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Mill’s A System of Logic

John Stuart Mill considered his A System of Logic, first published in 1843,
the methodological foundation and intellectual groundwork of his later
works in ethical, social, and political theory. Yet no book has attempted
in the past to engage with the most important aspects of Mill’s Logic. This
volume brings together leading scholars to elucidate the key themes of this
influential work, looking at such topics as his philosophy of language and
mathematics, his view on logic, induction and deduction, free will, argu-
mentation, ethology and psychology, as well as his account of normativity,
kind of pleasure, philosophical and political method and the “Art of Life.”

Antis Loizides teaches in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the
University of Cyprus
Routledge Studies in Nineteenth-Century Philosophy

1 The Scotch Metaphysics 4 Hegel and Psychoanalysis

A Century of Enlightenment A New Interpretation of
George E. Davie Phenomenology of Spirit
Molly Macdonald
2 Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding
Discourses
5 Peirce’s Account of
Philosophy, Literature, and
Purposefulness
Theology
A Kantian Perspective
George Pattison
Gabriele Gava
3 Dialectics, Politics, and the
Contemporary Value of Hegel’s 6 Mill’s A System of Logic
Practical Philosophy Critical Appraisals
Andrew Buchwalter Edited by Antis Loizides
Mill’s A System of Logic
Critical Appraisals

Edited by Antis Loizides

First published 2014
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business
© 2014 Taylor & Francis
The right of the editor to be identified as the author of the editorial
material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted
in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Mill’s a system of logic : critical appraisals / edited by Antis Loizides. —
1 [edition].
pages cm. — (Routledge studies in nineteenth-century philosophy ; 6)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Mill, John Stuart, 1806–1873. 2. Mill, John Stuart, 1806–1873.
3. Logic, Modern—19th century. I. Loizides, Antis, editor of compilation.
B1608.L6M55 2014
160—dc23
2014001677
ISBN: 978-0-415-84124-5 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-203-76654-5 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
Contents

Foreword by John Skorupski vii

Preface ix

Introduction 1
ANTIS LOIZIDES

1 Mill on Names 44
STEPHEN P. SCHWARTZ

2 The Sources of Mill’s Views of Ratiocination and Induction 63

STEFFEN DUCHEYNE AND JOHN P. McCASKEY

3 Mill and the Philosophy of Mathematics: Physicalism

and Fictionalism 83
MARK BALAGUER

4 Mill’s and Whewell’s Competing Visions of Logic 101

ELIJAH MILLGRAM

5 A Double Helix: Mill and Bain on Logic,

Psychology and Ethology 122
FREDERICK ROSEN

6 In Defense of Mill’s Theory of Free Will 134

BERNARD BEROFSKY

7 Mill on the Epistemology of Reasons: A Comparison

with Kant 151
CHRISTOPHER MACLEOD

8 Different Kinds of Pleasure 170

JONATHAN RILEY
vi Contents
9 Mill, Informal Logic and Argumentation 192
HANS V. HANSEN

10 Mill on the Method of Politics 218

ANTIS LOIZIDES

11 A System of Logic and the “Art of Life” 246

ALAN RYAN

Contributors 263
Index 267
Foreword

Mill’s reputation as a philosopher—as against a noble figure and public

thinker—went through a very bad batch in the earlier half of the twentieth
century. In contrast, it has been recovering remarkably over the last forty
years or so. The pattern is not particularly unusual. Post mortem slides
of reputation, typically accompanied by severe or even perverse misunder-
standings, seem to happen quite regularly to influential philosophers, espe-
cially to great philosophers who have a comprehensively worked-out view
across the whole of philosophy. Locke, Hume, Kant and Hegel all come to
mind. There is something in the sheer scale and breadth of their work, the
daunting demand to grasp it as a whole, that discourages and dispirits a
reader. Moreover, when vast comprehensiveness combines with great influ-
ence it is bound to annoy in some respect or other across the range of topics
of which it treats—especially if it incorporates active political polemicism
and attracts an admiring crowd, as in the case of Mill.
Still, even though Mill’s reputation has been recovering for some time, the
recovery has not yet reached the full range of his philosophy. There are signs
of change, there is interest in Mill’s treatment of a few disconnected topics
outside moral and political philosophy, yet, overall, contemporary interest
in Mill remains too one-sidedly restricted to his ethical and political writ-
ings. This is unfortunate. It is important to develop and familiarize an accu-
rate picture of Mill as a philosopher, a philosopher who sought to integrate
his interests in ethics and politics into his overall philosophy, rather than as
a primarily political thinker with somewhat unaccountable side interests in
philosophy. Mill worked out quite fully a naturalistic liberal humanism. Its
epistemological side is just as important as its ethical side, today as in his
own time. Critics as well as proponents should aim to understand it accu-
rately and in detail. Nor is this just about understanding Mill. A balanced
understanding of how philosophy developed in the nineteenth century must
take proper account of the substance and point of the A System of Logic and
the Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy.
These two works took up a large amount of Mill’s time and thought.
Coming toward the beginning and towards the end of his career, they are
the groundwork of his standing as a philosopher. In them he expounds his
viii Foreword
philosophy of language, his naturalistic epistemology, his account, within
that naturalistic and semantic framework, of induction, logic and math-
ematics, his conception of the moral sciences, his view of aprioricity and
necessity, his phenomenalistic metaphysics. Both works have to be studied to
get a full view of Mill as philosopher—nonetheless, all the topics just men-
tioned apart from the last can be found in the System of Logic. I would not
want to condone neglect of the Examination, since behind its unappetizing
title there lies some of Mill’s most penetrating and probing thought. Still,
the System of Logic is the work to which he gave the most time in his years
of first maturity, and it is, as it says it is, a systematic treatise, whereas in
the Examination Mill’s own views are set out in the context of a sometimes
strident polemic against Hamilton.
Mill himself thought that his two longest surviving works would be the
essay on Liberty and the System of Logic. But whereas work on Liberty
never comes to an end, and can sometimes seem to be multiplying praeter
necessitate (I am, I admit, one of the culprits), work on the System of Logic
cries out to be done. There is scholarly work to do—and the time is ripe to
do it. For one thing, the history of philosophy has begun to move on, having
fully caught up with Kant, to the fascinating complications of the nineteenth
century. For another, current pluralism and diversity in philosophy makes
it much easier to appreciate Mill, along with other nineteenth century phi-
losophers, than was possible fifty or more years ago, when philosophical
orthodoxy was so strongly at odds with most of their views, and certainly
with Mill’s.
It is extremely encouraging to see this renewal taking place. Mill’s repu-
tation as a philosopher who dealt comprehensively with the questions of
philosophy is important even for his reputation as a moral philosopher. A
just estimate will I believe show his philosophy to be one of the corner-
stones of nineteenth century thought, still fresh and interesting today. I hope
and believe that this excellent collection of papers will move his reputa-
tion strongly forward, and as one of the admirers of Mill I am grateful to
the editor and contributors for the hard work they have devoted to a very
worthwhile task.
—John Skorupski
Preface

John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic (1843) established him as a leading figure
among his peers, dominating university education in the second half of the
nineteenth century. He himself considered the Logic as the methodological
foundation or intellectual groundwork for his later works in economic, ethi-
cal, social and political theory. And for the past sixty or so years Mill’s ethical,
social and political philosophy has been reassessed, rediscovered and even rein-
vented in light of it. It is a book that Mill saw through the press several times,
each time making substantial revisions. Since Mill claimed, while in the process
of writing it, that he was a “Logician” rather than anything else, the Logic
became more than just a book—it was the book that would set the terms of the
intellectual renovation he sought. As the Introduction to this volume discusses,
the Logic was greeted as a monumental contribution to philosophical studies
of the time, by friends and foes alike. Criticism was almost never absent, but
no one ever questioned that they were “in the presence of a master.”
A conscious effort has been made to enlist to this project individuals who
have worked previously on Mill, could give a good look at Mill’s Logic
from the inside and could make connections between the Logic and other
aspects of Mill’s thought (and influence), as well as scholars with expertise
on subjects with which Mill engaged in the Logic but who could have a criti-
cal look on Mill from the outside and make connections between Mill and
contemporary analytical philosophy. The benefits of such a combination of
expertise seemed to outweigh the costs—but whether it indeed did or not,
remains to be seen. Moreover, as Mill’s Logic touches upon an immense
range of subjects, the contributions to this volume do not attempt to cover,
or uncover, all of its aspects. Although much remains to be done—both
philosophically and historically—for a full exploration of Mill’s Logic, the
volume does pay particular attention to some of its most important themes.
In Chapter 1, Stephen P. Schwartz critically examines Mill’s theory of names,
especially Mill’s theory of proper names and of general terms. Schwartz brings
out both the advantages and the shortcomings of Mill’s theories compared
with contemporary theories in the philosophy of language. In Chapter 2, Stef-
fen Ducheyne and John P. McCaskey explore the sources and highlight the
traditions that were important for Mill’s Logic; they discuss how Mill reacted
against certain traditions and trends as far as his views on ratiocination and
x Preface
induction are concerned. In Chapter 3, Mark Balaguer shows that Mill’s phi-
losophy of mathematics cannot account for contemporary mathematics or
even the mathematics of his own day and attempts to offer an explanation for
what Mill should have said about mathematics, given his background philo-
sophical commitments. In Chapter 4, Elijah Millgram examines the famous
exchange between Mill and William Whewell. The Mill-Whewell debate has
traditionally been cast as a disagreement about whether inference to the best
explanation has a place in science, but Millgram suggests that it is best under-
stood as the clash of competing views in the philosophy of logic. In Chapter 5,
Frederick Rosen highlights the philosophical tradition, associationist psychol-
ogy and utilitarian logic, in which Mill wrote by focusing on his thirty-year
relationship with Alexander Bain, which is depicted in terms of a double
helix, linking Mill’s System of Logic of 1843 with Bain’s Logic of 1870. In
Chapter 6, Bernard Berofsky examines Mill’s theory of free will, comparing it
to that of David Hume. Berofsky suggests that an adequate defense of the reg-
ularity theory, which has failed to satisfy critics, resting on a revised account of
systematization may be found in the comments of Mill himself. In Chapter 7,
Christopher Macleod compares Mill and Kant as regards their appeal to the
validity of our spontaneous propensities as reasoning agents; Macleod offers
an interpretation of Mill’s account of theoretical and practical reason that
attempts to do justice to the neglected fact that Mill’s demonstration of the
principle of utility runs parallel to his demonstration of the principle of induc-
tion. In Chapter 8, Jonathan Riley makes use of Mill’s System of Logic to
clarify what Mill means by different kinds of pleasures, and to confirm that,
for him, a difference of quality is an infinite difference, that is, an intrinsic
difference irrespective of quantity. In Chapter 9, Hans V. Hansen takes the
view that Mill’s contributions to informal logic and the study of argumenta-
tion are considerable. Not only did Mill’s work, Hansen argues, contribute
to the practice of argumentation, it was also an important precursor of the
development of informal logic in the late twentieth century. Chapter 10 exam-
ines whether the method of politics Mill sketched in Logic corresponds to the
one employed in his Considerations of Representative Government; to this
effect, the discussion draws on Mill’s discussion of the method appropriate
to arts and sciences and his criticisms of the traditional methods of politics,
either deductive or inductive. Finally, Chapter 11 forms Alan Ryan’s “second
sailing” with Mill’s “Art of Life,” revising some ideas on this aspect of Mill’s
thought that originally appeared fifty years ago, when he first engaged with
Mill’s architectonic technê of living.
I would like to express my gratitude and indebtedness to all contributors
for their willingness to participate in this project, their hard work preparing
their chapters (and related tasks) and their patience with unforeseen delays.
I am especially indebted to John Skorupski, Alan Ryan, Jonathan Riley, Fred
Rosen, Stephen Schwartz, Elijah Millgram, Georgios Varouxakis and Kyria-
kos Demetriou for advice and guidance during the completion of this project.
Hopefully, this volume will prove to be useful and interesting to all students
of John Stuart Mill, of the history of philosophy and of philosophy in general.
Introduction
Antis Loizides

Twenty two years after its original publication in 1843 a sixth edition of
John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic appeared in bookstores and on book-
shelves. By then Mill was confident, though reluctant to admit it publicly,
that all that he had to worry about was “how to make the best use of my
influence during such years of life & work as remain to me.”1 Already by 1847,
the Logic’s success had given Mill much “capital,” i.e., much leeway with
publishers, that he could spend by promulgating radical opinions which
would offend and scandalize “ten times as many people as” they pleased2
and which would eventually establish him as “one of England’s greatest
sons.”3 Two more editions of the Logic appeared before his death on 8 May
1873, twelve days short of his sixty-seventh birthday. Surveys of Mill’s life
and works would soon parade through the press. For some, Mill was “[t]he
great intellectual pointsman of our age”; he was “the man who has done
more than any other of this generation to give direction to the thought of
his contemporaries.” “[W]e are left,” the commentator added, “to measure
the loss to humanity by the result of his labours.”4 The two works selected
by Mill himself to survive longer than anything else he had labored on were
On Liberty (1859) and A System of Logic.5
Seldom do students of Mill’s works pause and think just how much Mill
had worked on A System of Logic, taking fifteen years from inception to
completion.6 For most, at the time, Mill’s Logic was “inestimable” and “a
revolution.”7 Some were not so generous; according to Abraham Hayward,
Mill’s Logic was “a book which no one would read for amusement, hardly,
indeed, except as a task; his style, always dry, is here at its driest.” However,
Hayward did note that “the circumstance of the work having reached an
eight edition in 1872 is, therefore, a conclusive proof of its completeness as
a system and a text-book.” Still, Mill, the author concluded, “with all his
errors and paradoxes, . . . will be long remembered as a thinker and rea-
soner who has largely contributed to the intellectual progress of the age.”
Hayward’s estimate of Mill’s accomplishments, being part of a stinging—to
say the least—Times obituary, had caused great annoyance among Mill’s
admirers and friends. However, it is indicative of Mill’s status in the late
2 Antis Loizides
nineteenth century that Hayward’s claim regarding the “completeness as a
system and a text-book” of the System of Logic—a very contentious claim
to make by 1873—was never challenged; rather it was deemed insufficient
to balance the charges of dryness, error and paradox.8
It is quite difficult, if it is even possible at all, to estimate Mill’s contribu-
tion “to the intellectual progress of the age”; more so with regard to isolat-
ing the impact of one specific work by a prolific writer such as Mill—Mill’s
“methods” being of no help here. Nevertheless an attempt must be made
at such an assessment, focusing on some aspects of the reception of Mill’s
Logic—however imperfect and incomplete that attempt may be.

I.

The story of Mill’s early study of logic found in his Autobiography (1873a)
is well known9—though perhaps not as well known as his story of his learn-
ing ancient Greek and of first reading Plato at the ages of three and seven
respectively.10 In his critical biography of Mill, Alexander Bain (1818–1903)
found Mill’s early training in logic, commencing at twelve with Aristotle’s
Organon, “the one thing, in . . . [Bain’s] judgment, where Mill was most
markedly in advance of his years.” Comparing Mill with his contemporaries,
Bain claimed that he had “never known a similar case of precocity.” Mill had
not only “read treatises on the Formal Logic, as well as Hobbes’s Computatio
sive Logica, but . . . he was able to chop Logic with his father in regard to
the foundations and demonstrations of Geometry.”11 In contrast, Bain was
not quite as impressed with regard to Mill’s attainments in Greek, noting
that Mill’s early reading “could be nothing but an exercise in the Greek lan-
guage.” The two stories however interconnect. And Mill made it clear how:

The Socratic method, of which the Platonic dialogues are the chief
example, is unsurpassed as a discipline for correcting the errors, and
clearing up the confusions incident to the intellectus sibi permissus, the
understanding which has made up all its bundles of associations under
the guidance of popular phraseology.12

Mill’s “strong relish for accurate classification,” acquired by school logic

and Plato’s dialogues, was another sense in which his early education was
a “course of Benthamism.” Most importantly, the application of the Ben-
thamite standard of the “greatest happiness” to law, ethics and politics (to
which Mill was referring when he argued that his early education had been
a “course of Benthamism”) came a few years later than that of studying the

close, searching elenchus by which the man of vague generalities, is con-

strained either to express his meaning to himself in definite terms, or to
confess that he does not know what he is talking about; the perpetual
 Introduction 3
testing of all general statements by particular instances; the siege in form
which is laid to the meaning of large abstract terms, by fixing upon
some still larger class-name which includes that and more, and dividing
down to the thing sought—marking out its limits and definition by a
series of accurately drawn distinctions between it and each of the cog-
nate objects which are successively parted off from it[.]13

According to Mill, dissecting bad arguments and identifying fallacies was the
“first intellectual operation in which . . . [he] arrived at any proficiency.”14
As this is not the place to pursue the link between Mill’s Socratic and logi-
cal studies in any depth,15 suffice it to say that his proficiency in logic did
come in handy in the “polemics of the day.” Bain was right in claiming that
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and James Mill (1773–1836) were at “war
against vague, ambiguous, flimsy, unanalyzed words and phrases . . . in the
wide domains of Politics and Ethics.”16 And this was a battle in which the
younger Mill joined, with “Socratic dialectics” as the weapon of choice.17 As
we shall see later on, Mill’s Logic was intended as a blow both to intuitionist
ethico-political views as well as their metaphysical underpinnings.
In Bain’s “estimate of Mill’s genius,” Mill “was first of all a Logician, and
next a social philosopher or Politician.”18 But Mill was not the one without
being the other. William Leonard Courtney (1850–1928) seemed thus to
have been closer to the truth in his own biography of Mill:

James Mill wished to educate his son to carry out his own work, to
make a thinker after his own likeness, and especially to save his pupil
from some of what he deemed the wasteful and unnecessary parts of his
own development. The son, therefore, need not go through the same
steps as the father, but commence almost at the very point which the
older thinker had attained. He must begin by being at once a radical
politician, a free-thinker, and a logician.19

At the height of the parliamentary reform debate, John Stuart Mill came to
test the strengths of his early education—logical, economical, ethical and
political—in the press, in journals, at clubs and societies; reason, the domain
of logic, rather than feeling was employed in the assessment of educational,
social, legal and political practices. In praise of the intellectual aspect of his
early training, Mill, later in life, was “persuaded that nothing, in modern
education, tends so much, when properly used, to form exact thinkers, who
attach a precise meaning to words and propositions, and are not imposed
on by vague, loose, or ambiguous terms” than “school logic.” However,
this did not mean that school logic itself was passively received: the young
Utilitarians—branded “the Brangles” by Harriet Grote (1792–1878)—took
up the study of syllogistic logic as a group in the mid-1820s, aiming to mas-
ter it as well as to improve it.20 Around this time—and due to his “Brangles”
meetings—Mill began putting his ideas for a book on logic on paper.21
4 Antis Loizides
Yet it was not the abovementioned aspect of the young utilitarians’ logi-
cal studies that formed part of their general perception. At the time, all that
Mill, and his friends, waving high the banner of utilitarianism, “thought of
was to alter people’s opinions; to make them believe according to evidence,
and know what was their real interest” (“evidence” being an operative word
in the Benthamic dictionary22). Their “youthful fanaticism” and “sectarian
spirit” thus led to the emergence of the caricature of a “Benthamite”, i.e., “a
dry, hard logical machine.”23 As Frederick Denison Maurice (1805–1872),
whose insight that “all differences of opinion when analysed, [are] differ-
ences of method” guided Mill in the composition of the Logic,24 noted in
1835: “The most University-hating priest-hating sect in England has taken
Logic under its patronage; and scholastic pedantries, which would have
furnished playwrights in the last age with excellent jokes against College
Fellows, are now oftentimes the youthful Utilitarian’s best passport to repu-
tation.” He immediately added: “The end which the Benthamites propose to
themselves, is the detection of fallacies in the writings or speeches of Whigs,
Tories, and, above all of Churchmen.”25 The error of these “dictators,”
Maurice argued, was setting logic up “as an ἐμπειρία [i.e., a skill or a rou-
tine] for the accomplishment of a specific purpose, instead of studying it as
a branch of humanity,” convincing only those who “had implicitly adopted
all their opinions beforehand.”26
In his Autobiography, Mill admitted that Maurice’s view of the Bentham-
ites was roughly an accurate description of himself during that period of his
life.27 But he soon underwent a great change in his opinions, following the
well-known crisis in his “mental history.” Reflected in his writings at the turn
of the decade, this change led Mill to seek the company of Maurice and John
Sterling (1806–1844) as well as Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881)—individuals
not only free from the “narrowness” of Mill’s circle up to the late 1820s
but also highly critical of the utilitarian sect. For this reason, while the
younger Mill was engaged in writing the Logic, James Mill’s old associates
viewed the younger Mill’s “enlargement-of-the-utilitarian-creed” project
with skepticism; Graham Wallas reported in his biography of Francis Place
(1771–1854), “the radical tailor of Charing Cross,” that Place thought that
the younger Mill by 1838 had “made great progress in becoming a German
metaphysical mystic”; Harriet Grote herself had called John Stuart Mill in a
letter to Place a “wayward intellectual deity.”28
However, particularly in his correspondence with Sterling and Carlyle,
John Stuart Mill, as he made progress with the Logic, increasingly identified
his “vocation” to be that of a “Scientist,” rather than that of the “Artist.”29
He was less “wayward” than his radical friends supposed; still, the Logic
seemed to offer an opportunity to be treated as a thinker in his own right.
Writing to Carlyle in 1837, Mill noted his hope that he did not “overrate the
value of anything I can do of that kind [that is, a treatise on logic] but it so
happens that this, whatever be its value, is the only thing which I am sure I
can do & do not believe can be so well done by anybody else whom I know
 Introduction 5
30
of.” Importantly, he considered it to be part of his “task on earth” to say
the things he had in mind on logic.31
Mill had already given a glimpse of what a writer on logic should attempt
to do almost a decade earlier when asked to review George Bentham’s (1800–
1884) An Outline of a New System of Logic (1827); that is, “not only be
superior, but prove himself to be superior, in knowledge of the subject, to
the author[s] whom he criticizes.” The readers, according to Mill, should see
that the author differs from others on logic “because he knows more” than
they do.32 Having convinced himself that he had something original to say,
by 1832 he had already made considerable progress in writing the Logic. But
he was soon led to a halt “on the threshold of Induction.” In 1837, William
Whewell’s (1794–1866) books on the history and philosophy of inductive
sciences gave Mill the push he needed, like Dugald Stewart’s (1753–1828)
five years earlier—Auguste Comte’s (1798–1857) Cours de Philosophie
Positive (1830–1842) provided much help too (especially with Book VI).33
In August 1837, he was “so immersed in Logic and . . . [was] getting on so
triumphantly with it that . . . [he] loathe[d] the idea of leaving off to write
articles” for the London and Westminster Review.34 The Logic was advanc-
ing rapidly, as Mill was untying all the “hard knots” that he found along the
way.35 In December 1841, following complete rewriting—which provided
the opportunity to incorporate reflection on Comte’s and Whewell’s new
books—Mill’s magnum opus was ready for the press. According to Ster-
ling, who had written an introduction for Mill to a prospective publisher,
the Logic was the product of “labour of many years of a singularly subtle,
patient, and comprehensive mind. It will be our chief speculative monument
of this age.”36
Right at the outset, Mill explained that his book was a product of “prac-
tical eclecticism”;37 he did not aim “to supersede, but to embody and sys-
tematize, the best ideas” on the subject. In laying no claim to originality
other than this synthesis, he did acknowledge however that what he had
attempted was no small feat:38

To cement together the detached fragments of a subject, never yet treated

as a whole; to harmonize the true portions of discordant theories, by
supplying the links of thought necessary to connect them, and by disen-
tangling them from the errors with which they are always more or less
interwoven; must necessarily require a considerable amount of original
speculation.39

On one hand, in the early draft of his Autobiography, Mill confessed that
“eclecticism,” “looking out for the truth which is generally to be found
in errors when they are anything more than mere paralogisms, or logical
blunders,” was part of his process of breaking through the narrowness of
his former education. On the other hand, Mill informed the readers of his
autobiography that his expectations were limited to “keeping the tradition
6 Antis Loizides
unbroken of what . . . [he] thought a better philosophy,” having to combat
“the opposite school of metaphysics, the ontological and ‘innate principles’
school.”40 In the past, too much stress had been given to the first, giving
rise to the caricature of Mill “as a good-natured but slack-minded eclectic,”
as Alan Ryan put it.41 In the last half-century or so, too much stress on the
second has given rise to the caricature of Mill as a “systematizer,” one who
obsessively, and ingeniously, attempted to follow wherever it led him what
he “thought a better philosophy,” even when it led him to absurdities. Schol-
ars have thus pointed out a tension with regard to Mill’s Logic. Did Mill
want “to do justice to the opinions of philosophers outside his own tradi-
tion,” as William Kneale and Martha Kneale noted?42 Or were the “goals,
method, and characteristic style of Mill’s philosophy . . . to a great extent
intelligible in terms of his dislike of . . . intuitionism”?43
In his Autobiography, Mill claimed that “the System of Logic supplies what
was much wanted, a text-book of the opposite doctrine [to the “German,
or à priori view of human knowledge, and of the knowing faculties”]—that
which derives all knowledge from experience, and all moral and intellectual
qualities principally from the direction given to the associations.” There
was much value, according to Mill, in the “analysis of logical processes”
and in “possible canons of evidence,” i.e., in what they could do “towards
guiding or rectifying the operations of the understanding,”—a value of logic
that Mill had come to appreciate in walks with his father while he was still
growing up.44 More than three decades later, Mill provided an insight, both
as to the rationale behind writing the Logic and writing it the way he did,
which deserves to be quoted at length:

The notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition
or consciousness, independently of observation and experience, is, I am
persuaded, in these times, the great intellectual support of false doc-
trines and bad institutions. By the aid of this theory, every inveterate
belief and every intense feeling, of which the origin is not remembered,
is enabled to dispense with the obligation of justifying itself by rea-
son, and is erected into its own all-sufficient voucher and justification.
There never was such an instrument devised for consecrating all deep
seated prejudices. And the chief strength of this false philosophy in mor-
als, politics, and religion, lies in the appeal which it is accustomed to
make to the evidence of mathematics and of the cognate branches of
physical science. To expel it from these, is to drive it from its strong-
hold: and because this had never been effectually done, the intuitive
school . . . had in appearance, and as far as published writings were con-
cerned, on the whole the best of the argument. In attempting to clear up
the real nature of the evidence of mathematical and physical truths, the
System of Logic met the intuition philosophers on ground on which they
had previously been deemed unassailable; and gave its own explanation,
from experience and association, of that peculiar character of what are
called necessary truths, which is adduced as proof that their evidence
 Introduction 7
must come from a deeper source than experience. Whether this has been
done effectually, is still sub judice; and even then, to deprive a mode of
thought so strongly rooted in human prejudices and partialities, of its
mere speculative support, goes but a very little way towards overcoming
it; but though only a step, it is a quite indispensable one; for since, after
all, prejudice can only be successfully combated by philosophy, no way
can really be made against it permanently until it has been shewn not to
have philosophy on its side.45

However, Mill wrote of his polemical intentions in composing the Logic

approximately a decade after the Logic’s original publication. The follow-
ing is from his introduction to the Logic: “I can conscientiously affirm, that
no one proposition laid down in this work has been adopted for the sake
of establishing, or with any reference to its fitness for being employed in
establishing, preconceived opinions in any department of knowledge or of
inquiry on which the speculative world is still undecided.”46 How could
Mill, in just a decade—while revising the Logic for a new edition—make
these conflicting claims?47

II.

Mill was not unaware that his book would be at odds with what was , as
he claimed, the dominant philosophical school of the day. But to the best of
his ability, he told Sterling, he tried to “keep clear” of the debate regarding
“the perception of the highest Realities by direct intuition.”48 Writing to
Carlyle, Mill had argued that logic was not the art of “knowing things” but
“of knowing whether you know them or not”;49 discovering “truth” did not
fall within the domain of logic, but deciding whether what one has found
out was indeed “truth.”50 As Mill argued, his book

professes to be a logic of experience only, & to throw no further light

upon the existence of truths not experimental, than is thrown by shewing
to what extent reasoning from experience will carry us. Above all mine
is a logic of the indicative mood alone:—the logic of the imperative, in
which the major premiss says not is but ought—I do not meddle with.51

Restricting logic “to the laws of the investigation of truth by means of extrin-
sic evidence whether ratiocinative or inductive,” as Mill attempted to do,
would still contradict some parts “of the supersensual philosophy”—though
only subordinate, not fundamental, parts.52 Logic offered a way of testing
experience—finding that “outward standard, the conformity of an opinion
to which constitutes its truth.”53 Mill argued that he had not developed any
final thoughts on the “great matters” of the time54—he even admitted that
may have had “something to learn on this subject from the German phi-
losophers.”55 Mill did seem to seriously take under consideration Sterling’s
8 Antis Loizides
advice on reading a few German books on logic, contemplating postponing
his plans for revising the Logic.56
In his epistolary discussions with Sterling, Mill noted that understand-
ing each other on the definition, and domain, of logic required “a good
deal of explanation.”57 Maurice, as we saw, protested to viewing logic as
merely a skill; his underlying assumption seemed to be that logic combined
with metaphysics would provide access to higher “truths.” Mill took up the
question of the scope of logic in the Logic’s Introduction. First, Mill consid-
ered whether logic was the science and art of reasoning. But defining logic
as the analysis of what takes place when one reasons as well as the rules,
based on that analysis, for reasoning correctly (to reason, in this sense, as
Mill immediately added, “is simply to infer any assertion, from assertions
already admitted”—including both deductive and inductive processes), Mill
answered, was too limiting.58 Second, Mill wondered whether logic was
“the science which treats of the operations of the human understanding in
the pursuit of truth.” Some such operations included naming, classification,
definition but also conception, perception, memory and belief. But this defi-
nition, according to Mill, included too much. The province of logic was dis-
tinct from that of “metaphysics” (i.e., trying to determine “what part of the
furniture of the mind belongs to it originally, and what part is constructed
out of materials furnished to it from without”). Mill did not consider the
distinction between what the mind “receives from and what it gives to, the
crude materials of its experience” as essential to the study of logic:59

The province of logic must be restricted to that portion of our knowl-

edge which consists of inferences from truths previously known;
whether those antecedent data be general propositions, or particular
observations and perceptions. Logic is not the science of Belief, but the
science of Proof, or Evidence. In so far as belief professes to be founded
on proof, the office of logic is to supply a test for ascertaining whether
or not the belief is well grounded.

According to Mill, logic was nothing short than the master science, “the sci-
ence of science itself”; though it does not observe, invent or discover, logic
judges whether conclusions follow from data; logic illustrates the condi-
tions under which facts may prove other facts: “Logic, then is the science
of the operations of the understanding which are subservient to the estima-
tion of evidence: both the process itself of advancing from known truths to
unknown, and all other intellectual operations in so far auxiliary to this.”
Mill’s aim was thus to define “a set of rules or canons for testing the suf-
ficiency of any given evidence to prove any given proposition.”60
Mill’s Logic consisted of six books. Book I dealt with names and proposi-
tions. In this Mill followed tradition, in commencing a book on logic with
a discussion of terms; he argued that correct usage of language (i.e., the
“signification and purposes of words”) eliminates an important source of
 Introduction 9
61
poor reasoning. At the same time, however, with the discussion of types
of names (general or singular; concrete or abstract; connotative or non-
connotative; relative or absolute; univocal or equivocal), Mill included a dis-
cussion of types of “nameable things” (feelings, or states of consciousness;
minds; bodies; relations).62 What was important to logic with regard to the
subject and the predicate of a proposition, Mill argued, was not the relation
of two ideas but of the two phenomena that the ideas express—true proposi-
tions depended on what was denoted by the subject possessing the attributes
connoted by the predicate.63 In Book II, Mill began discussing the two kinds
of reasoning involving such propositions: induction and ratiocination, or
reasoning from particulars to generals (i.e., “inferring a proposition from
propositions less general than itself”) and reasoning from generals to par-
ticulars (i.e., “inferring a proposition from propositions equally or more
general”).64 In his treatment of the dictum de omni et nullo, and the axiom
that Mill favored in its place—“whatever possesses any mark possesses that
which it is a mark of”—Mill laid the groundwork for his own theory of
induction, against the background of the traditional relation between deduc-
tion and induction.65 As William Hamilton (1788–1856) argued in 1833:

The Deductive and Inductive processes are elements of logic equally

essential. Each requires the other. The former is only possible through
the latter; and the latter is only valuable as realizing the possibility of
the former. As our knowledge commences with the apprehension of
singulars, every universal whole is consequently only a knowledge at
second-hand. Deductive reasoning is thus not an original and indepen-
dent process. The universal major proposition, out of which it developes
the conclusion, is itself necessarily the conclusion of a foregone Induc-
tion, and, mediately, or immediately, an inference—a collection, from
individual objects of perception, and consciousness. Logic, therefore, as
a definite and self-sufficient science, must equally vindicate the formal
purity of the synthetic illation, by which it ascends to its wholes, as the
analytic illation by which it re-descends to their parts.66

However, according to Mill, only induction involves “real” inference, that

is, inference from known truths to unknown, since ratiocination cannot
prove anything other than what is contained in the premises. Distinguishing
between the registering part and the inferring part of reasoning, Mill argued
that only the major premise of a syllogism can be thought as a product of
inference, but in reality, even that was merely an “intermediate halting-place
for the mind, interposed by an artifice of language between the real premises
and the conclusion”:

All reference is from particulars to particulars: General propositions are

merely registers of such inferences already made, and short formulae
for making more: The major premise of a syllogism, consequently, is
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