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Realignments in Russian
Foreign Policy
Editor

Rick Fawn
University of St Andrews

FRANK CASS
LONDON • PORTLAND, OR
 First published in 2003 in Great Britain by
FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS
Crown House, 47 Chase Side, London N14 5BP
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection
of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
and in the United States of America by
FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS
c/o International Specialized Book Services, Inc.
920 NE 58th Avenue, Suite 300
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Website www.frankcass.com
Copyright © 2003 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Realignments in Russian foreign policy
1. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations
I. Fawn, Rick II. European security
327.4′7

ISBN 0-203-01088-4 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0 7146 5496 5 (Print Edition) (cloth)

ISBN 0 7146 8396 5 (paper)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

has been applied for
This group of studies first appeared in a Special Issue on ‘Realignments of
Russian Foreign Policy’ of European Security (ISSN 0966–2839) 11/4
(Winter 2002).
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without the prior written permission of the publisher of this book.
 Contents

Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy: An Introduction 1

Rick Fawn
Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: Between Doctrine and 10
Pragmatism
Ludmilla Selezneva
Russian Foreign Policy and Its Critics 27
Mary Buckley
NATO Enlargement and Eastern Opinion 44
Ian McAllister and Stephen White
A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination? NATO-Russia 55
Relations, 1991–2002
Martin A.Smith
Strategic or Pragmatic Partnership? The European Union’s Policy 74
Towards Russia Since the End of the Cold War
Graham Timmins
Exploitation of the ‘Islamic Factor’ in the Russo-Chechen Conflict 92
Before and After 11 September 2001
John Russell
The Russo-Chechen Information Warfare and 9/11: Al-Qaeda 107
Through the South Caucasus Looking Glass?
Graeme P.Herd
Russia’s Reluctant Retreat from the Caucasus: Abkhazia, Georgia 127
and the US after 11 September 2001
Rick Fawn

Abstracts 146
About the Contributors 150
Index 152
 Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy: An
Introduction
RICK FAWN

Russia’s foreign policy alignments have always held great sway over the
European balance of power and, since the middle of the twentieth century, over
the international balance of power as well. Russia’s realignments after the Cold
War offer historic opportunities for both Russia itself and the wider world. The
Western hope, and that of many within Russia, was that the very tentative
democratization undertaken by the Gorbachev leadership would become fully-
fledged after the demise of communist rule, and that a Kantian pacific union of
like-minded liberal, democratic polities, eschewing war among themselves,
would confidently emerge across the whole of the northern hemisphere.
Such aspirations were buoyed by a Western-leaning post-communist Russian
government that espoused, at least rhetorically, many aspects of liberal
democratic and economic reform. Much opposition to a closer relationship with
the West of course exists within Russian society, and debate rages about what
Russia should adopt from the West, and how it is to preserve its own, arguably
unique, culture, history and geopolitical role and destiny. Punctuating 300 years
of Russian history, this dilemma has been framed as one between ‘Slavophiles’
and ‘Westernizers’. Where the former have stressed the preservation of Russian
values from foreign adulteration, the latter argued for at least a selective
importation of technology to modernize Russia.1
This classic debate has been elaborated and expanded since the end of Soviet
communism, taking on such terms as ‘Eurasianists’ and ‘Euro-Atlanticists’,2 but
was sharpened to three strands of foreign policy thinking, perhaps best defined
and articulated by Margot Light. Those supporting Western-style reforms were
identified as ‘Liberal Westernizers’, while others who expressed hostility to
economic reform and demonstrated extreme nationalism were called
‘Fundamental Nationalists’. With nationalism gaining significance across the
political spectrum in 1992, the category ‘Pragmatic Nationalists’ was devised for
those who advocated a more independent policy towards the West and greater
integration in relation to former Soviet republics.3
Anyone outside a pro-Western viewpoint in Russian foreign policy potentially
posed risks to the West. Even a Westernizer like Andrei Kozyrev, Russian
foreign minister until January 1996, gave a taste of what international life would
be with a nationalist government in Moscow. At the Conference on Security and
2 REALIGNMENTS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting in Stockholm in December 1992 he

declared that CSCE principles were no longer relevant to the Soviet successor
states, that the West should stay out of that region, and that Russia was offering
all assistance to former Yugoslavia. He exited the forum, then re-entered it to
proclaim his comments an exercise.4
A further taste of a radical Russian foreign policy was given by Vladimir
Zhirinovsky. Despite several electoral successes, including nearly one-quarter of
the parliamentary vote in December 1993, Zhirinovsky did not achieve power.
But his policies could not have served Western interests. He advocated dumping
nuclear waste in the Baltic and advancing Russia’s border so far south that
Russians could ‘wash their boots in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and
forever change to summer uniforms’.5 Perhaps only with hindsight have Western
governments been able to appreciate the best-case scenario of the Western-
leaning Russian governments that have been in power thus far.
Even so, Zbigniew Brzezinksi forcefully warned of Russian neoimperialism in
the Near Abroad, and its participation in a string of conflicts that coincided with
the outer borders of the former Soviet Union.6 Russia’s partial solution of
‘peacekeeping’ gave further fears of realpolitik cloaked in the language and
practice of the new interventionism.7 The wars in Chechnya, which resulted in
possibly tens of thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands displaced, also
gave concern, even if Western criticism was quiet in relation to the intensity of
the Russian military response.8 For even Russian commentators, the Chechen
war was assuming the proportions of France’s war in Algeria.9 In this context,
partnership with Russia was even more questionable. For wider geopolitical
purposes, the course that Russia took meant that it could be at best isolationist, or
even aggressive towards its neighbours.
Westernization involves money, and while Russia is resource-rich, its
technological base remains limited and has faced the flight of both capital and
human resources. With popular associations being made through post-
communist Central and East Europe between democracy and economic wealth,
the whole democratization project rested on palpable successes in socio-
economic reform. Outside funds, whether private or public, were therefore
essential; noting that five trillion dollars were spent on containing Soviet
communism, Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill called, even before the end of
the USSR, for economic assistance of ‘Marshall Plan proportions’ for Russia.
Among their proposals were outright grants of $15–20 billion dollars a year for
three years.10
The reconstruction of postwar Germany occurred under the direct
management of Allied powers; that prospect was absent in the case of post-
communist Russia. But Western promises of funds were relatively few, and what
was offered was rarely provided in full, even if the Clinton administration also may
have misunderstood and downplayed the extent of corruption in the Russian
political and economic system.11
 INTRODUCTION 3

Russia arguably has had much to fear as well. President Boris Yeltsin initially
claimed that everyone won with the end of the Cold War but subsequently
charged in December 1994 that, with the prospect of NATO expansion, there
was danger of ‘plunging into a cold peace’.12 The succeeding order appeared to
vindicate Western ideology and allowed for the implementation of Western
policies that threatened Russia. Foremost among these was the enlargement of
NATO announced at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, despite vociferous
Russian protest. Even Western-leaning, market-inclined reformers like Anatoly
Chubais foresaw this decision as ‘inevitably leading to a new dividing line across
the whole of Europe’ and ‘the biggest mistake made in Western policy for 50
years’.13 The most sensitive piece of real estate in the Russian mindset—Poland
— would join an alliance that to many Russians served no conceivable purpose
other than aggression.
The depth of anxiety about NATO was further illustrated by Grigory
Yavlinsky, leader of the liberal Yabloko alliance and a known proWesterner,
who said in 1998: Talk that this is a different NATO, a NATO that is no longer a
military alliance, is ridiculous. It is like saying that the hulking thing advancing
toward your garden is not a tank because it is painted pink, carries flowers, and
plays cheerful music. It does not matter how you dress it up; a pink tank is still a
tank.’14 To strain relations further, enlargement physically advanced the alliance
towards Russia in March 1999 just as NATO began the Kosovan war against
Russia’s fellow orthodox and Slavic Serbs.
NATO’s previous diplomatic reassurances to Russia could hardly be
satisfactory. NATO responded to Russian assertions of still being a great power
with no concrete acknowledgement but with the multilateral Partnership for
Peace that gave Russia participation in selected NATO activities on the same
level as Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. When NATO sought to assuage Russia with
the Founding Act of 1997, which apparently elevated its status in Europe, this
coincided with the announcement of NATO enlargement. The alliance also
signed a similar document with Ukraine, a demographically and geographically
smaller state, and one that many Russian nationalists questioned its cultural or
historical right to exist. Russia’s status therefore seemed unrecognized; some
argued it was better at least to give Russia a place in Europe that was delayed
rather than denied.15
This has been done belatedly and partially. The Group of 7 (G7) was
refashioned in 1994 to include Russia, but only as a political member of a new
G8 for political issues while G7 remained for economic matters; after all, the
Russian economy in absolute terms was no larger than the Dutch. Full membership
in the G8 was given at the Kananaskis Meeting in June 2002. While NATO
introduced various initiatives with Russia to give it at least a voice in the alliance’s
activities, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson made clear in February
2002 that Russia was not, contrary to media reporting, being given full status
within the North Atlantic Council and said that suggestions otherwise were
‘completely inaccurate’.16
4 REALIGNMENTS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The undermining of Russian prestige and confidence by actions abroad may

have been heightened by the demise of military and technological showcases at
home. The sinking of the nuclear-powered submarine Kursk and Moscow’s
Ostankino television tower fire occurred within days of each other in August
2000. A Russian rear admiral even wrote, referring to the loss of three principal
Russian submarines in 14 years, that Russian submarines sink and American
ones do not.17 Even so, economist Anders Åslund recently argued that: ‘In fact,
Russia has seen an extraordinary improvement in its infrastructure. Investment in
fixed assets (i.e., buildings, equipment) increased by 18 percent last year—a
healthy investment ratio of 20 percent of GDP (higher than the standard U.S.
ratio of 16 percent)’.18
The prospect of a revived, and internationally viable arms industry is still
forecast by some Western economists. As Steven Rosefield wrote in 2000,
‘Russia possesses the resources, assets, cultural and doctrinal traditions to rebuild
its armed forces to global competitive levels, and it has developed an “eastern”
market that could make its military-industrial economy more efficient than under
central planning.’19 Even if Russia has such military-economic potential, former
dissident Aleksandr Solzhensityn probably echoed widespread feelings that the
decay of Russia’s military capacity was due to privatization in the Yeltsin era.20
While popular support for a Western orientation in foreign policy has grounds
to be limited, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have given the Russian
government considerable scope for foreign policy realignment. Those attacks
have been taken as the embodiment of Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘clash of
civilizations’. Classifying Russia as one of seven or eight civilizations based on
its orthodox religion, Huntington recommended that as part of a number of
policies to safeguard Western interests, the West should grant Russia its sphere of
influence and improve relations.21
As some of the contributions in this collection show, Russia may actually have
lost sway in its immediate sphere of influence because of the American military
presence in former Soviet states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Nevertheless,
the need for information-sharing and over-flight rights and access to military
bases in Central Asia made Russia an important strategic partner in the ‘war on
terrorism’. In return, Putin could recast his war in Chechnya, one that had
increasingly blighted relations with the West, as part of the same struggle against
the international Islamic extremist menace.
It is in this geopolitical context that this collection examines changes in
Russian foreign policy since 1991 through to, and beyond, the security
challenges and opportunities presented by 11 September 2001. Authors analyze
the evolution of Russian foreign policy and also assess whether 11 September is
proving a watershed in Russia’s attitudes and relations with the outside world.
The general conclusion by the authors is that 11 September has not
overwhelmingly changed Russian policy, but perhaps has served most to
internationalize hitherto domestic problems, providing international
legitimization to existing state action, particularly regarding Chechnya. To be
 INTRODUCTION 5

sure, certain policy objectives have been gained, such as full membership in the
G8. But as these contributions show, suspicion of the West remains in various
circles of Russian society.
Of the contributors, historian Ludmilla Selezneva most deems 11 September to
be a watershed. She argues that Russian foreign policy has become increasingly
pragmatic which, in her view, is nothing short of revolutionary. This new-found
pragmatism is characterized by: the replacement of geopolitics by
geoeconomics; the prioritization of domestic over foreign policy and not the
other way round; the emphasis of integration over isolationism; and multi-
directionality in foreign policy. This, Selezneva describes, is tantamount to a
depoliticization of foreign relations. In what Selezneva then argues is a changed
foreign policy, President Putin has to struggle with deeply embedded anti-
Western sentiments among the political establishment and population.
Mary Buckley continues by illustrating the scope and depth of the criticism of
Westward-leaning Russian foreign policy. While developments after 11
September have allowed for improvements in US-Russian relations, easing some
of the tensions created by the 1999 Kosovan war, she demonstrates the
unlikelihood that the Bush administration will concede all that the Putin
administration seeks. She points out that after the Moscow hostage crisis of
October 2002, some Russian human rights activists also charge Putin with
emulating Bush’s anti-terrorism program to justify renewed military action in
Chechnya.
Perceptions play an important part in Russia’s relations with the West, and
data presented by Ian McAllister and Stephen White underline the East’s
ongoing suspicion of the West. Attitudes to NATO are part of a wider debate
about the future orientation of the post-communist countries: towards integration
with each other (a ‘Slavic choice’) or towards integration with the West (a
‘Western choice’). The evidence of representative surveys conducted in Belarus,
Moldova, Russia and Ukraine in 2000 and 2001 is that, though relatively few
believe there is a serious and immediate threat to their security, of potential
threats the US remains the most important, followed by Iran, Iraq and China.
And the US continues to be perceived as the likely threat to European security.
Almost half of Russian respondents in their study saw some threat to their
security in further NATO enlargement. The public opinion findings by
McAllister and White further indicate the difficulties the Russian government
will face in seeking a pro-Western stand after 11 September.
Institutionalization of relations, with the hope that, in regime language, values
become mutually embedded and the whole process of enlargement is better
understood, is part of the reason why both Russia and the West have explored
their relations through the existing institutions of NATO and the European Union
(EU).
Martin A.Smith characterizes Russia’s relations with NATO as six distinct
phases since 1991: the honeymoon period, 1991–93; deterioration, 1994–95;
upgrading of institutional links, 1996–97; the Kosovo crisis, 1998–99; phased
6 REALIGNMENTS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

restoration, 1999–2001; and post–11 September. Throughout, overall objectives

have not been identified by either side, but an underlying stability has
nevertheless become apparent in the relationship.
The pragmatism that Selezneva argues has been increasingly part of Russian
foreign policy is seen in Smith’s point that Kosovo led to only a ‘limited
disruption of relations’ between Russia and the West. Russia did not sever
relations because of its own sense of impotence, its fear of self-imposed isolation
and its continued reliance on economic sponsorship from the West.
Unlike Selezneva, however, Smith contends that 11 September has not led to a
fundamental change in Russia’s relations with NATO. He argues that the two sides
would have, in any case, come to the agreement of what became the May 2002
formation of the ‘NATO-Russia Council’ (NRC), which includes significant
issue areas such as military crisis management, counter-terrorism, non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and theatre missile defence. The
decision in June 2001 to proceed with a second round of eastern enlargement, he
argues, set in motion more intense cooperation with Russia. Indeed, argues
Smith, ‘the NRC idea was not dramatically new. Rather, it seemed like an
attempt to relaunch the NATO-Russia relationship on a basis not too dissimilar
to what was, officially at least, set out in the 1997 Founding Act’.
Smith’s conclusions dovetail with those of McAllister and White, who argue
that ‘there is little evidence, at the same time, that popular attitudes have shifted
significantly in a Western direction…by the spring of 2002 there was more
popular hostility towards the United States than there had been at any point in the
first half of the 1990s’.
Incremental steps in Russia’s relations with the West, with no clear
destination, also characterize Russia’s relations with the EU, argues Graham
Timmins. Strategic partnership also underscores Russia’s relations with the EU,
as seen by both the EU Common Strategy on Russia and the Russian Medium-
Term Strategy for Development of Relations with the EU, published in 1999.
But, as with NATO, Russia and the EU do not share a common agenda or ‘a
shared normative basis’. Distinct differences exist in foreign policy goals. Russia’s
central concern remains that of gaining a place at the ‘European table’ and
establishing its claim to being a regional power, while Europe seeks to encourage
dialogue and to propagate shared norms and values. Timmins concludes in much
the same way as Smith does for NATO: ‘Although there remains considerable
doubt regarding the extent to which the EU and Russia are able to interact in any
meaningful way within a framework of strategic partnership, it remains the case
that neither sees its interests as best served in marginalising the other.’
The events of 11 September have, superficially at least, made cooperation
between Russia and the West more possible. John Russell argues that Russia has
used the global war on terror to ‘absolutize its conflict with the Chechens’ as
part of the ‘coalition’s overall struggle with Islamic insurgents, ranking in
importance with that of Israel against the Palestinians and the West against the
Taliban and al-Qaeda’. The timing of 11 September was furthermore useful to
 INTRODUCTION 7

the Russian government, coming when public support for the second Chechen
war was waning. The events of 11 September have therefore not fundamentally
changed Russia’s policy towards Chechnya; they have simply given it
international legitimacy— even if the war against ‘Islamic’ terrorism has little in
common with the Bush-led ‘war’ against global terrorism. This is because, notes
Russell, the Russo-Chechen war might equally be perceived as ‘an unresolved
war of conquest against a more traditional way of life, as a war of liberation from
colonialism, or indeed, as a war against anarchy, crime and lawlessness’.
A significant aspect of Russia’s war with Chechnya has been about
perceptions and Graeme Herd focuses on the information warfare aspects of the
second Russo-Chechen campaign between 1999 and 11 September. Unlike
during the first campaign, Russian authorities in the second campaign have been
winning the information war by imposing an ‘information blockade’ and
reorganizing the management of federal media. Russia’s main media aims in the
second war have been ‘to isolate Chechnya from re-supplies of both practical aid
—men and military materiel—and moral and ideological support from the West
and the Islamic world, de legitimize and divide internal Chechen opposition to the
war (this was mirrored in the ‘Chechenization’ of the military conflict) and
ensure that the Russian public gave strong support to the campaign conduct and
objectives’. The issue of al-Qaeda has become dominant within information
warfare battles.
The international legitimization outlined by Russell has prompted the Russian
authorities to internationalize the conflict in their information war also, arguing
that the objectives of the state and the conduct of its security services are given
legitimacy by the wider threat posed by the links and collaboration between
Chechen separatists, al-Qaeda fighters and the war.
The events of 11 September have added a new dynamic to Russia’s policy
towards the South Caucasus. As one of the conflicts that seemed to fit the pattern
of Russian neo-imperialism, the Georgian-Abkhaz stand-off has resulted in the
presence of Russian militarily involvement through its deployment of
peacekeepers. The final contribution by Rick Fawn examines the impact of an
American initiative to train specialist Georgian forces, that has been interpreted
by some Abkhaz and Russians as American interference in the Russian sphere
and the bolstering of a weak Georgian state. What gains Russia has made in
aligning the West in the war against terrorism are arguably lost by having to
concede to an unprecedented US presence, including a military presence, in the
Near Abroad.
Many Russians doubtless are unsettled by this new American presence, and
consider it as American imperialism and/or a means to undercut Russian
influence in what was not only a sphere of influence but actually part of the Russian
and Soviet inner empires. Ultimately, if Russia is forced to retreat from the Near
Abroad it will cease to face the trade-off Brzezinski identified between
democracy and empire.22 Shedding imperial ambition would make Russia fit
8 REALIGNMENTS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

more comfortably with Europe and lessen tension with the US. Kozyrev said that
a democratic Russia and the West were ‘natural friends’.23
Few countries willingly or easily cede imperial desires; but European states
today are surely more pacific for having shed overseas possessions that provoked
conflict between colonizer and colonized and between colonizers. Recalling
Brzezinski’s statement that Russia cannot simultaneously be democratic and an
empire, being forced to shed imperial temptations in the Near Abroad on account
of events following 11 September may ultimately bring about a lasting
realignment in Russian foreign policy.

NOTES
These articles grew from a conference at the University of St Andrews held in
March 2002. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office kindly provided
funds, although no opinions that follow can be construed as representing any
official British government view. Professor Paul D’Anieri deserves thanks for
taking this proposal on board and assisting with it at every stage thereafter. The
late Professor John Erickson, who informed and inspired countless others on
Soviet and Russian affairs and who bequeaths a remarkable scholarly legacy,
was invited to participate in the conference but was prevented from so doing by
illness. It is to his memory that this collection is modestly dedicated.

1. See Nicholas V.Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching of the
Slavophiles (Cambridge: Harvard UP 1995) and Andrej Walicki, The Slavophile
Controversy (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975).
2. Yeltsin’s foreign policy adviser Sergei Stankevich used the term ‘Eurasianist’ in
March 1992 but was referring which was meant not so much as fundamentally anti-
Western but an advocacy of a Russian foreign policy serving its own interests. See
Neil Malcolm, ‘The New Russian Foreign Policy’, The World Today, Feb. 1994, p.
29.
3. Margot Light, ‘Foreign Policy Thinking’, in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy
Allison and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford:
OUP 1996) esp. p. 34.
4. The speech is contextualized in independent Russia’s foreign policy in Hannes
Adomeit, ‘Russia As a “Great Power” in World Affairs: Images and Reality’,
International Affairs 71/1 (Jan. 1995) p. 45.
5. Vladimir Zhirovsky, Poslednii brosok na yug (Moscow: LDP 1993), p. 64, cited in
Jacob W. Kipp, The Zhirinovsky Threat’, Foreign Affairs 73/3 (May/June 1994) p.
78.
6. Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘The Premature Partnership’, Foreign Affairs 73/2 (March/
April 1994) pp. 72–3.
7. For the emergence of Russian peacekeeping, see Suzanne Crow, ‘Russia Seeks
Leadership in Regional Peacekeeping’, and ‘Processes and Policies’, RFE/RL
Research Report, 9 April and 14 May 1993, pp. 23–34 and 47–52.
 INTRODUCTION 9

8. For an analysis of Western reactions to the first war, see Gail Lapidus, ‘Contested
Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya’, International Security 23/1 (Summer
1998) pp. 5–49.
9. Pavel Felgenhauer in Moskovskie Novosti, 24 April 2002. For analysis, see
Jamestown Foundation Chechen Weekly, III/13 30 April 2002.
10. Graham T.Allisonand Robert D. Blackwill, ‘America’s Stake in the Soviet Future’,
Foreign Affairs (Summer 1991) pp. 95 and 97.
11. Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand (NY: Random House 2002).
12. Cited in, e.g., Daniel Williams, ‘Clinton and Yeltsin Clash Over Future Role of
NATO’, Washington Post, 6 Dec. 1994, p. 2.
13. Cited in Larry Elliot, ‘Ignore Moscow at your peril, warns Chubais’, The
Guardian, 4 Feb. 1997.
14. Grigory Yavlinsky, ‘Russia’s Phony Capitalism’, Foreign Affairs 77/3 (May/June
1998).
15. Jonathan Haslam, ‘Russia’s Seat at the Table: a Place Denied or a Place Delayed’,
International Affairs 74/1 (Jan. 1998) p. 130.
16. George Robertson, Secretary-General of NATO, ‘Russia is not being invited to join
North Atlantic Council’, Financial Times, 28 Feb. 2002, p. 20.
17. Admiral Valery Alexin, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 Dec. 2000.
18. Anders Åslund, ‘Think Again: Russia’, Foreign Policy (July/August 2001) p. 22.
19. Steven Rosefielde, ‘Back to the Future? Prospects for Russia’s Military Industrial
Revival’, Orbis 46/3 (Summer 2000) p. 509.
20. Solzhenitsyn particularly noted the frequent crash of military helicopters.
Associated Press, 31 May 2002.
21. Samuel P.Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of Order (NY:
Touchstone Books 1996) pp. 163–86 and p. 312.
22. Brezinski, ‘Premature Partnership’ (note 6) p. 72.
23. Andrei Kozyrev, ‘The Lagging Partnership’, Foreign Affairs 73/3 (May/June 1994)
p. 59.
 Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy:
Between Doctrine and Pragmatism
LUDMILLA SELEZNEVA

For the purposes of this essay it is necessary to define the relationship between
ideology and pragmatism. Ideology is a system of ideas or views describing
attitudes to a reality, social issues and to the aspirations of classes, political
parties and nations. Pragmatism is a way of making short-term decisions,
grasping opportunities to achieve practical results, without considering the long-
term consequences and, in some cases, even the morality of the decisions. The
ideological approach and the pragmatic approach usually appear to be
contradictory. An excessively doctrinal approach can be destructive of social and
political stability. In fact, excessive ideology can destroy politics itself.
Ideologization of politics in the Soviet era reached an extreme level. Politics was
completely dominated by the theory of ‘Class Struggle’ and ‘World Revolution’.
In these circumstances, liberalization of politics could have been presented as an
alternative ideology, one giving more space for pragmatism. In this context we
find it possible to differ more or less on ‘pragmatic’ ideology. For example,
liberalism as an ideology is more pragmatic than the ‘World Revolution’
concept. After giving economic support to half of Asia and Africa, in an attempt
to spread the tenets of communism throughout the world, and yet being unable to
provide even basic living standards for its own people, the change to a pragmatic
approach in foreign policy, especially in foreign economic policy, itself seems
like a revolution. In 1991 the world witnessed the collapse of the Soviet empire
and the birth of a new country, the Russian Federation. The reborn Russia began
to formulate a completely new outlook on foreign policy.

SOVIET AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: HOW THEY

DIFFER
At least four main factors have to be taken into account to explain the difference
between Soviet and Russian post-Soviet policy. The new Russia has no imperial
status. Its population has decreased by 110 million people. Fifteen independent
states have replaced the former Soviet republics, which used to have no real
sovereignty, and came under heavy pressure to accept the centralized power of
Moscow. The Baltic countries did not join the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) at all and look very firmly towards Western Europe. The CIS has
 REALIGNMENTS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 11

been more of a formal declaration of independence than a real Commonwealth of

States.
There has been a considerable reduction in the size of the armed forces, from five
million in 1991 to 1.2 million today, and the army has lost its position as the
cornerstone of privilege in the Soviet political system. The highest rate of
suicides in the 1990s was among army officers and retired military staff. Only
10–25 per cent of industrial output is now for military purposes. Currently
Russia produces 40 helicopters and 21 military aircraft annually. Before 1992 the
figures were 690 and 620 respectively.1 There has been an economic decline, a
collapse of traditional Soviet industry; previously 80 per cent of its output was for
the military. The USSR had the second biggest GNP in the world, whilst modern
Russia comes only 14th.2 The current Russian GDP is only 30 per cent of what it
was in 1990.3
All Soviet policy, including foreign policy, was based on ideology. It did not
exclude some elements of pragmatism, which even dominated from time to time.
The 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, the coalition of anti-fascists
during World War II, and détente in the first half of the 1970s are examples of
this. Sometimes elements of pragmatism were more obvious, as in the first half of
the Khrushchev decade, when there was an attempt at peaceful coexistence with
some Western countries. But these can be classed as small islands in an ocean of
ideology, the ideology of two opposite and hostile systems: the ideology of class
struggle and of the ‘World Communist Revolution’. Several generations had a
strong perception that a world communist revolution would have universal
success sooner or later. The Soviet Union was regarded as the source of it.
Militarization of the economy, social relations and spiritual life; confrontation;
expansion; and isolation as the main features of foreign policy, were the direct
consequence of this theory. That ideology appeared, for example, in the famous
Khrushchev speech to the UN, threatening the world during the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962. The concept of ‘Cold War’ had also been a visible characteristic
of world revolution ideology. The most dramatic change in the whole Soviet
foreign policy was made by Gorbachev, who eliminated the ‘World Revolution’
approach, and started the era of real cooperation with Western countries. After
70 years, this confrontational foreign policy culminated in the break-up of the
Soviet Union. Hence, the level of pragmatism increased considerably, but neither
Gorbachev’s rule nor the collapse of the Soviet empire could liberate either
domestic or foreign policy from the cultural tradition of doctrine.
The doctrine in foreign policy itself has changed radically. It can be described
as a mixture of neo-imperialism, liberalism and social-chauvinism. Sometimes
during the post-Soviet era, liberal or chauvinistic approaches were more evident.
However, neo-imperialism has been the dominant trait.
Initially this can be explained, in part, by the following three reasons. First, the
Soviet empire and its status as the world’s second superpower disappeared too
quickly and unexpectedly even for the key participants in the meeting at Belarus
on 8 December 1991. The new political elite of Russia consisted mostly of
12 POST-SOVIET RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

former communists who could not change their political philosophy and did not
want to—the philosophy of confrontation with Western countries. The Soviet
population was used to the idea of the Soviet Union being the strongest country,
a social paradise whose historical mission it was to bring happiness to humanity.
Second, ‘market reform’ appeared as ‘shock therapy’. It was followed by the
decline of the whole economy and of living standards. In the middle of the 1990s,
70 per cent of the population was living below the poverty line. The equality of
Soviet times was replaced by an enormous social gap between differing sections
of society. The one million richest people had living standards a hundred times
higher than the one million poorest. Surveys show a 20–25 times difference in
living standards between the wealthiest seven per cent and the poorest 30 per cent.
A difference of more than seven or eight times has long been regarded as the
level that induces social frustration calling for some kind of consolation.
Throughout Russia’s history, ideology has been the main compensation, and it is
an imperial ideology. The Russians want their country to stay great despite all its
privations.
Third, some aspects of the policies of the Western countries, such as the
extension of NATO, the discriminatory policies of the IMF and the bombing of
Belgrade in 1999, stimulated suspicious feelings towards Western countries
among the population, and among the political and military elite. It is important
to realize that imperial ambitions have deep social and cultural roots in Russian
traditions. Its main features are the lack of a developed democratic tradition; a
long-established and strong agricultural community based on egalitarianism,
domination by the state and autocratic governments; and the weakness of civil
society. All these resulted in the relative weakness of individual self-
consciousness, individual self-esteem and individual responsibility. On the
contrary, the strong domination of a kind of ‘group’ or ‘collective’ psychology
developed.4 Russian people never write capital ‘I’; their ‘i’ (‘’) is always written
small. A small ‘i’ needs to be part of something big. Imperial ambitions are the
psychological compensation and the defence for weak individualism. This is the
social and cultural background for the strength of the imperial legacy in the
modern Russian psyche.
In sum, we can see a strong legacy of doctrine in post-Soviet foreign policy.
Russia still remains an ‘ideological’ nation. Compared with the past, the new
policy is sometimes the complete opposite of Soviet ideas. It is a mixture of the
liberal ideology of those who wish to westernize, and the ideology of a Great
Russian Statehood, but with a clear domination of the latter. At the same time,
post-Soviet foreign policy is the most pragmatic it has been for the past century.
I would say that the present ideologies are more pragmatic than the Soviet
ideology of confrontation and isolation.
However, during the ten years ‘after communism’, the relative strengths of
doctrinal and pragmatic tendencies have varied. I propose to divide the Russian
foreign policy of 1991–2002 into four periods: 1991–96, 1996–99, 2000–11
September 2001 and 11 September 2001 to the present day. Russian policy
 REALIGNMENTS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 13

towards the West and the other 14 successor states in the CIS has been changing
considerably.

HONEYMOON RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, 1991–96

The first years following Soviet collapse can be described as domination by a
liberal ideology, due to the mass anti-communist aspirations and the personality
of the foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev. He stood for a comprehensive
partnership with Western countries and complete integration with them. That
policy was rooted in what had been Gorbachev’s similar ideology of ‘universal
human values’. Russian politicians in the infant democratic Russia tried to
emphasize the differences from the previous political system and its foreign
policy. In their opinion even Gorbachev’s approach was still based on the
concept of two opposite political systems, world capitalism and world socialism,
and on a belief in the possibility of constructing a communist society. This might
lead to confrontation sooner or later.
The first Russian democratic rulers wished to create, as soon as possible, a
society based on the rule of law and a prosperous economy. The West was seen
as an absolutely necessary strategic, political and even ideological ally. The first
Russian president, Yeltsin, repeated many times that Russia and the US have
‘common interests’. In his report to the UN Security Council meeting on 31
January 1992, he said that Russia ‘considers the USA and other western
countries not only as partners but also as allies. Moscow shares the main western
values, which are the primacy of human rights, freedom, rule of law and high
morality.’5
The democratic leaders of Russia at that time saw a strategic partnership as
necessary to internal democratic reform, and recommended that the protection of
national interests should not be promoted too aggressively. At the same time, in
1992 all branches of power agreed that the main objective for Russia’s foreign
policy was to get access to world markets for finance, goods and for Russians to
be able to work abroad, and they linked their hopes to considerable Western
economic and financial support. The democratic part of the Russian political
establishment at that time openly wished to Westernize Russia, to make it a
member of the ‘Western prosperity zone’. Russia had to follow the Western
pattern.
Moscow’s relations with the independent states of the former Soviet republics
were not regarded at that time as the main direction of Russian foreign policy. At
the same time this new direction was not neglected, but Soviet political
consciousness, or maybe even more sub-consciousness, did not accept the new
reality and remained imperial in outlook. The Russian government and the
political elite were strongly convinced of the need for good relations with CIS
countries and close integration of current military and foreign policy. Radical
liberals, like Gaydar, had a different approach. They foresaw almost complete
14 POST-SOVIET RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

disintegration as a natural and inevitable ‘divorce’, and were happy to accept

that.
Disillusion soon followed. Post-Soviet countries diverged from each other as
well as from Moscow. The common market and common foreign and defence
policies did not happen at all. Divisions within the former Soviet empire
exacerbated the economic crisis, and market reforms followed in Russia, bwith
GDP declining by 40 per cent. The Soviet population as a whole suffered a
myriad of problems—health care, welfare, education and unemployment—
causing huge migrations. It is, however, impossible to regard Russian foreign
policy as completely fruitless. The administration of the CIS was established.
Despite the emptiness of all its formal declarations, the CIS has fulfilled some
objectives. Even if the CIS has been far from a perfect model of devolution,
devolution of the huge empire nevertheless took place largely peacefully.
The CIS remained a formality for two main reasons: first, the severe economic
crisis did not give the Russian state the chance to be the centre of a new regional
world organization which might have attracted other post-Soviet states; and
second, the domination of the ideological approach was succeeded by an eclectic
mixture of imperial ambitions and an ideology that was the exact opposite of
Soviet international unity, the ideology of unlimited sovereignty.
The strong influence of Western ideology appeared in relations with former
allies and Third World countries. Russia broke off relations with communist
regimes, and, for example, the government officially repented for the events of
1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and for the annexation of the
Baltic countries.
In the first of our chosen periods of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy we can
see that the level of pragmatism increased considerably compared to Soviet
times. There could be nothing more pragmatic than the policy of openness with
the West, and cooperation with Western countries. The Russian economy and
Russian society had great need for these. However, it had a very strong
ideological framework. The most pragmatic direction of policy was managed in
the most ideological way. It represented the direct opposite in ideology, namely
anti-communism. At least two main reasons account for this: first, there was too
recent and too strong a legacy of the Soviet system and, after the political
revolution of 1991, the people clamoured for the opposite ideology; and second,
the ‘culture of extremes’ as the dominating tendency in Russian political culture,
had developed throughout the history of Russia, up to the twentieth century.
Even if the first half of the 1990s had been characterized by a high level of
doctrine, the doctrine itself had become more pragmatic.

THE ‘POLICY OF ALTERNATIVES’, 1996–99

The second period was connected with the appointment of Evgeniy Primakov as
foreign minister of the Russian Federation. In practice the change in the attitude
of the Russian establishment happened earlier. The beginning of 1994 was
 REALIGNMENTS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 15

marked by the victory of the Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party.

Zhirinovsky’s triumph was due to the popularity of his extreme nationalistic ideas,
and brought about the resignation of Kozyrev. Zhirinovsky and the communist
leaders called for an isolationist policy. This faction of the Russian political
establishment considered Western countries, especially the US, as eternal
enemies of Russia, and that political dogma was widespread among the rest of
the political elite, though expressed more quietly. The Western-oriented part of
the elite became a fairly small minority, and even this group had to refer to the West
as ‘partners’ rather than as ‘allies’. It is very important to note that anti-Western
feeling did not reach the same degree as in Soviet times. Cooperation with the West
was continued and was marked by several considerable steps. In 1997 the
agreement between Russia and NATO was signed. Russia continued to seek loans
from the IMF, and joined the G7 group of nations. However, according to
opinion polls, only 13 per cent of the population had an open attitude towards the
values of Western democracy, and more than 50 per cent openly declared
themselves anti-Western.
Primakov’s foreign policy can be called the ‘policy of alternatives’. Instead of
animosity towards the West, alternative steps to those of the West were offered.
Contention with the West reached its peak in the spring of 1999, with the NATO
bombing of Yugoslavia. In the two weeks after 24 March 1999 the number of
people with anti-American feelings doubled, from 32 per cent to 64 per cent. The
two main causes of stronger anti-Western feeling in the second half of the 1990s
were twofold:
First, the continuation of a severe economic crisis, ‘shock therapy’, combined
now with frustration at the lack of economic assistance from the West. For
various reasons, the ‘Marshall plan’ for Russia, more expected by the Russian
government elite than promised by the West, did not happen. In addition, the
comprehensive economic crisis, which began in 1992, was considerably
exacerbated by the default on loans in August 1998, followed by devaluation of
the ruble. Already low living standards decreased by a further 30 per cent.
Second, several steps by the West, such as plans for NATO extension and the
NATO bombing of former Yugoslavia, increased support for the militant
nationalists inside the Russian political establishment. To them these steps
proved that the West was selfish and militant, and a ‘natural enemy’ of Russia.
Particularly in the case of Kosovo, the West did not take Russia, or the UN, or
international law, into consideration. Hence, relations between Russia and the
West became much more antagonistic than they were immediately after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
The situation in 1999–2000 looked very much like a return to the Cold War,
especially in Russian-US relations. The nationalistic ideology of ‘Great Russia’
rapidly strengthened and won over the great majority of the Russian political
elite. Many of them were disappointed with the outcome of the ‘multipolar
world’ idea, remarking that in practice it had turned into a unipolar one, with
domination by one superpower. Nostalgia about Russia’s ‘superpower past’,
16 POST-SOVIET RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

fashioned by the ideology of strong statehood, became the most widespread

feeling among the political and academic elites.
The concept of an ‘alternative’ foreign policy used the theory of ‘Eurasia’ as
its philosophical background. In accordance with the ideas of past Russian
thinkers like Leonid Karsavin and Petr Savitskiy, Russia cannot be included in a
European civilization. From a social and cultural point of view, ‘Continent
Eurasia’ is a unique phenomenon. The key idea is that of strong state unity as the
core of the Russian nation. Thus the whole of Russian history has been
characterized by the dominance not of personality, or of society, but of the state.
For this reason Russia appears different from Europe with its tradition of civil
society and human rights.
The second period in post-Soviet foreign policy did not bring any great
changes in the way in which the CIS functioned. Reintegration of the post-Soviet
state was announced as a foreign policy priority. Its political purpose was
formulated as a Eurasian confederation, which implied political sovereignty,
independence, a common economy, common security system and the
maintaining of ‘humanitarian relations’, as specifically defined for relations
among post-Soviet states. In practice, it remained a formality. The steps towards
a reunion with Belarus (the announcement of the union of the states of Russia
and Belarus in 1997) were made for opportunistic political reasons. The default
in 1998 made Russia much less attractive to post-Soviet states and almost all of
them felt greater security in developing their independence from Russia’s foreign
policy. Several of them appeared as active opponents to Russia: Ukraine with its
strong Western leaning, Azerbaijan with its strong southern leaning, Uzbekistan
with its southeastern leanings. They have been trying to dominate in their
regions.

PUTIN’S ‘GREAT RUSSIA’, 2000–SEPTEMBER 2001

In early 2000, Vladimir Putin ran his presidential campaign under the slogan of
‘Great Russia’ and ‘Strong Russian Statehood’, but without any detailed program.
This ideology could have evolved as a policy of ‘an alternative to the West’ or
even as one of ‘isolation’. Later, at the beginning of 2001, Putin put forward his
criteria: a clear definition of national priorities, pragmatism and economic
effectiveness.6 Nevertheless, it could still have been interpreted in various ways.
It sounded promising, but it did not shed enough light on the concept of his
foreign policy.
However, it appeared as a dynamic development of relations with other
countries. It was only in the autumn of 2001 that Putin himself declared the non-
isolationist character of his foreign policy, but it has been nonisolationist from
the very beginning. In 2000 alone, Russia participated in 260 international
meetings at the highest official level.7 The other features of Putin’s foreign
policy are: prioritization of European relations (not US, as in the first post-Soviet
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