influence in Afghanistan. The swift overthrow of the Taliban by American and Northern
Alliance forces rid Tehran of an implacable foe. With American support, the Northern Alliance
and its allies assumed power in Kabul. However, the ethnic and religious makeup of
Afghanistan presented problems. The Northern Alliance was dominated by Dari-speaking
Tajiks, whereas an estimated 40 percent of Afghanistan’s population is Pashtun.27 Hamid
Karzai, a polished and urbane Pashtun from a prominent Afghan clan, emerged as the leading
candidate to become the country’s new leader. However, the Northern Alliance leadership,
keen to promote its own ethnic and religious interests on the new government, was resistant to
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

a Pashtun president.
Iran played a crucial role in persuading the Northern Alliance to support Karzai.
According to Ambassador James Dobbins, the American envoy to Afghanistan at the time (and
the current American envoy to Afghanistan), it was the Iranian envoy, Mohammad Javad Zarif,
who convinced Younis Qanooni, a powerful Northern Alliance leader, to back Karzai.
Dobbins also received an offer from an Iranian general to assist in training the Afghan National
Army.28 According to a prominent Afghan leader, “If it weren’t for Iran, our Western friends
would not be able to come today so easily and tell us about all the things they have done for
us.”29
 Iran’s support for U.S. interests in Afghanistan was surprising given the level of mutual
hostility between Tehran and Washington. The major reason for Iran’s behavior was sheer
pragmatism. The U.S. overthrow of the Taliban benefited Iranian interests. But there were
other reasons for Iran’s helpful policies.
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami had adopted a policy of engagement with the West.
A proponent of “dialogue among civilizations,” Khatami was eager to decrease tensions not
only with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia but also with European countries and the
United States.30 Instead of exporting the Islamic revolution to the wider Middle East, Khatami
wanted to build cooperative relations with neighboring countries and global powers.
To understand Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan, one has to understand its relations with
the United States. Iran’s engagement with the United States in Afghanistan was shaped by
Khatami’s new approach. From the perspective of Iranian pragmatists, the United States and
Iran had converging interests in Afghanistan. They both opposed Taliban rule and desired a
stable and relatively strong central government in Kabul. Furthermore, Iran’s perennial Afghan
problems—including narcotics production, border insecurity, and refugees—were of concern
to the United States as well.
However, the Khatami government’s policies failed to produce the desired outcome. The
George W. Bush administration spurned Iran’s efforts of further cooperation in Afghanistan,
and instead branded Iran as a member of the Axis of Evil (the other members being Iraq and
North Korea).31 The U.S. government appeared to adopt a policy of regime change toward
Iran; Washington may have felt confident that this would work given its successful overthrow
of the Taliban in 2001 and Saddam Hussein in 2003.32
The negative U.S. reaction to Iran’s engagement efforts undercut Khatami’s political
standing in Tehran.33 Iranian conservatives, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, had long maintained that the correct approach toward the United States was
“resistance” rather than diplomatic engagement.34 Khamenei, the ultimate decision maker in
Iran, may have been amenable to Khatami’s engagement efforts, but up to a point. The U.S.
response to the Iranian overtures appeared to have confirmed his long-standing perception of
U.S. intentions, namely that Washington wanted to overthrow his regime rather than engage it.35
The initial U.S.-Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan was followed by a long period of
distrust and rising tensions. Iran’s secretive nuclear activities, the 2005 election of the hard-
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

line Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president, and Iranian support for Iraqi Shia insurgents fighting
U.S. forces brought U.S.-Iran relations to a new low. Cooperation in Afghanistan became a
moot point given the increasingly hostile relations between Tehran and Washington.
Nevertheless, Iran has played an overall positive role in Afghanistan. It has supported a
strong central government in Kabul. For Iran, a stable and secure Afghan government makes
sense. It can help prevent a Taliban takeover of the country and maintain security along Iran’s
border area. In addition, strong relations with a central government in Kabul allow Iran to
exercise influence beyond western Afghanistan and areas with Tajik and Hazara populations.
At the same time, Tehran has created a de facto zone of influence in western Afghanistan,
 focused on the city of Herat. Iran also has links to warlords and militias that often act
.

independently of Kabul. For example, the former warlord Ismail Khan, once the effective ruler
of Herat, is known to have close ties to Tehran.36

Iran’s Positive Economic Influence

Beginning in 2001, Iran’s policy toward Afghanistan has demonstrated a desire for stability in
its neighbor. Since 2002 Iran has pledged more than $500 million in economic assistance to
Afghanistan.37 Most of that amount has been spent on roads, energy infrastructure, and schools.
The Afghan government, particularly President Karzai, view Iran’s economic role in Iran as
being positive.38
Iran is also one of Afghanistan’s largest trading partners. Bilateral trade between the two
countries reached almost $5 billion by 2013, up from $2 billion in 2011.39 Although this figure
does not seem large by U.S. standards, it nevertheless demonstrates a deep economic
relationship between Iran and Afghanistan. Iran exports food products, medicine, oil, and
cement to Afghanistan, which is quite dependent on Iran for its oil and fuel needs.40
However, trade relations between the two are also lopsided. Iran exports far more to
Afghanistan than it imports from its poorer neighbor, as Iranian exports reportedly compose
approximately 75 percent of the traded goods.41 Overall, the trade imbalance between the two
countries favors Iran. This is largely due to Afghanistan’s weaker economic and industrial
base.
In some instances, Iran has used its economic advantage for political effect. The halting of
Iranian fuel exports to Afghanistan in the winter of 2010–2011, which had a negative impact on
the average Afghan, appears to have been an attempt to pressure U.S. forces and ISAF in
Afghanistan.42
But overall, Iran’s trade relations with Afghanistan serve a positive purpose. In addition to
the benefits of bilateral trade, Iran is helping other regional powers develop Afghanistan. For
example, India is helping Iran develop the Chabahar port on the Oman Sea in order to facilitate
Indian trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia.43 Chabahar will be linked to Afghanistan by
roads and railways being built by Iran and India.44
The Iranian-Indian endeavor is no doubt motivated by geopolitics; New Delhi wants to
Copyright © 2014. RAND Corporation, The. All rights reserved.

bypass Pakistan and build better relations with Afghanistan, and Kabul wants to diversify the
country’s trade routes and become less dependent on Pakistan. It is possible that Chabahar can
draw business away from Karachi, on which Afghanistan is heavily dependent. Pakistan has
often taken advantage of geography to pressure Afghanistan.45 As a prominent Afghan
businessman told us: “At the moment, the Pakistanis have made [operating through Karachi]
really expensive. It has put pressure on the people and the government of Afghanistan. They
take around $500 million of charges in a year. This might force businessmen to use the ports in
Chabahar. If this treatment is continued by Pakistan, then not only Chabahar but Bandar Abbas
[Iran’s biggest port] as well is a good option for us.”46
Iran’s cooperation with India also helps Tehran decrease its international isolation and
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