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Tamils and the nation India and Sri Lanka compared 1st
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Author(s): Madurika Rasaratnam
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Tamils and the Nation: India and Sri Lanka Compared
Madurika Rasaratnam
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Published: 2016 Online ISBN: 9780190638580 Print ISBN: 9780190498320
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Madurika Rasaratnam
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Acknowledgements
Published: August 2016
Over the course of researching and writing this book, I have been fortunate to have the support and
encouragement of many people and I would like to say a special thanks to some of them. The book emerged
from my doctoral research and my rst thanks are due to John Breuilly, my supervisor, for his dedicated
support. He took a deep interest in the puzzle this book addresses, and our many discussions over the years
have shaped its arguments and my scholarly development. I have bene ted greatly from the intellectually
stimulating environments of the Department of Government at the LSE, where I completed my doctoral
thesis, the Department of Politics and International Studies at SOAS, where I completed my undergraduate
studies and taught for several years, and the School of Politics and International Relations at the University
of Kent, where I presently teach. I am especially grateful to Mark La ey for his mentoring and friendship.
My understanding of Sri Lankan, Indian and Diaspora politics has been immeasurably strengthened by
numerous friends and colleagues who share my interests. In particular I would like to thank David Rampton,
James Manor, and Jan Jananayagam. My long-standing involvement with the Tamil Guardian has been a
de ning experience, and the countless conversations with the team, past and present, have helped me to
sustain an intimate engagement with Tamil politics. They also provided insightful comments on drafts of
several chapters. I am grateful to Michael Dwyer and Rob Pinney at Hurst for their enthusiasm for the
project—and their patience as I completed the manuscript!
This book and the doctoral dissertation which preceded it would not have been possible without many
interviews and conversations with past and present political leaders, journalists and activists in south India
p. viii and Sri Lanka. The origins of this book can be traced to a chance encounter in 1998 with the late
Dharmaratnam Sivaram, the leading Tamil journalist of recent decades He encouraged me to study politics
and sparked my interest in the historical depth of Tamil nationalist mobilisation and the international
dynamics of Sri Lanka’s con ict, of which he was known as a keen and perceptive analyst as well as a
participant. I am also indebted to the late Anton Balasingham, the chief negotiator and political strategist of
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, for generously sharing with me his time, experiences and sharp
insights into Tamil, Sri Lankan and international politics. His wife Adele has also been a source of warm
encouragement. I am also grateful to Gajen Ponnambalam for numerous conversations on Tamil nationalist
mobilisation and for introducing me to his fellow Tamil politicians in Sri Lanka.
I began work on this manuscript soon after my baby daughter was born, and its completion has depended on
the goodwill, encouragement and help of family and friends. My mother has been generous to a fault,
sharing caring for Maalathy with my partner Sutha to allow me the time to write. My dear friend Vino
Kanapathipillai repeatedly went out of her way, extending assistance and thoughtful advice just when they
were most needed—I look forward to repaying my debt as she begins writing up her own manuscript. The
moral support and company of my brother Ramkumar and my other dear old friends Neil Young, Ezra
Zahabi and Barira Limbada added to the pleasures whilst easing the anxieties of both motherhood and
writing. Most importantly, I have relied on Sutha and his a ection, humour and indefatigable enthusiasm
for life. His careful and critical reading also immeasurably improved the text, though I alone am responsible
for any errors. We share the pleasure of seeing it in print. Finally I am indebted to my late grandmother,
Sathyabhama Cumaraswamy, who passed away while I was completing this manuscript. She shared and
developed my interest in politics and history, not least because in her ninety three years she lived through
and sometimes participated in many of the tumultuous events discussed in these pages. It is dedicated to
her.
Tamils and the Nation: India and Sri Lanka Compared
Madurika Rasaratnam
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190498320.001.0001
Published: 2016 Online ISBN: 9780190638580 Print ISBN: 9780190498320
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Acronyms
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190498320.002.0006 Pages ix–x
Published: August 2016
ACTC
All Ceylon Tamil Congress
AI/ADMK
All India/Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Anna Dravidian Progressive Association)
BJP
Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party)
CNA
Ceylon National Association
CNC
Ceylon National Congress
CP
Communist Party
DK
Dravida Kazhagam (Dravidian Association)
DMK
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian Progressive Association)
FP
Federal Party
INC
Indian National Congress
ITAK
Illangai Tamil Arasu Kazhagam (Sri Lanka Tamil Government Association)
JVP
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front)
JYC
Ja na Youth Congress
LSSP
Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Lanka Equal Society Party)
LTTE
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MDMK
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Renewed Dravidian Progressive Association)
MEP
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (People’s United Front)
MGR
M. G. Ramachandran (leader of ADMK)
PMK
Pattali Makkal Katchi (Common People’s Party)
OHCHR
O ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
SLFP
Sri Lanka Freedom Party
TNA
Tamil National Alliance
p. x
TULF
Tamil United Liberation Front
UNHRC
United Nations Human Rights Council
UNP
United National Party
Tamils and the Nation: India and Sri Lanka Compared
Madurika Rasaratnam
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190498320.001.0001
Published: 2016 Online ISBN: 9780190638580 Print ISBN: 9780190498320
CHAPTER
Introduction
Madurika Rasaratnam
Abstract
The chapter sets out the book’s core argument: contingent political processes and the more or less
inclusive national identities they produce are causal in explaining the contrasting outcomes of the two
Tamil-speaking regions. The book adopts a conceptual and processes centered approach to ethnic and
national politics. Ethnicity and nation are understood as core concepts of political contestation and
organization in modern national states. Nationalist movements can resolve the problem of reconciling
ethnic pluralism and national identity in more or less inclusive ways. The chapter identi es the speci c
and temporally sustained processes that distinguish successful political movements that can explain
the very di erent national identities that emerged in India and Sri Lanka despite similar conditions.
1
The strikingly divergent political trajectories of the Tamil-speaking regions of south India and Sri Lanka
present an interesting puzzle for the study of ethnicity, nationalism and ethnic con ict. From the early
decades of the twentieth century, movements and ideologies stressing a distinct Tamil political identity and
interest have dominated Tamil politics in both south India and Sri Lanka. However, the relationship
between these movements and their respective states has evolved in very di erent ways and resulted in
dramatically di erent economic and political outcomes for the two Tamil-speaking regions. Tamil Nadu is
today an economically successful and politically stable component of the Indian Union. It has good
development indicators, a ourishing culture industry and has been well represented at the Union level
since independence. In contrast, the Tamil-speaking regions of Sri Lanka have been devastated by thirty
years of high-intensity armed con ict which ended brutally in May 2009 without resolving, and indeed
2
exacerbating, the underlying ethnic polarisation. While Tamil Nadu’s relationship with the government in
Delhi has at times been fractious and tense, disputes have invariably been contained within the
constitutional framework and never escalated into sustained violence. In Sri Lanka, however, relations
between the Colombo government and Tamil political actors since independence have been marked by
confrontation, abandoned compromises and recurrent violence that escalated into protracted militarised
con ict.
What is peculiar about these contrasting outcomes of south Indian ethnic accommodation and violent
ethnic con ict in Sri Lanka is that they are both diametrically at odds with the historical dynamics of Tamil
politics. In the late colonial period the south Indian Dravidian movement opposed Congress-led Indian
p. 2 nationalist mobilisation as a direct threat to Tamil identity and interests. Then when independence from
Britain approached, Dravidian leaders even advocated separation from India as a means of securing Tamils
against the alleged threats of Indian domination. This antagonism continued in the immediate post-
independence period. For example, the Indian government’s attempts in 1965 to replace English with Hindi
as the o cial language led to widespread and violent protests across Tamil Nadu. Seven people self-
immolated in protest against the act while two took poison, and up to 150 people were killed in ensuing
3
clashes between protesters and police. Con ict did not, however, escalate. Instead, from 1967 onwards,
Dravidian parties have held power at the state level and have worked comfortably within the Indian
constitutional framework. In 1976 the Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK), one of the two major
Dravidian parties, even added the All India pre x to its name to signal explicitly its acceptance of the Indian
4
constitutional framework, though it has remained an exclusively Tamil Nadu party. Furthermore, the
Dravidian parties were important partners in the coalition governments which governed in Delhi from the
early 1990s until April 2014.
While Tamil Nadu politics have moved from separation to integration, Sri Lankan Tamil politics have moved
in the opposite direction. From the late nineteenth century, Sri Lankan Tamil politicians led attempts to
form panethnic nationalist organisations, actively collaborating with Sinhalese politicians in these e orts.
As independence approached, Tamil political leaders advocated power-sharing within a single uni ed
constitutional structure as a means of promoting and protecting Tamil interests. Con ict between the
Tamils and the increasingly Sinhala Buddhist state emerged in the wake of the 1956 Sinhala Only act, which
established Sinhala as the sole language of state administration. This sparked demonstrations across the
Tamil-speaking areas, blockading government o ces and bringing civil administration to a standstill.
Although the protests were widespread and sustained, they were nevertheless quite tame in comparison
with the intensity of the language protests in Tamil Nadu. But con ict steadily escalated, despite occasional
and always abortive ‘pacts’ between Tamil and Sinhala leaders, and in 1977 a coalition of Tamil parties,
citing a history of state violence and discrimination, swept the polls in the Tamil-speaking areas on a
platform of independence. At around the same time, episodic confrontations emerged between the now
Sinhala-dominated military and a nascent Tamil insurgency seeking independence through armed struggle.
Military repression and continuing anti-Tamil violence, culminating in the July 1983 pogrom alongside
p. 3 powerful international interventions, tipped the simmering insurgency into a full-blown civil war. The
turning point of the con ict came in 1977 when the newly elected United National Party (UNP) government
adopted a series of pro-market economic reforms, pointedly abandoning the state-led development policies
of previous governments, and thus became an enthusiastic member of the US-led anticommunist alliance,
receiving both developmental assistance as well as military and diplomatic backing in its campaign against
Tamil militancy. Sri Lanka’s decisive shift towards the West and away from its previous ‘non-aligned’
stance prompted in turn Indian intervention that sought to counter the Westward tilt by providing support
and training to an array of Tamil militant groups. These developments fuelled the rapid militarisation of the
con ict whilst irreversibly enmeshing it in the shifting dynamics of Cold War and post-Cold War liberal
order making.
These dramatic reversals, from separation to union in Tamil Nadu and in the opposite direction in Sri Lanka,
despite a range of historical, social and economic similarities between the two cases, make them uniquely
comparable. India and Sri Lanka have a shared history of British colonial rule followed by sustained
competitive electoral democracy. They have similar social and economic systems, and electoral politics in
both states continue to include patronage networks that distribute public resources of various kinds. They
also have similar patterns of ethnic cleavages with overlapping di erences of caste, religion, language,
biological notions of race based on physical appearance and region. It has been suggested that India’s more
ethnically fragmented population, where the Hindu majority is cleaved by di erences of language and caste,
is more conducive to ethnic accommodation than Sri Lanka’s binary division between a Sinhala Buddhist
majority and a Tamil-speaking minority. However, the idea of a consolidated Sinhala Buddhist–Tamil
con ict in Sri Lanka overlooks regional, religious and caste cleavages that have been important sites of
5
intra-Sinhala and intra-Tamil con ict. Conversely, from the early decades of the twentieth century Indian
Hindu nationalists have sought to create a majoritarian Hindu political identity that incorporates intra-
6
Hindu caste and linguistic cleavages. The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) victory in the
April 2014 parliamentary elections relied in part on successfully mobilising cross-caste support in regions
7
where caste identities have long been politically important. In short, the political salience of an
overwhelming ethnic majority in Sri Lanka and a more ethnically fragmented polity in India are themselves
outcomes in need of explanation, and not pre-given variables that can underlie the divergent outcomes of
the Tamil question in India and Sri Lanka.
p. 4
Aims of the book
This book argues that the key to explaining this stark di erence in trajectories is the dominant
understanding of national identity that has come to structure political competition in the two states. The
politically dominant conception of national identity in India un-problematically includes Tamils, whereas
that in Sri Lanka does not. Through a comparative analysis of national identity formation that extends over
time from the late colonial era to the present day, the book argues that contingent—in that they could have
been otherwise—processes of political organisation and mobilisation explain the stark divergence between
the two Tamil-speaking regions. The empirical chapters show how distinct patterns of political activity that
emerged in comparable conditions brought to the fore very di erent conceptions of national identity. In
India patterns of political organisation and mobilisation beginning in the late nineteenth century and
reaching a crucial turning point in the mid twentieth century established the political dominance of the
Indian National Congress and its pan-ethnic conception of national identity that was inclusive of Tamils. In
contrast, in Sri Lanka, a di erent pattern of political activity over the same period and in comparable
conditions established as dominant a Sinhala Buddhist conception of the nation hostile to Tamil claims and
demands. The cross-case comparison sets out the contingency of the patterns of political activity, which
diverged despite similar conditions, as well as their causal force in establishing very di erent conceptions of
the nation and the attendant ethnic accommodations and con icts that these subsequently entailed. The
comparison of each case over time sets out in turn the causal force of national identity in establishing the
divergent relations of ethnic accommodation in India and ethnic polarisation, leading to violent con ict, in
Sri Lanka. Taken together therefore, the comparison between cases and the analysis of each case over time
establish both the contingency of national identities but also their causal force in the divergent outcomes of
the two Tamil-speaking regions. The analysis thus explains the dramatic reversals in south Indian and Sri
Lankan Tamil politics; from separatism to accommodation in the former and from pan-ethnic nationalism
to secession in the latter, as e ects of contingent but temporally continuous political processes and the
more or less ethnically inclusive identities that these create.
The analysis begins in the late nineteenth century and ends in the present day. It is divided into two parts.
Part One examines nationalist and Tamil politics comparatively in the two cases, from their rst emergence
p. 5 in the nineteenth century to a point of mature development in the late 1970s, when the relations of ethnic
accommodation in India and ethnic con ict in Sri Lanka were both apparent and settled. The con gurations
of Tamil Nadu’s stable accommodation in the Indian national framework have remained largely unchanged
since then, sustaining its ongoing stability as well as relative prosperity and economic development. There
have of course been important political developments as well as socio-economic changes, for example the
8
mobilisation of Dalit political parties, but these have not unsettled Tamil Nadu’s accommodation within
the Indian Union. In contrast, Sri Lanka’s ethnic con ict has been through radical shifts, intensifying in
violence as well as internationalising in scope, such that the con guration of actors and their relations have
transformed beyond measure.
Part Two is therefore devoted to Sri Lanka, tracing the genesis, escalation and ending of Sri Lanka’s armed
con ict from the late 1970s to the present, as well as discussing the subsequent and post-war
intensi cation of the underlying antagonism between the Sinhala Buddhist state and a now globalised
Tamil nationalist movement. It focuses on the pivotal role of international actors and processes in the war
and subsequent post-war period. The turn to the international is a departure from the framework of
analysis used in Part One, but one that is grounded in the deep and transformative internationalisation of
Sri Lanka’s ethnic con ict. The chapters show how the rapid militarisation of the con ict was coeval with its
internationalisation, and also how the unintended consequences of international action shaped in often
decisive ways the capacity of Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil nationalist actors to pursue their projects,
generally advantaging the former at the expense of the latter. It uses the term ‘liberal peace’ to capture the
directionality of international interventions in Sri Lanka that continue to seek an ethnically inclusive,
liberal-democratic and market-orientated state. International interventions in Sri Lanka are thus
understood as part of a broader set of Western- (primarily US-) led, post-WWII international processes and
institutions orientated towards securing a global paci c order based on the principles of liberal democracy
and market economics. The analysis draws on the now established scholarly and policy literature on liberal
order making, including the literature on Sri Lanka’s con ict, that uses the term ‘liberal peace’ to
characterise international e orts to secure peace and stability in sites of con ict and instability. In this
literature the liberal peace entails a di use and loosely coordinated, rather than centrally planned, set of
activities led by states, non-state actors and multilateral organisations orientated towards overlapping ends
such as con ict management, peace-building, economic reform, development, security sector reform,
human rights advocacy and democracy promotion.
p. 6 The chapters in Part Two show how and why Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil nationalist movements continued
to reproduce themselves and their preferred conceptions of national and ethnic order amidst powerful
international e orts to secure liberal reform. They explain why international e orts failed to realise their
stated ends—an ethnically inclusive liberal, democratic peace—and worked instead to fuel the
militarisation of the con ict whilst inadvertently strengthening the Sinhala Buddhist character of the state
and military that in turn also intensi ed countervailing Tamil nationalist mobilisation. The nalchapter
discusses the role of India and Tamil Nadu in the now internationalised post-war politics of Sri Lanka’s
ethnic con ict and thereby brings the divergent but now intersecting trajectories of the two Tamil-speaking
regions to the present. It shows that these complex and internationalised dynamics have their origins in the
contingent patterns of national identity politics that began in the late nineteenth century. Tamil Nadu
actors’ advocacy on behalf of Tamils in Sri Lanka is locked into a stable accommodation within the Indian
national-state framework that was formed in colonial era political processes, whereas Sri Lanka’s ethnic
con ict—now played out across international fora—is equally rooted in contingent patterns of nationalist
mobilisation that established a dominant and ethnically hierarchical Sinhala Buddhist nationalism
incompatible with Tamil nationalist demands for national autonomy and equality.
The politics of Tamil and national identities in India and Sri Lanka present plausible and interesting cases
for comparison, not just because of the social, historical and economic similarities in which the divergent
outcomes emerged, but also because of their ongoing and important connections. While both countries
share a history of British colonial rule, there were also important pre British political and trade relations
9
that embedded the island within broader Indian as well as south-east Asian ambits. The social and political
movements that shaped Tamil and national identities from the nineteenth century onwards were also
connected. There were connections between Indian Hindu revivalists and Sinhala Buddhists in Sri Lanka and
connections between the Tamil revivalisms of south India and Sri Lanka. The Indian Congress movement
10
was also in uential amongst Tamil and Sinhala political actors in Sri Lanka.
While these connections are pivotal in understanding the constitution of ethnic and national identities, the
analysis here nevertheless takes the two national states—India and Sri Lanka—as discrete units of
p. 7 comparison. It does so because conceptions of national identity and the powerful transformations of
ethnic inclusion, exclusion and hierarchy that they generate are contained within the territorial boundaries
of the state. Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and Indian nationalism were formed amidst cross-border
processes of economic, social and political change, but Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has worked to
marginalise both politically and economically the Tamils in Sri Lanka, not those in India, while Indian
nationalism incorporated Tamils in India, not those in Sri Lanka. Likewise, despite their manifold and
ongoing connections, Tamil politics in India and Sri Lanka have remained distinct and autonomous in their
goals and objectives. Sri Lankan and Indian political leaders have in the past, and usually opportunistically,
raised the spectre of a pan-Tamil irredentism crossing the Palk straits, unsettling Indian and Sri Lankan
state boundaries; but Tamil political activity has always been separated by state borders and de ned by the
11
national framework of its respective state. While Tamils in Sri Lanka have sought support from Tamils in
Tamil Nadu, and the latter are now enthusiastic in providing it, their joint enterprise is in seeking a
12
reorientation of power for the bene t of Tamils in Sri Lanka, rather than a joint political project as Tamils.
For these reasons the analysis presented here works within rather than against the territorial boundaries of
the two states.
The following section sets out the understandings of nationalism and ethnicity as well as the broader
theoretical framework that informs the empirical analysis presented here. The subsequent and third section
reviews existing approaches to ethnicity and nationalism in South Asia and shows how the focus on national
identity and political processes adopted in this study contributes to this literature. The nal and fourth
section then sets out an overview of the subsequent chapters, linking them to the overarching focus on the
causal role of contingent political processes and the powerful—as well as more or less ethnically inclusive—
national identities they create.
Framework of analysis
The nation and ethnicity are understood here as political concepts that are ubiquitous and unavoidable in
the politics of the modern nation-state system. The centrality of the nation and ethnicity derive from their
close connection to the doctrine of popular sovereignty, the sole principle of political legitimacy within the
13
system of nation-states. The claim to rule on behalf of the people is now ubiquitous, such that today
14
‘rulers, however tyrannical their rule, justify their sovereignty as an expression of their nation’s will’.
p. 8 Popular sovereignty insists that authority ows directly from the people, but as the concept of popular
sovereignty evolved and expanded from the late eighteenth century, the people have invariably been
identi ed as a nation; that is a collective—rather than a collection of individuals—constituted as such by a
shared history that in nationalist understandings also entails shared cultural characteristics and a shared
15
attachment to territory. The transformations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through the
interlinked processes of capitalism, war, colonial rule and industrialisation produced a globe-encompassing
system of territorial states that were at the same time also understood as national states; states that were of
and for the people as nations within their boundaries. Ethnicity and nationalism were not however surplus
or accidental by-products of this process; rather, as Andreas Wimmer argues, ‘modernity itself rests on a
basis of ethnic and nationalist principles’. That is:
The main promises of modernity—political participation, equal treatment before the law and
protection from the arbitrariness of state power, dignity for the weak and poor, and social justice
and security—were fully realised only for those who came to be regarded as true members of the
nation. The modern principles of inclusion are intimately tied to ethnic and national forms of
16
exclusion.
The terms nation and ethnicity are therefore linked in de ning the patterns of inclusion and exclusion.
Almost all national states contain culturally diverse populations that must somehow be reconciled into the
ideal of a historically constituted and culturally homogenous whole. This immediately raises a set of vexed
and contentious questions. Which of the various linguistic, religious, caste or regional groups contained
within the boundaries of the state will come to form the national core, and which will be excluded? It is in
this context of national inclusion and exclusion that terms such as ethnicity, minority, community and
communal acquire their political salience and meaning. In relation to the problem of de ning the
boundaries of national community, ethnicity and its cognates cover the set of di erences that are held to be
inherited and form the basis of categories that identify multi-generational populations. These categories
furthermore can become politically salient as markers of national inclusion, exclusion or hierarchical
subordination.
Class, gender and sexual orientation may also be important and often violent sites of national exclusion and
subordination; but the categories that are de ned as ethnic are di erent in that they may also form the basis
of national claims to political autonomy and maximally self-rule in an independent state. The ethnic
identities that become politically salient contain a historically speci c mix of religious, linguistic, caste and
p. 9 other categories. For example, Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism mobilises support from Tamil-speaking
Hindus and Christians but not Tamil-speaking Muslims, who tend to identify politically as Muslims rather
than Tamils. Ethnicity, like the nation, identi es a hereditary population deemed to have a shared past,
cultural solidarity and a claim to territory. As concepts the nation and ethnicity therefore overlap. While all
nations are in part ethnic—even so called ‘civic’ or ‘political’ nationalisms characterise the nation as a
17
multi-generational community with a shared past and shared ‘ancestors’ —ethnicity may also, but does
not always, form the basis of national claims. Caste is an important site of political mobilisation across
India, but does not form the basis of claims to national autonomy. Ethnicity is therefore distinct from class,
gender and sexual orientation not because it is more acute or more important than these other social
categories; in fact in many, if not most, circumstances it may be less so. Rather, ethnicity is distinct because
it can lead to speci c forms of inclusion and exclusion from the national community. Exclusion on the basis
of class, gender and sexual orientation is often linked to calls for greater equality or inclusion within the
existing boundaries of the national state. In contrast, ethnicity may form the basis for wholesale exclusion
of a multi-generational population, but may also serve as the basis of demands for national autonomy.
While ethnic pluralism thereby poses a problem that has to be overcome in the formation of a uni ed sense
of national community, this problem can be solved in more or less inclusive ways. This is apparent in the
contrast between the pan-ethnic conception of the Indian nation linked to the Congress movement and
Sinhala Buddhist nationalism that has dominated Sri Lanka’s politics in the post-independence era.
Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s rst post-independence Prime Minister, describes the diversity of India as
‘tremendous’. He notes in particular the di erence between the ‘Pathan of the North-West and the Tamil in
the far South’, whose ‘racial stocks are not the same’ and they di er in ‘race and gure, food and clothing
and of course language’. In between these two extremes are the myriad other groups, and he lists amongst
others the Marathas, the Gujaratis, the Malayalis, the Andhras, the ‘great central block’ of Hindustani-
speakers and the Kashmiris. But amidst all this diversity—all these groups have maintained their ‘peculiar
characteristics for hundreds of years’—there is also a historically constituted unity:
Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization. That
unity was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a standardisation of externals or
even of beliefs. It was something deeper and, within its fold, the widest tolerance of belief and
18
custom was practiced and every variety acknowledged and even encouraged.
p. 10 This understanding of the historical origins of the Indian nation has of course always been in con ict with
19
one that is more exclusively Hindu but was nevertheless important in de ning crucial aspects of the
Indian constitutional framework, particularly those related to language. In contrast the Sinhala Buddhist
conception explicitly excludes Tamil-speaking groups from the conception of the national core. Successive
Sinhala leaders from the early twentieth century to the present have equated the Sri Lankan nation with the
Sinhala nation and drawn on a history of the island in which the Tamils are positioned as invaders from
south India repeatedly threatening the ourishing Buddhist civilisation of the Sinhalese. This equation
between Sri Lanka and Sinhala is evident in a speech made by J. R. Jayewardene in 1987 in which he avers:
[The] Sri Lankan nation has stood out as the most wonderful nation in the world because of several
unique characteristics. [The] Sinhala nation has followed one faith, that is Buddhism for an
unbroken period of 2500 years…. The language of the King and the people 2100 years ago had been
Sinhala which we speak today…. Another unique heritage is the country’s history of sovereignty
20
and territorial integrity.
These depictions of national community gain force because they have become the principle axis of social
inclusion and exclusion. The boundaries of national community determine the entitlement to citizenship,
the distribution of economic goods and services, including welfare, military recruitment and the rights to
political representation. The analysis presented in the empirical chapters shows how the relative stability
and prosperity of Tamil Nadu is linked to the inclusion of Tamils within the ‘unity in diversity’ conception
of national identity associated with the Congress movement and politically dominant in the post-
independence decades. In contrast the Sinhala Buddhist conception of national identity excludes Tamils
from full membership of the nation and is linked to the post-independence exclusion of Tamils in Sri Lanka
from economic opportunities and political life, materially manifest in the relative impoverishment of the
21
Tamil-speaking regions and populations compared with their earlier relative prosperity. These material
outcomes are linked to a hierarchical conception of national identity in which Tamils and other minorities
occupy a subordinate positon and thereby are denied equal access to the rights and privileges, or the
‘promises of modernity’, enjoyed by the national Sinhalese. This was set out bluntly by Sarath Fonseka,
Commander of the Sri Lankan Army (2005–9), credited with the May 2009 victory over the LTTE. In an
interview given in 2008, Fonseka declaimed:
p. 11 I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities
and we treat them like our people…. We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give
in and we have the right to protect this country. We are also a strong nation … They can live in this
country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue
22
things.
The cross-case comparison of national inclusion and exclusion in India and Sri Lanka, as well as the
comparison of each case over time, show that these outcomes were not inevitable, but rather dependent on
contingent processes of political mobilisation through which more or less inclusive conceptions of national
identity were asserted, contested and more or less securely established as the organising principles of social
and political activity. The dominance of a pan-ethnic conception of Indian national identity or a Sinhala
Buddhist conception of Sri Lankan identity was not assured in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In India the Congress movement competed with Hindu, Tamil and Muslim movements that were
in various ways hostile to the Congress’s national claims. Likewise in Sri Lanka, alongside the Sinhala
Buddhist revivalist movement there were e orts to organise a pan-ethnic nationalist movement along the
lines of the Congress. The Sinhala Buddhist movement was also not assured of success as it had to overcome
intra-Sinhala ethnic cleavages (caste, region and religion) that were important sources of social and
political con ict at this time.
What therefore distinguishes successful ethnic and national movements from ones that fail? Why for
example was pan-ethnic nationalism successful in India while similar e orts in Sri Lanka failed? The
empirical chapters show that successful ethnic and national movements are those that bring together three
activities in a temporally sustained way: articulating an ideological framework that sets out key ideas about
the boundaries of national community and national interests; incorporating politically signi cant and
existing cleavages as well as interest groups; and nally e ectively marshalling support through activities
of direct political mobilisation. This framework builds on and departs from John Breuilly’s comparative
analysis of nationalist movements on the basis of the three functions of nationalist ideology: coordinating
23
diverse political interests, mobilising new groups, and legitimizing the movement to in uential outsiders.
But whereas Breuilly is concerned with the role of ideology, the focus here is on patterns of political activity,
of which setting out a clear ideological framework is only one. As the example of pan-ethnic nationalisms in
colonial India and Sri Lanka show, ideologically similar movements in comparable conditions can have
p. 12 di erent levels of success and therefore di erent outcomes; the causal di erence being absence or
presence of temporally continuous patterns of political activity that bring together the three activities
identi ed above.
In setting out an ideological framework, national movements have to make claims about the ethnic
boundaries of national community: which groups are included and which excluded. National movements
can variously set out a vision of national identity that is inclusive of all ethnic groups, that explicitly
excludes some groups whilst including others, or nally an ethnically hierarchical identity that privileges
some groups while subordinating others. Along with setting out a clear ideological framework, successful
political movements also have to mobilise support; this involves co-opting already powerful social and
political actors and directly mobilising amongst the target population. Groups and individuals who are co-
opted in such a way might support the movement for reasons that are quite apart from the movement’s
ideological objectives—for example, because they want political power. However, all ideological movements
that have become signi cant social and political forces must draw in, alongside the ideologically motivated
cadres, others who more or less consciously use the movement to pursue self-serving ends. Conversely, it
can be seen as a sign of an ideological movement’s success that individuals who are motivated to pursue
social recognition or power come to see the movement in question as a reliable or even unavoidable way of
securing these ends. Thirdly, all successful movements use methods such as mass protests and the channels
of mass communication to reach their target audience directly. This direct mobilisation requires constant
communication and often involves the use of popular and culturally resonant symbols and metonyms. The
scope and medium of direct mobilisation has therefore an impact on the ethnic boundaries of national
community. A movement can only build support amongst a target ethnic category if it is able directly and
e ectively to communicate its message by using resonant language and symbols. There is also a symbiotic
relationship between a movement’s proven capacity to mobilise support directly and its ability to co-opt the
support of powerful actors. Politically ambitious actors are more likely to support an ideological movement,
for whatever reason, if the latter has a proven capability for directly mobilising the support of a target
audience that is also important to the former.
The success of ethnic and nationalist movements is thus analytically distinct from the motivations and
interests of actors who participate in them. Ethnic and nationalist actors can be motivated by a wide range
p. 13 of interests that are quite apart from the stated objectives they pursue. Nevertheless by working to
advance a particular set of ethnic or nationalism claims, even for self-consciously self-seeking reasons,
they contribute to establishing the public visibility and resonance of those claims and the identities they
entail.
It is important to note two important caveats about the use of the word ‘success’ in this context. Firstly,
success does not refer here to a movement’s capacity to realise its stated outcomes which, in any case, are
often linked to external factors unrelated to its political salience and strength. For example, Sri Lanka
gained independence from British rule primarily because of the consequences of World War Two and the
related momentum of Indian independence. It was entirely unrelated to the fairly anaemic forces of the
anti-colonial movement on the island. Furthermore the Sinhala leaders to whom power was transferred
espoused—at least with British o cials—a pan-ethnic conception of national identity; but this was
extremely thin, not linked to a temporally continuous or socially expansive pattern of political activity, and
as such quickly dissolved after independence, leaving no lasting impact on the dynamics of political life. In
contrast, the Sri Lankan Tamil nationalist movement has utterly failed to secure its objective of Tamil self-
rule despite over six decades of powerful and coordinated mobilisation, rst through parliamentary politics,
then armed struggle. Nevertheless Sri Lankan Tamil nationalist mobilisation cannot be described as having
failed, as it has established a Tamil national identity as a dominant political reality which the Sri Lankan
state, international actors and non-nationalist Tamils have to negotiate in the now internationalised ethnic
con ict. Success therefore is not taken to mean a movement’s capacity to achieve stated objectives, but
rather its capacity to establish its preferred identity as an important, if not dominant, organising principle
of social and political life. It is in this way that Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism has been successful, though
having failed to secure its objective; whilst the pan-ethnic conception of Sri Lankan nationalism failed,
although it secured its objective of independence from colonial rule.
A second and related caveat is that success does not imply that a movement has transformed the day-to-day
subjective experiences and allegiances of its target population, or even its active adherents in its preferred
ethnic or national direction. The term ‘identity’ is thus used in relation to nationalism and ethnicity to
describe a spatially, socially and temporally consistent pattern of political activity embedded in formal as
well informal institutions, everyday behaviour and patterns of speech. The assertion that an ethnic or
national identity exists is not meant to imply the existence of an objective ‘group’ or a state of subjective
p. 14 allegiance and continually experienced social solidarity. Rather it is meant to capture a pattern of activity
that is publicly meaningful as ethnic or national and empirically observable over a sustained period of time.
National and ethnic identities are thus sustained patterns of social and political activity that can in turn be
outcomes of political mobilisation. Nationalist movements that capture state power can quickly and
e ectively transform social, economic and political life in their preferred direction by using the material
resources and coercive apparatus of public institutions. However, even national and ethnic movements that
fail to secure state power can nevertheless successfully establish their preferred identities as facts of social
and political life. Through sustained political mobilisation, they can build a broad electoral base and thereby
secure a lasting presence in political life. They can also mobilise mass protests and establish media and
other institutions to reproduce ethnic and national rituals, symbols and rhetoric in a banal but nevertheless
visible and productive way. When nationalist movements successfully mobilise support for an armed
struggle, they not only challenge the state’s territorial control but can also establish de facto governing
institutions that reproduce national identity in a state-like way. The successful assertion of an ethnic or
national identity is thus a matter of outward patterns of social and political behaviour over sustained
periods of time, rather than inward experiences of subjectivity, allegiance and solidarity.
Contribution to the extant literature
The analysis of ethnicity and nationalism that is presented here is focused on political processes,
contingency and the centrality of national and ethnic categories to the production, reproduction and
contestation of social, political and economic order in modern national states. The growing eld of ethnicity
24
and nationalism has been described as ‘unsurveyably vast’ but the approach here draws on two important
trends. The rst trend is the growing move away from ‘substantialist’ assumptions that presume the
existence of ethnic or national groups towards a focus on the processes and dynamics that underpin
25
nationalist and ethnic phenomena. Secondly, it also draws on the now substantial body of work that links
the political salience of national and ethnic categories to the modern territorial state and its allied political
26
principles of popular sovereignty. Ethnicity and nationalism matter not because they answer an innate
need for group solidarity, or because they are universally important components of human subjectivity; but
because they are powerful principles of political, social and economic ordering in the modern system of
territorial states.
p. 15 This explanation of the divergent outcomes of the two Tamil-speaking regions thus draws on but also
develops important trends in the study of ethnicity and nationalism. While focusing on the contingent
processes through which national and ethnic identities are constructed, it nevertheless also links these
identities to the core dynamics of social and political order in modern states and shows how once
established through long-run processes, they can have a powerful and directive e ect on social, political
and economic life. It argues therefore that while national and ethnic identities are indeed contingent and
constructed, they are not ephemeral and nor are they super uous to political contestation. Rather they are
core and unavoidable components in the struggles to contest and establish the legitimate boundaries of
political community and the authoritative purposes of public power and resources. This explanation also
uses the comparison between the two Tamil-speaking regions to show that while nation-building amidst
ethnic pluralism is a crucial and unavoidable problem, it is a problem that can be resolved in more or less
inclusive ways.
This study is also a contribution to the literature on ethnicity and nationalism in India and Sri Lanka, a
growing and theoretically as well as methodologically varied area of research that has sought to explain the
salience and often con ictual dynamics of ethnic and nationalist mobilisation in the two states. Extant
studies have focused on explaining a variety of phenomena such as Hindu–Muslim riots, caste-based
political parties, the escalation of Sinhala–Tamil con ict, the production of caste and ethnic identities, the
emergence of the south Indian Dravidian movement and the mobilisation of religious and linguistic
identities in north India. There are also two studies that are focused on the two Tamil-speaking regions: the
rst, by Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz and Yogendra Yadav, analyses the impact of the di erent models adopted
27
by India and Sri Lanka to manage ethnic pluralism on the two Tamil-speaking regions; while the second,
by Sankaran Krishna, examines how discourses of national identity in India and Sri Lanka shaped India’s
intervention in Sri Lanka’s con ict as well as the relations between these states and their respective Tamil
28
populations.
Amidst the diverse topics of inquiry and analytical approaches, there are nevertheless four areas of focus
that recur both singly and in combination in the explanations of ethnic and nationalist phenomenon in the
two states. The rst is the interests—material and otherwise—of political leaders and their followers and
the extent to which these promote ethnic polarisation or accommodation. Closely related to this is ethnic
p. 16 demography, the second area of focus. A binary ethnic division of the population between two competing
groups—as in Sri Lanka—is linked to ethnic outbidding by political elites and subsequent con ict, whereas
a more fragmented and cross-cutting ethnic structure—as in India—is said to inhibit such polarising
behaviour. The third area of focus is institutions—broadly conceived to include constitutions, but also
decision-making rules and whether these are con gured to promote inclusion or exclusion. Finally, a fourth
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