Berkeley on Abstraction and general terms

By Enrique Tamayo Torres

In the Introduction to the Principles of Human Understanding, Berkeley holds that the
difficulties of philosophical thought are due to the acceptance of erroneous principles.
Among them he highlights the doctrine of abstraction. He distinguish two different meanings
of this doctrine, admitting the possibility of abstraction understanding it like considering
some particular parts or qualities separated from others, like for example, imagining a door
separated from the rest of the house. But in opposition, he declines the possibility of
abstraction understanding it like the doctrine according to which the mind can form general
ideas by eliminating all the particular characteristics of objects. Like for example, imagining
a bird without conceiving him black, white, or with any particular color. Berkeley questions
this capacity, and considers that these supposed abstract ideas are philosophical fictions.​
This critique leads him to think about how to explain the use of general terms in thought and
language if abstract general ideas do not exist. The fragment we will analyze (Principles of
Human Understanding, Introduction, 11) is going to address this question.

In this passage, Berkeley begins by mentioning a statement by the philosopher John Locke,
according to which the faculty of abstraction is not only proper to the understanding of
humans, but also, it is this that defines the difference between people and wild animals. It is
important for understanding Locke’s argument to know his view on language and general
ideas. For Locke, general ideas come from ideas of particular things, which are obtained
through experience. Afterwards, certain characteristics of these particular ideas are abstracted
from the rest, thus giving rise to abstract and general ideas. Finally, these abstract ideas, when
associated with certain specific words, give rise to the general names we use in language.
Therefore, according to Locke’s reasoning, we can know that animals do not possess this
faculty of abstraction since we observe that they do not have any kind of language. And from
this observation we can deduce that they must lack the faculty to conceive abstract ideas
which, according to Locke, are the ones we associate with the general names of our language.
Berkeley considers correct the statement that wild animals are not capable of performing a
process of abstraction to conceive general ideas. However, he does not agree that this is what
distinguishes people from animals, since according to him, people are also not capable of
performing abstractions in that sense. Berkeley’s argument begins by describing Locke’s
argument, analyzing it under the following implication: “the use of words implies the
existence of general ideas which in turn implies that the men who use words are capable of
abstracting or generalizing their ideas” (this is due to the origin of general terms according to
Locke, which we have previously explained) (Berkeley, 1999, p.13).
Next, Berkeley, starting from the premise that this sense of the doctrine of abstraction is
incorrect (which we have explained in the introduction of this work, and which Berkeley
argues in fragment 10 of the introduction (Berkeley, 1999, p.11)) rejects that the use of
general terms implies this capacity of abstraction as Locke proposes, since this form of
abstraction is impossible.

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 Consequently, to explain the existence of general terms, after rejecting Locke’s proposal, he
introduces his second premise, on the true nature of general ideas. According to him, a word
becomes a general term, not by representing an abstract idea, but by equally representing a
multitude of ideas. For example, the word glass is not a general term because it represents the
abstract concept of a glass, stripped of any concrete property, but because it represents all the
ideas we may have of particular glasses. And this makes it general, insofar as it serves to
refer to each glass regardless of the specific color, the specific shape, and other characteristics
that each of them may have (Berkeley, 1999, p.13).
Based on these two premises, Berkeley is making it clear that the implication on which
Locke’s argument relies is not really true, since it is not valid to assume that the use of
language implies a capacity to abstract ideas, given that the general terms of language can
exist without needing to represent abstract ideas, but only by representing a broad set of
particular ideas.

Regarding its formal character, Berkeley’s argument seems logically valid to me. Assuming
that the premises from which it starts are correct, I consider that the conclusion necessarily
follows, which consists in denying the validity of Locke’s argument. Since Locke establishes
an implication, that is, a relation of necessity between the use of general terms and the
capacity for abstraction, this implication loses its logical validity at the moment it is denied
that this capacity for abstraction described by Locke is possible. Expressed in formal terms,
“A and not B” is incompatible with “A implies B”.
On the other hand, to evaluate the soundness of the argument, we also need to consider the
correctness of the premises. The first premise (that abstraction in the Lockean sense is
impossible) is based on the inability to form an idea that does not possess particular
characteristics, which in my opinion is quite reasonable, if it is accepted that every idea must
have concrete and particular content. That is, if we assume that each idea must be identified
with a concrete perception. This view of ideas is plausible, and personally seems quite logical
to me, but Berkeley seems to take it for granted and does not argue in its favor, leaving aside
the possibility that perhaps an idea does not always need to be identified with a concrete
perception.
An example of this would be to propose that the general idea of triangle could consist only in
the definition “a closed figure with three straight sides”, without needing to be linked to any
concrete image of an equilateral, isosceles, or scalene triangle. However, I do not consider
this to be a conclusive criticism of Berkeley’s position, since a much more extensive
discussion would be necessary about whether it would really be possible to form an idea of a
triangle consisting in such a definition that is truly not linked to any concrete image of a
triangle.
The second premise (that general terms do not need to represent abstract ideas, but function
as signs for multiple particular ideas) offers an alternative coherent with Berkeley’s doctrine.
However, we could question again whether it is really the only possible explanation as an
alternative to Locke’s doctrine of abstraction, or if a type of idea like the one we have
described previously could also be a possibility.

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 Therefore, regarding the correctness of the premises Berkeley uses, I consider them as
plausible and reasonable form Berkeley’s point of view, but as we have pointed out, they lack
complete justification to be accepted.
Because of all of this, I find Berkeley’s overall argument very interesting and valuable
insofar as it manages to question the necessity and certainty of Locke’s doctrine. Although it
must be pointed out that it is not, in itself, an absolutely secure and necessary proposal either.

Bibliography:

Berkeley, George (1999), Principles of Human Understanding and Three Dialogs. Oxford
University Press