No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_________
L ATHFIELD I NVESTMENTS , LLC, ET AL .,
Petitioners,
v.

CITY OF L ATHRUP V ILLAGE ,

Respondent.
_________
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit
_________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_________
CALEB R. TROTTER KATHRYN D. VALOIS
ROBERT H. THOMAS Counsel of Record
Pacific Legal Foundation Pacific Legal Foundation
555 Capitol Mall 4440 PGA Blvd.
Suite 1290 Suite 307
Sacramento, CA 95814 Palm Beach Gardens, FL
33410
BRIDGET F. CONLAN (916) 503-9011
Pacific Legal Foundation [email protected]
3100 Clarendon Blvd.
Suite 1000
Arlington, VA 22201
Counsel for Petitioners
 QUESTION PRESENTED
The City of Lathrup Village, Michigan, prohibits
leasing commercial property without a license. But
the City will not issue a license unless the property
owner first discloses the names of prospective tenants
and a description of the tenants’ principal business
activity.
Petitioners omitted this information in a license
application to comply with a nondisclosure provision
in its lease agreements, were denied a license, and are
therefore prohibited from renting their property.
They sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the
disclosure requirement as an unconstitutional “Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. Const.
art. I, § 10.
The Sixth Circuit, joining the Fourth, held that “an
alleged Contracts Clause violation cannot give rise to
a cause of action under § 1983.” App. 37a. In contrast,
the Second, Third, Eighth, and Ninth circuits have
concluded either expressly or implicitly that a
Contracts Clause claim may be brought under Section
1983.
The question presented is:
Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of
action for a Contracts Clause claim.
 ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The Petitioners are Lathfield Investments, LLC,
Lathfield Holdings, LLC, and Lathfield Partners,
LLC.
Respondent is the City of Lathrup Village,
Michigan.
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Lathfield Investments, LLC, Lathfield Holdings,
LLC, and Lathfield Partners, LLC, have no parent
corporations and no publicly held company owns 10%
or more of any of their stock.
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
These proceedings are directly related to the above-
captioned case under Rule 14.1(b)(iii):
Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup
Village, No. 24-1318 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2025).
Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup
Village, No. 21-CV-10193 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2023).
Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup
Village, No. 21-CV-10193 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2023).
Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup Vil-
lage, No. 2021-185589-CZ (Oakland Cnty. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 8, 2021).
 iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petition for a writ of certiorari ................................... 1
Opinions below ............................................................ 2
Jurisdiction ................................................................. 2
Constitutional and statutory provisions involved ..... 3
Statement of the case ................................................. 3
A. Petitioners...................................................... 3
B. Regulation of Lathrup Village Commercial
Real Estate .................................................... 4
C. This lawsuit ................................................... 5
Reasons for granting the petition .............................. 6
I. Certiorari is warranted to resolve a
circuit split ......................................................... 7
II. Section 1983 provides a cause of action to
bring Contracts Clause claims ........................ 13
A. The importance of the Contracts
Clause .......................................................... 13
B. Section 1983 is the way to bring a
Contracts Clause claim ............................... 15
III. The Petition presents an excellent vehicle
to resolve these conflicts ................................. 17
Conclusion ................................................................. 18
APPENDIX
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
No. 24-1318, Opinion (April 28, 2025) ................. 1a
United States District Court, Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, No. 21-cv-10193,
2023 WL 7418216, Opinion and Order Granting
the Motion for Summary Judgment Filed by De-
fendants Lathrup Village and the DDA (ECF No.
40) and Granting in Part and Denying in Part the
 iv

Motion for Summary Judgment Filed by Defend-

ants Wright and McKenna (ECF No. 42)
(November 9, 2023) ............................................ 44a
United States District Court, Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, No. 21-cv-10193,
Opinion and Order Denying Motion for Reconsid-
eration (December 20, 2023) ............................. 94a
State of Michigan, 6th Circuit Court for
Oakland County, No. 4:21-cv-10193-FKB-CI,
Complaint (January 28, 2021)......................... 102a
United States District Court, Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, No. 21-cv-10193,
Exhibit 16, Municipal Ordinances,
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 40-16) (July 31, 2023) ...................... 131a
 v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Alachua Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Carpenter,
757 F.Supp.3d 1248 (N.D. Fla. 2024) ................. 12
Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus,
438 U.S. 234 (1978) ......................................... 1, 14
Att’y Gen. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
642 N.W.2d 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) ............... 17
Cap. One Pub. Funding, LLC v. Lunsford,
No. 1:18-CV-3938-LMM,
2018 WL 9877380
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2018) ...................................... 13
Carter v. Greenhow,
114 U.S. 317 (1885) .............................. 7-11, 13, 17
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org.,
441 U.S. 600 (1979) ............................................ 8-9
Crosby v. City of Gastonia,
635 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2011) ...................... 7, 10-11
Dennis Melancon, Inc. v.
City of New Orleans,
703 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 2012) ............................... 12
Dennis v. Higgins,
498 U.S. 439 (1991) ......................... 7-10, 13, 16-17
El Paso v. Simmons,
379 U.S. 508 (1965) ............................................. 13
Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs.,
876 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2017) ............................... 12
Gallo v. District of Columbia,
No. 23-7158, 2025 WL 1446283
(D.C. Cir. May 20, 2025), petition for
cert. filed (U.S. Sep. 5, 2025) ............................... 12
 vi

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,

536 U.S. 273 (2002) ............................................. 16
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Org.,
307 U.S. 496 (1939) ............................................ 8-9
Heights Apartments, LLC v. Walz,
30 F.4th 720 (8th Cir. 2022) ........................ 7, 9, 10
Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979) ............................................... 8
Kaminski v. Coulter,
865 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2017) ............ 5, 7, 11-12, 15
Kunelius v. Town of Stow,
588 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009) .................................... 12
Lathfield Investments, LLC v.
City of Lathrup Vill.,
136 F.4th 282 (6th Cir. 2025) ................................ 1
Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137 (1803) ............................................ 14
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) ............................... 2
McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Bev-
erages and Tobacco, Dep’t of
Bus. Reg. of Fla.,
496 U.S. 18 (1990) ................................................. 8
Melendez v. City of New York,
16 F.4th 992 (2d Cir. 2021) ............................. 7, 10
Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225 (1972) ............................................. 16
Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978) ............................................. 16
Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961) ........................................ 15-16
Murray v. City of Charleston,
96 U.S. 432 (1877) ................................................. 2
 vii

Poirier v. Hodges,
445 F. Supp. 838 (M.D. Fla. 1978) ...................... 12
Robb v. Connolly,
111 U.S. 624 (1884) ............................................. 14
S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana,
336 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2003) ....................... 7, 9–10
South-Central Timber Development, Inc.
v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82 (1984) ................................................. 8
Storer Cable Commc’ns v.
City of Montgomery,
806 F. Supp. 1518 (M.D. Ala. 1992) .................... 12
Sturges v. Crowninshield,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) ............................... 1
Sveen v. Melin,
584 U.S. 811 (2018) ............................................. 10
U.S. Trust Co. of New York v.
New Jersey,
431 U.S. 1 (1977) ................................................. 13
Watters v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs.,
975 F.3d 406 (3d Cir. 2020) .......................... 7, 9-10
Constitutions
Mich. Const. art. I, § 10 ........................................ 5, 17
U.S. Const. amend. XIV ............................................ 15
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1........................................ 1
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ..................................................... 2
42 U.S.C. § 1983 .......................................... 1-3, 5-6, 18
Civil Rights Act of 1871 ............................................ 15
Second Enforcement Act of 1871 .............................. 15
 viii

Rules of Court
S. Ct. Rule 10(a) .......................................................... 6
S. Ct. Rule 10(c) .......................................................... 6
Other Authorities
Lathrup Village Code of Ordinances,
ch. 18, art. II, § 18-33(a) ........................................ 4
ch. 18, art. IV, § 18-184(a) ..................................... 4
Sunstein, Cass R., Section 1983 and the
Private Enforcement of Federal Law,
49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 394 (1982) .............................. 15
 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The Contracts Clause prohibits state and local gov-
ernments from enacting any “Law impairing the Obli-
gation of Contracts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. It
expresses the basic principle that “contracts should be
inviolable.” Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122, 206 (1819). Historically, the Contracts
Clause was “the strongest single constitutional check
on state legislation” during the early years of the Re-
public. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438
U.S. 234, 241 (1978).
Yet the Sixth Circuit dismissed Petitioners’ Con-
tracts Clause claim on the grounds that the civil rights
cause of action provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inap-
plicable to the Contracts Clause, deepening a circuit
split and leaving claimants in another circuit without
a means of vindicating their constitutional rights un-
der the clause. See Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City
of Lathrup Vill., 136 F.4th 282, 305 (6th Cir. 2025)
(finding Lathfield could not establish a Contracts
Clause claim under the U.S. Constitution, the Michi-
gan Constitution, or a private right of action under
Michigan law). App. 36a-38a. Unlike the Sixth and
Fourth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly held
that Contracts Clause claims may be brought via Sec-
tion 1983, while the Second, Third, and Eighth Cir-
cuits have decided Contracts Clause cases under the
implicit assumption that Section 1983 is the proper
vehicle. The First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh
and D.C. Circuits have yet to directly address this
split. The result of this confusing state of affairs is
that the viability of Contracts Clause claims depends
on geography and geography alone.
 2

This Court has stressed “the importance, and even

necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the
whole United States, upon all subjects within the pur-
view of the constitution.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816). Uniformity re-
quires definitive guidance on whether federal Con-
tracts Clause claims may be raised under Section
1983. Allowing a lack of uniformity to persist violates
“one of the highest duties of this court,” namely, “to
take care [that] the prohibition [of the Contracts
Clause] shall neither be evaded nor frittered away.”
Murray v. City of Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 448 (1877).
This Court should grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari to resolve the split, provide desperately
needed guidance on Section 1983, and bring the scat-
tered lower courts into alignment.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Sixth Circuit opinion is reported at 136 F.4th
282 and is reprinted in Petitioners’ Appendix (App.) at
App. 1a-43a.
The opinion of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan is unpublished but
available at 2023 WL 7418216 and printed at App.
44a-93a.
The district court’s denial of reconsideration is un-
published but available at 2023 WL 8806159 and is
printed at App. 94a-101a.
JURISDICTION
The final decision of the Sixth Circuit sought to be
reviewed was issued on April 28, 2025. App. 1a-43a.
This petition is timely filed, and the Court has juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
 3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, of the United States
Constitution provides, in relevant part: “No State
shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts[.]”
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, or-
dinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in eq-
uity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Petitioners
Lathfield Investments, LLC, Lathfield Holdings,
LLC, and Lathfield Partners, LLC (collectively, “Lath-
field”) are in the real estate business in Michigan. See
App. 48a. In 2020, Lathfield purchased property con-
sisting of land, commercial buildings, and a parking
lot in the City of Lathrup Village, Michigan. App. 45a.
Originally constructed in the 1960s, the City has li-
censed the property for use as offices, auto wholesal-
ers, barber shops, salons, nail studios, and retail shops
App. 105a. Lathfield has no plans to change the use
of the property. App. 105a.
Unlike many commercial property owners, Lath-
field does not enter a traditional landlord-tenant rela-
tionship with the entities who agree to use its proper-
ties. App. 110a. Rather, Lathfield licenses the use of
 4

its property to small businesses. App. 110a, 121a.

Lathfield’s license agreements include a “confidential-
ity and non-disclosure” provision in which the parties
agree to not disclose any “confidential information,”
including “the names of licensees” and “the licensees[’]
business identity or business operations in the li-
censed space.” App. 77a.
B. Regulation of Lathrup Village Commercial
Real Estate
The City of Lathrup Village regulates the commer-
cial use of real property. In order to lease commercial
property in Lathrup Village, the property owner must
obtain a landlord rental license.1 Lathrup Vill. Code
of Ordinances ch. 18, art. IV, § 18-184(a). See App.
140a. In addition, commercial property owners must
“file on an annual basis with the city clerk … a list of
all tenants in such building and the principal business
of each tenant.” Lathrup Vill. Code of Ordinances
ch. 18, art. II, § 18-33(a). See App. 136a.
After Lathfield purchased the Lathrup Village
property in 2020, it sought to comply with the City’s
license requirement for commercial landlords and ap-
plied for a landlord rental license. App. 5a. Because
of the confidentiality provision in Lathfield’s license
agreement, however, it did not provide a list of names
and principal businesses of its licensees (tenants) as
required by section 18-33(a) of the City Code. App. 6a,
136a. As a result, the City denied Lathfield’s applica-

1 In the courts below, Lathfield pressed a distinction between a

landlord-tenant relationship and the licensor-licensee business

model it operates under. For the purposes of this Petition,
however, the distinction is immaterial.
 5

tion for a landlord rental license and subsequently de-

nied general business applications submitted by Lath-
field’s licensees. App. 6a.
C. This Lawsuit
Petitioners initiated suit on January 8, 2021, by in-
dividually filing three separate suits in the 6th Circuit
Court for Oakland County, Michigan. All three com-
plaints raised substantially similar allegations and
claims premised on the City’s actions following Lath-
field’s purchase of the Lathrup Village property, in-
cluding the denial of Lathfield’s landlord rental li-
cense. Because the complaints all brought causes of
action claiming that the City violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and various provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion, including the Contracts Clause of Article I, Sec-
tion 10, the City removed the cases to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Mich-
igan where they were consolidated.
The district court granted summary judgment to
the City on all of Lathfield’s claims. Relevant to this
Petition, the district court ruled against Lathfield’s
Contracts Clause claim, reasoning that the nondisclo-
sure provisions of its tenant agreements allowed
enough disclosure to comply with the ordinance and
“would be void as against public policy” if not. App.
77a-78a.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed on alterna-
tive grounds. App. 36a-37a. The court held that it
was bound by Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 347
 6

(6th Cir. 2017), where a prior panel held that “an al-
leged Contracts Clause violation cannot give rise to a
cause of action under” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 App. 37a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The Petition should be granted for three reasons.
First, there is an entrenched circuit split on an im-
portant point of law. The Sixth and Fourth Circuits
hold that Contracts Clause claims are not cognizable
under Section 1983, while the Second, Third, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits say the opposite. See Supreme
Court Rule 10(a). This inevitably leads to disparate
outcomes for civil rights claimants in different cir-
cuits. Worse still, because the Sixth and Fourth Cir-
cuits have failed to clarify how litigants are to raise
Contracts Clause claims (if not via Section 1983), the
Clause has been sidelined in nine States. Without
clarity, the practical protection of the Contracts
Clause thus unjustly depends on the victim’s location,
unless this Court resolves the split.
Second, the split raises an important procedural
question of federal constitutional law meriting the
Court’s review: what is the appropriate mechanism to
bring a Contracts Clause suit? Whether the answer is
Section 1983, or some other procedure, this Court’s
guidance is needed. See Supreme Court Rule 10(c).
Uncertainty on such a fundamental question leads to
confusion, not only among the lower courts but also
among citizens who have to guess how to plead their
constitutional rights in court.

2 The court additionally held that, assuming Section 1983

provided a cause of action, Lathfield’s Contracts Clause claim
would still fail as the relevant contracts were entered into after
the enactment of the challenged City ordinance.
 7

Third, the Petition is an appropriate vehicle for

these issues. The posture of the case means the Court
can address the question presented to clarify the law
without wading into the merits of the underlying Con-
tracts Clause claim.
I. Certiorari Is Warranted To Resolve A
Circuit Split
The decision below deepens an existing circuit split
over whether Section 1983 provides a cause of action
for claims arising under the Contracts Clause. As
noted above, the Second, Third, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits all hold that Contracts Clause claims arise
under Section 1983. See Melendez v. City of New York,
16 F.4th 992, 996, 1032-47 (2d Cir. 2021); Watters v.
Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 975 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2020);
Heights Apartments, LLC v. Walz, 30 F.4th 720, 727-
28 (8th Cir. 2022); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana,
336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003). In contrast, the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits expressly reject that Sec-
tion 1983 provides a cause of action for Contracts
Clause claims. See Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635
F.3d 634, 641 (4th Cir. 2011); Kaminski, 865 F.3d at
347; App. 36a-37a.
The competing views amongst the lower courts
stem from differing interpretations of this Court’s
opinions in Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885),
and Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991). Carter
was a suit brought under the predecessor statute to
Section 1983 challenging a Virginia official’s refusal to
accept bond coupons offered as payment for taxes as a
result of an 1882 statute prohibiting tax collectors
from accepting anything other than “gold, silver,
United States treasury notes, and national bank cur-
 8

rency.” Carter, 114 U.S. at 318-19. Because the plain-

tiff taxpayer alleged that the bond coupons were au-
thorized by an 1879 statute that made the coupons ac-
ceptable for payment of all state taxes, he claimed that
his right to pay with bond coupons was “secured to
him by the constitution of the United States,” and any
refusal to accept them as payment violated his rights
“under color of ” state law. Id. at 319-20. While the
Court recognized that the plaintiff ’s claim was prem-
ised on enforcing the contract abrogated by the 1882
statute, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to suf-
ficiently assert his rights under the Contracts Clause
or show they had been deprived. Id. at 322.
This Court gave Carter a “narrow reading” in sub-
sequent decisions, including Dennis. See 498 U.S. at
451 n.9 (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613, n.29 (1979), and Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Org., 307 U.S. 496, 527
(1939) (opinion of Stone, J.)). In Dennis, the Court
considered whether the Commerce Clause confers in-
dividual rights that can be asserted through Section
1983. Id. at 450-51. In considering Section 1983’s pro-
tection of “rights, privileges, or immunities,” the Court
reiterated that the Commerce Clause is a “substantive
‘restriction on permissible state regulation,’ ” id. at
447 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326
(1979)), a “self-executing limitation” on state power,
id. (quoting South-Central Timber Development, Inc.
v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984)), and that individ-
uals may seek injunctive and declaratory relief
against state action that usurps those prohibitions. Id.
(citing, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Bever-
ages and Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus. Reg. of Fla., 496 U.S.
18, 31 (1990)). As a result, the Court held that the
“combined restriction on state power and entitlement
 9

to relief under the Commerce Clause amounts to a”

Section 1983 “right, privilege, or immunity.” Id. In
dissent, Justice Kennedy analogized to Carter, which
he interpreted as holding that Section 1983 does not
provide a cause of action for Contracts Clause claims.
Dennis, 498 U.S. at 457 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But
the Dennis majority explicitly rejected the dissent’s
reliance on Carter, reasoning that Chapman and
Hague had already confined Carter to its facts, includ-
ing the plaintiff ’s failure to plead a Contracts Clause
violation. Id. at 451 n.9.
Faithfully applying a narrow construction of
Carter, the Ninth Circuit held that Section 1983 pro-
vides a cause of action for a Contracts Clause viola-
tion. S. Cal. Gas, 336 F.3d at 887. In line with Dennis,
the court held that Carter was decided only “as a mat-
ter of pleading,” and explained that Section 1983 con-
strued “liberally and beneficently” guards against
Contracts Clause violations. Id. (right to be free from
impairment of obligations of contract “is a right se-
cured by the first article of the United States Consti-
tution.”).
Unlike, but consistent with, the express holding of
the Ninth Circuit that Section 1983 provides a cause
of action for Contracts Clause claims, the Third and
Eighth Circuits “assume” a plaintiff may bring a Con-
tracts Clause claim under Section 1983. Watters, 975
F.3d at 413 (“We will assume for purposes of this ap-
peal that § 1983 confers a private right of action prem-
ised on the type of Contracts Clause claim that the
teachers bring.”);3 Heights Apartments, 30 F.4th at

3 While the Third Circuit assumed Contracts Clause claims

were cognizable via Section 1983, the court recognized the split
of authority on the question, Watters, 975 F.3d at 413 n.2, and
 10

727-28 (“While this Court has not expressly decided

whether there is a private right of action under § 1983
for a Contract Clause violation, there have been cases
in this circuit in which such a cause of action has been
asserted. . . . We assume, without deciding, the un-
contested issue of whether a cause of action for a Con-
tract Clause violation may be brought under
§ 1983.”).4 The Second Circuit likewise indirectly held
that a Contracts Clause claim can be brought under
Section 1983. See Melendez, 16 F.4th at 996. Without
commenting on the cause of action for Contracts
Clause claims, the court proceeded to apply this
Court’s balancing test for Contracts Clause claims, see
Sveen, 584 U.S. at 818-19, and reversed dismissal of
the claim. 16 F.4th at 1032-47.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit expressly disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Southern Califor-
nia Gas that Section 1983 provides a cause of action
for Contracts Clause claims. Crosby, 635 F.3d at 640-
41. It interpreted Carter to bar Section 1983 actions
for Contracts Clause claims unless the plaintiff has no
adequate remedy for an established contractual im-
pairment or is entirely denied judicial review of their
claim. Id. at 640. The Fourth Circuit minimized Den-
nis, reasoning that it did not address “the continuing
vitality of Carter . . . with respect to the Contracts
Clause.” Id. at 641. Without hinting at an alternative

ultimately dismissed the claim after applying the balancing test

for Contracts Clause claims as articulated by this Court in Sveen
v. Melin, 584 U.S. 811, 818-19 (2018). See 975 F.3d at 413.
4 Like the Third Circuit, the Eighth Circuit recognized the

circuit split but analyzed the merits of the Contracts Clause

claim, as no party had disputed Section 1983’s applicability to
Contracts Clause claims. Heights Apartments, 30 F.4th at 727-
28.
 11

vehicle to vindicate Contracts Clause rights, the

Fourth Circuit held that “an attempted § 1983 action
alleging state impairment of a private contract will
not lie.” Id. at 641.
Likewise, in Kaminski, the Sixth Circuit—without
briefing or argument on the issue—considered
whether the Contracts Clause is enforceable under
Section 1983 as a constitutional “right, privilege, or
immunity.” Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 345. Applying
Carter’s logic to Section 1983, the majority deemed the
Contracts Clause “a structural limitation placed upon
the power of the States,” not “an individual constitu-
tional right enforceable under § 1983[.]” Id. at 346. It
did so despite acknowledging that “there is considera-
ble debate over” the question of whether the Contracts
Clause is “enforceable by section 1983[,]” and that
Carter may no longer “retain[] much precedential
force.” Id. at 345-46. Judge Moore dissented, conclud-
ing that the panel majority’s holding conflicted with
implicit circuit precedent and the “directive that
§ 1983 be broadly construed.” Id. at 349. Nonethe-
less, the majority defended its rule as better aligned
with Supreme Court precedent, the text and history of
Section 1983, and the principle that only the Supreme
Court can overrule its own precedent. Id. at 346.
In the instant case, the Sixth Circuit, following its
divided opinion in Kaminski, took the same approach
as the Fourth Circuit and held that “an alleged Con-
tracts Clause violation cannot give rise to a cause of
action under § 1983.” App. 37a (citing Kaminski, 865
F.3d at 347). The court followed dicta in Carter stat-
ing that the Contracts Clause guarantees an individ-
ual right “only indirectly and incidentally.” App. 37a.
Reasoning that “the Supreme Court has never defini-
 12

tively held that that an alleged Contracts Clause vio-

lation is cognizable as a § 1983 claim” the Sixth Cir-
cuit concluded that it was bound by its prior decision
in Kaminski, so Petitioners could not bring a Con-
tracts Clause claim under Section 1983. Id.
The First, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have
dodged the question. See Kunelius v. Town of Stow,
588 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2009) (declining to address
question upon concluding that Contracts Clause not
implicated); Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New Or-
leans, 703 F.3d 262, 279 n.14 (5th Cir. 2012) (declining
to decide question after holding that plaintiffs were
unlikely to prevail on merits of Contracts Clause claim
and affirming denial of preliminary injunction); El-
liott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 876 F.3d 926, 931-32 (7th Cir.
2017) (declining to address question after defendants
expressly waived the argument); Gallo v. District of
Columbia, No. 23-7158, 2025 WL 1446283, at *3 (D.C.
Cir. May 20, 2025) (declining to decide the question
after holding that plaintiff failed to allege elements of
Contracts Clause claim), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
Sep. 5, 2025) (No. 25-265). These cases reaffirm the
uncertainty permeating the lower courts.
Finally, uncertainty reigns within the Eleventh
Circuit, as the Court of Appeals has not yet weighed
in, but a split has developed among the district courts.
Compare Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838, 842
(M.D. Fla. 1978) (holding that the Contracts Clause
“is not a right redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”),
with Alachua Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Carpenter, 757
F.Supp.3d 1248, 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2024) (“Plaintiffs’
Contracts Clause claim is properly before this Court
under section 1983.”), and Storer Cable Commc’ns v.
City of Montgomery, 806 F. Supp. 1518, 1529 (M.D.
Ala. 1992) (“It is well settled that § 1983 provides a
 13

cause of action against municipalities for alleged vio-

lations of . . . the contracts clause”). See also Cap. One
Pub. Funding, LLC v. Lunsford, No. 1:18-CV-3938-
LMM, 2018 WL 9877380, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 19,
2018) (“the Court need not decide what appears to be
an open question in the Eleventh Circuit—that is,
whether a Contract Clause violation may be pursued
under § 1983.”).
All of this shows that uncertainty and confusion
pervade the lower courts on the question presented.
While the Ninth Circuit holds that Carter means little
and Dennis controls, the Sixth Circuit believes that
this Court would have to overrule Carter to find an
individual right in the Contracts Clause. Only this
Court’s intervention can clear up the confusion and re-
solve the ongoing disagreement.
II. Section 1983 Provides A Cause of Action To
Bring Contracts Clause Claims
A. The Importance of the Contracts Clause
Despite its lack of use in recent years, the Con-
tracts Clause remains one of the fundamental protec-
tions individuals have against unreasonable govern-
ment intrusion. Its inclusion in the Constitution re-
flects the importance the Framers placed on an ex-
press limitation of government power. U.S. Trust Co.
of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977).
Over the last century, however, Contracts Clause pro-
tections have slowly eroded, giving increased defer-
ence to government involvement in private and public
contracts. See El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 508, 508-
09 (1965) (the State “has the sovereign right . . . to pro-
tect the . . . general welfare of the people and we must
 14

respect the wide discretion on the part of the legisla-

ture in determining what is and what is not neces-
sary[.]”) (cleaned up).
Despite this increased deference, the Contracts
Clause remains part of our written Constitution. It is
not a dead letter. And as such, it must be understood
to impose some limits on the power of government to
abridge existing contractual relationships. Allied
Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 240-41. The scope of
that protection remains an open case-by-case question
for the judiciary. However, one must first have access
to the judiciary to raise such a question. Without Sec-
tion 1983, Contracts Clause claims are rendered inac-
cessible, as no other enabling statute exists for af-
fected individuals to assert such claims.
Given these high stakes, the guarantees of the Con-
tracts Clause must have a vehicle for vindication in
the federal courts. Yet neither the Fourth nor Sixth
Circuits suggested any cause of action that could sub-
stitute for Section 1983 and allow individuals to pur-
sue a remedy for the impairment of contractual obli-
gations. Broad inability to raise a Contracts Clause
claim simply cannot be the case. See Marbury v. Mad-
ison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws fur-
nish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right.”). State and federal courts exist “to guard, en-
force, and protect every right granted or secured by
the constitution of the United States and the laws
made in pursuance thereof[.]” Robb v. Connolly, 111
U.S. 624, 637 (1884). Closing the courthouse doors to
plaintiffs in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits who suffer
 15

Contracts Clause violations undermines that judicial

duty.
B. Section 1983 is the way to bring a Contracts
Clause claim
The import of Section 1983 and its predecessors
cannot be understated. Originally created as the Sec-
ond Enforcement Act of 1871, this Act was “one of the
means whereby Congress exercised the power vested
in it by [§] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment” to enforce
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment after the
Civil War. Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 345. The Act was
uniquely created to provide both a criminal and pri-
vate cause of action. Id.
Three years later, in 1874, Congress codified and
revised several laws, including the Civil Rights Act of
1871, whose private cause of action was expanded to
protect deprivations of rights “secured by the Consti-
tution and laws.” Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and
the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 394, 402 (1982). The resulting statute, codified
as Revised Statute 1979 and later re-codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1983, was substantially identical to the cur-
rent Section 1983. Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 345. And
since the Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 180 (1961), Revised Statute 1979 has been read
to afford federal rights valid causes of action in federal
courts:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legis-
lation was passed was to afford a federal right in
federal courts because, by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state
laws might not be enforced and the claims of cit-
izens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and
immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
 16

Amendment might be denied by the state agen-

cies.
365 U.S. at 180.
This history highlights the true purpose of Section
1983’s predecessors: protecting historically underpro-
tected classes from lack of access to state courts. See
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (“The very
purpose of [§] 1983 was to interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people as guardians of the
people’s federal rights—to protect the people from un-
constitutional action under color of state law[.]”). The
Section 1983 we know today serves the same purpose
—providing any person who is deprived of their rights,
privileges, or immunities under the Constitution with
a cause of action to seek redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002). To
omit the Contracts Clause from this protection now,
despite Section 1983 coverage of every other Constitu-
tional provision (except those covered explicitly by
other federal statutes), without having any other ena-
bling statute in place to provide private causes of ac-
tion in federal court, leaves affected individuals with
no ability to vindicate their constitutional rights. This
simply cannot be the case.
To date, the Court “has never restricted” Section
1983 coverage to only certain constitutional provi-
sions. Dennis, 498 U.S. at 445. “Rather, [it has] given
full effect to its broad language, recognizing that
§ 1983 ‘provide[s] a remedy, to be broadly construed,
against all forms of official violation of federally pro-
tected rights.’ ” Id. (quoting Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978)). The Court
has also “rejected attempts to limit the types of consti-
tutional rights that are encompassed within the
 17

phrase ‘rights, privileges, or immunities’ ” within Sec-

tion 1983. Dennis, 498 U.S. at 445. The logic utilized
in Dennis, which examined Section 1983’s applicabil-
ity over the Commerce Clause, should equally apply
to the Contracts Clause as both clauses are explicit
structural provisions, equating to the “rights, privi-
leges, or immunities” protected by the Constitution.
In keeping with this precedent and the virulent
need for individuals to have access to courts, the Court
should grant certiorari to clarify that Section 1983 is
at minimum a catchall statute that protects all un-
specified federal rights, regardless of where they are
found in the Constitution or federal law.
III. The Petition Presents An Excellent Vehicle
To Resolve These Conflicts
The Petition cleanly presents the issue of whether
Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle to bring a Con-
tracts Clause claim.
If Lathfield cannot bring its Contracts Clause claim
via Section 1983, it cannot proceed at all in any court,
as Michigan does not provide a state law cause of ac-
tion. This situation is different from Carter, which
even if this Court was to find was correct, would be of
cold comfort to Lathfield, who has no other remedy
available at law. 114 U.S. at 321-23. Petitioners here
brought Contracts Clause claims pursuant to the U.S.
and Michigan Constitutions. App. 37a. But because
the Michigan Contracts Clause, Mich. Const. art. I,
§ 10, is interpreted “no[ ] . . . more expansively than
its federal counterpart,” Att’y Gen. v. Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 642 N.W.2d 691, 698 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002),
and no Michigan law is read as providing an independ-
ent cause of action for state Contracts Clause claims,
see App. 37a, the existence of a federal cause of action
 18

is dispositive here. That provides the Court with a di-

rect opportunity to resolve this narrow, but important
question. Namely, whether Section 1983 is an appro-
priate mechanism for an individual to bring a Con-
tracts Clause claim. And if not, to clarify how a Con-
tracts Clause claim should be pleaded.
Finally, the district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the City on the Contracts Clause
claims and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Thus, this
Court would not need to address any issues of fact to
answer the question presented.
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

CALEB R. TROTTER KATHRYN D. VALOIS

ROBERT H. THOMAS Counsel of Record
Pacific Legal Foundation Pacific Legal Foundation
555 Capitol Mall 4440 PGA Blvd.
Suite 1290 Suite 307
Sacramento, CA 95814 Palm Beach Gardens, FL
33410
BRIDGET F. CONLAN (916) 503-9011
Pacific Legal Foundation [email protected]
3100 Clarendon Blvd.
Suite 1000
Arlington, VA 22201
Counsel for Petitioners

S EPTEMBER 2025