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Chapter (4)
The potential Implications of Shifts in Bangladesh–
United States Relations on Regional countries
Militarily Implications for Regional Countries
1. The relationship between Bangladesh and the United
States has evolved significantly over the past decades,
moving from development-focused assistance to a broader
strategic partnership. The United States has deepened its
military engagement with Bangladesh through initiatives such
as joint military exercises (e.g., "Tiger Lightning" and
"Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training" - CARAT),
defense dialogues, and arms sales. In recent years, military
cooperation has become an increasingly important element in
bilateral relations. This shift carries wide-reaching implications
for the Indo-Pacific region, affecting the security calculus of
neighboring countries like India, China, and Myanmar, as well
as influencing broader regional dynamics in South and
Southeast Asia.
2. Impact on China - China has long maintained a close
and strategic relationship with Bangladesh, especially in the
defense and infrastructure sectors. As one of the first
countries to recognize Bangladesh after its independence in
1971, Beijing has used this relationship to solidify its presence
in the Bay of Bengal—an area of growing geopolitical interest
due to its maritime trade routes, energy corridors, and
proximity to India’s eastern seaboard. However, the recent
expansion of U.S.–Bangladesh military cooperation is
increasingly viewed by Beijing as a potential challenge to its
strategic foothold in South Asia.
3. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, which emphasizes
containment of China’s influence, places particular
importance on enhancing security cooperation with nations
like Bangladesh. China has been the largest supplier of
military equipment to Bangladesh since the 2000s, accounting
for over 70% of Dhaka’s defense imports, including naval
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ships, tanks, missile systems, and fighter aircraft. Chinese-

origin military hardware is not only cheaper but also comes
with favorable financing terms and fewer political conditions.
If Bangladesh were to begin integrating U.S. systems under
agreements like GSOMIA or ACSA, it could undermine
Chinese defense sales.
4. The Bay of Bengal is critical to China’s maritime strategy,
particularly under the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, a
component of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China has
been developing port infrastructure in Bangladesh (notably
the Payra Seaport and the Chittagong port expansion), aiming
for dual-use potential—commercial and military. However, if
the U.S. were to gain access to Bangladeshi ports or conduct
surveillance missions in the Bay through joint naval exercises
or intelligence sharing, it would restrict China's freedom of
navigation and potentially expose its naval activities to
greater scrutiny. A militarily aligned Bangladesh could also
serve as an indirect surveillance platform for U.S. forces
monitoring China's maritime movement in the Indian Ocean
Region (IOR).
5. China sees growing U.S.–Bangladesh military ties as part
of a broader strategic encirclement policy. Along with the
U.S.–India strategic partnership, American military bases in
Diego Garcia, increasing naval access in Sri Lanka, and rising
ties with the Maldives, the potential militarization of U.S.–
Bangladesh relations adds to Beijing’s perception of
containment. To counterbalance this, China is likely to:
increase military aid and joint exercises with Bangladesh;
deepen economic incentives through BRI investments; offer
diplomatic support in international forums (e.g., on Rohingya
repatriation issues); leverage its influence in Myanmar and
Nepal to create parallel security networks in South Asia.
6. Inpact on India - India views the strengthening military
ties between Bangladesh and the United States through a
dual lens—as both a strategic opportunity and a geopolitical

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challenge. As the regional hegemon in South Asia and a key

U.S. partner under the Indo-Pacific strategy, India has a
vested interest in Bangladesh’s defense trajectory. However,
any increase in U.S. military influence could also complicate
India’s own regional security priorities and diminish its
dominant position in Dhaka's defense diplomacy.
7. India and the United States are already closely aligned
under several defense pacts, including the Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), BECA, and COMCASA,
which enable military cooperation, secure communications,
and geospatial intelligence sharing. These agreements are
designed to counterbalance China’s growing presence in the
Indian Ocean Region (IOR).From this viewpoint, U.S. military
engagement with Bangladesh is broadly aligned with Indian
strategic goals. India welcomes a militarily capable and
sovereign Bangladesh that can resist foreign (particularly
Chinese) coercion. A stable, U.S.-aligned Bangladesh also
strengthens the QUAD’s broader strategic influence in the
Indo-Pacific.
8. Despite shared interests with the U.S., New Delhi harbors
quiet concerns about the depth of U.S. defense inroads into its
eastern neighbor. India sees Bangladesh as part of its
traditional sphere of influence and maintains strong military
ties with Dhaka, including defense training, arms exports, and
coordinated counterterrorism efforts. An overt U.S. military
presence — or Bangladesh signing U.S. defense agreements
like GSOMIA/ACSA — could dilute India’s unique leverage. Any
foreign military influence—U.S. or Chinese—in Bangladesh is
seen as affecting the region’s strategic stability and posing
risks to India’s internal security calculus.
9. Inpact on Myanmar - Myanmar, which shares a long
and volatile border with Bangladesh, is closely observing
the strengthening defense ties between Dhaka and
Washington. From Naypyidaw’s standpoint, this
development is a potential geopolitical threat, especially

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in the context of the country's growing military isolation after

2021. While Bangladesh and Myanmar are not historical
adversaries, the deterioration of bilateral relations over the
Rohingya refugee crisis, compounded by increasing
international scrutiny of Myanmar’s military.
10. The Rakhine State, bordering Bangladesh, has been a
militarized flashpoint for years, particularly since the 2017
Rohingya crisis, which saw over 700,000 Rohingya Muslims
flee into Bangladesh following brutal military crackdowns.
With many Rohingya now in refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar,
Bangladesh has faced significant demographic, security, and
humanitarian challenges. Myanmar's military (Tatmadaw)
sees the U.S.–Bangladesh military alignment as a force
multiplier for Dhaka’s deterrent capabilities along the western
border. There is concern that enhanced U.S. support could
embolden Bangladesh to take a firmer posture on border
security or in international platforms, especially if U.S.
intelligence and surveillance tools are shared with Dhaka.
11. Impact on Other Countries - As the United States
strengthens its military ties with Bangladesh, the strategic
environment in the northeastern Indian Ocean and South
Asia is undergoing noticeable transformation. While the
central geopolitical players (China, India, and Myanmar) are
the most directly affected, smaller regional countries are
also recalibrating their defense, diplomatic, and geopolitical
strategies in response to this evolving dynamic. Sri Lanka has
welcomed U.S. port calls and maritime security assistance and
the growing Bangladesh–U.S. partnership could encourage
Colombo to deepen trilateral naval dialogues involving India
and the U.S., but it may also feel pressured to maintain
neutrality to protect its Chinese investments, such as
Hambantota Port.
12. Seeing another South Asian country (Bangladesh) moving
closer to the U.S. military orbit raises fears in Kathmandu that
it could be next in a perceived geostrategic chessboard,

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caught between Indian, Chinese, and U.S. pressures. As

Bangladesh receives more military and logistical support from
the U.S., Nepal may strengthen military-to-military ties
with India to maintain strategic space, or cautiously expand
its participation in UN peacekeeping training programs
jointly organized by the U.S. While Bangladesh is not an
ASEAN member, several ASEAN countries—especially
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore—have growing
interests in Bay of Bengal maritime security, especially related
to trade routes. However, some ASEAN states may view this
shift as militarization of the Bay of Bengal, potentially inviting
great power confrontation.

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