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P U B L I C A T I O N S O F T H E B U R E A U O F BUSINESS AND E C O N O M I C R E S E A R C H
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION
IN BANKING
 Publications of the
Bureau of Business and Economic Research
University of California

MONOPOLY AND
COMPETITION
IN BANKING

BY

DAVID A. ALHADEFF

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES
1
954
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON,ENGLAND

COPYRIGHT, 1954, BY
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD N U M B E R : 54-IO436

PRINTED IN T H E UNITED STATES OF A M E R I C A

BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA P R I N T I N G DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

MAURICE MOONITZ, CHAIRMAN

GEORGE F. BREAK
JOHN P. CARTER
JOHN B. CONDLIFFE
EWALD T. GRETHER
MELVIN M. KNIGHT
PAUL S. TAYLOR
FRANK L. KIDNER, DIRECTOR

T h e opinions expressed in this study are those of the author.

T h e functions of the Bureau of Business and Economic
Research are confined to facilitating the prosecution of
. independent scholarly research by members of the faculty.
 Preface

THE MAIN P U R P O S E of this study is to examine existing banking

markets from a market structure viewpoint and to observe how (or
whether) banking markets and banking structures have been af-
fected by banking concentration in the form of giant branch banks.
Such an analysis is a necessary prelude to an examination of the
implications of banking concentration for the monopoly problem.
The major emphasis in this study is upon banking concentration
in the form of branch banking. Where it has been permitted by
law, branch banking has been the most obvious vehicle for concen-
trating banking resources over a wide geographical area. Because
branch banking has grown more rapidly in California than in any
other part of the country, the analysis of branch-bank concentra-
tion in this study is based upon the California experience. With
minor modifications, both the analysis and the conclusions are
capable of general application in this country wherever banking
concentration develops under a branch organization of banking.
This study is, I believe, unique both in its approach and in its
content, since it represents an attempt to analyze the operations
and economic implications of branch banking with the analytical
tools developed in the field of industrial organization as well as
those of general economic theory, and to base the analysis as far as
possible on the statistical record. Earlier studies of branch bank-
ing have been primarily institutional in orientation and descrip-
tive in content, and most of the published works on the subject
are at least twenty years old, and many of them, much older. Much
has obviously happened in this field during that long period. Fur-
thermore, many of the analytical tools employed in this study
have only been developed by students of industrial organization
during the last twenty years. Since existing studies of branch bank-
ing deal adequately with the formal organization and structure
of branch banks, this information will not be repeated here.
Part of the analysis, especially the chapter, "Pricing Practices
and Price Policy," is based on interviews with senior loan officers
of the major branch systems in California. It is natural that those
involved in the day-to-day operations of a bank should take a
highly particularized view of their operations and tend to put
[vii]
viii Preface
great stress on the wide diversity of their dealings. By contrast,
my own approach has inclined in the opposite direction. Without
any wish to neglect the diversity of conditions surrounding indi-
vidual loans, the purpose of this study has constantly impelled
me to seek common denominators in diversified operations. It is
in the nature of a theoretical pattern to abstract from the diversi-
ties and complexities of real world situations, since the essence of
economic theory is to spotlight the important variables and to
show their interrelation. A theoretical analysis is not intended
to be a mere mirror image of the situation it tries to explain. Ana-
lytical structures sometimes tend to be either completely rarefied
or hopelessly involved. The useful theory must maximize the
heuristic simplicity of the former condition while maintaining
maximum contact with the microvariables of the system. In con-
centrating, therefore, on what have seemed to me to be the key
variables in the banking picture, e.g., size of borrower, I do not
mean to deny the importance of other relevant considerations.
Under ordinary conditions, however, certain variables are usually
more important than others in explaining basic patterns of action.
A few key variables are critical in initially discerning the basic
outlines of structure and behavior in banking markets. Once the
basic outline has been developed, however, the skeletal structure
of the analysis can be padded with numerous secondary considera-
tions in order to approximate more closely the detail and com-
plexity of real world structures.
Probably no sector of the economy is more heavily and exhaus-
tively documented statistically than is banking. The novelty
claimed for the statistical base of this study applies less to the raw
data, which are generally readily available, than to their incorpo-
ration in a systematic framework of market analysis. To a great
extent, however, this study is possible because operating ratios
for branch banks have been made available for the first time.
Unfortunately much critical information on bank operations is
still not available, e.g., time series of interest rates for different
size loans in individual banks in small towns. It is hoped that this
study will stimulate much needed further research into the subject
of the market performance of branch and unit banks.
The analysis of branch bank performance has been made pos-
sible by the cooperation of executive officers in the major branch
banks of California. By their kind permission, I was permitted
to examine operating ratios for individual branch banks. Although
these figures must remain confidential, they form the basis for
Preface ix
comparisons among individual branch banks and between branch
banks and unit banks. Moreover, for every ratio employed, an
average figure for branch banks as a group has been included in
the tables. I am indebted, too, to Oliver P. Wheeler, Vice-President,
and Gault Lynn, Supervisor of Research, Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, for their assistance in securing individual bank
ratios and for compiling additional special figures from Federal
Reserve records.
Permission has been kindly granted by the publishers to repro-
duce here material that first appeared in journals. Chapter iii is
the major part of an article that first appeared in the Quarterly
Journal of Economics, February, 1951, under the title, "The Mar-
ket Structure of Commercial Banking in the United States."
Chapter viii is largely based on an article that was published in the
American Economic Review, June, 1952, under the title, "Mone-
tary Policy and the Treasury Bill Market."
I am indebted, too, to my colleagues who read this manuscript
and offered helpful suggestions. The manuscript was read by Pro-
fessors W. L. Crum, H. S. Ellis, R. A. Gordon, and R. W. Jastram
of the Departments of Economics and Business Administration,
University of California, Berkeley. I am also grateful for the finan-
cial and clerical assistance provided by the Bureau of Business and
Economic Research, University of California, Berkeley, and for
the helpful cooperation of its Director, Professor F. V. Kidner.
My greatest debt is to my wife, Charlotte P. Alhadeff, for her
invaluable help and advice at every stage. For whatever errors and
inadequacies remain, I am alone responsible.
D. A. Alhadeff
January, 1954
 Contents

I. Introduction 1
II. Defining the Market 8
III. The Market Structure of Unit Banking 20
IV. Concentration in California Banking 38
V. Measures of Output Performance 55
VI. Comparative Cost Patterns 77
VII. Pricing Practices and Price Policy 108
VIII. Pricing and the Open Market 129
IX. Pricing and the Federal Reserve 150
li. Profitability of Branch and Unit Banking . . . . 173
Til. Entry 195
XII. Banking Concentration and Monopoly 217
Appendix 235
Index 251
 I
Introduction

T H E EVOLUTION of American banking has witnessed a long struggle

between those convinced that "money will not manage itself" and
those imbued with a strong determination to avoid the necessary
management under the aegis of a monetary monopoly, even a
government monopoly. Students of banking history seem agreed
that the failure of the premature attempt to establish a central
bank in this country, especially the Second Bank of the United
States, was in large measure owing to partisan politics of the period.
Inextricably involved in the event, however, was the considerable
popular support for Jackson's antipathy to monopoly in any form,
especially to a monetary monopoly, even if the "monopoly" was
under government sponsorship and control and was demonstrably
beneficial in the financial and economic affairs of the period.
The Free Banking Act of the State of New York (1838) was in-
tended to democratize commercial banking, and its strong bias
against monopoly and favored parties made it a model for many
other states. The unhappy result under Free Banking statutes was
an increase in bankruptcies and an era of wild speculation in
which banking was regarded less as a public trust than as a quick
and easy way to personal enrichment. The efforts of the Congress
to rescue the economy from this chaotic situation by passing the
National Banking Act in 1864 was a classic example of "too little
and too late."
The pressures for responsible management of the money sup-
ply culminated in the passage of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913,
but the underlying fear of monopoly reflected itself even in this
Act which established a central bank. The central bank itself was
broken into twelve regional banks,1 and the tradition of inviola-
bility of a dual banking structure was firmly established by the
1
Other considerations not related to the monopoly issue were also involved in this
decision.

[1]
2 Monopoly and Competition in Banking
stipulation that, except for national banks/ membership in the
Federal Reserve System would be voluntary. In other ways, too,
the original Reserve Act was one of limited scope. Subsequent
crises, such as the Great Depression, have led to a strengthening
of the central bank's control powers; 3 partly, too, these powers have
grown by administrative interpretation of existing authority.
T h e issues of banking concentration and monopoly have once
again been brought to the forefront of public discussion through
the deliberations of congressional committees and the antitrust
action by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
against the Transamerica Corporation. In a staff report of the
House Judiciary Committee of the 82d Congress on the subject
of "Bank Mergers and Concentration of Banking Facilities," 1 at-
tention was directed to the historical increase in concentration of
banking facilities. This "unrelenting trend towards mergers" is
deplored in the Committee's report because, " T h i s depletion of
the ranks of the country's banks has lessened competition among
banks in many communities." 5 T h e authors of the report recom-
mended remedial legislation to ensure that governmental banking
authorities, before approving any sort of bank merger or consoli-
dation, "would be obliged to determine whether the effect of such
merger might unduly lessen competition or tend to create a mo-
nopoly in the field of banking." 0 T h e problem of bank concen-
tration is an urgent one, because, in the words of the report,
"Concentration of financial resources and credit facilities are even
more ominous to a competitive economy than concentration on
an industry-wide basis.'"
A similar concern about monopoly power has motivated the
Federal Reserve Board in its recent suit against the Transamerica
Corporation, alleging violation of the Clayton Act.8 In large meas-
ure, the suit against Transamerica is a suit against Bank of America,
since most of the assets of the former were, until very recently,
National banks can easily shift from federal to state charters.
2

C f . J o h n H . Williams' analysis of the Banking Act of 1935 in his Postwar Mone-

3

tary Plans and Other Essays (2d ed., revised; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p p .
112-129.
1 Bank Mergers and Concentration of Banking Facilities, a staff report to Subcom-
mittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary, H . R . 82d Cong., 2d sess. (1952).
5 Ibid., p. 46.
6 Ibid., a p p e n d i x .
7 Ibid., p. viii.
8 T h e Transamerica Corporation was charged, on J u n e 24, 1948, with violation of

Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act by acquiring controlling stock interest in various inde-
pendent banks. At the time of such acquisition, these banks were in competition with
one or more of the banks already controlled by the Transamerica Corporation.
Introduction 3
those of the latter." Indeed, the Board's counsel has repeatedly
stated that, unless Bank of America is included in Transamerica,
the Board's case against Transamerica on the basis of tendency to
monopoly would probably collapse.10
T h e Transamerica case is not of direct concern in this study.
T h e case does serve, however, to throw the spotlight of national
attention upon the problems of banking concentration in one of
the largest and economically most important states in the country.
Under laws tolerant of branch banking, California has achieved
probably a higher degree of state-wide concentration of banking
assets than any other state in the Union. With few exceptions,
branch banking is the vehicle par excellence for the development
of the truly impressive kind of bank concentration such as is found
in California. T h e four large branch bank systems in California
are among the nation's largest banks. One of these banks is the
largest bank in the country; two are among the nation's ten largest
banks. California provides, therefore, an excellent case study of
branch banking, bank concentration, and monopoly.
A study of banking and monopoly should clarify at least two
critical questions. First, what is the meaning and nature of mo-
nopoly as applied to banking? As a corollary, what does it mean to
"unduly lessen competition"? Second, what are the consequences
of power, actual or potential, in concentrated banking markets?
In an economic approach, it is not sufficient to demonstrate merely
that monopoly power exists.11 T h e history of industrial monopoly
suits amply suggests that public policy is concerned not alone with
power but with the manner in which power is used.12
Monopoly power and the consequences of monopoly are widely
held to be inimical to the public interest. T h e concept of the public
interest is a complex phenomenon, heavily weighted with norma-
tive elements. It is sufficient for this study to recognize that deci-
sions affecting the public interest in economic affairs are rarely
9 During the course of the proceedings, Transamerica Corporation sold all its stock

holdings in Bank of America. Notwithstanding, the Board of Governors announced

their intention to continue their lawsuit against Transamerica. Cf. San Francisco
Chronicle, January 15, 1953, financial page.
10 Statement by Leonard J. Townsend, Solicitor for the Board of Governors, Federal

Reserve System, in Hearings before Governor R. M. Evans of the Federal Reserve,

in the Matter of Transamerica Corporation, 8385. (Hereinafter, these hearings will
be abbreviated Transamerica Hearings.)
11 In the Transamerica Hearings, the Solicitor for the Board did not contend that

Transamerica had necessarily abused its power but . . that they have the power
to do that (i.e., control their banks' loans, etc.), and power alone is the evil against
which the statute is aimed." Reply Brief of Counsel for the Board, November 9,
•OS1" P- 3 2 - (Italics mine.)
12 Cf., for example, the titanium lead antitrust case.
4 Monopoly and Competition in Banking
made on the basis of economic considerations alone. This study
is concerned with analytical clarification, not policy prescription.
Although policy recommendations are not explicitly introduced,
it is hoped that the results of this study will be of use in policy
formulation by authorized bodies. Accordingly, the final chapter
applies the analysis developed in this study to an examination of
some of the economic features of monopoly power which are usu-
ally considered in official decisions concerning monopoly. Monop-
oly is held to be injurious to the consumer (borrower), because
monopolized industries are alleged to extort high profits by restrict-
ing output, charging high prices, and exercising discriminatory
powers among their customers. Both the House Judiciary Commit-
tee and the Board of Governors (in the Transamerica suit) have
implicitly accepted the monopoly indictment as it applies to bank-
ing. It is the purpose of this study to develop the economic analysis
necessary for an appraisal of this indictment.

C O N C E P T U A L AND T E R M I N O L O G I C A L MODIFICATIONS

T h e concept of industrial monopoly is not simple. Moreover, in

applying this concept to banking, further complications arise. Gen-
erally, the service aspects of banking are stressed rather than its
points of similarity with (say) a manufacturing industry. In this
study, however, the banking business is examined after the fashion
of a manufacturing industry. Bankers are businessmen, and like
other businessmen, they are concerned with the problems of "pro-
ducing" and "marketing" their "product." This study attempts
to examine those functions by analytical techniques analogous to
those employed in industry studies. However, certain conceptual
and terminological modifications in the conventional views of an
industry and of money are required. T h e kind of modifications
which are necessary can be conveniently discussed by considering
briefly a few points of comparison and of contrast between indus-
trial markets and banking markets.
T h e products of industrial markets are economic goods; these
goods can be used either for direct consumption or for further
production. By contrast, the product of money markets (credit)
is not an economic good; no one "buys" credit in order to consume
it directly nor to employ it directly in the production of other
goods. When a businessman buys credit (negotiates a loan), he is
securing capital funds with generalized purchasing power, not
direct goods.18 Of course, credit has aspects other than its purchas-
13 In a sense, of course, purchasing power inheres in all economic goods. T h i s

characteristic of goods is manifest in the case of simple barter in which one article
Introduction 5
ing power. Conventional analysis directs attention to money as a
store of value, as a medium of exchange, as a standard of value,
and so on. But when we refer to money as an item of purchase and
sale, common experience suggests that the buyers are not concerned
with these other aspects of money, but rather with its ability to
command goods and services, i.e., its power to purchase. Accord-
ingly, the rate of interest is the price paid for money as the most
generalized form of purchasing power," and a banker may be
regarded as a "merchant of credit."
Money markets and commodity markets can be compared in
another way. In the market for commodities, goods are sold either
on a cash or on a credit basis. In the particular money market in
question (the customer loan market), money is not sold on a cash
basis. In the case of a loan, this is clearly true. T h e sale takes place
on D-i, and payment is not made until (say) D-90. T h e customer
loan market for short-term business funds is of necessity a market
through time.15 This fundamental fact is obscured but not changed
in the case of discounts. When a bank sells credit on a discount
basis, the money passes from banker to borrower, and the bor-
rower's note is given in exchange. T h e transaction is not com-
pleted, however, until the buyer on D-90 pays the seller (bank) the
discounted principal plus the interest.
A third comparison between a commodity market and a money
market is a corollary of identifying the money market as a market
through time. W h e n the ordinary producer of goods is in a posi-
tion to negotiate a sale, the problem of securing payment for his
goods (terms of sale) can be met in one of three ways. He can sell
on a credit basis, in which case the seller meets the risk of default
by the buyer by prior investigation of the buyer's character, gen-
has in effect the purchasing power to command other goods in exchange. However,
the element of purchasing power that inheres in economic goods is just one of their
delimiting characteristics: this purchasing power aspect is not the essence of their
nature. T h e i r nature is essentially defined pragmatically, i.e., why people want goods.
As indicated above, goods are usually desired either for consumption or for produc-
tive purposes.
14 Cf. Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 184.
13 Schumpeter, for example, has stated that "Every individual loan transaction is a

ieal exchange. A t first it seems strange, perhaps, that a commodity is as it were

exchanged for itself . . . [but] the exchange of present for future is no more an ex-
change of like for like, and therefore meaningless, than the exchange of something
in one place for something in another place. Just as purchasing power in one place
may be exchanged for that in another, so present can also be exchanged for future
purchasing power. T h e analogy between loan transactions and exchange arbitrage
is obvious, and may be recommended to the reader's attention." Ibid,., pp. 187-188.
(Italics mine.)
6 Monopoly and Competition in Banking

eral financial capacity, and general credit rating.16 If the prospec-

tive buyer cannot adequately meet these three tests, the seller can
insist that the sale be on a cash basis, thereby completely eliminat-
ing the risk of default by the buyer. If, finally, the prospective
buyer cannot satisfy the three tests, and is either unwilling or
unable to buy on a cash basis, the seller can refuse to sell.
Since the banker sells present purchasing power and is subse-
quently paid with future purchasing power, the banker does not
have the option of selling on a cash basis. He must sell on a credit
basis to sell at all. Like the businessman, the banker also wishes
to insure himself against risk of default by the buyer (borrower).
Thus, he, too, subjects his prospective buyer to a credit examina-
tion along the lines of examining his character, general capacity
to pay, and general credit rating. If these tests are satisfactorily
met, the sale is made, so to speak, on an "open book" account."
If, however, the prospective buyer cannot pass the three credit
tests, the customs of his trade suggest another option to the banker.
He can secure against risk of default by demanding collateral as
security for payment. If the collateral does not adequately cover
the risk of default, the remaining risk can be covered by raising
the price of credit, i.e., raising the interest rate. Finally, if the
prospective buyer is considered an unworthy risk on all counts,
the banker can refuse to sell, i.e., deny the loan on any terms.
A fourth comparison between a money market and a commodity
market concerns the costs of production and their relation to the
price of the product. In many industries, the price of the product
is computed by adding either a fixed sum or a fixed percentage
to the average variable cost of production. This fixed sum or fixed
percentage is the markup and includes an allowance for overhead
costs. Net profit per unit is thus the difference between the price
of the product and the average cost of production.
In like manner, bankers must purchase their most important
"raw materials" in the form of deposits. They pay for the use of
these deposits either directly or indirectly.18 In addition to their
raw materials, bankers are also concerned with labor costs which
are the most important category of variable costs. T h e interest rate
These tests are similar to the bankers' famous three C's: character, capacity, credit.
16

This is the so-called "unsecured loan."

17

18 On time deposits, interest is paid by the bank to the depositor. On demand

deposits, the Federal Reserve prohibits interest payments by member banks. How-
ever, banks in effect pay for the use of demand deposits by deducting from the service
charges on a checking account an amount that varies with the average size of the
demand deposit during the month.
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