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 Personal Autonomy
New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary
Moral Philosophy

Autonomy has recently become one of the central concepts in con-

temporary moral philosophy and has generated much debate over
its nature and value. This is the first volume to bring together
original essays that address the theoretical foundations of the con-
cept of autonomy, as well as essays that investigate the relationship
between autonomy and moral responsibility, freedom, political phi-
losophy, and medical ethics. Written by some of the most promi-
nent philosophers working in these areas today, this book represents
cutting-edge research on the nature and value of autonomy that will
be essential reading for a broad range of philosophers as well as many
psychologists.

James Stacey Taylor is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Louisiana

State University.
 Personal Autonomy
New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role
in Contemporary Moral Philosophy

Edited by
JAMES STACEY TAYLOR
Louisiana State University
  
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge  , UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521837965

© James Stacey Taylor 2005

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of

relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place
without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published in print format 2005

- ---- eBook (MyiLibrary)

- --- eBook (MyiLibrary)

- ---- hardback

- --- hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of

s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
 Contents

List of Contributors page vii

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 1
James Stacey Taylor

part i. theoretical approaches to personal

autonomy
1 Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency 33
Michael E. Bratman
2 Autonomy without Free Will 58
Bernard Berofsky
3 Autonomy and the Paradox of Self-Creation: Infinite
Regresses, Finite Selves, and the Limits of Authenticity 87
Robert Noggle
4 Agnostic Autonomism Revisited 109
Alfred R. Mele
5 Feminist Intuitions and the Normative Substance
of Autonomy 124
Paul Benson
6 Autonomy and Personal Integration 143
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
7 Responsibility, Applied Ethics, and Complex
Autonomy Theories 162
Nomy Arpaly

v
vi Contents

part ii. autonomy, freedom, and moral responsibility

8 Autonomy and Free Agency 183
Marina A. L. Oshana
9 The Relationship between Autonomous and Morally
Responsible Agency 205
Michael McKenna
10 Alternative Possibilities, Personal Autonomy, and Moral
Responsibility 235
Ishtiyaque Haji
11 Freedom within Reason 258
Susan Wolf

part iii. the expanding role of personal autonomy

12 Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy 277
John Christman
13 The Concept of Autonomy in Bioethics: An Unwarranted
Fall from Grace 299
Thomas May
14 Who Deserves Autonomy, and Whose Autonomy
Deserves Respect? 310
Tom L. Beauchamp
15 Autonomy, Diminished Life, and the Threshold for Use 330
R. G. Frey

Index 347
 Contributors

Nomy Arpaly is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Brown University.

Tom L. Beauchamp is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University.
Paul Benson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dayton.
Bernard Berofsky is Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University.
Michael E. Bratman is the Durfee Professor in the School of Humanities
and Sciences and Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University.
John Christman is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Political Science
at Pennsylvania State University.
Laura Waddell Ekstrom is the Robert F. and Sara M. Boyd Associate
Professor of Philosophy at the College of William and Mary.
R. G. Frey is Professor of Philosophy at Bowling Green State University.
Ishtiyaque Haji is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary.
Thomas May is Associate Professor of Bioethics at the Medical College of
Wisconsin.
Michael McKenna is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy
and Religion at Ithaca College.
Alfred R. Mele is the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of
Philosophy at Florida State University.
Robert Noggle is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Central Michigan
University.
vii
viii Contributors

Marina A. L. Oshana is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University

of Florida.
James Stacey Taylor is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Louisiana State
University.
Susan Wolf is the Edna J. Koury Professor of Philosophy at the University
of North Carolina–Chapel Hill.
 Acknowledgments

As a glance at the list of contributors will show, I am the only unknown

here; the others are among the most prominent writers on autonomy,
moral responsibility, and applied ethics working today. My primary debt,
then, is to those who have contributed chapters to this volume, all of
whom have not only been extremely generous with their time in helping
me to prepare this volume, but also the most agreeable contributors a
fledgling editor could hope to work with. I also thank Terence Moore (of
Cambridge University Press) and R. G. Frey (my Ph.D. supervisor) for all
of their advice and encouragement during this project and Russell Hahn
and Stephen Calvert for their editorial advice and assistance. Finally, I
thank my wife, Margaret Ulizio, for her support during this project’s
progress.

ix
 Introduction

James Stacey Taylor

In recent years, the concept of autonomy has become ubiquitous in moral

philosophy. Discussions of the nature of autonomy, its value, and how one
should respect it are now commonplace in philosophical debates, ranging
from the metaphysics of moral responsibility to the varied concerns of ap-
plied philosophy. All of these debates are underpinned by an increasingly
flourishing and sophisticated literature that addresses the fundamental
question of the nature of personal autonomy.
The concept of autonomy has, of course, been important for moral
philosophy for some time, being central to the ethical theories of both
Immanuel Kant and such contemporary Kantians as Thomas Hill and
Christine Korsgaard.1 However, recent interest in personal autonomy
does not focus on the Kantian conception of autonomy on which a per-
son is autonomous if her will is entirely devoid of all personal interests.
Instead, it focuses on a more individualistic conception of this notion,
whereby a person is autonomous with respect to her desires, actions, or
character to the extent that they originate in some way from her motiva-
tional set, broadly construed.
Interest in this individualistic conception of autonomy was stimulated
by the publication of a series of papers in the early 1970s, in which Harry
Frankfurt, Gerald Dworkin, and Wright Neely independently developed
“hierarchical” accounts of personal autonomy.2 The shared core of these
accounts is both simple and elegant: A person is autonomous with respect
to a first-order desire that moves her to act (e.g., she wants to smoke, and
so she smokes) if she endorses her possession of that first-order desire
(e.g., she wants to want to smoke). This approach to analyzing autonomy
has much to recommend it. First, it captures an important truth about
1
2 James Stacey Taylor

persons: They have the capacity to reflect on their desires and to endorse
or repudiate them as they see fit. Second, it is an explicitly naturalistic and
compatibilist approach to analyzing autonomy. As such, it fits well with
the currently dominant compatibilist analyses of moral responsibility, and
it seems able to disavow the implausible claim that personal autonomy is
incompatible with the truth of metaphysical determinism – a disavowal
that is defended by Bernard Berofsky and Alfred Mele in their chapters
in this volume.3 Finally, this approach to analyzing autonomy is content
neutral, for it does not require persons to hold any particular values in
order for them to be autonomous. This enables it to be readily applica-
ble to many debates within applied ethics where respect for autonomy
is of primary concern and where this focus on autonomy is driven by
the recognition that some means must be found to adjudicate between
competing value claims in a pluralistic society.4
Yet despite the many advantages of the hierarchical approach to ana-
lyzing autonomy, it suffers from significant theoretical difficulties. In the
light of these criticisms, some proponents of the hierarchical approach
to analyzing autonomy (such as Stefaan Cuypers and Harry Frankfurt)
have developed sophisticated defenses of it.5 Other writers have devel-
oped a “second generation” of neohierarchical theories of autonomy
that, while they move beyond the hierarchical approach to analyzing au-
tonomy, acknowledge that the origins of their views lie in the original
Frankfurt-Dworkin-Neely theory cluster. Two of the most prominent of
these neohierarchical theories of autonomy are those developed by John
Christman and Michael Bratman. Christman’s historical approach retains
the hierarchical analyses’ requirement that the attitudes of the person
whose effective first-order desire is in question are in some way auton-
omy conferring. However, rather than holding that this person must in
some way endorse the desire in question for her to be autonomous with
respect to it, Christman holds that she must not reject the process that
led her to have this desire.6 Bratman’s analysis of autonomy – the key ele-
ments of which he outlines in the chapter “Planning Agency, Autonomous
Agency” – combines his influential account of intention and planning
agency with certain elements of the hierarchical approach to autonomy.7
Such neohierarchical approaches to personal autonomy have also been
joined by a number of diverse and original approaches to analyzing au-
tonomy that depart from the hierarchical approach altogether. These
new approaches to analyzing autonomy include, but are not limited to,
the coherentist approach of Laura Waddell Ekstrom,8 the “helmsman”
approach of Thomas May,9 the doxastic approach of Robert Noggle,10
 Introduction 3

the sociorelational approach of Marina Oshana,11 and the foundational-

ist approach of Keith Lehrer.12 This debate over the nature of autonomy
has led to a significant increase in the philosophical understanding of this
concept, and so it is no longer correct that outside of the Kantian tradi-
tion autonomy “is a comparatively unanalyzed notion,” as John Christman
was truthfully able to write in 1988.13 Moreover, the increasing attention
that the concept of autonomy has recently received is not only of interest
to autonomy theorists. This is because, as I outline in Section IV, which
analysis of personal autonomy turns out to be the most defensible will
have direct implications for all debates in moral philosophy in which this
concept plays a major role.
These, then, are exciting times for both autonomy theorists and all who
draw upon the concept of autonomy. The chapters in this volume, each
original to it, represent the state of the art of the current discussion of
autonomy and the roles that it plays in discussions of moral responsibility
and applied philosophy. The purpose of this Introduction, thus, is to
provide the theoretical background against which these chapters were
written, by outlining the progress of the debate over the nature and role
of autonomy as this has unfolded over the past three decades. As such,
it can naturally be divided into four sections. The first will provide the
theoretical background to this collection as a whole, through outlining
Frankfurt’s and Dworkin’s hierarchical analyses of autonomy together
with the major criticisms that have led to their modification. Despite these
modifications, however, I will note that even in their most recent forms
these analyses are both still vulnerable to serious theoretical objections.
The second section of this Introduction will outline three of the most
prominent recent analyses of autonomy that have been developed to
avoid the difficulties that beset the Frankfurt-Dworkin-Neely hierarchi-
cal approach: John Christman’s historical approach, Michael Bratman’s
reasons-based view, and Laura Waddell Ekstrom’s coherentist analysis.
The second section of the Introduction will serve as a supplement to the
first, as it provides an introduction to the most recent theoretical litera-
ture on autonomy. In so doing, it will serve as a useful backdrop to the
discussions in the first part of this collection, “Theoretical Approaches
to Personal Autonomy,” in which Bratman and Ekstrom outline and de-
velop their respective analyses of autonomy and in which the relationships
among autonomy, free will, the “self,” and the concept of “identification”
are considered.
The third section of this Introduction will outline alleged connections
between personal autonomy and moral responsibility. This will provide
4 James Stacey Taylor

the theoretical background to the second part of this collection, “Au-

tonomy, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility.” Finally, the last section of
this Introduction will indicate the various ways in which the concept
of autonomy is invoked within areas of contemporary philosophy apart
from discussions of moral responsibility. This section will provide a use-
ful basis from which to approach the final part of this book, “The Ex-
panding Role of Personal Autonomy,” which focuses on the role that
autonomy plays in political philosophy and in various fields of applied
ethics.

i. the hierarchical analyses of autonomy

The core feature shared by Frankfurt’s and Dworkin’s analyses of auton-
omy and identification is that these concepts are to be analyzed in terms
of hierarchies of desire. (For the sake of clarity, I henceforth take the
phrase “is autonomous with respect to her desire x” to be synonymous
with the phrase “identifies with her desire that x.”)14 More specifically, on
Frankfurt’s original analysis of autonomy a person is autonomous with
respect to her first-order desire that moves her to act (her “will”) if she
volitionally endorses that desire. (A “first-order” desire is a desire that a
particular state of affairs obtains.) That is to say, a person is autonomous
with respect to her effective first-order desire that x if she both desired to
have the desire that x (i.e., she had a second-order desire that she have her
desire that x, where a “second-order” desire is a desire about a first-order
desire) and she also wanted her desire that x to move her to act (i.e., she
endorsed her desire that x with a second-order volition).15 Similarly, on
Dworkin’s original analysis of autonomy an “autonomous person is one
who does his own thing,” where “the attitude that [the] person takes to-
wards the influences motivating him . . . determines whether or not they
are to be considered ‘his.’”16 That is to say, on Dworkin’s view a person is
autonomous with respect to the desires that motivate him if he endorses
his being so moved. In addition to requiring that a person’s motivations
be “authentic” in this way, Dworkin also required that she enjoy both pro-
cedural independence and substantive independence with respect to her
motivations. A person possesses procedural independence with respect
to her motivations if her desire to be moved to act by them has not been
produced by “manipulation, deception, the withholding of relevant infor-
mation, and so on.”17 A person possesses substantive independence with
respect to his motivations if he does not “renounce his independence of
thought or action” prior to developing them.18
 Introduction 5

On both Frankfurt’s and Dworkin’s hierarchical analyses, then, a per-

son’s autonomy is impaired if she is moved to act by a desire that she
does not volitionally endorse – if she has a second-order desire not to be
moved by the first-order desire that is effective in moving her to act. In
most cases, this is intuitively plausible. For example, if a person is subject
to a constant neurotic compulsion to wash his hands from which he de-
sires to be free, then his autonomy will be impaired if he is moved to act
by a first-order desire to wash his hands that this neurosis causes him to
have and by which he does not wish to be moved. Similarly, if a person
is a “wanton,” if he does not care which of his desires moves him to act,
then it seems plausible to claim that he is not autonomous (he is not
“self-directed”), either because his “self ” is not engaged in directing his
desires or actions or because he has no coherent “self” to play this role.
Yet despite their plausibility, these early hierarchical analyses of au-
tonomy are subject to three serious objections. The first of these is the
Problem of Manipulation.19 Frankfurt’s hierarchical analysis of autonomy
is an ahistorical (or structural, punctuate, or time slice) account of autonomy,
on which a person is autonomous with respect to his effective first-order
desires irrespective of their historical origins, provided that he volitionally
endorses them. The proponents of the Problem of Manipulation note
that a third party (such as a nefarious neurosurgeon or a horrible hypno-
tist) could inculcate into a person both a certain first-order desire (e.g.,
the desire to smoke) and a second-order volition concerning this desire
so that there is the pertinent sort of hierarchical endorsement. Because
this inculcated first-order desire would satisfy Frankfurt’s conditions for
its possessor to be autonomous with respect to it, Frankfurt is committed
to holding that she is autonomous with respect to it – but this ascription
of autonomy to her with respect to this desire is suspect.20
Of course, Dworkin’s analysis of autonomy is not directly subject to
the Problem of Manipulation because it is blocked by his requirement
that the process by which a person comes to have her desires be one
that is procedurally independent – a condition that is clearly unsatis-
fied when a person’s desires are inculcated into her through hypnosis
or neurosurgery without her consent. Despite this, one can still use the
Problem of Manipulation to develop an indirect objection to Dworkin’s
analysis of autonomy. Thus, although Dworkin’s requirement of proce-
dural independence enables him to avoid the Problem of Manipulation,
it only does so by fiat, by simply ruling ex cathedra that a person is not
autonomous with respect to those desires that he has been manipulated
into possessing. And this is not enough for his analysis of autonomy to be
6 James Stacey Taylor

theoretically satisfactory. This is because an acceptable analysis of auton-

omy should not merely list the ways in which it is intuitively plausible that
a person will suffer from a lack of autonomy with respect to her effective
first-order desires, but must also provide an account of why a person’s
autonomy would be thus undermined, so that influences on a person’s
behavior that do not seem to undermine her autonomy (e.g., advice) can
be differentiated from those that do (e.g., deception).
Frankfurt’s and Dworkin’s analyses of autonomy also face the
Regress-cum-Incompleteness Problem.21 On these analyses, a person is
autonomous with respect to her effective first-order desires if she endorses
them with a second-order desire. Because this is so, the question arises as
to whether this person is autonomous with respect to this second-order
desire and, if she is, why this is so. If she is autonomous with respect to
this second-order desire because it is, in turn, endorsed by a yet higher-
order desire, then a regress threatens, for the question will then arise
as to whether she is autonomous with respect to this third-order desire –
and so on. If, however, this person is autonomous with respect to the
second-order desire for a reason other than its endorsement by a higher-
order desire, then the hierarchical approach to analyzing autonomy is
incomplete.
Of course, the proponents of the hierarchical approach could avoid the
Regress-cum-Incompleteness Problem simply by claiming that although
the person in question is not autonomous with respect to her higher-
order endorsing desire, she is autonomous with respect to her endorsed
first-order desire, because autonomy is simply constituted by such an en-
dorsement. Yet although Frankfurt and Dworkin could avoid the Regress-
cum-Incompleteness Problem by adopting this line of response, neither
of them does so, no doubt because they recognize that were they to do so
they would encounter the equally troubling Ab Initio Problem: How can
a person become autonomous with respect to a desire through a process
with respect to which she was not autonomous? Or, in other words, how
is it that a person’s higher-order desires possess any authority over her
lower-order desires?22 When put in this way, the Ab Initio Problem is often
termed the Problem of Authority and in this guise has been neatly en-
capsulated by Gary Watson: “Since second-order volitions are themselves
simply desires, to add them to the context of conflict is just to increase
the number of contenders; it is not to give a special place to any of those
in contention.”23
Faced with these three difficulties, both Frankfurt and Dworkin mod-
ified their original analyses. Recognizing that his analysis would be
 Introduction 7

subjected to the Regress-cum-Incompleteness Problem, Frankfurt at-

tempted to eliminate the possibility of such a problematic regress by
claiming that a person’s decisive identification with one of his desires
would terminate it.24 Frankfurt elaborated this decision-based version of
his hierarchical analysis of autonomy in “Identification and Wholeheart-
edness,” where he argued that a person is autonomous with respect to his
effective first-order desire if he decisively endorses it with a second-order
volition. Directly responding to the Regress Problem, Frankfurt claimed
that if a person endorses his effective first-order desire “without reserva-
tion . . . in the belief that no further accurate inquiry would require him
to change his mind,” it would be pointless for him to continue to assess
whether he was autonomous with respect to the first-order desire that
was in question.25 Furthermore, a person’s decisive identification with
his endorsing second-order volition also seems to circumvent the Ab Initio
Problem/Problem of Authority, for through this decision the person
in question will endow his volition with the authority that it previously
lacked.
Unlike Frankfurt, Dworkin did not directly attempt to address criti-
cisms of his analysis of what conditions must be met for a person to be
autonomous with respect to her desires and actions. Instead, he clarified
that his account was concerned not with the local conception of what con-
ditions must be met for a person to be autonomous with respect to her
actions (or desires), but, instead, with a more global conception of auton-
omy as a “second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their
first-order preferences, desires, wishes and so forth.”26 Dworkin argued
that once it is understood that he was not trying to provide an account of
what made a person autonomous with respect to her desires or actions, his
conception of autonomy avoids the Regress-cum-Incompleteness Prob-
lem. This is because, he claimed, as long as a person enjoyed procedu-
ral independence with respect to her reflection upon her desires, there
would be “no conceptual necessity for raising the question of whether the
values, preferences at the second order would themselves be valued or
preferred at a higher level. . . .”27 Similarly, Dworkin held that his account
of autonomy is unaffected by the Ab Initio Problem/Problem of Author-
ity. Because on his view persons enjoy autonomy when they engage this
capacity for reflection, the exercise of this second-order capacity for en-
dorsement just is what is involved in being autonomous.
Yet even if Dworkin’s more global approach to analyzing personal
autonomy avoids the major problems that were outlined above, this is
achieved at considerable cost. This is because in many discussions that
8 James Stacey Taylor

concern the nature of autonomy the issue is not what psychological ca-
pacities a person must possess to have the capacity for autonomy, for it
is generally accepted that to be autonomous an agent must possess the
ability to engage in some form of second-order reflection of the sort that
Dworkin outlines. Instead, what is really of interest in discussions of au-
tonomy is the question of how the exercise of this psychological capacity
for reflection results in persons being autonomous with respect to their
desires and actions. Thus, in adopting this more global approach to au-
tonomy Dworkin is no longer offering an analysis of autonomy that is
congruent with the discussions in moral philosophy in which autonomy
plays a major role, for these discussions focus on the more localized ques-
tion of what makes a person autonomous with respect to her particular
desires or her particular actions.
Once Dworkin’s more recent aims in developing an analysis of auton-
omy have been clarified, then, they can be seen to be distinct from the
primary aim of most autonomy theorists – namely, to provide an account
of what it is for a person to be autonomous with respect to her desires
and her actions. Yet this core aim of autonomy theorists is not satisfied
by Frankfurt’s decision-based analysis of autonomy either, for it fails as a
successful response to three of the objections outlined above. First, the
mere fact that a person has decisively identified herself with a particular
first-order desire does not halt any possible problematic regress. This is
because, as Frankfurt later recognized, the Regress-cum-Incompleteness
Problem would still arise, given that one could still question whether the
person in question was autonomous with respect to this decision. Fur-
thermore, the Problem of Manipulation still poses difficulties for this
account because such a decision could still be the result of the agent’s
succumbing to forces that are external to her. For example, she might
have been hypnotized into decisively identifying with a given desire.28
Finally, because a person can be manipulated into decisively identifying
herself with a particular first-order desire, the proponents of the Ab Initio
Problem/Problem of Authority can still question why such mental acts
are authoritative for her.
Frankfurt recognized that his analysis of autonomy was beset by these
three problems because it rested on the claim that a person became
autonomous with respect to her desires through endorsing them with
a “deliberate psychic event” – and one could always question whether
the person in question was autonomous with respect to this event. To
avoid these criticisms, Frankfurt developed a satisfaction-based analysis
of identification.29 On this analysis, a person need not engage in any
 Introduction 9

“deliberate psychic event” for her to identify with her desires. Instead, on
this analysis a person is autonomous with respect to a desire if he accepts
it as his own – if he accepts it as indicating “something about himself.”30
In accepting a desire, a person will reflect on it to see if it is expressive
of something about him. If it is, then he will form a higher-order atti-
tude of acceptance toward it as part of himself. It is this acceptance of the
desire that constitutes the person’s endorsement of it, to use Frankfurt’s
“misleading” terminology from “The Faintest Passion.”31 The sense of
endorsement that Frankfurt is using here, then, is the sense in which one
might endorse the claim of an entity to be a member of a class, with-
out thereby evaluating (either positively or negatively) the merits of the
particular entity that is making the claim. Once a person has met the
requirement that she reflectively endorse her first-order desires in this
way, Frankfurt does not also require that she then reflectively endorse
her attitude of endorsement, for, as he rightly notes, such a require-
ment would lead to a regress. Instead, Frankfurt holds that a person will
identify with a first-order desire if she is satisfied with the higher-order
attitude of endorsement (i.e., acceptance) that she has taken toward it.
For Frankfurt, a person’s being satisfied with his attitudinal set “does not
require that [he] have any particular belief about it, or any particular
feeling or attitude or intention. . . . There is nothing that he needs to
think, or adopt, or to accept; it is not necessary for him to do anything
at all.” Instead, his being satisfied with his attitudinal set simply consists
in his “having no interest in making changes” in it.32 And this, notes
Frankfurt, is important, for it explains why this analysis of identification
as satisfaction is not subject to a problematic regress of the sort that beset
his earlier analyses.33 Here, then, a person will be autonomous with re-
spect to his effective first-order desire if he is not moved to make changes
in his motivational economy when he is moved to act by it, if he is satisfied
with it.
Frankfurt’s satisfaction-based analysis of autonomy is not subject to the
Regress-cum-Incompleteness Problem for the reasons outlined above.
Moreover, it is also not subject to the Ab Initio Problem/Problem of
Authority. This is because Frankfurt has now clarified that a person’s
higher-order attitude of acceptance toward her lower-order desires does
not possess any normative authority over them; instead, these attitudes
are merely used by the person in question to assess whether her lower-
order desires are to be regarded as being descriptively hers, whether they
flow from her (broadly Lockean) self. However, this analysis of autonomy
still faces the Problem of Manipulation. This is because a person could
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