Ellen Bos · Astrid Lorenz Editors

Politics and
Society in
Hungary
(De-)Democratization, Orbán and
the EU
Politics and Society in Hungary
Ellen Bos · Astrid Lorenz
Editors

Politics and Society in

Hungary
(De-)Democratization,
Orbán and the EU
Editors
Ellen Bos Astrid Lorenz
Chair of Comparative Politics with a Faculty of Social Sciences and
Focus on Central and Eastern Europe in Philosophy, Leipzig University
the EU, Andrássy University Budapest Leipzig, Germany
Budapest, Hungary

ISBN 978-3-658-39825-5 ISBN 978-3-658-39826-2 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2

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Contents

(De-)Democratization, Party Competition and Structural

Constraints in Hungary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Astrid Lorenz and Ellen Bos
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization
of Democratic Procedures in Hungary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Ellen Bos
The Agony of a Young Constitutional Democracy. The
Hungarian Constitution 1989 to 2019. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
András Jakab and Eszter Bodnár
Judicial Review and Politics in Hungary 1990–2018. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Kálmán Pócza
Traditional Social Cleavages and their Impact on the Hungarian
Party System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Melani Barlai
Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Zoltán Tibor Pállinger
Civil Society, Social Movements and Political Participation in
Hungary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Dániel Mikecz
The Political Economy of Hungary: Managing Structural
Dependency on the West. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Zoltán Pogátsa

V
VI Contents

Hungarian Foreign Policy 1990 to 2018: Europeanization without

Conviction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
András Hettyey
Hungary’s Self-Peripheralization in the European Union:
Background and Prospects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Dániel Hegedűs
Hungary’s Asylum and Migration Policy: Change in Three Stages. . . . . . 189
Paula Beger
Right-wing Populism and Freedom of Science in Viktor Orbán’s
Hungary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Márk Várszegi
Regional Policy in Hungary: Effects of EU Membership and
National Priorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Györgyi Nyikos
Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Prof. Dr. Ellen Bos is Vice-Rector for Research and Young Academics and Chair
of Comparative Politics with a Focus on Central and Eastern Europe in the EU at
Andrássy University Budapest.
Contact: [email protected]

Prof. Dr. Astrid Lorenz is Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Philoso-
phy and Professor of the Political System of Germany and Politics in Europe at
Leipzig University.
Contact: [email protected]

Contributors

Dr. Melani Barlai Andrássy University Budapest, Budapest, Hungary

Paula Beger Leipzig University, Leipzig, Germany
Dr. habil. Eszter Bodnár Ph.D. Eötvös-Loránd-University (ELTE), Budapest,
Hungary
Prof. Dr. Ellen Bos Andrássy University Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
Dr. Dániel Hegedűs German Marshall Fund of the United States, Berlin, Germany
Dr. habil. András Hettyey Ph.D. University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary
Prof. Dr. András Jakab University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria

VII
VIII Editors and Contributors

Prof. Dr. Astrid Lorenz Leipzig University, Leipzig, Germany

Dr. Dániel Mikecz Republikon Institute Budapest and Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
Dr. habil. Györgyi Nyikos Ph.D. University of Public Service, Budapest, Hun-
gary
Prof. Dr. habil. Zoltán Tibor Pállinger Andrássy University Budapest, Buda-
pest, Hungary
Dr. habil. Zoltán Pogátsa Ph.D. University of Sopron, Sopron, Hungary
Dr. habil. Kálmán Pócza Ph.D. Mathias Corvinus Collegium, University of
Public Service, Budapest, Hungary
Márk Várszegi Police Academy Hamburg/University of Applied Sciences,
Hamburg, Germany
(De-)Democratization, Party
Competition and Structural Constraints
in Hungary

Astrid Lorenz and Ellen Bos

1 Introduction

Hungary was one of the first socialist states to make a complete break with the
old system in 1989. In the 1970s and 1980s, the reform policy of the Hungarian
Socialist Workers’ Party had already led to a soft economic and political liberali-
zation. Later on, the political system underwent three major waves of institutional
reform, which are presented below.
Democratization started in 1989 with the Round Table negotiations. In con-
trast to almost all neighboring countries this was done without the adoption of a
new constitution, which often symbolically marks a new political beginning. The
Socialist Constitution of 1949 remained in force, but was subject to a total revi-
sion in several rounds. In fact, its content was almost completely changed. This
institutional rebuilding was based on perceived historical traditions and included
the import of foreign legal constructs. Its product was a parliamentary system of
government with a single-chamber parliament (Országgyűlés) and a dual execu-
tive, with executive power largely vested in the government responsible to the
parliament.

A. Lorenz (*) · E. Bos

Chair of Comparative Politics, Andrássy University Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: [email protected]
E. Bos
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 1

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_1
2 A. Lorenz and E. Bos

In order to ensure the separation of powers, a Constitutional Court based on

the German model was introduced and given extensive powers. The background
of the decision was the desire of the opposition to secure the reforms negotiated
at the Round Table even in the event of the Socialist Party eventually winning
the first democratic elections (Bos 2004, p. 239ff.). After its founding, the court
immediately took a self-confident stance, interpreting the constitutional text on
many issues that were merely vaguely regulated and also playing an important,
sometimes even activist role in shaping the new democratic system through its
jurisdiction. This was the case, for instance, when interpreting the powers of the
President of the Republic in the conflicts during the first democratic legislative
period from 1990 to 1994 between then President Árpád Göncz and the govern-
ment of József Antall. The conflicts were directed at the powers of the President
as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the foreign policy representation of
Hungary and in the appointment of important state offices.1 The Constitutional
Court was called upon by the government several times in the course of the dis-
putes. In its decisions on September 23, 1991 and June 8, 1992 it argued that the
constitution enshrined a parliamentary system and interpreted the presidential
competences restrictively (Brunner and Sólyom 1995, pp. 55ff., 107ff.; Majoros
1994). The decisions are examples of the fact that the Court’s rulings did not
always distinguish clearly between constitutional interpretation and constitution-
building.
The second major wave of institutional reforms followed in preparation of
accession to the European Union, which was completed in 2004. Hundreds
of pages of European law, the acquis communautaire, were incorporated into
national law. Since acceptance of the EU legal framework was a precondition for
accession, this is usually referred to as the EU conditionality policy. However, not
all details of the national policy were actually prescribed. The fact that there was
room for maneuver can be recognized from the fact that the constitutions of the
candidate countries and later EU Member States differ(ed) significantly, and that
the new arrangements for policy areas were not identical either. Which European
country provided administrative assistance via the twinning procedure and who
documented the progress on the EU side left a footprint as well. Typical, however,
were the particular role of the administration in this process and the pronounced

1 Specifically,it was about the possible use of the army in the so-called taxi drivers’ strike
in October 1990 and the representation of Hungary at a summit of the Visegrád states in
February 1991 as well as the appointment of the directors of public radio and television sta-
tions during the so-called “media war” (see Majoros 1994; O’Neil 1997, p. 209ff.).
(De-)Democratization, Party Competition and Structural … 3

will to join the EU, which pushed party-political differences about the content of
EU policy and its institutions into the background. This also promoted a rather
apolitical character of the national institutional reforms.
The third major wave of reforms was triggered by the “conservative revolu-
tion” under Fidesz-KDNP and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. This reconstruction
of the system has been taking place since 2010 and was directed at dismantling
democratic control mechanisms within the government system (especially curtail-
ing the independence of the judiciary as well as filling high positions with people
close to Fidesz) and outside the government system (limiting independent media
and civil society organizations). This illiberalism was not so much the result of a
coherent ideology on the part of the governing parties, but rather arose from their
desire for power and their ability to use their electoral supermajority to secure
and expand their influence in the long term. The dismantling of liberal liberties
and of the rule of law contradicts the values of the EU and thus resulted in the
well-known conflicts with the EU Commission and the EU Parliament as well as
in infringement proceedings before the European Court of Justice. The conflicts
culminated for the time being in the initiation of the Article 7 procedure in Sep-
tember 2018. This procedure can be started if there is “a clear risk of a serious
breach of the values referred to in Article 2 of the EU Treaty” in a Member State.
The character and sequence of these waves of institutional reform in Hungary
is not in line with the main assumptions of research on democratization in East
and Central Europe, which focus very strongly on the effect of formal institu-
tions. Corresponding theoretical considerations and models assumed more or
less explicitly a linear development towards a democracy that consolidates itself
in several steps. According to this theorizing, the initial institutional transforma-
tion influences the actors’ options for action, followed by the consolidation of the
actors of representative democracy – particularly the parties – who must abide
by the new law in order to govern and shape policies. The next stage is the con-
solidation of behavior of informal political actors as well. Finally, the attitudes
of society as a whole towards politics and the state, i.e. the political culture, but
also the actual behavior consolidate. It was also assumed that the accession to the
European Union as a community of values of democratic states supports and pro-
motes democratization.
In practice, institutions obviously had a much less determinant effect (see also
Krastev and Holmes 2020). Although the three stages of increased institutional
change in Hungary differed in their content, objectives and extent (changes in
the context of EU accession, for example, affected certain policies rather than the
system itself), they were all based on an instrumental, voluntaristic approach to
the constitution and legislation. Law has always been regarded as an i­nstrument
4 A. Lorenz and E. Bos

of political action and has been amended or supplemented without extensive

political deliberation. In this understanding, coming to power through elections is
the central act of legitimation of democracy, the binding force of law a secondary
one. Reaching agreement across parties or government–opposition lines was also
hardly possible or not a priority.
After 1989, the political camps have alternated regularly in government, and
domestic politics has been highly polarized rhetorically. In the immediate democ-
ratization phase, the MSZP, which emerged in October 1989 as a reform-oriented
successor party from the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, ruled temporarily.
After the first free elections in the spring of 1990, it was replaced by a Christian
conservative coalition of MDF, FKGP and KDNP. It was followed in 1994 by a
social-democratic-liberal government consisting of MSZP and SZDSZ. Starting
in 1998, the government was formed by a conservative coalition of Fidesz, FKGP
and MDF. After that, a social-democratic-liberal coalition of MSZP and SZDSZ
was reelected for two terms. Since 2010, the Christian-conservative coalition of
Fidesz and KDNP has been in office, winning four general elections with a two-
thirds majority.
Contrary to key assumptions of comparative policy studies and party research,
these changes in the party composition of governments did not result in dif-
ferent outputs in some core areas of policy. Economic, foreign and European
policy in particular are characterized by remarkable constants. Thus the basic
lines of Hungarian foreign policy formulated under the first democratic govern-
ment (accession to the EU and NATO, representing minority rights of Hungar-
ians living abroad, good relations with neighboring states) are undisputed across
camp boundaries; differences exist mainly with regard to the hierarchy of these
goals. The differences in government action and rhetorical conflicts instead have
focused on institutional issues of maintaining power in domestic politics as well
as on media policy and the relationship between politics and society.
The Hungarian population has supported these developments in different
ways. Since 1990, voter turnout has ranged from 61.7 (2014) to 70.5% (2002),
with an outlier of 56.3% in 1998, when Fidesz won a majority of direct man-
dates for the first time and gained government responsibility. While this provides
legitimacy to the parties in power (despite the high disproportion between votes
and mandates, as created by the electoral system), confidence in the national gov-
ernment has been very low. According to representative Eurobarometer surveys
conducted since 2004, its lowest points were from 2006 to 2009, when only 13
(2008) to a maximum of 27% (spring 2007) of respondents expressed confidence
in the Hungarian government. Amongst other factors, this was caused by the
“Őszöd speech” of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány to his Hungarian Socialist
(De-)Democratization, Party Competition and Structural … 5

Trust in...
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
01-10-2004
01-06-2005
01-02-2006
01-10-2006
01-06-2007
01-02-2008
01-10-2008
01-06-2009
01-02-2010
01-10-2010
01-06-2011
01-02-2012
01-10-2012
01-06-2013
01-02-2014
01-10-2014
01-06-2015
01-02-2016
01-10-2016
01-06-2017
01-02-2018
01-10-2018
01-06-2019
naonal gvt. - EU-wide naonal gvt. - Hungary
EU - EU-wide EU - Hungary
nat. judiciary - EU-wide nat. judiciary - Hungary

Fig. 1 Trust in national government, judiciary and the EU in Hungary and EU-wide, 2004
to 2019. Source of data Directorate-General for Communication (ed.), Eurobarometer
62–91, EU Open Data Portal. https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/home (retrieved April 15,
2020)

Party at its 2006 party congress as well as by a financial crisis. Confidence in

the national judiciary has long been continuously about ten to over twenty points
above trust in government, but correlated strongly with it overall.2 The Pearson
correlation coefficient for the period 2004 to 2019 was 0.88. It is only in recent
years that confidence in the government has recovered and almost reached the
level of confidence in the judiciary (Fig. 1).
For a long time, trust in the European Union has been much higher than
trust in national institutions. The highest level was reached in 2006, when 70%
of those interviewed in the Eurobarometer survey said they trusted the EU.
After that, scores fell, but even in 2019, about half of respondents still trusted
the EU institutions – slightly more than the proportion who trusted the national
government and the national judiciary. This is despite the fact that the Fidesz-
KDNP government had been extremely critical of the EU institutions for several
years. For example, in the context of regular public conflicts with the European

2 Confidencein the judiciary is not always surveyed in Eurobarometer surveys. Therefore,

some data points are missing here.
6 A. Lorenz and E. Bos

­ ommission and the European Parliament on the rule of law in Hungary and EU
C
asylum policy, the government had launched a large-scale “Stop Brussels!” cam-
paign.
All the phenomena described above show that Hungary as a deviant case is
a particularly promising object of study for theory-building regarding democ-
racy and democratization, regarding the effect of institutions on political action,
as well as regarding the actual impact of EU integration on EU member states,
i.e. the phenomenon of Europeanization or de-Europeanization. As an EU mem-
ber state in the heart of Europe, the country is also relevant for understanding
the functioning and range of political systems in Europe and for contextualizing
studies of other political systems. Not least of all, Hungary has been the focus
of critical political observation and media coverage since Viktor Orbán came to
power, due to its domestic political development and EU-skeptical attitude, as
well as its new foreign policy interest in the East. This edited volume contributes
to research in all three areas by conveying a deeper knowledge of politics and
society in Hungary: to the analysis and evaluation of developments in the country
itself and Hungary’s position in the EU, to comparative studies, and to the empiri-
cal foundation of theory formation.

2 Hungary in Research

Interestingly enough, despite the theoretically unexpected deterioration in the

quality of Hungary’s democracy, fewer English-language publications on its
political system have been published since 2013 than before (Fig. 2).
In terms of content, research on the political system of Hungary has followed
the general trend of political science research on Eastern and Central Europe and
reflects the sketched phases of political development since 1989. In the 1990s, the
focus was on the processes of breaking with the socialist system and of democra-
tization. Numerous studies were published on the negotiated change of the system
(e.g. Tölgyessy 1992) as well as on the genesis and structure of the new constitu-
tional basis (e.g. Bos 2004; Halmai 1996; Szoboszlai 1991) and the electoral sys-
tem (Benoit 1996). In this context, interest was also focused on the role of the
elites in the system change and the remaining of the former elites in the new sys-
tem (e.g. Pállinger 1997).3 This was supplemented by work on the formation of

3A good overview is given by Bozóki 2002.

(De-)Democratization, Party Competition and Structural … 7

45000

40000

35000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Fig. 2 Number of academic publications on the Hungarian political system in English,

1990 to 2019. Indicated is the number of Google Scholar hits for “political system Hun-
gary”, international.4

the party system (e.g. Ágh 1994; Segert and Machos 1995) and the establishment
of new values and norms (Szelényi et al. 1996; Rose 1997). In addition, the estab-
lishment and consolidation of the central political institutions, such as Parliament
(Ágh 1995), Government, President of the Republic (Ágh 1996) and the Consti-
tutional Court (Halmai 1995; Schwartz 1998) were examined. Hungary has also
regularly been included in comparative studies (Linz and Stepan 1996; White et al.
1993; Rüb 1994; Grotz 2000) in this area. The country was regarded as a model of
successful democratization at that time, and its political and representative institu-
tions appeared to be particularly stable compared to other countries in the region.
Before and after Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004, the necessary pro-
cesses of adaptation to the EU legal acquis (acquis communautaire) and the
Europeanization of the political system became another central research topic
(cf. e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmayer 2005; Andor 2000). Studies on
the ­Europeanization of the governmental apparatus (Lippert et al. 2001), the

4 According to Google, each is an “approximate number.”

8 A. Lorenz and E. Bos

­administration (Goetz 2001), the regions (Sturm and Dieringer 2005; Hughes
et al. 2005), the political process (Ágh 1999) and other elements of the political
system were produced.
From the mid-2000s onwards, interest turned more strongly to questions of
democratic quality. The background to this were the increasingly obvious func-
tional deficits in the supposedly consolidated democratic system. Accordingly,
such deficits were highlighted and the factors responsible for the incomplete
unfolding and implementation of democracy discussed (Rupnik 2007; Mungiu-
Pippidi 2007; Krastev 2007; Ilonszki and Lengyel 2009, Schöpflin 2009). The
“deficits” that were uncovered have often been analyzed under the headline of the
“post-accession crisis” (e.g. Dieringer 2009). As a cause of the functional deficits,
legacies from the communist era were identified (e.g. Seleny 2007), which led
to a greater involvement with the “legacies” of socialism and previous historical
characteristics. In addition, the long-term effectiveness of EU accession condi-
tionality was viewed more skeptically (e.g. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2001).
After the 2010 elections and the beginning of systemic restructuring under the
Orbán government, processes of deconsolidation of Hungarian democracy have
been in the spotlight (Rupnik 2012; Kréko and Enyedi 2018; Bogaards 2018;
Sapper and Weichsel 2011). Particular attention is paid to constitutional policy –
in particular to the adoption and content of the new Basic Law and the numerous
constitutional amendments – as well as the restriction of the Constitutional Court
(Bánkuti et al. 2012; Scheppele 2013; Bos and Pócza 2014; Tóth 2017; Drinóczi
and Bień-Kacała 2019). In addition, an intensive examination of the conceptual
foundations of the “Orbán system” has been taking place (Pap 2018; Kovács and
Trencsényi 2019). Many authors try to classify the type of government that has
arisen. On the one hand, they resort to established concepts – such as “illiberal”
or “defect” democracy, populism (Pappas 2014; Antal 2017) or “hybrid” regimes
(Gyulai 2017) – and on the other hand, many new terms have been created (cf.
the overview by Bos in this volume).
A current comprehensive presentation of the Hungarian political system in
English is lacking. While there was a significant temporary increase in the num-
ber of articles on Hungary after 2010, each of these focused on specific aspects of
the system. This is also the case for the most recent volumes published in English
by Pap (2018) and Körösényi, Illés and Gyulai (2020). An overview of various
aspects of the systemic transformation pursued under the Orbán government is
provided by a volume published by Kovács and Trencsényi (2019).
The situation is different in Hungarian. In this context, particular reference
should be made to the 2015 publication “The Hungarian Political System – A
Quarter of a Century On” (A magyar politikai rendszer - negyedszázad után),
(De-)Democratization, Party Competition and Structural … 9

published by András Körösényi, in which all the central areas of the political sys-
tem are covered in detail. The volume on trends in Hungarian politics by Boda
and Szabó in 2017 also contains contributions on the political system, the main
parties, participation and governance. Finally, the journal Politiktudományi Sze-
mle (“Political Science Review”) also features regular articles on the development
of the political system. Due to the language barrier, these publications are only
accessible to a few international readers. The present volume therefore fills an
important gap.

3 Structure and Key Findings of the Volume

This volume provides a profound insight into the political system and the devel-
opment of democracy in Hungary since 1989. The focus is on the system of gov-
ernment and constitutional policy, society (the party system, civil society and
social movements), foreign and European policy, and other selected policy areas
(economic policy, regional policy, asylum and refugee policy, science policy).
The contributions explain key characteristics and their connection to the EU, they
trace important lines of development over the past decades, and they classify the
findings in comparison with other states.
Together, the contributions paint a picture of a country polarized by domes-
tic politics and characterized by illiberal policies since 2010, with a weak civil
society. A country whose foreign and economic policies are far less influenced
by party competition and conflict than domestic policies. The reasons for this
include structural constraints (being a small country, strong dependence on for-
eign investment). Rhetorically, the Orbán governments since 2010 have sought
to distance themselves from the entire post-1989 phase, advocating conservative,
sovereignty- and community-oriented policies, but in practice, they have been
deviating less from the policies of previous governments than suggested. In many
policy areas, an instrumental use of power and structural constraints dominate
over consistent ideology or socialization as potential factors of explanation.
In her contribution, Ellen Bos shows in more detail that the fundamental
restructuring of the political system pursued by the Orbán government since 2010
does not – as is often assumed – represent a complete break with previous devel-
opments, but rather reinforces preexisting functional problems. After 1990, the
new democratic system in Hungary was quickly formally consolidated, but there
were functional deficits in the democratic institutional structure and in the behav-
ior of the political elites. This included the increasing polarization of political
competition and consequently denying political opponents’ legitimacy. Secondly,
10 A. Lorenz and E. Bos

there has been a gradual shift of power in favor of the executive. It was supported
by the high disproportionality as produced by the electoral system, which encour-
aged the formation of a parliamentary majority and the emergence of a bipolar
party system. The functional deficits took on a new, dramatic quality with the
two-thirds majority achieved by the Fidesz-KDNP government in 2010, because
this landslide victory created the basis for a largely unrestrained centralization of
power in the executive, the unimpeded enforcement of the majority principle, and
the monopolization of political representation by Fidesz-KDNP.
In their contribution to constitutional policy, András Jakab and Eszter Bodnár
underline the voluntarist approach to the law and the importance of taking over for-
eign elements of law. Already the first written constitution of Hungary of 1949 pre-
sented a transfer of law (in this case forced) and an instrumental use of law. It tied
the access to rights to the fulfilling of duties. After 1989, the newly founded Consti-
tutional Court often adopted Western European, especially German, interpretations
of law. Although formally new, the constitution adopted in 2011 with the votes of
the governing coalition retained much of the text of the previous constitution. It also
includes a liberal catalogue of fundamental rights. Fidesz and KDNP partly neutral-
ized the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court by making legal provisions that
had failed before the Court part of the constitution itself. Fixing important decisions
in the constitution or in the “cardinal laws”, which can only be changed by a two-
thirds majority, generally helps to provide them a permanent status.
In his contribution on the Constitutional Court, Kálmán Pócza refutes com-
mon narratives about its role in the political system. This refers to the positive
assessment that the court, endowed with extensive competences, effectively coun-
terweighted the governing majorities as a courageous and activist actor and a
guardian and further developer of Hungarian democracy. This assessment is wide-
spread in Hungarian legal studies. The author also rejects the critical assessment by
the Fidesz-KDNP governments that the court had overused its formal competences
and had restricted the leeway of the democratically elected governing majority
too much. Rather, empirical data showed that the performance of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court was rather average in a regional comparison. Moreover, until
2010, the court had predominantly sought dialogue with the legislature in the case
of laws found to be unconstitutional and had relied on milder forms of sanctions
than annulment of the legal norm. Furthermore, the court had already been a thor-
oughly politicized body before 2010. The difference lies in the extent to which the
practice of constitutional jurisdiction has become politicized, which has increased
significantly since 2010. Adding to that, party logics had become the dominant pat-
tern of judicial decisions. According to the author, this tendency was reinforced by
the right-wing conservative majority achieved in the court.
(De-)Democratization, Party Competition and Structural … 11

In his contribution on direct democracy, Zoltán Pállinger illuminates how

Hungary’s representative political system with its strong inclination to a majori-
tarian system and the increasing polarization between political forces affected the
design and practice of referendums. Both factors have led to the failure to create a
political sphere in which political issues can be discussed independently of party
politics. Therefore, the referendum campaigns further exacerbated the existing
division of political forces. This environment contributed to the instrumentalizing
of direct democracy by the (governing) political elites, who used referendums pri-
marily to mobilize their supporters. The dominance of the Fidesz-KDNP govern-
ments since 2010 has further accentuated this tendency in an increasingly illiberal
environment.
In her contribution, Melani Barlai shows how strongly the Hungarian party
system is shaped by historical cleavages that emerged in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries already as a result of industrialization and the national revolution.
Since then, the contrasts between urbanists and agrarian populists or between tra-
ditionalists and “Westernizers” have structured the political conflicts. While the
traditionalists and agrarian populists represented Christian national values and
promised to preserve national traditions and values, the urbanists and “Westerniz-
ers” advocated liberal and Western values and, consequently, Europeanization and
globalization. After 1989, party competition was initially determined by the trans-
formation conflict between supporters and opponents of the old socialist regime.
However, since the 1994 parliamentary elections the traditional antagonisms
between advocates of national-particularist or international-cosmopolitan values
and norms have proven to be the defining cleavage. Both the newly founded lib-
eral parties, such as SZDSZ and Fidesz, and the historical parties, such as MSZP,
FKGP and KDNP, fitted into the bipolar conflict structure. After the upheaval of
the party system in 2010, the new parties, such as Jobbik, LMP and DK, also
positioned themselves along the existing main lines of conflict.
Dániel Mikecz points out that the low level of formal organization of Hungar-
ian civil society and its fragmentation into actors with very different concerns,
understanding of roles and financing are important context conditions for politi-
cal development. Nonpolitical leisure activities and informal nonprofit work domi-
nate. NGOs dealing with environmental protection, feminism, minority rights and
peace issues work in an expert and project-oriented manner and have professional-
ized fundraising rather than membership recruitment. Under Fidesz-KDNP, social
activities are supported by the state if they serve the realization of the ­common
good. Their national unity and the partnership and division of labor with the gov-
ernment are other important funding concerns. Since NGOs see themselves as
watchdogs that are critical of the government and are often supported by foreign
12 A. Lorenz and E. Bos

countries or the EU, their relationship with the government is marked by tensions.
It finally resulted in a law prescribing that foreign funding above a certain level
has to be made public. Government and opposition parties, which all have a rather
low membership rate, seek to establish good contacts with organizations that have
similar objectives to strengthen their ties to the society. A protest culture emerged
which includes radical right-wing actors, who were especially present in the 2000s,
as well as burgeoning and then rapidly disappearing single-issue movements.
More concrete structuring effects on the governments’ policy options result
from Hungary’s dependence on foreign direct investment. According to Zol-
tán Pogátsa, governments since 1986 have responded to this situation with a
strong liberalization, deregulation and opening towards the West. They were
in direct competition with their East Central European neighbors for the lowest
labor costs and taxes, the weakest rights for trade unions to have a say, the low-
est environmental requirements and the highest levels of state aid. Despite these
efforts, employment rates, wages and upward social mobility, among other things,
remained at very low levels compared to Western economies. Particularly under
the socialist-liberal governments, this contrasted with their social program. All the
while, the national debt rate was rising. Dissatisfaction with this situation paved
the way for the election of Fidesz in 2010 and the collapse of the former ruling
parties. The party had previously announced a new economic model, but then devi-
ated little from the strategy of previous governments. A novelty in certain sectors
was the granting of state licenses and public contracts to Hungarian entrepreneurs
in the Prime Minister’s entourage, which, according to Pogátsa, contributed to the
emergence of a “national bourgeoisie.” Major EU-funded infrastructure projects,
tax relief for high- and middle-income groups and increases in the minimum wage
were added. Favorable economic development contributed to higher wages and
a falling unemployment rate. Although convergence with the West has not been
achieved yet and a middle class has not emerged, these improvements have helped
to mobilize support for the government despite its policies in other domains.
András Hettyey illustrates the many serious uncertainties that arose for Hun-
gary after 1989 as a result of the disintegration of three of its previously five
neighboring states (Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) as well
as of wars and domestic crises in its immediate regional environment. After the
negotiation of the Soviet troop withdrawal and the dissolution of the Warsaw
Pact, accession to the EU and NATO and developing good relations with the
new neighboring states were important concerns. Unlike in certain constitutional
issues, there was cross-party consensus on this, according to Hettyey. Western
integration in particular, apart from the right-wing spectrum, was perceived as
having no alternative in historical and economic terms and was also promoted
(De-)Democratization, Party Competition and Structural … 13

by the successor party to the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, the MSZP –
including participation in NATO operations in Yugoslavia. This shows a parallel
to the weak effects of party competition on economic policy. Only with regard
to the treatment of the 2.7 million Hungarians living abroad did the post-1989
governments take different positions. Otherwise, the dominant mode was that
of “downloading” EU or NATO policy without great domestic controversy, but
also without the possibility of influencing policy by “uploading” one’s own posi-
tions. After its accession to NATO and the EU, Hungary remained largely passive
in these organizations and rarely expressed dissenting positions. However, as a
recipient country it profited considerably from EU membership and participated
in NATO missions (again also under socialist-liberal governments). The Orbán
governments after 2010 tried to distance themselves from this whole post-1989
phase. In an environment of diminishing integration euphoria (see above), they
pursued a sovereign, non-normative foreign policy, which combined a continued,
often smooth implementation of EU policies with public conflicts in areas such as
EU asylum policy and intensified Visegrád cooperation in East Central Europe.
The “opening to the East” in addition to Western integration was also new.
In his in-depth analysis of Hungary’s European policy, Dániel Hegedűs
speaks of the change from the role of a “euphoric policy taker” to a “pragmatic
disruptor” characterized by post-accession fatigue. After a period of passivity,
which Hettyey observed, the country was becoming increasingly isolated under
the Orbán governments. This is not so much due to purely EU issues, in which
Hungary more often than not cooperates and contributes – e.g. with the adoption
of a Danube Strategy, the policy towards the Balkans and the European Roma
Strategy. Instead, the problems are caused mainly by the government’s illiberal
domestic politics. In a European Union which defines itself as a community of
values composed by democratic Member States, Hungary is increasingly being
criticized, having sanctions imposed, and causing infringement proceedings. Evi-
dently, domestic and foreign policy can no longer be clearly separated in the EU’s
multilevel system. There has been an escalation of rhetoric, including the “Stop
Brussels!” anti-EU campaigns in Hungary mentioned above.
Dániel Hegedűs also shows how Hungary pursues specific interests, which do
not vary greatly from one government to another, in different policy areas that
are intensively regulated at EU level. It is opposed to joining and deepening the
eurozone in order to maintain national fiscal and economic policies. In cohesion
policy, it is interested in maintaining the high transfer payments, which are also
important for securing the support of relevant stakeholder groups at the domes-
tic level through the licensing and contracting activities mentioned above. In the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, it is committed to the Western Balkans, but
14 A. Lorenz and E. Bos

also to Eastern neighboring countries and Asia. The Hungarian governments were
critical of the EU’s Russia sanctions, mainly because of energy policy considera-
tions, but did not veto them in the Council. In asylum policy, on the other hand,
they have refused any compromise or further EU integration in recent years.
In her contribution to asylum and migration policy, Paula Beger states that the
position taken by the Orbán governments since 2015 against a common European
asylum and migration policy represented a break. Initially, the majority of respec-
tive EU framework regulations had been adopted. The Comprehensive Migration
Strategy, adopted almost ten years after EU accession, shaped Hungary’s national
policy as part of the Common Asylum and Migration System of the EU. As a result
of the 2015 European migrant crisis, the Hungarian government then carried out a
fundamental reorientation of its policy. In rapid succession, it enacted restrictive
laws and decrees, thus taking a position against the European Commission and, in
particular, against a Europe-wide distribution of migrants. However, regardless of
this change, the issue of migration had already been debated and regulated before
with regard to security concerns. While the initial focus was on reducing illegal
immigration and combating organized crime, since 2015 the priority has been on
combating terrorism and protecting Hungarian identity and culture, as well as safe-
guarding jobs. Even though the Hungarian government successfully instrumental-
ized the issue of migration to mobilize support for its policies, this only led to a
partial politicization of the policy area, since the other parties hardly reacted to it
with alternative positions. This is also because the Fidesz-KDNP policy is in line
with attitudes towards migration in the population (cf. Pickel and Öztürk 2021).
In his contribution on science policy in Hungary, Márk Várszegi shows how
the right-wing populist ideology and the illiberal concept of the state under Orbán
affect the practice of science. He stresses that the government and the parliamen-
tary majority of Fidesz and KDNP have also expanded their control and influ-
ence in this area. On the one hand, the government fundamentally intervened in
the structure of higher education institutions by modifying the Higher Education
Act; on the other hand, it eliminated the autonomy of academic institutions. The
latter particularly concerned the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In addition,
case-by-case actions were taken against individual elements of the science sys-
tem that were critical to government policy or were incompatible with Fidesz’s
world view. This primarily affected the private Central European University and
gender studies. In addition, the preference for applied sciences with “measurable”
benefits to society has led to a redistribution of resources. In this context, sciences
and courses of study with allegedly low “market value” – such as humanities and
social sciences – have been systematically deprived of funding.
(De-)Democratization, Party Competition and Structural … 15

György Nyikos describes the development of Hungarian regional policy

before and after EU accession, which is characterized by significant institutional
changes in the approach to governance and the management of EU funds. During
the comprehensive economic, political and social transformation that began after
the collapse of the socialist political system and in preparation for integration into
the structures of the EU, state intervention to overcome regional disparities was
not on the transformation agenda. There was also no comprehensive public-law
planning basis. As regional disparities widened in the early 1990s, regional policy
focused mainly on crisis management. In Hungary, regionalization and decentral-
ization as triggered by EU regional policy in other countries failed to materialize.
The attempt to establish a territorially decentralized planning and development
administration system failed and a centralized system was established. In the
early EU planning periods, Hungary was characterized by a high absorption rate
and a low level of irregularities and corrections. Over time, however, the perfor-
mance and quality of the EU fund management system has declined significantly.
Therefore, Hungarian regional policy will probably continue to be marked by
centralized solutions in the future.

4 Conclusion, Open Questions and Research

Perspectives

For almost two decades after the system change, Hungary was regarded as a
model example of successful democratization and rapid integration into the West-
ern system of values and organizations by academics, politicians and the media.
Since 2010, this assessment has changed fundamentally. On the contrary, under
the governments led by Viktor Orbán, Hungary has since become a particularly
striking example of illiberal policies and the erosion of a democratic institutional
system. The chapters in this volume contribute to an understanding of this contra-
dictory development. They show that 2010 marked a less dramatic turning point
than often depicted – firstly, because the relevant framework conditions and fea-
tures of the policy were already in place and, secondly, because certain character-
istics and positions of the opposition and NGOs are sometimes less different from
those of the ruling parties than is sometimes assumed.
Party competition, for example, was already characterized by a strong polari-
zation before 2010, which not only prevented the formation of compromises
across the party camps, but also called into question the legitimacy of the politi-
cal opponent per se. Thus, regardless of their political orientation, actors exhibit
constants in attitudes and behavior. In addition to anti-pluralist ideas, this
16 A. Lorenz and E. Bos

also includes, as many contributions show, a tendency towards an instrumental

approach to law, including the constitution. The two-thirds majority of Orbán’s
government, which is already in its third consecutive legislative term, has dra-
matically exacerbated these existing functional deficits of the democratic system.
However, what international observers often underestimate is that despite polari-
zation and mutual delegitimization of the opponents, central foreign and eco-
nomic policy principles are undisputed across the camps.
The speed and manner of the rapid deconsolidation of the previously suppos-
edly consolidated democracy in Hungary fundamentally call into question the
widespread assessments of the 1990s and early 2000s. Obviously, they painted an
overly optimistic picture of the Hungarian transformation. The reported processes
of change in the behavior and value orientations of political actors and the popu-
lation proved to be at least to some extent shallow and not sustainable. Perhaps
an overly deterministic perspective of transformation research, which sees the
democratization of authoritarian systems primarily as an adaptation to a stylized
Western model of liberal democracy, also contributed to this misjudgment. It led
also to a belated recognition of the domestic changes that Hungary has undergone
following its accession to the EU.
In general, the approach of viewing democratization processes as a catch-up
transfer or copy-and-paste of Western institutions and procedures has proven to
be inadequate. In this perspective, functional problems were interpreted primarily
as defects of the young democracies that still had to be overcome. However, in
order to understand the deconsolidation of Hungarian democracy, it is not enough
to take account of the deviations from the Western model. Research is faced with
the task of better understanding the functioning of the political system – in par-
ticular the patterns of legitimation and representation – and of defining the regime
more precisely in typological terms. This may also require further theoretical-
conceptual adjustments, which have been intensively discussed against the back-
drop of global system development since the turn of the millennium.
The question of the long-term stability of the regime that emerged under the
Orbán government is also unresolved. After more than a decade in government,
Fidesz-KDNP continues to dominate the political contest in Hungary virtually
unchallenged. The opposition has not yet succeeded in presenting itself as an
effective alternative that is attractive to broad sections of society. Why has the
opposition not developed (stable) joint forms of action, programmatic alternatives
and argumentation vis-à-vis Fidesz-KDNP over the years, despite positions that
sometimes overlap in content?
In addition, the discrepancy between the government’s anti-EU stance and the
pro-EU stance of the Hungarian people is puzzling and needs to be explored even
(De-)Democratization, Party Competition and Structural … 17

more intensively in the future. How does the enduring confirmation of Orbán in the
elections fit in with the voters’ positive attitude towards Hungary’s EU member-
ship and their high confidence in the EU institutions?5 More in-depth comparisons
with other East Central European states that show similar unexpected de-democra-
tization tendencies – such as the Czech Republic (Lorenz and Formánková 2020) –
could provide additional insights to answer the open questions.
However, it is also clear that the conditions for future research on politics
and society in Hungary may deteriorate: restrictions do not seem to be out of the
question. Should the pressure on critical social scientists continue to increase,
they might find themselves forced to not even put certain topics on their research
agenda for career or political reasons. Analyses carried out exclusively by for-
eign researchers are not a viable alternative, but they may also face problems in
obtaining independent information if there are further restrictions on independent
media in Hungary.
A look at the worldwide debate on problems and the future of liberal democ-
racy reveals that the analysis of the Hungarian political system from a political
science perspective is not only relevant for Hungarian and Eastern European
studies. Illiberal tendencies, such as the erosion of checks and balances and the
restriction of minority rights, but also personalization and populism, as well as
the emergence, functioning and stability of hybrid regimes and those that defy
adequate description by current scholarly typologies, should be of the greatest
interest to democracy research and comparative politics as a whole.

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Prof. Dr. Astrid Lorenz is Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Philosophy and
Professor of the Political System of Germany and Politics in Europe at Leipzig University
Contact: [email protected]

Prof. Dr. Ellen Bos is Vice-Rector for Research and Young Academics and Professor of
Comparative Politics with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe in the EU at Andrássy
University Budapest.
Contact: [email protected]
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy
and Instrumentalization of Democratic
Procedures in Hungary

Ellen Bos

1 Introduction

Hungary was considered the liberal exception among socialist countries and,
together with Poland, was one of the pioneers of democratic reform in the Eastern
Bloc. After the collapse of the socialist system, the country acquired the reputa-
tion of being a model of a successful political transition and a rapid democratic
consolidation. Hungary's accession to the European Union in 2004 appeared to
be the final proof of the successful transition to democracy and a market economy
and the integration into the Western system.
After the parliamentary elections of 2010, in which the conservative Alli-
ance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, Fidesz1) under Vik-
tor Orbán in an electoral alliance with the small Christian Democratic People's
Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP) had achieved a landslide victory,
the assessment of Hungary fundamentally changed. The restructuring of the polit-
ical system that was initiated by the Orbán government at high speed after the

1 Since 2003, the party name has been supplemented by the abbreviation MPP (Magyar
Polgári Szövetség, Hungarian Civic Union).

E. Bos (*)
Professor of Comparative Politics with a Focus an Central and Eastern Europe
in the EU, Andrássy University Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 21

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_2
22 E. Bos

election victory met with fierce criticism both in Hungary and in Western media
­coverage (see, for example, Kahlweit 2010; Tenbrock 2011). Since then, it is
being argued that the reforms implemented by the Hungarian government violate
the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law and lead to a loss
of democratic quality. The well-known Hungarian writer György Konrád already
said in December 2010 that there could “no longer be any talk of democracy” in
Hungary and that Orbán would destroy democracy (Kolb 2010). Quite similarly,
the Hungarian Prime Minister was already accused in a debate in the European
Parliament in January 2011 of leading Hungary from democracy to totalitarian-
ism (Truttmann 2011).
The critical assessment of the Orbán government’s transformation of the polit-
ical system was also reflected negatively in the rankings of the relevant democ-
racy indices.2 And also in scientific analyses, the voices prevail that observe a
blatant decline in democratic quality in Hungary. These analysis carried out in
political and legal sciences unanimously identify an erosion or undermining of
democratic institutions and procedures. Hungary is no longer considered as a
model of successful democratization, but as an example of democratic “backslid-
ing” or a return to authoritarianism (cf. e.g. Herman 2016; Uitz 2019).
The following article will shed light on the contradictory development of Hun-
garian democracy after the regime change. Based on an analysis of the transfor-
mation of Hungary’s political system after 1989, it is shown that 2010 does not
represent a complete break in the development, but rather that the already existing
functional problems of Hungarian democracy have been exacerbated due to the
changed majority situation. Subsequently, the restructuring of the political sys-
tem since 2010 will be examined and the essential elements of the“Orbán system”
will be identified, in particular the instruments of governance and the ideological
basis. The third part shows how differently the politics under Orbán are evaluated
by political science, followed by a summary of the central findings.

2 Cf.e.g. the Freedom in the World Index (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world)

and the Nations in Transit Index (https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit) by Free-
dom House or the Bertelsmann Transformations Index (https://bti-project.org/en/home.
html?&cb=00000).
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 23

2 The Political Development Before 2010—

Pioneer of Democratization, But Deficits
in Implementation

2.1 The Negotiated Regime Change in 1989

In the 1980s, Hungary was known as the “funniest barrack” in the socialist camp,
and its system was also referred to as“goulash communism.” These metaphors
emphasize that after the bloody suppression of the national uprising against the
communist regime by Soviet troops in 1956 and a subsequent period of retalia-
tion, a more pragmatic domestic policy with milder forms of rule gradually pre-
vailed in Hungary. Under the leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
(Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP), János Kádár, the slogan “Whoever is
not against us is for us” became the maxim of governance. Not only was the with-
drawal into private life and political abstinence allowed to citizens, but they also
received a number of so-called “little freedoms” over time, such as the opportu-
nity to travel regularly to (Western) countries. This was added to by a liberal cul-
tural policy (see Swain 1993, p. 67; Brunner 1981, p. 223).
Against the background of this “repressive tolerance” of the Kádár era, a
“latent pluralism” arose from which later a regime opposition emerged (Szabó
1991, p. 63). Kádár's reform policy were initially limited to experiments with
economic and social reforms that were intended to help the regime gain legiti-
macy through better fulfillment of consumer desires. These policies were supple-
mented by political reforms in the early 1980s. Even before the regime change of
1989, a strong reform wing within the MSZMP set in motion a liberalization of
the political system. As part of this policy, for example, a Council for Constitu-
tional Law was introduced in 1983, and competitive elements were integrated into
the electoral system (cf. Bos 2004, p. 228 ff.).
As the economic situation deteriorated in the mid-1980s, the legitimacy of the
Kádár regime was increasingly called into question. This was the background for
the emergence of a variety of opposition movements that gradually transformed into
parties. Historic parties such as the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)
and the Party of Independent Small Farmers (Független Kisgazdapárt, FKGP) were
also re-established. At the same time, the reformers in the socialist MSZMP became
stronger. They set in motion a liberalization of the political system, which also
included intensive work on a draft of a new constitution (ibid., p. 230 ff.)
The second phase of the regime change began in the spring of 1989, when
the MSZMP gave up its monopoly on power and began talks with representatives
24 E. Bos

of the opposition. The political reforms were no longer decided in circles of the
Communist Party, but were negotiated between representatives of the MSZMP
and the opposition at the so-called “National Round Table”. The reforms were to
be based on a broad societal consensus (ibid., p. 239 ff.).
With regard to the design of the new government system, the introduction of
a democratic parliamentary system was undisputed. The head of state was to be
a president (previously president of the presidential council), although the ques-
tion of how the state president should be appointed and with which competences
the office should be equipped became a central conflict in the negotiations. The
basis for the agreement finally reached on 18 September 1989, was the cooperation
between the moderate representatives of the opposition and the reformers of the
MSZMP. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum; MDF),
which brought together moderate members of the opposition, had assumed the role
of a mediator between the radical opposition and the MSZMP (ibid., p. 244 ff.).
The negotiated “democracy package”, which contained a comprehensive
revision of the constitution, was passed by Parliament with an overwhelming
majority in October 1989. The constitutional revision came into force on the anni-
versary of the 1956 national uprising, on 23 October 1989. Although it was for-
mally only a modification of the existing socialist constitution from 1949, more
than 90% of the constitutional text was changed and, in addition, a clear break
with the socialist system of the past was made by enshrining the basic principles
of liberal democracy, such as the separation of powers, the rule of law and party
pluralism, in the constitution (ibid., p. 252 ff.).
There had been consensus at the “National Round Table”, that the constitu-
tional revision of 1989 had created only a “transitional constitution” for the
regime change, which was to have a provisional character. However, the adoption
of a new constitution did not receive special priority on the agenda of the Chris-
tian-conservative government formed after the founding elections in May 1990.
Instead of starting the preparation of a new constitution, the revision of the exist-
ing constitution was continued. In order to be able to initiate these despite the
lack of a two-thirds majority of the Christian-conservative coalition, a political
pact was concluded between the MDF and the then largest opposition party, the
Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége; SZDSZ).3 The con-
stitutional amendments made possible in this way resulted in essential changes

3 Inreturn for their consent to the desired constitutional amendments, the government fac-
tions supported the SZDSZ candidate for the office of President of the Republic, Árpád
Göncz.
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 25

in the relationship between Parliament and government in 1990. The government

was particularly strengthened by the fact that the simple vote of no confidence
was replaced by a constructive one and the possibility of expressing lack of confi-
dence in individual ministers was abolished (ibid., p. 253 ff.).
The adoption of an entirely new constitution was put on the agenda only
after the parliamentary elections of 1994 by the new coalition government of the
Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) and SZDSZ, which
had the required two-thirds majority. In order to establish the new constitution
on a broader consensus beyond the government coalition, the coalition agreed
with the representatives of the opposition to increase the quorum for the adop-
tion of the constitution to four-fifths. Work on the new constitution began in June
1995, but ended in June 1996 without results, as the necessary majority was not
reached in a decisive vote. This had been missed because part of the socialist fac-
tion, including ministers and members of the party presidium, had refused to give
their consent. Work on the new constitution could not be completed by the end of
the legislative period. Instead, the polarization of the political camps increased,
which prevented the overcoming of differences. It therefore looked as if the tran-
sitional constitution would become the permanent constitutional basis of the Hun-
garian democracy due to the lack of willingness to compromise (ibid., p. 263 ff.).

2.2 The Political System from 1990 to 2010: Formal

Consolidation with Functional Deficits

The stepwise and gradual adaptation of the constitution to the changing politi-
cal conditions, which took place in a process of “permanent constitution-making”
(Halmai 1996, p. 354), did not stand in the way of a rapid stabilization and con-
solidation of the new democratic institutions. The “Constitution of the Transition”
created in several rounds of constitutional revision enshrined a parliamentary sys-
tem of government with an unicameral legislature and a “medium-strong” head of
state (Majoros 1994). Following the example of the German chancellor democ-
racy, the Prime Minister was given a prominent position in the government struc-
ture. Moreover, a Constitutional Court with extensive competences was created,
which was able to establish itself as an effective counterweight to the executive
branch in the centralized system of government (Bos 2004, p. 259 ff.; regarding
the Constitutional Court see Pócza in this volume).
In addition to the constitution, the actors at the “National Round Table” also
had agreed on a parallel election system that combines elements of proportional
26 E. Bos

and majority voting and also containes compensatory elements (cf. Bos 2004,
p. 250 ff.). 176 of the 386 parliamentary mandates were awarded in single-mem-
ber constituencies by absolute majority vote and 152 via territorial party lists by
proportional vote with a four- or five-percent threshold.4 A further 58 mandates
were distributed via a national list.5 Voters had two votes. With the first, they
voted for a direct candidate in the respective constituency; with the second, they
voted for a regional party list. The compensatory element consisted in combining
first and second votes that either went to the defeated candidates in the constitu-
encies or were left over when the the second votes were counted and using these
votes to decide on the allocation of the national list mandates. The election law
was primarily aimed at ensuring Hungary’s governability (Tölgyessy 1992, p. 41).
In fact, the system had a majority-forming effect, which resulted in a high degree
of disproportionality between the share of votes and the share of mandates, which
was disadvantageous for smaller parties.
Unlike in most other states in Central Eastern Europe, in Hungary the parlia-
mentary majority situations and governments proved to be stable. So all parlia-
mentary elections took place as scheduled at the end of the four-year legislative
term. In addition, until 2010 there were only three government reshuffles during a
legislative term (see Grotz and Weber 2011, p. 206 ff.).6
Already in the course of the first democratic legislative term, a development
began that strengthened the government's position vis-à-vis Parliament. There
was a gradual transfer of power in favor of the executive branch, to which the
expansion of the office of the Prime Minister contributed, in addition to the
majority-promoting effect of the electoral system—the government factions
considered the government they supported as their steering body —and the con-
structive vote of no confidence. This tendency was further reinforced by the

4 The four-percent threshold was replaced by a five-percent threshold in the run-up to the
1994 elections (Dieringer 2009b, p. 97).
5 Candidates wishing to stand in a constituency had to submit at least 750 signatures from

supporters. Only parties that had nominated candidates in at least 25% of a territorial con-
stituency and in addition at least two candidates in other territorial constituencies were enti-
tled to stand in a constituency with a territorial list. Finally, parties had to be represented in
at least seven of the 20 territorial constituencies via territorial lists in order to submit a list
for the allocation of mandates at national level.
6 In 1993, after the death of Prime Minister József Antall, a new government head had to be

elected. In 2004 and 2009, political conflicts within the ruling MSZP led to changes in the
office of the Prime Minister.
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 27

emergence of a bipolar party system, which led to a decreasing fragmentation of

government coalitions (see Schiemann 2004; Müller 2010).
However, the stabilization of the party system went hand in hand with its
increasing polarization, which was only superficially covered up during the EU
accession negotiations, due to the pressure to fulfill the accesion criteria. As soon
as the compulsion to self-discipline fell away with the achieved accession, the
conflicts broke out again and were fought out more and more sharply (Bos 2011,
p. 47). The increasing hardness of the confrontation between the two political
camps prompted the current President of Parliament and then Minister without
Portfolio László Kövér to make the following statement in April 2000: “Today
there is no consensus between the parties in Hungary. And where there is no con-
sensus, there is also no real discussion. There is only a dialogue of the deaf, or a
fight. I dare to claim: In Hungary today a cold civil war is taking place in public
life.” (Origo 2000).
When the first Fidesz government was voted out of office in the 2002 parlia-
mentary elections and a coalition of MSZP and SZDSZ took over the reins of
government, the polarization further intensified and the two camps became even
more irreconcilable. Tamás Fricz, a political scientist close to Fidesz, stated at
the beginning of 2004 that both camps did not accept the legitimacy of the other
within the democratic system. He accused the government of having carried out
a “very massive purge” in the “state bodies and institutions, in the foundations,
in the ministries, in the banks”. According to him, the government was pursue-
ing the goal of “retroactively criminalizing” the opposition and “assessing and
qualifying” the four years of Fidesz government “with criminal categories”. The
government ultimately wanted to make the opposition “superfluous” (quoted
according to Bos 2011, p. 48).
The disputes came to a head again after the 2006 elections, in which the
MSZP-SZDSZ government under Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány had been
confirmed. The trigger was the publication of the secretly recorded recording of
a non-public speech of Gyurcsány, which he had held in front of members of the
MSZP faction in the spring of 2006. The recording had been leaked to the media
in the run-up to the local elections in the fall of 2006 (Bos 2011, p. 48). Among
other things, the Prime Minister admitted in the speech that he had deliberately
lied to voters during the election campaign: “We have obviously lied throughout
the last one and a half, two years. It was quite clear that what we were saying was
not true. That we are so far beyond the possibilities of the country as we could
never have imagined from the joint government of the Hungarian Socialist Party
and the Liberals. And what else have we done during the four years? Nothing.
You can’t name a single significant government decision that we can be proud of”
(Gyurcsány 2006).
28 E. Bos

The publication of the speech triggered a wave of demonstrations and protest

actions, some of which resulted in violent clashes between protesters and police.
Against this background, Viktor Orbán declared the local elections to be a vote
on the legitimacy of the Gyurcsány government and, after the victory of Fidesz,
called for the resignation of the government within 72 hours. After the expiry of
the ultimatum, Fidesz not only organized daily protest rallies, but also boycotted
parliamentary sessions until the end of the legislative term as soon as Gyurcsány
entered the plenary hall (cf. Ahn 2006).
The increasing polarization had far-reaching consequences for the politi-
cal system. Although it was formally a consolidated democracy, it showed defi-
ciencies. On the one hand, there was a growing politicization of the ministerial
bureaucracy. After each change of government, the exchange of staff, carried out
on the basis of party political considerations, reached lower ranks. In this way,
the respective government parties wanted to increase their control over the formu-
lation and implementation of political decisions. Regardless of which camp the
government could take over, the “inherited personnel” of the political opponent
was replaced by trustworthy own personnel after the election victory (Meyer-
Sahling 2006). On the other hand, the polarization resulted also in a politiciza-
tion of other areas of the social system. Thus, for research institutes, think tanks,
cultural institutions, newspapers and broadcasting stations it became increasingly
impossible to take a neutral position (Schöpflin 2009).
In political disputes, both sides fundamentally questioned the legitimacy
of their opponents, not just their respective goals and programs. Fidesz and its
allies considered MSZP illegitimate because, as he successor party of MSZMP,
it derived directly from the communist system. On the other hand, MSZP and the
Liberals denied the legitimacy of Fidesz because they considered it undemocratic.
From the perspective of the left-wing camp, elections were about the survival of
democracy, while from the perspective of the right-wing camp, the survival of the
nation was at stake. In the disputes between the “defenders of democracy” and
the “saviors of the nation”, the political opponent was no longer seen as a legiti-
mate player in the pluralistic contest, but as a “total enemy”. This is also reflected
in the language that aimed at the demonization and moral destruction of the polit-
ical opponent on both sides (Miszlivetz 2009). This is hardly compatible with the
basic principles of democratic systems, for which a pluralistic competition based
on a democratic consensus on values and procedures is essential.
György Schöpflin (2009) attributes the extremely deep cleavage between the
camps to “mutually exclusive notions of justice, of good and evil, of the coun-
try's past, and, ultimately of the ‘good life’” (Schöpflin 2009, p. 32–33). Ferenc
Miszlivetz highlights the deep contrast between proponents of a neoliberal policy
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 29

on the one hand and representatives of an “archaic vision of Hungariness” on the

other. While the former assumed that the market regulates everything, the latter
claimed that “there exists a single, correct, homogeneous, white and Christian
European value system” that “focuses on the national community and the family”
(Miszlivetz 2009, p. 634).
The behavior of the Prime Ministers also contributed to a weakening of the
democratic institutions. For example, under Orbán and Gyurcsány, political
decision-making processes were outsourced from the constitutionally legitimate
institutions and parliamentary rights were disregarded. Gyurcsány, for example,
transferred the “central policy formulation” to external reform committees and
advisers and reduced the ministries to “purely administrative bodies” (Dieringer
2009a, p. 9, b, p. 137). In addition, he used the parliamentary right to recall the
government in at least questionable ways when he initiated a constructive vote
of no confidence against himself in order to exclude the head of state from the
process of re-electing the head of government (Müller, 2010; Dieringer 2009a,
p. 9). In his first term in office, Orbán weakened the Parliament by introducing a
three-week cycle for parliamentary sessions, in which the Parliament only met in
plenary sessions every third week. In addition, in the fall of 2006 he “shifted large
parts of his policy from Parliament to the street” (Ilonszki 2007, p. 54).
In this context, Gabriella Ilonszki and György Lengyel (2009, p. 8) noted a
disturbance in the functioning of democratic institutions and in political behavior
even before the 2010 elections. Because large parts of the elites and society only
imitated the acceptance of democratic rules, a simulated democracy had emerged.
Although, according to the authors it was still a democracy, it was falling behind
consolidated democracies in terms of democratic quality.

3 The Restructuring of the Political System After

2010: Steps and Instruments

The parliamentary elections in April 2010 marked a fundamental upheaval in the

development of Hungarian democracy. From the perspective of the newly elected
Prime Minister, not simply the sixth democratic elections since the regime
change had taken place, but a “revolution in the voting booths”. Only with this
had the national uprising of 1956 and the regime change of 1989 been completed.
While Orbán had announced after his first election victory in 1998 that he wanted
less than a regime change, but more than a change of government (Bozóki 2008,
p. 199), he now proclaimed a complete change of the political system. With the
elections, he said, the nation had agreed that in the country “everything must be
30 E. Bos

changed. The constitution, the laws, public morality, taboos, commandments,

goals, relationships and values. The media and environmental protection, schools
and public administration” (Orbán 2010).
In fact, the Orbán government immediately began pushing through far-
reaching reforms of the political system after its election victory (see Bos 2011,
2018a).7 In addition to extensive institutional changes, these included a com-
prehensive change of personnel in all important state and societal positions, the
restructuring of the media system, and the creation of a new ideological founda-
tion. Since 2015, these measures have been supplemented by the creation of a
permanent state of emergency. The reforms massively accelerated the previously
observed trends towards centralization of power in the executive branch while
weakening institutional checks and balances and relied on new patterns of repre-
sentation and legitimation.
The great pace of reform was reflected in intense legislative activity, which
made adequate democratic consultation and control of the government impossible.
A total of 859 laws were passed between 2010 and 2014 - almost twice as many
as in Orbán's first term between 1998 and 2002 and about 150% more than in the
immediately preceding legislative period. In the first 20 months after taking office,
49 cardinal laws were amended, for which a two-thirds majority is necessary. The
majority of the laws were introduced as Private Members' Bills by individual depu-
ties, for which a shortened legislative procedure is used without extensive debates
and consultations with the relevant stakeholders. Ten of the twelve amendments to
the old constitution that came into force during this period were initiated by individ-
ual deputies. As a result, the procedure, which was originally concieved as a means
for the parliamentary minority, became an instrument for fortifying the governing
majority (Pap 2018, p. 15 ff.). The “radical instrumentalization of parliamentary
legislation” (Kazai 2019) reduces Parliament to the function of rubber-stamp-
ing and formally enshrining the government's wishes. In addition, the distinction
between constitutional and legislative amendments is systematically undermined.

3.1 Institutional Reforms

The enforced changes were not only about codifying divergent policy views,
but also about reforming the political institutions and procedures of the political

7 The extensive reforms of the economic system are largely left out of the following consid-
erations. See Pogátsa's contribution in this volume.
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 31

p­ rocess. One example of this was an amendment to Parliament's Standing Orders.

These were modified to the effect that an extraordinary legislative procedure, in
which a bill can be brought directly from the first draft to the final vote without
debate, no longer requires a four-fifths majority, as was previously the case, but
only a two-thirds majority. In addition, in legislative procedures in which the draft
law was submitted by the government and therefore – as required – a consulta-
tion process was carried out, the deadlines for stakeholder' comments were set so
short-term – in some cases they were only one day – that a deliberation process
could not even come about (Pap 2018, p. 16).8
The most important step, however, was the adoption of a new constitution in
2011 (see the chapter of Jakab and Bodnár in this volume). The new Hungarian
“Basic Law” (Alaptörvény) took over the basic structure of the system of govern-
ment enshrined in the constitution of the transition, but it strengthened the position
of the government by weakening checks and balances - in particular the Consti-
tutional Court. In addition, it created the new institution of the Budget Council,
which limited the central budgetary competence of the Parliament (Bos 2011).
Even after the adoption of the new Basic Law, there were regular constitutional
amendments. These were usually motivated by the fact that decisions of the Con-
stitutional Court declaring laws unconstitutional could be “overruled” in this way.
The constitution was adjusted by the revision in such a way that the laws could be
passed again and put into force. It is significant that one year after the Basic Law
came into force, 20 percent of the constitutional text had already been changed
(Tóth 2013, p. 25). In July 2022, the eleventh amendment to the constitution was
already adopted. The frequent amendments to the constitution and the way in
which the judgments of the Constitutional Court are dealt with point to a political
instrumentalization of constitutional law-making for day-to-day political goals.
Among the government's key reform initiatives was the adoption of a new
election law9, which took place in December 2011.10 This retains the basic
structure of the previous system (combination of majority and proportional vot-
ing, compensatory elements) but at the same time includes far-reaching changes.

8 Between 2010 and 2014, the adoption of a draft law took an average of 34 days, 104 laws
were passed in less than 10 days, without extraordinary procedures being used (Kazai
2019, p. 8).
9 Cf. the 2011 Election Act 2015, 2017; Renwick 2012; Bos 2018b.

10 2011. évi CCIII. Törvény az országgyűlési képviselők választásáról, in: Magyar Közlöny,

165/2011, pp. 41.095–41.181.

32 E. Bos

On the one hand, the number of MPs was reduced from 386 to 199.11 On the
other hand, the ratio between direct and list mandates was modified in favor of
the direct mandates so that 106 of the 199 mandates are allocated in single-mem-
ber constituencies. Another important innovation is that the election of the direct
candidates is no longer carried out with an absolute, but with a relative majority,
so that only one ballot is necessary. In addition, the regional lists were abolished
and replaced by national party lists, for which the voters cast their second vote.
The five percent threshold was maintained. List alliances from two parties have to
overcome a ten percent threshold, alliances from three and more parties a thresh-
old of 15% (Bos 2018b, p. 216 ff.).
There was also a innovation in the compensation system. In the distribution of
the list mandates, not only the votes cast for the party lists continue to be taken
into account, but also the so-called “fractional votes” (töredék szavazat), which is
intended to ensure that as few as possible of the votes cast in the single-member
constituencies remain unaccounted for. However, not only- as before - the votes
for the losing candidates are included (loser compensation), but also the votes of
the successful candidates that would not have been necessary to win the mandate
(winner compensation). The compensation votes together with the second votes
of the voters decide the distribution of the list mandates.12
Finally, the group of those entitled to vote was extended to include Hungarians
who have Hungarian citizenship but do not have a Hungarian residence. This reg-
ulation applies in particular to Hungarians living in the territories of neighboring
states that were separated from Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon after the First
World War and transferred to these states by redrawing Hungary's borders. Hun-
garian citizens without Hungarian residence must register before the elections and
can cast their votes only for the the parties’ national lists. They can participate in
the elections by absentee ballot. In contrast, Hungarians who have a Hungarian
address but are temporarily residing abroad must also register before the election,
but may only cast their vote at Hungarian embassies and consulates.13

11 In 2010, the deputies had already decided to reduce the size of Parliament.
12 In the compensation only parties are considered, which were able to overcome the 5 or
10 or 15% threshold.
13 In addition, special rules were introduced for the thirteen national minorities recognized

in Hungary, which, like the parties, can submit candidate lists. Voters who have registered
as members of a minority vote with their second vote not for a party list, but for the list
of their minority. Reduced quotas apply to the deputies of the minorities. If the number
of votes necessary to win a mandate is not reached, the top candidate of the list enters the
national assembly as a so-called spokesperson (nemzetiségi szószóló). This person has the
right to speak, but not the right to vote (Bos 2018b, p. 217).
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 33

By modifying the voting system, its majority-forming and disproportionate

effect was strengthened. On the one hand, this is due to the increase in the propor-
tion of mandates allocated by relative majority vote; on the other hand, the modi-
fied compensation system contributes to this.
Another important goal of the reform was a restructuring of the media sys-
tem. In 2011, a new media law was passed that brought the state media under
one roof and placed them under the control of the government with the help of
new supervisory boards. The newly created National Media and Communications
Authority (Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hátoság; NMHH) and the Media Coun-
cil were also given licensing and control rights with regard to the other media.
The NMHH awards broadcasting frequencies and is responsible for consumer and
competition protection. The Media Council’s duties include monitoring the “bal-
anced” reporting of the media. In addition, the state news agency MIT has had a
monopoly on news coverage for the state broadcasters since the law came into
effect (Bos 2011, p. 55 ff.).
The restructuring of the media system by the new media law was supplemented
by a system of financial support for media close to the government through the
allocation of government advertising. In addition to state media, this also benefits
media of entreprneurs closely associated with Fidesz. The aim of these changes
was to control and restrict the flow of information and to “flood” society with
unchallenged “government information” (see Haraszti 2019). After the govern-
ment's confirmation in the elections of 2014, state-backed takeovers of opposition
media by government-related entrepreneurs began. Also after Fidesz's next elec-
tion victory in 2018, a fundamental change followed, when a centralization of
pro-government media was initiated with the “Central European Press and Media
Foundation” (Közép Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány, KESMA). The owners of
the media handed them over to the foundation free of charge (see ibid.). Officially,
the foundation is intended to “counteract fake news and disinformation from pro-
gressive sources; to take action against political correctness, and to strengthen the
national-civic side, so that truly conservative-Christian thinking can be present in
the public discourse with the same force as its left-liberal counterpart.”14
By buying up previously independent media and selectively awarding state
advertising contracts to government-friendly media, it has been possible to push
important opposition media into the background or out of the market altogether.

14 Cf.
the mission and goals of the Central European Press and Media Foundation
(KESMA), 06.02.2019, https://cepmf.hu/#sectionAnnouncement.
34 E. Bos

This has enabled Fidesz to also secure a dominant position in the private media
sector. As a result, there are only a few independent media left. With the exception
of Népszava (Volksstimme), all other national or regional daily newspapers have
fallen into the hands of government-friendly businessmen, who have handed them
over to KESMA in 2019. After the takeover of the second largest commercial tel-
evision station (TV 2) by a person close to Fidesz, only RTL Klub remains inde-
pendent among the important private television channels. The broadcaster was
only able to preserve its independence through the resistance of the foreign owner
Bertelsmann and the support of the German federal government. Among the state
and private radio programs, only Klubrádio remained independent. However, this
station could only be received in the Hungarian capital and finally lost its licence
in 2021. The market for online media has also been re-divided. Thus, in 2016,
Origo.hu, one of the two most important independent news portals at that time,
was integrated into the government-friendly media system (Haraszti 2019; Bos
2018a, p. 22 ff.). In 2020, the remaining, very popular independent news portal
index.hu also lost its independence. However, the former journalists of index man-
aged to set up the new internet portal Telex.hu, which is financed by crowdfundig
and quickly gained great popularity. Investigative journalism is also be carried out
by smaller internet-based platforms such as Átlátszó (Transparent) and Direkt36.
After the foundations of the political system had been redesigned between
2010 and 2014, several laws during the following legislative term aimed at
restricting the room for maneuver of previously autonomous state institutions and
certain social actors. This mainly affected Hungarian higher education institutions
and the scientific system (see the chapter of Várszegi in this volume.), NGOs sup-
ported from abroad and opposition parties (see Bos 2018a, p. 20 ff.).
For example, the law on the “Transparency of NGOs Supported from Abroad”,
passed by Parliament on 13 June 2017, required NGOs that receive more than
HUF 7.2 million (about EUR 23,500) from foreign donors in a year to register
with a court and to name their donors from an individual grant of HUF 500,000
(about EUR 1,650) onwards. They also have to declare themselves as “organisa-
tions supported from abroad” on their website and in all publications. A clause in
the law on the “protection of general appearance of towns and villages” stipulated
that parties and public institutions may only rent advertising space at the current
list price for their advertising. In addition, the contracts must be submitted to the
competent authorities immediately. If this does not happen, the authorities may
have the posters removed.
The objecive the Hungarian government gave as a reason to justify the new
regulations - creating fair competition, or fighting against money laundering,
financing of terrorism and hidden party financing - are undoubtedly legitimate,
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 35

but often the intention to harm certain political opponents and actors critical
of the government can hardly be denied.15 The corresponding laws were again
passed at great speed and without prior consultation of those affected in a fast-
track procedure. Overall, the course of action speaks for an instrumental under-
standing of law, which can hardly be reconciled with the principle of procedural
fairness. In addition, it gives the impression that the Hungarian government
intended to restrict the room for maneuver of opposition parties and critical civil
society organizations.

3.2 Comprehensive Exchange of Elites

The transformation of the system was not only achieved through institutional
reforms, but also through a comprehensive exchange of personnel. Since the elec-
tion victory in 2010, the government has systematically filled all important posi-
tions in the state apparatus, in the judiciary, in the state media and in the cultural
sector with loyal supporters, thus following a trend that had already been observed
previously. However, in contrast to previous governments, its own advantage in
power gave it more opportunities to exert influence (Bos 2018a, p. 23).
In order to be able to bring the desired people into the intended positions, it
was sometimes necessary to change legal regulations first, because they contained
certain exclusion criteria with regard to the necessary qualifications. If designated
persons did not meet these criteria, these were eliminated by amending the law.
For example, the age limit for ambassadors was lowered or the requirement that
university presidents must have at least a Ph.D. was dropped (Pap 2018, p. 16
f.). On the other hand, changes in the law were also used to remove non-govern-
ment appointed officeholders from their positions, for example by lowering age
limits or restructuring institutions. At the same time, the terms of office of the
new office holders were extended so that they would remain in office even after a
possible change of government. Another regulation, according to which the office

15 The new regulations target two specific individuals. The NGO law is primarily directed
against Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros, who finances NGOs with his Open
Society Foundation that are committed to open and democratic societies. He is also the
founder of CEU. The Poster Act was directed against Hungarian businessman Lájos Simic-
ska, who had made his poster space available to Jobbik's campaign against the government
at a price far below list price. Simicska had been a close ally of Viktor Orbán for a long
time, but had separated from him in 2015 in a dispute. See Bos 2018, p. 21 ff. for this.
36 E. Bos

holder was to remain in office until the Parliament had elected a successor, which
is often only possible with a two-thirds majority, was also meant to surve this pur-
pose (Pap 2018, p. 17).
By this method of staffing policy, the independence of the judiciary was
restricted as well as the autonomy of state media, museums, theaters, and uni-
versities. For the latter, for example, the institution of the chancellor responsible
for finance was created, with the chancellors not being elected by the universities
themselves, but by the competent ministry. The filling of management positions
in state institutions with loyal persons has led to a fundamental change in their
function. They do no longer serve to control the government, but rather function
as instruments of the government.
In addition, the network of government-affiliated persons also includes entre-
preneurs and owners of private media, to whom the government awards public
contracts or places advertisements in their media. This network of politicians and
business and media actors escapes democratic control (Martin 2017, p. 275 ff.).
This part of the reconstruction of the political system had been prepared by
Orbán long-term since his election defeat in 2002. Fidesz used the time in opposi-
tion to systematically expand the party's organizational structures in the country-
side. This was complemented by the founding of organizations close to the party,
with which local elites from business and culture could be tied to the party. An
important part of these measures to expand the network was the annual exclu-
sive meeting in the village of Kötcse, to which Orbán invited his loyal follow-
ers. Orbán also used the meetings to inform his followers about his strategies
and plans (Kristóf 2017, p. 130). Finally, the party built its own media empire
with the help of close businessmen. The government of Orbán was able to rely
on these structures and persons when it came to the personnel restructuring of the
political, cultural and social system (Bos 2018a, p. 23).

3.3 Ideological Foundations and Understanding

of Representation

The ideological foundations of the reconstruction of the system were already

apparent in a speech Orbán gave on May 9, 2002, at the castle in Budapest. In
this speech, he he made strong references to the concept of the homeland (“The
homeland is not simply politics, but our lives.”) and presented Fidesz and its allies
as the true representatives of the interests of the Hungarian nation (Orbán 2002).
In a much-noticed speech in Kötcse in 2009, he formulated the building of a new
“civic” Hungary as his central strategic goal. In place of the previous “dual power
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 37

field,” there should be Fidesz as a “single governing party, a central political

power field” (centrális erőtér) that is “capable of adressing the national issues.”
This would require the replacement of the post-communist elite with a new civic
elite, as well as a moral renewal based on Hungary’s national identity (Orbán
2009). These statements showed, on the one hand, that Orbán does not view the
events of 1989 as a regime change and considers the „National Round Table“ par-
ticipants as “preservers” of the system (Bozóki 2008, p. 213). On the other hand,
he advocates a majoritarian view of politics and does not seek compromises, but
rather hegemony of the conservative-Christian-national value system he promotes.
After the 2010 election victory, these ideas can be found again in the Dec-
laration adopted by Parliament on 14 June 2010, entitled “Let There Be Peace,
Freedom and Unity” (Országgyűlés 2010). This “Declaration of National Coop-
eration” (Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere, NER) claimes that the Hungarian
nation has “in the spring of 2010 […] carried out a revolution at the ballot box”.
With the elections, a new social contract has been concluded and a “new system
of national cooperation” was adopted, on the basis of which a new political com-
munity is to be created. Its foundation is formed by conservative values, in par-
ticular work, home, family, health and order. Those who want to belong to the
nation are expected to share these values; a “proper” Hungarian is supposed to be
“a God-fearing (preferably Christian) married individual who is willing to make
sacrifices for family [...] and country” according to this idea (Uitz 2019). This
Christian-conservative ideology with a clear preference for conservative family
values and a paternalistic, patriarchal concept of the political community is also
reflected in the new Constitution and in cultural and educational policy. The Con-
stitution accordingly declared the conservative values to be the core of national
identity in the preamble (cf. Bos 2011, p. 52; Pap 2018).
The government program of 2010 emphasized that with the elections, citizens
had regained their ability to self-determination and the opportunity to unite their
forces in order to steer the country in a new direction in the interest of the com-
mon good. After the regime change, the elites had controlled the transformation
by invisible contracts. Thus, the upward development of the country had been
prevented by fruitless debates. The system of national cooperation created by the
elections in 2010, on the other hand, was based on unity instead of exclusion,
on political responsibility instead of political irresponsibility, on the rejection and
elimination of extremes instead of their tolerance, on the possibility of self-deter-
mination instead of its limitation, and on the restoration of the balance between
rights and duties (Pap 2018, p. 52 ff.; Programme of National Cooperation 2010).
The ideological justification for the system was further developed by Viktor
Orbán in a speech at the Free Summer University in Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tușnad/
38 E. Bos

Bad Tuschnad, Romania) in July 2014. In it, he explicitly announced that he

wants to build an “illiberal state” in Hungary and made the claim that illiberal
democracy offers a future-oriented alternative to modern liberal democracy in
Europe. He justifies this by saying that the future does not belong to Western lib-
eral democracies, but to states such as Russia, China, India, Singapore and Tur-
key, which are superior to Western states in terms of their competitiveness in the
international system. In contrast to liberalism, which places individual interests
above the interests of the community and the nation, the illiberal state should
serve the interests of the community and the nation and rebalance the rights and
duties of citizens (Orbán 2014).
The anti-elitist and anti-pluralist elements of the concept become clear. Orbán
therefore contrasts the elites of the old system, who in liberal democracy could
have maintained the power relations of the socialist era, with the nation and the
(pure) people. The will of the people and national unity are threatened by dis-
senting opinions and interests. The aim is therefore to create a culturally homo-
geneous Hungarian nation conceived as a Christian community (Bos 2018a, p.
24 ff.). The Hungarian nation, according to Orbán, “is not simply a collection of
individuals, but a community that must be organized, strengthened, and even built
up.” The “new state that we are building in Hungary” does not “deny the basic
values of liberalism, such as freedom, […] but does not make this ideology the
central element of state organization, instead it contains its own national approach
that deviates from it.”
Orbán's understanding of the state and the desired unempeded enforcement
of the majority principle - without the limitations of rule of law and separation
of powers - are in the tradition of Carl Schmitt's concept of the political, which
rejects the liberal notion of the
​​ binding of state power to the rule of law and the
subordination of Parliament and government to the constitution as well as the
monopoly of constitutional interpretation given to the Constitutional Court. Attila
Antal (2017) describes this understanding as “political constitutionalism.”
According to Pap, the substance of Orbán's concept of illiberalism is “insti-
tutionalizing of the tyranny of the majority; a clientelist decision-making regime
that defies the rule of law principals; dismantling core institutional guarantees for
government control; passing laws that curtail individual liberties and do not meet
international standards for human rights and constitutionalism and lack appropriate
public debate and deliberation; and adoption of an ideologically biased constitution
that cements the above-described developments and initiatives” (Pap 2018, p. 11).
Since 2018, Viktor Orbán has replaced the term “illiberal democracy” with
“Christian democracy”, but has retained the essence of the idea. In his speech at
the Fidesz party congress in September 2019, he said that the current Hungarian
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 39

state is “based on the principles of Christian democracy and not on those of lib-
eral democracy”. As he put it: “Democracy yes, liberalism no.” Christian democ-
racy was not set up in the spirit of liberal freedom, but in the spirit of Christian
freedom. Christian freedom means: “Patriots instead of cosmopolitanism. Love
of one’s homeland instead of internationalism. Marriage and family instead of
the propagation of same-sex relationships. The protection of our children instead
of the liberalization of drugs. Border protection instead of migration. Hungar-
ian children instead of immigrants. Christian culture instead of multicultural
drivel. Order and security instead of violence and terror. The unification of the
nation instead of the betrayal of the nation […]” (Orbán 2019). Under the head-
ing “Christian democracy”, exactly those elements were highlighted and further
developed that were previously used to describe “illiberal democracy”.
To legitimize its policy, the Orbán government firstly resorts to revolutionary
rhetoric. The “simulation” of a revolutionary upheaval is intended to justify the
high pace of reforms and the comprehensive exchange of elites. On the other hand,
the government continuously points to alleged external and internal enemies who
are said to destroy Hungarian identity and culture and undermine Hungarian sover-
eignty. With the permanent production of enemy images, the government justifies
its aim of defending the Hungarian nation against external and internal threats and
protecting the sovereignty and identity of the country with a strong hand. In par-
ticular, the EU or “Brussels”, the Hungarian-born financial investor George Soros
and migrants moving to Europe were built up as external enemies. Internal ene-
mies include all parties, media and civil society organizations opposing the govern-
ment's policy, which are demonized and discredited as enemies of the Hungarian
nation and “mercenaries” or “agents” of the external enemies (Bos 2018a, p. 27).
This attitude is expressed clearly in Viktor Orbán's speech (2018) on the anni-
versary of the March Revolution of 1848 on March 15, 2018:

“We do not have to fight against the bloodless opposition parties, but against an
organized empire with an international network. Media maintained by foreign cor-
porations and domestic oligarchs, professional paid activists, organizers of demon-
strations that cause unrest, the NGO chain financed by international speculators,
which the name of George Soros summarizes and which he personifies. Against this
world we have to fight to defend ourselves. The good soldier does not fight because
he hates what is against him, but because he loves what is behind him; he loves
Hungary and the Hungarian people.”The Fidesz-KDNP campaign's key message in
the 2018 elections was accordingly that the opposition's top candidates are all con-
trolled by George Soros in the background. “Let's stop Soros's candidates!” was
their slogan (Bos 2018a, p. 27).

The Orbán government sees itself as being equipped with a comprehensive man-
date by the voters through its two-thirds majority. Nevertheless, the government
40 E. Bos

has developed the instrument of national consultations (Nemzeti konzultációk) in

order to legitimize its policy even further during the legislative terms. It regularly
turns to the population directly with public opinion polls on important political
issues. For this purpose, a questionnaire formulated by the government is sent to
all Hungarian households. The consultations are always accompanied by inten-
sive media and poster campaigns, which serve not so much to inform the popula-
tion, but primarily to advertise the government's policies. The questions are just
as suggestively formulated as the predetermined answer options (Bos 2018a, p.
26). Leading Hungarian opinion researchers therefore criticized the question-
naires as “unprofessional and manipulative”. They are a “tool of political com-
munication masquerading as opinion research”.16 The consultations are also used
to reject criticism using them as confirmation of the democratic legitimacy of the
government’s policy - as e.g. in the disputes with the European Commission.
By their two-thirds majority gained in the elections of 2010, 2014, 2018 and
2022 and high approval ratings in the National Consultations, Fidesz-KDNP con-
sider itself regularly confirmed in its role as the sole legitimate representative
of the Hungarian people. This monopolization of representation is based on the
claim that only Fidesz-KDNP can represent the values and interests of the Hungar-
ian nation. Any criticism of Orbán and his government is therefore rejected as an
attack on Hungary as a whole or on the Hungarian people. Values and interests of
the nation are represented primarily by the executive and in particular by the Prime
Minister. On the other hand, the representation function of Parliament is receding.

4 No Agreement on the Assessment of the Orbán

System

The reconstruction of the political system enforced by the Orbán government has
quickly triggered a debate in politics and academia about the Hungary’s demo-
cratic quality and the typological classification of the Orbán system. On the one
hand, the diagnoses are similar with regard to the political measures and their
direction. On the other hand, observers do not agree when it comes to grasping
and assessing the specific set of problems.

16 Public opinion researchers, social scientists protest against the national consultation,
<https://kettosmerce.blog.hu/2015/04/30/kozvelemeny-kutatok_tarsadalomtudosok_
tiltakoznak_a_nemzeti_konzultacio_ellen>.
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 41

In the international democracy indices, the assessment has prevailed that the
transformation of the political system has had negative effects on Hungarian
democracy. The well-known Freedom in the World Index by Freedom House
already attested Hungary a downward trend in democratic quality in the 2011 edi-
tion because the government was trying to “consolidate control over the coun-
try’s independent institutions”. (Freedom House 2011, p. 20) . Two years later,
the Nations in Transit Index, also published by Freedom House, found that the
government had used its two-thirds majority to bring a number of key institu-
tions, such as the judiciary and the media, under its control. Hungary was still
classified as a consolidated democracy, but the rating was getting closer to the
borderline of the semi-consolidated democracy (Habdank-Kołaczkowska 2013,
p. 6). The first change in Hungary's classification then took place in the Bertels-
mann Transformation Index in 2014. Since then, Hungary has been classified not
as a “consolidating democracy”, but as a “defective democracy” 17 The Nations
in Transit Index from Freedom House followed a year later. In 2015, it classi-
fied Hungary not as a consolidated, but only as a semi-consolidated democracy
(Habdank-Kołaczkowska 2015, p. 14). In 2019, the Freedom in the World Report
from Freedom House also changed its classification. Hungary is no longer classi-
fied as a “free”, but as a “partly free” country (Freedom House 2019). Finally, the
Nations in Transit Index 2020 registered a further decline in the democratic qual-
ity in Hungary and classified it as a “hybrid regime” (Csaky 2020, p. 3).
In Hungarian political science, there has been an intense discussion in recent
years about the typological classification of the regime that emerged under the
Orbán government. On the one hand, there are authors who state that Hungary
now belongs to the group of authoritarian systems. Attila Ágh (2015, for exam-
ple, notes a development in which a “chaotic democracy” (up to 2010) has first
been transformed into a “Potemkin village democracy” and then into an “elec-
toral autocracy”. He characterizes this as a centralization of political power in
the executive and the weakening of checks and balances in the political system.
This tendency has been accompanied by increasingly populist rhetoric and more
and more nationalist politics. János Kornai (2015) also describes the development
as the systematic destruction of democracy. According to him, there has been a
“U-turn”, a 180-degree turn in 2010, which led to centralization and nationali-
zation in the direction of autocracy. András Bozóki (2016) also characterizes the
political system as anti-democratic and concludes that Hungary has been an illib-

17 See the BTI ratings at: https://www.bti-project.org/de/home.html?&cb=00000.

42 E. Bos

eral democracy since 2016. He therefore no longer considers the term “liberal
democracy” to be appropriate.
On the other hand, there are authors who, while also qualifying the regime as
no longer democratic, locate it in a grey zone between democracy and autocracy
as a hybrid system. These include, for example, Attila Gyula (2017), who notes a
hybridisation of the political system, through which authoritarian elements have
emerged alongside the democratic ones. András Bozóki and Dániel Hegedűs
(2018) also speak of a hybrid regime. For them, the ambivalent relationship
between Hungary and the EU is central, which is characterised by the fact that the
EU limits the authoritarian aspirations of the Orbán government, but at the same
time stabilises and legitimises the regime. They therefore describe Hungary as an
“externally constrained hybrid” regime.
A third group highlights individual aspects of the system. András Körösényi
(2017) emphasises, for example, the strong personalisation of politics. Follow-
ing Max Weber, he classifies the resulting specific form of rule as plebiscitary
leader democracy, in which Viktor Orbán plays the central role as a charismatic
leader. However, the regime cannot gain long-term stability due to Orbán's central
importance for its functioning. Gábor Török (2018) also stresses that the regime
that emerged under Orbán is characterized not by specific institutions, but by its
strong personalization. He argues, that “Orbánism” can best be described as a
“kingdom” erected behind a “mass democratic facade”, in which the democratic
institutions were not liquidated, but occupied by loyal followers who regard the
implementation of the “royal” will as their most important task. For Bálint Mag-
yar (2016) the mixture of political and economic power is the most important fea-
ture of the system. He therefore describes the regime as a post-communist mafia
state. Other authors highlite populism as a characteristic feature. Attila Antal
(2017) emphasizes that the takeover of government by Fidesz-KDNP marked the
beginning of an “era of ruling populism”. This is characterized, he argues, by a
monopolization of political representation by the ruling parties, which deny the
legitimacy of parties and groups that represent alternative positions. Other fea-
tures of ruling populism are the strong politicization of public life and the expan-
sion of state influence on the economy and society.
Kovács and Trencsényi (2019a) state that Orbán initially turned away from
liberalism in order to introduce moderate conservatism. Later, however, he
also left this behind to move towards the populist right. Now, he is on the way
to hard authoritarian rule on the borderline of autocracy. As main feature of the
system of national cooperation that emerged under Orbán, they determine the
lack of an essential core beyond the insistence on power itself and the ability to
make different offers to different observers in order to meet their (contradictory)
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 43

e­ xpectations.18 The system functions as a “simulacrum”. Its most important fea-

ture is a “mix of segmentation, fragmentation, variability and camouflage”. This
makes it extremely difficult to formulate a coherent critique.
Important contributions to the debate on the typological classification of the
Orbán regime are provided by Kay Lane Scheppele (2013) and Matthijs Bogaards
(2018). They emphasize that it is not enough to consider the individual elements
of the system’s reconstruction in isolation. Rather, they argue, the interdepend-
ence between the different elements and their systemic interaction must be taken
into account. Scheppele introduced the concept of the “Frankenstate” for this
purpose. Only by their interaction the elements, which are unproblematic when
considered individually and in a different institutional context, develop their
“monstrous”, democracy-eroding effect. András L. Pap (2018, p. 4) speaks in this
context of “worst practice constituionalism”. Bogaards (2018) argues similarly.
He applies Wolfgang Merkel’s concept of defective democracy to Hungary and
comes to the conclusion that, in Hungary's political system, there are defects in
all democratic sub-regimes, and that there is a need to take into account the inter-
action between the different defects. He therefore describes Hungary as a “dif-
fusely defective democracy”.
Finally, reference should be made to the explanatory approach of Robert Sata
and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski (2020). They identify three central features of the
system that has emerged under the Orbán government, which they hold respon-
sible for the de-democratization of Hungarian politics: clientelism, state capture
by the government parties and an exclusive identity politics. They combine these
three elements under the concept of “Caesarean politics”.

5 Conclusion and Outlook

The present contribution first showed that Hungary quickly consolidated for-
mally as a democracy after the regime change in 1989, but exhibited functional
deficits which gradually intensified after its accession to the EU. These include,
above all, the increasing polarization between the two large political camps and
the concomitant decreasing willingness to recognize the legitimacy of the politi-
cal opponent as such. This anti-pluralist attitude and the lack of elite consensus

18 Forexample, foreign investors are offered a neoliberal economic policy, while at the
same time domestic entrepreneurs are promised state subsidies.
44 E. Bos

are incompatible with the basic principles of democratic systems, which are
characterized by party pluralism and competition on the basis of a fundamental
consensus shared by all. This already existing problem has gained a new explo-
sive force through the two-thirds majority of the Fidesz-KDNP government after
2010, since this enabled the government to unilaterally shape the political system
according to its own preferences and to secure this permanently.
In the second part it was shown that essential elements of the restructuring
of the political system pursued after 2010 are institutional reforms strengthen-
ing the executive branch while simultaneously weakeneding the existing checks
and balances, as well as an exchange of elites. The curtailment of the jurisdiction
of the Constitutional Court and the weakening of Parliament as an autonomous
institution in the legislative process reflect an instrumental understanding of law
and constitutional law. The exchange of elites affected all management positions
in state institutions, the judiciary, the state media and the cultural institutions.
In addition, the media system was restructured in favor of government-friendly
reporting and the room for maneuver of oppositional civil society organizations
was restricted. Legitimation is based on a concept of a national and Christian-
conservative community, an illiberal state, the fight against ever new external and
internal enemies, the system of “National Cooperation” and a sole representation
claim of Fidesz-KDNP.
The third section made it clear that the assessment of political developments
in Hungary, despite all the similarities in empirical observations, differs. Inter-
national democracy indices unanimously come to the finding that the quality of
Hungarian democracy has deteriorated so much since 2010 that Hungary can no
longer be counted among the group of consolidated democracies. Political sci-
ence assessments, on the other hand, are much more differentiated. Besides
authors who identify a falling back of Hungary into autocracy, others state a
hybridization of the system. Also, different aspects - such as the strong personali-
zation or the close intertwining of political and economic power - are highlighted
as specific features of the regime created under the Orbán government. Finally,
attention is drawn to fact that the transformation process initiated in 2010 has not
reached its end point and to the systemic interplay of the individual elements of
the political system’s reconstruction.
Against Orbán's concept of “illiberal democracy” it must be pointed out that
democracy is not possible without guarantees for a fair political competition and
institutional checks and balances that protect minorities from the tyranny of the
majority. The retreat of the liberal principle by limiting the separation of pow-
ers and civil rights therefore led to a hollowing out of democracy and an there
is a threat of drifting towards authoritarianism. The “constitutionally sanctioned
Functional Deficiencies of Democracy and Instrumentalization … 45

power maximization” (Uitz 2019) made possible by the election victory of

Fidesz-KDNP in 2010 that resulted in a two-thirds majority can be continued as
long as the government is able to secure the necessary support in parliamentary
elections. Depending on how comprehensive the erosion of democracy finally
turns out to be, at the end an authoritarian regime may emerge.

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Prof. Dr. Ellen Bos is Vice-Rector for Research and Young Academics and Chair of Com-
parative Politics with a Focus on Central and Eastern Europe in the EU at Andrássy Univer-
sity Budapest.
Contact: [email protected]
The Agony of a Young Constitutional
Democracy. The Hungarian
Constitution 1989 to 2019

András Jakab and Eszter Bodnár

This chapter provides an overview of Hungarian constitutional politics over the

past 30 years.1 In order to make the background understandable, it begins with a
short history of the Hungarian constitution, including the democratic turnaround
of 1989/90, and then describes the constitutional amendments of 2010 to 2012.
The main focus is on the current state of the constitutional system, which is ana-
lyzed in the light of those essential constitutional values ​​which form the basis
of Western constitutional states. The final part concentrates on the context: the
actual practice and the narratives as well as the international, social and cultural
background of the formal constitutional rules are presented.

1 Historical Overview of the Law

Until the middle of the 20th century, Hungary did not have a constitution, but
rather a so-called historical constitution, which, like the traditional English con-
stitution, consisted of doctrines and several (important in content, but formally

1 We would like to thank Lando Kirchmair and Herbert Küpper for their critical comments
and useful suggestions.

A. Jakab (*)
Universität, Salzburg, Austria
e-mail: [email protected]
E. Bodnár
Eötvös-Loránd-Universität (ELTE), Budapest, Hungarye-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 51

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_3
52 A. Jakab and E. Bodnár

simple) laws. The first attempt at creating a written constitution was indeed made
during a short period of the Hungarian bourgeois republic and then the Soviet
republic after the First World War, but this did not influence the subsequent con-
stitutional legislation. After the Second World War, the foundations of a new dem-
ocratic and republican order were laid down in Law I of 1946 on the State Form of
Hungary, the provisions of which were incorporated into later constitutional texts.
However, this was not a fully-fledged constitution, but only the regulation of a few
state-organizational questions on a simple legal level, and the constitutional sys-
tem was quickly changed into a socialist dictatorship after the Soviet model.
Paradoxically, the first written constitution of Hungary was introduced during
the socialist era. Law XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Hungarian People’s
Republic was largely a translation of the Soviet (Stalin) Constitution of 1936. The
system was based on the collectivization of the means of production, the centrali-
zation of state power, the instrumentalization of law, the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat (in practice: the leadership of the state party), the exclusivity of socialism as
a political ideology, and the binding of the effectiveness of law to the fulfillment
of duties. The 1949 Constitution explicitly referred to this in several places.
The political system change in 1989 was accompanied by constitutional
amendments. As a result of the so-called “National Round Table” talks (a
negotiation between new democratic movements and the state party as well as
regime-affiliated organizations such as the unions), the Law XXXI of 1989 on the
Amendment of the Constitution was passed and proclaimed on October 23, 1989
together with the proclamation of the Republic.2 Formally, it was an amendment
to the constitution and not the adoption of a new constitution. Together, however,
with the laws passed shortly afterwards, it changed the constitutional system from
the ground up. Accordingly, one often spoke of the 1989/90 constitution, although
the official constitution was still from 1949.
The contents of the 1989/1990 Constitution mainly came from Western Euro-
pean constitutions (especially the German Basic Law), while some solutions
to state organization law came from the Law I on the Hungarian State Form
of 1946. The constitutional basis was that of a liberal democracy, and a Con-
stitutional Court was established as the main legal control organ. Through its

2 For the history of the National Round Table and the constitutional amendments of
1989/1990, see Kukorelli (2018, pp. 214-229). October 23, 1989 was symbolic: it was the
33rd anniversary of the 1956 anti-Soviet revolution, which was violently suppressed.
The Agony of a Young Constitutional Democracy. The Hungarian … 53

j­urisprudence, the often short constitutional provisions were interpreted and thus
an enormous contribution was made to the development of the Hungarian consti-
tutional system and constitutional culture.3
Two decisive moments in this period have shaped the constitutional system
the most: the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1993
and the accession to the European Union in 2004. The ratification of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) meant on the one hand a supplement
of the national protection of law system by an international mechanism, on the
other hand the accession to the ECHR supported the national legal order as well
as a standard of the constitutional norm review, and it served as an interpretation
aid for any national legal norm. As a precondition of the EU accession numerous
laws and ordinances were newly established or changed in order to make them
conform to the EU. This was necessary in order to introduce Hungary into the
common European constitutional space (pre-accession conditionality).
The 1989/90 constitution was by no means perfect. It was based on a fragile
compromise and was therefore unstable. The constitutional reform had been pre-
pared in 1989/90 within a short period of time, which resulted in a text with gaps
and contradictions. The Constitutional Court could hardly rely on national con-
stitutional traditions, which is why it often adopted Western European, especially
German, solutions. The constitution failed to symbolize the democratic transition
and lacked political legitimacy: politicians regarded it as a necessary evil; in the
wider population it was hardly known. In addition, the high flexibility led to a
number of constitutional amendments.4
There were several attempts in the 1990s and 2000s to pass a new constitution,
but all of them failed due to lack of compromise: the adoption of a new constitu-
tion would have required a two-thirds majority in parliament. In the years 1994 to
1998, the left-liberal coalition had such a majority and even tried to involve the
opposition parties in a constitutional process. However, this attempt failed due to
internal coalition conflicts.

3A peculiarity of Hungarian constitutional dogmatics, the “invisible constitution” (devel-

oped by László Sólyom, the first president of the Constitutional Court, in Decision 23/1990
(X.31) AB is defined as the framework of constitutional court decisions.
4 See Sonnevend et al. (2015, p. 39 ff.) for details.
54 A. Jakab and E. Bodnár

2 The Constitutional Amendments from 2010

to 2012

After an election victory with more than two thirds of all mandates in 2010, the
governing coalition of Fidesz and KDNP announced that it would use its majority
to adopt a new constitution. The draft of a new Hungarian constitution was pre-
pared behind closed doors and in an opaque manner, and neither members of the
opposition parties nor civil society organizations were involved. The draft consti-
tution was introduced by the government coalition deputies on March 14, 2011
and barely a month later, on April 18, 2011, it was adopted by parliament. None
of the opposition parties voted for the new constitution: some of them did not
even take part in the - anyway stage-managed - parliamentary debate, the oth-
ers voted “no”. The new constitution, called “Basic Law”, was proclaimed by the
President of the Republic on April 25, 2011 and came into force on January 1,
2012.
The constitutional process was followed with great interest by the European
institutions. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (2011a, b) issued
two opinions during the process, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on
the Hungarian Basic Law and a few months later held a debate on Hungary. None
of these actions had any real impact on the process of constitutional drafting or
(with the exception of some technical details) on the text of the constitution.
The name “Basic Law” (Alaptörvény) stands for a certain historicizing atti-
tude, which avoids the word “constitution”, which refers to a single document
(Küpper 2011, p. 295; Vincze and Varju 2012, p.437). It implies respect for the
above-mentioned historical constitution.
Contrary to the political rhetoric that suggested a break in continuity, about
eighty percent of the text came from the democratic constitution of 1989/90. The
decision-makers probably realized that it would have been too risky for them to
experiment with completely new solutions. Therefore, they rejected ideas for the
introduction of a semi-presidential system or a two-chamber system. Hungary
remains a parliamentary one-chamber system.
There were some improvements to codification as well as some positive
changes in content, such as the introduction of a debt brake. The new parts of
the text include partly symbolic or ideological elements, such as a liberal cata-
logue of fundamental rights with ad-hoc restrictions, a conservative preamble and
anti-Marxist rhetoric. But they are rather contradictory and eclectic. For example,
on the one hand there is parliamentary sovereignty to justify the curtailment of
the competences of the Constitutional Court, on the other hand the Parliament’s
The Agony of a Young Constitutional Democracy. The Hungarian … 55

budget sovereignty is limited by a veto right of the Budget Council. The process
and also the text seem to be motivated by ad-hoc decisions: pragmatism was
probably stronger than any ideological components (Sonnevend et al. 2015, p.
108).
The original text of the Basic Law of March 2011 contained no transitional
provisions at all. Point 3 of the final provisions of the Basic Law provided that
the parliament should pass transitional provisions of the Basic Law in accordance
with the rules on constitutional amendments. On this basis, the parliament, as the
constitutional authority, passed these as a kind of annex to the Basic Law on 30
December 2011. However, the transitional provisions included not only the regu-
lations on the transitional period from the old to the new constitution, but also
several new substantive provisions. Some of them contained specific restrictions
on fundamental rights or were obviously intended to counteract the jurispru-
dence of the Constitutional Court. In a dramatic decision, however, the Consti-
tutional Court ruled that the parliament had exceeded its constitutional authority
by adding new rules to the transitional provisions that did not have the character
of transitional provisions. Consequently, it annulled these excessive regulations
(Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága 2012c).
The tendency towards constitutional voluntarism was also expressed in the
changes that followed the adoption of the Basic Law, because sometimes the
desired political result was not achieved on the first attempt. The Basic Law has
been amended seven times to date.
The most important was the fourth amendment of the constitution.5 The main
part of this amendment tries to undo the mentioned decision of the constitutional
court about the repeal of those parts of the transitional provisions which did not
have the character of transitional regulations. Parliament decided to unify the two
text parts of the constitution and added the regulations about the transitional pro-
visions into the text of the constitution. These re-established rules included sub-
stantive provisions such as the competence for the re-allocation of cases by the
president of the country court office (Art. 27 Abs. 4 constitution of Hungary, in
the following: ungGG) or the suspension of the law about the expiration of crimes
which were not prosecuted for political reasons under the communist regime (Art.
U Abs. 6 ungGG). Apart from that, the fourth amendment practically undid all
politically sensitive decisions of the constitutional court after the elections in the
year 2010. This was achieved by taking the content of the laws repealed by the

5 For a good reason alarming analysis of the fourth amendment see Collot (2013).
56 A. Jakab and E. Bodnár

constitutional court into the constitutional text itself and thus making it constitu-
tionally binding.6
This amendment led to a constitution with many specific exceptions with
regard to fundamental rights and with numerous regulations which are normally
regulated at the level of simple statutory law. This not only reduced the level of
protection of fundamental rights, but also the possibility of constitutional review,
which was further reinforced by the requirement for an application and new dead-
lines. Finally, the Fourth Amendment also set the decisions of the Constitutional
Court “out of force”, which had been issued before the Constitution came into
force. Whether this is a ban on quotation, a content-related negation or merely
rhetoric remains controversial in the literature (point 5 of the final provisions of
the Constitution). The Venice Commission (2013) criticized the Fourth Amend-
ment in its statement, which was actually taken up in the Fifth Amendment with
regard to some points of criticism (unrealistically tight deadline for some proce-
dures before the Constitutional Court, reassignment of cases by the President of
the Land Court Office).
The Seventh Amendment, passed in June 2018, is to be seen against the back-
ground of the government’s anti-migration campaign: its main theme was migra-
tion, but in connection with this it also obliged all state institutions to protect the
“identity of the constitution and the Christian culture of Hungary” (Art. R para. 4
of the Constitution). In addition, limits were set for membership of the European
Union: membership of the EU “must be compatible with the fundamental rights
and freedoms as laid down in the Constitution and may not limit Hungary’s indis-
pensable right of disposal in relation to its territorial integrity, population, form
of government and government organization” (Art. E para. 2 of the Constitution).
The Constitution maintained the system of cardinal laws (other translations:
two-thirds laws, key laws): these are laws the enactment, amendment and repeal
of which require a two-thirds majority and which stand in the hierarchy between
simple statutory level and the Constitution. The number of topics that may be
regulated only by cardinal laws remains high, but according to new law the two-
thirds requirement affects fewer fundamental rights but rather state organizational
law. Cardinal laws give rise to the risk of future governments being blocked,
which is problematic in the case of typical day-to-day political decisions, e.g.
on economic and financial matters. In the years 2011 to 2013, new cardinal laws

6 See
for example Art. L Abs. 1 about the definition of family and Art. VII. Abs. 2 and 3
ungGG about the recognition of churches.
The Agony of a Young Constitutional Democracy. The Hungarian … 57

were enacted in almost all areas of state law, so that as a result the entire constitu-
tional system was changed.

3 Overview of the Current Constitutional System

Since the Basic Law came into force, there have been numerous further changes
to the constitutional system. We cannot give a complete overview of all these
changes in this short chapter, but rather intend to take a snapshot of the central
problems of the current state of the Hungarian constitutional system.

3.1 Lack of Stability and Political Instrumentalization

Although an amendment to the Basic Law requires a two-thirds majority of MPs,

it is actually quite flexible, because for most of the time since the Basic Law was
passed, the Hungarian government had such a majority. The Constitution thus
became a tool of politics. The amendments served everyday party political needs,
either by responding to constitutional court decisions or by neutralizing possible
constitutional concerns about certain legislative projects.
In addition, for actual dealings with the legal system from 2010 onwards, an
increasing politicization of legislation in general as well as unpredictability were
characteristic.7 The number of laws enacted has since risen continuously, with
increasingly shorter deadlines for their coming into force. This is disadvantageous
from the point of view of legal certainty and has negative effects on the quality of
legislation, as frequent amendments are necessary.8
While the new constitution maintained the most important institutions of the
constitutional system, several new content creations weakened the counterweights
to the government. The Constitutional Court, which played the decisive role in
the separation of powers in the preceding decades, was the first target of these
measures. Even before the adoption of the constitution, the number of members
of the Constitutional Court was raised from eleven to fifteen, whereby the incum-
bent government was able to elect five new judges at once (Law LXI of 2011).

7 For a lack of legal certainty, see Tölgyessy (2016, p. 17); Szalai and Jakab (2016, p. 116).
8 For statistics on the changes to recently enacted laws, see Sebők et al. (2017, pp. 300,
304).
58 A. Jakab and E. Bodnár

The Basic Law also restricted the competence of the Constitutional Court in
various ways. First, the Fourth Amendment explicitly prohibited the review of
constitutional amendments, except in formal matters (Art. 24 para. 5 ungGG). As
already mentioned, it also invalidated the constitutional court decisions stemming
from the time before the entry into force of the Basic Law.9 The Basic Law also
excluded a wide range of topics from the constitutional review competence, for
example in all cases with regard to the state budget, taxes, duties, contributions
and customs duties (Art. 37 para. 4 ungGG). This means a serious loophole; a
wide field in which the Constitution cannot be applied by judicial control.
Before the Basic Law came into force, anyone could turn to the Constitutional
Court with a norm control application. The Basic Law abolished this actio popu-
laris and introduced a constitutional complaint according to the German model
(Art. 24 ungGG). This change, which had long been demanded by constitutional
lawyers, was intended to reduce the workload of the Constitutional Court. But in
fact this led to a balance which rather makes the Constitutional Court a counter-
weight to the ordinary courts, but not to the legislative and executive power. For
some years now, the Constitutional Court has decided only a fraction of its cases
on the merits, taken a minimalist, non-activist stance in politically sensitive cases,
made use of weaker means (e.g. when it does not annul unconstitutional provi-
sions, but merely finds that the legislature has failed to do so) or simply does not
decide.
While in the case of the Constitutional Court the increase in the number of
members helped to change the composition, in other institutions the opportu-
nity was created to exchange the leaders by renaming them. The six-year term
of office of the incumbent Data Protection Ombudsman was prematurely ended
by the creation of a new national data protection authority. This step was chal-
lenged by the European Commission before the ECJ, whereupon the Hungarian
government finally made a compensation payment to the former Data Protection
Ombudsman to avoid various supranational court proceedings (Court of Justice
of the European Union 2012b). The Constitution provided in its Art. 25 para. 1
ungGG that the previously highest court called the Kúria (a historical Hungar-
ian name for the Supreme Court) and that consequently the term of office of the

9 However, the intention of Parliament was not fully fulfilled. In its decision 13/2013. (VI.
17.) AB, the Constitutional Court held that it was competent to use the judgments of the
decisions taken before the entry into force of the Basic Law if the wording and context of
the interpreted provision of the Basic Law are essentially identical to the wording and con-
text of the Constitution of 1989/1990.
The Agony of a Young Constitutional Democracy. The Hungarian … 59

President of the Supreme Court ended prematurely with the entry into force of
the Constitution. The former President of the Supreme Court turned to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and won the case (European Court of Human Rights
2016a), but his successor remained in office. Since most holders of constitutional
offices are elected by a two-thirds majority of parliament, the government coali-
tion had the power to appoint them without the consent of the opposition parties,
e.g. the Commissioner for Civil Rights, the President of the Kúria, the Presi-
dent of the National Election Office, the Attorney General, the members of the
National Election Commission, the President of the National Audit Office or the
President of the National Bank.
Another goal of the political takeover was the judiciary. The Basic Law
founded a new institution for the administrative affairs of the judiciary, the so-
called State Justice Office. Its president, who is also elected by two-thirds of the
members of parliament, has the most important competences in appointing judges
and presidents of the courts. Although this power was partly limited due to the
criticism of the Venice Commission, the president of the State Justice Office still
has a significant influence in these areas. There are many credible - partly also
publicly made by the media - reports that in the personnel policy of the State Jus-
tice Office a personal relationship to the head of the office was constantly con-
sidered to be much more important than the official performance criteria. This
painfully disintegrates the informal elements of judicial independence (Bencze
and Badó 2016, p. 441).
By introducing a new age limit already before the entry into force of the
Basic Law 2011, about ten percent of all judges, including many in leadership
positions, were relieved of their office within one year. Since the regulation was
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and contrary to European
law by the European Court of Justice, many have regained their judicial office
(but not in a leadership position) (Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága 2012a; Ger-
ichtshof der Europäischen Union 2012a). The latest step in the reform of the jus-
tice system is the introduction of an independent administrative judiciary through
the Seventh Amendment of the Basic Law. These courts will rule on appeals
against administrative decisions, including politically sensitive areas such as elec-
tions or freedom of assembly. Critics - such as the Commissioner for Human
Rights of the Council of Europe (2018) - argue that the new administrative judici-
ary system and, in particular, the pronounced organisational competence of the
Minister of Justice, may pose a risk to judicial independence. With reference
to the international criticism in this regard, the introduction of the independent
administrative judiciary was suspended indefinitely after the European elections
in June 2019.
60 A. Jakab and E. Bodnár

3.2 Manipulation of Democratic Mechanisms

The Basic Law changed the circle of those entitled to vote by abolishing the
restriction of the right to vote according to which a voter must have his residence
in Hungary. This had a considerable influence on the results of the 2018 elec-
tions,10 because this added several thousand new voters from all over the world
to the list of those entitled to vote, who predominantly supported the government
coalition.11
The electoral system itself was also redesigned: It contains elements that
favor the larger parties. As a result, the government coalition received 66.8% of
the mandates with 48% of the votes in the parliamentary elections in 2018. In its
report on the elections, the OSZE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission stated
that they were “characterized by a deep overlap of resources from the state and
the governing parties, which undermined competition on an equal basis. Voters
had a wide range of political options, but the intimidating and xenophobic rheto-
ric, the one-sidedness of the media, and the opaque campaign financing restricted
the space for serious political debates, thereby impeding voters’ ability to make a
fully informed decision” (OSCE 2018).
In the past few decades, the means of direct democracy have played an impor-
tant role in Hungary’s constitutional system (see Pállinger in the following).
The new Basic Law did away with the citizen initiative (a means of setting the
agenda whereby voters could influence the agenda of parliament by collecting
enough signatures), but kept national and local referendums. In practice, there
are almost insurmountable hurdles for referendums initiated by voters or political
parties: The Election Commission and the Kúria, which are responsible for the
preliminary examination of the questions with regard to their compatibility with
the legal rules, systematically reject the politically more critical issues. The only
national referendum since 2010 was initiated by the government and concerned
the migration quotas of the European Union - a question that should not have
been accepted because, according to the Basic Law, a national referendum can

10 According to the Law CXIII of 2018, issued in December 2018, these voters were also
able to vote in the elections to the European Parliament.
11 See for the exact numbers Nemzeti Választási Iroda (2019) and an analysis by Bodnár

and Varsányi (2018).

The Agony of a Young Constitutional Democracy. The Hungarian … 61

only be held on issues falling within the competence of the Hungarian parliament.
However, the referendum was ultimately invalid because of the low voter turnout.

3.3 Liberal Catalogue of Fundamental Rights

with Exceptions and Diminishing Effectiveness

The Basic Law contained a catalogue of fundamental rights of Western ori-

entation, which was even broader than that of the Constitution of 1989/90 and
included some new rights derived from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
such as the prohibition of cloning (Art. III para. 3 of the Basic Law) or the right
to good administration (Art. XXIV of the Basic Law).
However, the Fourth Amendment and the Seventh Amendment to the Constitu-
tion introduced some specific exceptions to various fundamental rights that aim
to “correct” the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. For example, Art. IV.
Abs. 2 ungGG allows for a life sentence without parole for “intentional violent
crimes”. The European Court of Human Rights (2016b) held that the Hungar-
ian provision is incompatible with the ECHR because it constitutes inhuman or
degrading treatment. However, the regulation remained unchanged. Rejecting
a decision of the Constitutional Court that the concept of family restricted to a
marriage between a man and a woman is too narrow because the state should
also protect long-term emotional and economic partnerships of cohabiting per-
sons (Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága 2012b), with the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution Art. L Abs. 1 of the Constitution was amended accordingly,
that “family ties are based on a marriage or the relationship between parents”. So
today’s constitution excludes different forms of families in the sociological sense
from the legal definition of family.
The analysis shows that the level of protection of fundamental rights has been
significantly lowered, for example in the case of freedom of information and
freedom of assembly, when considering the laws and, in particular, daily prac-
tice. Serious cases are pending before national and international human rights
courts, e.g. concerning academic freedom in the so-called lex CEU,12 concerning

12 Case C-66/18 European Commission against Hungary. The Hungarian Constitutional

Court suspended its proceedings until the decision of the ECJ, see the decisions of the Con-
stitutional Court 3199/2018. (VI. 21.) and 3200/2018. (VI. 21.) AB. See also the chapter of
Várszegi in this volume.
62 A. Jakab and E. Bodnár

freedom of association with regard to the designation of NGOs as “funded from

abroad”13 or concerning the dignity of persons who are punished for their home-
lessness.14

4 The Constitutional System’s International, Social

and Cultural Background

Looking only at the Constitution alone is not enough to understand the Hungarian
constitutional system. Many problematic provisions can be found in simple laws
or cardinal laws, or they arise in practice and can only be understood in the context
of legal culture and taking into account the international, social and cultural back-
ground (Jakab 2018, p. 10 ff.). The problems of constitutionalism actually lie less
in the change of formal rules than in the change of practice. These changes were
made possible by the social and cultural context. The selective personnel continu-
ity in independent institutions, the election and appointment of holders of public
offices without cross-party consensus or debate, and finally the informal influence
on the activities of institutions by these new leaders, all jeopardize the independ-
ence of these institutions and thus pose a risk to the separation of powers. 15
Although the text of the Basic Law, with a few exceptions, could even be the
basis for a well-functioning constitutional state, factors outside the constitutional
regulations have the opposite effect. Institutionalized corruption, the lack of (and
further shrinking) media pluralism, and an illiberal political rhetoric all contribute
to the gradual weakening of the rule-of-law institutions. The various rule-of-law
indices (Freedom in the World, World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, World-
wide Governance Indicators Rule of Law Index) all come to similar conclusions:

13 Case C-78/18 European Commission against Hungary. The Hungarian Constitutional

Court suspended its proceedings until the decision of the ECJ, see the decision of the Con-
stitutional Court 3198/2018. (VI. 21.) AB.
14 Four regular judges turned to the Constitutional Court and criticized the unconstitutional-

ity of the aforementioned provision of law: See Reg. Num. III / 01.727 / 2018, III / 01.829
/ 2018, III / 01.704 / 2018 and III / 01.628 / 2018. The applications were rejected by the
Constitutional Court, see the decision of the Constitutional Court 19/2019. (VI. 18.) AB.
15 For an empirical analysis of government influence on the Hungarian Constitutional

Court, see Szente (2016).

The Agony of a Young Constitutional Democracy. The Hungarian … 63

10.00
9.00
8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
Democracy Index and Market
4.00 Economy Index together

3.00 Democracy Index

Rule of law
2.00
(democracy sub-index)
1.00 Market Economy Index
0.00
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Fig. 1 Hungary in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2006-2018

a slow, gradual erosion that started from a very good starting point by interna-
tional standards (Jakab 2018, p. 14 ff.). This is exemplarily shown in Fig. 1 using
the values in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index.
The figure shows that Hungary initially had a value of around 9 points just
below the maximum value of 10. The index values show that there was no sud-
den crash, but a slow but steady erosion took place, which gets worse every year.
Since February 2019, Hungary (as the only EU member state) has been classi-
fied by Freedom House as “partly free” rather than “free” in its rating (Freedom
House 2019).
The EU has long postponed stricter measures to protect the rule of law. How-
ever, on September 12, 2018, the European Parliament proposed to the Coun-
cil that it establishes that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the values
referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union by Hungary. This can
lead to the application of the Article-7-EUV mechanism. However, a unanimous
decision by the European Council is required to suspend Hungary’s voting rights
and impose sanctions - a step that can therefore be blocked by a single other
Member State.
64 A. Jakab and E. Bodnár

5 Resume and Outlook

In the last three decades, the Hungarian legal system has undergone two funda-
mental changes: the first was the dismantling of socialism and the establishment
of liberal democracy, the second was the dismantling of liberal democracy and
the establishment of a hybrid regime. The first meant a targeted approach to the
Western values of modern constitutionalism, especially in its German form (gen-
erally: protection of fundamental rights and separation of powers; more specifi-
cally: human dignity as a key concept and strong constitutional jurisdiction in the
state organizational structure), while the second meant a gradual, yet deliberate
departure from it. This erosion of the rule of law since 2010 is also quantifiable
with rule of law indices.
The previous steps taken by the EU have proved to be insufficient to stop or
reverse this downward trend. Without serious external pressure, however, there is
only a small chance that this process will change in the near future. And even if
the constitutional system is restored one day, the re-establishment of the rule of
law culture surrounding the constitutional system will be a longer and more chal-
lenging process.

References

Bencze, M., and A. Badó. 2016. A magyar bírósági rendszer hatékonyságát és az ítélkezés
színvonalát befolyásoló strukturális és személyi feltételek. In A magyar jogrendszer
állapota, eds. A. Jakab and G. Gajduschek. Budapest: MTA TK JTI.
Bodnár, E., and B. Varsányi. 2018. Decision of the Hungarian constitutional court on the
exercise of the right to vote of Hungarian citizens living abroad. Hungarian yearbook of
international law and European law 2017:427–458.
Collot, Pierre-Alain. 2013. Difficulté contre-majoritaire et usage impérieux du pouvoir con-
stitutant dérivé au regard de la quatrième révision de la Loi fondamentale de Hongrie.
Revue française de Droit constitutionnel 96:789–812.
European Court of Human Rights. 2016a. Baka v. Hungary, no. 20261/12, Judgment of 23
June 2016.
Freedom House. 2019. Europe. https://freedomhouse.org/regions/europe. Accessed: 12 Dec
2019.
Court of Justice of the European Union. 2012a. Europäische Kommission gegen Ungarn.
Rechtssache C-286/12.
Court of Justice of the European Union. 2012b. Europäische Kommission gegen Ungarn.
Rechtssache C-288/12.
Jakab, András. 2018. What is Wrong with the Hungarian Legal System and How to Fix
it. Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL)
Research Paper No. 2018–13. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213378. Accessed: 14 Feb
2019.
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Kukorelli, István. 2018. Alkotmánytörténeti áttekintés. In Alkotmányos tanok I., eds. E.

Bodnár and Z. Pozsár-Szentmiklósy. Budapest: HVG-ORAC.
Küpper, Herbert. 2011. Einführung in das ungarische Recht. München: Beck.
Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága. 2012a. 33/2012 (VII.1).
Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága. 2012b. 43/2012 (XII. 20) AB.
Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága. 2012c. 45/2012 (XII. 29.) AB.
Nemzeti Választási Iroda. 2019. www.valasztas.hu. Accessed: 6 Dec 2019.
OSCE. 2018. Hungary parliamentary elections 8 April 2018. Warschau: ODIHR limited
election observation mission final report.
Sebők, M., B. Kubik, and C. Molnár. 2017. A törvények formális minősége – Egy empiri-
kus vázlat. In Trendek a magyar politikában 2. A Fidesz és a többiek: pártok, mozgal-
mak, politikán, eds. Z. Boda and A. Szabó, 285–311. Budapest: Napvilág.
Sonnevend, P., A. Jakab, and L. Csink. 2015. The constitution as an instrument of every-
day party politics: The Basic Law of Hungary. In Constitutional Crisis in the European
Constitutional Area, eds. A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend, 33–109. Kooperation-
swerk Beck – Hart – Nomos.
Szalai, A., and A. Jakab. 2016. Jog mint a gazdasági fejlődés infrastruktúrája. In A magyar
jogrendszer állapota, eds. A. Jakab and G. Gajduschek. Budapest: MTA TK JTI.
Szente, Zoltán. 2016. Die politische Orientierung der Mitglieder des ungarischen Verfas-
sungsgerichts zwischen 2010 und 2014. Jahrbuch für Ostrecht 1:45–67.
Tölgyessy, Péter. 2016. Politika mindenekelőtt: Jog és hatalom Magyarországon. In A mag-
yar jogrendszer állapota, eds. A. Jakab and G. Gajduschek. Budapest: MTA TK JTI.
Venice Commission. 2011a. Opinion on three legal questions arising in the process of
drafting the new constitution of Hungary (No 614/2011, 28 March 2011).
Venice Commission. 2011b. Opinion on the new Constitution of Hungary (No. 618/2011,
17–18 June 2011).
Venice Commission. 2013. Opinion on the fourth amendment of the fundamental law of
Hungary (No 720/2013, 14 June 2013).
Vincze, A., und M. Varju. 2012. Hungary the new fundamental law. European Public Law
18:437–453.

Further Literature

Bertelsmann Transformation Index. 2019. Transformation Index BTI. https://www.bti-pro-

ject.org/en/home/. Accessed: 12 Dec 2019.
European Court of Human Rights. 2016b. T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary, no. 37871/14 and
73986/14, Judgment of 4 October 2016.
Council of Europe. 2018. Commissioner calls on Hungary’s President to return to the Par-
liament the legislative package on administrative courts. https://www.coe.int/en/web/
commissioner/-/commissioner-calls-on-hungary-s-president-to-return-to-the-parlia-
ment-the-legislative-package-on-administrative-courts. Accessed: 12 Feb 2019.
Court of Justice of the European Union. 2018a. Europäische Kommission gegen Ungarn.
Rechtssache C-66/18.
66 A. Jakab and E. Bodnár

Court of Justice of the European Union. 2018b. Europäische Kommission gegen Ungarn.
Rechtssache C-78/18.
Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága. 2013. 13/2013 (VI. 17) AB.

Prof. Dr. András Jakab is Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law in the
Department of Public Law, International and European Law at the University of Salzburg.
Contact: [email protected]

Dr. habil. Eszter Bodnár Ph.D. is a university lecturer at the Department of Constitu-
tional Law of the Faculty of Law of Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) in Budapest.
Contact: [email protected]
Judicial Review and Politics
in Hungary 1990–2018

Kálmán Pócza

1 Introduction

According to one of the most famous narratives of the late 1990s, the Hungar-
ian Constitutional Court (HCC) enjoyed - even in global comparison - a uniquely
powerful position within the Hungarian political system, which the judges very
tactically used at the beginning of the democratization process. In addition to the
broad formal competences that were guaranteed to the court during the regime
change, this potential was based above all on the institution of the actio popu-
laris. That every citizen could initiate an abstract norm control procedure at the
HCC without any restrictions as an applicant was a significant factor in the for-
mation of authority and the expansion of the power potential of the Constitutional
Court. However, nobody at the so-called “National Round Table Talks” of 1989
expected that the HCC would deal so clever with its power and become one of the
most important political actors of the democratic transformation and consolida-
tion process.
This unique position undoubtedly changed in 2010: Due to the significant
institutional and personnel changes, observers believe that only a remnant of its
former glory remained with the court. Legal scholars are almost in agreement
that the quality of jurisprudence has declined. Some argue that the HCC has suc-
cumbed to the right-wing conservative parliamentary two-thirds majority (Bencze
and Kovács 2014). Others saw that the authority of the Constitutional Court and
its determination to protect the principles of the rule of law had not completely

K. Pócza (*)
Mathias Corvinus Collegium, University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 67

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_4
68 K. Pócza

faded and emphasized that a bias in favor of the right-wing conservative govern-
ment only became obviously and dominant when the new judges, all of whom
were elected by the right-wing conservative government majority after 2010,
formed a majority on the HCC, i.e. since approximately May 2013 (Lembcke and
Boulanger 2012; Halmai 2014).
The present article pursues the aim of shedding light on the changes in the
institutional structure and practice of Hungarian constitutional adjudication. First,
an overview will be given of the international political context and the interna-
tional academic discussion of the relationship between politics and constitutional
adjudication. This will be followed by an examination of the origin, structure
and development of the HCC in the period from 1990 to 2018. Against this back-
ground, the practice of constitutional adjudication will be analysed and it will be
examined whether the predominantly positive narrative of Hungarian legal schol-
arship or the critical narrative of the conservative Orbán government can be justi-
fied with regard to the HCC’s ability in the 1990s and 2000s. The narrative of
the legal scholarship claims that constitutional adjudication in Hungary has been
quite apolitically before 2010, that the HCC made its decisions free of political
influence, and that the institution was only politicised after 2010. In contrast, the
dominant narrative of the conservative government after 2010 argued that the
HCC has accumulated too much power after 1990 and that a rebalancing of the
power relations was therefore necessary.

2 International Context and Academic Discussion

Before the Second World War, the possibility of a judicial review and repeal of
laws passed by parliament was unknown in most Western democracies (with the
exception of Austria, Czechoslovakia and the United States). However, after 1945
there were three waves of democratization in which former authoritarian states
introduced a new model of democracy. In this model, a body separate from the
ordinary judiciary, operating at the frontier of law and politics, could review and
even repeal laws for their unconstitutionality. First in Germany and Italy, then in
Portugal and Spain and finally in the countries of the Eastern and Central Euro-
pean region, constitutional courts were established as powerful institutions of
checks and balances into the newly democratized systems, in particular to protect
fundamental rights of citizens.
This model of democracy has been so dominant since the early 1990s that it
has been considered in former Eastern and Central European states as the only
Judicial Review and Politics in Hungary 1990–2018 69

valid model of democracy (Stone Sweet 2004). The rise and spread of consti-
tutional review has become a global trend (Ginsburg 2008; Lustig and Weiler
2018). Although it was sometimes convenient for politicians to leave sensitive
and politically costly decisions to constitutional courts, judges have been increas-
ingly criticized in consolidated democracies because of their lack of legitimacy
(Shapiro 1999). Critics emphasize that constitutional courts, which have only
indirect democratic legitimacy, have the last word in such matters which (after
a lively public discussion) should rather be decided directly by the people or by
their political representatives.
In the last two decades, political and legal scholars who have followed the
rise of national and global “juristocracy” with concern have drawn attention to
the downside of this model of democracy (Stone Sweet 2000; Hirschl 2004; Wal-
dron 2006). The model referred to as “legal constitutionalism” has been criticized
from the perspective of “political constitutionalism” (political constitutional-
ism). While proponents of legal constitutionalism see the supremacy of constitu-
tional courts as the most effective means of protection against the tyranny of the
democratic majority, proponents of political constitutionalism associate constitu-
tional courts, which can annul laws passed by the parliamentary majority, with
a tyranny of the minority and the abolition of political equality (Bellamy 2007).
Given the ongoing international debate between legal and political constitutional-
ists, it is rather surprising that constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe
were able to quickly and easily establish their positions immediately after the
democratic transition. There were no public or scientific debates about whether
the model of legal constitutionalism and the supremacy of constitutional courts
would really be the best model for transformation countries. Although there are
significant differences as far as the competences of the constitutional courts of
the Central and Eastern European region is concerned, the concepts of democ-
racy and constitutional review seemed to have grown so inseparably together as if
democracy without judicial review would be inconceivable (Sadurski 2002; Blok-
ker 2013).
From the perspective of democratic theory, this inseparable intertwining of
democracy and constitutional review is rather problematic. An elitist institution
that takes decisions behind closed doors on the most important political ques-
tions and promulgates its dictum (which tolerates no contradiction) in a rather
obscure legal language and through theatrical staging does not correspond at
all to the postulates of the ideas of the participatory or deliberative democracy.
Despite (or because of) the global triumph of constitutional review, theoretical
approaches, which does ot regard judicial review of legal norms as a constitutive
70 K. Pócza

and ­indispensable element of democracy, have become more and more visible in
the academic discussion (Gardbaum 2015). Supporters of the participatory, con-
sociational, deliberative or egalitarian model of democracy, but also the advocates
of the majoritarian democracy, have very serious reservations about the legiti-
macy, theory and practice of constitutional review (Pócza 2015).
While these theories of democracy are rather sceptical about the benefits of
judicial review, Hungarian legal scholars almost exclusively enthusiastically wel-
comed the global triumph of constitutional review. Prior to 2010, the practice of
constitutional review was occasionally criticized by politicians but no one has
questioned the existence and necessity of the institution of constitutional review
(Pokol 1992, 1994). Given the global trends, it can be concluded that the practice
of judicial review in Hungary developed in line with these global trends or even
served as a reference point in domestic and international academic discussion.
This has changed fundamentally after the parliamentary elections in 2010:
in contrast to the global trends, the HCC was clearly weakened - but not abol-
ished. However, the changes after 2010 did not follow a democratic theory-based,
coherent concept; rather, they were based on the day-to-day and power political
interests of the right- wing government. As mentioned above, according to the
dominant narrative of the Orbán government, the HCC had become a too power-
ful political actor after the democratic transformation process of 1989/90, unduly
restricting the room for maneuver of democratically legitimate legislators. There-
fore, the sovereignty of the parliament should be strengthened and the compe-
tences of the Constitutional Court curtailed.

3 Origin, Structure and Development of the

Constitutional Court

After the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the HCC was the second constitutional
court to be established during the democratic transition of 1989/90 in the former
socialist countries. In contrast to Poland, where judicial review of legislation had
historical precedents, the constitutional review was unknown in the Hungarian
legal and constitutional tradition. While the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was
already established in 1986, i.e. before the democratic system change, the estab-
lishment of the HCC was the result of negotiations on the democratic transition at
the Round Table Talks of 1989 (Sadurski 2002, 2014; Luchterhandt et al. 2007).
This means that the HCC was in fact the first constitutional court to be estab-
lished during a democratic transformation process with almost complete demo-
cratic legitimacy.
Judicial Review and Politics in Hungary 1990–2018 71

The democratic legitimacy of the HCC was, however, only nearly complete.
The National Round Table Talks between the Communist elite and the demo-
cratic opposition began in June 1989 and showed a dynamic that nobody had
expected at the beginning of the transformation process. At first, it was only about
working out the most important legal provisions of the first democratic parlia-
mentary elections; all other important questions were to be decided by the demo-
cratically elected parliament (Bozóki et al. 2016; Tőkés 1996). At the end of the
process, in October 1989, the old Communist Constitution of 1949 was changed
so extensively, that, according to a common saying, only the name of the Hungar-
ian capital remained unchanged. The establishment of the HCC was not a priority
of the democratic opposition - at least not at the beginning of the transformation
process. It was rather initiated by the Communist Party elite - mainly in order to
have another institution in which the Communist elite preserve strong positions
(Ginsburg 2003, p. 19; Hirschl 2004, p. 50).
Due to the special self-dynamics of the negotiations in summer of 1989, the
democratic opposition was increasingly willing to accept the establishment of a
constitutional court, but only under the condition that 1) the decisions of the con-
stitutional court should be final (i.e. they cannot be overridden by the parliament);
2) the group of potential applicants should be as wide as possible (introduction of
the so-called actio popularis); and 3) the election of the 15 constitutional judges
should take place in three stages (the first five judges by the last communist
parliament, the next five judges in the first and the last five in the second post-
socialist legislative period) (Bozóki 2002, pp. 107–191). Although the first five
judges of the HCC were actually elected by the last communist parliament, two
judges were nominated by the democratic opposition, two more by the Hungarian
Socialist Workers’ Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP) and one by
consensus of the two political camps. Three were professors of law, one was pre-
viously ordinary judge and the fifth served as Deputy Minister of Justice between
1988 and 1989.
The HCC began its work with five judges on January 1, 1990, just four months
before the first democratic elections and about half a year before the first demo-
cratic parliament was convened. In the summer of 1990, five more constitutional
judges were elected by the parliament, so that the court thereafter consisted of
nine to ten judges (Brunner 2000, p. 65). Actually, the last five judges were sup-
posed to be elected in the second legislative period (1994 to 1998), but due to
lack of consensus, no more judges were ever elected. Instead, the number of con-
stitutional judges was reduced by a constitutional amendment in November 1994
to eleven (Law No. LXXIV/1994).
72 K. Pócza

The polarization of political life also caused serious problems later. The selec-
tion of judges was a highly politicized process because the one-chamber parlia-
ment nominated and elected them by a simpe two-thirds majority (Körösényi
et al. 2009, p. 34). Since the HCC was constantly on the verge of being unable to
pass resolutions (due to the vacant positions on its benches), the practice of elect-
ing two judges, one conservative and one liberal, became the informal standard.
The filling of vacant positions therefore often took several months and sometimes
directly endangered the functioning of the HCC. Before the election of the judges
in a plenary session of the parliament, an ad hoc committee was set up with one
representative from each parliamentary group. The candidates not only had to be
supported by a two-thirds majority in the plenum, but also in this ad hoc commit-
tee, which implied that no successful election was possible without the consent
of the opposition parties until 2010. The committee served as a formal institution
and at the same time as a barrier for governments that had a two-thirds majority
in the plenum - as it was the case during the socialist-liberal government between
1994 and 1998.
Between 1990 and 2010, judges were elected for nine years and could be re-
elected once. Until 2012, the President of the HCC was elected for three years by
the HCC itself; however, this mandate could be extended several times (Schwartz
2000, p. 78). The structure of the HCC between 1990 and 2010 was quite simple.
Although there were chambers with three judges, the most important decisions
were made exclusively in the plenary session of the court. The court decided its
decisions by simple majority. According to the law on the HCC of 1989, the par-
liament would have had to pass a law on the rules of procedure of the HCC: How-
ever, this was delayed continuously. In 2001, the HCC finally passed its own rules
of procedure. This meant that the court worked in a rather opaque way between
1990 and 2001: General rules were set by the Constitution of 1989 and the Law
on the HCC, but specific rules for the procedure emerged rather in practice. How-
ever, these procedural rules were not officially published until 2001, which was
certainly a paradoxical situation (Brunner 2000, p. 65).
In terms of the HCC’s competence, all forms of constitutional review were
introduced in 1989 with the exception of the German type constitutional com-
plaint (Dezső and Somody 2010, p. 184). A priori and a posteriori norm control,
constitutional complaint against laws applied by the ordinary courts and abstract
constitutional interpretation could be initiated, but a constitutional complaint
against the decisions of the ordinary courts could not be filed until 2012. This, for
example, meant that serious conflicts between the ordinary courts and the HCC
were almost never registered. Since the institution of actio popularis guaranteed
that all important issues ended up on the court’s table, it was almost irrelevant
Judicial Review and Politics in Hungary 1990–2018 73

which other political actors (government, head of state, parliamentary representa-

tives or, indeed, ordinary judges) were entitled to file a petition (Dupré 2003, p.
37). Although some public hearings took place in the first months of its existence,
the court otherwise dealt with applications behind closed doors. From all this it
followed that the HCC functioned as a counterweight to political actors (govern-
ment and parliamentary majority), while the review of decisions of the ordinary
courts was not possible. The HCC was therefore a politicized institution from the
very beginning. But it has found its place in the Hungarian political system.
In 2010, the political context changed dramatically (Sonnevend et al. 2015).
In the 2010 parliamentary elections, Fidesz and KDNP achieved an two-thirds
majority in parliament. In one of the first sessions of the new legislative period,
the rules for the election of constitutional judges were changed. The composi-
tion of the parliamentary committee responsible for the election of judges was
changed in such a way that the parties received seats in proportion to their share
of all mandates. This paved the way for candidates who were not supported by
consensus, but exclusively by the right-wing parliamentary two-thirds majority
(Sonnevend et al. 2015, p. 44). With this change, two new judges were elected.
Seven more judges followed by May 2013.
This allows the governing parties to influence the composition of the court
in the long term. The judges elected before 2010 initially continued to form the
majority (8:7). Only after a new wave of judge elections in the spring of 2013 did
the new judges form the majority. When Fidesz-KDNP lost its two-thirds major-
ity in parliament due to by-elections in 2015 (which it only regained in 2018), it
had to ompromise with the opposition in order to elect new judges. In November
2016, four new constitutional judges were elected with the support of the green
opposition party (LMP 1).
Further changes concerned the term of the judges. They are elected for twelve
years without the possibility of re-election. While this fundamentally promotes
the autonomy of the court on the one hand, autonomy was restricted to some
extent on the other hand, since the president of the new HCC is no longer elected
by the members of the court, but by the parliament. The president of the HCC
appoints the “rapporteur-judge” in each case, who prepares the first draft of a
decision. In this respect, the autonomy of the HCC was certainly greater when the
Constitutional Court still elected the President.

1 Lehet Más a Politika (Politics Can Be Different).

74 K. Pócza

Commentators see the change in the composition of the judges as the deci-
sive turning point for the HCC (Vincze 2014; Kelemen 2017): From 2010 to May
2013, it struggled with the two-thirds majority . Both sides have either threat-
ened or used far-reaching sanctions: The two-thirds majority of parliament has
repeatedly amended the constitution to circumvent controversial decisions of
the HCC (such as the one on the compensation of former civil servants or the
compulsory retirement age of ordinary judges), while the court threatened with
a constitutional review of the constitutional amendments (decision no. 61/2011
and 45/2012). This development came to a standstill when the judges elected
by Fidesz and KDNP after 2010 had the majority in the HCC. Since May 2013,
compliance with the government’s will has become the dominant behaviour of the
majority of judges.
Fidesz-KDNP also changed the competences of the HCC. As a result of
a series of constitutional amendments between 2010 and 2014, the HCC is no
longer competent to review legislation on public finance, unless it concerns
human dignity, the protection of personal data, Hungarian citizenship or freedom
of conscience and religion. This restriction of competences was incorporated into
the new constitution, which came into force on 1 January 2012.
The spectrum of potential applicants was extended as far as abstract a priori
reviews is concerned, but drastically restricted in the case of a posteriori review:
While the institution of actio popularis was abolished, only the government, 25%
of the deputies, the President of the Supreme Court (Kúria), the Attorney General
and the Ombudsman can file a petition in a posteriori review process. While no
one had demanded a change with regard to a priori review, some scholars and
even the former President of the HCC had argued that the abolition of the actio
popularis (and the introduction of the German type constitutional complaint)
could serve the depoliticization of the HCC (Bragyova 2010, pp. 59–61; Paczolay
2010, p. 44).

4 Judicial Review in Practice 1990 to 2018

The establishment of the HCC, the rapid stabilization of its authority, and the
reforms after 2010 are indeed important events, but they only incompletely repre-
sent the developments concerning the practice of judicial review in Hungary. The
reactions to the escalation of the conflict between the HCC and the second Orbán
government after 2010 can only be understood by taking into account the prac-
tice of the court’s activities, the changes in the international political context, and
Judicial Review and Politics in Hungary 1990–2018 75

the academic discussions on the benefits and perils of constitutional review. The
Orbán government justified the curtailment of competences and the restructuring
of the HCC after 2010 by the fact that the HCC had excessively restricted the
sovereignty of parliament and the room to maneuver of democratically legitimate
governments from the very beginning.
The HCC was also recorded among the legal scholars as one of the most effec-
tive institution checking the political power and as a “legendary” defender of
human rights. Although some critical analyses claimed that the initial activism
had faded away later (Halmai 2002), the institution was considered to be a neutral
and politically neutral veto player which was powerful but never abused its com-
petences in favor of political decision-makers (Scheppele 1999, 2006).
Whether and to what extent these assessments are actually true will be exam-
ined below using a quantitative analysis of all relevant decisions of the HCC
between 1990 and 2018. Individual decisions of theHCC are deliberately not
addressed. In the research project JUDICON, an index was developed that meas-
ures the strength of the court’s decisions and answers the question of to what
extent constitutional courts constrained the room for maneuver of the legislator
(Pócza et al. 2017, 2019a, b).2
First, the analysis shows that the HCC does not stand out with its rigor
towards the legislature and the parliamentary majority in the regional comparison
(Pócza et al.2019b). If one disregard the first year of its activity, it can be seen
that the HCC did not exercise its competences with excessive harshness in the
period from 1990 to 2010 (see Fig. 1). This means that the narrative of the con-
servative government after 2010 should be corrected just as much as the dominant
narrative of legal scholarship. In general, we can argue that the HCC has rather
modestly restrained the room for maneuver of the legislator. However, between

2 While HCC’s decisions are always binding erga omnes, they can constrain legislative
options to varying degrees. If, for example, the court only detect procedural errors, the leg-
islature could re-enact its political program unchanged without substantive revision of the
bill. The Court quased the bill only on procedural grounds. On the other hand, if the court
annul a legislative act on a substantive ground, the legislative proposal should be changed
as far as its substantive content is concerned - a comparatively “stronger” restriction of the
legislative scope of action. The term “strength” can best be grasped with a metaphor from
the field of boxing: It is about the “punch” and its strength, not about the effect the blow
has on the other boxer (whether he dodges with a sidestep or goes down with a knockout).
For the exact methodology of the strength index, see: Pócza and Dobos 2019. For the pro-
ject see: https://judiconeu.uni-nke.hu/.
76 K. Pócza

7.0

6.0

5.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

0.0

Czech Republic Poland Hungary Romania Slovakia

Fig. 1 The strength of rulings 1990 to 2015. (Source JUDICON research project (https://
judiconeu.uni-nke.hu/))

2010 and 2013 it actually acted as a strong veto player and decisively restricted
the legislator’s leeway. The year 2012, in which the conflict between the HCC
and the parliamentary two-thirds majority reached its peak, stands out in particu-
lar.
Although the court already enjoyed significant authority in the early 1990s, at
that time it rather prompted a kind of dialogue with the legislature by mitigating
its decisions through a temporal limitation or a partial annulment of the contested
legal norms. Other mild forms of sanctions were the finding of a legislative omis-
sion without further legal consequences, declaration of a procedural unconstitu-
tionality, or the interpretation of the legal norm in harmony with the constitution
without annuling it (Pócza et al. 2019a). In contrast to more constraining forms
of decisions (e.g. finding of a substantial unconstitutionaity), by “softer” deci-
sions the legal system is spared, but at the same time the legislature is prompted
to repeal the constitutional infringement itself. This dialogue-friendly mentality
changed rapidly after 2010. It was first replaced by a confrontational, and after
2013 by a more government-friendly attitude, as the indicators of the strength
index show. That the HCC kept the legislature under strong control from the very
beginning is therefore a myth.
Judicial Review and Politics in Hungary 1990–2018 77

Number of rulings
100
Number of rulings with at least one dissenng opinion
Number of dissenng opinions
90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

Fig. 2 Number of dissenting opinions at HCC, 1990 to 2018. (Source JUDICON research
project (https://judiconeu.uni-nke.hu/))

The same applies to the dominant assessment of legal scholarship that the
HCC acted apolitically or neutral before 2010, and it only became politicized
after 2010. It is true that the court in its first period (1990-1998) under the presi-
dency of László Sólyom had really only published dissenting opinions (a possible
sign of politicization and polarization of the court) very rarely, which certainly
contributed to the rapid establishment of its authority. But in the post-Sólyom era,
from 1999 to 2010, the constitutional judges published more and more dissenting
opinions; their number even skyrocketed after 1999 (see Fig. 2).
Polarization, which is reflected in the increasing number of dissenting opions,
might have various reasons that have nothing to do with politics. Different meth-
ods of legal interpretation, different views of judicial activism or different views
on moral issues can contribute to the fact that judges publish a dissenting opinion.
But a kind of political logic is certainly to be assumed when a minority coalition
of judges with the same political background publishes one or more divergent
opinions with the same tenor. And that was precisely the dominant attitude of
the judges who opposed the majority decisions in their dissents even before 2010.
It should be stressed that politically homogeneous minority coalitions published
their dissenting opinions: Judges who had been nominated by the left-wing politi-
cal camp almost exclusively formed “dissenting coalitions” among ­themselves.
78 K. Pócza

The same applies before 2010 to the right-wing judges - but to a lesser extent,
although the newly elected right-wing judges between 2010 and 2013 also
formed a very cohesive group (see 3).
In addition, the data show that coalition formation followed the party-political
logic when it came to politically important issues (Pócza et al. 2019c). Appar-
ently, the left-wing judges were aware of which petitions were politically sensi-
tive even before 2010. In politically less salient questions, they were willing to
abandon the party-political logic, and they formed relatively more cross-party
coalitions. At the same time, it is also true that a right-wing majority of the court
has declared a law to be unconstitutional more likely if it was passed by a left-
wing parliamentary majority, and a right-wing majority of the judges was less
willing to annul the laws of a right-wing parliamentary majority. This applies not
only to the period after 2010, but already before 2010 (Pócza et al. 2020).
Both phenomena point to the same trend: The HCC was already very polit-
icized before 2010, although the party-political logic of the judiciary prevailed
above all in politically sensitive questions. The party-political logic did not deter-
mine the behavior of the judges alone and political bias was not decisive in every
case and under all circumstances. But the assumption of a court strongly isolated
from politics is certainly an illusion.

Fig. 3 Dissenting coalitions at the HCC in politically relevant cases, 1990 to 2018. The
thickness of the lines refers to the frequency of dissenting coalition. (Source JUDICON
research project (https://judiconeu.uni-nke.hu/))
Judicial Review and Politics in Hungary 1990–2018 79

The most important difference between the HCC before and after 2010 there-
fore lies not in the politicization of constitutional adjudication. The essential dif-
ference lies in a shift of party-political logic in the sense that it (with individual
exceptions) became the dominant motivational pattern of judicial decision-mak-
ing after 2010. Even more important than this shift is the right-wing majority,
which after 2013 turned into a majority of the new right-wing judges (elected
after 2010). The two phenomena - shift in emphasis in the motivational pattern
and majority of the new right-wing judges - have jointly led to the fact that legal
scholars have taken a very critical position with regard to the practice of constitu-
tional adjudication after 2010.

5 Conclusion

The Hungarian Constitutional Court enjoyed undoubtedly its heyday direct

after the democratic transformation process of 1989/90. The legal scholarship
and international organizations have celebrated the HCC as a model of a brave,
activist court that intensively constrains the legislature and radically restricts the
leeway of the current government. This positive but idealized image must be cor-
rected in the light of the systematic analysis presented above. This also applies to
the counterpart of this narrative: The right-wing government has often justified
the restructuring of the HCC after 2010 by the fact that the court has excessively
used its power and has constrained to heavily the government of the day. Empiri-
cal data refute this narrative as well.
Data rather showed that the HCC was not an outlier; in the regional compari-
son its performance could be assessed rather as average. However, the data also
refute another misconception: The HCC was already a highly politicized body
even before 2010. The difference lies rather in the extent of the politicization
which increased significantly after 2010.

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Traditional Social Cleavages and their
Impact on the Hungarian Party System

Melani Barlai

1 Introduction

After the change of system in 1989/1990, the newly created party system in Hun-
gary gained a stable structure compared to other countries in the region very
quickly. A number of political parties had already been newly or re-founded
before that, so that the basic structures of a pluralistic party system were already
in place before the first democratic elections in the spring of 1990. Five of the six
parties that entered parliament after the first free elections in 1990 were also rep-
resented in the fifth democratic legislative period between 2006 and 2010. In the
initially three-dimensional party system, roughly Christian-conservative, liberal
and social democratic parties could be distinguished. During the first two legis-
lative periods, this basic structure developed into a bipolar party competition, in
which one large party dominated the left or the right camp. In addition, two to
three smaller parties regularly managed to enter parliament.
On the left side of the political spectrum, the Hungarian Socialist Party (Mag-
yar Szocialista Párt, MSZP), which emerged from the Communist Hungarian
Socialist Workers’ Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP) as the suc-
cessor party, formed as the strongest force. After its poor performance in the first
democratic elections in the spring of 1990, it was able to quickly profile itself as
a social democratic party and (re-)gain the trust of left-wing voters. This was the
basis for it to emerge as the strongest party from the parliamentary elections in
1994 and take over the government.

M. Barlai (*)
Andrássy University Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 83

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_5
84 M. Barlai

On the right side of the political spectrum, the Young Democrats (Fiatal
Demokraták Szövetsége, Fidesz) developed into the dominant force. Founded
in 1988 as a liberal youth movement, the party underwent a programmatic rea-
lignment at the end of the first democratic legislative period, moving from the
liberal to the national-conservative camp. The associated orientation towards
bourgeois society was also reflected in the addition of the abbreviation MPP
(Magyar Polgári Párt, Hungarian Civic Party) to the party name. The other parties
of the Christian-conservative party family—the Hungarian Democratic Forum
(Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF), the Christian Democratic People’s Party
(Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP) and the Independent Smallholders’ Party
(Független Kisgazdapárt, FKGP)—formed the first democratically legitimate
government, but were absorbed by Fidesz in the following years. While MDF and
FGKP disappeared from the political stage, KDNP remained present as a coali-
tion partner of Fidesz. However, their sending of deputies to parliament was only
possible via a joint list with Fidesz.
The Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SZDSZ),
founded in 1988 as a liberal counterweight to the Christian-conservative parties,
initially came in second in the first free elections after the MDF. After the 1994
elections, the social-liberal wing of the party prevailed, forming the basis for the
first coalition with the MSZP. The SZDSZ held on to this course in the following
years. However, the party gradually lost importance in the process.
Until the parliamentary elections in 2010, the approximately equally strong
large parties MSZP and Fidesz determined the bipolar structure of the party sys-
tem. With the landslide victory achieved by Fidesz in these elections, which was
reflected in a two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament, a fundamental
change in the party system was then initiated. Fidesz has been the sole dominant
party since then, with significantly smaller parties on both the left and the right.
In addition, in 2010, new forces entered parliament on both sides of the political
spectrum with the right-wing movement for a better Hungary (Jobbik Magyaror-
szágért, Jobbik) and the green-liberal party “Politics can be different” (Lehet Más
a Politika, LMP), while with MDF and SZDSZ two established parties of the sys-
tem change disappeared. In the parliamentary elections in 2014, further new par-
ties were able to enter parliament in an electoral alliance with MSZP.
The following article focuses on the social conflict lines that shape and shape
the Hungarian party system. The starting point is the assumption that historical
structures and characteristics determine the voting decisions of social groups to a
large extent and that parties and party systems can be seen as a reflection of social
constellations. Therefore, the cleavage concept is used, which provides explana-
tions for the relationships between parties and supra-temporal conflict structures.
Traditional Social Cleavages and their Impact on the Hungarian … 85

The article deals with the question of which traditional social conflicts can be
found in Hungary that structure the society and party system. For this purpose,
the basic assumptions and central findings of the sociological approach are first
explained and their applicability to the analysis of the Hungarian party system is
discussed. This is followed by a historical review of the traditional political con-
flict lines in Hungary. Finally, the current conflict and party structure is illumi-
nated and it is shown how strongly it is shaped by historical conflicts and old
stereotypes. In this way, the current Hungarian party system and the structure of
political disputes are to be made understandable.

2 The Cleavage Concept of Lipset and Rokkan

and its Applicability to Hungary

The cleavage concept was developed by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rok-
kan in their 1967 study of West European party systems. Based on aggregate data
on social structure, they examined the relationship between socio-political con-
flict lines and modernization processes and showed their institutionalization along
political parties (cf. Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1980, p. 120). The cen-
tral assumption is that the social conflicts determined by historical events shape
the party systems and solidify in them. A freezing (Freezing) of the conflicts then
takes place when democratization processes are completed with regard to univer-
sal suffrage and political articulation and representation of interests.
Lipset and Rokkan locate the cleavages in a two-axis coordinate system with
a territorial-cultural and an economic-functional manifestation, the latter being
shaped by the territorial-cultural legacies. Thus, the authors combine system-the-
oretical components with assumptions about historical processes of state forma-
tion, industrialization and democratization for the study of the selected countries
(cf. Randall 2002, p. 239). In this way, the concept appears to be predestined for
the investigation of long-term, time-transcending conflict structures.
Lipset and Rokkan identified four factors responsible for the establishment of
parties: decision-making traditions, the mobilizing power of opposition voices,
the possibility and effect of alliance formation, and finally the process of govern-
ment formation. For each of these, they laid down thresholds that parties must
overcome for their stability: legitimacy, integration, representation, and majority
formation (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967, p. 27).
The world political changes of the late 1960s and 1970s led to the break-up
of the party political structures that had existed up to then. In the course of the
political and social upheavals interpreted by Ronald Inglehart (1977) as a “silent
86 M. Barlai

revolution”, the cleavage concept was adapted. The conflict between Church and
State, for example, became the opposition between Conservatives and Moderns,
and on the territorial axis the conflicts in materialism vs. post-materialism were
re-shaped (see Geiling and Vester 2007, p. 468). Lipset and Rokkan worked out
success factors for old and new parties. Thanks to these adaptations, the concept
of cleavages has not only played a central role in the analysis of party systems,
but also as a sociological model for explaining voter behavior (see Schmitt-Beck
2007, pp. 251–255).
The applicability of the theory to the young democracy systems of Central and
Eastern Europe is controversial in the literature (Tiemann 2008). There is no con-
sensus on which socio-political contrasts are to be described and to what extent
a interaction of these can be observed with the party system. Some political sci-
entists1 expected the return of the historical conflict lines, which had only been
interrupted by the authoritarian communist regimes, so that the pattern of the
pre-communist party systems would assert itself again. Others represent a “zero
hour theory” that defines the post-communist party landscape as a new beginning
(Kitschelt 1995, p. 450). They emphasize the absence of stable social cleavages
and the chaotic socio-economic environment after the system transformation (cf.
Bielasiak 1997, p. 24). Kitschelt (1995) also emphasizes that the lack of civil
society competence and the international environment prevented the formation of
a cleavage system in the Central and Eastern European space.
Grotz’s comparative study of Hungarian political competition up to 1998
shows that “the previous development of party systems in post-socialist Hun-
gary does not point to the existence of firmly established social cleavages” (Grotz
2000, p. 277), especially since there is a lack of traditional party affiliation among
voters (ibid., p. 278). At first glance, these observations may indeed appear to be
correct. However, if we look at the historical party-based conflict constellations
that have been detached from the system change, the zero hour assumptions must
be relativized. For example, the FKGP, which was founded in 1908, was able to
assert itself in the Hungarian party competition until 2002. It even governed in
two of the four legislative periods. The KDNP, founded in 1943, was part of the
first government after the system change from 1990 to 1994 and was able to re-
enter parliament after a long break in 2006. Today, the KDNP forms the govern-
ment together with Fidesz. The roots of the MSZP predecessor, the MSZMP, lie

1 Onthe “frozen party systems” of the Western industrial states, see Lipset and Rokkan
1967, p. 50.
Traditional Social Cleavages and their Impact on the Hungarian … 87

in the socialist dictatorship; even in democracy, the tradition of old cadres exerts
an influence.

3 Traditional Social Conflicts in Hungary

In Hungary, the political and social conflict discourse in the 18th and 19th centu-
ries was largely influenced by the aversion or affinity for the Habsburg monarchy.
The call for an independent Hungary came from the Hungarian national revolu-
tion. The always newly composed political groups were interested in conserving
and reproducing the “Habsburg-fear” now burned into the “Hungarian” soul in
order to keep the political system as stable as possible. The “Habsburg-fear” of
those days was first of all expressed as fear of an all-powerful Vienna and the loss
of control of Budapest and secondly as a romantic clinging to the remnants of
national sovereignty.
In Hungary, two main conflicts arose that shaped the country’s political sys-
tem to this day: these are, on the one hand, the economic contrasts that arose
as a result of industrialization between the urbanists and the so-called agrarian
populists, and on the other hand, the conflicts stoked by nationalization efforts
between the traditionalists and the “Westernizers”2. The former had already
emphasized national independence since the 1920s. In their program, they
focused on preserving national traditions and values. The “Westernizers”, on the
other hand, relied on Europeanization and globalization without a fixed commit-
ment to national traditions and regarded the loss of sovereignty associated with
international treaties as a self-evident necessity. On the economic level, the agrar-
ian populists represented Christian-national values, while the urbanists advocated
for Western, liberal values and urban interests. On the cultural level, the aristo-
crats, who remained loyal to the Habsburg monarchy in order to preserve their
privileged privileges, faced the impoverished revolutionary people.
In contrast to Western European political systems, in which democratic struc-
tures emerged from the demands of society and in response to the negotiated
inter-party conflicts, the democratic ideas in Hungary at the end of the 18th and
the beginning of the 19th centuries resulted in ideological power struggles carried
out by the political elite. Political changes were dictated solely by the p­ olitical

2 To describe the ideological contrasts in Hungary after the change of system, this term was
used for the first time by János Mátyás Kovács. He meant by this the representatives of
political and economic liberalism (Kovács 1997, pp. 199–252).
88 M. Barlai

elite, which had to “tolerate” the population. In the best case, parts of society
were beneficiaries of the system, but without a say. On the one hand, this resulted
in the fact that the enlightened and revolutionary spirit was constantly reinvented
within the circle of the political elite. On the other hand, however, a sense of sub-
servience became entrenched among the majority of the Hungarian population,
which had an impact on the country’s political culture and, consequently, on the
party system. The control, monitoring and reproduction of the “Habsburg-fear”
initiated the depoliticization of Hungarian society. An “anonymous nation” was
created. The lack of a Hungarian middle class accelerated the process of politi-
cal anonymization even further. This pre-structured the future conflict dimensions
and paved the way for the institutionalization of a solidifying conflict system until
1948 and beyond (Barlai 2018).
While the old conflicts have lost their validity during socialism, they have not
completely disappeared from the party political stage. The conflict on the eco-
nomic level continued to exist in socialism in the struggle for supremacy between
the industrial and the agricultural lobby. This is also evidenced by the party for-
mations as a result of the thaw policy after Stalin’s death, which can be seen in
Hungary in “goulash communism.”3 János Kádárs manifested. In the mid-1980s,
the agrarian populist and urban elites came together for a short time. However,
the increasingly conflict-oriented power struggles between the different intellec-
tual circles prevented the formation of a movement. In addition, there was a lack
of a wider social supporter base. The passivity of the population was due to the
fact that, on the one hand, the revitalization of the political public was primar-
ily driven by intellectuals, and that, on the other hand, the needs of the work-
ers and the population employed in agriculture, that is, those social classes that
formed the proletariat in socialism, were ignored by all parties and political cir-
cles. Unlike in Poland, where Solidarność functioned as a non-partisan umbrella
organization, the reform movements in Hungary were driven by intellectuals with
a rigid ideological bias that sought to clarify their content differences in party
political program competitions. As a result, the fight for party political power was
hardly taken into account by interest groups and mistrust of social interest groups.
After 1990, it can be concluded that the transformation moment was primarily
determined by groups that were mainly interested in power distribution and not in
interest representation.

3 Asa kind of compensation for the bloody suppression of the revolutionaries of 1956, the
regime of János Kádár granted the population small freedoms such as the occupation in the
shadow economy or the consumption freedoms.
Traditional Social Cleavages and their Impact on the Hungarian … 89

4 Impacts of Historical Conflicts on the Clevages

and Party Structures after the Change of System

Immediately after the change of system, the competition of parties was deter-
mined first and foremost by the transformation conflict. The contrasts between
the legitimists and the opposition dominated, i.e. between the heirs and the oppo-
nents of the socialist system. The approach of the SZDSZ to the MSZP made the
liberals the main enemy of the opposition, which increasingly positioned itself
as conservative nationalists. Already the parliamentary elections in the year 1994
testified of the presence of the traditional conflicts on the cultural axis. In the con-
flict “Westernizers” versus Traditionalists, the unseated government parties MDF,
KDNP and FKGP were considered Traditionalists, while the new left-liberal alli-
ance of MSZP and SZDSZ presented itself as “Westernizers” and Urbanists.
Also in the following election campaigns, the contrasts between the pro-
ponents of national particularistic on the one hand and the representatives of
international cosmopolitan attitudes, values and norms on the other hand were
the shaping fracture line. After the EU accession in the year 2004, the contrast
between “Westernizers” and Traditionalists intensified even further by adding
pro-European versus EU-skeptical positioning to the conflicts.
In the run-up to the first elections after EU accession in 2006, the relationship
to the nation, the protection of national interests and national independence were
once again in the foreground. Fidesz and its coalition partners set themselves
even more intensively for the protection of national interests with the slogan:
“Only Hungary counts”. On the other hand, MSZP and especially SZDSZ pur-
sued a cosmopolitan-liberal course. The SZDSZ saw itself as the representative
of an urban modernization and capital city academic class. The MSZP-SZDSZ
coalition saw the European Union as a platform for solving the national question.
In 2006, the conflict on the economic axis was revitalized alongside the cul-
tural conflict. Fidesz targeted the votes of the working class and the rural pop-
ulation and therefore positioned itself against the capitalists or multinational
companies, which the conservatives accused of using the country as a “transit
station”. In addition, Fidesz represented an anti-elitist course against “those up
there” as well as the large companies based in the cities and at the same time
appealed to the allegedly homogeneous “people”. The fact that this course of
Fidesz was merely a clever deception maneuver becomes clear after their takeo-
ver of power in 2010.
In terms of central conflict lines, little changed after the party system upheaval
in 2010, as the new parties Jobbik, LMP and DK also fit into the main conflict
streams. The MSZP had suffered a defeat of historic proportions in the 2010
90 M. Barlai

p­ arliamentary elections, with which it lost its status as a people’s party. The
strategic profiling of Jobbik as “the party of the little man” and the crisis of the
socialists—caused by the alienation from the base—led to a change in the tra-
ditional voting behavior among MSZP and thus also among Fidesz-KDNP sup-
porters. In 2010, the conservatives received a majority in those constituencies that
had previously been dominated by the socialists. Even traditional MSZP voters
voted for Fidesz in 2010. In 2010, more pensioners, city dwellers, atheists and
former members of the MSZMP voted for Fidesz than for the MSZP. As a result,
the MSZP lost 1.35 million votes to the conservatives. In addition to the poor eco-
nomic data, which experts attributed to the mismanagement of the social-liberal
and then the socialist governments (2002-2008, 2008-2010), the 2010 elections
were burdened by the confession of the former MSZP Prime Minister Ferenc
Gyurcsány in his so-called “lie speech” from 2006: “We fucked up and lied in
the morning, during the day and in the evening! We fucked it up! (Népszabadság
Online, Archive 2020).
The loss of a large part of their electorate plunged the socialists into a severe
identity crisis. Their communist past, which they had always tried to ignore,
caught up with them. The attempt at a technocratic-structural Western orienta-
tion could not free them from their ideological shackles from the past either. They
also continued to count on profits from nostalgia for Gulasch communism. But
this dual character proved to be incompatible at the latest since 2010. The funda-
mental debates about the ideological orientation of the party further weakened the
social democrats. The ideological dispute also marked the consensual break in the
left camp, which makes the process of re-inventing Hungarian social democracy
that has been going on ever since more difficult.
Jobbik was formed in 2003. After the unexpected success of MSZP in the par-
liamentary elections of 2002, there was a break between Orbán and disappointed
activists who had mobilized right-wing voices for Fidesz for years as part of the
right-wing youth—also part of Fidesz. As a result, prominent members of the
youth organization founded Jobbik, first as a youth movement, then as a right-
wing extremist party of small and especially young people. They addressed issues
that were neglected by both conservatives and socialists. As a result, it became
the most popular party among Hungarian youth and students. The foundation
stone for institutionalized right-wing extremism was laid. Jobbik was able to
establish itself as a serious player in the camp of the traditionalists next to Fidesz-
KDNP. Until the parliamentary elections of 2018, she was considered the big-
gest competitor of Fidesz. In the run-up to the elections, Jobbik had undergone
an ideological change of position to a center-right party. As a result of the lack
of success of this strategy, her chairman, Gábor Vona, resigned. This led to the
Traditional Social Cleavages and their Impact on the Hungarian … 91

split of the party. Representatives of the right-wing wing of the party founded the
“Mi Hazánk” (Our Homeland) movement, which is now trying to revive the once
national-radical tradition of Jobbik.
The LMP, which emerged from a left-wing citizen initiative in 2009, was
able to address young voters, like Jobbik. As a result, the LMP was also major-
ity-elected by students in the 2010 parliamentary elections. The fact that it was
able to establish itself primarily in Budapest and the other university and college
towns reflects the urban character of the party.
The Democratic Coalition (DK) emerged as a breakaway from the MSZP.
The profile of the party founded on 12 October 2011 by former Prime Minister
Ferenc Gyurcsány as a “progressive, Western, bourgeois, left-of-center” party
(Democratic Coalition 2014) is shaped by the distancing from the Communist
past and the turn towards Europe and the West. The “project” of Europe has come
to the fore in the communication strategy of the DK. The opening text of the DK
founding document states: “Our values and goals bind us to Europe; we believe
that Hungary of the 21st century can only be successful as a respected member
of the European Union and the transatlantic security cooperation” (ibid.). In this
sense, Gyurcsány also positioned himself during the protests against the Inter-
net tax plans announced by the Orbán government in 2014. Gyurcsány thanked
the demonstrators who “give the chance and hope that the Orbán regime can be
overthrown and Hungary can return to Europe and the community of freedom and
democracy” (HVG-online 2014).
The question is often asked how it could happen that Viktor Orbán, who once
fought for the liberal values of the West, has been driving the expansion of an
illiberal state since 2010. On closer inspection, it becomes clear that this change of
course has been apparent since the defeat of Fidesz in the parliamentary elections
in 2002. After their first term in office from 1998 to 2002, the young politicians
who had by now become a conservative bourgeois party had to give up power
to the social-liberal MSZP-SZDSZ coalition, contrary to all predictions. The
defeated Prime Minister Viktor Orbán did not want to simply accept the social-
ist’s democratic election victory and organized an extra-parliamentary mobiliza-
tion strategy. He announced the creation of a bourgeois “new social movement”
and called for the establishment of bourgeois circles (polgári körök)4 under the
name “Hajrá Magyarok!” (Forward, Hungary!) modeled after Silvio Berlusco-
ni’s “Forza Italia”. Orbán continued to adhere to his goal, formulated in 1995,

4 ViktorOrbán’s call for the establishment of civilian citizen circles, in: 16 Óra (radio pro-
gram), public-law Kossuth Rádió, 26.05.2002, 16.00.
92 M. Barlai

of creating a bourgeois Hungary. Already after the 1994 election loss, it had
become clear that “for Orbán and his circle of friends, liberalism was merely a
mask that they […] were always ready to take off” (Lendvai) 2016, p. 45). Orbán
and his supporters prepared during the eight years of opposition the “System of
National Cooperation” (Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere, NER). This was to
replace the liberal oligarchs and post-communists with a new “illiberal” middle
class.
In order to take the wind out of Jobbik’s agrarian populist sails in the inter-
war period, Fidesz initiated the Bodengesetz, which came into force in May 2014,
before the parliamentary elections in 2014. According to the new regulations, ara-
ble land in Hungary may only be sold for agricultural or forestry purposes, and
the buyers must be either self-employed, family businesses or primary producers
registered as farmers.5 By a gradual radicalization, Fidesz was able to displace its
biggest rival Jobbik on the cultural axis. In line with its proven absorption strat-
egy, it is now trying to integrate disappointed Jobbik voters into its own elector-
ate by means of a broad-based right-wing radical issue-setting and corresponding
issue-maintenance on the cultural axis—first by means of institutional reforms
aimed at cementing its position of power. This strategy proved to be successful
(see the chapter of Bos in this volume).
The electoral system reform initiated after 2010 and implemented until 2014
and 20186, which among other things included the redrawing of constituency
boundaries in favor of the largest parties, the founding of “fake” and business par-
ties, the double winner compensation, the administrative hurdles for vote counters
as well as the restriction of critical media, the simultaneous monopolization of
public media and not least the systematic election manipulation.7 This also helped
Orbán in 2018 to continue his policy of isolation and, due to the structural defi-
ciencies and the lack of control mechanisms of the EU, to further expand his illib-
eral clientelism. The scenario is supported by the mechanisms of action achieved
by the Hungarian government’s migration discourse in parts of the Hungarian
and European populations. The Fidesz-KDNP was able to increase its popularity,
which had declined since 2014, through “moral” activism in the refugee crisis.

5 So Ángyán József, Deputy State Secretary for Regional Development under the second
Orbán government, in an interview in January 2017.
6 More on the effects of the electoral system reforms on the outcome of the parliamentary

elections 2018 by Tóka o. J.).

7 For irregularities in the parliamentary elections in 2018, the European elections 2019 and

the local elections in 2019, see Barlai and Banuta 2018 and 2020.
Traditional Social Cleavages and their Impact on the Hungarian … 93

The government strategies directed against refugees and asylum seekers in 2015
and 2016, such as the corresponding national consultation, the poster, media and
referendum campaigns, achieved their intended effect. At the same time, the level
of xenophobia within the population reached record levels in 2018 (Sík 2019; see
also the chapter of Beger in this volume)
Overall, the left-liberal opposition has so far failed to take advantage of
numerous opportunities to react to the government’s anti-western policy with a
united front and mobilize supporters with its own issues. Instead, it got caught up
in personal vendettas time and again, which only served to further fragment it.8
In view of the parliamentary elections in 2018, Jobbik also formulated the not
quite utopian goal of displacing Fidesz as the strongest force. The approach to
the political center was the logical chess move in order to win voters from the
moderate part of the Fidesz camp in the future. As a result, however, she had to
accept losses in her numerically most important group of supporters, a “disadvan-
taged” youth. Ahead of the European Parliament elections and local elections in
2019, she hoped to make up for these losses by continuing her dual strategy of a
moderate urban and a radical rural program. Due to a successful absorption tactic,
Fidesz was able to successfully push its biggest competitor, Jobbik, into the back-
ground in both the parliamentary and EP elections.
The strategy debates of the Hungarian parties in the EU election campaign
(Fig. 1) illustrate on the one hand the sole rule of Fidesz on the cultural as well as
the economic axis of the political coordinate system and on the other hand reveal
the heterogeneity of the opposition camp, which showed itself to be more pluralistic
and helpless than ever before. They were only united in the juxtaposition of Orbán
and Europe, but without seriously debating why Fidesz-KDNP remains alternative-
less in the Hungarian population despite the pro-European mood in the population.

5 Resume and Outlook

In general, it can be said for the period after the change of system that the old
cultural and economic conflicts could solidify within the spectrum of political
parties. The bipolar character of the traditional conflict structures—on the one

8 For example, see the power struggles within LMP that led to the party’s fragmentation
after the 2018 parliamentary elections and ultimately to its failures in the 2019 European
and local elections. (cf. Dull 2018.) Also, the strategic positioning of DK and its chairman
Gyurcsány, often at the expense of MSZP, regularly blocks the opposition from appearing
together. (cf. Magyar Narancs 2020).
94 M. Barlai

Fig. 1 Strategy debates in Hungary in the run-up to the European Parliament elections in
2019. Source FES 2019

hand between traditionalists and “Westernizers” and on the other hand between
agrarian populists and urbanists—remained. Both the newly founded liberal par-
ties, such as the SZDSZ and Fidesz, and the historical parties, such as the social-
ists (MSZP), the farmers’ party and the Christian Democrats, fit into the old
framework. Party foundation outside of the traditional conflicts usually remained
without success. Political organizations had two alternatives: Either they let them-
selves be integrated into the already established and dominant “big party” within
the respective conflict or they adapted their program to anchor themselves within
the respective camp.
The first variant was chosen, for example, by the Christian Democrats, the
small farmers, the Romaparties, the Liberals and the Greens (LMP). They either
formed coalitions with Fidesz or the MSZP or integrated into the dominant
Traditional Social Cleavages and their Impact on the Hungarian … 95

p­ arties. However, the willingness to form coalitions and to integrate deprived the
ground for the prospect of future electoral success as an independent party, espe-
cially since cooperation within a government coalition went hand in hand with a
renunciation of sovereignty and indirect loss of votes. The right-wing extremist
party Jobbik, however, decided in 2006 to go it alone. As a result of its rhetori-
cal—but not content-related—change of course in 2010, it was able to establish
itself within the existing conflict structures and to emerge as the third strongest
force from the parliamentary elections in 2014.
At first glance, after another landslide victory of Fidesz 2022, the Hungarian
party system can be considered as stable. It regained the old established struc-
ture of the “central force field” (centrális erőtér) where Fidesz positioned itself in
the center as the strongest and most dominant party. To its left and right roughly
two similarly sized political blocs are occupying the remaining parts of the field.
However, this stability is deceptive. It masks major asymmetries between the
Fidesz party and the opposition in the areas of party funding, degree of organi-
zation, media access, and the use of institutional manipulation mechanisms.
These asymmetries arose primarily because Fidesz began expanding its own
system as early as 2002, which enabled the party to capture the state’s institu-
tions when it came to power in 2010 and subsequently channeled state resources
into the Fidesz cartel. At the same time, the Fidesz elite transformed the party
into a commercial enterprise that now uses state funds for their own economic
gains. A state party of a new kind has emerged. Left-of-center, the party system
is experiencing increasing fragmentation, which raises the question of the need
for numerical reduction in political forces in the left-liberal spectrum. Right-of-
center, institutionalized right-wing extremism has been revived with Mi Hazánk.
For Mi Hazánk, as well as for the liberal party Momentum, the question arises
whether they can expand and attract a more diverse electorate in order to estab-
lish themselves as people’s parties. Consequently, the Hungarian party system, as
defined by Sartori an Duverger, can be described as a dominant party system. It
is dominated by one party, Fidesz, which has won the parliamentary elections in
a row with an absolute, even two-thirds majority; which has a stable electorate;
and with which the Hungarian public associates an epoch (Sartori 2005; Duverger
1963: 275ff.). Prospectively, as long as the demands arising from social interest
controversies do not find their way into the system, the structure of the Hungarian
party system will not change much. As a result, post-materialist or moderate-con-
servative parties, for example, will continue to have little chance of success, and
society’s middle ground will remain underrepresented in the future.
96 M. Barlai

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98 M. Barlai

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Dr. Melani Barlai is a research associate of the Inter-University Network Political Com-
munication (netPOL) at the Chair of Comparative Politics with a Focus on Central and
Eastern Europe in the EU at Andrássy University Budapest.
Contact: [email protected]
Referendums and ‘National
Consultations’ in Hungary

Zoltán Tibor Pállinger

1 Introduction

Hungary has a long tradition of parliamentarism; direct democratic instruments

were, however, only established in the course of the regime change in 1989/90, as
in most other Central and Eastern European countries. Thus, the socialist regime
tried to consolidate the legitimacy of the system, inter alia, by the adoption of the
law on referendum and popular initiative (Act XVII/1989) in June 1989. Since
this law came into force before the fundamental revision of the constitution in
October 1989, which laid the foundation for democracy, and before the first free
elections in March/April 1990, one can speak of the fact that direct democracy in
Hungary is older than democracy itself.
By means of a constitutional and legislative revision, the first major adapta-
tion of the direct democratic instruments took place in 1997. In April 2011, the
parliament adopted a new constitution (“Fundamental Law”, FL), which also
affected direct democracy and partly restored old regulations. In 2013, the par-
liament adopted a new “Act on Popular Initiative, European Citizens’ Initiative
and the Procedure of Referendum” (Act CCXXXVIII/2013), which implements
the provisions of the Basic Law and makes clarifications with regard to the
procedure. Finally, in November 2021, the “Act on Electoral Procedure” (Act
XXXVI/2013) and the “Act on Popular Initiative, European Citzens’ Initiative
and the Procedure of Referendum” (Act CCXXXVIII/2013) were amendede in
such a way that in the future referendums and elections can be held on the same

Z. T. Pállinger (*)
Andrássy University Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 99

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_6
100 Z. T. Pállinger

day (previously, a ban on referendums applied 40 days before and after parlia-
mentary and European elections, respectively).
After the initially successful system change, democracy in several countries
in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, and thus also in Hungary, is in crisis
(Coman and Tomini 2014, p. 855; Ágh 2015, p. 6). The increasingly illiberal ten-
dencies are “the most severe challenges to democratic institutions that have taken
place in the region since the end of communism” (Herman 2016, p. 258) and are
also reflected in the rankings of the common democracy indexes.1 Critics of the
current government assume that the “chaotic democracy” that existed in Hungary
until 2010 has degenerated into a facade democracy and sunk to the status of an
electoral autocracy after the 2014 elections (Ágh 2015, pp. 17 ff.). There is no
doubt that the time after the overwhelming victory of Fidesz in 2010 differs sig-
nificantly from the phase before (Bíro-Nagy and Laki 2020, p. 4).
The present article examines to what extent the above described changes were
reflected in the conceptional framework and practice of direct democracy at the
national level in Hungary2: In modern democracies, state power is basically repre-
sentative and direct democracy has an institutional complementary status (Marxer
and Pállinger 2007, pp. 14 ff.). If the type and quality of (representative) democ-
racy change, this will probably also affect the functioning and use of direct dem-
ocratic procedures. There could be attempts at instrumentalization by the ruling
majority, but also attempts by the opposition to use direct democratic initiatives
to go against the government. In order to test this, the concept of direct democracy
and the procedures will be explained first. In the main part, an overview of the
practice of direct democracy will be given, which will be evaluated at the end.

2 The Concept of Hungarian Direct Democracy

Direct democracy does not really fit Hungary’s political tradition. During the
Revolution of 1848, direct democracy concepts were discussed, but they fell
behind the idea of representative democracy. In the 1890s, the idea of direct
democracy was picked up again, but now it was critically evaluated and seen as
an undesirable alternative to representative democracy (see Nagy and Tamás n. d.,
pp. 4–5). Reform proposals by the liberal thinker Oszkár Jászi for the Austro-
Hungarian monarchy, which were based on the Swiss direct democracy, did not

1 See, for example, Freedom House 2020, p. 14.

2 The instrument of referendums is also available at the local level. However, its influence is
largely locally limited due to the centralized state structure.
Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary 101

gain much traction in the political discourse at the beginning of the 20th century
(see Nagy and Tamás n. d., pp. 4–5). After the First World War, a referendum was
held in Sopron/Oedenburg to decide the question of the city’s belonging to Hun-
gary or Austria (see Cede 2012, pp. 16–17). However, there was no interest what-
soever in direct democracy during the authoritarian interwar years.
In 1949, the possibility of a referendum in the Hungarian political system was
anchored in the Communist Constitution of 1949,3 but it played no role in prac-
tice (cf. Komáromi 2017, p. 185). Not until the 1980s did the authorities use con-
sultative instruments such as “people’s assemblies” or “village assemblies” in the
context of urban or regional development projects. At this time, opposition forces,
in particular the environmental movement, began to call for the introduction of
initiatives and referendums (cf. Máday 1998). Against this background, the adop-
tion of the Act on Referendum and Popular Initiative by the Communist parlia-
ment can be explained.
The Act on Referendum and Popular Initiative was still tied to the regula-
tions of the authoritarian system and thus, the relationship to the new democratic
institutions was unclear. Moreover, the fifty percent participation quorum severely
restricted its prospects for success. Therefore, the integration of direct democratic
instruments into representative democracy caused problems. The adaptation and
integration of the direct democratic instrument into the representative system
made the clarification of numerous legal details necessary, which is why, after
1990, the Constitutional Court became an important actor in shaping Hungarian
direct democracy (see also Pócza et al.). Its basic decisions set the framework for
the parliamentary legislator.
Although the Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2011 emphasizes the prin-
ciple of popular sovereignty, it immediately restricts it again by stating that the
people usually exercise their power through their elected representatives and
only in exceptional cases directly (Art. B, para. 4 FL). This was a certain shift
of emphasis compared to the old constitution, in which direct and indirect exer-
cise of popular sovereignty still stood side by side on an equal footing (Art.
2, Law XX/1949). In accordance with this principle, Parliament is the high-
est legislative body and also has the monopoly on legislation and budgetary
authority (Art. 1 FL). These provisions are confirmed in the new "Act on Pop-
ular Initiative, European Citizens' Initiative and the Procedure of Referendum"
(Act CCXXXVIII/2013). Direct participation of citizens is therefore an

3 Art.20 (1), Lit. d of the Constitution of the Hungarian People’s Republic of 1949 (Law
XX/1949) provided that the Presidential Council of the People’s Republic could order a
referendum on matters of national importance.
102 Z. T. Pállinger

e­xception. However, in the event that a popular initiative is successful, direct

exercise of power takes precedence over indirect (representative) exercise of
power. In such a case, according to the Constitutional Court, Parliament falls into
an “executive role” and must implement the popular will through corresponding
legislative acts (Decision 52/1997 of the Constitutional Court).
This conceptual definition is problematic in two respects: First, there appears
to be a contradiction between the legislature’s monopoly and the binding nature
of a referendum. However, this tension is alleviated in practice, because in the
referendum, not the formulated legal texts, but the underlying political questions
are decided. The parliament, on the other hand, has the duty to implement the
political decision made by legislation. It is therefore a political obligation which
would not be enforceable in law, but which has been implemented every time so
far. Secondly, the process of popular legislation (in the event of a successful initi-
ative) is completely under the control of the citizens, as the aforementioned deci-
sion of the Constitutional Court confirms. By strictly separating the representative
and direct democratic procedures, a dialogue between politics and civil society is
prevented, since the parliament merely makes procedural decisions without any
provision for a discussion of the initiative on substance.
At first glance, the subject matter of direct democracy is quite comprehensive.
According to Art. 8 para. 2 of the Basic Law, in principle, all questions that fall
within the scope of tasks and competences of the parliament can be the subject of
a referendum. But in the next paragraph, the scope of application is restricted again
(Art. 8 para. 3 FL). Therefore, it is not allowed to hold referendums on a) consti-
tutional amendments, b) measures affecting the central budget and its implementa-
tion, c) election laws, d) obligations arising from international treaties, e) internal
organizational and personnel questions of the parliament, f) the dissolution of the
parliament or g) of self-governing bodies, h) the proclamation of a state of war, of
a state of national crisis and state of emergency, furthermore, on the declaration and
extension of a state of preventive defence, i) the participation in military operations
and j) the exercise of the right to pardon. With the Fundamental Law and the new
law on the referendum, the restrictions were made clearer, but also broader. Thus, in
the new legal framework (in contrast to the previous situation), a confirmatory refer-
endum on a complete or partial revision of the constitution is categorically excluded.

3 Legal Framework of Direct Democracy

Although the Fundamental Law does not make a terminological distinction

between different types of direct democratic procedures, but speaks only of the
“nationwide referendum” (Országos népszavazás) in general, three different types
Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary 103

of direct democratic instruments can be distinguished: A popular initiative, which

leads to a referendum, an agenda initiative, in which the parliament decides
whether a referendum is held, and a plebiscite. Typologically, the direct demo-
cratic instruments in the Fundamental Law thus remained unchanged in compari-
son to the old constitution, but the actual agenda initiative was abolished.4
The first type of procedure (Art. 8 para. 1 FL) is a people’s initiative. If at least
200,000 citizens support an initiative, the parliament is obliged to hold a referendum.
By means of the “nationwide referendum” a political question is decided or an opin-
ion is expressed. The result is binding on the parliament (Art. 8 para. 4 FL). In Hun-
garian usage, this instrument is referred to as the “obligatory referendum” because
the parliament is obliged to set the referendum if there are enough signatures.
If between 100,000 and 199,999 citizens support a popular initiative, parlia-
ment may decide to hold a “national referendum” on a political issue or expres-
sion of opinion (Art. 8 para. 1 FL). This type of procedure can best be described
as an agenda initiative with a possible referendum. If parliament decides to hold
a referendum, the result is binding (Art. 8 para. 4 FL). Under the old constitution,
parliament had to decide before the referendum was announced whether the result
was binding or merely consultative (Art. 28 C in Law XX/1949). In Hungarian
usage, there is no distinction between an agenda initiative with a possible refer-
endum and a plebiscite. Both are referred to as “optional referendums” because
parliament can decide of its own accord (optional) to hold them.
Finally, parliament can also, at the request of the President or the Government,
decide to hold a “national referendum”. The referendum in turn has the decision
on a political issue or expression of opinion as its object and is binding on parlia-
ment. Under the old constitution, one third of parliamentarians also had the right
to request a referendum (Art. 8 C Law XX/1949).
For referendums to be valid, more than half of all eligible voters must par-
ticipate in them (participation quorum). Between 1997 and 2012, a 25% approval
quorum applied. The new provisions represent a return to the original rules that
were in place between 1989 and 1997.
The concrete implementation of direct democracy has developed from a inter-
play between legislative acts and Supreme Court decisions. The first important
step was taken by the constitutional amendment of 1997 (Act 1997/XCVIII) and

4 For an overview of the practice of actual agenda initiatives, see Pállinger (2012, pp. 121
ff.).
104 Z. T. Pállinger

the subsequent law on the initiative and referendum (Act 1998/III). This new law
regulated the procedure and clarified the role of the National Election Commis-
sion, as well as introduced a prior validity check (Komáromi 2015, pp. 230 ff.).
With the currently valid law (Act 2013/CCXXXVIII), an attempt was made
to bring together the material regulations for all direct democratic instruments
(European Citizens’ Initiative as well as national and local referendums) in one
law, but some regulations have remained in the law on the electoral procedure
(Act 2013/XXXVI). With the new law on the citizens’ initiative and the referen-
dum, it was sought to reduce the number of “unserious” initiatives. The new pro-
vision that at least 20 persons must attest their support with their signature serves
this purpose (previously only one signature was sufficient). Secondly, the Chair-
man of the National Election Office checks in advance whether an initiative meets
the legal requirements and can reject it within five days. There is no possibility of
appeal against such a decision, but the unchanged initiative can be resubmitted
and must then be forwarded to the National Election Commission.
A solution for competing initiatives was also introduced in the new law. If sev-
eral competing initiatives are aimed at the same subject, these must be dealt with
in chronological order, i.e. the others remain blocked until the entire procedure
has been completed for the first initiative. With the new law, partly new time lim-
its were introduced and also the possibility of withdrawing the initiative was cre-
ated. Finally, the system of legal remedy was also adapted.
A people’s initiative is launched by 20 to 30 supporters submitting a speci-
men of the signature sheet of the National Election Commission for validation.
The sheet must contain the exact question to be put to the vote. The National
Election Office carries out a preliminary review. The National Election Commis-
sion refuses validation if the legal requirements are not met. This means that the
question must be answerable in a clear manner and fall within the competence
of Parliament. In addition, the proposal must be in compliance with the constitu-
tional prohibition clauses and the further formal provisions. All decisions of the
National Election Commission can be appealed to the Supreme Court (Kúria).
The initiators must collect the required signatures within 120 days. The
National Election Commission must then validate the signatures within 60 days.
The National Election Commission then informs the President of Parliament.
If the formal requirements are met and at least 100,000 signatures or more than
200,000 signatures have been collected, Parliament must place the proposal on
the agenda within 30 days. If fewer than 200,000 signatures are collected or with
initiatives of the President and the Government, Parliament may decide in its own
competence whether to hold a referendum or not. If more than 200,000 signatures
are collected, it must schedule the referendum. If Parliament decides to hold a
Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary 105

referendum, it must also grant the necessary financial resources at the same time.
Parliament’s decision is published in the Official Gazette, and the President is
also informed of the decision. Within 15 days, he or she must set a date within 70
to 90 days. The referendum is valid if more than 50% of the eligible voters have
participated and more than half of them have voted in favor of the proposal. The
result of the referendum is binding on Parliament and must be implemented by
Parliament within 180 days. In addition, there is a three-year period within which
Parliament may not act legislatively in the same matter.
Since 1989, eight national referendums have been held in Hungary, in which
17 questions have been decided. The following is a brief chronological overview
of the referendums actually carried out and also the referendums prevented (for
the statistical data see Table A1 in the appendix).

3.1 Transition-related Referendums

The first two national referendums were related to the transition from state social-
ism to democracy. The state party (MSZMP5) agreed with the main opposition
parties within the framework of round table talks on the key points of the demo-
cratic transition and the constitutional amendments necessary to ensure that the
transition could take place within a rule of law framework. The results of these
talks had to be implemented by the—state socialist—parliament, which did so by
adopting the so-called “cornerstone laws”.
However, the radical opposition feared that the agreements reached with the
state party would allow the MSZMP to retain certain of its power positions. In
order to ensure complete democratization and neutralize the power resources
of the MSZMP, the two opposition parties, the SZDSZ6 and Fidesz7, ­therefore

5 The state party, Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt—
MSZMP), decided at the XIV. Party Congress on October 6/7, 1989, to transform itself
into a new, democratic party called Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt—
MSZP). It saw itself as the legal successor of the MSZP and also took over its property. In
addition, it continued to govern. At the same time, the conservative wing broke away and
also took over the name of the old state party (MSZMP) and continued to politicize from
December 1989 as an independent party.
6 SzDSz = Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége - Alliance of Free Democrats.

7 Fidesz = Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége was formerly known as the Alliance of Young
Democrats and has since renamed itself to Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance while retain-
ing the “brand name”.
106 Z. T. Pállinger

wished for further changes: specifically, they wanted the “workers’ militia” and
the party organizations at the workplaces to be dissolved. They also wanted the
state party to account for its possessions. Finally, they also demanded that the
election of the President be postponed to a date after the parliamentary elections
in order to prevent the election of a popular socialist politician. The two opposi-
tion parties began to collect signatures for the four aforementioned questions.
Since the initiators were able to get the necessary signatures, parliament was
forced to schedule a national referendum. Although it had already given in on the
first two questions and thus a referendum on the matter was actually unneces-
sary, the initiatives could not be formally withdrawn. The other two questions
remained of great political importance. The referendum was held on 29 Novem-
ber 1989 and the radical opposition parties were able to win by a hair’s breadth.
The defeat of the MSZP (Komáromi 2015, pp. 230 ff.) in the important question
of the presidential election prevented this party from transferring its power to the
democratic system (Pállinger 2014, pp. 266 f.).
The referendum campaign made it possible for SZDSZ and Fidesz to increase
their visibility and popular support vis-à-vis MSZP and the moderate opposition
parties. The referendum forced against the will of the moderate opposition and
the MSZP was a break with the original consensus and made it clear that the two
radical opposition parties were pursuing a long-term strategy to strengthen their
position in the first free elections. Although they were able to destroy the last bas-
tions of the state party before the first free elections with their victory in the refer-
endum, this led to a longer-term disruption of the relationship of trust between the
democratic forces of the country and thus anticipated the extreme polarization of
Hungarian politics. This was to have an impact on politics in the new democracy.
After the first free elections in the spring of 1990, the former opposition came
to power and the MSZP was marginalized. In order to ensure the governability of
the country, the two largest parties, MDF8 and SZDSZ, concluded an agreement
(“paktum”). In return for concessions on some laws whose amendment or adapta-
tion required a two-thirds majority, the SZDSZ was given the post of President
of the Republic, to be elected by Parliament. The now oppositional MSZP hoped
to improve its position by launching an initiative for the direct popular election
of the President. It succeeded in collecting enough signatures so that Parliament
was obliged to hold a referendum. The MSZP demanded that the referendum be
held at the same time as the local elections in September, which would have guar-
anteed a high turnout. The other parties did not want to endanger their pact and

8 MDF = Magyar Demokrata Fórum - Hungarian Democratic Forum.

Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary 107

were also keen to strengthen parliamentary rule and limit direct democracy. For
this purpose, Parliament (Resolution 56/1990 of the Parliament) decided to hold
the referendum in the middle of summer, on 29 July 1990. The choice of date
was linked to the hope that, due to the summer holidays, only a few voters would
be moved to go to the polls. This calculation turned out to be correct, and so the
popular demand failed due to the low turnout. With these two referendums, the
immediate phase of transition was completed (Pállinger 2012, p. 125.).

3.2 The Process of European Integration

The referendum on NATO membership in 1997 was initiated by the Hungar-

ian Parliament. The referendum on EU membership in 2003, on the other hand,
was prescribed by a constitutional amendment in 2002 (Arató 2004, p. 850) in
the constitution (Law 2002/LXI). Both referendums were controlled by the gov-
ernment majority and served to strengthen their position. In order to achieve a
valid result despite the traditionally low participation in Hungary, the parliament
changed the rules with regard to the NATO vote (Dieringer 2009, pp. 344 ff.) and
replaced the fifty percent participation quota with a twenty-five percent approval
quota (Law 1997/XCVIII). In both cases, the political elite could count on the
support of the people. These two foreign policy referendums were more of a sym-
bolic nature and served to legitimize Hungary’s West integration (Pállinger 2014,
p. 284.).

3.3 Referendums in Consolidated Democracy

The 2004 referendum can be seen as an example of a referendum that pursued

narrowly defined political goals. The opposition party MSZMP launched a suc-
cessful signature collection in the autumn of 2003 to reverse privatization in
healthcare. Although the Constitutional Court declared privatization to be unlaw-
ful in December 2003, the referendum had to be carried out anyway because
withdrawal was not legally possible, so a vote was scheduled for 5 December
2004. Since the major parties were divided on this issue and the other referendum
issue (see below) was unable to mobilize, the campaign was not very polarizing
and voters decided—as various polls showed—more on the basis of individual
preferences than party political preferences (Karácsony 2009, pp. 197 ff.).
108 Z. T. Pállinger

In the spring of 2004, the World Federation of Hungarians launched a success-

ful signature collection campaign for the granting of citizenship to Hungarians
living outside the motherland. This referendum was also scheduled for 5 Decem-
ber 2004. The question aimed at solving the problem that has existed since the
end of the First World War, that with the peace treaty of Trianon large parts of
the ethnic Hungarians had to live outside the “motherland”. The clarification of
the relationship between Hungarians living in the motherland and those living
outside was a delicate issue for every democratic Hungarian government, which
had numerous symbolic references (see Hettyey in this volume). In general, it can
be said that conservative parties took a more active position in this question than
socialist or liberal parties. Due to the symbolic loading of the question, the MSZP
held back in the campaign. Although the opposition Fidesz supported the initia-
tive and the campaign was ideologically loaded, there was no great mobilization
and in this question the individual preferences dominated. As a result, both initia-
tives did not lead to a valid result due to the low participation (Karácsony 2009,
S. 197 ff.).
While privatization in the health sector was not further promoted by politics,
the issue of dual citizenship became a hot potato that could only be solved after
the victory of Fidesz in 2010.

3.4 Deconsolidation and Intensification of the Power

Struggle

Hungarian politics became increasingly polarized in the second half of the 2000s.
The MSZP was able to win the 2002 and 2006 elections. However, in the 2006
election campaign, unrealistic promises were made and it quickly became clear
after the elections that the financial situation of the country was much worse than
assumed. The government therefore had to initiate austerity measures, while try-
ing to combine them with reforms. These affected in particular the health and
education sectors. The measures announced in June 2006 gradually eroded the
government’s popularity. During the campaign for the local elections in the
autumn, a speech (Őszöd speech) by then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány
delivered to members of the socialist parliamentary faction in May was leaked
to the public. In this speech, the Prime Minister confessed that in the last eight-
een months he had systematically lied to the public about the state of the country
(Szoboszlai 2009, pp. 244 ff.). The reactions to this speech were fierce. The con-
servative and right-wing parties organized demonstrations on Parliament Square.
Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary 109

The President also called on the Prime Minister to resign before the local elec-
tions. Gyurcsány then decided to put himself to a vote of confidence in parlia-
ment. Opposition leader Viktor Orbán rejected this proposal and called on the
MSZP faction to replace Gyurcsány and to enter into negotiations on the forma-
tion of an expert government. On 6 October 2006, parliament expressed confi-
dence in Gyurcsány, leading to mass protests (Pállinger 2016, p. 13 f.).
Since the governing coalition had a solid parliamentary majority, the govern-
ment could not be forced to resign. The opposition recognized the futility of their
efforts, but did not want to lose momentum, which is why the idea arose to over-
throw the government by means of a referendum. Orbán declared on 23 October
2006, National Day, that a referendum against the austerity measures would be
the last remaining democratic means to oust the government (Bártfai et al. 2009,
DVD). With the referendum threat, the protests were to be kept within the legal
framework and the pressure on the government maintained. On 24 October 2006,
Fidesz submitted seven questions to the National Election Commission for vali-
dation with its allies, the KDNP9. The proposed questions were carefully chosen.
They reflected the grievances of numerous interest groups that were negatively
affected by the government’s decisions (Pállinger 2016, pp. 14 ff.).
After a long legal dispute, three questions were finally approved to be put to
a vote. They concerned the abolition of the outpatient sick fee, the hospital daily
allowance and the study fees in state higher education. The opposition parties
were able to collect the necessary signatures within a short time, and Parliament
scheduled the referendum for 9 March 2009. Given the unpopularity of the aus-
terity measures, public opinion was very positive towards the three initiatives.
While the government sought to rationalize the measures, the opposition was able
to appeal to the self-interest of the citizens. In addition, it tried to make the refer-
endum a tribunal on the government’s performance. It is hardly surprising that all
three initiatives were successful. The fees were abolished immediately. But the
referendum also had indirect consequences: the government coalition broke up
and the MSZP had to govern with a minority government from then on. This ref-
erendum finally also helped the opposition to take the momentum into the 2010
parliamentary elections, in which it won an overwhelming victory (Pállinger
2016, p. 15.).

9 KDNP = Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt - Christian Democratic People’s Party.

110 Z. T. Pállinger

3.5 Instrumentalization of Direct Democracy

During the referendum campaign of 2008, both parties and civil society discov-
ered the importance of initiatives as political weapons. After that, both the gov-
ernment and the opposition submitted numerous initiatives for validation. The
referendum threat became part of the “political game”. In the end, however,
the instrument of referendums was not used more often because it would have
reduced the influence of the parties and because its use would have been associ-
ated with high costs.
Between 2008 and 2016, there were three cases (2008, 2009 and 2016) of pre-
vented/pre-emted referendums.10 In the first two cases, already scheduled referen-
dums were prevented by the parliament passing amendments to the law between
the announcement and the vote on the same issue, thus making the referendums
moot. In the case of a referendum scheduled for 2009, the procedure can be seen
as manipulative, as in the event of a successful initiative, the expenses of par-
liamentarians would have been subject to stricter regulation. With the regulation
passed by parliament, which led to the annullation of the referendum, only the
formal, but not the material, aspect was taken into account.11
In the third case of a prevented referendum, the question was about the Sun-
day sales ban. The government had introduced such a ban in 2014 at the urging
of the KDNP. This measure was unpopular from the outset and the opposition
recognized that an initiative to abolish the Sunday sales ban would be a welcome
opportunity to inflict a political defeat on the governing coalition and to increase
its internal cohesion. The submission of such an initiative, however, was pre-
vented in an undignified manner over several months.
Again and again, actors appeared who—also using unfair means—succeeded
in submitting an initiative on the same topic before the opposition, which blocked
the initiative of the opposition. After a particularly blatant example in which
the representative of the MSZP was physically prevented from being the first to
submit the initiative, the Supreme Court ended the “game” and on 6 April 2016
ordered the National Election Commission to validate the question of the opposi-
tion. This decision would have made it possible to collect the signatures and it is

10 Another important prevented referendum in 2017 concerned the local level (Budapest). A
civil society organisation managed to collect the necessary signatures for holding a local
referendum on the question of whether Budapest should withdraw its application to host
the 2024 Olympic Games. In order to avoid the risk of defeat at the polls, the authorities
withdrew the application on their own.
11 For more information, see Pállinger (2016, pp. 15 ff.).
Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary 111

very likely that the necessary signatures would have been collected. Parliament
reacted quickly and repealed the Sunday sales ban on 12 April 2016. This made
the referendum moot and at the same time took the wind out of the sails of the
opposition (cf. Pállinger 2016, pp. 16 ff.).
Between April 2008 and September 2016, not a single referendum was held.
Since 2010, the Fidesz-KDNP coalition has governed with a two-thirds majority.
This allowed them to revise the constitution and fundamentally reform the politi-
cal system. The opposition was unable to stop the ruling parties. In such a situ-
ation, popular initiatives could have been a way to influence government policy.
But during this time not a single valid popular initiative came about. Between
2012 and June 5, 2016, 328 questions were submitted to the National Election
Commission for validation, but only 15 were declared admissible.12 Reasons for
rejection were ambiguity in 79%, formal errors in 48%, bona fides in 16% and
lack of competence of the parliament in 12%.13 The National Election Commis-
sion (and the Constitutional Court) argue very formally and are negative towards
citizen initiatives. In particular, the requirement for clarity is handled very restric-
tively. Moreover, the opposition is so divided internally that it cannot organize
effective campaigns against the government.
In 2010, the Hungarian government created the instrument of the National
Consultation. As part of this, citizens are invited to express their opinion on cer-
tain questions predetermined by the government by means of a questionnaire. The
answers are evaluated by the administration and the results are published. So far,
nine national consultations have taken place on 1) pensions (2010), 2) principles of
the new constitution (2011), 3) social issues (2011), 4) economic issues (2012), 5)
questions concerning “migration and terrorism” (2015), 6) “stop Brussels!” (2017),
7) the “Soros plan” (2017), 8) “questions concerning the protection of families”
(2018), 9) “the coronavirus and economic defense measures” (2020), 10) "the open-
ing after the pandemic" (2021), 11) "life after pandemic" (2021), and 12) "Brussels
sanctions" (2022). From the government’s point of view, these consultations repre-
sent an element of dialogue with the population, but the opposition regards them
as populist window dressing, because the questions are very manipulative and the
evaluation is also carried out in an opaque manner (Pállinger 2019, p. 73).

12 A newer study that examined the period from 1999 to 2018 concluded that only 13%
of the proposed referendum questions were validated by the National Election Commis-
sion. It also confirms the findings of Farkas with regard to the reasons for rejection. See:
Komáromi and Antalicz 2019, pp. 86 ff.
13 Most questions were rejected with more than one than one justification, which is why the

sum totals more than 100% (Farkas 2016, p. 23).

112 Z. T. Pállinger

The only referendum in the last decade took place against the background of
the migration crisis of 2015 and was not triggered from below by the people, but
from above by the government. It can thus be classified in the category of the
plebiscite. The number of refugees had been steadily increasing since 2010 and
reached a provisional peak in 2015 when approximately 1.3 million refugees and
migrants had come to Europe. Hungary, located on the Balkan route, was one of
the countries most affected by the refugee crisis. Despite all the efforts of the EU
and its member states, they were not able to get the crisis under control. In this
situation, the EU decided in May 2015 to initially redistribute 40,000 Syrian and
Eritrean refugees. In September, the further redistribution of 120,000 refugees
from Greece, Italy and Hungary according to a binding quota—by majority deci-
sion—was decided against the will of Hungary as an emergency measure. Slova-
kia and Hungary have challenged this decision in the European Court of Justice
(see Pállinger 2017, pp. 161 ff.).
On May 15, 2015, the chairman of the far-right party Jobbik14 demanded a
referendum on the question of whether to ban the settlement of foreign citizens in
Hungary by quotas or deportations. The party started collecting signatures, which
was basically a political marketing campaign aimed at mobilizing its own sup-
porters. The signatures were never submitted and the initiative would not have
been admissible because it aimed at changing existing international treaties (see
Pállinger 2017, pp. 161 ff.).
At the same time, Fidesz also started a petition against the mandatory refu-
gee quota (this petition was also continued after the announcement of the refer-
endum). On February 24, 2016, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán finally announced
that the government would initiate a referendum on the mandatory refugee quotas
of the EU, which it had consistently rejected. The citizens should express them-
selves on the specific question “Do you want the European Union to be able to
prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary with-
out the consent of the Hungarian Parliament?”. This question was validated by
the National Election Commission, and the objections were also rejected by the
Supreme Court (and the Constitutional Court). These decisions were criticized by
numerous experts and civil society organizations because, in the opinion of the
critics, the initiative did not meet the legal requirements because it did not fall
within the competence of the parliament and also contradicted the principle of
clarity. After the rejection of the objections, the state president set the date of the
vote for October 2, 2016 (cf. Pállinger 2017, pp. 161 ff.).

14 Jobbik = Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom - Movement for a Better Hungary).

Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary 113

According to the legal framework, referendums can lead to three different

results: Either the yes or no votes win or the vote is invalid. This initial situa-
tion then determined the further course of the campaign. Due to the formulation
of the referendum question, the government parties and Jobbik campaigned for
a “no”. The supporters of most of the opposition parties were also against the
quota. Thus, these parties would have been forced to campaign for the govern-
ment’s proposal, which was not a viable option given the political polarization.
For this reason, these parties campaigned for a boycott of the referendum. The
MLP15 were the only party to vote for a “yes” because they wanted to send a
positive signal to the EU and denied the existence of a binding quota. The LMP16
finally took a neutral position and did not issue a voting recommendation. The
supporters of the government initiative (“no camp”) emphasized the need to send
a strong signal to Brussels, pointed to the security policy risks and warned of the
danger of “foreignization”. The boycotting parties (MSZP, DK)17 and some small
left-wing parties) justified their call for a boycott by pointing out that the question
was legally speaking pointless. In addition, they saw the opportunity to inflict a
defeat on the government (cf. Pállinger 2017, p. 161 ff.).
The government conducted an aggressive campaign and the reporting (not
only) in the public media was very one-sided. The campaign of the government
camp had a xenophobic undertone. The means were also very unevenly dis-
tributed: The government side spent about 50 million EUR, five times as much
money as for the election campaign in 2014. All opposition parties together spent
a total of 100,000 to 130,000 EUR (in addition to the campaign of the satire party
MKKP18, which was able to mobilize about 85,000 EUR through crowd-funding)
(cf. Pállinger 2017, p. 161 ff.).
Although more than 98% of the participants voted for the government pro-
posal, that is, with “No”, and only about 1.6% put a “Yes” in the ballot box, the
vote failed because the necessary quorum of 41.32% was not reached. The oppo-
sition tried to record the result as a success and spoke of the weakening of the
government. However, the ruling parties were able to push the invalidity of the
vote into the background by means of clever communication. They saw them-
selves strengthened vis-à-vis Brussels and declared that the mandate of more than

15 MLP = Magyar Liberális Párt - Hungarian Liberal Party.

16 LMP = Lehet Más a Politika - Politics can be different.
17 DK = Demokratikus koalíció - Democratic Coalition.

18 MKKP = Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (Hungarian Two Tailed Dog Party).
114 Z. T. Pállinger

3.4 million citizens could not simply be ignored. The government promised to
defend the Hungarian position tenaciously in Brussels and wanted to secure it
domestically by means of a constitutional amendment, in which the content of
the—invalid (!)—referendum would have been cast in a legal form. This attempt
finally failed—temporarily—due to a power struggle between Fidesz and Jobbik,
which tried in vain to force the ruling parties to make additional concessions. The
government used its “success” in the referendum to further profile itself as the
true guardian of Hungarian interests and also continued the anti-quota campaign.
In addition, she succeeded in portraying Jobbik as an opportunistic party that
betrayed the interests of the nation. Opinion polls after the referendum showed
that—if at all—the government camp could benefit from the referendum. It says a
lot about the understanding of law and politics of the ruling parties that after their
re-election in 2018 they carried out a constitutional amendment that referred to
the legally non-relevant referendum (cf. Pállinger)2017, p. 161 ff.).
For the sake of completeness, it should also be pointed out that Hungary, in
the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, declared a so-called state of emergency
under Article 53 of the Constitution, a kind of state of emergency, from March
11, 2020 to June 18, 2020. This initially time-limited measure was extended
indefinitely by parliament. Its indeterminate time and the fact that the termi-
nation of this state of emergency was effectively in the hands of the executive
were criticized at home and abroad. However, after successfully coping with
the acute first phase of the pandemic, the government itself initiated the termi-
nation of the state of emergency. Due to the aforementioned legislative changes
in November 2021, it became possible that another referendum--initiated by the
government--could be held at the same time as the parliamentary elections on 3
April 2022. The opposition also tried to launch a referendum, but was not able to
gather the necessary signatures so quickly that the vote would also have had to
be held at the same time as the elections (later the initiatives were declared inad-
missible anyway). The plebiscite initiated by the government followed the pat-
tern of the 2016 referendum. On 15 June 2021 the Hungarian Parliament passed
the so-called "Child Protection Act" (Act on Stricter Action against Pedophile
Offenders and on the Adaptation of Individual Laws for the Purpose of Protcting
Children--Act LXXIX/20221). The law, which was originally intended to protect
children was also supported by the opposition, was enriched with elements that
deliberately mixed pedophilia and homosexuality and thus tended to violate the
rights of sexuaal minorities. This law was strongly criticized at home and abroad,
especially by the EU. The Hungarian government reacted to this by launching a
plebiscite, which would serve to reaffirm the provisions of the law. Of the original
five questions, four were validated so that the plebiscite could take place at the
Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary 115

same time as the 2022 parliamentary elections. The referendum was on wheter
to restrict sex education in schools and ban the "popularization" of gender reas-
signment surgery. Furthermore, it should be forbidden to offer gender reassign-
ment therapies to children. Finally, it should also no longer be possible without
restriction to make available to children such media content with sexual content
that could influence their development. The Prime Minister justified the neces-
sity for the referendum by saying that it should show the EU that Hungary does
not want to follow the European "wrong paths" and protect its children. The ref-
erendum questions were largely devoid of practical relevance, as the criticized
practices are prohibited anyway because of the Child Protection Act. It was there-
fore unclear what legislative obligation could have been derived for parliament,
since the questions are formulated in such a way that no new regulations would
habe been necessary in the event of successful referendum. These questions, how-
ever, are irrelevant because the individual questions failed at the quorum, as the
number of valid votes was 47 % in each case (Országos Választási Iroda 2022).
Thus, although the opposition's call for boycott was successful, approximately 95
% of the participants in the referendum cast their votes in favor of the govern-
ment. However, this example shows very well that the government has cleverly
exploited the instrument of referendum. The subject of the referendum was sym-
bolically charged and represented a "trigger" in the identity-political conflict in
Hungary. It was capable of polarizing the population and mobilizing the support-
ers of the governing parties. It is also striking that the announcment of the refer-
endum coincided with the "Pegasus scandal", in which it became known that the
government had used the Pegasus spy software excessively against (allegeded)
opponents of the regime. Finally, the postioning of the referendum as a defensive
instrument against the EU's "encroachements" illustrates the government's skill-
ful two-level game. On the one hand, the government is seeking backing for the
conflicts with the EU, while at the same time presenting itself internally as the
defender of Hungarian interests. Moreover, from a ruel of law perspective, the
fact that the rules were changed in the course of the proceedings is problematic.
Only then it became possible to hold a plebiscite and parliamentary elections on
the same day.19

19 1)Are you in favor of the topic of sexual orientation finding its way into the teaching of
minor children in public educationalinstitutions without parental consent? 2) Are you in
favor of gender reassignment treatments being popularized for minorchildren? 3) Are you
in favor of allowing sexual media content that affects the development of minor children to
be shownwithout restriction? 4) Are you in favor of underage children being shown such
media content that depicts genderreassignment treatments? (cf. Nemzeti Választási Iroda
2022)
116 Z. T. Pállinger

4 Conclusion

The starting point of the article was the hypothesis that an increasingly illiberal
environment affects both the design and the practice of direct democracy at the
national level in Hungary. This hypothesis can be seen confirmed for the last 30
years. The experiences of the transition phase were rather ambivalent. Thanks to the
first referendum, it was indeed possible to completely dismantle the socialist sys-
tem, but this also marked the beginning of the deep division between the political
forces in Hungary, which continues to this day. The second referendum (1990) made
it clear that there was consensus among the political elite to restrict direct democ-
racy. In contrast, the third (1997) and fourth referendums (2003) were intended to
legitimize Hungary’s foreign policy reorientation. These referendums were only
valid because the required quorum had been lowered beforehand. The fifth refer-
endum (2004) was invalid due to the low turnout. In contrast, the sixth referendum
in 2008 was used as a weapon in the power struggle against the government, as the
opposition otherwise has no adequate means in the strongly majority parliamentary
system. The seventh and eight referendums of 2016 resp. 2022 were plebiscites. In
doing so, the government played a two-level game, trying to strengthen its internal
position and thus gain more negotiating power in Brussels at the same time.
The function of direct democracy in the Hungarian political system is diffi-
cult to grasp. It is not insignificant—important questions were decided by refer-
endum—but it struggles with two conceptual problems: The Hungarian political
system is extremely majoritarian and representative-democratic. This prevents the
emergence of a political space in which political questions can be discussed inde-
pendently of party politics, which leads to the fact that referendum campaigns
appear to be highly polarizing. The discourse does indeed reflect the deep divi-
sion of society, but it takes place at a very low substantial level. In addition, the
imbalance of material resources is problematic for a fair discourse. The strongly
representative-democratic orientation of the political system also leads to the fact
that the elites try to restrict the space of direct democracy. The government and
administration do not support citizens in the development of initiatives and inter-
pret the procedure in a very formalistic way.
The adaptation of direct democratic instruments to the majority and representa-
tive system appears to be difficult. In a certain way, the parties have reacted to
this situation: Direct democracy is used by the (governing) parties mainly to mobi-
lize their supporters and to strengthen their internal and external positions. Thus,
the current situation contributes to an instrumentalization of direct democracy by
the elites and the representative system, which is accentuated even more by the
­dominance of Fidesz. Empirically, the Hungarian example showed that in excep-
tional cases, direct democracy can indeed serve as a “safety valve”, but in the “nor-
mal case” it is controlled by the political parties, especially the government parties.
Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary 117

Appendix
Table A1 Referendums in Hungary 1989 to 2022

Year Subject Initiator(s) Number Type Participa- Share Result

of signa- tion in % „Yes“
tures in %
1989 Presidential Fidesz 140.000 Popular 58,03 50,07 approved
election SZDSZ initiative
after the first (consulta-
free elec- tive)
tions
Ban on party Fidesz 140.000 Popular 58,03 95,15 Approved
organisa- SZDSZ initiative
tions in (consulta-
companies tive)
Account- Fidesz 140.000 Popular 58,03 95,37 Approved
ability of the SZDSZ initiative
state party (consulta-
for its assets tive)
Disband- Fidesz 140.000 Popular 58,03 94,94 Approved
ment of the SZDSZ initiative
workers’ (consulta-
militia tive)
1990 Direct elec- MSZP 173.000 Popular 14,10 85,90 Invalid
tion of the initiative (Participa-
President of (binding) tion quorum
the Republic of 50 % not
met)
1997 NATO Parliament – Plebiscite 49,24 85,33 Approved
accession (binding)
2003 EU acces- – – Mandatory 45,62 83,76 Approved
sion referen-
dum
(binding)
2004 Dual citi- World 274.000 Popular 37,49 51,57 Invalid
zenship for ­Federation initiative (Approval
Hungar- of Hungar- (binding) quorum of
ians living ians 25 % not
abroad met)
(Continue)
118 Z. T. Pállinger

Year Subject Initiator(s) Number Type Participa- Share Result

of signa- tion in % „Yes“
tures in %
Prohibition MSZMP 239.000– Popular 37,49 65,01 Invalid
of privatisa- 244.000 initiative (Approval
tion in the (binding) quorum of
public health 25 % not
sector met)
2008 Abolition of Fidesz 250’000 Popular 50,51 82,42 Approved
the outpa- KDNP initiative
tient health (binding)
fee
Abolition Fidesz 250.000 Popular 50,51 82,22 Approved
of the daily KDNP initiative
hospital (binding)
allowance
Abolition Fidesz 250.000 Popular 50,51 84,08 Approved
of tuition KDNP initiative
fees in (binding)
state higher
education
2016 Rejection Govern- – Plebiscite 41,32 98,36 Invalid
of the EU’s ment (binding) (Participa-
mandatory tion quorum
refugee of 50 %
quotas not met)
2022 Topic of Govern- – Plebiscite 47,60 92,32 Invalid
sexual orien- ment (binding) (Participa-
tation in tion quorum
teaching of 50 % not
met)
Popu- Govern- – Plebiscite 47,23 95,92 Invalid
larization of ment (binding) (Participa-
gender reas- tion quorum
signment of 50 % not
treatment met)
for minors
No restric- Govern- – Plebiscite 47,13 95,33 Invalid
tion on sex- ment (binding) (Participa-
ual media tion quorum
content that of 50 % not
is accessible met)
to children
(Continue)
Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary 119

Year Subject Initiator(s) Number Type Participa- Share Result

of signa- tion in % „Yes“
tures in %
Showing Govern- – Plebiscite 47,11 95,17 Invalid
children ment (binding) (Participa-
media tion quorum
content of 50 % not
that depicts met)
gender reas-
signment
treatments

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Prof. Dr. habil. Zoltán Tibor Pállinger is Chair of Political Theory and European
Democracy Research at Andrássy University Budapest.
Contact: [email protected]
Civil Society, Social Movements
and Political Participation in Hungary

Dániel Mikecz

1 Introduction

The concept of a civil society was rediscovered in Hungary and throughout East-
ern Europe during the democratic transformation processes and became the guid-
ing principle of the political turnaround. Since then, there have been various key
events in the development of civil society (Arató and Mikecz 2015, p. 325). These
include the protests against the Gabčíkovo power plant in 1989, the taxi driver
blockade at the end of 1990, the protests of the democratic charter between 1992
and 1994, the emergence of a globalization-critical movement, the right-wing
protests since 2002 and the protests against the Orbán government since 2010.
Political discussions about the role of civil society resumed in the late 2000s. The
reason for this were the democratic setbacks in Eastern Europe. The Visegrád
countries and Hungary in particular were considered pioneers of the democratic
transformation in the 1990s, but since the middle of the 2010s the government of
Viktor Orbán and the Polish government de facto led by Jarosław Kaczyński have
followed the model of an illiberal democracy. In this way, they challenged the
fundamental values of the European Union (Bachmann and Héjj 2018).
This article provides information on civil society, social movements and
political participation in Hungary. First, it sketches the historical development of
civil society and the 1989 blueprint. It then highlights the development after the

D. Mikecz (*)
Republikon Institute Budapest and Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 121

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_7
122 D. Mikecz

regime change and provides an overview of social engagement. In another sec-

tion, the trends since the important parliamentary elections of 2010 are illumi-
nated. Despite the deterioration in the framework conditions of its action, civil
society activism has even expanded and changed. The last section systematizes
different types of activism, before a conclusion follows at the end.

2 Historical Development and the Blueprint of Civil

Society

The idea of civil society is closely linked to the Enlightenment and the devel-
opment of bourgeois society (Keane and Merkel 2015, pp. 445 ff.; Tilly 2004;
Tarrow 1993). In Hungary, modernization efforts have historically promoted the
emergence of an autonomous civil society and broader social participation. For
Hungarian Jacobinism and later in the so-called Reform Era between 1825 and
1848, independence from the state meant independence from the centralized
Habsburg monarchy. Drivers of this development were the liberal middle nobil-
ity (Köpeczi 1989, p. 454). On the one hand, the counties were used as self-gov-
erning organs of the nobility for national autonomy efforts, on the other hand the
foundation of associations, clubs or the Hungarian Academy of Sciences was pro-
moted by magnates like István Széchenyi.
In the time of the Dual Monarchy, the right to association and the right
to assembly were not regulated by law, but by decree, which made arbitrary
approval procedures possible and interfered with the competence of the commit-
tees. Because of the selective approval process, cultural clubs were also used as
places of political action, such as by the agrarian proletariat and ethnic minori-
ties. For this reason, reading associations were particularly popular. They served
alphabetization, magyarization and the development of a bourgeois consciousness
(Gyáni 2010, pp. 486 ff.). Only in 1938 did a legal regulation take place; arbi-
trary approval procedures therefore remained practice even in the interwar period.
New was the emergence of a literary movement of so-called popular writers (Bor-
bándi 1976, pp. 131 f.). They wanted to pursue a Hungarian “third way”, which—
according to the intention—would neither be National Socialist nor Communist,
but would serve Hungarian interests and could mitigate the great inequality in
Hungarian society. This movement promoted young intellectuals with an agrar-
ian proletarian background. The largest social organization of the interwar period
was the National Association of Catholic Journeymen’s Clubs (KALOT). It also
served as an organization of young agrarian proletarians, but under the umbrella
of the Catholic Church (Mártonffy-Petrás 2002, p. 216).
Civil Society, Social Movements and Political … 123

After the communist takeover of power, the autonomous civil society was sup-
pressed. Trade unions and youth organizations functioned as “transmission belts”
between the government or party leadership and the population in the socialist sys-
tem, i.e. they were used for ideological indoctrination and surveillance. Nevertheless,
also during socialism ideas and strategies of a civil society developed. The Polish dis-
sident Adam Michnik was one of the first to dress the need for autonomous organiza-
tions in a concept. He rejected the attempt of a humanization and democratization
of socialism by the Communist Party and on the basis of a revised Marxism as well
as a strengthening of the Catholic Church and the intelligentsia as an opposing elite
(Michnik 1985, pp. 135 f.). According to his approach, the “new evolutionism”, the
working class has the potential to force the government to change. The goal is to
“create a framework for democratic socialism”, which is not necessarily an institu-
tionalized legal structure, but a daily practice of interactions of people. This commu-
nity can arise through acts of “defiance” (Michnik 1985, p. 148).
Similarly to the idea of the “New Evolutionism”, Hungarian writer György
Konrád, a supporter of the Polish Solidarność movement, introduced the con-
cept of “antipolitics”, referring to everyday activities outside the political sphere.
Antipoliticians gain their power from the moral and cultural weight of civil soci-
ety, which can limit the political sphere’s political power (Konrád 1989, p. 92).
In this context, civil society is an non-institutionalized part of “checks and bal-
ances”. Konrád looks beyond the communist regime and sees civil society and
antipolitics as important instruments to deepen democracy, even if the institu-
tional context is already democratized. Citizens should also participate politically
at work and in their local communities. In this sense, Konrád’s concept resembles
the democracy concept of the new social movements in Western Europe (Falk
2003, p. 302). Measures of antipolitics include various initiatives, experiments,
new research projects, independent publication, cultural enterprise, or founding a
company (Konrád 1989, pp. 166–167). Also, the recognition of small farmers and
independent departments of the developing shadow economy and the Samisdat
literature could support these antipolitics measures.1
Similar ideas were also widespread in Czechoslovakia. Václav Havel devel-
oped the idea of an existential revolution, which among other things included a
“moral reconstruction of society”, the renewal of interpersonal and individual
community relationships, and the assumption of more responsibility (Havel 1985).

1 But as Elemér Hankiss (1988, p. 39) noted, the shadow economy and the second society
supplemented the official society because they fed additional resources into the system and
satisfied special needs.
124 D. Mikecz

Through moral renewal, new communities and structures could be developed that
promote more interpersonal trust, integrity, and coherence of communities. The
semi-institutionalized, short-lived, versatile structures and organizations could
serve to solve certain social problems and relieve various tensions.
All of these ideas related to an autonomous interaction space without inter-
ference from the official, communist system, which was later referred to as civil
society. The ideas of the dissidents were linked with Western political, philo-
sophical thoughts, such as those of Hegel, Tocqueville, and Arendt (Falk 2003,
p. 314). The concept of civil society also implied that the measures should not be
directed at the state. On the one hand, this strategy prevented open conflict with
the communist regime, which—as in the years 1956 and 1968—would have inev-
itably led to intervention by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the civil society
adapted to post-Marxist citizens aimed at a break from state-mandated Marxism.
The idea that the parallel society or the autonomous interaction space could grad-
ually overthrow the communist system through delegitimization also appeared in
scientific works (Arato and Cohen 1992; Ekiert and Kubik 2001).
The idea of civil society became the guiding principle of 1989. Before politi-
cal parties could be legally organized, political dissidents found a place in move-
ments and umbrella organizations. In Hungary, a green movement against the
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros waterworks on the Danube and special student dormito-
ries fulfilled such functions. However, politics was not only discussed in dissi-
dent circles, but also at roundtable talks and in political clubs, which were often
organized by official organizations such as the Patriotic People’s Front or the
Hungarian Communist Youth League with the aim of democratizing socialism
and reforming the regime.

3 Regulations and Trends in Political and Social

Participation

Before the first democratic election in 1990, the right to association and assembly
was newly regulated. Laws II and III of 1989 were passed by the last National
Assembly of the People’s Republic of Hungary in accordance with the agree-
ments reached during the negotiations at the national round table, in order to
ensure the legal transition. Both laws, like the other legal provisions of the regime
change, aimed at a democratic minimum in order to create a framework accept-
able to all parties. Law II on the right of association guaranteed every natural
and legal person the right to create and work in organizations or communities.
According to Law III, the right to assembly could be exercised in the form of
Civil Society, Social Movements and Political … 125

peaceful assemblies, demonstrations and marches. Its scope did not include cam-
paign events, church, cultural, sporting and family events. The organizers only
had to notify the competent police station of the assembly three days in advance.
The authority was only allowed to prohibit an event if it would interfere with the
smooth operation of the legislature or the courts or unduly impede traffic. The
latter gave the police some room for decisions on bans. However, the Hungarian
regulation of association and assembly was in line with international law, such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the UN (Civil Cov-
enant).2
After 1989, the number of social organizations increased rapidly. From 1993
to 2017, it quadrupled (Central Statistical Office 2019). In 2017, there were
61,151 non-profit organizations in Hungary, almost one third of which were
foundations, two thirds of which were clubs and non-profit companies. The most
common activity was leisure, hobby, culture, sport and education (Table 1). This
shows that social organizations are primarily a field for alternative public ser-
vices. Activities with a higher potential for political conflict (social work, pro-
fessional and economic representation, environment, legal aid, human rights,
politics) are only 18.6% of all civil organizations in Hungary.
The large number of social organizations might lead to the assumption that
Hungarian society is very active. Beyond voter turnout, however, participation
is low and formal membership is not very common (Table 2). According to data
from the European Social Survey, the most common form of participation was
contacting politicians and officials. The least common form is being a member of
a political party, which is exercised by approximately 1% of the adult population.
In election years, political participation is usually higher, including in the impor-
tant 2010 election, which marked a restructuring of the party system (Róbert and
Papp 2012). Hungarians are significantly less active than, for example, German
citizens. When interpreting the data, one should take into account that many char-
itable activities in Hungary are carried out informally, such as within the family
and among friends. However, the low level of activity sparked a debate about the
“weak civil society” (Szabó 2009; Nizák 2009) and the NGO-ization of political
action, i.e. the depoliticization of social conflicts (Mikecz 2018a; Sárosi 2018).

2 This states in Article 21: “The right to peaceful assembly is recognized. The exercise of
this right shall not be subject to any restrictions other than those provided for by law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national or public security,
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.” (United Nations 1966, p. 8).
126 D. Mikecz

Table 1 Civil organizations in Hungary by activity field

Activity field Share (%)
Leisure, Hobby 15.7
Culture 15.2
Sport 15.2
Formation 13,0
Social work 8,8
Urban development 5,1
Professional, economic interest representation 5.1
Health 4.2
Environment 3.3
Protection of public safety 3,3
Economic development 2,6
Research 2,1
Religion 1,9
Disaster relief, fire fighting 1,5
International relations 1,2
Legal aid, human rights 0,9
Politics 0,5
Granting organization 0,4
Source: Central Statistical Office

4 Civil Society in Illiberal Democracy

Since the mid-2000s, democracy has deteriorated in many Central and Eastern
European countries. According to Ivan Krastev, this “populist revolt” is directed
against the anti-egalitarian coalition of the post-nomenclature, against liberal
elites and the pursued neoliberal economic policy. Populist political forces prom-
ised the population to give them back their voice and sovereignty (Krastev 2007).
In the anti-pluralist concept of illiberal democracy, an independent civil society
plays a minor role.
Accordingly, after the already mentioned critical parliamentary elections of
2010 under the second Orbán government, the financing of social organizations
was changed and new conflicts arose between the government and NGOs partly
Civil Society, Social Movements and Political … 127

Table 2 Participation forms in Hungary and Germany compared

Participation HU HU HU HU HU DE 2016 (%)
form 2008 (%) 2010 (%) 2012 (%) 2014 (%) 2016 (%)
Have you had 8.6 11.9 4.8 8.9 6.7 17.8
contact with
a politician or
public official
in the last 12
months?
Have you 0.9 2.6 1.1 0.8 1.1 4.7
worked with a
political party
or group in the
last 12 months?
Have you 5.3 6.6 3.3 3.2 3.8 30.6
worked with
another
organization
or association
over the past 12
months?
Have you 7.2 2.8 3 5.2 4.3 37.7
participated in
a petition drive
in the last 12
months?
Have you par- 2.2 2.7 3.6 3.4 2.4 11.8
ticipated in an
approved pub-
lic demonstra-
tion in the last
12 months?
Source: European Social Survey n.d.

financed from abroad (Arató and Mikecz 2015, p. 318 ff.). At the end of 2011,
the Hungarian parliament passed a new civil law. The National Support Pro-
gramme for Civil Organizations (Nemzeti Civil Alapprogram, NCA), the most
important state funding instrument, was renamed the National Fund for Coopera-
tion (Nemzeti Együttműködési Alap, NEA). In the NEA, representatives of the
government have more influence than before in the NCA. The role of the fund
was also changed. The task of the NCA was to “strengthen civil society, promote
128 D. Mikecz

the civil society engagement of organizations, promote partnership and division

of labour between government and civil society”. The NEA, on the other hand,
“supports the activities and professional activities of civil society initiatives and
their national unity and promotes their role in the realization of the common
good” (Arató and Mikecz 2015, p. 318 ff.).
According to this new approach, those organizations can be considered “civil
society” which serve the nation as a community, while government-critical
“watchdog” organizations as well as foreign donor organizations and organiza-
tions financed by intergovernmental agreements were labeled by Viktor Orbán as
“foreign-paid political activists” (Orbán 2014). This approach was implemented
in the form of concrete measures by the government when János Lázár, then head
of the Prime Minister’s Office, ordered a payment review after the parliamentary
elections in 2014, in which it was claimed that people involved in the green party
LMP were involved in the decision on the granting of financial aid from the so-
called Norwegian Civil Fund. The “Norway Grant” is offered by Norway as a
member of the European Economic Area (EEA) for new EU member states in
order to reduce inequalities within the EEA.
The initiation of the peace marches (Békemenet) by the government and its
close associates and civil society organizations also shows that the new concept
of civil society is not just a rhetorical change. The peace march is a phenome-
non in its own right because it is mobilized for and not against a government,
that is, for the decision-maker. The peace march and the organizer, the Forum for
Civic Unity (Civil Összefogás Forum, CÖF), can be considered as Fidesz sat-
ellite movements or as auxiliary (auxiliary) civil organizations (Metz 2015). In
response to the low party membership rate, an attempt is being made to mobilize
Fidesz voters through the peace march, to deepen their involvement and to enable
the experience of participation and self-expression. In addition, the peace march
and the Forum for Civic Unity embody the “national community-building” social
activity and role concept: “The state should […] work institutionally and fairly
with civil society, which is based on non-profit activity, in order to achieve the
common good to the greatest benefit of as many people as possible” (Csizmadia
et al. 2014, p. 8).
In political debates, civil society is often considered as the natural immune sys-
tem of democracies, as an antidote to the described democratic setback. In fact,
since the mid-2000s, social engagement has changed in Eastern Central Europe.
Despite or because of the described politics, social movements and grassroots
initiatives have emerged in addition to existing non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). Urban movements introduced new forms and topics of collective action
(Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013; Sava 2015). In Hungary, in the 2000s, the street
Civil Society, Social Movements and Political … 129

presence of right-wing radicals determined the Hungarian protest culture. One of

the first events became known as the “Battle of the Elizabeth Bridge”. Right-wing
radical activists disputed the results of the 2002 elections and demanded a recount.
Four years later, the publication of the so-called “lie speech” by the then socialist
Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány triggered an even more violent and violent, pre-
viously unknown in Hungarian protest culture, type of protest wave (Szabó 2007,
pp. 169 ff.). In the course of this right-wing radical protest wave, a right-wing radi-
cal civil society emerged with Jobbik as a movement party (Mikecz 2015).
Initiatives directed upwards have been given new impetus in Hungary since
the early 2010s. In 2011, when the second Orbán government introduced a con-
troversial new media law, social activities arose beyond the fragmented liberal
and left opposition party spectrum. The so-called Milla movement (Egymilióan
a sajtószabadságért, A Million for Press Freedom) mobilized disappointed vot-
ers of the opposition for the protest against the new media law (Jensen 2015).
The Milla movement later became institutionalized and joined forces with the
left-wing electoral coalition in 2014. Three years later, six months after the elec-
tion of the third Orbán government, many citizens expressed their dissatisfaction
with the planned internet tax (Szabó and Mikecz 2015). Because of the public
protests, the government withdrew its plans, even though the various organizers
had not been able to maintain the mobilization. In 2016, the Tanítanék movement
(I Would Like to Teach) challenged the Orbán government. Teachers, parents and
students protested against the centralization of the education system, while Mária
Sándor, a former nurse and activist, called for a fundamental reform of the health
care system. The massive demonstrations in February / March 2016 raised high
expectations in the opposition press and the public, but did not last. For this rea-
son, this protest wave was rated as unsuccessful in the press.
In 2017, protests against the government’s policy towards the Central Euro-
pean University (CEU) followed. They inspired the founding of the Közös Ország
Mozgalom (Common Country Movement), which wanted to prepare a successful
election strategy for the fragmented opposition for the 2018 parliamentary elec-
tions. At the end of 2018, the new overtime law of the fourth Orbán government,
or, as the trade unions put it, the “slave law”, triggered another massive wave of
protests. While liberal issues such as education and press freedom had been in
the foreground between 2014 and 2018, the protests this time were about mate-
rial demands. However, the restriction of liberal rights remained a reason for
demonstrations in 2019. The preservation of academic freedom was therefore a
key demand of the protesters when the government placed the research institutes
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under its direct control (see the chapter
of Várszegi in this volume).
130 D. Mikecz

5 The Patterns of Activism in Hungary

Overall, despite the generally low level of organization and political obstacles,
a diverse landscape of activity has developed in Hungary. To typify the differ-
ent forms of social and political participation, one can use the beneficiaries of the
action, the direction, the institutional background, the type of participation and
the involvement as indicators (Mikecz and Böcskei 2017, p. 239). The following
section sketches various types and gives examples for each.
The universal pattern of activism refers to the normative concept of active citi-
zenship, which recourse to universal values and is directed at decision-makers by
means of civil organizations and a broad, direct involvement of citizens. In Hun-
gary, those initiatives that are based on the normative civil ethos belong to this
pattern of activism, such as the already mentioned Milla movement, which was
originally directed against the new media law of 2011 (Petőcz 2013). This pat-
tern of activism corresponds to the 1989 blueprint and includes a kind of political
hostility.
The second pattern are actions of trade unions and professional groups. This
type of action favors a group that is determined by the same economic interests.
Successful actions in this area are guaranteed above all by strong trade unions.
But here too, elements of universalism can arise, especially when an action is car-
ried out by employees in the public service. The teacher protests of 2016 not only
addressed the salaries and working hours of teachers, but also the centralization
of the education system and democracy in schools.
In transactional activism, it is not about mobilizing citizens, but about mobi-
lizing networks, about connections between the acting civil society organiza-
tions and the media, political actors and decision-makers (Petrova and Tarrow
2007, p. 6). The main actors of transactional activism are NGOs that generally
do not work with volunteers, but with professional staff. These organizations
are also dependent on donor organizations, EU and other foreign funds. NGOs
are often active in areas such as environmental protection, feminism, minor-
ity rights and international peace, which are also characteristic of the new social
movements that have arisen in Western Europe since the late 1960s. In addition
to Hungarian foundations and associations, such NGOs are local subsidiaries of
international organizations such as Amnesty International, the International Hel-
sinki Committee and Transparency International. The expertise and credibility
of these organizations are ensured by the employment of experts and activists
and by their integration into professional and scientific networks. Transactional
activism and contacts between organizations are also promoted by the similar
social status and attitudes of their employees or activists. During the transition,
Civil Society, Social Movements and Political … 131

donor ­organizations such as the Soros Foundation and USAID financially sup-
ported such organizations. Later, after EU accession, the European Structural and
Investment Funds took over this role (Arató and Mikecz 2015, pp. 326 ff.). Since
expertise and professional credibility are at the center of transactional activism,
the need for resources is high. For this reason, writing applications and project-
oriented organization are among the core activities of these organizations.
In the case of transactional activism, the goals—as with the civic ethos and
experiential activism—are universally oriented. Here it is about helping disadvan-
taged people, the needy, the vulnerable in the sense of the universalism of civil
society, that is, not arbitrarily restricting the circle of initiators on the basis of
nationality, skin color, religion. However, project-related activity is character-
ized by the target group approach, so that the beneficiaries of specific projects
can hardly be involved in the main activity of the organization due to lack of
expertise. Transactional activism addresses decision-makers with policy propos-
als and expert knowledge. An important element of their identity is the role of the
“watchdog”, the monitoring of the activities of the state and to a lesser extent also
of private companies.
This “watchdog” identity and a stronger political engagement have arisen from
the conflict between the transitional organizations and the Hungarian government
over the disbursement of funds from the Norwegian Fund. In connection with the
conflict, the question arose in public debate as to from whence the role of the
guardian of transactional organizations can be derived and on what basis the legit-
imacy of social actors rests to control a government democratically authorized by
the political community. Similar to the single-issue movements that arose during
regime change, these organizations have exercised their activity on the one hand
with “cis-political”, that is, professional, and on the other hand with “trans-politi-
cal”, that is, universal means (Bozóki 2003, p. 65).
Experience-oriented, altruistic activism is the fourth category in our typol-
ogy. As in the case of civic ethos and transactional activism, political action takes
place along universal values ​​in this case. Anyone can enjoy the benefits of expe-
rience-oriented activism as soon as he accepts these universal values. With expe-
rience-oriented activism, political action is not about specific political decisions,
but about the internal enrichment of the actor, about the acquisition of experience
and the realization of the individual experience project (Schulze 1992). Therefore,
this activism is closely linked to everyday aesthetics, forms of hybrid participa-
tion and self-expression at the border of art, entertainment, politics and expertise.
Not only the endpoint, but also the starting point of experience-oriented activism
is the individual. Whether it is an individual action, such as a boycott or con-
scious consumption, or community activism is practiced—participation depends
132 D. Mikecz

on the decision of the individual and not on individual affectedness. The indi-
vidual is thus not active as a member of a professional group or local commu-
nity, but based on an indignation founded on universal values. Because of the lack
of direct affectedness, solidarity is the most important motivation of the activist.
For this reason, the activity forms of experience-oriented activism are solidarity
demonstrations, altruistic actions (e.g. distribution of food), as well as cultural
self-expression and alternative consumption. In addition to Budapest-centered,
alternative, left-wing subcultures, these include groups that supported refugees
during the peak of the refugee crisis in Hungary. These groups did not make
demands on decision-makers; they only wanted to exercise their altruistic activity
uninterrupted.
The last identified category is particular activism. As in the case of profes-
sional activism, the results of the action cannot be enjoyed universally. In con-
trast to unions and professional associations, the legitimacy of particular activism
cannot be acquired through institutionalized membership. Rather, it is determined
by the local embedding or ethnic affiliation. The action is directed outward, the
addressee is the decision-maker, the pressure on him is exerted through com-
munity involvement. The basis for participation are direct complaints that the
individual has suffered as a member of a group (e.g. mortgage debtors). Typical
particular civil actions are the so-called NIMBY3 -movements, in which residents
protest against local investments (Hubbard 2005). The anti-globalization move-
ment was able to partly integrate such protests into a transnational interpretive
framework that rejects neoliberal globalization with the help of the slogan “Think
Global, Act Local!” (Mikecz 2018b). In the case of particular civil activism, how-
ever, NIMBY protests cannot be linked to a universal framework. This category
includes the demonstrations against the refugee camps in Vámosszabadi (2013)
and Martonfa (2015) or against the construction of a children’s home in Tolna
(2014). In the case of the mortgage debtor movement, this particularity was char-
acterized by the use of right-wing, nationalist symbols during mobilization.
The typology used refers to civilian organizations, NGOs and informal groups
that are politically active. For this reason, leisure, hobby and sports clubs are usu-
ally not taken into account here. However, cultural or leisure clubs can also be
political, as in the case of the re-staging of historical events in the right-wing radi-
cal milieu. The number of groups or population shares active in each type is diffi-
cult to estimate because not all groups or activities exist permanently. The largest
group are the unions. According to the data of the Hungarian Central S ­ tatistical

3 Not In My Backyard.
Civil Society, Social Movements and Political … 133

Office KSH from 2015, 328,829 Hungarians are union members, which cor-
responds to nine percent of all employees. The think tank Policy Agenda states
that in 2018, 513 unions submitted their annual report to the court (Policy Agenda
2019). In the case of transactional activism, it is about ten large NGOs with a
total of 50–70 employees and several hundred volunteers. However, their media
resonance is higher than one would expect from their share of Hungarian civil
society organizations due to their professionalism.
The other forms of activism are characterized by informal groups and ad-hoc
coalitions of civil organizations. Protests that are organized in the spirit of univer-
salism, like the aforementioned Milla movement, can mobilize tens of thousands
of demonstrators. The basis of experiential activism is a new left-wing political
subculture with about 1500 activists. Actions of particular activism are organized
sporadically. The protests of debtors and NIMBY events usually involved 20 to
300 demonstrators. All of these forms serve social engagement and participa-
tion. As a result, they are important in developing and maintaining a participatory
political culture. In contrast, particular activism can promote an anti-democratic
mindset and corresponding behavior because of its exclusive nature.

6 Conclusion

This article has shown that the emergence of civil society in Hungary was his-
torically mainly associated with national emancipation and modernization efforts.
After the Sovietization of the country, the autonomy of civil society was abol-
ished. However, since the 1970s, anti-communist dissidents have founded parallel
organizations and created a second public as an oppositional strategy. This has
contributed to the spread of the concept of civil society. This also emphasized the
cultural and political belonging to Europe. Other movements, such as the anti-
globalization movement and the experience-oriented activism, also follow West-
ern models. The leading idea of 1989, the civil ethos, lives mainly in intellectual
circles, while the political and social activity level of the individualized Hungar-
ian society is low. Since the 2000s, 3 to 5% of Hungarians are active in a social
organization and 2 to 4% take part in a demonstration. Despite this low level of
organization, the variants of activities are diverse. Based on a typology of civil
society activism, they were presented and illustrated with examples.
134 D. Mikecz

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The Political Economy of Hungary:
Managing Structural Dependency
on the West

Zoltán Pogátsa

Hungary was once the star student of both political and economic transition.
Along with Poland, it was heralded by Western international institutions as the
most open, reformist, Western-oriented country in the former Eastern block. Yet
a few decades down the line, both of these countries have become closed, illib-
eral and nationalist. In this chapter we attempt to prove that it is impossible to
understand these unexpected trajectories without dwelling more deeply into the
political economy of these countries. As many other Eastern European countries,
the Hungarian economy does not fit into any previous model outlined in econom-
ics literature because it relies almost exclusively on foreign direct investments.
The chapter explains how the governments managed this structural dependency.
It starts from sketching out the model of a dependent competition state and then
traces back Hungarian governments’ economic policies since the 1980s.

1 The New Model of a Dependent Competition

State

Most of the economics literature related to the transition from Soviet style social-
ism to capitalism was written in the framework of ‘transition economics’ (Aslund
2002; Blanchard 1991; Sachs 1994 and others). This genre is part of a wider
paradigm generally referred to as modernisation theory. The central tenet of this
approach is that an ideotypical developed capitalist economy exists, a kind of

Z. Pogátsa (*)
University of Sopron, Sopron, Hungary
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 137

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_8
138 Z. Pogátsa

textbook case, which less developed, emerging or transitional economies should

aim to emulate and approximate. The more this is achieved, the more success-
ful the economic convergence. The generic, ideotypical capitalist economy can be
created by introducing a basic set of capitalist institutions, such as private owner-
ship, liberalised prices, market relations, low corruption, etc.
Modernisation theory suggests that it is up to the given society to implement
the necessary ‘reforms’, the failure of which can usually be accounted for by a
certain cultural deficiency of the given society (‘Eastern mentality’, ‘high propen-
sity for corruption’, etc.). Modernisation theory projects that emerging economies
have every opportunity to reach the level of developed economies provided they
undertake the necessary efforts. It sees no causal relationship between the accom-
plishments of developed nations and the poverty of the rest: the global economy
is linear and not relational, it consists of stages rather than interdependencies. In
this world, everything is possible.
At the other extreme is dependency theory. This paradigm is anchored within
world systems theory, according to which a global capitalist economy has devel-
oped over the centuries, with a centre and a periphery (e.g. Wallerstein 1974;
Arrighi 1994). The development paths of the centre and the periphery are not
independent of each other. Developed states have always taken advantage of
less developed ones. International economic dependencies have changed form
over time from overt colonisation to less obvious forms of exploitation such as
investment by first world transnational corporations, free trade, offshore financial
leakages and so on. In this framework there is no room for successful economic
convergence, as it is in the interest of the centre to keep the periphery and the
semi-periphery in economic dependence.
Both approaches have their merits and convey important considerations. How-
ever, in reality the truth lies somewhere in-between. There is no denying that
there are interdependencies in the global economy. We have countless cases of
first-world multinationals exploiting the natural resources or cheap labour of
less developed economies. In order to do this, they are even prepared to cooper-
ate with repressive political regimes, or bribe democratic ones. We have evidence
(Centre for Applied Research 2015) that offshore jurisdictions in the first world,
such as Switzerland, Luxembourg or the crown dependencies connected to the
City of London1 suck away more resources from developing states than the capi-
tal that flows from the first world to these countries in the form of investment and
aid. The interdependencies are obvious; to deny them takes deliberate blindness.

1 Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, etc.
The Political Economy of Hungary: Managing … 139

There is an astonishing degree of stability in the global capitalist system in that

effectively no capitalist economy has ever fallen out of the global centre once it
made it there.
Yet the international economy is not over-determined in the way dependency
theory implies. A relatively large share of the global population has achieved eco-
nomic convergence over the centuries. Britain overtook Flanders as the centre of
global capitalism, subsequently in the nineteenth century the United States and
Germany caught up, as did Scandinavia. After World War Two the Far Eastern
tigers and Israel made enormous leaps forward, as did the Celtic Tiger of Ireland.
In recent decades it has been the world’s most populous country, China, which
has astonished the world with a rate of development never seen before in human
history. Thus economic progress and convergence are clearly possible. Economic
interdependencies clearly exist in the international economic system, but his-
tory is not absolute destiny. While there is no economic over-determination, as
dependency theory would like us to believe, there is also no cultural determin-
ism, as modernisation theory suggests when it explains the lack of convergence in
terms of cultural deficiencies, in a context that it sees as free of external depend-
encies.
As a response to the above debate, a third paradigm has appeared, which
attempts to combine the merits of the first two schools to incorporate the above
complexities and achieve a higher degree of realism. This approach, known as
dependent development (Evans 1979), accepts the interdependencies of the world
economy, but also allows for national agency within this context. In other words,
it treats the capitalist world system as stochastic rather than deterministic. It
accepts the dominance of global centripetal forces, but also finds room for the
occasional ascent of the periphery.
Dependent development theory makes use of the so-called varieties of capital-
ism research programme (Albert 1991; Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001 and
many others). This approach posits that we must recognise a diversity of capi-
talisms in plural rather than to presuppose a single unitary picture of capitalism.
While the basic characteristics of a capitalist economy (private property, profit
motive, etc.) are common, the differences between the different varieties of capi-
talism express more about the success of certain types than others. Thus we might
differentiate between liberal/Anglo-Saxon capitalism, welfare states, the Conti-
nental/Rhineland model, Mediterranean capitalism, the Far Eastern development
state, offshore jurisdictions, petro states and so on.
Different varieties of capitalism have demonstrated different capacities for
economic convergence. If we exclude offshore jurisdictions and petro states,
140 Z. Pogátsa

which thrive on external or naturally available resources, we find that the success-
ful models of economic convergence involve a coordinating role of the state, be it
social democratic welfare states (Scandinavia) or nationalist development models
(Far Eastern Tigers, Ireland, belatedly China).
Framed in such a way, the question then becomes the following: on top of
the basic institutions of a market economy, what model of capitalism have East-
ern European former state socialist states, Hungary in particular, adopted since
1989? How successful has this model been in terms of economic development,
convergence to the centre of the world economy, sustainability, social justice and
equality? What has been the contribution of this model to the sustainability of
democracy in the region?
The varieties of capitalism literature has come to the conclusion that Eastern
Europe does not fit into any previous model. It constitutes an entirely new variant
that had not existed anywhere before. This new type has been dubbed the for-
eign direct investment dependent competition state (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009;
Bohle and Greskovits 2012; Drahokoupil and Myant 2014; Pogátsa 2016). Hun-
gary was the pioneer country of this kind of capitalism in the late eighties. It is
foreign direct investment (FDI) based, because it relies on FDI as the primary and
overwhelmingly dominant source of investment. This is in contrast to the other
convergence models that rely dominantly on domestic savings. Not only does this
Eastern European model make use of FDI as the primary source of capital, but
also as a replacement for development policies that are carried out by the state in
other capitalisms. Instead of constant and conscious skill and knowledge upgrad-
ing through well-financed education and retraining, employment policy is con-
strained to attracting foreign investors with low taxes and wages in the hope that
they will create jobs. Social policy is replaced by this job creation, marginalising
social groups and regions that FDI overlooks. Technology policy does not exist,
the upgrading of value added is expected exogenously from the foreign plants.
Regional policy is little more than an attempt to woe investors into certain cities
or towns.
Generally, whatever is a conscious evidence-based policy in Western European
models of capitalism, strategically prepared and negotiated with social partners,
is crudely substituted for by FDI attraction in the East. In fact, the term compe-
tition state (Cerny 1997) refers to the fact that these states in the East compete
with each other to attract Western (and lately also Chinese and Russian) capital.
Rather than coming together to form a common Visegrád investment platform, for
instance, they struggle with each other by offering cheap labour, low taxes, weak
trade unions, deregulation, generous direct state aid, lax environmental control
and a long list of further neoliberal advantages.
The Political Economy of Hungary: Managing … 141

2 1986–2010: Lack of Convergence and Economic

Collapse

Hungary pioneered as a dependent market economy in the late 1980s and the
early 1990s, when other states in the region were still experimenting with coupon
based privatisation (Bruszt and Stark 1998), which almost always led to crony
capitalism. In 1986, the Hungarian economic transition started, as did privatisa-
tion for foreign investors. Eventually all followed Hungary’s FDI-based model,
with the only exceptions being Slovenia and Croatia, the two former Yugoslav
republics that had had some experience with operating domestic companies
amidst semi-market conditions. As well as its pioneer, Hungary also became an
extreme example of this model.
This was not a consequence of some conscious design or well-informed
decision, but a sort of drifting from the decade-long tendency of the Hungarian
technocratic economic elite to promote elements of market liberalism into the
socialist centrally planned model. As described by Csaba and Szamuely (1998)
and Fabry (2019), the mainstream of the Hungarian economic profession had
been socialised into focusing on liberalisation as a universal panacea for all the
ills of a state-owned, centrally planned economy. The ‘transition’, ‘modernisa-
tion’ paradigm of a generic market economy was simply a default arrival point of
this previous process. Until today, most of these Hungarian economists remain in
this paradigm, and are either ignorant of the varieties of capitalism and dependent
development approaches, or discount them as irrelevant.
As a consequence of its FDI-dependent model, Hungary has become one of
the most open economies in the European Union in terms of exports and imports
as a percentage of GDP. It was the 11th most open economy in the world in 2017
according to the rankings of the World Bank, at a 169% of GDP. The fate of the
Hungarian economy has been dependent on the performance of transnational cor-
porations that had invested in Hungary mainly because of:

1. low wages, at around 1/4 to 1/3 of wages in Western Europe,

2. the country’s prospective and (in 2004) realized accession to the European
Union, entailing the elimination of tariffs and quotas vis-à-vis other member
states, as well as the protection of property rights, etc.
3. geographical closeness to Austria, Northern Italy and Southern Germany, ena-
bling short transport routes,
4. very weak trade union rights, further liberalised by successive governments,
5. low taxes, further decreased by successive governments,
142 Z. Pogátsa

Table 1  Employment rate Hungary 54.1

in quarter 1 of 2010
Continental model
Germany 70.4
Austria 69.6
Netherlands 73.4
Scandinavian model
Sweden 70.4
Denmark 73
Norway 75
Source (Eurostat)

6. generous direct state aid packages,

7. lax environmental regulation.2

A comparison of key statistics reveals a lot. GDP per capita would be the obvious
indicator to compare, but this is problematic in an economy where most value
added is produced by transnationals. Due to massive reliance (Bradbury et al.
2018) on transfer pricing (the practice of shifting taxable revenues to jurisdictions
where taxation is more favourable), their effective contribution to GDP is a mat-
ter of accounting decisions. Tax competition nowadays comes down to a contrast
between a 30–35% corporate tax in many EU states as opposed to perhaps a 0.5%
tax in an offshore jurisdiction. Since about 2/3 of trade in the global economy
takes place on an intrafirm rather than interfirm basis, it is easy to see that GDP
per capita says very little about the actual development of the economy.3
Much more pertinent indicators are the employment level and wages. As can
be seen in Table 1, in the first quarter of 2010, just before Viktor Orbán’s (Fidesz)
landslide victory in parliamentary elections, the employment rate in Hungary was
no more than 54.1%, significantly lower than in the countries of the Continental
or Scandinavian model.

2A striking example: in the city of Győr, a Natura 2000 site was opened for industrial con-
struction because Audi was set to build a new production plant there. The European Com-
mission astonishingly decided in favour of ‘job creation’.
3 The deployment of a GNI rather than a GDP indicator would still not account for losses

due to transfer pricing.

The Political Economy of Hungary: Managing … 143

Table 2  Median net 2005 2010 2017

annual income, euros, total
economy Hungary 3,447 4,241 4,993
Continental model
Germany 16,395 18,795 21,906
Austria 17,758 21,058 24,752
Netherlands 17,002 20,292 23,563
Scandinavian model
Sweden 17,327 18,916 25,395
Denmark 22,116 25,672 29,383
Norway 25,668 32,419 38,494
Source (Eurostat)

The development of wages in contrast to neighbouring developed regions also

demonstrates a lack of convergence. As in the case of employment, comparison
to the European average wage is problematic, as the latter includes the collapsed
economies of Southern Europe, hardly an appropriate benchmark for Eastern
Europe.
Table 2 provides a comparison with neighbouring developed regions. Thus the
Austrian wage in 2005 was 14,311 € higher than the Hungarian, in 2010 it was
16,817 € higher, and in 2017 it was 19,759 € more.4 That is a wage that is eas-
ily attainable just across the border. With free labour mobility in the European
Union, not surprisingly hundreds of thousands of Hungarians took the opportu-
nity and made the move. Austria, Germany and the UK have become the favourite
destinations for Hungarian labour migrants.
Not only did the FDI-based model keep Hungary poor, but it also remained
very unjust. The neoliberal underfinancing of the educational, health, social pol-
icy and retraining systems meant that chances for social mobility were dimin-
ished. As can be seen in Fig. 1, a 2007–2010 Europe-wide study (Eurofound
2017) found Hungary to have the least social mobility in all of the European
Union before Orbán’s 2010 parliamentary victory.

4A comparison on purchasing power parity (PPP) would be more appropriate here. Unfor-
tunately, the PPP indicators of Eurostat are highly problematic. The Eastern European fig-
ures are diminished by the inclusion of services (hotel, taxi, restaurants), which domestic
citizens hardly consume. There is also no reliable inflation component for housing prices, a
leading expenditure.
144 Z. Pogátsa

Index of
dissimilarity
0.45

0.4

0.35

0.3

0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

Dissimilarity index O-D O-D, sons O-D, daughters

Fig. 1 Social mobility in the European Union before 2010. Source Eurofound 2017

The percentage of households living below the living wage (Fig. 2) was on a
rapid increase under a nominally Socialist-led government.
The FDI-based Hungarian model did not have the potential for convergence.
Multinational firms used it as a low wage production platform for low value-
added production phases, in order to re-export to Western Europe in the frame-
work of the single European market. They had no interest in industrial upgrading
in this region, keeping high value-added, high-wage production closer to home. It
became obvious that FDI will not and cannot replace human resources and infra-
structure building state policies.
In addition, the lack of a welfare state made it impossible for Hungarians born
into poorer families to achieve social mobility. Hungary was unjust and falling
further away from benchmarks such as neighbouring Austria.
If all this wasn’t enough, there was also dramatic economic misgovernance
by the nominally Socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (see Figs. 3 and 4).
The Political Economy of Hungary: Managing … 145

households living below subsistence level many %

Fig. 2 Percentage of Hungarian households below the living wage, 2000–2013. Source
Hungarian Statistical Office

Record high budget deficits in the years after 2004 resulted in a fast augmenting
state debt to GDP ratio, which in turn led investors at the outbreak of the global
financial crisis in 2008 to pinpoint Hungary as a problem economy. Refinanc-
ing yields shot up through the roof, effectively shutting the country out of capital
markets. Gyurcsány resigned, and effectively a caretaker government under Gor-
don Bajnai led Hungary up to the historical turning point of the 2010 elections.
A colossal IMF loan was negotiated, tied to a massive stabilisation programme
that cut into the already underfinanced state subsystems, as well as people’s liveli-
hoods.
The combined effects of the lack of convergence to the West, the extreme lack
of social mobility, as well as economic misgovernance by the Socialist-Liberal
coalition led to a historic collapse of the Left and the Liberals. While in 2006 they
had still collected 2.6 million votes against Viktor Orbán’s 2.5 million and won
the election, four years later, Viktor Orbán’s vote rose only slightly to 2.7 mil-
lion, but the Socialists fell below 1 million and the Liberals completely dropped
out of Parliament. The Hungarian Left and Liberal forces went under, and have
146 Z. Pogátsa

Fig. 3 GDP growth (green) and primary budget deficit (red) during the Socialist-Liberal
governments in Hungary, 2002–2009. Source Eurostat

Fig. 4 Debt to GDP in Hungary during the Socialist-Liberal period, 2002–2009. Source
Eurostat

been struggling to regain their popularity ever since. 2.7 million votes for Fidesz
out of an electorate of 8 million was a decent result for any mainstream right-
wing party, but nothing extraordinary. The real reason was the collapse of the Left
due to misgovernance and the failed economic model they had pursued (Pogátsa
2020).
The Political Economy of Hungary: Managing … 147

3 Since 2010: Combining Dependent Market

Economy with Incentives for Particular Electoral
Groups

While in opposition before 2010, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party rallied against
neoliberalism. It even ran a successful referendum against the planned privatisa-
tion of the healthcare system, as well as numerous other neoliberal initiatives of
the formally Socialist government of Ferenc Gyurcsány. In 2010, when Fidesz
achieved victory in the parliamentary elections, it consequently announced a new
economic model. Hardly anyone noticed that in interviews5 to UK newspapers,
Orbán repeatedly called Margaret Thatcher his political idol. He was also one
of the rare acting national leaders to attend her funeral in 2013. At home, Orbán
positioned himself as anti-neoliberal to gather votes, while at heart his closely
held economic beliefs were truly neoliberal.
In contrast to his own rhetoric of an “economic freedom fight”, Orbán contin-
ued the same FDI-dependent neoliberal model. In political terms, he announced
the beginning of illiberal politics. In socio-economic terms, he spoke of the “end
of the collapsed welfare state era and the beginning of a new workfare state”. He
was never pressed to explain why he thought Hungary had been a welfare state
before 2010. Evidence suggests that it had not been: as we have demonstrated,
underfinanced education, welfare and social policy resulted in frozen social
mobility. Neither was he asked why he thought European welfare states had col-
lapsed. They had not: Scandinavia, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands contin-
ued to lead all EU listings from competitiveness, employment, living standards,
freedom of the press, corruption, etc. The traditionally neoliberal concept of the
workfare state should have been a warning sign. In reality this meant massive
workfare programmes without retraining, paid at half the living wage, forcing
unskilled people in deprived regions of the country to work meaningless menial
jobs in absence of alternatives.
Orbán’s former Economy Minister, now central bank chairman György Matol-
csy, repeatedly highlighted the merits of the Far Eastern development model. This
would have served as a plausible choice for Orbán: most of the Asian economic
miracles had taken place amidst at least semi-authoritarian circumstances, with
economic development and rising living standards serving as a legitimating force.

5 Forexample, to the telegraph on 13 October 2013, where he agrees with her “there is no
such thing a society remark” and professes to be against “social engineering”.
148 Z. Pogátsa

On his trips to China, and elsewhere in the Far East, Orbán repeatedly praised
their model.
Yet at home, Orbán’s economic policy was decidedly different. The Far East-
ern development model entails constant technological upgrading and the enhance-
ment of the nation’s human capital. The prime example is Singapore, where
illiteracy was dominant after WW2, and the country then developed into one of
the technological and knowledge hubs in Asia in a matter of no more than two
generations. Orbán even acknowledged this on his visit to the Lion City. How-
ever, at home he followed the opposite route. Essential state subsystems respon-
sible for human capital development (education, healthcare, retraining, social
policy, etc.) remained underfinanced. Hungary was spending a few percentage
points lower than the EU average on each of these policies (see Figs. 5, 6 and 7).
In fact it should have been spending more, as the population was far unhealthier,
less educated, spoke fewer languages and so on. No national technology policy
appeared either, and government spending on research and development remained
low in an international comparison.
The Far Eastern development model (Allen 1981; Castells 2004; Johnson
1982; Xu and Ruef 2004; Yew 2000) leads to national export champions produc-
ing high value-added end products and services: Sony, Toyota, Kia, Samsung,
Huawei, Alibaba, Tencent to name just a few. No such champions appeared in
Orbán’s Hungary. Instead, a small coterie of cronies grew to be the new ‘national
bourgeoisie’ thanks to state licenses granted to them (in the tobacco, media,

Fig. 5 Health expenditure of selected Eastern European EU member states and the EU
average, 2006–2017. Source Eurostat
The Political Economy of Hungary: Managing … 149

Fig. 6 State expenditure on education, selected Eastern European member states and the
EU average. Source Eurostat

22.

20.

EU27
18.
Czechia
% of GDP

16. Hungary
Slovenia
14. Slovakia
Poland
12.

10.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Fig. 7 Expenditure on social protection in selected Eastern European member states and
the EU average, 2006–2017. Source Eurostat

b­ anking and casino industries), as well as public procurement tenders (mostly

construction), often financed from European Union transfers. Many of these
cronies are personally related to the Prime Minister, such as Lőrinc Mészáros, a
childhood friend and a previously bankrupt gas repairman, who overtook a bank-
ing boss in 2018 to become the country’s richest man, and Orbán’s son-in-law
István Tiborcz, who came in at 32nd place, from nowhere, as the youngest on
150 Z. Pogátsa

the list in 2019. The development state envisaged by Matolcsy never materialised.
The firms created and made unusually profitable by the state remained highly
dependent on the state itself, and did not grow outside of Hungary. Scheiring
(2019) calls this an “accumulation state”.
At the same time Viktor Orbán dismantled the rudimentary welfare state that
was left after two terms of neoliberal governance by the Socialist-Liberal coali-
tion. Income remained low in an international comparison, especially for single
parents (see Fig. 8). He decreased unemployment benefit to the lowest sum and
the shortest period in Europe. The Labour Code was liberalised to such an extent
that it became one of the most neoliberal in Europe. Under pressure from Ger-
man automobile investors (Audi, Mercedes and BMW all invested and cooper-
ated gladly with Orbán’s illiberal government), the Labour Code was once again
altered in 2018 to allow for extensive overtime that would only have to be reim-
bursed over a period of three years. Dubbed the ‘Slave Law’, this amendment
drew street protests and strikes, but over time the trade unions proved to be inef-
fective.
As far as taxation is concerned, a low and flat rate personal income tax was
introduced, clearly favouring the highest income brackets (Tóth and Virovácz
2013), and punching a massive hole into the budget. The corporate tax rate was
also reduced, to a level comparable to tax havens. The largest corporations in
Hungary, almost all of them foreign investors, paid almost no taxes, due to gener-
ous tax breaks and direct subsidies provided by the government. In spite of the
anti-neoliberal and anti-multinational rhetoric, the Orbán government gave more
direct subsidies to transnational investors than the preceding Socialist- Liberal
coalition (see Fig. 9). It even signed so-called ‘strategic agreements’ with them,
the content of which was officially declared a state secret.
However, this long list of measures was combined with tactfully introduced
benefits for lower middle-class voters. Such measures included forcing utility
companies to cap their fees. It also entailed sizeable increases in the minimum
wage that raised the living standards of about 1.2 million directly and hundreds
of thousands more indirectly. Average wages also rose. While labour force migra-
tion to Western Europe increased (estimated to plateau around 350,000 after
2011), the already mentioned senseless public works programmes (200,000 –
220,000 very exploited and precarious ‘beneficiaries’) as well as labour-intensive
infrastructural projects financed by the European Union created jobs (estimated
some 170,000 new workplaces). Thus Hungarians experienced an end to unem-
ployment and real wages rising at around 4–5% annually year after year in the
2015–2019 period. Pensioners also saw their income levels preserved against an
 The Political Economy of Hungary: Managing …
151

Fig. 8 Net annual earnings of different family models in 2015

152 Z. Pogátsa

Fig. 9 Direct support to multinational investors (billions HUF, lhs and HUF/employee
rhs), 2004–2019. Source K-Monitor

inflation that almost disappeared. The measures were not in favour of the very
poorest, who tend not to vote.
The still essentially neoliberal nature of Orbán’s governance was hidden by
these feel good measures aimed at voters further down the income scale. Crony
oligarchs grew rich at an astronomical rate, the upper class at an acceptable
rate, and even voters further down felt some benefits. The contrast with previous
Socialist-Liberal governments could not have been greater. Hungary went from a
collapsed economy in IMF custody to a seeming success story.
Looking into the underlying factors, it is hard to call Orbán’s economic model
an autogenous growth configuration to be emulated by other right-wing govern-
ments. It has been thoroughly dependent on external resources for growth. Year
after year, it has received 5–7%/GDP from the European Union’s cohesion pol-
icy as a non-repayable support. On top of this, according to World Bank data,
remittances by Hungarians working abroad rose to around 3.5%/GDP. Thus each
year Orbán’s Hungary would receive almost 10%/GDP as non-refundable injec-
tions into the economy. As a comparison, the average GDP growth rate in this
period was no more than 2.5%. It is easy to see that without this external source
of funding the growth would have disappeared, as would hundreds of thousands
of jobs. There is little that is sustainable about this ‘economic model’. It is highly
ironic that in the political arena Viktor Orbán has spent much of his time
The Political Economy of Hungary: Managing … 153

76

74

72

70

68

66

64
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Fig. 10 Productivity per hour in the Hungarian economy (EU-28 = 100%). Source Eurostat

c­ ampaigning against the very EU that has been underpinning his semblance of
economic stability.
The most telling proof of how the advancement to a higher value-added econ-
omy has not taken place in Hungary is the productivity trend, which has remained
almost completely flat in the case of Hungary in spite of the colossal inflow of
development resources (as well as FDI and remittances) from Western Europe
(see Fig. 10).

4 Summary

In economic terms, the Hungarian FDI-dependent competition state failed to

become a successful model of capitalism. It did not create a domestic Mittelstand,
and left most citizens working in low-wage, low value-added jobs for transna-
tional companies, or at even weaker small and medium-sized companies. Decades
154 Z. Pogátsa

of neoliberalism prior to 2010 created no sizeable middle class. Moreover, it led –

indirectly – to the deterioration of democracy. As Esping-Anderson (1985, 1990)
and Moore (1966) caution, a functioning democracy requires a knowledgeable
middle class with financial independence. The economic model of post-commu-
nist Hungary failed in this respect. In addition, a distinct lack of social mobility
left the majority of the population frustrated.
When an economic collapse was created by the out-and-out economic mis-
governance of the nominally Socialist-Liberal coalition of Ferenc Gyurcsány,
these political forces collapsed, leaving the way open for right-wing populist Vik-
tor Orbán. Once in power, Orbán coupled his still neoliberal economic regime
with popular mood enhancing measures. A form of crony capitalism, Orbán’s
economic model is unsustainable, and has not led to rising productivity and an
economic restructuring leading to a high-end economy. Finally, it still depends
on immense external financing from Western Europe. In doing so, it supports the
illiberal Fidesz regime.

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Contact: [email protected]
Hungarian Foreign Policy 1990 to 2018:
Europeanization without Conviction

András Hettyey

1 Introduction

The present article aims to provide an overview of Hungarian foreign policy since
1990. It focuses on the most important interests, values and decisions in order to
identify the key lines of development. In addition, it also examines the values and
views shared by decision-makers and the perceptions of Hungarian foreign policy
under different Hungarian governments. The article is structured chronologically
and attempts to include all governments since 1990. Middle-range theories such
as role theory, the findings of small state studies and the concept of Europeaniza-
tion are used to analyze the topic. Specifically, it is examined whether and to what
extent Hungarian foreign policy has been Europeanized.
The term Europeanization refers to a multidimensional process of construct-
ing, disseminating and institutionalizing formal and informal rules, procedures,
policy ideas, behaviors, and shared beliefs and norms that were originally defined
and anchored as part of EU decision-making processes and then transferred into
the logic of domestic discourse, national identities, political structures, and policy
areas (Radaelli 2003, p. 30). The Downloading dimension captures how EU pol-
icy, politics, or polity change leads to change in member states, while the Upload-
ing dimension captures how, in turn, EU member states seek to influence policy,
politics, or polity at the European level.
In addition to searching for examples of Down- and Uploading, we are also
trying to answer the question of what motivation lies behind the Europeanization

A. Hettyey (*)
University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 157

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_9
158 A. Hettyey

of Hungarian foreign policy: Is the adoption of European convictions and norms

by Hungarian governments 1) only an instrumentally motivated strategic calcula-
tion to pursue the same Hungarian interests as before 2004, only this time in a
more effective EU framework, or 2) do we see a deeper socialization in European
norms, where action-guiding European role models are adopted to such an extent
that they reconstitute and define Hungarian foreign policy, its goals and interests
through this process (Heller 2008, pp. 50–52; Checkel 2005, pp. 804–805)? In
other words, it is tried to answer whether Hungarian foreign policy is guided by
a logic of consequence (What is useful?) Or a logic of appropriateness (What is
right?).

2 1990 to 2002: Hungary on the Way to Europe

When the results of the first free elections were announced in May 1990 and a
conservative three-party government (together with the Smallholders and the
Christian Democrats) could be formed under József Antall (MDF1), both Hungary
and its regional environment were in the midst of great changes. In addition to
the political transformation processes and the manifold economic problems in the
countries of Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was already
underway, which culminated in the end of 1991. The conflict lines in Yugoslavia
were also already emerging and led to war a few months later. Finally, the Czech-
oslovak Republic dissolved at the beginning of 1993. Of the five former neigh-
boring countries of Hungary, only Austria and Romania remained intact. In place
of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was now the neighbor in the northeast and from the
bankruptcy estate of Yugoslavia not fewer than three new neighboring countries
emerged: Slovenia, Croatia and (after several name changes) Serbia. In the north,
the Slovak Republic formed as an independent state.
Of course, all of these processes meant a series of uncertainties for the Antall
government. Hungarian foreign policy had to find a new way, new contacts and
partners. In addition, about 2.7 million Hungarians lived in neighboring countries,
1.6 million of them in Romania, 570,000 in Slovakia and 340,000 in Serbia. State
and nation did not automatically coincide.
The leaders of the new Hungarian foreign policy, led by Prime Minister Antall
and Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky (MDF), made two decisive decisions soon

1 Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum).

Hungarian Foreign Policy 1990 to 2018: Europeanization … 159

after taking office in the spring of 1990 and partially renewing the foreign policy
apparatus. The first was to achieve a short-term goal, namely the restoration of
Hungary’s full sovereignty. The country was not sovereign for two reasons: on
the one hand, about a hundred thousand Soviet soldiers were still stationed in
Hungary, on the other hand Hungary was still a member of the Warsaw Pact. In
the first case, an agreement could be reached with Moscow after tough negotia-
tions, and the last Soviet soldier left Hungary on June 17, 1991. Parallel to the
negotiations on the troop withdrawal, the Antall government took the view much
earlier than the other Warsaw Pact states that the outdated and anti-democratic
alliance must be dissolved. Since the end of 1990, other members, led by Poland
and Czechoslovakia, also took this position, and the Soviet Union decided to dis-
solve the military alliance on July 1, 1991.
Thus, Hungary regained its sovereignty—only to lose it again immedi-
ately. For the second strategic, long-term decision of Hungarian foreign policy
in 1990/1991 was the development of a concrete target structure: What does the
new, democratic Hungary actually want to achieve with its foreign policy? After
a longer process of thought, a so-called triad crystallized, which consisted of the
following goals and shaped Hungarian foreign policy until 2004 (and partly until
today): 1) the fastest possible western double integration (EU and NATO mem-
bership), 2) the representation and, if possible, enforcement of the minority rights
of Hungarians abroad and 3) cooperative and good relations with neighbors (Kiss
2008, p. 398).
Remarkably, until 2004 there was a certain political consensus among the par-
ties on these issues. Even if there was hard debate about how and when and in
what order the goals should be pursued, no party called the correctness of the
concept into question on a fundamental level—with one exception: the right-wing
radical MIÉP2 rejected membership in the EU and NATO (Zellner and Dunay
1998, p. 446). However, the MIÉP was only represented in parliament in the
1998–2002 legislative period. The political consensus was reflected in the 1990s
in a relatively homogeneous integration discourse, the main argument of which
was the inevitability of Western integration (Szűcs 2015, p. 363). Alternative dis-
courses were marginalized and found only in right-wing extremist newspapers.
That the majority opinion in favor of Europe was also carried by wide parts of
society was shown in the referendums on NATO membership (1997) and EU

2 Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Ungarische Wahrheits- und Lebenspartei).

160 A. Hettyey

membership (2003): both times a majority of more than 80% voted in favor of
membership, although with a voter turnout of only about 50% (Molnár 2011).
The goal of Hungary’s European integration was motivated both politically-
historically and economically. The Antall government, which consisted to a large
extent of historians, always emphasized that Hungary had always been part of
the West throughout its history and that the years between 1945 and 1989 had
only represented an anomaly. Therefore, the Antall government portrayed its
goal of being accepted into the EU as a “return to Europe”, where it had always
belonged. This argumentation had the implicit intention of putting pressure on the
EU to open up as quickly as possible: On the one hand, Hungary was entitled to
EU membership because of its history and identity, on the other hand, the Euro-
pean Union now had a great opportunity to correct the historical mistake of the
divided Europe.
Hungary expected economic modernization from West integration above all
else. This term, recurring time and again in strategic documents and speeches,
characterized the conviction that Hungary would only make up its economic-tech-
nological deficit vis-à-vis Western Europe through early complete membership.
Western standard of living—this was the (partially unreal) dream of Hungar-
ian society in the first years after the regime change, when the country was in
its biggest economic crisis since the end of the Second World War: because of
the legacy of the planned economy, recession prevailed throughout 1990 to 1994,
and GDP shrank by a total of 20% (Zachar 2015, 140–145). Inflation remained
at over 15% per year until 1995, and government debt was close to the 100%
mark of GDP. Instead of narrowing, the gap in prosperity between Hungary and
Western Europe thus widened further in the first years after 1990. The MDF-led
government was therefore voted out in 1994.
Instead, with an absolute majority, the MSZP3, the successor party to the for-
mer Communist state party, won. Gyula Horn became Prime Minister. In order
to dispel fears in Europe that the socialists are striving for a restoration of state
socialism, the liberal SZDSZ4 was involved in the government. Little changed
in the country’s foreign policy: Western integration was advanced with a deter-
mination that was partly viewed with unease by Western partners. Helmut Kohl
wanted to bring about NATO enlargement without the unnecessary injury of
Russian sensitivities—an undertaking in which the Eastern Europeans were not

3 Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party).

4 Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Free Democrats).
Hungarian Foreign Policy 1990 to 2018: Europeanization … 161

always partners. However, the continuity of Hungarian foreign policy after 1994
(and also after 1998) is hardly surprising: research on the foreign policy of small
states (small state studies) has shown that changes of government in smaller
countries usually have no major impact on foreign policy (Szalai 2014, p. 7).
The biggest difference between the Antall and the following Horn government
was that they handled the question of the Hungarian minority in different neigh-
boring countries. In short, it was the opinion of Antall and Jeszenszky that the
relationships with the neighbors with larger Hungarian minorities (Romania, Slo-
vakia, Serbia) should depend on how the legal situation of the Hungarians there
is. Budapest’s central demand was autonomy, but none of the countries agreed
to it. The second best option from a Hungarian point of view was the signing of
basic treaties with the neighboring states, which should guarantee as extensive
minority rights as possible. Significantly, this only succeeded under the first gov-
ernment with Ukraine, Slovenia and Croatia, where the number of Hungarian
minority was far below 1% of the population. Bratislava, Bucharest and Belgrade
were not willing to sign similar contracts; accordingly, the relationships were also
bad.
This image changed after the change in government in 1994: The Horn gov-
ernment saw the realization of European-Atlantic integration as a guarantee for
minority protection. Since the Western partners saw the signing of the foundation
treaties as a sign of the good inter-state relations in the region as a condition for
Western integration, Budapest was willing to bring them to a conclusion even if
not all the hoped-for rights were guaranteed (e.g. Hungarian-language universi-
ties). With the signing of the treaties with Slovakia in 1995 and Romania in 1996,
another obstacle in the direction of the West was removed—paradoxically, with-
out this improving the situation of the Hungarian minorities. This did not happen
because Western partners like Germany never found themselves willing to exert
the bilateral pressure on their neighbours demanded by Budapest: In addition
to more or less cautious admonitions by Kohl and Genscher, German diplomats
always referred their Hungarian colleagues to the OSCE or the Council of Europe
in order to achieve a change of heart in Bucharest or Bratislava. For Berlin, even
“apparent stability” in the East-Central European region is more important than
solving the minority problem, summarized a disappointed Hungarian diplomat
the position of Berlin (Hungarian Foreign Ministry 2002).
In addition to its continuity and willingness to compromise, Hungary’s for-
eign policy after 1990 could also count on other assets. On the one hand, it was
the island of stability in a region characterized by wars, refugee flows, secession-
ist tendencies, left- and right-wing extremist parties, and permanent government
crises. While the first three democratic governments in Hungary between 1990
162 A. Hettyey

and 1990 were able to complete their legislative periods without serious disa-
greements within the coalitions, for example, Poland had nine prime ministers
between 1990 and 2002. In addition, with the exception of the MIEP, no extrem-
ist party was elected to the Hungarian parliament—in contrast to the situation in
Romania or Slovakia, where the nationalists were even represented in the gov-
ernment. In contrast to Slovakia under Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar (1993–
1998), Hungary’s West orientation was never called into question.
This internal political viability and external political stability, coupled with a
strategically favorable geographical location and an economy in the region that
was still modern after the low point in 1993, growing again by 4% from 1996,
guaranteed that Hungary was a desired partner. In addition to its admission to
the Council of Europe (as the first country from the region) in 1990 and to the
OECD in 1996, this was also shown by foreign investment: For example, German
investments in Hungary were four times as high per capita as in Poland by 1998.
“Hungary has the same key role in the region as Germany in Europe”—CDU par-
liamentary leader Wolfgang Schäuble summed up the situation (Hungarian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs 1993).
Another, however, sad evidence of Hungary’s attractiveness was that the
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1992/93 the country elected as one
of the non-permanent members. The main motivation was not only the prestige
of the Antall government, but the fact that the war in Yugoslavia was raging on
the southern border: the world expected that Hungary, due to its location and its
regional expertise could be helpful in solving the conflict. Hungary was affected
not only by economic losses and about 100,000 refugees, but also the fact that the
fighting in Eastern Slavonia areas included, where Hungarian communities lived.
Also, it was feared that, as a few years later during the Kosovo war, that the Milo-
sevic regime would also aim to expel the Hungarian minority in northern Serbia’s
Vojvodina. However, the war in Yugoslavia had the advantage for Hungary that,
on the one hand, the West showed the security policy fragility of the region and
thus the NATO expansion was accelerated, and on the other hand Hungary could
make a valuable contribution to solving the problems.
When the Dayton Agreement could be closed in 1995, Hungary—although
not itself a member of the Alliance—participated with a contingent of 400 sol-
diers in the IFOR-SFOR-peace mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was
led by NATO. In addition, it made its airspace available to the Alliance, as well
as two airports, from which a large part of the logistics mission was carried out.
(Three years later, in the spring of 1999, the Taszar airport in southern Hungary
became one of the most important bases for American F-18 fighter jets during the
bombing of Serbia as part of Operation Allied Force). These factors u­ ndoubtedly
Hungarian Foreign Policy 1990 to 2018: Europeanization … 163

accelerated Hungary’s NATO accession: The Alliance was also ready to take on
the Eastern enlargement on German initiative from 1994/95. In addition to its
strategic location and the capabilities of its army, Hungary was one of the first
applicants for NATO membership above all because it had proved between 1994
and 1998 that the country could contribute to the achievement of NATO goals
(Gazdag 2004, p. 205).
When the conservative Fidesz5 -MDF-government under Prime Minister Vik-
tor Orbán took office in the spring of 1998, the immediate foreign policy goals
were already foreseeable, above all the quickest possible integration into the EU
and NATO. With the latter, the accession negotiations were already concluded
and Hungary was admitted to the Alliance on 12 March 1999. The years of the
“security policy vacuum”, when Hungary had no formal allies and territorial
guarantees, were over. However, the country was faced with a difficult hurdle ten
days after its entry: The North Atlantic Council decided to bomb Serbia because
of the atrocities committed by the Serbian army and police in Kosovo. On 24
March 1999, the air strikes against Yugoslavia began as part of Operation Allied
Force. As mentioned, the government made two airports and its airspace available
by a parliamentary decision. Budapest was thus in a difficult dilemma because
of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina: On the one hand, it wanted to show its
Western partners that it is a loyal ally, on the other hand it did not want to expose
itself too much, because the Milošević regime had the Hungarian minority almost
as a hostage in its hands.
Although the Hungarian government supported the NATO measures with full
conviction, people still lived in constant fear that Milošević could also order eth-
nic cleansing against the Hungarians. So Prime Minister Orbán summed up his
position to the German Chancellor (Hungarian Foreign Ministry 1999). In order
to reduce the tension between integration and minority policy and to convince the
skeptical Hungarian public, the country’s participation was explained with refer-
ence to the endangered Hungarian minority. In Kosovo, not only the question of
how to deal with the Albanian minority will be decided, but also that of minorities
in Europe as a whole (Kiss 2000, p. 294).
The accession negotiations with the European Union progressed more slowly
than with NATO. While the Orbán government hoped to conclude the acces-
sion before the elections in spring 2002, many European actors (including the

5 Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Hungarian Civic Alliance), originally: Fiatal Demokra-

ták Szövetsége (Alliance of Young Democrats).
164 A. Hettyey

­ erman government under Gerhard Schröder) did not want to rush the enlarge-
G
ment. In order to take in a large number of poorer countries and remain efficient,
the EU had to revise its institutional structures and redirect a large part of the
budget to the needs of the new countries. Both processes harmed the interests of
the old member states, which had to be resolved by complicated compromises.
At the same time, the negotiations with the candidates, which included some dif-
ficult issues, such as the free movement of workers, for which Germany insisted
on exception and transitional rules, or agricultural policy, in which the acced-
ing states wanted to maximize the financial instruments available, while the old
members wanted to minimize them. After a slowdown in accession negotiations
around 2000, an agreement was reached in December 2002 on the modalities.
For Hungarian foreign policy, the accession negotiations meant a slow but
steady process of Europeanization. Hungary went through a period of Download-
ing: European positions were adopted—also in foreign policy—without having
the opportunity to upload its own preferences to the European level itself (Arató
and Koller 2015, p. 380). While in the case of Hungary the Europeanization of
the Polity level was relatively quickly completed, Attila Ágh already complained
in 1999 that important actors, such as the parliament, interest groups, parties and
also the public, were not part of this process in the desired way and were not pre-
pared for accession in an appropriate way (Ágh 1999, pp. 842–852). However,
the quick and professional adoption of the acquis communautaire concealed this
fact. The problems that this ambivalent Europeanization will cause for Hungary
became apparent above all after 2010.

3 Arrived in Europe: Hungarian Foreign Policy

2002–2010

When Hungary’s accession to the European Union was finally confirmed on May
1, 2004, completely new opportunities opened up for Hungarian foreign policy.
Hungary went from being a traditional policy-taker country to a policy shaper.
It was not only part of the most successful economic and political integration
project and recipient of significant funding; from now on, it also had the oppor-
tunity to chart new territory and sometimes go against the preferences of major
players like Germany. Just as this is highlighted for the Federal Republic of Ger-
many after 1949, Hungary’s loss of sovereignty as a result of its EU and NATO
membership ultimately meant a gain in sovereignty. Because in the years before
2002, there is not a single example that can be cited in which Hungarian foreign
Hungarian Foreign Policy 1990 to 2018: Europeanization … 165

policy would have risked a disagreement with major Western partners on a impor-
tant international issue, the new room for maneuver became apparent at the end
of 2002/beginning of 2003, when Hungary sided with the USA in the Iraq issue.
This step by the social-liberal coalition elected in spring 2002 under Prime Minis-
ter Péter Medgyessy (MSZP) was a direct affront to Germany and France, which
rejected an attack on Iraq. Above all, the fact that the Hungarian side did not con-
sider it necessary to keep Berlin up to date with its plans showed that from now
on the clocks were running differently in Budapest.
However, this rift remained an exception at first. Under the social-liberal
government coalition of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (2004-2009), Hun-
garian foreign policy went through a learning process: Like the 24 new Hungar-
ian members of the European Parliament, the entire Hungarian foreign policy
establishment had to learn the rules of political action in Brussels first. There-
fore, Hungary was rather passive on the European level in the phase from 2004 to
2010: Emphasis was rather only set on expansion policy, where the accession of
Croatia was strongly advocated, and on minority policy, where Fidesz and MSZP
members tried to raise the question of the treatment of Hungarian minorities in
the region to the European level in rare agreement. While this “Europeanization
of the minority question” was not successful with regard to Romania, which was
already admitted to the EU in 2007, a number of measures could be achieved in
Serbia that were beneficial to the local Hungarian minority—precisely because
the country was still on the way to becoming an accession candidate (Törő 2013,
pp. 47–49).
However, Hungary also took a more passive role in Europe from 2006
onwards for another reason. The domestic political crisis that began with the sen-
sational “Őszöder Lügenrede” (Autumn Lies Speech) by Prime Minister Gyurc-
sány, and the financial crisis that began in 2008, hit the Hungarian government
hard. With falling poll numbers, a recession of 6.6% of GDP, and the termina-
tion of the government coalition by the liberal SZDSZ, the Hungarian govern-
ment’s foreign policy was limited: Only a loan from the International Monetary
Fund saved Hungary from bankruptcy. In general, the social-liberal government
was primarily concerned with the country’s internal political and economic
survival in the years after 2006 and did not set any major foreign policy priori-
ties (Dunay 2010, p. 4). Nevertheless, the social-liberal governments could also
boast successes: In 2007, border controls were abolished with the accession to
the Schengen Agreement; measured by population, Hungary was one of the most
favored recipient countries in the EU between 2007 and 2013; and it was involved
in NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
166 A. Hettyey

4 The Foreign Policy of a Sovereign State: 2010

to 2018

In general, Hungary confirmed the expectation formulated by the small state stud-
ies up to 2010 that foreign policy is relatively constant and hardly influenced by
changes of government. However, the opposite could be observed after the elec-
tions in this year: The government program pointed out that, with the two-thirds
majority, the voters had empowered Fidesz to achieve fundamental, even “revo-
lutionary” changes in all areas of public life (Fidesz 2010, p. 6). The background
to this goal was an inventory, which was summarized in the government program
as follows: Not only the eight-year government period of the socialists from 2002
to 2010 was a disaster. No, the period from 1990 to 2010 as a whole had failed
to achieve its goal: Instead of independence, there was indebtedness, instead of
prosperity, poverty, instead of hope, a deep political, economic and social crisis.
Seen in this way, the ‘other’ of Hungarian domestic and foreign policy since 2010
is not only the government period of the socialists, but the entire period since
1990.
Against this background, the most important change of the Fidesz govern-
ments was the establishment of the sovereignty discourse after 2010. It replaced
the former integration discourse quite abruptly (Szűcs 2015, p. 365). The forma-
tion of this new hegemony discourse had several reasons: First, the opportunity
structures had changed fundamentally through the Hungarian EU accession; as
mentioned, Hungary now had a greater foreign policy leeway. The changed insti-
tutional anchoring of Hungary thus made the sovereignty discourse possible, but
it did not force it. For this purpose, it was necessary that political actors recog-
nized its potential, such as the right-wing extremist, integration-skeptical Jobbik6,
which won almost 17% of the votes cast in the 2010 elections from scratch, or
the partly integration-skeptical green LMP7, which received 7%. These develop-
ments already required a response from Fidesz before the parliamentary elections
in 2010, which they found in the sovereignty discourse.
An analysis of 103 political speeches by Orbán, Foreign Minister János Mar-
tonyi (2010 to 2014) and Péter Szijjártó (2014 to 2018) shows, however, that the
dominance of the sovereignty discourse after 2010 was not only due to external
causes, but also to the conviction of leading Fidesz politicians. In these speeches,

6 Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary).

7 Lehet Más a Politika (Politics can be different).
Hungarian Foreign Policy 1990 to 2018: Europeanization … 167

the role concept of a “sovereign, autonomous” state is most frequently (in 38%
of all speeches) argued in favor of.8 An example of this is the statement that they
will not allow “others from outside to tell Hungarians what to do or not to do”
(Kormányportál 2011). The role concept of a “sovereign, autonomous state” is
in line with Hungarian history, which has been “a succession of struggles for the
gain and retention of Hungarian sovereignty,” according to Orbán (Kormánypor-
tál 2017). Hungary must go its own way even more because the financial crisis
and the euro crisis have clearly shown that the success model of Western liberal
democracies has come to an end. In short: Hungary has “had enough of the poli-
tics that only looks at how to please the West, the banks, the big finance, the for-
eign press” (Kormányportál 2014).
What foreign policy resulted from such a determination of location? First of
all, it cannot be denied that, paradoxically, since 2010, a further Europeanization
of Hungarian foreign policy has been observed. Thus, Hungary held the presi-
dency of the Council in the first half of 2011, and while the public image was not
the best due to the Media Act passed at the end of 2010, the actual implemen-
tation was smoothly and professionally organized (Tóth and Dieringer 2011, p.
188). The accession of Croatia and the implementation of the Danube Strategy
could be advanced just as successfully as a closer cooperation in economic policy
(the so-called “Sixpack”). The government was also able to maintain its image as
a good European by achieving the termination of the EU deficit procedure, which
had been in place since 2004, through austerity measures and the taxation of for-
eign companies in 2013. The EU sanctions against Russia were also supported,
albeit reluctantly.
The expansion policy, this time with regard to Serbia, has remained a main
topic of Hungarian European policy, as has the situation of Hungarians abroad.
Although not initiated by Budapest, but supported, the successful signature col-
lection for the European Citizens’ Initiative Minority Safe Pack was also a suc-
cess, as the upcoming debate in the European Parliament has now raised the issue
to a European level even more.9 Moreover, Hungary is still actively involved in

8 The most frequent role concept is Hungary as a “stable, reliable state” in 40% of all
speeches.
9 However, Hungarian foreign policy towards Hungarians abroad is by no means com-

pletely Europeanized: There are significant economic development programs and scholar-
ships for Hungarians abroad, high state investments flowed into the neighboring countries
and there are still close relationships and support for the various parties of Hungarians
abroad. The granting of dual citizenship in 2010 also showed that Budapest does not seek
to secure the interests of Hungarians abroad solely by European measures.
168 A. Hettyey

the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): In 2016, 163 Hungarian sol-
diers were active in Bosnia and Herzegovina, making it one of the largest con-
tingents; Hungarian soldiers were also involved in EU peacekeeping missions in
Mali, Somalia and Georgia.
Not least the enthusiasm with which Hungarian foreign policy seeks allies in
Central and Eastern Europe in general and within the Visegrád group in particular
testifies to a Europeanization, because it is mostly European-wide issues, such as
the EU refugee quota or energy policy, that are discussed in common positions. It
fits into the picture that the fifth most common foreign policy role concept, which
is articulated in 28% of the speeches, portrays Hungary as part of a Central Euro-
pean “community of destiny”. Since 2014, this concept has even occurred more
often than its counterpart Hungary as a member of a European “community of
destiny”. Above all, it is emphasized from Hungarian side that the region with its
above-average growth rates is the “economic engine” of Europe (Kormányportál
2018). In addition to successes, such as the largely closed rejection of the Ger-
man position in migration policy including the refugee quota, there are indeed
divergent interests to be observed among the Visegrád states: The relationship to
Russia is without doubt such a topic and shows the fragility of this cooperation
(Rácz 2012).
Although rarely highlighted in public, the Orbán governments have continued
to see Hungary as part of the West. The high EU funding levels, averaging 3% of
GDP between 2014 and 2020, speak for membership in the EU. The Hungarian
government also knows that the “opening to the East” (or “global opening") pro-
claimed after 2010, that is, the building of more intensive economic and political
contacts with countries of the post-Soviet space, Asia, Africa and Latin America,
is only possible because the relationships with the key partners in Western Europe
and the USA are secured and exploited through EU and NATO membership. “We
cannot open up to the West because Hungary is part of the West,” Orbán replied
to calls for stronger cultivation of Western contacts (Kormányportál 2015). The
global opening changed little the fact that the states of the European Union
remain the most important trading partners for Hungary: almost 80% of exports
and 77% of imports are handled with EU states (2017). This is even a larger share
than five years ago, even if, absolutely speaking, trade with non-EU countries
increased. The population is also pro-European on the whole: in 2018, 79% of
respondents said that EU membership offers more advantages than disadvantages
to Hungary—well above the EU average. However, in the same survey, only 60%
thought that membership was a good thing. However, this was still an increase of
100% compared to 2014, when only 30% thought so (index.hu 2018).
Hungarian Foreign Policy 1990 to 2018: Europeanization … 169

The global opening brought another important characteristic of Hungarian for-

eign policy since 2010 to light, namely the consistent rejection of a normative
foreign policy. Whether it is Turkey after the military coup, China or Israel: both
in its bilateral relations and at the European level, Budapest is aiming to prevent
normative aspects from being applied to these important economic and security
partners (keywords: global opening and migration) as much as possible. “Interna-
tional actions” against Russia or Turkey are just as “disrespectful” as the EU rule
of law procedure against Poland, because they damage Hungarian interests such
as “peace, cooperation, trade, mutual investments and a regional balance favora-
ble to Hungary” (Kormányportál 2016).
Against this background, Budapest has, for example, several times watered
down or even not supported China- or Israel-critical statements by the EU (Rett-
man 2018). Since a foreign policy based on values ​​such as freedom, democracy,
equality, rule of law and respect for human rights is part of the basic understand-
ing of the European Union (as well as of important member states), conflicts with
European partners are pre-programmed (European Union 2007, Preamble). And
here the circle closes. Because criticism of third countries is not desired for the
same reason as the rule of law procedure according to Art. 7 EUV and other criti-
cism of Hungary: they violate, according to the interpretation, the sovereignty of
the states.

5 The Europeanization of Hungarian Foreign Policy

In retrospect, Hungary’s foreign policy since 1990 can be divided into three peri-
ods. In the first period (1990 to 2004), the Antall government—after a relatively
short period of self-finding—set the decisive course with the foreign policy triad,
which was followed by the next governments. This was the greatest achievement
of Hungarian foreign policy since 1990: Antall and Jeszenszky, in an extremely
difficult regional environment, set goals that on the one hand enjoyed internal
political consensus and lasted until 2004, on the other hand were bold but at the
same time achievable: With the desire for a soon NATO and EU membership,
they exerted pressure on the West without risking its goodwill.
However, when the goal of European-Atlantic integration had been achieved
with the NATO and EU accession in 2002/04, the fragile foreign policy consen-
sus broke and the polarization prevailing in domestic politics also affected foreign
policy. This constellation persists to this day (Kiss 2008, p. 406). In this second
period under the social-liberal governments (2002 to 2010), Hungarian foreign
policy became increasingly Europeanized, although the domestic political crisis
170 A. Hettyey

that began in 2006 led Hungary to go through this learning process rather pas-
sively.
The 2010 election then brought about great changes and ushered in the third
phase of Hungarian foreign policy. Accompanied by a shift from the previously
prevailing integration discourse to a sovereignty discourse, the Orbán govern-
ments showed a new understanding of their role: that of an independent, sover-
eign Hungary that determined its own fate. That this does not completely reflect
reality is shown by the fact that, paradoxically, the Europeanization of Hungarian
foreign policy continued to progress. Even and especially under the Orbán gov-
ernments, Hungarian foreign policy became increasingly embedded in European
processes, as can be seen, for example, in enlargement policy and minority policy,
where Budapest has tried to assert its own preferences vigorously at the EU level.
At the same time, some areas of foreign policy have remained largely unaffected
by the process of Europeanization: the strategy of global openness with the anti-
normativity underlying it has remained a national domaine réservé just as much
as—to some extent—policy towards Hungarians abroad.
The question raised in the introduction, what motivates the Europeanization
of Hungarian foreign policy, can be answered with the fact that no deeper sociali-
zation in European norms and values can be observed. Instead, Budapest has
mostly used the European stage (and the “toolbox” of common foreign policy)
instrumentally since 2010, when it was necessary to enforce already constituted
national interests with European help. Examples of this are the expansion policy,
energy policy, migration policy or (partly) the policy with regard to Hungarians
abroad. Where the EU context was not helpful for Hungarian interests, norms,
such as the protection of certain values, were completely ignored (global open-
ing). Hungarian foreign policy after 2010 was therefore clearly guided by utilitar-
ian, strategic calculations, that is, by a logic of consequence (Hettyey 2013; Gál
und Malova 2018). The years since 2004 have changed little in this regard.

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Contact: [email protected]
Hungary’s Self-Peripheralization
in the European Union: Background
and Prospects

Dániel Hegedűs

1 Introduction

Hungary’s role as a democratic pioneer in the period of transition and in the

period of accession candidacy gave way to an increasing “accession fatigue”
and declining willingness to integrate after 2004. Since Viktor Orbán’s return to
power in 2010, not only have fundamental constitutional and internal political
changes taken place, but Hungary’s relations with the European Union have also
changed profoundly. Hardly any other member is currently in the EU in such an
isolated position as Hungary, which is criticized for its internal political devel-
opments and lack of democratic quality. In the ECFR Coalition Explorer survey
of 2018, European partners rated the country as the “most disappointing” (Végh
2019). Hungary changed its role from an “EUphoric policy taker” to a “pragmatic
Disruptor” (Hegedűs 2014; Végh 2019).
This article sheds light on the background of Hungary’s self-peripheralization
in the EU. After a brief introduction to the history of its EU membership, it recon-
structs the relationships between the EU and its first “illiberal” member state,
which has departed from the values of democracy and the rule of law anchored
in the Copenhagen criteria. On the other hand, the article outlines the positions
of the Hungarian governments in key policy areas of European integration: fis-
cal and monetary policy, cohesion policy and EU budget, Common Foreign and

D. Hegedűs (*)
German Marshall Fund of the United States, Berlin, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 173

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_10
174 D. Hegedűs

Security Policy and migration. The aim is to contextualize and classify the self-
peripheralization tendencies in order to be able to pursue Hungarian interests in
areas that have received less public attention.

2 The Objectives of Hungary’s European Policy

Government Strategies

Hungary long held the position of one of the leaders of democratic transformation
and Euro-Atlantic integration in Eastern Europe. Thanks to the favorable condi-
tions, it received support from the PHARE accession assistance fund as early as
summer 1989 and signed an Association Agreement with the EC in December
1991, which came into force in 1994. The first democratically elected government
under Prime Minister József Antall declared Euro-Atlantic integration to be the
top priority of Hungarian foreign policy (Kiss 2004; see also Hettyey in the same
work). This reflected the strategic consensus of Hungarian elites regarding the
European and transatlantic binding of the country, which began to crumble only
in the crisis phase after 2008 and was gradually challenged and called into ques-
tion by the Viktor Orbán Fidesz-KDNP government after 2011.
The implementation of the acquis communautaire was effectively ensured
by the end of 1999 and the accession negotiations were concluded in December
2002. The acquisition of arable land by EU citizens proved to be a particularly
critical issue. A seven-year transition period was supposed to solve this prob-
lem. After a referendum on accession, Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy signed
the accession treaty in 2003 and on May 1, 2004, the country became an official
member of the European Union.
Hungary’s first years after joining were characterized by parallel post-acces-
sion fatigue and crisis. The country was under a deficit procedure from 2004 to
2013, as the budget deficit exceeded the three percent threshold of the Maastricht
criteria. The growth rate remained one of the lowest in the regional compari-
son, but has been steadily positive since 2010. Parallel to the economic difficul-
ties of the post-accession period, the Hungarian elites have only slowly reacted
to the country’s changed political environment and have been able to leave the
“policy-taker” role of the accession period behind with difficulty. The Hungarian
post-accession strategy, published only in 2008, foresaw, in addition to an active
value- and interest-based contribution of Hungary to the common EU policy
fields, an opening of the Hungarian economy towards the global markets and the
diversification of export markets (Magyarország Külkapcsolati Stratégiája 2008).
Hungary’s Self-Peripheralization in the European Union … 175

In view of the global financial crisis, which brought Hungary to the brink of a
state bankruptcy and currency collapse in autumn 2008, the implementation did
not enjoy priority. But the social-liberal governments before 2010 were at least
rhetorically committed to Hungary’s integration into the deeper integration levels
and willing to avoid the emergence of a multi-speed integration and Hungary’s
peripherilization in the integration process through future participation in further
integration formats, including the eurozone.
In December 2007, Hungary joined the Schengen Zone, but took no serious
political steps towards joining the Eurozone. With the permanent violation of
the Maastricht criteria and the increasing state debt, the introduction of the euro
would have been practically impossible. Due to the volatile economic situation,
the Hungarian government also did not join the Exchange Rate Mechanism II
(ERM/ERM II), which could have served as a signal of the seriousness of Hun-
garian euro ambitions.
The clearly pro-European, “EUphoric” period of Hungarian EU policy ended
with the change of government in 2010. Since then, a increasingly pragmatic
approach has been pursued. During its presidency in the first half of 2011, Hun-
gary made a significant contribution to the adoption of the fiscal “Six Pack” and
pushed forward the Croatian accession process. As further successes, it recorded
the adoption of the Danube Strategy and a European Roma Strategy (Balázs
2011). But these symbolic successes and key projects of the Hungarian presi-
dency have largely lost their political significance today.
The first political conflicts also arose between the EU institutions and the gov-
ernment in Budapest. After the controversial media law came into force, critical
meetings took place in the European Parliament on the situation in Hungary, and
the Hungarian government was only able to avoid an infringement procedure on
the part of the Commission through a re-formulation of the law. These interac-
tions between the European institutions and the Hungarian government demon-
strated the first steps of the famous “peacock dance” strategy of Viktor Orbán,
which characterized the dynamics of the relationship between the EU and Hun-
gary to the greatest extent in the following years. From 2011, the EU-critical
tones of the Hungarian government increased, although Hungarian diplomacy
was still able to effectively correct the perception of regime quality in Brussels
and Strasbourg until 2014 (Balázs 2017).
Since the re-election of Fidesz-KDNP in April 2014, the government has been
pursuing a more flexible, almost multi-vector foreign policy and has clearly made
the EU an enemy image in the Hungarian public in the context of the refugee
­crisis.
176 D. Hegedűs

In this period, the interests of the self-autocratizing Hungarian regime increas-

ingly prevailed over objectively definable national interests of Hungary in EU
policy as well, leading to a unique ambivalence of Hungarian EU policy. The gov-
ernment in Budapest is still interested in the highest possible financial transfers
within the redistributive EU policy fields, such as agricultural or cohesion policy,
but at the same time with as weak a control as possible over the rule-compliant
application of these financial instruments. In addition to preserving absolute tax
sovereignty, the avoidance of a multi-speed integration is another important goal.
The government in Budapest completely rejects a distribution of asylum seek-
ers among the EU member states (relocation). In parallel, especially since 2017,
the government of Viktor Orbán has used the veto in the Council more and more
often in foreign policy matters. After these key characteristics, the guidelines of
Hungarian EU policy since 2014 can be described as a “pragmatic, disruptive
free-rider-strategy”.

3 Ambivalent Relationships between Hungary

and the EU Since 2010

Hungary’s relationships with the EU institutions and other important European

partners have changed enormously since 2010. The main reason was demo-
cratic erosion, which ultimately led to a peripherization and partial isolation of
the country within the EU. This led to official disputes with the European insti-
tutions, in particular the Commission, in the form of infringement proceedings
and the application of the Article 7 procedure.1 In parallel, the Hungarian gov-
ernment’s communication has increasingly instrumentalized the European Union
and the term “Brussels” that symbolizes it as an external enemy image since
2011. The starting point was a speech by Prime Minister Orbán on March 15,
2011, when he first compared the EU with the Soviet Union (Buras and Végh
2018). This was intended to mobilize domestic support for the government’s
position. Particularly aggressive examples of this populist mobilization were the
EU quota referendum in October 2016, the “Stop Brussels!” campaign and the

1 German-language literature and media often refer to the Article 7 procedure as the “rule
of law procedure”. However, this can be misleading, as the Article 7 procedure and the
Commission’s “rule of law framework” (Rule of law framework or Rule of law mecha-
nism) are two different, legally independent institutions and procedures. Unlike Poland, the
European Commission has not yet applied the rule of law mechanism to Hungary.
Hungary’s Self-Peripheralization in the European Union … 177

associated “National Consultation” in 2017 (Buras and Végh 2018; Frank 2018;
Hegedűs 2017).
The anti-European communication of the Fidesz government remained with-
out serious political consequences in Brussels for a long time, because the Hun-
garian government heavily invested in maintaining the perception of cooperation
with its EU partners. This strategy has become known in the international media
as the aforementioned “peacock dance” (Hopkins 2019). Only since 2019 do
most European partners seem to suspect that the concessions made at EU level
were tactically motivated. Since 2017, more and more signs have pointed to the
gradual introduction of a conflict-oriented strategy towards the EU. The recurring
Hungarian vetoes in the Council in important foreign policy issues have under-
mined the perception that the government in Budapest is a reliable partner in
essential political questions despite its unpredictability and discursive volatility.
Its internal political actions also raised more and more legal questions. Examples
are the Advertising Act passed in June 2017 with a simple majority instead of
the necessary two-thirds majority (Freedom House 2018), the planned reform of
administrative justice in 2018, which foresaw a curtailment of the independence
of the judiciary, and other legal acts (Bos 2018).
The European institutions and, in particular, the Commission, did not system-
atically and substantively follow up on the violation of EU values in Hungary
for almost eight years. Between 2011 and 2018, the European Parliament doc-
umented the restrictions on Hungarian democracy in six comprehensive reports
and proposed institutional and political solutions for the worrying situation. Par-
tisan motivations prevented further steps, as the European People’s Party (EPP)
did not want to strain relations with its member party Fidesz (Kelemen 2017;
Sedelmeier 2016). Nevertheless, the Parliament advocated using inter-institu-
tional partnerships for more effective defense of EU values and initiated the Arti-
cle 7 procedure in September 2018. However, it was obstructed by procedural
measures in the Council (Hegedűs 2019, pp. 7–8).
The EU Commission reacted to the initiatives of the Parliament repeatedly
with rejection and reserve. Despite its official position as “guardian of the trea-
ties”, it did not take any measures on the basis of Article 2 TEU, that is, with
reference to the EU values. At least, however, since 2010 it has initiated infringe-
ment proceedings against the Hungarian government in eight particular questions,
which concerned the areas of democracy, rule of law and uncontrolled concentra-
tion of government power, and in which the violation of EU law was immediately
evident and easily verifiable.
The first three infringement proceedings responded to the Hungarian consti-
tutional legislative process in 2011. In one case, Hungary amended the central
bank statute in accordance with the Commission’s criticism, even though the new
178 D. Hegedűs

text of the law approved by the Commission later did not guarantee the inde-
pendence of the central bank. With regard to the independence of the Data Pro-
tection Officer and the forced early retirement of the judges (CJEU 2012, 2014),
the Hungarian government did not give in; in both cases, the European Court of
Justice ruled in favor of the Commission. Wide-ranging sanctions did not arise
because the early retirement case was from the outset conceived solely as a case
of age discrimination without any reference to the independence of the judici-
ary, which reduced the Commission’s legal risks before the CJEU, but ruled out
corresponding protective or restorative measures. In the end, the CJEU awarded
compensation to the affected judges. The legal success in the case of the Data
Protection Officer also had no further positive impact on data protection standards
in Hungary. The Commission accepted the personal compensation of the former
data protection officer removed from his position as remedial measure.
Five more infringement proceedings began in the 2014 legislative period.
Two of them concerned refugee policy (see below), two others the law against
civil society organizations financed from abroad (Lex NGO), which the Commis-
sion criticized inter alia for violating the free movement of capital, and the “Lex
CEU”, which changed the university and accreditation regulations for foreign
universities and thus made the stay and operation of the Central European Univer-
sity (CEU) in Hungary impossible.
Despite the sporadic infringement proceedings, no overall strategy of the
EU emerged to safeguard the democratic values and rule of law. The legalistic
approach aimed to keep the negotiations and proceedings as apolitical as possi-
ble in order to avoid a political escalation of the conflict with Hungary. In con-
trast to the Polish government, initially the Hungarian government appeared to be
more cooperative towards the Commission. For example, in 2011 it was ready to
amend the new Media Act in order to avoid an infringement procedure the Euro-
pean Commission threatened with. In addition, thanks to its constitutional super
majority, the incumbent Fidesz party did not formally violate constitutional proce-
dures between 2010 and 2015 while it transformed the political system to suit its
own interests (Closa 2018; Batory 2016; Hegedűs 2019). Up to 2017, it constantly
signaled its willingness to dialogue and compromise to the European Commission.
The lack of effective instruments or corresponding political will has also been
cited as the reason for the EU’s inability to stand up to the democratic backslid-
ing process and to ensure compliance with EU’s fundamental values in a member
state (Halmai 2017; Scheppele and Pech 2018).2 In the end, the EU institutions

2 Closa (2018) denies that party political considerations played a role in their decision-making.
Hungary’s Self-Peripheralization in the European Union … 179

not only tolerated autocratisation in Hungary, but indirectly supported it through

payments from European cohesion funds. This did indeed successfully secure
certain standards of fundamental freedoms, but also stabilised the Hungarian
regime. With the financial resources, the corruption channels of public procure-
ment could be used directly for power resources (e.g. through acquisitions in the
media market) and legitimacy resources (contribution to economic performance).
In addition, the lack of sanctions has greatly benefited the regime’s democratic
image and its self-defence discourse against criticism (Bozóki and Hegedűs
2018).
The laws on NGOs and the CEU seem to have triggered a rethink in the Euro-
pean People’s Party. This rethink enabled the forging of a two-thirds majority in
the European Parliament in 2017/18 for criticism and measures against the gov-
ernment in Budapest. In September 2018, the Sargentini report was adopted and
the Article 7 procedure against Hungary was initiated. In the spring of 2019, in
the face of an anti-European propaganda and hate campaign against Commission
President Jean-Claude Juncker, former loyal supporters of Hungary lost patience.
They threatened to expel Fidesz from the European People’s Party. The conflict
ended with the temporary suspension of its membership in March 2019, and, in
order to avoid expulsion, Fidesz leaving EPP in early 2021.
As of 2020, Hungary’s political networks and coalition partnerships within the
EU are now mainly limited to the other three countries of the Visegrád group,
as well as Germany and Austria (ECFR 2018). Outside this circle, Budapest is
still perceived as a responsive partner in Croatia and Bulgaria. Since 2018, Hun-
garian-Slovenian relations have also developed very dynamically. This network
allows for a positive shaping of the European agenda by Germany as well as the
development of common positions within the Visegrád group. The Hungarian
government is positioning itself as a disruptive actor. While this has so far yielded
the desired domestic political effects, the strategy in the Multiannual Financial
Framework (MFF) for 2021–2027 risked considerable losses in transfer payments
(Végh 2019). The quoted poor performance of Hungary in the ECFR Coalition
Explorer 2018 supports the hypothesis of Hungary’s increasing peripherization in
the EU (ECFR 2018). The other EU states see practically no signs of Hungarian
engagement for deeper integration.
However, due to the differentiation of national positions within the Viseg-
rád group, Hungary’s increasing alienation from Germany, and the strengthened
political conflict between Fidesz and the EPP, Hungary’s diplomatic room for
maneuver has significantly decreased. The deepening cooperation with right-
wing forces, such as the Italian Lega Nord, may occasionally protect the Hungar-
ian regime from possible sanctions under Article 7. However, the illiberal course
180 D. Hegedűs

and the disruptive behavior of the Hungarian government have cost the country
its previously stable European partnership network. In addition, influential forces
such as French President Emmanuel Macron, the European Socialists or parties
on the liberal fringe of the EPP are now basing their campaigns on the figure of
Viktor Orbán and his illiberal regime.

4 Hungary’s Policy Priorities in the EU

Beyond the general European policy grand strategies outlined above, Hungarian
governments pursue specific policy interests, which will be outlined below.

4.1 Fiscal Policy and European Monetary Union

Although Hungary has officially pursued the Eurozone membership after its EU
accession, no government put together a serious and detailed convergence pro-
gram. In this context, the target dates set by the first Orbán government (1998–
2002) and the Medgyessy government (2002–2004) can mainly be evaluated as
political communication instruments. Since Hungary did not meet the Maas-
trichter criteria to a large extent from 2004 to 2010 and in 2013, Eurozone mem-
bership was out of reach. In February 2009, Prime Minister Gyurcsány requested
the relaxation of the Maastrichter criteria in order to cure the consequences of the
financial crisis in Hungary with the help of a rapid Euro entry, but the European
Commission rejected his request.
During the social-liberal coalition governments, there was a widespread view
in Hungary that, under the existing conditions of economic and fiscal policy,
the preservation and effective use of the instruments of national monetary pol-
icy were essential for growth and macroeconomic convergence. After 2010, this
approach prevailed. The “unorthodox” economic policy of the Hungarian govern-
ments since 2010 would not have been conceivable in this form in the eurozone.
By 2013, the key figures of fiscal policy were effectively stabilized through a
conservative budget policy and since 2013 Hungary has fulfilled all Maastricht
criteria. However, since then there is a lack of political will to push ahead with
the introduction of the euro, even if the issue is discussed from time to time.
With the anchoring of the national currency Forint in the new Hungarian consti-
tution, which came into force on 1 January 2012, it became clear that eurozone
membership is not on the agenda in the long term. Fiscal and monetary sover-
eignty has become a key component of the system of “national cooperation” and
Hungary’s Self-Peripheralization in the European Union … 181

the ­political benefits of their maintenance clearly outweigh the macroeconomic

benefits of a potential euro introduction, especially since the deepening of the
eurozone so far and in the future constantly increases the conditions and costs of
membership.
Hungary is opposed to deepening the eurozone in order to prevent the estab-
lishment of a two-tier system of EU membership. This demand paved the way
for cooperation between Budapest and other member states outside the eurozone,
such as Poland, the Czech Republic or the United Kingdom. At the same time,
however, the government is keeping its distance from institutionalized coopera-
tion formats in which it could also participate as a non-eurozone member (for
example, the banking union).

4.2 Cohesion Policy and EU Budget

Hungary is one of the largest net recipients within the EU, measured in terms of
transfers per capita from the European budget (Cantat 2017; Mrak et al. 2015).
In both EU budget periods after its accession, that is, 2007 to 2013 and 2014 to
2020, cohesion policy transfers to Budapest exceeded three percent of Hungar-
ian GDP annually. Calculated only with the primary demand effect of cohesion
transfers, Hungary would not have achieved positive economic growth in most
years since 2007 without EU funds. Consequently, the importance of the negotia-
tions and agreements on the Multiannual Financial Framework for Hungary can
hardly be overestimated. Securing the highest possible financial transfers is both
an objective in itself and an important political communication issue for the Hun-
garian government, which, like in other Central and Eastern European countries,
can be used successfully for legitimacy purposes.
In 2014, the Hungarian government introduced a new system of fund manage-
ment. The management functions were taken away from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office. This has contributed to a
fundamental centralization of fund management and the expansion of systematic
political control over resource allocation (Arató et al. 2015). The changes in man-
agement structures led to a temporary suspension of payments by the European
Commission in 2014.
As public procurement is a key venue of state-organized political corrup-
tion, EU transfers have also played an important role in the expansion of the
media empire and other key political and economic resources of the ruling party
and oligarchs close to it. (Bozóki and Hegedűs 2018). European Union bodies,
such as the European Parliament’s Budget Committee or the European Anti-Fraud
182 D. Hegedűs

Office (OLAF), began systematically investigating cases of politically organized

strategic corruption in 2017/18, but in the absence of direct competences and due
to the lack of cooperation by the Hungarian Public Prosecutor, the reports of the
aforementioned bodies remained largely without consequences.
Under these conditions, the two highest priorities of the Hungarian govern-
ment during the negotiations of the Multiannual Financial Framework for the
period 2021–2027 were firstly to avoid any conditionality or control measures in
relation to the expenditure and management of cohesion funds, and secondly to
maximize cohesion transfers. The two priorities were in clear tension with each
other due to the increasing political attention at European level to the corrup-
tion phenomena of cohesion transfers. Since the Hungarian government clearly
rejected both the rule of law conditionality of cohesion transfers and the exten-
sion of the competences of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to Hungary, it
had to expect significant revenue shortfalls in Brussels as part of the already rela-
tively small post-Brexit budget of the EU and was perceived together with Poland
as a blocker. How the transfer volume affects the political support of the Fidesz
government for the EU and Hungary’s future foreign policy positioning against
Russia and China is open.

4.3 Hungary and the GASP

As mentioned, Hungarian foreign policy since 1989 has had a traditional focus
on Euro-Atlantic integration and neighbourhood relations (Kiss 2004). Since the
first priority was successfully achieved by 2004 and most of Hungary’s regional
neighbours also joined the EU by 2007, Hungarian foreign policy had to be rein-
vented, inter alia in terms of its positions on European Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP). Similar to the other Visegrád states, Hungary defined the
stabilisation and support of the integration of the Western Balkans and the Eastern
Partnership countries, in particular Ukraine and Moldova, as objectives of its for-
eign policy, with the Western Balkans enjoying clear priority (Rácz 2011).
Hungary has traditionally been one of the most important international inves-
tors in the Western Balkans, in particular in Croatia and Macedonia (since 2019
North Macedonia), even though there have often been tensions in bilateral rela-
tions due to allegations of corruption. A significant proportion of Hungarian
development aid went to the region, in particular to Serbia, Montenegro and Kos-
ovo (Huszka 2010). Despite the increasingly EU-critical positions of the Orbán
Hungary’s Self-Peripheralization in the European Union … 183

governments after 2010, Hungarian engagement for future EU enlargement in

the Western Balkans did not decrease, as it largely corresponded to Hungarian
national interests, such as stabilising the region and protecting Hungarian minori-
ties and investments (Huszka 2017).
Budapest was never a pioneer of political conditionality for accession in the
Western Balkans region (Huszka 2017). After 2010 and especially in recent years,
relations with some Western Balkan countries, such as Macedonia during the
Nikola Gruevski government and Serbia during the Aleksandar Vučić presidency,
have become increasingly close. In November 2018, Hungary guaranteed Nikola
Gruevski, convicted of corruption and on the run, the status of a refugee, causing
great international uproar.
With regard to the strategic realignment of Hungarian foreign policy, the Vik-
tor Orbán government announced the so-called “opening to the east” in 2011, the
aim of which was to open up new export markets in emerging countries such as
Russia, China, Turkey or Azerbaijan through political and economic diplomacy.
Although the hoped-for economic success has so far been lacking, the diplomatic
offensive served as a useful framework for the restructuring of Budapest’s rela-
tions with, among others, Moscow and Beijing.
Hungary’s relations with Russia were primarily characterized by energy policy
pragmatism and the interest of the two regimes in strategic corruption (Hegedűs
2016). Orbán’s proximity to Putin and Hungary’s dependence on the Kremlin
were perceived by Western partners as a security risk, especially after Russia’s
annexation of the Crimea. However, fears that Russia will use the Paks II nuclear
power plant project3 and the related loan agreement to undermine European
sanctions by breaking EU unity, have never materialized. Although the Hungar-
ian government has never concealed its opposition to European sanctions against
Russia, which has repeatedly contributed to political uncertainty over extension
decisions in the Council, Budapest never risked vetoing, as this could have led to
Hungary’s isolation on the European stage. However, the Hungarian government
provided important diplomatic services to the Russian leadership when it received
Vladimir Putin as a state guest three times since 2014. At the same time, relations
with Ukraine became increasingly frosty after 2014. After the adoption of the
new Ukrainian Education Act in autumn 2017, which restricted the use of Hun-
garian as a minority language in school education, Hungary blocked meetings of

3 In January 2014, representatives of the Hungarian government and the Russian nuclear
energy company Rosatom signed a contract for the construction of two new reactor blocks
for the Hungarian Paks nuclear power plant worth 12 billion EUR, to be financed by a loan
from the state-owned Wneschekonombank. For further details, see Hegedűs 2016.
184 D. Hegedűs

the NATO-Ukraine Committee. This served the strategic interests of Russia and
hindered a clarification of the issue with Ukraine.
Hungarian diplomacy demonstrated another significant departure from the
shared European position on China. As an engaged member of the so-called
“17 + 1” cooperation (formerly: 16 + 1), which promotes economic and political
cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and 17 Central and South-
east European states, Hungary breaks from time to time from European positions
in order to demonstrate its value as a partner to Beijing and thus secure economic
advantages over regional competitors.
In 2016, Hungary and Greece prevented the adoption of a common European
position that would have formulated critical positions towards China after the
arbitration regarding Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea (and their
rejection by Beijing). At the same time, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szi-
jjártó repeated Chinese core positions as part of the Hungarian position. In 2017,
Hungary and Greece blocked critical EU positions in connection with the human
rights situation in China. A flagship project of the “17 + 1” cooperation, the new
railway line between Belgrade and Budapest initiated by Beijing, is developing,
even if its benefits for the Hungarian economy are questionable. In the Council,
Hungary has so far almost exclusively supported the anti-dumping procedures
proposed by the Commission against China, indicating that the government wants
to preserve its room for maneuver in both directions, both towards Beijing and
Brussels.

4.4 Migration

A key question of Hungarian EU policy since 2015 has been refugee policy and
migration. Hungary served from spring to October 2015 as the only one of the
four Visegrád countries as a transit country, crossed by hundreds of thousands of
asylum seekers in this period of time in the direction of Austria (and Germany).
But the central importance of the policy field did not arise from this concern, but
through the instrumentalization for purposes of populist mobilization, which is
still successfully applied by the Orbán government today (see also the chapter
of Beger in this volume).
The refugee flows of the Western Balkans route stopped with the takeover of
the asylum seekers arriving in Hungary by Germany and the sealing of the Hun-
garian-Serbian and Hungarian-Croatian border in September and October 2015.
This partially reduced the migration pressure on Hungary. In parallel, the Hungar-
ian government introduced ever harsher measures. It rejected the distribution of
Hungary’s Self-Peripheralization in the European Union … 185

asylum seekers among the EU member states, as mentioned, and sued together
with the Slovak government before the ECJ against the Council Decision of Sep-
tember 2015, which ordered the distribution of 120,000 people. Hungary should
take over 1294 asylum seekers from this number. The European Court of Justice
rejected Hungary’s and Slovakia’s objections definitively and the European Com-
mission initiated an infringement procedure due to the non-compliance with the
existing legal obligations.
When Hungarian authorities in newly established transit zones did not meet
the minimum standards of European asylum law, particularly with regard to
ensuring translation in asylum proceedings and the legal standards for filing an
appeal, the European Commission launched another infringement procedure in
December 2015. The measures of the Hungarian authorities were later supple-
mented by compulsory detention for the entire duration of the asylum procedure
(for adults and minors) and repeatedly by the refusal to provide food in the transit
zones. When the Hungarian government also criminalized civil society engage-
ment supporting refugees and asylum seekers as part of the so-called “Stop
Soros” legislation, the Commission initiated the second stage of the procedure by
turning to the ECJ.
In its judgments (C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU) in May 2020, the ECJ
found that the Hungarian transit zone regime was in breach of EU law. The Hun-
garian government did close the notorious transit zone a few days later, but access
to the Hungarian asylum system was not eased. Regardless of the ECJ ruling, it is
unlikely that the government in Budapest will change its migration policy course.
Constructed “migration threats” have already served as the basis for the quota ref-
erendum in October 2016 and the National Consultation “Stop Brussels!” in the
first half of 2017. These populist instruments feed the fear of migration and mobi-
lize support for the government in a country without immigrants and refugees.
Although the regime has diversified its external enemy images to some extent since
2015, the European Union and its refugee policy continue to play a central role.
The relationship of the aforementioned policy areas to the general European
policy positioning of the Hungarian government shows great differences. As an
important net recipient of European cohesion funds, Hungary is largely interested
in maintaining this European solidarity measure and, as a result, in the pooling of
an ever-increasing share of national GNI (Gross National Income) and in the larg-
est possible EU budget, despite the general EU-skeptical discourse of the Hungar-
ian government since 2010. Both the budget and the migration policy have great
domestic importance in Hungary, and the effective enforcement of one’s own pri-
orities at the European level serves as an important domestic legitimacy source
for the government.
186 D. Hegedűs

The political weight of migration policy has increased enormously since 2015,
and in line with the role of the country as a “pragmatic disruptor”, the govern-
ment in Budapest rejects any burden sharing in asylum and migration policy.
While Hungary has also developed into a disruptor in the field of GASP, the
country consistently supports the EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, which
is reflected in the appointment of the Hungarian Olivér Várhelyi as EU Commis-
sioner for Enlargement by Commission President von der Leyen. This diversity
of positions in different policy areas may appear inconsistent, but it allows Euro-
pean partners to constructively involve Hungary in different policy compromises
despite the generally euro-skeptic positions and the disruptor role of the govern-
ment in Budapest.

5 Conclusion

As the article shows, Hungarian EU policy has made a remarkable journey since
2004. The country developed from an “EUphoric policy taker” after 2010 to a
domestically motivated “pragmatic Disruptor”. While most of Hungary’s strate-
gic policy priorities remained unchanged after 2010, the Hungarian government
has largely maneuvered to the periphery due to its policy of increasing autocracy
and its hard-hitting EU criticism and propaganda campaigns within the EU. After
years of legalistic and non-systematic approach of the EU Commission towards
Hungary, the Article 7 procedure against the country was finally launched in 2019
and the membership of the governing party Fidesz in the European People’s Party
was suspended. Possible cuts in EU financial transfers in the Multiannual Finan-
cial Framework may have unpredictable effects on Hungary’s economic perfor-
mance, regime stability and future European and foreign policy priorities.

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Dr. Dániel Hegedus is Fellow for Central Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the
United States.
Contact: [email protected]
Hungary’s Asylum and Migration
Policy: Change in Three Stages

Paula Beger

1 Introduction

In the European Union, the Fidesz government under Viktor Orbán is one of the
forces opposing a European-wide distribution of refugees and thereby appearing
as an opponent of a common European asylum and migration policy. However,
this development is relatively new, as this article shows. Since summer 2015,
many political measures on asylum and migration have been carried out, includ-
ing nationwide poster campaigns, “national consultations” and a referendum.
How did the policy field of asylum and migration policy develop in Hungary and
why did a change apparently take place here? These are the leading questions of
the following study, which focuses on the influence of national factors and EU
integration in the last 30 years.
The article first describes the policy area of asylum and migration. It then
illuminates the three phases of the development of the policy area since 1989 by
sketching the important laws and institutions in the pre-accession phase up to
2004, the post-accession phase from 2004 and the influence of the refugee cri-
sis in 2015. In the last part, it deals with the question of whether there has been
a deeper change in Hungary since 2015. The wealth of mobilizing and polariz-
ing measures since then is to be examined within the framework of the theory
of politicization. For this purpose, the policy field will also be examined in more

P. Beger (*)
Leipzig University, Leipzig, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 189

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_11
190 P. Beger

detail on the basis of party programs and opinion polls. With the presentation, the
article builds on studies on transformation and Europeanization in Hungary, but
also on policy field analysis.

2 A Policy Field with National and EU Requirements

Although migration and asylum policy is traditionally considered a policy field of

national sovereignty (Bendel 2011, p. 371; Guiraudon 2000, p. 251), increasingly
European standards and directives are shaping the policy area. Based on Art.
79 (2) AEUV, migration and asylum policy is designed as a shared competence
between the EU member states and the EU institutions. This means that although
there is a common legal framework for the policy field, the implementation of the
policy lies with the member states. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the
EU legal framework has been providing increasingly detailed guidelines for the
design of the policy field to all member states, but it does not replace a national
asylum and immigration concept (Weber 1993, p. 171). In line with the EU legal
framework, migration and asylum policy is currently being implemented in the
EU member states in four different sub-policies: asylum, irregular migration,
legal migration and the external dimension of migration (Ceccorulli 2017, p. 11).1
In Hungary, EU standards have been in force in asylum policy since 2004. The
country is part of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the Schen-
gen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation apply. Hungary manages a part of the
EU’s external border with Serbia and Ukraine and is responsible for all asylum
applications from persons who enter the country via this external border under the
Dublin Rule. In terms of EU-wide comparison, recognized refugees in Hungary
receive one of the longest residence permits. Thus, persons with refugee status
can stay in Hungary for ten years, and those with subsidiary protection status can
stay for three years (Ceccorulli 2017, p. 26). At the same time, the recognition
rate of refugees in Hungary is particularly low. In 2016, for example, more than
90% of asylum applications were rejected and even a year later the rejection rate
was almost 70% (ECRE 2017, p. 7).
Irregular migration affects persons who have either entered a country ille-
gally or are staying there illegally, for example because a legal residence permit

1 There are other divisions, for example between the five categories of refugee and asylum
policy, irregular migration and border protection, cooperation with countries of origin and
transit, labour migration and integration policy (Bendel 2011, p. 377).
Hungary’s Asylum and Migration Policy: Change in Three Stages 191

has expired (European Commission 2001a, 7; European Parliament and Council

2008, Art. 3 [2]). The EU requires its member states to deport illegal immigrants
(Art. 79 [1] AEUV). Hardly any data is available on irregular migration. How-
ever, Hungary is described by the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
as an important European transit country for irregular migration because the
eastern and southeastern migration routes of Europe intersect in Hungary (IOM
2018).
So far, only few directives and standards have been created in EU legislation
for legal migration,2 which is why immigration policy is mainly shaped by the
member states. Hungary therefore has a relatively large national scope for shap-
ing policy. Legal migration has been focused since the late 1980s on the entry
of Hungarians from neighboring countries who were recruited specifically. Legal
migration is still primarily understood as immigration of Hungarian speakers and
the return migration of Hungarians who have emigrated from Hungary is politi-
cally promoted. With the Lisbon Treaty, integration policy has also become part
of the common legal migration agenda, but so far without any harmonization of
the member states’ legal provisions (Art 79 [4] AEUV). As can be seen in the fol-
lowing section, however, integration policy in Hungary is so far only moderately
developed (Hettyey 2017, p. 110).
The fourth part of asylum and migration policy, external cooperation in migra-
tion matters, takes place in Hungary in the form of cooperation in the field of
security and crime prevention (Ceccorulli 2017, p. 61). As long as the EU does
not pass contrary own legal acts, Hungary can, for example, conclude readmis-
sion agreements on a bilateral basis (Thym 2016, p. 282).
Although the division of asylum and migration policy into the four part poli-
cies provides a good framework for the policy field in general, it is only partially
suitable for the case of Hungary, because it only insufficiently captures other
migration movements that are particularly relevant for the country. Since the
economic crisis of 2008, there has been an increased emigration from Hungary:
In particular, younger, well-educated people are migrating to Germany, Austria
and the United Kingdom (Blásko and Gödri 2014). The increasingly negative
immigration balance since 2008 (Földházi et al. 2014) prompted the Hungarian

2 The European Commission is trying to better pool policy-making by initiating regulation

of legal migration that is sector-specific or target-oriented (Thym 2016, p. 272), such as the
EU Blue Card, directives for seasonal workers or interns.
192 P. Beger

g­ overnment to promote return migration more strongly.3 The subdivision into the
four sub-policies also omits so-called transit migration, which plays a significant
role in Hungarian migration and refugee movements. Here the country is not the
target, but only a transit station for migrants and refugees. Comparative disadvan-
tages compared to other EU countries in terms of wages, social benefits, integra-
tion system and the low recognition rates of refugees lead migrants and refugees
to move on to Western European countries (Hettyey 2017, p. 110; Miciukiewicz
2011, p. 189).
As in other EU countries, the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for asy-
lum and migration in Hungary. In cooperation with other ministries, such as the
Ministry of National Economy, the Ministry of Human Resources and the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs4, the Ministry of the Interior is the supreme decision-maker
in asylum and migration matters. The Directorate-General for Aliens’ Affairs
(Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság)5 works as an executive administrative
institution and decides on visas, residence permits, asylum and citizenship. Since
2019, the administrative institution has been headed by a General Director of the
Police. Nationally, it monitors an open reception centre in Vámosszabadi and a
community centre in Balassagyarmat; the open centre in Kiskunhalas has been
closed indefinitely. The Directorate-General also manages the guarded facilities in
Békéscsaba and Nyírbátor. All facilities are located near the border with Romania,
Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine. The Office is the executive institution of Hungarian
asylum and migration policy and decides on the entry, stay, residence and return of
foreigners and asylum seekers (Office for Immigration and Asylum) n. d.; National
Directorate-General for Aliens Policing 2018a, b).

3 In2015, the Hungarian government initiated the “Gyere haza fiatal” return program to
bring back young, well-educated Hungarians from the United Kingdom. Returnees were
promised good job prospects, travel and accommodation subsidies, and support for self-
employment. When the program expired a year later, only 100 people had applied. The
long-term effect of the program cannot yet be assessed (IOM 2018; Index 2017).
4 Since
2014, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs has been the supreme deci-
sion-maker in asylum and migration matters.
5 The administrative institution has frequently changed its name and the scope of its com-
petences has been gradually extended since the end of the 1980s. In 1989 it was called the
Office for Refugee Affairs, from 1993 the Office for Refugees and Migration Affairs, from
2000 the Office for Immigration and Citizenship (Hárs 2009, p. 47). Until 2019, the institu-
tion was called the Office for Immigration and Asylum.
Hungary’s Asylum and Migration Policy: Change in Three Stages 193

3 Three Development Phases of the Asylum

and Migration Policy Field

The development of the asylum and migration policy field took place in Hungary
in three phases: The first phase lasted from 1991 to 2004, when, in preparation for
EU accession, the national legal framework had to be adapted to the required EU
standards. The second phase extended from EU accession in 2004 to 2015 and
included the development of a national policy. The third phase saw a politiciza-
tion, as can be seen from the political measures and legislative changes that have
been carried out in Hungary since the refugee crisis in 2015.

3.1 Asylum and Migration Policy in the Pre-Accession

Phase

In the times of socialism, Hungary was a relatively closed country. Immigration

was controlled by the state, only a few migrant workers from other socialist coun-
tries were able to settle down and only a few political refugees were granted asy-
lum. There were only larger waves of emigration as a result of the uprising in
1956, after which about 200,000 Hungarians fled the country. The closed nature
of the country led to an increasingly homogeneous population until the 1980s
(Hárs 2009, pp. 9–10; Hettyey 2017, pp. 105–107). From then on, Hungary
developed into an immigration country. However, until the early 1990s, mainly
Hungarian-speaking people from neighboring countries immigrated, first from
Romania, then from Ukraine and Serbia. Hungary’s migration policy was directed
at Hungarians living abroad with the first Migration Act in 1989 (Act XXXI),
who came from the Western diaspora, were subject to repressive regimes or had
lost their citizenship (Melegh 2016, pp. 91–92; Hárs 2009, p. 12).
When the wars in former Yugoslavia broke out in the early 1990s, non-Hun-
garian-speaking refugees and migrants from the neighboring Balkan region
came to Hungary for the first time in several decades. In the 1993 Foreigners Act
LXXXVI, the interests of the approximately 100,000 Bosnians, Croats, Serbs,
Albanians and Roma who had arrived were to be regulated in order to obtain citi-
zenship and settle down (Gyollai 2018, p. 12; Melegh 2016, p. 97). In the same
year, the Office for Refugees and Migration Affairs (Menekültügyi és Migrációs
Hivatal) was founded, which replaced the Office for Refugee Affairs. From 1993
onwards, the policy field of asylum and migration was thus institutionalized and
regulated by law for the first time. The Hungarian asylum and migration laws
194 P. Beger

were developed on the basis of technical regulations and in a security-oriented

framework. The Foreigners Act of 1993, for example, was debated in the Hungar-
ian Parliament with the aim of protecting the Hungarian labor market from visa
and access regulations for foreigners (Hárs 2009, pp. 47–48).
In 1997, the Hungarian Immigration and Citizenship Act was passed, creating
a four-part migration system for persons from the European Economic Area, from
third countries, from third countries with Hungarian roots and asylum seekers
(Melegh 2016, p. 97). On the one hand, this aligned laws and regulations with the
Common European Asylum and Migration System. On the other hand, it created
the basis for a hierarchical migration system that gives Hungarians speakers faster
citizenship procedures and better integration than refugees and migrants.
With the 2001 Foreigners Act (Act XXXIX), the entry and stay of foreign-
ers in Hungary was regulated. The exact legal distinction between those moving
from EU and third countries could be aligned with the standards required by the
EU. Similar to the Foreigners Act of 1993, the parliamentary debate preceding
the implementation of the law was based on security aspects. The focus was on
reducing illegal immigration and combating organized crime, with emphasis on
compliance with EU regulations (Hárs 2009, p. 51). The Immigration and Nation-
ality Office (Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal) was established and
placed under the Ministry of the Interior (Melegh 2016, p. 98). In this way, an
institution was created in the pre-accession phase that still exists today and is the
main implementing body for Hungarian asylum and migration policy.

3.2 The Asylum and Migration Policy after Joining

the EU

Since Hungary joined the European Union in 2004, it has been part of the Com-
mon European Asylum and Migration System. Delegates from Hungary have
been working in the EU agencies EASO (European Asylum Support Office),
Frontex or Europol since then. The country has also implemented the Dublin
Convention (VO 343/2003) and is therefore obliged to take back refugees if nec-
essary. Since the EU’s competences in the field of asylum and migration have
been constantly expanding since the 2000s, Hungary implemented, among other
things, directives on asylum procedures and the granting of residence permits
to third-country nationals shortly after its accession. At the same time, the Hun-
garian government and administration were no longer subject to the criteria for
admission and monitoring of the European Commission and were able to con-
tinue to pursue national goals in areas where the EU does not have competence.
Hungary’s Asylum and Migration Policy: Change in Three Stages 195

The government pursued two goals in particular as long-term projects: the policy
of naturalization of foreigners with Hungarian roots and the development of a
comprehensive migration strategy.
In 2004, in a referendum held on a popular initiative in favor of a faster natu-
ralization of Hungarians of foreign origin, 51.6% of those voting were in favor
of this possibility, but the referendum failed due to low turnout. Not until 2010
was there a modification of the Citizenship Act of 1993, which allowed Hungar-
ians of foreign origin to be naturalized in a fast procedure (egyszerűsített honosí-
tási eljárás). For this, precise criteria were added to the law. Candidates for the
fast procedure must be able to prove Hungarian language skills, a historical con-
nection to Hungary and at least one Hungarian ancestor. Within two years of the
adoption of the law, about 430,000 new citizenships were granted. However, it is
difficult to prove how many of the applicants, who mainly come from Romania,
Serbia and Ukraine, actually came to Hungary, as the applications can also be
made outside Hungary (Melegh 2016, p. 98; Gödri et al. 2014, p. 17). This further
hierarchicalization of immigrants to Hungary based on ethnic factors.
An inter-ministerial committee should design the national, long-term migra-
tion policy pursued by the government (Hárs 2009, p. 52). First ideas for a
medium-term strategy were not publicly discussed or actually implemented.
Instead, three laws were enacted in 2007 and 2008, which are based on the frame-
work of the Common European Asylum and Migration System, but implement
it in a restrictive and security-focused interpretation. The law on the recognition
of persons from third countries (Law II) allows persons from non-EU countries
to stay in Hungary for a maximum of three months. The new asylum law (Law
LXXX) differentiates the recognition procedure for refugees and regulates refu-
gee status, subsidiary or temporary protection as well as the granting of residence
permits and expulsion. The law on the state border (Law LXXXIX) introduced
the possibility of temporarily setting up transit zones in Hungary in which asylum
procedures can be carried out.
It was not until 2013 that the government presented a more comprehensive
national migration strategy with the government decree (government decree
1698/2013). The migration policy is therefore based on the rules and laws of
the EU, with Hungary as a receiving country offering protection and support to
migrants and asylum seekers (Juhász 2017, p. 38). Migration is understood in the
government ordinance as the management of immigration, transit migration and
asylum procedures. This leaves out topics such as emigration and the immigra-
tion of Hungarians (Gödri et al. 2014, pp. 14–16). Here too, migration and refu-
gee movements are defined according to their own interests and brought into a
hierarchical system.
196 P. Beger

3.3 Asylum and Migration Policy and the Refugee Crisis

Another watershed in the development of Hungarian asylum and migration pol-

icy came with the refugee crisis in 2015. Although a shift from permissive to
restrictive migration and asylum policy had been taking place since about 2010,
by implementing EU directives primarily in their restrictive form (Ceccorulli
et al. 2017), a deeper change and a veritable flood of legislation in the policy
area took place since 2015. Numerous laws have been enacted and the constitu-
tion amended since then. National referendums, poster campaigns and a referen-
dum were used by the Hungarian government to carry out and legitimize further
measures in the policy field. Observers speak of the deconstruction of the asylum
system (Melegh 2016, p. 101), a revision of Hungarian asylum legislation (Nagy
2016, p. 1045) or a “new era of asylum policy” (Hungarian Helsinki Committee
2017).6
Starting in summer 2015, the Hungarian government passed a large number of
laws and decrees at an unprecedented speed and with a strongly security-oriented
focus. In July, parliament approved a list of safe third countries and safe coun-
tries of origin (Law CVI and Decree No. 191/2015 VII. 21), which included EU
accession candidates such as Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus
contradicting recommendations of the Hungarian Supreme Court and the UNHCR
(Juhász 2017, p. 43; UNHCR 2016). In August 2015, the borders were temporarily
closed (Law CXXVII) and the fence along the border with Serbia was completed.
The state of emergency declared one month later by law due to a “crisis situation
caused by mass immigration” (Law CXL) initially lasted on a transitional basis,
then permanently until September 2018 (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2017, p.
11). Starting in September 2015, the border police were given extensive powers to
combat terrorism and mass migration. To prevent damage to the state border, the
armed forces were allowed to use force from then on (Law CXLII).
Despite the significant decrease in the number of refugees in Hungary since
the construction of the fence, the Hungarian government continued to pass laws
and decrees in the field of asylum and migration. The law of June 2016, among
other things, provides for the reduction of social benefits for third-country nation-
als. With the law on asylum procedures at the border (Law XCIV), which came

6 The refugee crisis in Hungary had a particularly pronounced effect on the subfield of asy-
lum policy, with government representatives often using flight and migration interchange-
ably in public communication (Nagy 2016). In the laws and decrees passed, migration and
asylum are not clearly distinguished from each other.
Hungary’s Asylum and Migration Policy: Change in Three Stages 197

into force in July, a border procedure for asylum seekers was established. In addi-
tion, police forces can return asylum seekers to the transit zone on this basis if
they are found up to eight kilometers within the national borders (Juhász 2017, p.
44). In order to be able to punish the crossing of the closed border or the damage
to the border fence with several years in prison, the penal code and the criminal
procedure were changed. In times of mass migration, criminal proceedings at the
border should be given priority over other forms of criminal prosecution (Juhász
2017, p. 45).
In 2016, the Hungarian government stabilized the “crisis situation caused by
mass immigration” (Law CXL) and, in June 2016, added a paragraph declaring a
terrorist threat to the Hungarian Constitution. Parliament can therefore, by a two-
thirds majority, pass measures for 15 days that do not require parliamentary or
judicial approval (Priebus and Beger 2017). In 2017, two new laws and three new
decrees on asylum and migration were passed. The asylum procedures for the
border zone were further specified (Law XX) and tightened (Government Decree
No. 70/2017 III. 31). Detailed procedural rules for unaccompanied minors were
laid down and the AEA was obliged to decide on border procedures within three
days. All expenses in communal accommodation are to be borne by the applicants
themselves. The declaration of a crisis situation caused by mass immigration
was also maintained in 2017 and laid down in the newly adopted laws (Law XX;
Government Decree No. 70/2017 III. 31). In January 2018, a very comprehensive
government decree on migration came into force, which provides detailed infor-
mation on the admission and stay of third-country nationals, but also makes fur-
ther provisions for asylum seekers, such as legal aid (Decree No. 411/2017 [XII.
15.]).

4 The Politicization of the Policy Field of Asylum

and Migration

Since 2015, a politicization of Hungarian asylum and migration policy has been
observed. While in the first two phases migration and asylum had found little
attention in the media, parties and population, now various actors mobilized and
politicized. Politicization is understood as a process in which a political problem
becomes the subject of public discussion and, as a marginal issue, enters the mass
political debate (Hooghe and Marks 2012, p. 844). Politicization is therefore “the
demand for or the act of transporting a decision or institution into the political
sphere” (Rauh and Zürn 2014, p. 125). It must cause a deeper effect that goes
beyond the mere thematization of a problem and has structural effects on the
198 P. Beger

political debate (Grande and Hutter 2016, p. 5). A topic must have a certain rel-
evance and visibility, and for example crises offer a possible starting point (Bör-
zel and Risse 2018). If the condition of visibility is given, the topic can be further
developed by political decision-makers in a way that is effective in terms of pub-
lic relations.

4.1 Mobilization

Politicized decisions are mostly justified in an utilitarian way with consequences

on the labor market or in a culturalist way with the threat of national identity
(Dolezal et al. 2016, pp. 59–60). Both variants can be found in the argumentation
of the Hungarian government for its measures. In June 2015, it had posters put up
that were supposedly addressed to immigrants and refugees, but were written in
Hungarian. With headlines like: “If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our
culture” or “If you come to Hungary, you must not take the work away from the
Hungarians” (Szalai and Gőbl 2015, p. 16) culturalist and utilitarian arguments
were used in a very direct form of public mobilization.
The posters were supposed to “enlighten” the population about the first
“national consultation”, a kind of informal referendum on the refugee issue (Prie-
bus and Beger 2017, p. 36), but rather mobilized to vote in a certain way in the
national consultation. A few months later, when the survey on “immigration and
terrorism” took place, Hungarian citizens were able to vote on twelve questions.
The preface already makes the influencing character of the survey clear and uses
culturalist and utilitarian arguments:

“We cannot allow illegal immigrants to threaten the jobs and security of the Hungar-
ian people. We have the right to defend our culture, language and values. The states
of Central Europe, which have only recently recovered from the financial crisis, can-
not afford to become victims of the wrong policy of Brussels” (own translation after
Szalai and Gőbl 2015).

The individual questions were also suggestively framed with a strong utilitarian-
ism:

“Question 4: Did you know that economic migrants illegally cross the Hungarian
border and the number of immigrants in Hungary has increased twentyfold?” (own
translation after Simonovits and Bernát 2016).
Hungary’s Asylum and Migration Policy: Change in Three Stages 199

“Question 12: Do you agree with the Hungarian government that instead of
immigration, Hungarian families and unborn children need support?” (own transla-
tion after Simonovits and Bernát 2016).

According to official figures, 1.25 million of 8 million eligible voters participated

in the national consultation (Juhász 2017, p. 40).
The Hungarian government took a next step in mobilization by announcing a
referendum against the European distribution mechanism for refugees. In Novem-
ber 2015, the Fidesz party began collecting signatures for a petition. After about
1.8 million people had signed, the referendum was announced for early October
2016. Although the legality of the vote was highly controversial, Hungarian citi-
zens were able to vote on the question: “Do you want the European Union to be
able to prescribe the settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the
consent of Parliament?” (Priebus and Beger 2017, p. 42). 98% of those who voted
were against it, but the referendum was not considered valid because the quorum
of 50% of eligible voters was not reached (Juhász 2017, p. 50).
Political theories measure referendums to have a great effect. They create a
direct communication channel between the government and the population and
can have a long-term strong influence on the institutional framework of a country
(Hooghe and Marks 2012, p. 846). While national referendums often restrict gov-
ernments in their plans and possibilities (Börzel and Risse 2018, p. 86), it seems
to be the other way around in the case of Hungary. The Hungarian government
mobilized the population with the referendum to gain more leeway or to legiti-
mize measures already taken in the policy field of asylum and migration (see also
Pállinger in the B.).

4.2 Polarization

As a second dimension (Börzel and Risse 2018, p. 85), polarization provides the
prerequisite for talking about the politicization of an issue. By politicization is
meant the sustainable, irreversible impact on political structures and programs
(Grande and Hutter 2016, p. 27). If there is a high degree of politicization, clear
oppositional opinions must face each other. Polarization therefore manifests itself
in the fact that individuals or interest groups, parties, voters or mass media par-
ticipate in a political process with different programmatic content (Grande and
Hutter 2016, p. 26; Rauh and Zürn 2014, p. 125). For the analysis of politicized
issues, parties are the central actors (Hooghe and Marks 2012, p. 845; Dolezal
et al. 2016, p. 55), which, for example, map their programmatic positions in party
programs.
200 P. Beger

The positions of the three largest parties Fidesz/KDNP, Jobbik and MSZP will
therefore be presented below, and in addition the position of the Hungarian popu-
lation will be checked by opinion polls.
Until 2015, the field of politics was debated in the Hungarian parliament to
a lesser extent and primarily as a question of the implementation of EU stand-
ards and appropriate management. Since early 2015, however, the parliamentary
debate has been dominated by topics related to migration and asylum, primar-
ily by Fidesz. This is illustrated, for example, by a parliamentary resolution
addressed to the EU, which was carried by Fidesz deputies in September 2015
and directed against the distribution mechanism for refugees. The resolution
states: “Irresponsible are the European politicians, who with the illusion of a bet-
ter life encourage the immigrants to leave everything behind and by risking their
lives set out towards Europe […] We have the right to defend our culture, lan-
guage, values (Resolution 36/2015 (IX. 22), Magyar Közlöny No. 136 from 22
September 2015). Even after the European distribution mechanism had already
been voted on in the Council of the EU, the topic determined the policy of Fidesz
(Hettyey 2017, pp. 111–112).
The parliamentary debates led by the governing parties Fidesz and KDNP
build on Orbán’s rhetoric, which defined migration and asylum exclusively as
economic immigration from the beginning of 2015 (Nagy 2016, p. 1053). The
rhetorical framing of migration and refugee issues as a crisis, threat and urgent
problem to be solved followed the Fidesz rhetoric consistently (Szalai and Gőbl
2015, p. 29). Already in the party program of 2007, the party addressed migra-
tion in connection with the granting of national security: “Our security policy
program is based on the premise that our times are inherently beset with a multi-
tude of risks and sources of danger. These include terrorism, ethnic and religious
conflicts, international crime, the sale of illegal weapons, and migration” (Fidesz
2007, p. 14). The goals of migration policy are the adoption of a migration strat-
egy, the support of Hungarians abroad and the avoidance of a high emigration of
young Hungarians (Fidesz 2007, pp. 41–42).
In the party program of the right-wing populist Jobbik party from 2003, how-
ever, migration is not mentioned. However, the idea of Greater Hungary is to
bring together Hungarians on the basis of the ius sanguis (CEE Identity 2013b):

“In the age of globalism and consumerism, there is an increasingly pressing need to
truly form a common nation with the Hungarian communities living in the territo-
ries torn away from us so that we could connect with them more closely and dem-
onstrate the vitalizing force of national togetherness to the upcoming generations”
(Jobbik 2003).
Hungary’s Asylum and Migration Policy: Change in Three Stages 201

In early 2018, Jobbik released a party program as a guide for a Jobbik-led govern-
ment, listing among its political goals:

“The challenge of migration has revealed Europe’s vulnerability. We, Hungarians

respect and appreciate everybody’s traditions, customs, faith and identity while we
do not want to replace ours by anybody else’s. Hungary does not want anything to
do with the dead-end Western European multiculturalism, we categorically object
to it being forced on us, and we will defend our cultural identity developed over our
history” (Jobbik 2018).

The following uses migration in relation to Hungarians abroad:

“The 21st century is the era of new and great migrations, which poses new and great
challenges for the Hungarian nation as well. Our job in this 21st century is to pre-
serve and empower the Hungarian people” (Jobbik 2018).

The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) also does not mention migration policy
in its party program and rather refers to the protection of minorities, especially
the Roma. Furthermore, European cooperation is rated as particularly important
in times of crisis (CEE Identity 2013a). The MSZP’s new election program from
2018 mentions goals of migration policy, but these do not relate to either asylum
or immigration policy. It formulates as goals of migration policy to support Hun-
garians (MSZP 2018, p. 7), to stop the emigration of doctors and nurses (MSZP
2018, pp. 11–12) and to better regulate migration throughout the country rather
than just in the capital (MSZP 2018, p. 20).
Table 1 summarizes the goals of asylum and migration policy of the three larg-
est Hungarian parties.
In comparison, it can be seen that there was no polarization after 2015 in the
party programs, that is, irreversible effects and antagonistic positions: In the latest
party programs of Jobbik and MSZP from 2018, migration policy is interpreted
very narrowly and, for example, does not include immigration or asylum policy.
In addition, few concrete programmatic goals are set for the political area. Migra-
tion and asylum policy play a marginal role, the goals are similar across parties
and focus on a policy for Hungarians or Hungarians who have emigrated abroad.
So even though Fidesz has dominated the topic of migration since 2015 with leg-
islative initiatives, mobilizing measures and parliamentary debates, the other two
parties have not reacted with a programmatic counter-positioning.
This is also reflected in the Eurobarometer surveys conducted twice a year.
When asked about the most important problem at the national level, respondents
rated immigration as an important issue. However, in the period from 2015 to
202 P. Beger

Table 1 Asylum and migration policy in the party programs of Fidesz, Jobbik and MSZP
Fidesz Jobbik MSZP
Migration • Security risk • Western European •P olicy for Hungar-
defined as • Immigration multiculturalism ians
• Policy for Hungarians • Policy for Hungar- • Emigration
• Emigration ians
Goals • Common EU immigration • Promote better • Support for Hun-
policy conditions for garian minority
• National migration strategy Hungarians without outside Hungary
• Promote better conditions immigration • No emigration of
for Hungarians without • Return possibil- doctors and nurses
immigration ity for emigrated • Distribution of
• No mass emigration of Hungarians migrants through-
young Hungarians out Hungary
Source: own representation based on the party programs of Fidesz (2007), Jobbik (2018)
and MSZP (2018)

Table 2 The most important task and the prioritization of immigration at the national
level according to Hungarian respondents
2015 2016 2017 2018
Immigration 13 % 34 % 28 % 30 % 27 % 28 % 24 %
Health and social security 37 % 33 % 41 % 42 % 46 %
Unemployment 45% 36%
Source: own representation based on data from the Standard Eurobarometer 2015–2018
(European Commission 2015a, b, 2016a, b, 2017a, b, 2018)

2018, it always ranked after the topics of unemployment and health and social
security. In the second half of 2015, Hungarian respondents rated the topic of
immigration 21% points more important than in the previous half-year (Table 2).
Here too, only a—albeit weak—politicization of the policy field of immigration
took place.

5 Resume

The contribution showed that the policy field of asylum and migration in Hungary
was designed in accordance with the Common European Asylum and Migration
System. The sub-areas of asylum, legal and irregular migration as well as exter-
nal cooperation in migration matters were designed similarly to other European
Hungary’s Asylum and Migration Policy: Change in Three Stages 203

Member States. However, these sub-areas do not cover all migration and refu-
gee movements that exist in Hungary. Transit movements and return migration
relevant to Hungary are not part of the European Asylum and Migration System
and therefore not part of EU policy. Hungary fills these sub-areas mainly through
national policy.
The development of the asylum and migration system took place in three
phases. When Hungary developed from a closed country to a state with migration
movements at the end of the 1980s, migration and asylum were only regulated by
a few laws. When adapting to the EU framework, the aspect of migration and asy-
lum management dominated. There was no long-term vision of how to integrate
migration and asylum into national policy areas. Instead, recognition procedures
or integration were rather considered administrative tasks. Almost ten years after
EU accession, a comprehensive migration strategy was adopted, which should
locate Hungary with its national policy as part of the EU’s Common Asylum and
Migration System. The European refugee crisis of 2015 represented a watershed
after which restrictive legislation was further tightened; this was expressed in a
rapid succession of comprehensive, detailed laws and decrees. This led to the
establishment of a hierarchical migration system with a privileging of Hungarian-
speaking foreigners over migrants from third countries and asylum seekers.
Not only during the refugee crisis, but already in the first and second phase,
migration was debated and legally formulated in a security policy context. While
initially the reduction of illegal immigration and the fight against organized
crime were in the foreground, since 2015 the parliamentary and public debate
has increasingly shifted to security-related issues, such as the fight against terror-
ism, the loss of jobs and the subversion of national culture. The Hungarian gov-
ernment took measures to mobilize for its policy. However, for the other major
parties and the population, the issue is not of paramount importance and hardly
any counter-programs have been developed in the sense of polarization. Overall,
therefore, only a partial politicization of the policy field can be spoken of.

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Contact: [email protected]
Right-wing Populism and Freedom
of Science in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary

Márk Várszegi

1 Science in the System of National Cooperation

“Work, home, family, health, order”—these are the first five words of the “Pro-
gram of National Cooperation” which was adopted by the Hungarian National
Assembly, the central legislative body, on 14.06.2010 (hereinafter: the Program).
The then freshly re-elected Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declares in the foreword
that it is his personal goal to implement this program “consistently and without
compromise”.
The five words and the values they represent (Böcskei 2014) run through the
program like a leitmotif through a score. It is striking that art, science and crea-
tive activity are mentioned only rarely. Thus, only the chapter on economic pol-
icy briefly mentions the education system and here sees the overemphasis on the
importance of theoretical knowledge as a basic evil. In contrast, the knowledge
acquired in practical training is considered to be of paramount importance and the
way to economic prosperity is seen in the promotion of entrepreneurship. Accord-
ing to the program, the imparting of “entrepreneurial values” should be the top
priority in elementary school. With regard to higher education, the emphasis is on
the STEM subjects, as these are conducive to the development of lucrative eco-
nomic sectors (innovation, research and development and generally high tech). In
contrast, it is objected that there is no corresponding demand on the labor mar-
ket for half of the university degrees and that therefore students should be better
informed about the “market value” (sic!) of their future diplomas.

M. Várszegi (*)
Police Academy Hamburg/University of Applied Sciences, Hamburg, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 207

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_12
208 M. Várszegi

Can we regard the program as a basic document from which the world view
of the most successful Hungarian politician of the last 30 years can be deduced?
And if we answer this question in the affirmative: Does it help us to understand
the role that education and science play in this world view? The events of the last
nine years answer both questions more clearly than any theory does with a “yes”:
Orbán kept his word and actually implemented the goals set out in the program
“consistently and without compromise”, assigning education and science exactly
the place that the wording of the program suggests.
This contribution is intended to show how this affects the practice of scientific
research. It sketches the situation of universities and the Academy of Sciences
since the Wende 1989/1990, with a focus on the period since the Fidesz victory
in 2010. In addition, two events will be briefly mentioned that have received a lot
of attention from the media throughout Europe: the conflict between the Central
European University (CEU) and the Hungarian government that has been going
on since 2017, and the ban on gender studies courses in 2018.1 The aim of this
article is to encourage the search for an answer to the question whether right-
wing populist ideology and modern science are compatible in the long term.

2 Autonomy and Control: The Relationship

of Hungarian Universities to the State

The adoption of the first comprehensive university law for democratic Hungary
took three whole years after the change of system (Law No. LXXX/1993). Like
many other laws from the early years of the young democracy, this code also
suffered from some childhood diseases, but it proved to be a viable vehicle for
twelve years. The new university law passed by the socialist-liberal coalition in
2005 (Law No. CXXXIX/2005) was, however, under a bad star: partly because
of the world economic crisis, partly because of years of mismanagement, the
universities got into a precarious situation, and so the call for professional and
economically efficient management—and ultimately also for a new legal regula-
tion—became louder and louder (Rónay 2018, p. 120; Rónay and Kováts 2018,
pp. 60–68).

1 For the CEU see Varszegi (2017), for the Gender Studies Varszegi (2018).
Right-wing Populism and Freedom of Science in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary 209

Although the Orbán government created a completely new university code as

early as 2011 (Law No. CCIV/2011), it did not fundamentally intervene in the
structure of the universities until 2014 (Law No. XXXVI/2014). From this year
onwards, the rector, as the traditional head of the university in the case of state
universities, was obliged to appoint a chancellor.2 This new incumbent is respon-
sible for the economic operation and has extensive powers in this area. He is
responsible for the economic, financial, legal and IT activities of the university as
well as for its asset management. He has a right of consent (in fact: a veto right)
with regard to all decisions of the university senate or the rector, if these have
consequences for the budget, the organization or the operation of the university
(13/A (2) a)–g) of the law No. CCIV/2011).3
The chancellor is appointed by the Prime Minister on the proposal of the min-
ister responsible for education, who also exercises the rights of the employer
(Article 37 (4a); 13/A (4) of Law No. CCIV/2011). The low requirements that the
law imposes on the qualifications of the chancellor are noteworthy: he need only
have completed a university degree and have three years’ experience in a manage-
ment position–whether at a university, in the private sector or in the public sector
(Article 13/A (3) of Law No. CCIV/2011).
The circumstances of the enactment, the justification of the draft law and
above all the content of the new regulation give rise to the suspicion that the gov-
ernment is using the (undoubtedly difficult) financial situation of the universities
as a pretext (Polónyi 2018), in order to create an office which gives it stronger
influence on university affairs (Rónay 2018, p. 102). The history of the innovation
already has an unpleasant aftertaste. In its original form from 2011, the newly
enacted university code broke with tradition and determined that the senate of the
respective university should no longer have the right to determine the rector as the
head of the institution, but the responsible minister. The senate only had a right of
proposal. The fact that this unpopular innovation was reversed, but the chancellor
system was created, suggests that the government was interested in gaining influ-
ence at the universities and that it was willing to make use of any office for this
purpose.

2 Law No. CCIV. of 2011 on National Higher Education (§§ 91 f.) recognizes two large
groups of universities: state and non-state, with the majority of universities belonging to
the first group. The second group includes institutions whose carriers are either a private
person or a church.
3 For the complete catalogue of competence see § 13/A para. (2) a)–g) of the law No. CCIV.

of 2011.
210 M. Várszegi

The justification for the change in the law also speaks in favor of this assump-
tion. The government referred to the high indebtedness of the universities, for
which it held the university management consisting of scientists and their “viola-
tions of the law” responsible. In this way, it tried to justify the need for a “profes-
sional” commercial management and a “transparent” budget management (Rónay
2018, p. 104), but did not mention that the reason for the shortage of money was
primarily the decline in financial support from the government (especially since
2012) as well as that the violations of the law by the universities were often due
to the impenetrable and overregulated university law and more often resulted
from (not necessarily culpable) ignorance than from bad will (Rónay 2018, p.
103). The call for more professionalism is also hardly reflected in the require-
ments that the new regulation places on the person of the chancellor. Rather, the
feeling arises that these were deliberately kept low in order to expand the minis-
ter’s selection options and enable the appointment of less qualified but govern-
ment-loyal persons.
The goal of efficient household management could have been better promoted
by a simpler means: by sharpening the responsibility of management. The new
regulation only deepens the chaos through the introduction of the chancellor and,
since 2015, also through the creation of a consistory. This new, tradition-less
body is a five-member committee that was created to support and control house-
hold management. In addition to the rector and the chancellor, three persons del-
egated directly by the minister find a place in it. The consent of the consistory is
required for the validity of some particularly important decisions of the senate
(§ 13/B, 13/C (1) of the Act No. CCIV/2011). In the thus created quartet of rector,
chancellor, senate and consistory, the shifting of responsibility for important deci-
sions to the senate and in particular to the consistory is programmed, since the
determination of the responsibility of the members of one of these collective bod-
ies (at least in this of their functions) is in fact impossible (Rónay 2018, p. 106).
The inadequate suitability of the new regulation for the achievement of its
(actual or alleged) purpose is thus conspicuous. In addition, there are numerous
difficulties that it almost inevitably causes and that the legislator should have
foreseen.
The first problem is that in practice it is often not possible to clearly distin-
guish between purely economic and those questions that belong to the operation
of the university and thus to the competence of the rector. Rather, the decisions of
the second group often have financial “side effects”. Due to the division of com-
petences, the efficiency of university management thus depends essentially on the
willingness of the rector and the chancellor to cooperate. If this is not the case,
conflicts seem inevitable.
Right-wing Populism and Freedom of Science in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary 211

Furthermore, the innovation also suffers from significant legal-dogmatic weak-

nesses. A serious deficiency is that the new regulation creates difficulties in deter-
mining the person of the head of the university: It is stipulated that the rector is
still the “supreme responsible leader and authorized representative” of the insti-
tution, who is authorized to decide on all matters which the law—so literally—
does not refer to the competence of another person. However, the next sentence
already determines that the chancellor proceeds in the performance of his duties
“as leader and authorized representative” (sic!) of the university (§ 13 (1) S. 1
and 2 of the law No. CCIV/2011). This second sentence cannot be read as a mere
assignment of competence or task to the chancellor, as the first quoted sentence
would suggest. Rather, it suggests the assumption that the chancellor acts as the
“right” leader and authorized representative of the university in his field of activ-
ity. Here we have the problem of a double leadership and authorization. If we
keep the imprecise separation of competences between rector and chancellor in
mind, it becomes clear that contradictory behavior in the external relationship or
the behavior of the rector or the chancellor as a (good-faith) “representative with-
out authorization” is almost inevitable.
In addition, the new regulation contradicts the provision of the State Budget
Act according to which the head of each budget authority is responsible for the
performance of its legally prescribed duties (Article 10 (1) of Act CXCV/2011).
In the case of universities, the Act on National Higher Education defines
research and teaching as tasks (Article 2 (1) of Act CCIV/2011), for which the
rector (and not the chancellor) is clearly responsible. Nevertheless, according
to the prevailing opinion in Hungary, the chancellor is considered the “head”
which is justified by the argument that he is authorized to determine the “head
of internal control” (Rónay 2018, p. 104). Whether this competence outweighs
the traditional, centuries-old responsibility of the rector for research and teach-
ing is questionable. In any case, the author considers the aforementioned inter-
pretation to be untenable.
Is the introduction of the new office in the present form constitutionally justifi-
able? In this respect, several interpretations are possible. However, the past, pre-
sent and probably also the future of the reform leave a bad overall impression. It
is many small facts that, taken together, even with a benevolent view, raise the
concern that the government is striving for influence in higher education. Who
can stop it or an ambitious chancellor from shutting off the money tap to chairs,
projects or scientists who represent views that do not fit into the world view of the
respective governing party? And is it not humiliating for the rector, who is tradi-
tionally the bearer of the symbols of power, to no longer (or no longer clearly) be
the first person of the university?
212 M. Várszegi

3 Hard Line: The “CEU Affair” and the Ban

on Gender Studies

Statements by several Fidesz top politicians have repeatedly shown that the par-
ty’s world view, which the program provides so much information about, seems
incompatible with many achievements of modern science. So Vice-Premier Min-
ister Zsolt Semjén explained in an interview in 2014 that, in his opinion, the the-
ory of evolution was merely a “hypothesis” afflicted with “problems of logic”.
Minister of Human Resources Prof. Miklós Kásler, on the other hand, held the
view in 2018 that the majority of deadly diseases could be avoided by adhering to
the Ten Commandments (Index 2014; Hegyeshalmi 2018). László Kövér, Presi-
dent of the National Assembly, went even further when he compared gender stud-
ies with eugenics during the Nazi era in 2018 (Echo TV 2018).4
Given these statements, it is hardly surprising that the government had the
Central European University (CEU) in Budapest in its sights. This university,
founded by financier György Soros, is committed to Karl Popper’s ideal of an
open society and advocates for liberal values. Since as a private university it
remained unaffected by the introduction of the chancellor system, the government
resorted to another means and created new rules for foreign universities based in
Hungary through a law that received a great deal of international attention under
the name “lex CEU” in April 2017. However, it is almost obvious that this law,
which appears neutral at first glance, is actually a disguised individual measure
whose goal has always been to make the CEU’s continued operation in Hungary
impossible. 5 Although the CEU was willing to cooperate, the Hungarian govern-
ment was not willing to compromise, so the university’s leaders finally decided in
2018 to move to a new campus in Vienna (Der Standard 2018).
In August 2018, Gender Studies was hit: Although offered by only two uni-
versities to a limited extent, the government and the media close to it devoted
disproportionate attention to this scientific discipline.6 If you read the government

4 Itshould be noted here that Kövér—Fidesz man from the very beginning—is one of Vik-
tor Orbán’s closest confidants.
5 The “lex CEU” raises a number of public law issues, its constitutionality is (to put it

politely) questionable. The interested reader is referred to (Varszegi 2017).

6 See Varszegi (2018) for this. In terms of media, the journalist and moderator Zsolt Bayer

deserves mention. In his weekly television show, he repeatedly made transmen and -women
contemptuous and often used vulgar language. Bayer is one of Orbán’s closest personal
friends and has the Fidesz party book with the number 5.
Right-wing Populism and Freedom of Science in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary 213

program mentioned at the beginning, the reason becomes clear quickly: This
stipulates that the birth of children should not only bring joy to the family, but
also serve the edification of the nation.7 Thus, the traditional, preferably child-
rich family is at the center of the program. In the eyes of the government, the
gender studies courses apparently promoted ideologies whose goal was to give
“alternative” and thus undesired forms of coexistence a right to exist. The ruling
Fidesz party “solved the problem” simply by withdrawing the accreditation for all
courses.

4 Break with Tradition: Conflict with the Academy

of Sciences Since 2018

A special feature in the scientific life of Hungary is the Hungarian Academy of

Sciences (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, hereinafter referred to as the Acad-
emy). This autonomous institution, organised in the form of a public law corpora-
tion, has developed into the centre and flagship of Hungarian scientific life since
its foundation.
It goes back to the National Assembly of 1825, during which several Hungar-
ian nobles agreed to dedicate a considerable part of their private funds to the care
and modernisation of the Hungarian language, leaving the decision on its precise
use to the legislature. The latter finally founded an academy in 1827, which, in
addition to the modernisation of the language as its main activity, also had the
task of promoting science and art (Law No. XI/1827).8 It started its activities in
1830. Although its primary activity in its first years—as planned—was the mod-
ernisation of the Hungarian language,9 the Academy quickly developed into the
center of intellectual life: In addition to the publication of books and its own jour-
nal Tudománytár it was also able to award scholarships and pay salaries to its
members (Főnagy and Pótó 2016).

7 See p. 10 of the program.

8 The law passed immediately afterwards, No. XII, contains no provisions or sanctions, but
simply thanks the donors. The fact that this is the oldest law still in force in Hungary is evi-
dence of the Academy’s special importance for the Hungarians.
9 This is explained by the fact that the revision of the Hungarian language in the “Reforma-

tion era” from 1830 was the most urgent challenge. Results of the ambitious activities of
the Academy were the first editions of the Hungarian spelling rules (1832), the Hungarian
grammar (1846) and the first bilingual Hungarian dictionary (1862).
214 M. Várszegi

The fact that many members of the Academy were supporters of the increas-
ingly strong liberal opposition from 1840 onwards led to downfall between the
suppression of the 1849 revolution and the “compromise” with Austria in 1867.
It became the target of the Vienna administration, which was keen to restrict its
autonomy, which had been the most important principle of their function since
their foundation. The compromise after the 1867 “compromise” restored the
autonomy of the Academy, and the period up to 1914 is considered its first golden
age:10 From 1867 it received state financial support, and its 1869 charter (which
served as the basis for its activities until 1945) guaranteed its autonomy.
The collapse of 1918 hit the Academy hard: In particular, the inflation caused
by the war devalued its considerable assets. Nevertheless, it quickly became the
center of scientific activity again, thanks to generous state and private support.11
However, its autonomy was shattered by the Bolshevik state leadership in 1948.
It only granted the Academy a small financial support and favored the Hungarian
Council of Sciences (Magyar Tudományos Tanács) founded on the Soviet model
as the allegedly progressive counterpart to the “reactionary” Academy. The conflict
was finally ended in 1949 by means of a merger of the two institutions. The Coun-
cil was absorbed by the Academy, which from then on had to fulfill its original
tasks with great difficulty: As the “supreme scientific institution” it was responsi-
ble for the “planned management of the scientific operation at the highest level”
(§ 1 of Law No. XXVII/1949). This task assignment was ideologically shaped. In
the “spirit of progressive sciences” the Academy was obliged to expand the “points
of contact between theory and practice” (§ 1 of the Law No. XXVII/1949).12
However, the legal regulation makes it clear that the true center of power in the
scientific community is the executive controlled by the Communists and that the
Academy should merely have acted as its executor. So it had to determine the

10 As early as 1865, the Academy received the building in which its central seat is still
located today. The magnificent building, designed by Friedrich August Stühler, is one of
the most beautiful buildings in Budapest and is considered a symbol of Hungarian science.
11 Hungary owes particular gratitude to two people here: Count Kuno Klebelsberg, who,

during his time as Minister for Religious and Educational Affairs (1922–1931), paid special
attention to the Academy and guaranteed its state support despite the difficult economic
situation (see Law No. I of 1923 for this), and Count Ferenc Vigyázó, whose monumental
property the Academy inherited in 1928 due to his death.
12 The preamble of this law is also a prime example of the strong ideological charging of

law texts typical for this time. So it stipulates that the mentioned planned organization of
the sciences pursues the goal of putting all the forces of society at the “service of the estab-
lishment of the socialist society”.
Right-wing Populism and Freedom of Science in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary 215

“goals of s­cience” (sic!) In line with the plans typical of socialist planned econ-
omy and to draw up a “science plan” itself (§ 2 para. (1) point a) of the Law No.
XXVII/1949). The executive had extensive power. Its consent was a requirement
for the effectiveness of the Academy’s statute, and the government controlled
whether the Academy’s activities complied with the provisions of this statute (§ 4
para. (2) and para. (3) of the Law No. XXVII/1949). With the extensive powers of
the Academy, the government was able to indirectly control and monitor all matters
of science (Article 2 para. (1) points d), i) and j) of Law No. XXVII/1949).13
In this context, it is hardly surprising that the new law on the Academy, passed
four years after the fall of communism in 1989/90, reads like an antithesis to the
socialist regulation of 1949. Already the preamble declares that it was the Hun-
garian nation that created the Academy in order to foster the Hungarian language
and to serve science. In this sense, the preamble describes the freedom of the
“Hungarian institution of science with a great past” in its “existence and activity”
as a “legitimate claim of society”. It is easily recognizable that these lines repre-
sent a return to the founding spirit of the Academy of 1825. Knowing the law of
1949, it is just as unsurprising that the preamble makes this demanded freedom
dependent on the legal guarantee of the Academy’s right to self-government and
the strengthening of its “internal democracy”. Finally, the preamble stipulates that
no other scientific institution may be affected in its autonomy by the Academy
(Preamble of Law No. XL/1994, hereinafter: MTA tv.).
The 1994 law made the Academy a two-faced institution again. On the one
hand, it is a society of outstanding scientists, on the other hand—and this is per-
haps even more important—it is the carrier of a comprehensive network of sci-
entific research centers and institutes. In 2019, the Academy has a extensive
infrastructure, including ten research centers and five institutes, with a total of
about 5000 employees (3000 scientists).14 In addition, the Academy also supports
numerous small research groups (MTA 2019d).
After the gender campaign of 2018, the Fidesz government turned its atten-
tion to the Academy. A seemingly insignificant detail of legislation triggered the
most serious conflict that has occurred in the scientific community since the fall

13 The powers of the Academy to control the scientific (!) Activity of all scientific institutes
and all clubs in the country as well as to harmonize the activity of all scientific publishers
with the needs of science sound particularly depressing.
14 A complete list of all research centers and institutes with a short description of their

respective areas of activity in English can be found on the Academy’s homepage (MTA
2019a).
216 M. Várszegi

of communism in 1989/90. In June of 2018, the Minister of Finance presented the

government’s draft budget for the year 2019 to the National Assembly. Although
this did not involve any significant change in the amount of state funds earmarked
for the Academy, it did stipulate that 28 of the 40 billion forints in total would
henceforth no longer come from the central state budget, but from the budget of
the Ministry of Innovation and Technology (Draft Bill No. T/503). The major-
ity of these reallocated funds (approx. 20 billion forints) are used to finance the
Academy’s basic needs; in addition to the costs of infrastructure, the salaries of
the scientists are also included here. As a result, the funds for the Academy’s
basic research were almost completely withdrawn and are now part of the Min-
istry’s budget. This is—in contrast to the case of applied research—research
whose main goal is not the achievement of a certain “tangible” result, but rather
the search for answers to questions posed by science itself, for which it is not a
requirement that the results be immediately applied in practice (Article 3, para.
1 of Law No. LXXVI/2014). The Academy regards this basic research as its
most important activity and is accordingly striving to retain the necessary funds15
(Lovász 2019). In addition, it considers it problematic that from now on the com-
petent minister decides on the distribution of funds between her organizational
units.16 The government’s approach was also criticized: It informed the Academy
only one day before the introduction of the draft law by e-mail (!) and thus left
only about 45 min to comment on the planned measures (Bolcsó and Dull2018).
The draft law was passed by the state assembly on 20.07.2018, so it was up to the
Academy and the minister to implement the new financing model in practice.
The protest of the Academy and large parts of the scientific community had
little effect, the negotiations between the minister and the Academy proved to be
fruitless. In the end, the minister created the so-called “Program of Excellence
by Subject Areas” which is supervised by the ministry and in which the funds
are placed that the central budget provides for the academy with the mediation

15 This is the explanation of the Board of Trustees of the Academy from 15.06.2018. In
addition, an almost passionate plea for the preservation of basic research comes from the
pen of László Lovász, the current president of the Academy. To illustrate this, he refers
to the Hungarian mathematician Pál (Paul) Erdős, whose initially “too theoretical” basic
research later became the basis for number theory and combinatorics and thus made him
one of the most influential mathematicians of all time (Lovász 2019).
16 See the already mentioned statement of the Board of Trustees of 15.06.2018. A little

later, the scholarship holders of the Lendület scholarship program, which was very success-
ful with young scientists and initiated by the previous government, joined this statement
(MTA 2018a).
Right-wing Populism and Freedom of Science in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary 217

of the ministry (NKFIH 2019). This program allocates the available resources
to four large areas, with the amounts for “culture and family” being the lowest.
For example, the funds earmarked for the humanities are only about 60% of the
amount that was earmarked for the corresponding organizational units of the
Academy in previous years (Szabó 2019). In addition, the less transparent struc-
ture is to be criticized: It is not recognizable who decides on the distribution of
the resources and for how long funds are to be granted. For example, not even the
salaries of the Academy’s employees are secured. The position of the Academy
is finally also weakened by the fact that, in addition to it, institutes and univer-
sities independent of it can also benefit from the funds,17 the program therefore
explicitly favors such projects in which institutes (including those of the Acad-
emy) cooperate with universities (NKFIH 2019, p. 9).
In connection with the measure, the Fidesz government referred to Western
European models such as the Max Planck Institute, but this comparison is com-
pletely untenable: It is difficult to imagine that a serious, autonomous institute
can exist in Europe without having a fixed source at least for its infrastructure and
for the salaries of its employees. Government representatives were also fond of
referring to increased efficiency as a goal; however, it is not apparent how this can
be promoted by the centralization of sources at the ministry. The Academy has
rightly pointed out that, in particular, state control, but only orientation towards
international standards, promotes efficiency in basic research (MTA 2018b, c). It
is also not true that the Academy–as also claimed–does not have an independent
strategy. The research centers and institutes all have medium and long-term stra-
tegic plans in which projects of both applied research and basic research are dealt
with in detail. The government knew these plans and never objected to them (e.g.
MTA Agrárinnovációs Centrum 2018).
An interview with the responsible inister, however, suggests that the reason
was something else. He explained that the autonomy of science nowhere in the
world means that “we (the scientists, the author) then decide for ourselves what
we want to research” (Szalai2018). The reading of government-friendly media
supplements this statement. A few days after the announcement of the govern-
ment’s plans, very negative reports were made about some employees of the
Academy, with the conspicuous fact that those researchers were targeted who
research topics that are unpleasant for Fidesz: gender, migration, the situation of

17 Itshould be noted here that the Fidesz government founded several such institutes, such
as the “Institute for the Research of Hungarism” (Magyarságkutató Intézet), whose name
suggests nationalist tendencies.
218 M. Várszegi

Roma and other minorities in Hungary etc.18 Also, a rather generous treatment
of facts (MTA 2018d)19 and a disrespectful tone20 suggest here too that it is the
government’s goal to silence scientists who address unpopular topics to it through
control of the Academy’s funds.
The Academy and President Lovász showed great cooperation towards the
government for months21 , while the planned “restructuring” was met with very
strong criticism at home and abroad.22 Nevertheless, the government did not devi-
ate in any way from its plans, and the National Assembly adopted the one from
the Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén23 introduced draft law on 02.07.2019.

18 The author deliberately refrains from giving this source. László Lovász spoke very
clearly and described the mentioned article as “primitive”. Minister Palkovics also dis-
tanced himself from it (Bolcsó and Dull 2018).
19 The Academy requested clarification in this regard: In an article on a government-

friendly Internet portal, more than ten untruths were found, with regard to such important
facts as the assets and budget of the Academy, the salaries of its leadership or its scientific
standards.
20 For example, the government-affiliated newspaper Magyar Hírlap received a letter from

the Academy asking for correction of facts and defending itself against accusations made
by Fidesz MP László Böröcz. The newspaper then explained in an article that it would treat
the Academy’s letter as a reader’s letter and not publish it (Szalai 2019).
21 For example, the Academy’s General Assembly, its most important body, met twice

and submitted its own extremely compromising alternative proposal to the Ministry on
01.06.2019, which Minister Palkovics rejected (MTA 2019b).
22 Even the enumeration of only the most important expressions of discontent would exceed

the scope. Mention should be made here of the expressions of solidarity of the largest
universities in Hungary, as well as a demonstration on 02.06.2019 in Budapest, at which
several high-ranking Hungarian scientists took part, including, for example, Lajos Vékás,
the father of the Hungarian Civil Code (Ptk). Attention should also be paid to an open let-
ter from the German Alliance of Science Organizations to Viktor Orbán, in which, among
other things, they very clearly distance themselves from the attempts of the Hungarian gov-
ernment to legitimize its actions by comparing them with the Max Planck Society and other
German organizations. The letter also criticized the treatment of the CEU and the demoni-
zation of gender studies. Almost ironically, the alliance is a member of the Max Planck
Society. (e.g. Alexander von Humboldt Foundation 2019).
23 Varszegi, 2018 already pointed to Semjén’s comments in the run-up to the ban on gen-

der studies courses. In 2012, allegations of plagiarism in connection with his doctorate title
made headlines. The University of Eötvös Lóránd found that Semjén had committed “seri-
ous academic and ethical misconduct” in connection with his promotion. In the end, his
doctorate was not revoked for formal reasons, and the affair remained without political con-
sequences.
Right-wing Populism and Freedom of Science in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary 219

State President János Áder showed no reservations and gave his blessing to the
draft law on 12.07.2019 with his signature.
The new regulation effectively separates the entire network of the Academy
with all research centers and institutes from it. 17 such entities of the Academy
lose their status as autonomous working and economically active organizational
units and in the future will only be a line item in the central budget managed by
the minister (45 para. (1) of Act LXXVI of 2014 (hereinafter: KFI tv.), Annex
2 of the KFI tv.). The amendment assigns them to a special purpose organiza-
tion, the “Eötvös Lóránd Research Network”24 under (§ 42 of Act No. LXVI of
2014), which not only has supervisory powers, but rather very extensive powers
(§ 42/B para. (2) of Act No. LXVI of 2014).25 The infrastructure required for
the operation of the network shall continue to be made available by the Acad-
emy, and it shall also be obliged to grant the minister extensive usage rights (§ 3
para. (1a) of the MTA tv.). At the head of the newly created research network is a
thirteen-member body. The President of the Academy and the competent minister
each have the right to propose six members; for the person of the president of the
Research Network, the president and the minister make a joint proposal, with the
right to appoint all members vested in the Prime Minister (Article 42/C (2), 42/D
(1) of Law No. LXVI of 2014).
The justification for the new package of laws is brief and stated in general
terms; the style and all new regulations fit seamlessly into the system of national
cooperation.26 The declared aim is to create control and intervention possibilities
for the executive in the interests of efficiency (Government Bill T/6359). How-
ever, this is in contradiction to the fact that the unstructured units of the Academy
have carried out a great deal of basic research, the efficiency of which can hardly
be promoted by the new structure. Nor is it true that the Academy has not been
efficient in its economic operations: On the contrary, many of its projects have

24 This network is named after the Hungarian physicist Lóránd Eötvös, who is also the
namesake of the Eötvös Lóránd University of Sciences. However, these two institutions
should not be confused with each other, there are no points of contact between them.
25 For example, the body is authorized to determine the goals, tasks and even the content of

the statutes of the individual research centers and institutes and to appoint their directors. It
also has extensive powers in connection with the individual budgets available to the respec-
tive centers or institutes. Finally, it can establish new centers and institutes and dissolve
existing ones. (Article 42/C (3) of Law No. LXVI of 2014).
26 For example, it expressly provides that priority shall be given to those projects which

contribute directly to the promotion of the competitiveness of the Hungarian economy in

the distribution of the state funds available. (Section 28 (1) of Act LVI of 2014).
220 M. Várszegi

been successful in recent years despite the relatively modest budget in compari-
son with Western European countries (MTA 2019b).

5 Conclusion: Centralization

Given the measures taken by the Orbán government, the question of the place of
sciences in Orbán’s world view can be easily answered: They are not supposed to
thrive outside of the political system, they are not supposed to form a counterpole
to it and they are by no means supposed to show its shortcomings. The centrali-
zation tendencies inherent in the system do not spare the free spirit either, with
Orbánism proceeding ruthlessly.
While the government program still spoke of the “market value” of some
degree programs, the curtailment of autonomy rights creates the possibility of
withdrawing financial resources from sciences with supposedly low “value”—at
universities by the chancellor, at the Academy with the help of the ministry. The
preference for applied sciences with “concrete” utility is, however, a logical con-
sequence of the glorification of entrepreneurship in the program.
Whether the world view and politics of Fidesz can be described as conserva-
tive is not to be decided here. In any case, the independence of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences was most severely restricted not during the years of con-
servatism shaped by the Horthy system, but in the dark years of state socialism.
The first Prime Minister József Antall, his successor Péter Boross and the first
president of the now again free Academy, Domokos Kosáry, were all known for
their conservative world view—and nevertheless considered the restoration of the
autonomy of the Academy to be the highest commandment. Finally, the hollow-
ing out of the rights of the rector does not speak of a sense of tradition. The pro-
cedure against CEU and against gender studies can be described as brutal and
caused the protest of many conservative professors and members of the Academy.
Also, for a conservative it is difficult to understand how the treasures of Hun-
garian culture—without a doubt of world rank—can be preserved if the—to use
the vocabulary of Fidesz—less “marketable” basic research and the “starving”
humanities are not given the necessary resources.27

27 By way of example, the work of Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály should be mentioned
here, the preservation of which the Academy devotes itself to with special care.
Right-wing Populism and Freedom of Science in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary 221

The author’s respect for the achievements of the Hungarian mind compels him
to conclude with a personal remark: The history of Hungary has shown several
times that attempts to bend the free mind to state considerations of efficiency and
economic viability have always had catastrophic consequences.

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Regional Policy in Hungary: Effects
of EU Membership and National
Priorities

Györgyi Nyikos

1 Introduction

Hungary is a centrally organized country. This is the standard type of territo-

rial state organization also in Western Europe, where, however, since the 1970s,
increasing decentralization and regionalization tendencies could be observed (da
Conceiҫão-Heldt 1998, p. 9). The regional and structural policy of the European
Union set additional incentives for decentralization, because access to the corre-
sponding financial resources, which fall under the shared administration, such as
the European Structural and Investment Funds, is linked to a functioning regional
policy and a functioning institutional system. They are to ensure their effective
use. Hungary’s accession to the European Union was therefore, from a socio-
logical point of view, an interesting case study for the development of political-
administrative institutions. What was more influential: the forces of centralism or
decentralization processes?
This article deals with this question. It should be noted that the implementa-
tion of regional policy and the design of the EU’s administrative system are not
predetermined. They can be different in the Member States and in the different
programming periods. These differences can be explained by the internal system
of regional policy, the scope and orientation of the programs and the experience
in the administration of the operational programs (Ferry et al. 2007; Nyikos and
Talaga 2014). In Hungary, significant institutional changes have been made in
regional policy and in the administration of EU funds since 1990. The chapter

G. Nyikos (*)
National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 225

GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
E. Bos and A. Lorenz (eds.), Politics and Society in Hungary,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_13
226 G. Nyikos

examines how the Hungarian government’s approach to regional policy and its
institutional structure have changed before accession and in the three previous
programming periods (2004 to 2006, 2007 to 2013 and 2014 to 2020).

2 Regional Policy as a New Policy Area

2.1 The Situation in Hungary in 1990

A decentralized development policy that is compatible with EU principles did

not exist in communist countries. In Hungary there was a centralized planned
economy in which, on the one hand, state decisions were oriented towards a uni-
form basic supply and, on the other hand, territorial and local actors had very few
rights. In the last years of socialism, a growing departure was made from this
classical model of hierarchically centralized economic structures and bureaucratic
forms of planned economy. In Hungary, as a result of economic reform policy, a
so-called negotiation process (regulation bargaining) had developed, which was
associated with the transfer of negotiations from easily achievable output figures
to regulatory benefits, improvisations, exceptions and personal connections that
evade the official “route” (Kornai 1992).
After the change and the associated economic, political and social system
transformation while at the same time integrating into the structures of the EU,
state intervention to overcome regional disparities was not on the transforma-
tion agenda of Hungary. At the same time, after 1990, the legal basis for planning
was abolished as a counterpoint to the former planned economy and there was no
comprehensive public planning basis anymore.
At the beginning of the 1990s, then the regional differences in Hungary have
become much larger and the regional policy consisted essentially of crisis man-
agement. With the beginning of the change of the economic structure, about one
and a half million jobs were lost and production declined in the former indus-
trial centers. In agriculture, the loss of the eastern markets weakened the former
organizational and production system, which was further aggravated by political
decisions to restore property relations. The western regions of the country were
able to adapt more quickly, as economic relations were directed towards West-
ern Europe and foreign capital flowed into these regions due to favorable condi-
tions for settlement (Rechnitzer 2003). Later, in parallel with the establishment of
national institutional framework for regional policy, adjustments to the structures
and procedures of the EU Structural Policy have taken place in Hungary.
Regional Policy in Hungary: Effects of EU Membership… 227

2.2 The EU Concept of Regional Policy

The EU regional policy serves to reduce regional disparities and is intended to

stimulate regional growth in order to secure regional competitiveness, realize the
sustainability of regional development and the catch-up of lagging regions and
promote regional and territorial cross-border cooperation.
Their history began with the Treaty of the European Economic Community
(EEC) and the Treaty of the European Atomic Community (EURATOM) in 1957.
For the first time, “regional differences” were mentioned in these treaty texts.
With the establishment and simultaneous entry into force of the treaties and the
European Social Fund (ESF) in 1958, the intention was formulated to “promote
the professional use and the local and professional mobility of workers within the
Community” (Art. 123 EEC Treaty). The introduction of the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975 marked the actual starting point for an
“active” European regional policy (Höllmann 2013).
The Single European Act can be considered as a legal basis for cohesion
policy because with it the goal of economic and social cohesion was officially
included in the ERA for the first time in 1986 (Art. 158 EG-V, formerly 130a). In
1993, the cohesion goal was included in the Maastricht Treaty as a basis for deep-
ening the Community (Art. 2 EUV). The EU Structural and Regional Policy, or as
it is called in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in Article 174,
the Cohesion Policy, is the most important solidarity instrument of the EU for
equalizing and improving living conditions throughout the EU. It is intended to
contribute to economic, social and territorial cohesion as a long-term investment
policy in cooperation between the European, national, regional and local levels. It
is precisely in the regions and municipalities that the direct effects of EU policy
on the ground become visible to citizens (Béres et al. 2019).
The EU invests on the ground as part of its cohesion policy, which is financed
by three funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohe-
sion Fund (CF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). Together with the Euro-
pean Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European
Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), they form today the European Structural
and Investment Funds (ESI Funds). The majority of the funding is received by the
economically weakest regions, but the funds support projects in all regions. The
funds made available are managed in agreement with national, regional and local
authorities.
228 G. Nyikos

% of EU GDP

Total

Fig. 1 Financial resources for cohesion policy, 1986 to 2023. Note: The time profile of
expenditure for 2014 to 2023 is based on the result for 2007 to 2013 and the assumption of
100% absorption over the period. (Source: DG REGIO, historical data)

Cohesion policy plays an important role at EU level—both in terms of coor-

dinating and monitoring spatial development processes and the spatial develop-
ment of sectoral policies. Figure 1 provides an overview of the financial resources
used for this purpose in the period 1986–2023. Integrated development strategies
should be taken into account in the preparation of programmes in order to further
increase the European added value of cohesion policy through synergies.
Several studies and evaluations by the European Commission1 have confirmed
the contribution of cohesion policy to economic growth, which however depends
on the ability of national and regional institutions to develop sound strategies,
allocate resources effectively and manage EU funds efficiently (Bachtler et al.
2014, p. 735; Ederveen et al. 2006). An effective functioning of all implementa-
tion systems is essential to clearly define powers and responsibilities and to set up
well-functioning coordination mechanisms that are well documented and imple-
mented properly (Nyikos 2013, p. 52). A weak capacity level can hamper the
effective management and implementation of operational programmes and, as a
result, negatively affect overall regional development outcomes (Smeriglio et al.
2016, p. 178). Empirically, government capacity is positively correlated with the
absorption performance of the ERDF (Tosun 2014).

1 Evaluations are available at: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/.

Regional Policy in Hungary: Effects of EU Membership… 229

2.3 From the Turn to EU Accession: Parallelism of Policy

Field Genesis and Adaptation to EU Regional Policy

The EU officially did not require any adaptation measures with regard to the
structure and mechanisms of Hungarian funding administration, but, as men-
tioned, the experiences of the Member States showed that a network of institu-
tions working effectively in accordance with European standards is necessary,
especially with regard to the absorption capacities of the system, i.e. the ability
to call up the allocated funds in time at the Commission. Since the EU cohesion
policy is based on the NUTS-2 level,2 it was important to examine the possibil-
ity of founding corresponding regions. The territorial level of administration and
the national electoral system were and are the counties in Hungary, but in terms
of their size and population (NUTS 3) they are not suitable as a basis for EU
regional policy.
One of the cornerstones of Hungarian regional policy was the 1996 Act on
Territorial Organization and Regional Development (Act XXI/1996), which was
amended in 1999. It shifted the administrative structures of the development
funds from the traditional and historically grown county level in Hungary to the
regional level (NUTS 2)3 and thus increased the degree of EU compatibility sev-
eral times. At the central level, the new legal regulations created the National
Council for Regional Development and new institutions (Regional Development
Boards, Territorial Development Boards of the Counties, Associations of Munici-
palities) for the realization of regional development goals. The financial instru-
ments of territorial development policy were divided into central and regional
sources—each 50% on the titles associated with territorial development of the
budget. This has partially led to a decentralization of national resources for ter-
ritorial development. The law has introduced a hierarchy of different develop-
ment plans with regard to planning (concept for territorial development; regional

2 The NUTS classification (System of Territorial Units for Statistics) is a hierarchical sys-
tem for subdividing the economic areas of the EU and the United Kingdom for the follow-
ing purposes: collecting, developing and harmonizing regional statistical data of the EU;
socio-economic analysis of regions (NUTS 2: Basic regions for regional policy measures);
shaping the EU regional policy: regions eligible for funding under cohesion policy are
determined on the basis of NUTS-2 level.
3 On the basis of Decision 35/1998 of the Hungarian Parliament on the national concept

of territorial development, the seven (statistical and planning) regions were defined, which
correspond to the EU planning regions NUTS-2.
230 G. Nyikos

development programs; spatial planning). For the preparation of the plans at the
different administrative levels (country, region, county, district, municipality), the
respective administrative bodies and institutions were made responsible.
However, these institutions hardly fulfilled the goals and tasks in connection
with the implementation of national and EU regional policy. One of the problems
was that the regional development councils were based on the county develop-
ment councils. At the same time, the members of the regional development coun-
cils were mostly determined by the central government. Not a single member was
responsible to or legitimized by the population of the region. All of them rep-
resented the interests of their “parent institution”, trying to get as large a share
of the subsidies as possible. As a result, the subsidies were usually distributed
among the participating counties and micro-regions according to a certain head-
count, not according to the actual needs of the region.
Despite the openness of the EU legal framework for different national
designs, the EU made efforts in formulating EU requirements and pre-accession
aid granted4 to agree similar documents or programs with all accession candi-
dates. Little regard was given to the national institutional structure that had been
developed or to country-specific, structural economic problems (Pieper 2006).
Regional PHARE programs were carried out in Hungary (see Table 1), but the
requirements for granting aid measures could more or less be unilaterally set by
the EU Commission. In programming, the newly created regional development
councils and regional actors played no role.
The management of the PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD programs was central-
ized; only ministries were involved in implementation. General coordination fell
within the competence (in all three programs) of the Minister without Portfolio
(responsible for the implementation of the PHARE program). The responsibility
for regional economic development programs under the PHARE program rested
with the Ministry of Agriculture and Regional Development. Monitoring for the
three pre-accession programs was carried out by a National Monitoring Commit-
tee. Financial settlement of the programs was the responsibility of the ­Hungarian

4 The EU-15’s financial preview for the period 2000 to 2006 included planned aid (also
called pre-accession or transition aid) for middle and eastern European accession candi-
dates with three elements: transition aid for agriculture and rural development SAPARD
(Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development); structural pol-
icy instrument ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies Pre-Accession); extension of the
PHARE program (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies)
already running since 1990.
Regional Policy in Hungary: Effects of EU Membership… 231

Table 1 The development periods of the PHARE program in Hungary

Time period Characteristics
1989 to 1992 • Quick reactions to pressing problems
• Necessity of flexibility
• Lack of planning capacity and of completely elaborated projects
• Important role of foreign consultants, focus on technical assistance
• Increasing number of those affected, increasing diversity of funding
goals
1993 to 1997 • More focus on EU integration
• Need for more investment
• Lack of concentration—dispersion of funds
• Attempt to introduce medium-term planning
• New, more complex planning methodology
1998 to 1999 • Only accession-related projects
• Partially uniformed procedures
• Reinforcement of domestic coordination in the countries concerned
(Gradually increasing competence of the EU delegations)
2000 to 2004 • Two new pre-accession instruments alongside PHARE
• Greater emphasis on regional development in PHARE
• Preparation for the EU Structural Policy
• Decentralisation of the execution of programmes
Source: Heil 2000, p. 90

Treasury in the form of the Ministry of Finance, within which the National Fund
corresponding to EU expectations was set up. The technical coordination of the
programs and contracts also played a crucial role in the CFCU5 set up in accord-
ance with EU regulations (Szemlér 2002). In this context, EU funding man-
agement solutions have had a significant impact on the further development of
Hungary’s institutional apparatus and on the content orientation of regional pol-
icy.
It can be held that the pre-accession programs based on the ERDF actually
had an impact on national design: The promotion of the endogenous potential
of a region and the cross-sectoral use of modern instruments of regional policy
beyond investment promotion were included in the regional development. The
influence was also shown by another example: Hungary already began work on
a national development plan in 1997. However, the EU reformed the PHARE

5 Central Financing and Contracting Unit.

232 G. Nyikos

2500.00

2000.00

1500.00 Other aid

Cohesion policy

1000.00 Subsidies for agriculture

Deposits

500.00

0.00

Fig. 2 Financial transfers between Hungary and the European Union, 2004 to 2017 (in bil-
lion HUF). (Source: Ministry for Innovation and Technology)

p­ rogram in 1999. In this and similar cases6 there were short-term disruptions
in the preparations for EU accession only because the EU did not recognize the
institutional reforms already carried out.

2.4 Implementation of EU Cohesion Policy after EU

Accession

Access to the European Union opened up a relatively wide range of opportuni-

ties for EU funding for Hungary. As Fig.2 proves, the country is a significant net
recipient of EU funding (Eckardt and Pállinger 2013, Nyikos and Soós 2020).

6 The case of the Monitoring Committees was similar: Hungary began to set up these
units when they were not yet a requirement of the PHARE program. Later, when the EU
demanded the establishment of a Joint Monitoring Committee, the institutions previously
set up by Hungary had to be re-structured. When establishing the National Fund (Fund for
the technical, financial implementation of transfers), the EU did not want to accept that the
already existing Hungarian Treasury fulfilled almost exactly the same functions: therefore,
a new institution had to be created.
Regional Policy in Hungary: Effects of EU Membership… 233

The transfers arriving in Hungary are many times higher than Hungary’s national
contributions to the EU budget.7
The first programming period presented all new Member States with the
challenge of setting up and preparing administrative capacity for a functioning
system. With EU funding, the institutional infrastructure in the field of regional
policy was built and expanded. The support aimed to design regional develop-
ment strategies, to involve relevant actors in the regional development process
and to strengthen administrative capacity for the implementation and manage-
ment of programmes.
In Hungary, the need for social and economic plans, as well as the social
importance and professional status of planning, have constantly changed. This
also includes the recognition that every development measure has a sectoral
character and a spatial dimension and therefore both approaches should form a
natural unit. The Hungarian Act on Land Development and Land Use Planning
(Act XXI/1996) established a unified system of institutions at national, regional
and micro-regional levels, defined tasks, named decision-making bodies for
regional development and identified the actors involved in the decision. Hungar-
ian regional policy aimed at a system that is based essentially on the principles,
practices and institutional framework of the European Union’s regional policy,
with the Act on Regional Development and with national and regional develop-
ment strategies.
The first National Spatial Development Concept (hereinafter: NRK) was, after
the change, adopted by Parliament as the first comprehensive strategic document
harmonized with EU principles for development policy (35/1998. (III. 20.) and
renewed later. The goal of the concept, to make a coherent development policy
out of all development plans and programs and to harmonize Hungarian and
international financial aid and sources with each other,8 was however largely
missed.
A significant problem turned out to be that despite its institutionalization, the
Hungarian regional policy was still not able to coordinate sectoral d­ evelopments

7 For a detailed breakdown of payments and receipts in Euros since Hungary’s EU acces-
sion, see European Commission 2020.
8 The goal of the new NRK was to renew spatial planning, improve the effectiveness, trans-

parency, and coherence of the financial system, and implement a program-based financial
system. The goal was set to increase the share of decentralized sources, increase the own
financial resources of areas and municipalities, and increase the regional concentration of
financial resources in line with the spatial development objectives.
234 G. Nyikos

and manage EU funding due to the lack of legal instruments. While the strength-
ening of the regional level and decentralization were also central goals of the
government program for the development of the Hungarian administration,
the institutions at the regional level could not be significantly strengthened.
Although decentralization of regional policy was a fundamental element of politi-
cal democratization and pluralism in Hungary until 2010, and there were several,
partly decentralized domestic development funds that could also pursue differ-
ent cohesion goals, this was never the goal in EU fund management. This always
remained centralized.
Since 2004, EU funding in Hungary has almost corresponded to development
policy, so the institutional system that implements it has gained enormous impor-
tance. However, a parallel and centralized administration and planning system
was set up for the management of EU funds, i.e. there are parallel institutions of
the administration of national resources and of resources outside the traditional
Hungarian ministerial administration system (Nyikos and Talaga 2014). In this
way, the achievement of the cohesion policy goals of the EU—often indepen-
dently of national goals—seemed easier and more controllable. This pattern was
also followed by the EU fund management practice already introduced in the EU
pre-accession aid. Consequently, only the management of part of the dwindling
national resources remained in the established decentralized regional develop-
ment system.
Since the accession to the EU in 2004 and until 2010, i.e. during the time of
the political leadership of the Socialists, coordination was initially delegated to
the Office of the Prime Minister, before the National Development Agency was
set up there. After 2010, with the victory of Fidesz, a very strong centraliza-
tion process began. The political government was strengthened and all relevant
decisions were made at government level. Even technical decisions are made
exclusively on a political basis and at government level. The responsibility for
coordination changed from time to time (from the National Development Agency
to the Ministry of National Development, then to the Office of the Prime Minister
and currently to the Ministry of Innovation and Technology), but the role of ter-
ritorial actors was permanently weakened.
Between 2004 and 2006, in addition to the sectoral operational programs,
only one regional operational program9 was carried out for the whole country

9 Operational programs are detailed plans in which the Member States set out how they will
spend the funds from the individual European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) dur-
ing the programming period. Operational programs can be created for specific regions or
for a national thematic goal (e.g. environment).
Regional Policy in Hungary: Effects of EU Membership… 235

(Table 2). The administrative authorities10 worked in line ministries11 under the
coordination of the Prime Minister’s Office, but the inclusion of several interme-
diate bodies12 with overlapping responsibilities created a complex system with
difficulties in maintaining a nationally coherent approach to the interpretation and
application of regulatory requirements (Nyikos and Kondor 2019).
During the programming period 2007 to 2013, the system was completely
revised. The newly established National Development Agency (NDA) managed
all operational programmes with all administrative authorities within its organisa-
tion, and the new national regulations contain uniform standards for programme
implementation (Hajdu et al. 2017). As mentioned, strong centralisation and
standardisation were the goals behind the re-organisation. However, with more
than 25 intermediate bodies and overlapping regulations, the solution inevitably
leads to inconsistencies and fragmentation.
When comparing the programming periods, it can be seen that the number of
operational programmes and thus the administrative authorities was highest dur-
ing the period 2007 to 2013. Therefore, the need for coordination was greatest
at this time. Although regional operational programmes were also implemented
in Hungary during the programming period 2007 to 2013, their implementation
remained in the hands of the ministerial administrative authorities and was only
decentralised for intermediate tasks.
According to the relevant data, Hungary seems to have succeeded in spending
the majority of the allocated funds. Between 2004 and 2008, 95% of the funds
from the EFRE and the EAGFL were paid out, while the absorption rate for the
ESF was 91.02% and for the FIAF 86.19%. Hungary had an overall absorption
rate of 94.11%. Hungary’s absorption rate was also quite successful during the
programming period 2007 to 2013 with just over 94% of the available funds.

10 The competent administrative authority in the Member State is responsible for the man-
agement of the programmes and provides information on the programme, selects projects
and monitors implementation.
11 Three ministries (Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Employ-

ment) and the Hungarian Office for Territorial and Regional Development (Central Admin-
istration Office).
12 The implementation system that actually carried out the transactions was rather frag-

mented with 22 intermediate bodies.

236 G. Nyikos

Table 2 Operational cohesion programmes and their management authorities in Hungary

2004 to 2006 2007 to 2013 2014 to 2020
Economic competitive- Economic development Economic development
ness National Development Agency and innovation
Ministry of Economics Ministry of Economicsa
and Transport
Regional Development West Pannonia Territorial and Settlement
National Development National Development Agency Development
Office under the Ministry Southern Lowland Ministry of Economics
of the Prime Minister National Development Agency
Northern Lowland
National Development Agency
North Hungary
National Development Agency
Central Transdanubia
National Development Agency
Southern Transdanubia
National Development Agency
Central Hungary Competitive Central
National Development Agency Hungary
Ministry of Economya
Environmental Protec- Environment and Energy Environment and Energy
tion and Infrastructure National Development Agency Efficiency
Ministry of Environment Ministry of National Devel-
and Water opmentb
Transport Integrated Transport
National Development Agency Ministry of National Devel-
opmentb
Development of Human Social Innovation Development of Human
Resources National Development Agency Resources
Ministry of Youth, Family, Social Infrastructure Ministry of Human
Social Affairs and Equal National Development Agency Resources
Opportunities
State reform Public administration and
National Development Agency development of the public
Electronic Administration service
National Development Agency Office of the Prime Minister

Implementation
National Development Agency
(continued)
Regional Policy in Hungary: Effects of EU Membership… 237

Table 2 (continued)
2004 to 2006 2007 to 2013 2014 to 2020
Agriculture and rural Rural development Rural development
development Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Agriculture Hungarian Fisheries and
Aquaculture
Ministry of Agriculture
afrom2018 Ministry of Finance
bfrom2018 Ministry of Innovation and Technology
Source: Nyikos and Vyrostova 2021

For the assessment of the performance of the EU fund management system,

not only the absorption, but also the regularity,13 The effective and efficient use of
sources is particularly relevant. With regard to irregularities and financial correc-
tions, Hungary was moderately successful in the programming period from 2000
to 2006 in the early period after accession. In the period from 2000 to 2006, the
country worked with very small financial corrections in line with expectations
and rules of the EU (see Fig. 3).

13 Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 defines an “irregularity” as meaning that the recipients

of EU funds act contrary to Union law or national law, which would result in a burden
on the EU budget by an unjustified item being charged. The concept of irregularity is to
be distinguished from “error” and “fraud”. An error may consist in the fact that, during
the execution of the EU budget, the rules were not complied with. Individual errors which
are not sufficient to meet the definition of an irregularity are usually not reported in the
form of financial corrections. Fraud is a criminal offence whereby someone intentionally
damages the EU or national budget (Nyikos and Tátrai 2010). Financial corrections are the
main penalty for irregularities in the use of EU funds. A financial correction means a com-
plete or partial withdrawal of EU funds from the programme and/or the project. This may
be related to an implementation error of the programme (system error) or the project. The
consequences are the same in both cases: The European Commission does not pay for the
amount of the financial correction, so that the Member State or the project promoter should
finance this part.
238 G. Nyikos

Fig. 3 Cumulative financial corrections of EU Member States in the EFRE and ESF
programming period 2000 to 2006. (Source: Report of the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council and the European Court of Auditors—Annual Administrative and
Performance Report 2016 for the EU Budget (COM (2017) 351 final))

2.5 Changes in the Regional Policy Approach of the

Hungarian Government Since 2010

The mid-term review and political change in 2010 also included a re-program-
ming and institutional restructuring. The coordination and control functions of
the administrative authorities had to be strengthened and the provisions extended.
The main elements of the measures introduced in 2011–2012 were:

• the elimination of elements of internal regulation that are stricter than EU

requirements,
• the development of electronic applications (online application, electronic com-
munication with applicants, electronic signature in the payment process, etc.),
• the introduction of a supplier advance and a equity fund to alleviate liquidity
problems associated with the beneficiary’s own contribution (the financing of
the equity fund was available to beneficiaries of the public sector),
• an individual project monitoring system to assist delayed larger projects,
• the initiation of changes to operational programs and important project phases
for reallocation purposes at the European Commission.
Regional Policy in Hungary: Effects of EU Membership… 239

As the final change towards the end of the programming period 2007 to 2013,
supervision of the NDA was transferred from the Ministry of National Develop-
ment to the Office of the Prime Minister.
The start of the programming period 2014 to 2020 has brought further sig-
nificant changes to the institutional system of cohesion policy. In January 2014,
the NDA was abolished and its functions were distributed among the relevant
ministries and the Office of the Prime Minister. The management authorities
were (re)transferred to the line ministries. The Office of the Prime Minister was
also entrusted with the tasks of central coordination.14 Intermediary bodies were
abolished and their tasks integrated into the relevant ministries which assume the
tasks of the management authority. The Hungarian State Treasury is an exception
in that it acts as an intermediary body for the Territorial Development and Settle-
ment Development Operational Programme.
In addition to other measures to support the use of funds, a high advance (up
to 100% for public institutions) financed from the national budget was intro-
duced. As a result, Hungary is leading in the group of EU countries using ESI
funds with more than 41% absorption. Hungary’s performance can therefore be
rated as good based solely on the absorption rate.
However, an examination of irregularities in the 2007–2013 programming
period in Hungary clearly revealed higher financial correction rates (see Fig. 4).
In 2012, Hungarian policy declared it a priority to develop what the Hungarian
government considers necessary and to use available EU funds instead of follow-
ing the EU funds and their goals. With the change of approach and the declining
administrative capacity, performance also changed over time. Hungary was at the
end of the 2007–2013 period in third place with the highest rate of financial cor-
rections, indicating a high national co-financing.

2.6 Re-Adjustments in EU Cohesion Policy 2021–2027

and the Hungarian Government

The EU has always tried to maintain the amount and share of cohesion policy funds
available in the current budget periods, but this process would end according to the

14 The Office of the Prime Minister is responsible for coordination tasks at the level of
Member States, which include the following: preparation of programme documents, func-
tions related to programme implementation, monitoring of use of funds, drafting of legisla-
tion and proposals for its amendment, and centralised management functions in relation to
all programmes (e.g. communication, evaluation).
240 G. Nyikos

Fig. 4 Cumulative financial corrections by EU Member States for the ERDF, CF and ESF
programming period 2007 to 2013. (Source: Commission Report to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council and the European Court of Auditors—Annual Administrative and Perfor-
mance Report 2016 for the EU budget (COM (2017) 351 final))

European Commission proposal of May 2018 (EC 2018) in 2020. In the period
2007–2013, 438 billion euros or almost 45% of the EU budget went into cohesion
policy and in the period 2014–2020 450 billion euros or 47%. The proposal of May
2018 sets the cohesion policy to a historic low of 373 billion euros and 29%.15
This is a significant cut for Hungary as a recipient country. To maintain finan-
cial resources, it is argued from the favored countries on several levels. In addition
to the need to further reduce development differences, it is argued that EU funds
also flow back into the economy of a contributing country through several chan-
nels.16 Polish researchers have tried to estimate the amount of money flowing back

15 Of course, a smaller overall budget is expected for the next period with Brexit, but with
this Commission proposal, the share of cohesion policy in this will be significantly reduced.
16 This happens, for example, by products or services from Western European companies

for development projects acquired directly or through the project supplier. Foreign subsidi-
aries established in cohesion countries can also be direct recipients of financial aid. In addi-
tion, the imports of the Central European economies will increase in the long term as a
result of the developments.
Regional Policy in Hungary: Effects of EU Membership… 241

to the EU-15 for the completed funding period 2007 to 2013. Their method was
based on a macroeconomic model estimation of indirect import effects and ana-
lyzed direct supplier and subsidy rollbacks by analyzing account and support data.
According to this, the 120 billion euros in EU funds flowing into the four Visegrád
countries had economic effects of 96.6 billion euros in the old EU member states,
which means that at least 80% of the subsidies were reimbursed to the net payer
states on the basis of the estimated economic effects (Nyikos et al. 2020).
According to the Commission proposal, cohesion policy should also be more
closely linked to the European Semester and the Union’s economic governance.
This means that the financial resources of cohesion policy depend on compliance
with the rules on fiscal and economic governance. This is a good proposal for the
efficient use of public funds, but it is controversial for regional cohesion and soli-
darity. Since Hungary is a unitary state, the central government is responsible for
both fiscal and cohesion policy, i.e. macroeconomic conditionality is managed by
the government in both areas. However, this can be a great challenge for member
states with a decentralized development structure.
Relevant from a Hungarian perspective is the proposal of the European Com-
mission for the so-called rule of law conditionality (COM (2018) 324 final). It
is often seen as the EU’s political response to rule of law deficiencies under the
Fidesz government. However, the use of conditionality in cohesion policy has a
long history and is an increasing trend (Nyikos 2014). The current regulations
include the following provisions:

• macroeconomic conditionality: linking cohesion policy to the EU’s economic

policy steering,
• ex-ante conditionality: setting the conditions for efficient and effective use of
ESF funds, political and strategic framework conditions, sufficient administra-
tive and institutional capacity and
• interruption/suspension conditions: linking financing to normal operation and
implementation.

In this context, the CPR Regulation (Common Provision Regulation)17 pro-

vides that Member States shall be required, in accordance with applicable rules,

17 Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17

December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development
Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for
Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down gen-
eral provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund,
the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council
Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006.
242 G. Nyikos

to ensure the proper functioning of the institutional system responsible for the
implementation of the Funds (including the management of irregularities).
In examining the Commission proposal and comparing it to the existing cohe-
sion rules, Article 3(1) of the proposal clearly refers to the requirements of the
existing cohesion rules, while Article 3(2) concerns the legal principles and fun-
damental rights of the EU, in particular the requirement of the rule of law. In
cohesion policy, the proper functioning of the institutional system (including the
courts in dealing with irregularities) has always been a prerequisite for the use
of resources, although the Commission has not really examined the management
of irregularities and claims, and the proper functioning of the involved organi-
sations. The Member State had to report that the function was operational and
accepted (Nyikos and Talaga 2014).
The new Commission proposal has generated considerable political debate, in
particular over the transparency and objectivity of the proposed rules and their
application, and over the justification for extending the requirements of resource
management to areas of constitution and rule of law. In order to ensure the equal
treatment of Member States, criteria must be developed by which the consistent
application of the provisions can be assessed in the event of general rule of law
deficiencies that jeopardise the economy of public finances.

3 Summary

After the turn, Hungary tried to establish a sectorally integrated and territorially
decentralized planning and development administration system of regional policy.
Due to lack of political commitment and because of counterproductive effects,
this was revised later. Instead of decentralized regional policy, an absolutely cen-
tralized development system has developed. The EU regional policy, which in
western and southern European Member States has promoted regionalization and
decentralization, thus showed in Hungary not this effect.
In the first program planning periods, Hungary fully complied with the expec-
tations and requirements of the EU and therefore had both a high absorption rate
and a low irregularity and correction level. However, this approach changed over
time and the performance and quality of the EU fund management system visibly
declined. In addition, the regulation of cohesion policy became more complex
and, due to the diverse re-organization of the system, many administrative capaci-
ties were lost. Due to the high national pre-financing, the absorption (with many
irregularities) is progressing well, which means a significant need for additional
national financial resources.
Regional Policy in Hungary: Effects of EU Membership… 243

It is currently questionable whether the EU will be able to adopt a new budget

and a new cohesion policy regulation in time or at all and with what content.
Therefore, the future of EU cohesion policy, which is very important for Hun-
gary because of the funds, is completely uncertain. So far, no decisions have been
made on the Hungarian operational programmes and administrative institutions
for the next multi-year financial framework due to lack of legal and financial
framework conditions, but government declarations expect centralized solutions.

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Prof. Dr. Györgyi Nyikos Ph.D. is a university professor and head of the Department of
Public Finance at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies of the Univer-
sity of Public Service in Budapest.
Contact: [email protected]