BS 5607-2017
BS 5607-2017
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Contents Page
Foreword iv
Section 1: Preliminary processes 1
1 Scope 1
2 Normative references 1
3 Terms and definitions 2
4 Preliminary procedures 7
4.1 General 7
4.2 Legal framework 7
5 Role of the client 7
5.1 General 8
5.2 Demolition works 8
6 Risk assessment and site survey 10
6.1 Risk assessment 10
6.2 Site survey 11
6.3 Hazards from electrical sources 12
6.4 Exclusion zone and warning procedures 12
6.5 Sources of ignition and fire 12
6.6 Advance notices and consultation 12
7 Method statement 13
7.1 General 13
7.2 Preparation 13
7.3 Implementation of the method statement 14
7.4 Exclusion zone and warning procedures/systems 15
8 Supervision and responsibility 16
9 Safety and security of explosives during acquisition, transport and storage on site 18
9.1 General 18
9.2 Planning 18
9.3 Storage 19
9.4 Transport of explosives on site 22
9.5 Transport of explosives by air 23
9.6 Disposal of unwanted explosives or explosives which have deteriorated during storage 23
10 Safety when using explosives 24
10.1 General 24
10.2 Handling and charging of explosives 24
10.3 Types of explosives 25
10.4 Initiation systems 27
10.5 Misfires 30
Figure 1 — Procedure to remedy misfires 31
Section 2: Blasting operations 36
11 Tunnelling and shaft sinking 36
11.1 General 36
11.2 Method statement 36
11.3 Site survey 36
11.4 Containment measures 37
11.5 Explosives 37
Figure 2 — Exclusion zones for shaft sinking and tunnelling 38
11.6 Safety and operations 40
12 Demolition 46
12.1 General 47
12.2 Quality assurance and auditing of the works 47
12.3 Pre-weakening 47
12.4 Site survey/risk assessment 47
12.5 Blast design 48
12.6 Independent audit of the blasting method statement and its implementation 49
12.7 Method statement 49
12.8 Explosives 53
12.9 Safety and operations 54
12.10 Misfires 55
12.11 Debris and site clearance 55
13 Underwater blasting 55
13.1 General 56
13.2 Method statement 56
13.3 Site survey 56
13.4 Exclusion zones and blast warning procedures 57
Figure 3 — Relationship of blast area and exclusion zones in underwater blasting 57
Table 1 — Recommended minimum distances from underwater blasting operations 57
13.5 Explosives 58
13.6 Safety and operations 60
13.7 Misfires 62
13.8 Seismic impulse generation 62
14 Land excavation 62
14.1 General 62
14.2 Documentation 63
14.3 Risk assessment and site survey 63
14.4 Method statements 64
14.5 Drilling 65
14.6 Exclusion zones and blast protection 65
Figure 4 — Exclusion zone for land excavation 66
14.7 Transport and storage 67
14.8 Explosives and initiation systems 67
Table 2 — Selection and use of explosives 67
Table 3 — Selection and use of initiation systems 68
14.9 Safety and operations 68
15 Other forms of blasting 69
15.1 Mini-blasting 69
15.2 Deflagrating compounds (low-velocity explosives) 70
15.3 Cardox 70
15.4 Expanding grouts 70
Annex A (normative) Competence for blasting operations 71
Annex B (informative) Qualifications for blasting 72
Table B.1 — Blasting operations competency units 73
Annex C (informative) Explosives engineering training 73
Annex D (informative) General properties of explosives 74
Bibliography 75
Summary of pages
This document comprises a front cover, and inside front cover, pages i to vi, pages 1 to 77, an inside back cover and
a back cover.
Foreword
Publishing information
This British Standard is published by BSI Standards Limited, under licence from The British
Standards Institution, and came into effect on 31 October 2017. It was prepared by Technical
Committee B/513, Construction equipment and plant, and site safety. A list of organizations
represented on this committee can be obtained on request to its secretary.
Supersession
This British Standard supersedes BS 5607:1998, which is withdrawn.
Hazard warnings
WARNING. This British Standard calls for the use of substances and/or procedures that can be injurious to
health and safety if adequate precautions are not taken. It refers only to technical suitability and does not
absolve the user from legal obligations relating to health and safety or the acquisition, handling or storage of
explosives at any stage.
Presentational conventions
The provisions of this standard are presented in roman (i.e. upright) type. Its recommendations are
expressed in sentences in which the principal auxiliary verb is “should”.
Commentary, explanation and general informative material is presented in smaller italic type, and does
not constitute a normative element.
The word “should” is used to express recommendations of this standard. The word “may” is used in
the text to express permissibility, e.g. as an alternative to the primary recommendation of the clause.
The word “can” is used to express possibility, e.g. a consequence of an action or an event.
Notes and commentaries are provided throughout the text of this standard. Notes give references
and additional information that are important but do not form part of the recommendations.
Commentaries give background information.
Where words have alternative spellings, the preferred spelling of the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary is used (e.g. “organization” rather than “organisation”).
• The Ammonium Nitrate Materials (High Nitrogen Content) Safety Regulations 2003 [21];
• The Manufacture and Storage of Explosives Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006 [22];
• The Dangerous Goods in Harbour Areas Regulations 2016 [23];
• The Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1991 [24];
• The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 [25];
• The Identification and Traceability of Explosives Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2010 [26].
NOTE 1 These regulations are regularly amended, so it is necessary to ensure that the latest version of each is
applied. Attention is drawn to local regulations in overseas jurisdictions.
NOTE 2 All legislative requirements relating to explosives in Great Britain form “relevant statutory provisions” as
defined in the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 [3].
1 Scope
This British Standard gives recommendations for the safe storage, handling, transport and use of
blasting explosives and accessories in construction and demolition operations.
Section 1 covers general recommendations for handling and safety.
Section 2 is concerned with safety in the use of explosives in special applications and situations such
as tunnelling, demolition, excavation and underwater working.
This British Standard is not applicable to:
a) blasting on offshore oil and/or gas platforms or structures, or any associated works;
b) underground works carried out for the purpose of exploiting mineral reserves and extensions to
voids left following ore extraction, which are governed by mining legislation; or
c) operations involving the use of cartridge-operated fixing tools, which are specified by
BS EN 15895 and whose use is covered by BS 4078‑1.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their
content constitutes provisions of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited
applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any
amendments) applies.
Standards publications
BS 5930, Code of practice for ground investigations
BS 5975, Code of practice for temporary works procedures and the permissible stress design
of falsework
BS 6031, Code of practice for earthworks
BS 6164, Code of practice for health and safety in tunnelling in the construction industry
BS 6187:2011, Code of practice for full and partial demolition
BS 6472 (both parts), Guide to evaluation of human exposure to vibration in buildings
BS 7385‑1, Evaluation and measurement for vibration in buildings — Part 1: Guide for measurement of
vibrations and evaluation of their effects on buildings (withdrawn)
BS 7385‑2, Evaluation and measurement for vibration in buildings — Part 2: Guide to damage levels
from groundbourne vibration
BS EN 13763‑26:2004, Explosives for civil uses — Detonators and relays — Part 26: Definitions,
methods and requirements for devices and accessories for reliable and safe function of
detonators and relays
BS EN 16228 (all parts), Drilling and foundation equipment — Safety
ISO/DIS 19296, Mining and earthmoving machinery — Mobile machines working underground —
Machine Safety
Other publications
[N1] HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE. Explosives Regulations 2014. Safety provisions. Guidance on
Regulations. Approved Code of Practice L150. Sudbury: HSE Books, 2014
[N2] HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE. Explosives Regulations 2014. Guidance on Regulations –
Security provisions. Approved Code of Practice L151. Sudbury: HSE Books, 2014
[N3] HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE. . Health and safety at quarries. The Quarries Regulations 1999.
Approved Code of Practice L118. Sudbury: HSE Books, 2013
[N4] MINERAL PRODUCTS ASSOCIATION. Positioning a shotfiring shelter: Guidance on what to
consider when positioning a shotfiring shelter, London: Mineral Products Association, 2009
3.2 ANFO
mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil that can be used as an explosive
NOTE The preparation of ANFO is required to conform to the licensing provisions of Explosives
Regulations 2014 [8], Regulation 6.
3.3 approved
authorized for use by an authority having jurisdiction
3.7 blowdown
reduction and demolition of a structure by the controlled use of explosives
3.10 burden
shortest distance between explosives and any free face
3.11 canister
portable container specifically intended and designed to carry a small quantity of explosives
or accessories
3.13 cartridge
wrapped or otherwise protected cylinder of defined size of a homogeneous explosive material
3.14 competence
combination of training, qualifications, skills, experience, knowledge and other qualities that an
organization or individual has to allow them to perform a task assigned to them properly and safely
3.18 detonator
initiator for explosives materials that contains a charge of high explosive fired by means of a flame,
spark, electric current (including an electronic signal) or shock tube
NOTE An American synonym is “cap”, which is deprecated.
3.23 exploder
device designed for initiating detonators
3.24 explosive
article, substance or mixture of substances that is manufactured to produce a practical effect
by explosion
3.32 Misfires
3.32.1 type A misfire
misfire in which testing before firing a shot reveals broken continuity which cannot be rectified
3.36 pre-splitting
blasting technique to minimize overbreak by creating a fracture plane on the perimeter of an
excavation using shot holes which are fired simultaneously before the main shot holes and which are
lightly charged and closely spaced
3.38 primer
cartridge or cast primer of explosive or other material into which one or more detonators or
detonating cord is inserted or attached, in order to initiate or boost a larger charge
3.39 round
group of shots fired in one operation
3.42 sensitivity
measure of ease with which a substance or article can be made to explode, or its liability to explode,
when subjected to deliberate or accidental shock, friction or heat
3.44 Shelters
3.44.1 blast shelter
protective structure for use below ground in which a shotfirer and others involved in the blasting
operations can shelter from blast fume
3.47 shotfirer
appropriately qualified and competent person appointed to be in immediate control of the shotfiring
operations which include checking to ensure that the blasting specification is still appropriate for the
site conditions at the time blasting is to take place; mixing explosives; priming a cartridge; charging
and stemming a shothole; linking or connecting a round of shots; withdrawal and sheltering of
persons; inspecting and testing a shotfiring circuit; firing a shot; and checking for misfires
3.49 Signals
3.49.1 all clear signal
predetermined visual and/or audible signal given after an explosion after checking that there have
been no misfires and the area is safe to enter
3.51 stemming
inert, incombustible material used to confine explosives in a shot hole
4 Preliminary procedures
4.1 General
All uses of explosives should be preceded by:
• a review of the relevant legal framework to ensure the proposed procedure is lawful (see 4.2);
• a risk assessment to identify potential hazards arising from the work (Clause 6);
• completion of a method statement (Clause 7) to address the risks identified by the
risk assessment;
• identification of those with responsibility and supervisory control of the operation and
responsibility for completing the method statement (Clause 8).
NOTE It may be decided that the use of explosives is inappropriate and an alternative approach is required.
To complete the preliminary procedures, site survey(s), blast design and development of the method
statement (Clause 7) should be carried out.
NOTE 2 Although the Quarries Regulations 1999 [16] do not apply directly to civil engineering construction,
Part V, along with the relevant section of the accompanying Approved Code of Practice [N3], contains much useful
information on the safe use of explosives.
Special regulations could apply in Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands, Isle of Man and the
Scilly Isles, and should be checked prior to operations in these areas.
operation can be undertaken by that contractor or by a specialist subcontractor. The purpose of the
blasting is to fragment rock for subsequent excavation and transport. The main high‑consequence
risk arises from the blasting process being inadequately conceived or undertaken.
b) The use of explosives in the demolition of structures is characterized by specifically-designed
blowdowns of a complex nature, often involving structures which have been deliberately
pre‑weakened. There can be a requirement for a specialist structural engineer, experienced and
competent to design the pre-weakening scheme. The explosive demolition contractor is likely to be a
specialist for this type of high-hazard work. The intention of the explosive demolition is to mobilize
the already pre-weakened structure and to cause it to collapse under gravity and break up.
Pre‑weakening can be achieved by different techniques, including mechanical, or using specialized
explosive cutting charges to achieve the purpose of pre-weakening the structure in part or in full
before mobilization of the structure occurs. The appropriate choice of technique should be made by
the competent shotfirer to ensure the risks are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
The main low-frequency but high-consequence risks include the premature collapse of the
structure, a fault in the blasting operation, the failure of the blast to bring down the structure
either totally or in part, the collapse of the structure in an unplanned location and the failure of the
structure to break-up.
5.1 General
The client should ensure that the recommendation of this British Standard, the HSE guidance on the
Quarries Regulations [N3] and the Institute of Quarrying's practices, and other forms of relevant good
practice (RGP) are followed to ensure safety.
The client should ensure coordination between the parties and that the demolition project is
carried out safely.
The client should review the adequacy of each tender in accordance with the client's tender
assessment procedures, so as to make a judgement on the adequacy of each tender, taking account of:
a) the safety and technical adequacy of the tender, including but not limited to:
1) the design of any pre-weakening works undertaken as part of the tenderer's proposal; and
2) the tenderer's outline risk assessment, method statement and design of exclusion zone
reduce the risks to as low as reasonably practicable;
b) the tenderer's demonstration of suitability, competence and experience to undertake the type of
work required;
c) the tenderer's proposals for adequate site supervision during work on site to ensure compliance
with the design assumptions, along with technical and quality requirements;
d) the tenderer's change management procedures for addressing design changes or changes in the
method of carrying out the works on site, including independent [Category (CAT) 3] checking
before submission for approval by the client;
e) any areas of risk or topics either missing or of insufficient detail in the tender, and the
implications and potential consequences of these omissions for the safety of the works; and
f) the client's learning from experience of similar or relevant projects, the information from which
could benefit the client's judgement as to whether the works can be undertaken safely.
The client should then undertake a process of review internally and, where appropriate, involve an
independent review undertaken by a competent third party (sometimes referred to as a CAT 3 check).
Any learning experience identified by the client [see f)] should be passed on to appropriate parties,
particularly if occurring during the tender process.
The client, appropriately informed in accordance with a) to f), should then select a suitable explosive
demolition contractor based on the evidence from the tender review. The client should keep a formal
record of the selection decision-making process.
The explosive demolition contractor should develop the detailed proposals for a robust technical
design, including comprehensive risk assessments and method statements that address the full scope
of the works.
The client should ensure the explosive demolition contractor’s detailed proposals are in accordance
with relevant good practice such as set out in this British Standard and in compliance with the
law. Any shortfalls should be addressed within a formal change control process (see 5.2.5) by
the explosive demolition contractor, and submitted for further review by the client and potential
acceptance before the works proceed safely on site.
Vibration levels should be minimized by appropriate explosives and collapse design. Where
necessary, a contractual limit should be specified or the recommendations of BS 7385‑1 (withdrawn),
BS 7385‑2 and BS 6472 (both parts) should be followed to minimize damage from vibration
and human exposure levels to vibration. Where ground or airborne vibrations could constitute
either a nuisance or a potential damage risk, structural surveys should be undertaken before and
after blasting.
Initial trial blasting, along with vibration monitoring, should be carried out with small isolated
charges to allow the transmission properties of the ground in that particular location to be
characterized and the vibration effects from blasting calculated with a degree of confidence.
Presently, no initiation system offers complete protection against direct lightning strikes, so if a
lightning storm approaches a blast site charging should cease and the blast area should be vacated of
all personnel. If stray currents from any sources are forseeable, initiation systems offering protection
should be employed, for example, non-electric systems.
Extreme caution should be exercised when using electric detonators adjacent to public highways as
illegal over-powered transmitters could be carried on vehicles passing close to the area of blasting.
Electronic systems or other intrinsically safe means should be adopted. Where any doubt remains,
electrical means of firing should not be used.
7 Method statement
7.1 General
Before any work commences on site, a method statement based on the blast design and associated
risk assessments (see Clause 6) should be prepared by the contractor. Where appropriate, the
method statement should be developed in stages, with the overall design adjusted and refined on the
basis of information gathered from structural assessments/investigations and trial blasts [see 6.2.2
and 6.2.4]. The method statement should be proportionate to the scale and complexity of the project,
and reflect the level of potential risk.
Drawing up a method statement should be seen as an essential step in demonstrating compliance
with the requirement of Section 2(2) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 [3] to provide a
safe system of work.
The method statement should also include procedures and practices drawn from instructions and
site rules specified by the company, to ensure compliance with current legislation, codes of practice
and guidance notes. It should identify problems and their solutions, and form a reference for site
supervision. The method statement should be easy to understand, and be known and agreed by all
levels of supervision, including shotfirers and any contractors involved on the site.
NOTE Paragraphs 319 and 320 of HSE publication L138 [32] give recommendations on the preparation of a
method statement, including its contents.
On sites where Parts 2 and 3 of the CDM Regulations 2015 [6] apply (see 4.2.1), the
method statement should be an integral part of the health and safety plan developed by the
principal contractor.
7.2 Preparation
The following points should be factored into the preparation of the method statement:
a) scope of the operation and objectives;
b) general philosophy of explosives works and intended outcome;
c) technical information;
d) risk assessment factors (see Clause 6);
e) details of key personnel, including explosives engineers, shotfirers, explosives storekeepers, and
other persons authorized to handle explosives;
f) an organization chart showing the relationship between the key personnel;
g) plant to be employed;
h) services, buildings and structures identified as potentially at risk from blasting operations;
i) factors to be considered in the determination of the potential exclusion zone and arrangements
to ensure the protection of site personnel and the public, and the placing of sentries for each
blast (see 7.4.2.4);
j) arrangements for evacuation of personnel, third parties, members of the public, pets, livestock,
etc., from the exclusion zone;
k) system of audible and visible signals giving clear warning of impending blast, actual blast event
and all clear, including personnel responsible for giving warnings (see 7.4);
l) the arrangements to be made for the acquisition, storage (if required), transportation
and, if necessary, disposal of explosives to comply with current legislation and regulations
(see Clause 9);
m) the arrangements and timing of suitable trial blasts to confirm the way in which the target will
respond to the blasting regime being considered;
n) provision for the preparation of a blast plan for each blast to be carried out, made up of a
charging plan and (where applicable) a drilling pattern;
NOTE A number of typical blast plans might be required to indicate to what extent different situations will
affect the blast design and execution.
Any changes to the blast plan that become apparent prior to charging should be agreed by the person
responsible for approving the original design.
Charging should not commence until the shotfirer has checked that all shot holes drilled conform to
the blast plan. Where they do not conform, they should be re-drilled or permission obtained from the
designer of the blast plan to amend the plan, unless the method statement empowers the shotfirer to
make variations to the plan.
The shotfirer should ensure that each shot hole is charged in accordance with the method statement,
and that detonators, explosives and stemming are positioned in their correct location in the shot hole.
Where the shotfirer is unable to comply with the method statement or when the exclusion zone
appears to be different from that shown in the method statement, operations should be suspended
until the differences have been resolved and independently reviewed. Revisions to the method
statement should be reviewed by an independent explosives engineer, unless the variations are
of such a nature and extent as to be within the limits of the shotfirer’s discretion as set out by the
explosives engineer in the method statement.
Detonators should not normally be inserted into explosives until the charges are about to be finally
placed. If charges are made up in advance, a safe system of work for prior priming and transport
should be implemented.
Where, because of conditions at the charging place, the explosives engineer considers that prior
priming would be a safer option, a pre-agreed method statement should be implemented for the
construction of a suitable priming station and for the transport of primed explosives to the blast site.
The method statement should extend to include the adjacent operations and equipment that might
affect the safety of the priming and transport of the primed explosives.
7.4.2.1 General
Before any blasting commences on a construction site a suitable system of signs, signals and sentries
should be established which uses fit for purpose systems, including audible and visual signalling
systems where appropriate, to give warning of blasting operations. The code of signals to be used
should be notified to all personnel involved in securing the zone and others affected by the event,
including the general public. The explosives engineer should ensure that the system is practised
before the event.
Measures should be put in place to warn personnel who might fail to hear warning signals because of
noisy machinery or other diversions during blasting.
Where control of public access to the site is difficult, additional visual signals, such as red flag(s),
should be displayed in prominent positions so that they are visible over a wide area when blasting is
in progress, e.g. on a tower, flag pole or high fence.
7.4.2.4 Sentries
At blasting times sentries should be positioned as planned and in accordance with the agreed method
statement, and should be posted at the accesses, with clear instructions as to when they have to stop
access to the site and when they can allow access. Where a public road passes close to the site, so that
there is a danger to traffic from either projected material or distraction to drivers, the assistance of
the police should be obtained in controlling traffic. Where road closures or diversions are required,
permissions should be obtained in accordance with the local highway department authority.
The sentries should be in communication with the shotfirer, either directly or indirectly. Where
standard electric detonators are used, a suitable means of communication should be introduced to
prevent premature initiation.
NOTE This may be by radio communication using hand-held radios, provided they are not taken within 10 m of
a circuit containing standard electric detonators and are switched off at the firing point, or preferably not taken
within 5 m of the firing point.
Where control of site personnel is complicated by the presence of different contractors and
progression of different jobs on the site, special shotfiring shelters with sentries should be provided.
Each sentry should check that all working groups and individuals under their control have retired
to the shelter before blasting begins. A detailed system should be in place to ensure that all parties
on site have a coordinated procedure for withdrawing from the exclusion zone and recording the
location of all personnel.
8.6 When one or more contractors are involved in work on the same site, the principal contractor should
ensure close liaison and collaboration with the explosives engineer and/or the shotfirer responsible
for the explosives work, both in the planning and in the execution of the work, so as to prevent any
hazard to personnel, materials or equipment. All site personnel present during blasting operations
should be under the control of the explosives engineer and/or shotfirer.
8.7 During the design, preparation and execution stages of events where explosives are used, a site and
task-specific quality assurance and auditing system should be implemented. The mechanics of the
system should be proportionate to and suitable for the complexity of the event, and should extend
to include all elements of the explosives operations, e.g. pre‑weakening, charging, initiation systems,
protection, public safety. The system should incorporate documented procedures for addressing
areas of nonconformity, remedial actions and re-evaluation of methodology.
9 Safety and security of explosives during acquisition, transport and storage on site
9.1 General
COMMENTARY ON 9.1
The Explosives Regulations 2014 [8] require that those acquiring and/or keeping certain explosives
obtain an “acquire only” certificate from the police for the area where the applicant resides and/or an
“acquire and keep” certificate from the police for the area where the store is located.
Transfer of explosives is also covered by the Explosives Regulations 2014 [8] in terms of the
requirements to record transactions. Possession of a recipient competent authority (RCA) document
is required for civil explosives under the Regulations. However, any physical transport of explosives is
required to conform to the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure
Equipment Regulations 2009 [18] which implement the European Agreement concerning the
International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road 2017 (ADR) [5].
In Great Britain, the Explosives Regulations 2014 [8] require possession of a licence in order to
store explosives, other than exempted quantities, and compliance with the conditions of that licence.
Before certain explosives can be acquired it is necessary to obtain a certificate from the police which
certifies that a person is fit to acquire or keep explosives in accordance with the terms of the explosives
certificate. Without a certificate it is not possible to acquire relevant explosives from a manufacturer
or supplier. In addition, the certificate holder for an explosive for civil use is required to have an RCA
document, unless the explosive is used immediately at the place of manufacture.
The storage of quantities of explosive in excess of 2 000 kg will be subject of a licence issued by the
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) or the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).
Storage of quantities of less than 2 000 kg is licensable by the police or, in certain circumstances, the
local authority, the ONR or the HSE, e.g. on a new nuclear build site or where Schedule 1 (5) of the
Explosives Regulations 2014 [8] applies. Guidance on store construction is given in HSE Approved Code
of Practice L151 [N2].
Persons wishing to acquire and/or keep relevant explosives should apply for the necessary certificate
and RCA document in sufficient time.
9.2 Planning
The type and quantities of explosives to be used, and the techniques to be applied, should be decided
before any action is taken to arrange storage or transport. The best location for any store needed
should then be determined in consultation with the relevant licensing authority responsible for
those explosives.
NOTE 1 It might not be possible to obtain storage facilities for the required quantity of explosives because of the
proximity of structures and services which need to be protected. The licensing authority has no discretion to reduce
the safety distances required by the stores under the Explosives Regulations 2014 [8]. In the guidance accompanying
the Explosives Regulations [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, N1, N2] there are stringent requirements for the construction of stores
to ensure that they are secure.
The explosive liaison officer of the relevant police force should be consulted for detailed advice on
the standards of construction required for stores (see also 7.4.1), sources from which stores can be
purchased and the method of mounting such stores.
If ammonium nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO) types of explosive (including either bulk emulsion or
emulsion ANFO blends prepared on site) are to be used, the Explosives Regulations 2014 [8]
should be consulted to determine if specific exemptions from the requirement for a manufacturing
licence apply.
In general, the types of explosives used in Great Britain can be stored in the same place, whether they
are nitroglycerine-based or trinitrotoluene (TNT)-based explosives, slurry explosives, emulsions
or explosives of the ANFO type. Detonating cord may be stored in the same compartment, but the
detonators should be stored separately. Explosives should be stored in their original packaging. Most
commercially available explosives stores have a separate annex suitable for the storage of detonators,
but special conditions apply to explosive devices containing exposed iron or steel to prevent sparking
in the explosives store by ferrous objects. Care should be taken to ensure that the explosives store
used is licensed to do so and satisfies the conditions of the licence. Where there is any doubt, the
explosive liaison officer for the relevant police force should be consulted.
NOTE 2 Site-mixed explosives are made for immediate use and are not generally stored except in exceptional
circumstances.
As the techniques to be used and the phasing of work on a site influence both the size of explosives
store needed and the transport arrangements necessary, these should be established at the
planning stage.
9.3 Storage
COMMENTARY ON 9.3
Safety provisions for the storage of explosives are given in HSE Approved Code of Practice L150 [N1].
The floor of the store should be thoroughly swept after any delivery or withdrawal of explosives. The
sweepings should be removed from the store itself and treated as explosives for disposal (see 9.6).
a) maintain an up-to-date record of all incoming and outgoing explosives and explosive items
(including detonators, detonating cords and safety and other fuses); and
NOTE 2 The bar-coding system adopted by the Federation of European Explosives Manufacturers involves
each explosives item being allocated a unique number for the purpose of tracing that item throughout its
life cycle [http://feem.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Guidance-Note-FEEM-European-Code-Structure-
Mod.1-April-2013.pdf (last viewed 25 October 2017)].
b) check that the weight of explosives in the store does not exceed the licensed quantity.
NOTE 3 For the purposes of such calculations, the weight of plain or electric detonators can be obtained
from the manufacturer. Linear cutting charges or similar explosive articles can be reckoned on net explosive
quantity or charge.
The storekeeper should complete and sign the record on a daily basis. The record should be available
on site at all times. Any discrepancy should be investigated immediately and resolved. The senior site
manager should be informed without delay of the incident and of the outcome of the investigation.
When delivered to the site, explosives should be transferred either to their place of immediate use or
to the licensed store without delay.
Explosives should be used in the order in which they have been delivered, and old stocks should not
be allowed to accumulate. Stocks of explosives should be regularly checked for signs of deterioration.
If more explosives have been issued than are required and the intention is to return them to the
licensed store, they should be examined by the shotfirer before return. If they are neither wet nor
contaminated in any way, they should be taken into store as normal, but should be kept separately
and should be the first material to be re-issued. If explosives are found to have been contaminated by
water or dirt they should be:
1) examined to make sure that detonators and blasting explosives are separated;
2) specially wrapped to ensure that contamination of the store does not occur;
3) placed in a clearly identified container within the store itself; and
4) used or disposed of within one week of being returned to store and not allowed to accumulate
over long periods (see also 9.6).
When explosives are returned to store, detonators and blasting explosives should be kept completely
separate, each in their appropriate place and appropriately repackaged, generally by returning the
explosives to the packaging in which they were classified for transport. The good practice guidance in
HSE Approved Code of Practice L150 [N1] should be followed.
NOTE 4 Requirements for transporting packaged dangerous goods are set out in the European Agreement
concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road 2015 [5] and the Carriage of Dangerous Goods
and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009 (as amended) [18].
or cold cutting is required then the wooden lining should be carefully examined for explosives
contamination and the wood removed.
The lining and the explosives should be replaced only after careful examination for sparks and after
the cooling of any hot spots.
9.4.1 General
Explosives should be moved within the site in sealed manufacturers’ cases or containers and in
vehicles clearly displaying that they are carrying explosives (see 9.4.2). Detonators should be
transported in a separate sealed and secured container designed for the purpose. Movement of
explosives or detonators should always be under the direct control of an explosives engineer or
shotfirer (see 8.2).
The safety provisions of L150 [N1], paragraphs 97 to 103, should be observed at all times.
9.4.2 Vehicles
Where practicable, vehicles used for transporting explosives on a working site should conform to the
requirements for vehicles for the conveyance of explosives by road (see Commentary on 9.1). Where
site conditions do not allow such a vehicle to be used:
a) the vehicle used should be cleaned out and clean sheeting, for example a tarpaulin, laid for
receipt of explosives boxes;
b) the vehicle should be in a safe mechanical condition and have a fixed on-board fire suppression
system, supplemented by a portable fire extinguisher;
c) the vehicle should be supervised by the shotfirer;
d) no flammable liquids or gases should be carried other than in the vehicle's fuel tank;
e) detonators should be kept in a suitable container, which should be kept locked when access to
the contents is not required;
f) detonators should be separated from explosives by at least 1 m and both should be stored in
accordance with 9.3;
g) explosives should be protected from weather during transit;
h) “No Smoking” restrictions should be observed;
i) charges of explosives which have already been fitted with detonators should not be carried in
any vehicle; and
j) the vehicle should be clearly marked.
a) Passenger aircraft Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) classification 1.4S (e.g. safety fuse, safety
electric fuse, beanhole connectors)
c) Charter aircraft: All classes The aircraft is dedicated solely to transport of explosives and prior
permission has to be obtained from the CAA by the airline concerned
9.6 Disposal of unwanted explosives or explosives which have deteriorated during storage
Damaged or contaminated explosives should be handled with extreme care and disposed of in a safe
manner on site if at all possible.
Extreme care should be taken when dealing with any explosives or detonators which have apparently
deteriorated. Before handling any such materials or disposing of unwanted explosives, advice should
be obtained from a supplier or the manufacturer's literature or, if this is not possible, from the local
authority or HM Inspectorate of Explosives. If the explosives are to be returned to a secure store they
should be securely packed and labelled in accordance with advice obtained from the manufacturer.
NOTE The packing and labelling of explosives is also covered by statutory regulations, e.g. The Carriage of
Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009 (as amended) [18] and the
European CLP Regulation [39].
Care should be taken when disposing of packing materials, such as cases, case linings, wrappers or
other materials used in cleaning up waste explosives which might have become impregnated with
explosives. Disposal operations should not be carried out within 50 m of the licensed store.
Burning on site should only be considered as a last resort and only for the disposal of very small
quantities of explosives or explosives-contaminated material, because of the possibility of an
explosion. The quantity burnt in any one fire should be limited to not more than the equivalent of
2.5 kg of blasting explosive. The quantities of explosives burnt on any one occasion should therefore
be related to the size of the disposal site and a procedure should be adopted for the safety of
personnel and the public as in any blasting operation.
f) rock, stone or similar material being projected from the blast, causing an accidental detonation
of explosives, so that excess explosives should be removed from the blast site to a place of safety
before blasting takes place;
g) shock tube detonators being initiated when subjected to “snap, slap and shoot”; and
NOTE 2 The process can occur when the shock tube is stretched to breaking point so that it snaps and recoils,
producing a high velocity whiplash action. If the exposed core of the severed tubing then impacts against a
hard surface during this motion, initiation can occur. “Snap, slap and shoot” incidents are very rare, but the
consequences of such incidents can be very serious if a detonator fires.
To avoid “snap, slap and shoot”, shock tubing should not be subjected to excess pulling or sudden
jerking. If explosives charging vehicles operate in a blast area all excess tubing should be coiled
compactly to prevent tangling in any moving parts, for example wheels and other rotating parts, and
extreme care should be taken when driving between shot holes to avoid the coils.
10.3.1 General
The properties of the various types of explosives which have been classified and made available to
the UK market vary, and many have been developed for specific applications (see Annex D), so care
should be taken in selecting the most suitable explosive for the particular work activity.
The shelf life of explosives and accessories, which varies according to the conditions of storage,
should be taken into account when selecting explosives. Manufacturers’ data sheets should be
consulted and the recommendations of 10.2 followed.
In certain conditions of extremes of temperature some types of explosives are unsuitable and can
be dangerous, so manufacturers should be consulted, especially where work is to take place in
pre‑frozen ground or in hot furnaces.
ammonium nitrate. The ANFO should be thoroughly mixed so that the fuel oil is uniformly distributed
throughout the ammonium nitrate.
NOTE 1 If ANFO is underoiled, excess oxides of nitrogen are produced (brown fumes), whereas overoiling produces
excess carbon monoxide in post-detonation fume. In both cases performance is adversely affected, and in the former
case the sensitivity is increased.
When site-mixing takes place, periodic checks should be undertaken to determine the fuel ratio
calibration.
NOTE 2 Manufacturers of ANFO sometimes add aluminium to their compositions, which has the effect of raising the
temperature of the reaction and increasing available energy.
NOTE 3 ANFO has minimal water resistance; it has a reasonable weight strength, but because of its low density its
bulk strength is very low.
The combination of emulsion explosive and ANFO increases its bulk strength and waterproofs the
ANFO. Adequate priming should be used with these compositions.
Detonators should be handled with care and not subjected to mechanical shock, high temperatures or
stray electrical discharges.
Electric or electronic detonators from different groups should not be used in the same round as this
can cause misfires since the different groups have different electrical properties. For the same reason,
detonators from different manufacturers should not be used in the same round.
Non-primary explosive detonators are available which contain only secondary explosive. Shock tube
detonators of this kind are less sensitive to heat, friction and shock than detonators which contain
primary explosive, but such detonators should always be handled with care.
The risk of cut-off with non-electric circuits should be taken into account and action taken to
incorporate redundant circuitry (for example, parallel or twin path initiation) when planning
large circuits.
It is common blasting practice in some sectors to double up on initiation systems for out of reach
charges in deep shot holes. Where charges cannot be safely retrieved because, for example, ground
conditions are difficult, two detonators per charge should be used if circumstances require.
Good insulation should be ensured because of the high voltages and the large amounts of electrical
energy inherent in such systems.
Because the use of detonating cord on the surface is extremely noisy and produces air overpressure,
surface connections should be covered whenever possible. The air blast effect of surface cord should
be accounted for even in underground excavations.
Some systems have no provision for advanced initiation, for example, detonating cord and detonating
relays. Others have the principle incorporated to some degree, for example, multi-channel electric
detonator systems and, to a greater degree, non-electric detonator systems. Some systems provide
total advanced initiation, for example, delayed action electric detonators when fired in single circuits.
Whichever system is employed, sufficient advanced initiation should be provided to minimize the
possibility of misfires caused by cut-off.
Storage of explosives at the work face, explosives waiting to be fixed and those in use should not be
left unattended and should be kept in one area to minimize the risk of loss.
10.5 Misfires
10.5.1 General
Specific procedures should be followed to safely resolve any misfire (see Figure 1).
Where a misfire is identified, the shotfirer in charge of the shot should:
a) disconnect from the shotfiring apparatus the removable handle or key, together with the
shotfiring cable;
b) short or ground the bared wires together;
c) consult the site manager, who should ensure so far as is reasonably practicable that:
1) except for the manager, no person other than the shotfirer, trainee shotfirer or any other
person authorized by the manager enters the exclusion zone:
• until a period of 30 min has elapsed since the misfire, where the shot was fired by
means of safety fuse; or
• until a period of 5 min has elapsed since the misfire and any electrical shotfiring
apparatus has been disconnected from the shot, where the shot has been fired by
other means;
2) appropriate steps are taken to determine the cause of, and to deal with, the misfire;
3) a suitable record is kept of the misfire (which is a statutory requirement); and
NOTE All misfires are required by RIDDOR [11] to be reported to the Health and Safety Executive on Form
2508. A suitable record includes a written report to site management, a special book provided for the purpose,
or the blasting/charging pattern endorsed with details of any misfire.
4) appropriate steps are taken to prevent theft of the explosives and detonators or their
initiation by an unauthorized person; and
d) erect danger notices giving warning of the location of the misfire, and such barriers as are
necessary to prevent any person approaching the location.
Until the misfire has been remedied, no drilling or any other site work should be carried out in the
vicinity of the misfire, unless this is directly involved in the treatment of the misfire.
When detonators are attached to downlines of detonating cord at the surface and a faulty detonator
is traced, it should be replaced with another and the blast fired using normal shotfiring procedures
after the circuit has been tested again.
If a visual inspection of the shotfiring circuit reveals a faulty shock tube connector it should be
replaced before the round is fired.
b) Re-prime the shot, either by attaching a new detonator to any remaining line of detonating fuse
leading to the charge, or by trying to expose the charge so that another primer can be inserted.
c) Where necessary to ensure the safety of the general public and site personnel, inform the police
or other local authority about the action to be taken.
hole contains a detonator, removal of the stemming should not normally be attempted, as this might
subject the detonator to maltreatment and set off the charge. Where the misfired shot hole cannot
be re-primed, or where it would be dangerous to attempt to re-fire it, the next approach should be
to drill and fire relieving holes placed so as to work away the rock surrounding the stemming and
charge of the misfired shot holes (see 10.5.5).
In surface blasting operations the procedure should vary according to the circumstances. Where
the normal primary blasting technique involves the use of relatively shallow (up to approx. 4.5 m),
small‑diameter shot holes, the firing of lightly‑charged 55 g to 115 g relieving holes of 1 m to 1.2 m
depth, drilled not less than 0.3 m away from the misfired shot hole, will eventually remove sufficient
rock to expose the charge. At this stage, a decision should be taken on whether to insert a new primer
and attempt to fire the charge.
In deep faces, and with large‑diameter shot holes, this procedure has its limitations, but again it might
be possible, through the successive firing of relieving holes, to gain access to the misfire so that it can
be re-primed. Because of the heavy charge concentration in a large‑diameter shot hole, widespread
rock projection can be expected, especially as the charge will not be effectively stemmed. It might be
possible to contain or reduce this by removing part of the misfired charge by hand if the cartridges
are relatively loose in the shot hole. Removal of explosives from a misfired shot hole in this manner
should only be undertaken as a last resort. The possible consequences of each course of action should
be carefully considered as part of the contingency plan for misfires before deciding upon the most
appropriate action in the circumstances prevailing.
NOTE 1 The only situations in which this procedure may be relaxed are in demolition or tunnelling operations
where shot holes are normally concentrated in a tight and closely spaced pattern.
Conditions can be hazardous for drilling relieving holes because of the danger of drilling into
a charged shot hole, or because of the risk of disturbing loose rock at the tunnel face. The use
of compressed air should be avoided in shot holes containing detonators since the release of
compressed air down a tube, accompanied by the motion of particles of grit or similar substances, can
generate charges of static electricity capable of initiating either electric or plain detonators. Instead,
water should be used to clear the stemming from a shot hole.
Where the misfired shot hole does not contain a detonator, the stemming may be removed by means
of compressed air or water under pressure. The air or water should be fed only through a tube made
of plastics or rubber. Metal tubes should not be used for this purpose.
NOTE 2 Removal of the stemming by these means is only likely to be effective, however, if the stemming material is
sand or grit. If it consists of compacted material such as clay, it is virtually impossible to remove by compressed air
or water, and other remedial action becomes necessary.
During the process of removing the stemming from a misfired shot hole, care should be taken to
avoid rough treatment of the explosives as the compressed air or water pipe approaches close to the
charge. After the stemming has been cleared from the shot hole, another primer may be inserted and
the shot hole fired in the usual manner.
NOTE 3 ANFO charges are liable to be desensitized by water, so that re-priming in this manner is unlikely to be
satisfactory.
hole should be drilled 300 mm away from the charged hole in the stemming area. The relieving hole
should then be fired to enable access to the misfired hole.
As shot hole diameters and depths can vary considerably the following should be addressed as part of
a revised risk assessment before commencing to drill a relieving hole.
a) How accurately can the direction of the misfired shot hole be determined? The objective is to
drill the relieving hole parallel to the misfired shot hole.
b) How accurately can the relieving hole be drilled? This, to some extent, determines the stand-off
distance of the relieving hole. Whilst 300 mm might be sufficient stand-off distance in a tunnel
where, for example, 38 mm holes are drilled to a depth of 2 m, it would be very unwise to use
such a stand-off distance on 15 m holes drilled at a diameter of 100 mm.
c) Can the relieving hole be safely fired? The shotfirer should consider whether the relieving hole
will have sufficient burden so that it does not create a danger when fired. The possibility of
sympathetic detonation occurring when firing a shot hole very close to another should also be
taken into account.
The drilling of a shot hole into any charge or socket remaining from a previous shot can result in loss
of life and should be prohibited.
NOTE The underlying tenet is that very careful planning and execution are required to ensure that the misfire
can be safely recovered.
Care should be taken to avoid unsafe or undesirable practices creeping in through increasing
familiarity with the day-to-day handling of explosives in the cyclic operations, which can continue
over periods of several months or more.
Notification of the work to be carried out should be given to all owners and occupiers of properties
along the tunnel route.
NOTE 2 Tunnelling operations could commence some distance away and the owners/occupiers might be unaware
that a tunnel is to pass beneath their property.
All buildings along and adjacent to the tunnel route should be surveyed and appropriate
blast‑induced vibration limits should be determined for each one.
In each situation a test blast, along with appropriate vibration monitoring, should be conducted with
small charges to produce a regression line the contractor can work to. This should occur when the
tunnel is near to vulnerable surface structures.
The nature of the work to be carried out in a tunnel passing below any building should be
determined. Discussions should be held with building occupiers to ascertain if equipment or activities
undertaken in the buildings could be adversely affected by vibration. Limits on vibration should be
agreed with building occupiers. Where necessary, special restrictions on blast-induced vibrations
should be specified for particularly sensitive locations.
11.5 Explosives
11.5.1 Types
Where necessary due to wet conditions, waterproof explosives, cartridge or pumped, should be used.
As the working area can be very confined and emphasis is placed on advancing the face as rapidly
as possible, the type(s) of explosive to be used should be selected on the basis of good fume
characteristics and with due regard to the effectiveness of the method(s) of ventilation.
In tunnels where flammable gases could be present, only explosives and detonators suitable for use in
these conditions should be used.
NOTE 1 This is most likely to occur in sedimentary strata but could also arise, for example, as a consequence
of spillage of hydrocarbons in surface installations above the tunnel route or damage to utility services
adjacent to a shaft.
NOTE 2 Information about appropriate explosives and detonators is given in the Mines Regulations 2014 [40].
a) Shaft sinking
Figure 2 (continued)
Explosives and accessories should be transported to the tunnel face ideally still in their original
packaging, in separate, lockable wood-lined containers. These containers should always be placed
within the skip of the vehicle or secured to it in the case of flat wagons. Explosives or accessories
should never be carried within the cab of the vehicle or placed on the locomotive itself.
With all systems of tunnel transportation precautions should be taken to prevent explosives spilling
on to the tunnel floor.
NOTE 2 Not only can packages of explosives and accessories or their contents fall on to the track and be detonated
by mine cars in the train or later journeys of the locomotive, but, particularly with detonators, there is a risk of
accidental ignition by stray electric currents on the locomotive due to devices such as batteries or accumulators,
electric motors, generators and lights.
From the inbye terminus of the transport system, the explosive should be transported manually to the
tunnel face.
NOTE 3 The conditions are often cramped and confined, which introduces difficulty in handling.
Where possible, the explosive packages should be kept in a wooden transport box so as to provide
some protection to the explosives cases, particularly from water lying at the tunnel face.
11.5.3 Storage
Unused, primed cartridges should not be put back into store, unless the detonators have been
removed and stored separately.
Unused, unprimed cartridges remaining after charging a round should be carefully collected, packed
into a portable container, ideally their original packaging, and conveyed out of the tunnel to a licensed
store or an attended place of safety. Surplus explosives should not be left unattended underground.
NOTE Where the length of the tunnel, or some other similar factor, would render this difficult or unreasonable
during a shift, the site management may permit the temporary storage of surplus blasting materials in reserve
stations underground between blasting events.
Where reserve stations are permitted they should preferably be excavated in the tunnel wall
and fitted with lockable steel doors to protect the contents and to prevent unauthorized access.
They should be located on the opposite side of the tunnel from electric cables, not close to any
transformers or switchgear, and not nearer than the distance to the tunnel face or any other location
where blasting is taking place determined as safe by risk assessment.
A reserve station should not be used for long-term storage of explosives. Any explosives remaining
in it at the end of the shift should be returned to the licensed explosive store. A log of explosives
deposited and removed for use or returned to surface should be maintained within the reserve
station to complement the licensed explosives store log and the face charging records.
Detonators should not be stored in any reserve station with explosives.
In most operations, the rate of driving is an important consideration. It is normal practice to drill a full round of
shot holes in the face, so that the complete face area can be blasted in a single operation, and the full cross section of
the tunnel or shaft advanced a planned distance each time. This practice may vary according to tunnel cross section,
ground conditions and other operational constraints.
Shot holes should be drilled by a machine-mounted drilling rig conforming to BS EN 16228 (all parts).
Where there is insufficient space for a machine-mounted rig to operate safely, shot holes may be
drilled using airleg-mounted drills or, as a last resort, by hand-held drills. The noise, vibration and
manual handling risk from drilling should be assessed and normal risk mitigation measures put in
place. Wet drilling or dust capture at source should be undertaken. A regular pattern of shot holes
should be drilled for each round. The design of the drilling pattern, utilizing a wedge cut, burn cut,
fan cut or drag cut, should be informed by the rock type, the tunnel size and shape and the planned
rate of advance.
Blast initiation can be by means of electrical, electronic and non-electrical systems. Selection of the
initiation system should take account of the high risk of stray electrical currents in the often wet
conditions in shafts and tunnels. Initiation of the blast should be via a single path if electrical or
non‑electrical bunch blasting methods are used.
NOTE 2 Non-electrical harness blasting provides two paths of initiation, thereby reducing the risk of misfires.
The shot hole pattern and delay sequence should be designed, and drilled accurately, to avoid the
possibility of sympathetic detonation or desensitization of charges in adjacent shot holes.
In tunnels and shafts, shot holes often do not break to their full depth and sockets are left which
potentially contain residual explosive that could be detonated by the hammering effect of a drill if
it enters the socket during drilling for a subsequent round. The blast design should be adjusted to
prevent sockets being left. If sockets are left they should all be identified and washed out or marked
and sealed with substantial wooden plugs as a precaution against a drill accidentally slipping into one
during collaring of a new shot hole.
Direct drilling into sockets remaining from a previous shot can result in loss of life and should be
prohibited. In shafts all loose rock should be removed after each round and the floor should be kept
as free of standing water as possible to ease the location of sockets.
Access equipment should be fitted with a falling object protection system (FOPS) on the
working platform.
NOTE 2 Scaffold towers are not normally suitable for underground use.
b) Stemming rods should be made from wood, anti-static plastic or soft, non-ferrous metal, and
should be used to check the shot hole for depth and clearance before the primed cartridge
is inserted.
c) After inserting the charge, each shot hole should be stemmed with approved inert material so as
to give the charge maximum confinement.
NOTE 2 This helps the explosive to perform the most effective work and also helps to minimize the amount of
fume or smoke produced.
d) Great care should be taken during the charging operation to avoid damaging the insulation of the
leading wires of electrical or electronic detonators. If the insulation is split or abraded through,
or stripped of even a very short length of the leading wires, short circuits and current leakage
from the blasting circuit are likely in wet conditions, and misfires could result. Kinks in the
leading wire should be carefully loosened and removed before inserting the primed cartridge
into the shot hole.
Over-vigorous use of the stemming rod should also be avoided, as this can cause damage to the
non-electric detonator or abrasion of the leading wire insulation against the sides of the shot
hole, particularly if particles of sand or grit have become embedded in the stemming rod.
NOTE 3 Non-electric wiring misfires if it is abraded to such an extent that, in wet conditions, water
penetrates the explosive core.
c) In certain circumstances, in tunnels and shafts dangerous accumulations of static electricity can
occur, particularly when atmospheric conditions are dry, and charges can be built up sufficient to
fire an electric detonator.
d) Dangerous charges can be built up in plastic ventilation ducting by compressed air discharging
along pipes and hoses, and in processes which involve the discharge of granular or powder
materials such as ANFO along pipes and hoses. All such equipment should be securely earthed.
All shotfiring operations in tunnels should be stopped during electrical storms (thunderstorms),
even when using non-electric systems. Where these are liable to be sudden or at frequent intervals,
regardless of whatever blasting method is being employed, shotfiring (including all operations
involving handling and charging explosives) should be suspended when notice is given of an
approaching storm.
Shotfiring cable should conform to BS EN 13763‑26:2004, Clause 8. Where the shotfiring cable
is a permanent installation and liable to be damaged by fly rock in the confinement of a tunnel or
shaft, the connection between the firing cable and the charged round at the face should be made by
insulated copper connecting wire so that the permanent firing cable can be kept out of the damage
zone. Where copper connecting wire is used in this way or to replace the shotfiring cable, or is added
to the main cable in round, it should have a resistance of 27.1 Ω/km, i.e. 2.71 Ω/100 m. In addition,
the shotfirer should carry out an open and closed circuit test each day and record the resistance
of the circuit from a place of safety. The connecting wire used in this way should not be reused in
subsequent rounds. Where rock projection from a blast is greater than normal, the shotfiring cable
should be examined for damage, and any damaged portion should be discarded and not used for any
other purpose.
Spare cables should be available at the shot firing point.
The suspension points for the firing cable should be wooden or non-conducting stakes secured into
the side walls. Care should be taken not to suspend the shotfiring cables close to electric cables. Both
ends of the firing cable should be shorted out at all times until firing is due to take place.
Before standard electric detonators and explosives are taken to the face or shaft bottom in
preparation for charging, all lights and other electrical equipment, such as drill rigs and pumps,
should be withdrawn a safe distance from the face.
As a general rule, electrical equipment should not be allowed within 10 m of the face when preparing
or charging blasts. Lighting suitable for zone 1 conditions should be provided, e.g. protected cap
lamps or LEDs. At the same time, in order to avoid unnecessary activities in the vicinity of a charged
face, all mobile equipment should be withdrawn to a distance where it is safe from damage from fly
rock, and barriers or protective coverings should be erected to protect permanent fixtures such as
manifold pipe fittings.
A blast shelter should normally be housed in a cross passage or specially-created niche in the
tunnel for protection against fly rock. Where the shelter is in direct line of sight of the blast it should
be sufficiently far from the blast not to be at risk of impact from fly rock. The door should not
face the blast.
Where located on a vehicle route, the shelter should be protected from vehicle impact.
The shelter should:
a) be sufficiently robust to withstand any shock loading from the blast;
b) be capable of being supplied with fresh air at a rate of 0.3 m3 per person per minute for 2 h;
c) have the capability to maintain a positive pressure of 50 mbar to 100 mbar in the shelter whilst
in use and to flush the shelter with fresh air; and
d) be lit internally to a level of 100 lux at floor level.
Temperature in the shelter should be controlled below 28 ˚C whilst it is in use. The shelter can be
used as a mess/welfare unit, but should be kept clean.
Exceptionally, a refuge chamber conforming to ITA Report 14 [41] may be used as a blast shelter
provided it has been specifically intended for such use by its manufacturer. Its use as a blast shelter
should not detract from its availability and use as a refuge chamber. The refuge chamber should be
cleaned and inspected daily to ensure it remains immediately ready for use as a refuge chamber and
that the equipment and stores in it are not compromised in any way by its use as a blast shelter. A
foam fire extinguisher and first‑aid kit should be provided in the blast shelter.
The following should be taken into account when providing a blast shelter:
1) the blast shelter is not intended to provide protection against fly rock;
2) type, size and location necessary for the tunnel being excavated;
NOTE Typically, a blast shelter is constructed to similar dimensions of standard shipping containers, with a
length of either 3 m or 6 m.
The firing station should be not less than the distance from the face determined as safe by risk
assessment. The possibility of ricochet should be taken into account when deciding the appropriate
safe distances.
Electric detonator circuits should be checked at the firing station for continuity of resistance before
any attempt is made to fire them.
NOTE 1 Rounds normally include relatively large numbers of detonators, and any irregularity in the blasting
circuit can cause partial firing of the round and complete failure to achieve the desired advance.
After firing the blast, no one should be allowed to enter the tunnel until sufficient time has elapsed
for the blasting fumes to be diluted and dispersed or extracted and the tunnel atmosphere shown
to be fit for respiration. At that point the shotfirer should re-enter the tunnel carrying a portable
gas detector to confirm the tunnel atmosphere is fit for respiration. The go-back shotfirer should
be observed from a distance by another person. The recommendations of BS 6164 for atmospheric
monitoring and ventilation should be followed.
WARNING. Blasting fumes contain toxic or asphyxiating gases such as carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide
and oxides of nitrogen. Such gases can only be reliably detected by atmospheric monitoring equipment.
Exposure limits are set out in BS 6164 and in EH40 [42]. Exposure to blasting fumes can be injurious to
health and can lead to unconsciousness or death in extreme cases.
Sequencing operations so that the blast is initiated immediately before a meal break or shift handover
should be considered as a further way of reducing unproductive time.
Immediately following the blast, and before work recommences, the shotfirer should remove the
exploder handle and disconnect the cable from the exploder. Once the tunnel atmosphere has been
declared fit for respiration, the shotfirer, along with the tunnel shift engineer, should examine the
shaft bottom or the tunnel face for misfires and the general face area for dangerous rock overhangs,
loosened, damaged or dislodged supports and loose roof rock.
No one should enter below unsupported or loose rock until scaling of the intrados has been
completed and rock support installed.
Throughout mucking operations the debris pile should be carefully examined for undetonated
explosives and detonators.
11.6.10 Misfires
COMMENTARY ON 11.6.10
All misfires are individual and unique, and the recommendations of this subclause are generic.
In addition to the recommendations of 10.5 for the avoidance, recognition and treatment of misfires,
the following recommendations should be followed.
The means of dealing with each misfire should be subject to a bespoke risk assessment, and be
supported with a robust method statement for dealing with the problem. Advice should be sought
from as wide a pool of expertise as possible, but as a minimum involve the explosives supplier, the
shotfirer and the explosives engineer.
NOTE Blasting operations in tunnels are normally conducted by delay blasting rounds, each round comprising a
comparatively large number of closely spaced shots, and each individually primed with a delay detonator.
Due to the close shot hole spacing, the interdependence of the shots in a round and the fact that
successive rounds are drilled in the face left by the immediately previous blast, the procedure
laid down for the recognition and treatment of misfires should be appropriate to the tunnelling
environment. Particular care should be taken to avoid drilling into misfired shot holes.
To identify potential misfires with electric initiation systems before firing the round, once the tunnel
round has been charged and connected up, all personnel removed to a place of safety, and all other
preparations for blasting completed, the shotfirer should return to the firing station and make
the test for circuit continuity and resistance in preparation for firing the round. If this identifies a
down‑the‑hole fault, the procedure in 10.5.3 should be followed. If the stemming is capable of being
readily removed with water, the shotfirer may remove it by this method, insert a second primed
cartridge in direct contact with the existing charge and fire the round in the normal manner. The
detonator leads from the redundant primed cartridge should be anchored with string or cord to a
secure place, to assist recovery of the charge in case it fails to detonate.
Where the stemming cannot be removed the shotfirer should isolate that shot and fire all the
detonators up to the delay number of the misfire. If the misfire is not dislodged the rest of the round
should be fired singly or in a group. In some circumstances it might be preferable to fire the whole
round at once. In either case the detonator leads of the misfired shot should be anchored with string
or cord to a secure place to assist recovery of the charge in case it fails to detonate.
If this procedure fails to dislodge the misfire a relieving shot hole should be drilled not closer than
300 mm at any point to any unexploded charge and the normal shotfiring procedures followed.
Where misfires are encountered after firing a round, potentially leaving the rock at the face in a
fractured and weakened state, the shotfirer should call upon the shift engineer for the assistance
required to render conditions safe from falls of rock, so as to secure their own safety when dealing
with the misfires. The shotfirer should then, after assessing the situation with regard to safe
procedures, reconnect the misfires to the cable and attempt to fire them by the normal procedure. If
any misfires remain after this procedure, the shotfirer should attempt to fire them singly. Any misfire
which fails to explode should be dealt with either by washing out the stemming and re-priming, or its
recovery attempted by the use of relieving holes.
Throughout mucking operations the muck pile should be carefully examined for undetonated
explosives and detonators. Any misfired electronic detonator discovered in a blast pile should not be
handled and should be destroyed in situ as shock damage might have disrupted the internal wiring,
which might have not allowed the capacitor to discharge so that the detonator could still be live.
12 Demolition
COMMENTARY ON CLAUSE 12
Explosives can be used in demolition, including partial demolition, for the:
a) deliberate collapse of:
• concrete and masonry structures;
• steel structures; and
• structures containing combinations of steel, concrete and masonry;
b) breaking or shattering of objects such as concrete blocks and foundations; and
c) full or partial removal of structural elements.
Explosives are used to weaken a structure sufficiently to engineer a collapse. Explosives are placed
either in shot holes for shattering, or as surface-mounted charges for cutting or kicking. Most frequently
the explosives are of the nitroglycerine or emulsion type, but occasionally high-energy detonating cord is
used as the primary explosive, usually in shot holes.
The charges may be initiated by electric detonators, electronic detonators, non-electric detonators,
detonating cord or a combination of these systems.
Explosives can be used as cutting and felling charges on steel or iron structures where other methods
would be uneconomical, impracticable or dangerous.
Demolition of certain types of structure might best be carried out by explosives because of some
elements in their design, time constraints on the duration of the demolition or simply because it is the
safest method.
Such structures include, for example:
1) precast concrete panel and framed buildings;
2) pretensioned or post-tensioned prestressed structures;
3) slung structures;
4) large span roofs;
5) stressed skin or shell structures;
6) bridges; and
7) chimneys.
Demolition work is covered by the CDM Regulations 2015 [6].
12.1 General
Demolition involving the use of explosives should be in accordance with BS 6187.
12.3 Pre-weakening
Pre-weakening can involve complex structural analysis, along with an understanding of the collapse
mechanisms required. To avoid premature or unintended collapse of the pre‑weakened structure,
structural engineering expertise, with relevant experience of comparable projects, should be available
to those managing the demolition project. The recommendations for weakening and pre-weakening
structures in BS 6187 and BS 5975 should be followed.
12.6 Independent audit of the blasting method statement and its implementation
On a large, complex project involving a large number of individual charges an independent audit
of the blasting method statement and its implementation should be carried out by a person(s)
with sufficient experience and knowledge of the overall process, and preferably not involved in the
day‑to‑day implementation of the specific project, to check compliance/non-compliance with the
method statement. The independent auditor should produce a report confirming implementation
meets with method statement and identifies any areas of non-compliance.
NOTE Independent audit can include:
a) checking the pre-weakening process is fully following the design and sequence of cuts;
g) source protection: placement of shielding materials to the individual charges and surrounding
area to minimize the expulsion of projectiles, with the design and placement of such protection
developed, where possible, from the results of trial blasts and the placement of protection
in such a manner that it does not itself become a projectile or prejudice the desired effect of
the explosives;
h) remote protection: placement of materials at locations to mitigate the potential for damage from
projectiles, air overpressure and other effects of the event, with the design and placement of
such protection developed by the explosives engineer and other professional with experience of
comparable events;
i) measures to protect vulnerable services and structures, including those in the ground, from
direct debris impact and potential damage from air overpressure and ground vibration, with
predicted air overpressure and ground vibration measured in decibels and peak particle
velocity (PPV), respectively, used as criteria to determine the protection and mitigation measures
to be applied;
j) appropriate event control documentation and procedures, which should include:
1) management structure, with defined roles and responsibilities;
2) fit-for-purpose blowdown manual;
3) exclusion zone (see 12.7.4);
4) exclusion zone control and security;
5) evacuation procedures for the site and overall area affected by the event, covering:
i) able-bodied and disabled persons;
ii) elderly and infirm persons;
iii) pets and livestock to be rehoused;
iv) pets that cannot be removed (e.g. fish ponds);
v) non-planned event (emergency at another location taking up police resource); and
vi) security of properties during evacuation and repopulation of the exclusion zone);
6) crowd control and personnel control;
7) road closures;
8) defined safe access routes;
9) sequence of events;
10) misfire procedures (see 12.10);
11) contingency plans (see 12.7.2);
12) arrangements for environmental monitoring (see 7.2); and
13) communications methods and procedures.
The method statement should be developed between the explosives engineer, structural engineer
and project manager, as necessary, to ensure safety at all stages in the demolition procedure. For the
demolition of structures, the explosives engineer should consult the structural engineer to agree
amendments to the pre-weakening plan and charging plan.
The statement should be signed off by the qualified explosives engineer and the structural engineer
employed by the client.
12.7.3 Consultation
Prior to carrying out the works, a project steering group should be established. The size and
composition of this group should be determined by the nature, scale and location of the project, and
should comprise individuals and representatives of parties that have the potential to influence or
be affected by the works, e.g. client, contractors, local authority departments, landowners, adjacent
occupiers, statutory undertakers, emergency services, public transport providers, sports venues and
places of worship. These parties should be involved from an early stage in the process in order that all
reasonable requirements can be accommodated within the blowdown event planning.
breaking up, and logistical local constraints such as road junctions, access to hospitals, ability to
secure and police the area, etc.
Account should also be taken of the ground onto which the structure is to be dropped. This area
should be clear of debris, mud or any other material that can be projected by the impacting structure.
In addition, assessments of the impact effect of the structure should be carried out to determine
both the ground vibration frequencies and magnitude that will be generated. These factors should be
taken into account when the explosives engineer designs the blast. If ground conditions change out
of acceptable parameters, due for example to heavy rain or flooding, the explosives engineer should if
appropriate adjust the exclusion zone and viewing areas or postpone the blast.
The protection materials selected by the explosives engineer should be verified by trial blast(s).
NOTE 2 Protection may either be placed directly over the blast to give protection at source, or be of the stand-off
variety, or a combination of both.
When close protection is used it should be designed to allow for the expansion of the material being
broken until the gas expansion phase of the blast is over.
When stand-off protection is used, such as blocking windows in high-rise flats, it should be
constructed so that it can resist not only material being projected at it but also air blast which can be
several seconds in front of the main blast. If it is required during part of the collapse sequence of the
building, it should be designed to stay in place.
12.8 Explosives
12.8.1 Transport
Explosives should be transported from a licensed store, or directly from the manufacturer in
accordance with Clause 9.
12.8.2 Storage
Explosives should be stored in accordance with 9.3.
Only the amount of explosive which can be readily charged in one day should be taken into the
structure. Uncharged explosives should be removed to a location where they can be stored legally
until the following day.
Where conventional electrical detonating systems are being used they should be split and
short‑circuited to prevent unintentional initiation. Contact with moisture should be avoided.
12.8.3 Security
Security needs to be effective when explosives are on site, including when they are in position in the
structure, so provision should be made for the following:
a) an adequate number of authorized security guards with the ability to perform personnel and
vehicular searches, to be on duty;
b) a system of communications with the police explosive liaison officer or security control centre;
c) a system of communications with the explosives engineer or delegated deputy, who should be
able get to the site in a reasonable time period in the event of an emergency; and
d) floodlights to light the areas, as appropriate.
Arrangements should be made to ensure that explosives cannot be prematurely detonated, including
unintentional initiation, e.g. when positioning floodlights or using mobile telephones and radios (see
HSE Approved Code of Practice L151 [N2]).
A contingency plan should be in place to make safe the explosives and surrounding area where there
is a potential for lightning strikes.
On large demolition sites where structures such as high-rise flats are to be brought down, security
should be carefully planned as it could take a week or more to charge up the structure and at any
time there can be thousands of shot holes ready primed. The site of such a building(s) should be
fully fenced to prevent unauthorized access to the site and, if possible, the building itself should
be protected.
Police and fire authorities should be made aware of the charged status of the building.
The building should be guarded 24 h per day until blowdown.
If possible, the number of entrances to the building should be limited to restrict entry and make
control easier.
A rigid and fit for purpose system should be in place to ensure quality assurance and auditing of
the charging process is in full compliance with the explosives engineer’s design and the authorized
method statement. Any non-compliance should be immediately reported to the explosives engineer
and, where applicable, the structural engineer for consideration and further instruction in relation
to remedial action. Any changes to the method statement should be clearly recorded and all involved
personnel and parties notified.
12.10 Misfires
In the aftermath of a misfire, the situation should be thoroughly analysed and a new risk assessment
carried out. Where necessary, the exclusion zones should be maintained and site security kept at a
high level until the situation has been satisfactorily resolved.
13 Underwater blasting
COMMENTARY ON CLAUSE 13
Underwater blasting for rock excavation ranges from small‑scale operations conducted in shallow
water for the deepening of rivers or the excavation of foundations and foreshore trenches, to major
harbour works involving the extension or construction of deep water berth facilities for large ships.
Underwater blasting might also be required for the levelling of the sea bed or for the demolition or
clearance of offshore obstacles and structures.
Underwater blasting can also cover blasting in heavily waterlogged ground.
Further guidance is given in the Marine Technology Directorate Ltd. publication, Guidelines for the
safe use of explosives under water [43], and the Joint Nature Conservation Committee's Guidelines for
minimising the risk of injury to marine mammals from using explosives [44].
13.1 General
COMMENTARY ON 13.1
Water is an excellent transmitter of shock, and the compression wave set up by underwater explosions
can cause severe injury to divers or swimmers in the vicinity. Even if the peak pressure transmitted
through the water is below the injury threshold, it could cause temporary discomfort and alarm to a
diver or swimmer.
Even when small charges of a few kilograms are being fired in underwater blasting, all personnel,
including the divers who place the charges, should be out of the water.
The severity of the shock wave at a distance from an underwater blast should be assessed using the
parameters of peak overpressure and impulse.
NOTE The strength of the shock wave is reduced with increasing distance from the blast. It is also affected by
other factors, such as type of explosive, the degree of burial of the explosive within the sea bed, the depth of water
at the location of the blast, the blast geometry, and depth of the water at the measuring point. Any reflection from a
solid surface can increase the severity of the shock wave.
Blast vibrations are more easily transmitted through waterlogged ground than dry ground so that
vibration levels at a given point might well be higher than expected, so suitable instrumentation
should be employed to measure vibrations so that the site characteristics can be determined.
Key
1 Boundary of outer exclusion zone 3 Blast area
2 Boundary of inner exclusion zone
NOTE Diagrammatic and not to scale.
For charges greater than 50 kg it is not possible to reliably predict the safe distances because of the
compounding factors mentioned in 13.1, so until more conclusive information is available, swimmers
should never be permitted close enough to an underwater blast to be exposed to a shock wave whose
impulse at that point is greater than 14 Pa·s (2 psi·milliseconds) or whose peak overpressure is
greater than 170 kPa (25 psi).
Where work is to be carried out in the vicinity of bathing beaches, arrangements should be made with
the relevant authorities to establish and maintain these exclusion zones. Within any such zone, all
swimming, diving, boating and other sports should be prohibited during blasting operations.
The extent of the blast area and exclusion zones should be informed by the size and type of the shot
being fired. In intertidal areas and in water depths where fly rock is possible, the land excavation
exclusion zone (see 14.6.2, Figure 4) should also be applied.
If there is any doubt, pressure and impulse measurements should be taken at representative locations
using suitable instrumentation.
A code of signals should be established in accordance with 7.4.2. Adequate warning systems should
be set up to ensure that during blasting operations no swimmers are within the exclusion zone, that
all vessels are clear of the blast area and that all divers are out of the water.
13.5 Explosives
13.5.1 Explosives types
The explosives used in underwater blasting should:
a) have adequate resistance against water for the likely period of immersion, backed up with a
robust, non-pressure sensitive booster and appropriate initiation;
b) be capable of detonating completely in long narrow columns (simulating a shot hole charge)
under water; and
c) be desensitized in water after an extended period of time so that they are rendered safe if any
misfires occur.
When emulsions and slurries are used, the manufacturer’s data sheet should be checked to determine
if the product is detonator or booster sensitive. The explosives manufacturer should be consulted
about suitable explosives and accessories for the particular operation.
Where a more water-resistant type of explosive that is not desensitized by pressure is used for deep
water operations (greater than 30 m), its long immersion life should be taken into account when
considering misfires.
When using delay blasting techniques in wet or waterlogged ground, explosives of low sensitivity
should be used to reduce the possibility of sympathetic detonation.
NOTE 1 Two-part liquid explosive mixtures are also available for use in specialized charges, in which neither of
the components are explosive in themselves until they are mixed together. The main advantage of using this type of
explosive is the ease of handling, transporting and filling the special cutting charges.
The use of lay-on charges creates a larger waterborne shockwave than when explosives are placed
in shot holes, so the charges should be positioned accurately. Once they are placed, weights or
holding‑down devices should be used to prevent the charges being moved by tidal action or
strong currents.
Multiple charges should be used when a large area is to be blasted by this method. A rigid frame
should be used for the assembly of the charges prior to lowering. A relatively large deck area, which is
kept free from other operations, should be used to carry out this assembly with due care and proper
regard to safety. A lifting crane of adequate capacity, and with sufficient reach, should be used to raise
the frame and charges clear of the deck and fixtures, and to swing the frame for lowering into the
correct position.
NOTE 2 The attachment of the charges might be such that they can be manoeuvred into position by the divers.
For larger groups of charges a rope mesh might be a more convenient method of stringing charges
together and, particularly where the water is not deep, it could facilitate charging by a method of
paying out the roped assemblies over the stern of the barge. For these methods, attention should
be given to firmly securing the charges in place and to making reliable connections of initiating
mechanism between charges, to ensure satisfactory results and freedom from misfires.
Any cut ends which could become submerged should be sealed against moisture entry by means
of sealing compounds, blanking-off tubes and waterproof taping. When using detonating cord all
connections should be directional.
The same measures should be applied when using the shock tube method of initiation, where
again water can penetrate into the explosive core through any cut or abrasion in the outer tube. All
connections should be above the waterline and protected from shrapnel.
Initiation lines linking individual charges can be subjected to tension by tidal or current action that
exceeds the levels the wire or cord are designed to withstand and lead to breakage, with consequent
misfires and possible loss of a charge(s). Where such forces are likely to be encountered, charges
should be linked by rope or by a rigid framework arranged to take the strain.
13.5.3 Transport
Explosives should be transported in accordance with 9.4 and 9.5.
NOTE The movement of explosives within a harbour or harbour area is controlled by the Dangerous Goods in
Harbour Area Regulations 2016 [23], which are supported by Approved Code of Practice L155 [45]. If a harbour is
not licensed for loading or unloading of explosives these regulations allow the movement of quantities of less than
1 t intended for immediate use in connection with harbour works in the harbour or harbour area, provided that the
written consent of the harbour master has been obtained.
13.5.4 Storage
Adequate land-based licensed storage accommodation should be provided for all underwater blasting
operations requiring the regular use of explosives. Explosives should be stored and handled in
accordance with 9.3 to 9.5.
When drilling and blasting operations are conducted from a pontoon, floating barge or other small
craft close to land, explosives and blasting accessories should not be taken onto the craft until
required immediately for blasting. Surplus explosives should be removed as soon as practicable after
completion of charging and before firing the blast.
Where the system employed requires that each shot hole is charged immediately after it has been
drilled, so that it is necessary to keep a stock of explosives on the drilling barge, wood‑lined steel
containers should be used for separate storage of explosives and detonators until they are required
for immediate use.
NOTE The main purpose of this on-deck storage is to protect the explosive from accidental maltreatment, such
as impact from drill rods, bits and spanners thrown down onto the deck. In the constricted conditions on deck there
is also a risk of loose explosives cases or cartridges being washed overboard by a sudden swell or movement of the
barge, with subsequent problems of recovery.
Provision should be made for the containers to be jettisoned in an emergency, such as fire, and to be
suitably buoyed for eventual recovery.
Great care should be taken to prevent stray electric currents anywhere on the craft. All equipment
should be properly earthed and high standards of wiring and maintenance should be maintained to
ensure that these conditions prevail.
NOTE 1 The use of detonators, either electric or shock tube, on drilling barges fitted with electrically operated
machinery and equipment, for example pumps, winches or lights, can be hazardous if proper precautions
are not taken.
All work with explosives should cease and special precautions taken to isolate the detonators when
an electric storm occurs.
NOTE 2 An electric storm can cause accidental initiation of detonators of either the electric or shock tube type.
Strict rules should be laid down concerning the handling and use of electric detonators. Risks of
premature ignition should be minimized by using high-resistance fuse heads. As an additional
precaution, each electric detonator should be shorted by connecting together the bare ends of the
leading wires until immediately prior to connection into the blasting circuit. Shock tube detonators
should only be used for underwater works if they are fitted with tubing of sufficient strength.
Detonating cord should not be used to initiate emulsions and slurries. If detonating cord is used for
the initiation of other types of charges, it should be threaded through the first cartridge inserted in
the shot hole with the open end sealed in accordance with 13.5.2. Where conditions are exceptionally
severe, the detonating cord should be protected by taping, or by lengths of non-metallic tubing to
prevent abrasion through the outer plastic covering. After the shot hole depth has been checked, the
length of detonating cord required should be cut from the reel, leaving sufficient slack to allow for the
motion of the barge in swell or tidal movements.
Detonating cord lines from groups of charged shot holes should not be connected together until the
final preparation for firing the blast.
When the shotfiring cable is connected to the detonators, the cable should be firmly attached in such
a way that it is not possible to pull the detonating lead wires from the detonators, as this could cause
premature ignition.
Detonating cord is a high explosive, which can be initiated by impact, so care should be taken to
protect it from impact.
13.7 Misfires
Misfires in underwater blasting can cause exceptional problems, so the charging and firing operation
should be designed to ensure, as far as possible, that misfires do not occur. For example:
a) double lines of detonating cord or other initiating system should be led to each charge;
b) detonating systems that minimize the risk of misfires due to earth leakage should be
employed; and
c) precautions should be taken to avoid lines of detonating cord or lead wires becoming entangled
or subjected to excessive strain.
A regular routine of drilling, charging and firing small blasts should be followed rather than
attempting to blast large areas in one operation, where the explosives, detonators and other
detonating devices could be immersed for long periods before blasting takes place.
NOTE The following guidance is appropriate to different circumstances.
1) If a whole blast has misfired, then with the aid of divers it might be possible to re-prime each shot hole and
attempt to fire the blast again.
2) If a blast has partially misfired and the ground remains relatively undisturbed, again, re‑priming of the
misfired shot holes might be possible.
3) Where a minority of shot holes in a blast has misfired, the ground might be extensively disturbed and
re‑priming of charges is likely to be extremely difficult. However, attempting to re-prime and re-fire the
misfired holes is again the only reasonable option available.
4) If, after taking action to remedy a misfire, a suspicion remains that the charge has not fired, markers can be
placed to indicate the location of the possible misfire so that subsequent digging or dredging operations can
proceed cautiously in the suspect area.
5) Because of the relatively close spacing of shot holes and the difficulty of accurately locating the drilling barge
and precisely spotting the shot holes, the re-drilling of an area where misfires have occurred is extremely
hazardous. The placing and firing of heavy lay-on charges might rectify poor breakage in areas affected by
misfires or inadequate blasting results and could also help in detonating misfired charges.
14 Land excavation
14.1 General
COMMENTARY ON 14.1
Land excavation covers the use of explosives to assist in the fragmentation and excavation primarily of
rock for trenches, pipelines, roads, bridges, etc. The scale of material to be blasted can vary from a few
cubic metres for small drainage ditches and site levelling, to millions of cubic metres for major road or
infrastructure projects.
In every situation drilling is required in order that the explosives can be accurately positioned and
distributed through the volume to be excavated.
The safety and well-being of anyone in the vicinity of land excavation sites is paramount and, where
blasting is required, there exists a close synergy with the requirements of safe blasting on mineral
extraction sites. The Quarries Regulations 1999 [16] are highly prescriptive in their requirements for
the shotfirer and explosives supervisor, and as such the extractives industry has developed Vocational
Qualifications (VCs) that are minimum requirements to allow personnel to carry out blasting operations.
Both in the terms of best industry practice and the fact that most shotfirers operate within both
blasting locations it is not overly onerous to expect that shotfirers in land excavation hold the current
VCs as a minimum.
The training requirements that form the relevant VCs are described in Annex A and Annex B .
Where large volumes of rock are to be excavated the operation becomes akin to major quarrying
activity and the requirements of Part V of the Quarries Regulations 1999 [16] should be followed
when developing safe systems of work (see Commentary on 14.9), unless there are specific reasons
for not doing so.
Blasting operations that take place outside a recognized rock excavation site (e.g. a quarry) can
create a sense of alarm within the local community, and are categorized as a high risk, irrespective
of control measures and site parameters. The site operator should address these issues with the
local community and provide a means of communication and discussion to manage the concerns of
local residents.
14.2 Documentation
With most projects being operated under BIM (Building Information Management), the quality and
style of blasting records should reflect the system set out in the Quarries Regulations 1999 [16]. As a
minimum the following should be kept, preferably in electronic form:
a) location of the blast;
b) volume extracted;
c) depth, diameter pattern of blast holes;
d) type and amount of explosives;
e) type and amount of initiation; and
f) location of track and trace data.
14.3.2 Survey
14.3.2.1 General
The survey should cover the following:
a) ground conditions/geotechnical properties;
b) response of structures to ground vibration/air overpressure;
c) operational limits for ground vibration and air overpressure as required by the licensing
authorities;
d) detailed survey of blast site; and
e) third party/public interaction.
The survey should also identify any potential hazard to the general public. The blast design and
designated exclusion zone should take account of these factors.
14.5 Drilling
Shotholes should be formed by drilling rigs conforming to BS EN 16228 (all parts). Appropriate dust
capture at source techniques should be implemented to minimize occupational and environmental
exposure to dust. Appropriate steps should also be taken to minimize occupational and
environmental noise exposure from drilling.
c) identify the limit of an exclusion zone from which all personnel other than the shotfirer are
excluded, and which allows for a margin of safety outside the potential scatter area and may be
enlarged to take into account natural barriers or features (see Figure 4).
NOTE The shotfirer may fire from within this area provided that he uses a shotfiring shelter.
Key
1 Boundary of exclusion zone 3 Potential scatter area
2 Blast area
NOTE Diagrammatic and not to scale.
14.6.3.1 General
Containment measures should be applied to prevent scatter or fly rock and where blasting is being
carried out in close proximity to structures and/or the general public.
Any containment measures should not incorporate materials which might themselves be projected by
the force of the blast.
14.6.3.2 Netting/meshing
Where netting/meshing is to be used for containment, the appropriate type should be used in the
correct configuration for the conditions.
NOTE Netting types used as containment can vary from standard steel mesh net, through polypropylene rope
nets to very heavy duty “submarine” netting. These nets can be hung or draped over vertical or sub-vertical faces
to prevent sub‑horizontal projection of material, or placed over sub-horizontal surfaces to prevent vertical or
sub‑vertical projection. In extreme circumstances netting/meshing may also be used as overnetting to provide
complete aerial coverage to a blast site.
14.6.3.3 Matting
Where blasts have only the surface as a free face (for example, sinking or ramping excavations, or
more typically trenching and pipeline excavations), scatter should, where necessary, be controlled by
matting and/or covering.
NOTE This may take the form of used conveyor belting or similar material laid directly on the blast surface and
weighted down to provide containment by the addition of locally available inert material, for example, topsoil,
sand or gravel.
14.7.2 Storage
Temporary daytime storage, if required, should be in secure containers or boxes and should be under
the direct control of the shotfirer.
Longer term storage should only be permitted in a licensed store, the construction and security of
which are prescribed by the Explosives Regulations 2014 [8].
Heavy water
14.8.2 Initiation
The selection of initiation system used in any particular application should be informed by
such factors as:
a) the maximum allowable charge which may be detonated per time delay;
b) the presence of any electrical hazard; and
c) the number of individual charges which need to be fired in one blast.
NOTE See 10.4 for more detailed recommendations on initiation systems. Table 3 gives guidance on the selection
of initiation systems.
The charging regime and intended firing pattern should be planned and calculated before charging
commences to ensure that the blast ratios and actual burdens and spacings are as intended and will
lead to a safe and efficient blast.
Partial misfires might not become immediately apparent, but all misfires should be treated in
accordance with the misfire procedures identified in the method statement [see 7.2, item q)], which
normally as a minimum require a shotfirer to be present during excavation to assist and advise the
excavator operator on safety.
NOTE 2 See 10.5 for further guidance on misfires, their identification, reporting and remedial action.
15.3 Cardox
COMMENTARY ON 15.3
This system utilizes the rapid release of gas (often carbon dioxide) from a previously charged or
pressurized shell or container placed in a borehole. The rapid release of energy can be used to
break out rock.
A cardox system should follow the same procedures in use as for conventional explosives.
Annex A (normative)
Competence for blasting operations
h) they check the blast area to confirm there are no misfires before allowing people to
enter work area.
Annex B (informative)
Qualifications for blasting
B.1 General
The Quarries Regulations 1999 [16], Part 5, provide extensive guidance on explosives operations,
intended to maximize safety during blasting, and this guidance is also applicable to surface blasting
operations (see Clause 14).
NOTE These Regulations also provide guidance on shotfiring training and, when combined with formal
qualifications, for example those provided by Mineral Products Qualifications Council (MPQC), provide a robust
grounding in the understanding of explosives operations.
B.2 to B.6 set out the range of relevant qualifications within the NVQ/SVQ and QCF/SQCF frameworks
which go towards demonstrating competence in various aspects of explosives operations.
B.2 Shotfirer
Appropriate qualifications for shotfirers are a Level 3 NVQ/SVQ in Blasting Operations or a Level 3
Diploma in Shotfiring for the Extractive Minerals Processing Industries.
Annex C (informative)
Explosives engineering training
The explosives engineer is expected to be able to hold a QCF/SQCF Level 5 Diploma in Shotfiring
Supervision for the Extractive and Minerals Processing Industries, or demonstrate that they have
successfully completed a course of training covering:
a) duties of the “explosives supervisor” under the Quarries Regulations 1999 [16];
b) hazard assessment and safety management;
c) legislation and codes of practice relating to the acquisition, carriage by road, transfer in
harbour areas, storage, use and disposal of explosives in as much as it relates to that part of the
construction industry in which they operate;
d) legislation relating to the packaging and labelling of explosives;
e) characteristics and types of explosives;
Annex D (informative)
General properties of explosives
The strength of an explosive is its energy content and this gives an indication of its
potential to do work.
The power of an explosive is the rate at which it can do work and this is effectively the speed at which
the energy content is delivered.
The potential energy of a high explosive is released by detonation, an extremely rapid process
whereby the explosive is converted to gases by the passage of a detonation wave. The speed of travel
of this detonation wave is the velocity of detonation; that is, the speed at which the conversion of
potential energy takes place.
The detonation pressure of a high explosive is the force per unit area exerted on surrounding matter
by the passage of a detonation wave. This pressure is related by a scaling factor to the square of the
velocity of detonation and the density of the explosive through which the detonation wave travels.
The sensitivity to initiation of an explosive is an indication of the amount of energy which has to be
provided in order to achieve the required initiation. This is normally provided by a relatively small
charge called a detonator which converts a given signal or flame front into a detonation wave. If
the main charge is sensitive to this detonation wave, initiation of the main charge takes place. The
main charge would be referred to as “detonator sensitive”. Not all explosives can be initiated in this
way. Some main charges have a lower sensitivity and require a larger impulse than that which can
be provided by a detonator. The additional impulse is provided by the introduction of a “booster”
or “primer” whose function is to pick up the detonation wave from the detonator and increase the
energy available by detonation of the primer. The new level of energy now released is (by correct
selection of size and type of primer) sufficient to cause initiation of the main charge.
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Standards publications
For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
Standards publications
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BS 6657, Assessment of inadvertent initiation of bridge wire electro-explosive devices by radio‑frequency
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BS EN 15895, Cartridge operated hand-held tools — Safety requirements — Fixing and hard
marking tools
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