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 H ELLENIC AIR FORCE
WAR COLLEGE ( HAFWC )
EDITION
Emblem
“MΑΘΗ ΓΑΡ ΤΟΙ ΦΡΕΝΑΣ ΑΥΞΕΙ”
(Education enlarges the mind)
Empedocles
Empedocles, a presocratic philosopher,
emphasizes the importance of learning, since education
cultivates the mind and provides precious experience

CITATION: Hellenic Air Force War College/Magazine Publication Department.

(2025). Hellenic Air Force Review (#134 - Apr 2025).
Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15206321
RESPONSIBLE FOR ISSUING
Hellenic Air Force War College (HAFWC)
Colonel (Pilot) Dimitrios Zervos, Commander

EDITOR IN CHARGE
Dr. Gerasimos Karabelias Professor, Panteion University

SCIENTIFIC ADVISOR OF PUBLICATION

Brigadier General HAF (ret.) Alexander Kolovos
Professor, Hellenic Air Force Academy

SELECTION COMMITTEE / EDITORIAL TEAM

Colonel (Pilot) Dimitrios Zervos
(HAFWC Commander)
Major Michael Maravgakis
(Head of Magazine Publication Department)
Dr. Gerasimos Karabelias
(Professor, Panteion University)

TEXT EDITING
Major Michael Maravgakis

ARTISTIC EDITING
Major Michael Maravgakis
2nd Lieutenant Dominiki Spada

DIGITAL EDITING
2nd Lieutenant Dominiki Spada
Chief Master Sergeant Nikoletta Tsaousoglou

PRINTING
Hellenic Air Force Publication Agency

PACKAGING – DISTRIBUTION
Hellenic Air Force War College (HAFWC)/ Magazine Publication Department

WEBSITE
www.haf.gr/news/publications/aeroporiki-epitheorisi

CONTACT
email: [email protected]
tel: +30 210 819 3964 - 16
 April 2025
EDITORIAL

In a world transformed by rapid technological progress and intricate geopolit-

ical changes, space has become a pivotal factor in global security. It is no longer
merely a frontier for exploration but a crucial arena where countries compete for
strategic dominance, technological superiority, and operational resilience. The
growing reliance on space-based technologies, spanning communication, navi-
gation, intelligence, and surveillance has elevated space security to a pressing
priority for nations worldwide.

This competitive, multipolar environment drives states to harness space, to

strengthen their defense capabilities and safeguard their autonomy. For air forces,
space is now a vital tool, sharpening precision, boosting situational awareness,
and enabling seamless coordination over vast expanses. The Hellenic Air Force
understands that these shifts are reshaping contemporary warfare, offering new
possibilities to embrace and obstacles to address.

The Hellenic Air Force Review introduces the issue titled “Space Security in a
Multipolar World” underscoring Hellenic Air-Force’s dedication to tackling the
changing significance of space in both national and global security contexts. Fea-
turing insights from experts, it delves into how space influences air power, global
powers and Europe’s initiatives, as well as Greece’s aspirations. We all want to
believe that this publication will enrich the ongoing conversation about safeguard-
ing the space domain and highlight the Hellenic Air Force’s eager role in it.

Gerassimos Karabelias
Professor-Panteion University
 April 2025
ISSUE INTRODUCTION

Conceptual Overview and Structure

of Issue No. 134
of the Hellenic Air Force Review

The concept for this English edition of the Air Force Review emerged following
the conclusion of a specialised module, spanning five intensive days, entitled
«Space Applications for Security and Defence». This course, now in its third con-
secutive year, was held at the Hellenic Air Force Academy in Athens (25-29 No-
vember 2024) under the aegis of the European Security and Defence College.
The ESDC has also approved the syllabus of this course, proposed by the HAFA in
2017 and revised in 2024. The majority of the authors in this edition were speak-
ers at this event. However, the rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape and its im-
plications for European and space security prompted a broader examination of
these matters.

The April 2025 edition of the Air Force Review, titled “Space Security in a Mul-
tipolar World,” offers a comprehensive examination of space as a pivotal domain
in contemporary security and defence. Structured into four distinct parts, this
issue brings together leading voices from military, academic, and policy spheres
to address the multifaceted opportunities and challenges that space presents.

Part I, “Space and Airpower Capabilities,” explores the integration of space

into modern air forces and defence. Professor and Brigadier General HAF (Ret.)
Alexandros Kolovos’ inquiry into the survival of air forces without space sets the
stage. This is complemented by Colonel HAF (Ret.) Konstantinos Pilaftsis’ discus-
sion on the growing necessity of space-based intelligence, surveillance, and re-
connaissance (ISR). Additionally, Georgios K. Kotlidas and Fotios Kotzakioulafis
examine national and international challenges and opportunities in space law
and security.

Part II, “The Space Superpower and Other National Space Powers,” shifts
focus to the strategies of key players in the global space race. Contributions in-
clude Professor Peter L. Hays’ analysis of the United States’ reconnaissance-strike
complex. Professor Kostas Grivas, along with Anastasios Seferiadis, covers Rus-
sia’s ambitions. Space experts like Dr. Dimitrios Stroikos examine the rise of China
and India as space powers, while Dr. Deganit Paikowsky outlines Israel’s approach
to space security. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Panagiotis Katsaounis (ΗAGS)
presents the space program of Türkiye. Collectively, these contributions offer a
broad view of national priorities in this arena.
 April 2025
ISSUE INTRODUCTION

Part III, “European Space Security,” highlights Europe’s collective response

to global space trends. Patrick Chatard Moulin from the European External Action
Service and Dr. Christina Giannopapa detail the European Union’s space strategy
and the evolving role of the EU Agency for the Space Programme, respectively.
The EU Satellite Centre’s Director, Admiral Louis Tillier, explains the geospatial in-
telligence capabilities of the EU SatCen, while Dr. Nikolaos Tantouris and col-
leagues from ENISA address cybersecurity risks in space. Additionally,
contributions from Dr. Pascal Legai, Senior Security Adviser to the European
Space Agency Director General and Major General FASF (Ret), and Professor Kai-
Uwe Schrogl, Special Adviser for Political Affairs at the ESA, further explore Eu-
rope’s strategic priorities and public engagement with space.

Finally, Part IV, “Greece and Space Security,” showcases contributions from
Greece to this domain. Lieutenant Colonel (HAF) Fotios Giantsis discusses a pos-
sible option for next-generation military satellite communications, while Dr. Haris
Kontoes details the National Observatory of Athens BEYOND Centre’s role in se-
curing autonomy in Earth and space observation. Professors Vaios Lappas and
Antonios Paschalis present the forthcoming ERMIS nanosatellite constellation’s
defence applications, and Second Lieutenant (HAF) Georgios-Marios Margos con-
siders the potential for a Hellenic Air Force pilot to become an astronaut.

Together, these articles hope to offer a comprehensive perspective on space

security, connecting global developments with strategic interests relevant to
Greece. This issue aims to enrich the global dialogue on space security by pre-
senting diverse insights, encouraging collaboration and innovation among air
forces, policymakers, and scholars from leading spacefaring nations.

Alexandros K. Kolovos,
Professor, Hellenic Air Force Academy,
Brig. General, Hellenic Air Force (Ret)
Table of Contents
SPACE & AIRPOWER CAPABILITIES 8 - 53

Can Air Forces Survive Without Space?

8
Prof. Alexandros Kolovos, Brig. General HAF (ret)

Space-Based ISR: A Modern Imperative in Defence

26
Konstantinos Pilaftsis, Colonel HAF (ret)

Space Law and Space Security: National and International

Challenges and Opportunities 38
Georgios K. Kotlidas, Fotios Kotzakioulafis

THE SPACE SUPERPOWER & OTHER NATIONAL SPACE POWERS 54 - 127

The Evolving United States Space – Enabled Reconnais-

sance – Strike Complex: Theory, Practice and Challenges 54
Prof. Peter L. Hays, USAF (ret)

The Russian Space Program Post 1991

70
Prof. Konstantinos Grivas - Hellenic Military Academy, Anastasios Seferiadis

China and India as Space Powers: Geopolitics, Domestic

Interests, and Prestige 88
Dr. Dimitrios Stroikos, LSE

Israel's Approach Towards Space Security & Sustainability

104
Dr. Deganit Paikowsky

The Space Program of Τurkiye

114
Lt. Colοnel Panagiotis Katsaοunis

EUROPEAN SPACE SECURITY 128 - 201

The EU Space Strategy for Security & Defence

Patrick Chatard Moulin, Senior advisor Space Security & Defence, 128
European External Action Service

An Evolving Engagement of the EU Agency for the Space

Programme in Space Security 134
Dr. Christina Giannopapa, European Union Agency for the Space Programme
 April 2025

The European Satellite Centre: Geospatial Intelligence at

the Services of the EU and its Member States 156
Rear Admiral Louis Tillier, SatCen Director

NIS 2 in Orbit: Cyber Challenges and Risk Management

in Space 168
Dimitrios Papamartzivanos, Evangelos Rekleitis, Nikolaos Tantouris (ENISA)

ESA’s Potential Contribution to the EU Space Strategy

for Security & Defence (EU SSSD), From Ambition to
184
Implementation
Pascal Legai, Senior Security Adviser to ESA DG

The Popularisation of Space. A European Perspective

Prof. Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Special Adviser for Political Affairs of the European 194
Space Agency (ESA)

GREECE & SPACE SECURITY 202 - 261

Advancing National Security: Greece’s Strategic Plan for

Next-Gen MILSATCOM Systems 202
Lt. Colonel (Pilot) Giantsis Fotios

BEYOND Centre - National Observatory of Athens: Securing

National and European Autonomy in Earth and Space 216
Kontoes Charalampos (Haris) et. al.

The ERMIS Nanosatellite Constellation: Defence and

Security Applications 236
Prof. Vaios Lappas, Prof. Antonios Paschalis – University of Athens

Can a Hellenic Air Force Pilot Become an Astronaut?

252
2nd Lieutenant (Pilot) Georgios-Marios Margos
 Can Air Forces Survive
Without Space?

Professor Alexandros Kolovos ,

Hellenic Air Force Academy, Brigadier General HAF ( ret) 1

Citation: Dr. Alexandros Kolovos, Professor Hellenic Air Force Academy, Brig. General
HAF (ret.). (2025). Can Air Forces Survive Without Space? Hellenic Air Force Review,
134 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15170068
 Hellenic Air Force Review 9

“We are now transitioning from an rector of the National Reconnaissance

air force into an air and space force on Office (NRO), as the next Secretary of
an evolutionary path to a space and air
force (Department of the U.S. Air Force, the Air Force, underscores the strategic
1997)”2 importance of integrating space and air
capabilities within the United States Air
Abstract Force (USAF). The NRO, part of the U.S.
Intelligence Community and Depart-
This article emphasizes the strate- ment of Defence, manages reconnais-
gic importance of integrating space ca- sance satellites. Dr. Meink’s experience
pabilities within air forces for national with space-based collections is pivotal
security. It reviews historical context for this integration.
and current trends among global play- The nomination of Matthew
ers like the U.S., China, Russia, and Eu- Lohmeier, a former Space Force lieu-
rope. The Hellenic Air Force pioneered tenant colonel, as Under Secretary of
this integration by creating a space cen- the Air Force, further highlights the crit-
ter in 1977 and incorporating space ical role of space in modern military op-
into its ISR capabilities over 30 years. erations and the need for cohesive
The analysis advocates for HAF to re- space and air strategies within the Air
gain authority over ISR space-based as- Force.
sets, aligning with airpower theory and The integration of space with air
European trends. This approach en- gained prominence after the First Gulf
hances the precision and effectiveness War (1991), often called ‘the first space
of air and space operations, maintain- war,’ which showcased the utility of
ing a competitive edge in modern mili- space-based technologies like GPS for
tary challenges. navigation and precision targeting. This
success highlighted the strategic impor-
Keywords tance of space in warfare and spurred
discussions on incorporating space ca-
Air Power; Space Power, Hellenic Air pabilities into air forces.
Force; Space Integration; ISR Capabili- In 1995, an article in Joint Force
ties; National Security; Strategic Evolu- Quarterly argued that the Air Force
tion needed to evolve into a space force to
remain relevant. 3 This foresight was re-
Prologue alised when President Trump signed the
National Defense Authorization Act on
President Donald Trump’s selection 20 December 2019, creating the U.S.
of Dr. Troy Meink, Principal Deputy Di- Space Force as the sixth branch of the
10 Hellenic Air Force Review

U.S. Armed Forces, tasked with ensur- The U.S. Air and Space Nexus
ing American space superiority. This
new branch was tasked with ensuring The USAF was established on 18
American space superiority through the September 1947 with the National Se-
organisation, training, and equipping of curity Act. It covered all U.S. photorecon-
space personnel.4 naissance needs until a U-2 crash in
The revival of U.S. Space Command 1960 ended overflights over the USSR.7
in August 2019, after a 17-year hiatus, The first space image from Discoverer-
reflects a parallel commitment. SPACE- 14 on 19 August 1960 began the era of
COM’s global space operations inte- space imagery intelligence, convincing
grate with other combatant commands, President Eisenhower there was no
reinforcing the centrality of space in mil- “missile gap”, which meant that the
itary strategy.”5 It should be noted that USSR did not have missile superiority
the difference between the Space Com- over the USA.8 The National Reconnais-
mand, and the Space Force (USSF), is sance Office (NRO) was founded on 25
that the first is the combatant com- August 1960. Both institutions have
mand, while the latter is the military been crucial in U.S. defence and intelli-
service (Table 1).6 gence, focusing on air and space capa-
bilities.

Table 1: Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships of U.S. Air Force and Space Entities
 Hellenic Air Force Review 11

The Air Force has historically en- tioned from leading the NRO to serving
gaged with aerospace technologies like as Secretaries of the Air Force, high-
satellites and missile defence. The term lighting the integration of space and air
‘aerospace’ was introduced by General expertise (Table 2). This pattern under-
White in 1958 and widely adopted until scores the close relationship between

Table 2: Transition of NRO Directors to Secretaries of the Air Force

the 1990s.9 Initially focused on air su- the NRO and the Air Force, with NRO
periority and reconnaissance, the Air leadership experience being valuable
Force’s role expanded as space be- for the strategic oversight required as
came a vital domain, requiring dedi- Secretary of the Air Force.
cated resources and strategic planning. In 1990, USAF Chief of Staff Gen-
The USAF’s extension to space op- eral McPeak renamed ‘aerospace’ to
erations made it well-suited to manage ‘air and space’ to reflect the distinct cul-
and develop space capabilities. Many tures and principles of these domains.
space-based assets, such as satellites This transition was driven by several
for ISR, communication, and navigation, factors, including the increasing re-
are integrated with air operations. The liance on space-based assets for com-
Air Force’s control of airspace and aerial munication, navigation, and ISR,
missions logically extends to managing making space crucial for national secu-
space assets. ‘Outer space’ is contigu- rity. 11 The threat of space-based con-
ous to ‘air space,’ with the lower limit of flicts and the need to protect space
‘outer space’ being the upper limit of assets highlighted the importance of
‘air space.’ 10 space security. Integrating space capa-
Several individuals have transi- bilities into military operations required
12 Hellenic Air Force Review

specialised knowledge and skills, mak- and Russia, have also recognized the
ing education in space security and de- importance of integrating space capa-
fence vital. The global trend towards bilities into their military operations.
space militarisation also underscored However, while the U.S. has established
the need for international cooperation. a separate Space Force, and a Space
However, in 1997, General Ryan rein- Command, China and Russia have
stated the term ‘aerospace’. In 2002, taken different approaches.
the USAF replaced ‘aerospace’ with ‘air In 2015, the Chinese People’s Lib-
and space power’ to acknowledge the eration Army (PLA) established the
distinct culture and principles of space Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) to
(Table 3). oversee space, cyber, and electronic

Table 3. Evolution of Air Force Terminology over Time 12

Responses from Major warfare efforts. This was part of

Competitors and European Allies broader reforms aimed at centralizing
control over these crucial domains
This strategic shift is not unique to within the PLA. However, President Xi
the United States. Other countries have Jinping’s vision for China to become a
also recognized the importance of this great space power by the early 2020s
integration. has driven aggressive investments and
policies in space technology, aligning
Major Competitors military and civilian efforts to ensure
space superiority.13 On April 19, 2024,
Other major players, such as China the PLASSF was dissolved, and its func-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 13

tions were redistributed across the European Allies

PLA’s other branches. Concurrently, the
PLA established the Aerospace Force, In Europe, the trend is also gaining
consolidating all space-based systems momentum. France and Spain have re-
and assets under a unified command. named their air forces to include the
This restructuring is seen as a move to space domain. The French Air Force
integrate China’s space capabilities was renamed Armée de l’Air et de l’E-
more closely with its overall military space (Air and Space Force) on Septem-
goals. 14 The establishment of the Aero- ber 10, 2020. The French Space
space Force enhances China’s ability to Command (Commandement de l’E-
synchronize space operations with air space, CDE) was created on 3 Septem-
and missile defence strategies, with an ber 2019 to enhance the operational
eye on regional and global military influ- effectiveness and governance of space
ence. within the French Ministry of Armed
Similarly, Russia on August 1, 2015, Forces. It is a French Air and Space
has established the Russian Aerospace Force command but also a joint forces
Forces (VKS), which combines the Air organization, including members from
Force, Air Defence Forces, and Space the Air and Space Force, Army, Navy, De-
Forces. This structure enables Russia to fence Procurement Agency, and joint
coordinate its air and space operations forces logistics department. Function-
more effectively, ensuring a unified ap- ally, the CDE is under the French Chief
proach to national defence. of Defence Staff for military operations
and space policy, while organically it is

Table 4: Comparison of Aerospace Forces in China and Russia

14 Hellenic Air Force Review

under the Chief of Staff of the French in national defence.16

Air and Space Force. ● The German Air Force (Luftwaffe)
The Spanish Air Force was renamed oversees the German Space
Ejército del Aire y del Espacio (Air and Command (Weltraumkomman-
Space Force) on June 27, 2022. It in- do), which was established on
cludes a Space Command consisting of July 13, 2021. It consists of per-
personnel from the air force. Spain’s in- sonnel from the Luftwaffe and fo-
vestments in space are focused on de- cuses on protecting Germany’s
veloping its space capabilities and space assets and enhancing its
ensuring the security of its space as- space situational awareness. Ger-
sets.15i Both countries renamed also many’s investments in space are
their Military Academies too. aimed at strengthening its de-

Table 5: Renamed European Air Forces to include Space in their names

Other countries preferred to estab- fense and technological capabili-

lish only a space command, most under ties.17
the auspices of their Air Force. These ● The Italian Defence General Staff,
changes reflect the growing recognition oversees the Italian Space Oper-
of space as a critical domain for military ations Command (Comando delle
operations and the need for air forces Operazioni Spaziali), a joint com-
to incorporate space capabilities into mand that includes personnel
their strategic frameworks. from all branches of the military.
● The United Kingdom Royal Air It was established on June 30,
Force oversees the U.K. Space 2020, to coordinate Italy’s mili-
Command, which is a joint com- tary space activities and enhance
mand established on April 1, its space defence capabilities.18
2021. It includes personnel from
the Royal Navy, British Army, Lessons Learned from the
Royal Air Force, and the Civil Serv- Organisational Structure Followed
ice. The U.K. has made significant
investments in space capabilities, Countries discussed above have
reflecting its strategic importance structured their military organizations to
 Hellenic Air Force Review 15

Table 6: European Countries with Space Commands

align with their strategic interests. Na- sources.19 According to the Strategy,
tions with global ambitions, such as the DAF will grow its spacepower capacity
United States, have recognised the im- over the next 10 years to ensure space
portance of space for achieving security superiority and secure the Nation’s vital
and power projection. In contrast, coun- interests.
tries with more regional or national in- The USAF continues to play a vital
terests have different options, which role in national defence, but the forma-
are analysed below. tion of the Space Force reflects the
recognition that space has become too
Space as a Separate Domain: significant and intricate to remain a
The US Approach subordinate function within another
The United States, as currently the branch. This separation allows both
only space super-power, has invested branches to specialise and excel in their
heavily in both its Air Force and Space respective domains, ensuring compre-
Force, with the latter now part of the De- hensive coverage of both air and space
partment of the Air Force (DAF). While operations.20
the Air Force did not merge with the The Integrated Approach:
Space Force, the creation of the latter Aerospace Forces of China
as it is documented by the 2020 De- and Russia
fense Space Strategy, underscores the
In contrast, nations with more re-
growing complexity of space operations,
gional strategic focuses, such as the
necessitating dedicated focus and re-
great space-powers China and Russia,
16 Hellenic Air Force Review

have adapted their space and aero- Space Command Within

space structures to address national in- Existing Structures:
terests. China’s recent military The Medium - Power Approach
restructuring, particularly the creation
of the PLA Aerospace Force in 2024,
In nations with limited global ambi-
mirrors the Russian model. In 2015,
tions and regional security interests, the
Russia consolidated its Air Force, Anti-
establishment of a Space Command
Missile Defence Forces, and Space
often depends on resource constraints,
Forces under the Russian Aerospace
strategic priorities, and organisational
Forces (VKS), positioning itself for long-
efficiency. These countries typically lack
term strategic competition. This inte-
the scale or necessity to create an inde-
grated structure enables Russia to
pendent space force. Instead, they in-
coordinate air and space operations
corporate their space operations within
more effectively, strengthening its na-
existing structures, such as the, the
tional defence and broader strategic ob-
Ministry of Defence as a specific com-
jectives. China’s recent Aerospace
mand or the Air Force.
Force reflects a similar approach, align-
ing its space forces with its overarching
Space Command under the
defence strategy, which is influenced by
Ministry of Defence:
the Russian example. Both nations aim
A Joint Command Approach
to optimise their military structures by
embedding space as a core component
Some countries choose to place
of their regional power projection.
Space Commands directly under their
These developments underscore
Ministry of Defence as joint commands
the interconnectedness of air and
involving all branches. The Italian Space
space operations, where space is not
Operations Command provides a no-
simply an isolated domain but a crucial
table example. It operates under the
enabler of military objectives. Russia
Italian Defence General Staff, empha-
has integrated its space assets into the
sizing a joint approach to space opera-
VKS to support strategic needs across
tions across all branches of the Italian
Europe and Central Asia, while China’s
military. This approach reflects a
emphasis on the Indo-Pacific has driven
broader vision of space as a cross-do-
substantial investments in space sys-
main enabler rather than a specialized
tems.
domain linked solely to the air force.
Joint commands, may facilitate integra-
tion across land, sea, air, and cyber do-
mains, ensuring that space operations
 Hellenic Air Force Review 17

are aligned with the overall strategic ob- reason for situating a space command
jectives of the armed forces. within the air force is the continuity of
While this model promotes inter-ser- command structures and mission ob-
vice collaboration, it can also introduce jectives. Air forces oversee high-altitude
complexity in decision-making and co- operations, including missile defence
ordination, especially in nations with and aerial support systems, which
limited resources. The traditional hier- serve as stepping stones to space-re-
archical mindset can lead to delays in lated missions. The Air Forces is the
the dissemination of critical informa- only branch that has the ability to
tion, especially in wartime situations. A quickly deploy and redeploy assets
characteristic example is the Gulf War across long distances, which is essen-
in 1991 when the CIA employs first in- tial for maintaining situational aware-
formed their leadership in the U.S. ness of the area of interest and
about the findings and then sent the re- responding to threats. By integrating
sults to General Norman Schwarzkopf, space command within the air force, na-
who was the Allied Forces tactical com- tions can ensure a seamless transition
mander and who needed those most.21 between air and space domains, creat-
ing a unified chain of command that
Space Command within the simplifies coordination and enhances
Air Force: Leveraging operational readiness.
Existing Expertise France and Spain provide strong ex-
amples of this trend. The creation of the
Alternative, embedding the space ‘Armée de l’Air et de l’Espace’ in France
command within the air force is also a and the renaming of the Spanish Air
common choice, reflecting historical, Force to include ‘Space’ (Table 5),
operational, and technological syner- demonstrate a clear commitment to in-
gies. The air force is often selected as tegrating space operations within the
the home for a space command be- existing Air Force structure. Further-
cause of its inherent expertise in do- more, the establishment of the ‘Com-
mains that intersect with space mandement de l’Espace’ within the
operations. French Air and Space Force and the cre-
The air force’s long-standing experi- ation of the ‘Mando del Espacio’ within
ence in managing advanced technolo- the Spanish Air and Space Force (Table
gies, such as radar systems, satellite 6) further solidify this integration, lever-
communications, and aerial reconnais- aging existing expertise and infrastruc-
sance, provides a natural foundation for ture. The United Kingdom also
developing space capabilities. Another exemplifies this approach. The UK
18 Hellenic Air Force Review

Space Command is co-located with Air targets at much greater distances due
Command within the Royal Air Force, to the range and speed of aircraft, al-
while the German Space Command be- lowing for operations in geographically
longs to the German Air Force (Luft- remote areas that other branches can-
waffe), highlighting the close opera- not reach.
tional relationship and utilisation of ex- The target development process,
isting resources. which involves creating and updating a
One critical issue for all Air Forces’ list of entities of interest supported by
missions is targeting. Targeting is at the intelligence, is crucial during crises or
heart of airpower theory. According to war. During such times, targets known
Giulio Douhet (1869-1930), a pioneer- from peacetime may relocate, or new
ing air power theorist often called the mobile targets may emerge. Time, infor-
father of strategic air power due to his mation transmission networks, and an-
influential ideas on the use of aircraft in alysts’ experience are critical factors.
warfare, “the choice of enemy targets is Challenges arise when image analysts
the most delicate operation of aerial from other branches, who may not fully
warfare.” 22 understand the Air Force’s specific
All Air Forces have the capability to needs and operational context, analyse
strike targets with precision and effec- its targets. Cultural differences and
tiveness, utilizing Air Power. They can varying priorities can lead to misinter-
engage a wide range of deep targets, in- pretation, with analysts selecting and
cluding strategic centers of gravity, crit- analysing data that is not relevant or
ical infrastructure, and mobile targets, critical for air operations. This lack of
both in the air, at sea, and on the understanding can hinder the Air
ground. To achieve this, all Air Forces re- Force’s ability to make timely and in-
quire intelligence, especially for remote formed decisions. In urgent situations,
areas of interest. As Owens stated, “Air this misalignment becomes even more
power is targeting, and targeting is in- critical, as the Air Force relies on rapid
telligence.” For these deep targets, in- and accurate analysis to respond to
telligence is provided via space-based threats and execute missions effec-
ISR systems. 23 tively. Any delay or error in target selec-
Also, Air Forces can strike a signifi- tion due to cultural misunderstandings
cantly larger number of targets than all or differing operational priorities can
other branches. The targeting by the Air have serious consequences, impacting
Forces differs internationally from the mission success and personnel safety.
targeting by other branches of the
Armed Forces. The Air Force can strike
 Hellenic Air Force Review 19

Hellenic Air Force and Space ices about space science activities, pro-
cessing satellite imagery, and repre-
The unified Hellenic Air Force was senting these entities in space-related
established as an independent branch fields. By evolving into an «aerospace
of the Armed Forces with Law 5121 «On force,» HAF could leverage advanced
the Organisation of the Air Force» on 10 technologies that operate seamlessly
July 1931. In 1952, Greece became a across both air and space domains.
member of NATO, leading to the reor- The history of the HAF’s involvement
ganisation and restructuring of the Hel- with Space has been detailed in the Air
lenic Air Force in line with NATO Force Review (Issue 127).24 However,
standards, with support from the United certain topics that are relevant to the
States. Consequently, due to the close content of the present article are reiter-
relationship between the two air forces, ated or further specialised in this text.
the HAF was able to stay informed In 1995, the Council of Chiefs of
about developments in the United General Staff (SAGE) redefined the
States Air Force, including those related name and the mission of the NSRC to
to space. the National Center for Space Applica-
This is evident as the term «aero- tions (NCSA). The NCSA was tasked for
space» was included as one of the top- supporting the operational work of the
ics of interest for which «Air Force General Staffs and other national enti-
Review,» the official magazine of the Air ties in the collection and processing of
Force, accepted articles for publication. satellite images and was subordinated
Notably, from the first issue of Air Force to the A’ Branch of the Hellenic Air Force
Review (January - June 1972), the term General Staff (HAFGS).
«aerospace» was mentioned and spe- While the HAF was instrumental in
cialised in topics concerning the establishing the NCSA and proposed
achievements of the two superpowers, the Space Policy for the Ministry of De-
the development of strategy and tactics fence (1995), the Space Policy of the
of flying objects, and the future of air- Western European Union (1998), and
craft in light of space achievements. the EU Council decision ‘ESDP and
In 1977, the HAF established the Space’ (2004)25, as well as the creation
National Space Research Center of a ‘Space Office’ within the Ministry of
(NSRC). The mission of the NSRC was Defence in 2006, this progress was
to support National Defence and the halted. In 2007, the HAF experienced a
National Economy through space tech- separation from the ISR space capabil-
nology. This included informing the Air ities after proposing participation in the
Force, Armed Forces, and Public Serv- Helios II programme. Despite initial
20 Hellenic Air Force Review

challenges, the political leadership’s ac- space.26

ceptance of the proposal brought the In contrast, 2023 HAF Doctrine, in a
issue of control over Helios II to the fore- dedicated subsection on ‘Air Power and
front. Space,’ integrates space as a crucial el-
In November 2006, the Council of ement of air power, recognizing it as a
Chiefs of the General Staffs decided ini- natural extension of the air domain.27 It
tially to transfer the NCSA to the Hel- acknowledges that space exploitation
lenic National Defence General Staff. provides new capabilities, adding Space
Then, on 9 July 2007, the new Minister Power as an additional dimension to Air
of National Defence decided to abolish Power. Space offers broad geographic
the NCSA once the Helios II ISR ‘Ground coverage and long duration, enhancing
Satellite Station’ became operational. military capabilities.
The station was installed at the 114 Given that the 2023 HAF Doctrine
Combat Wing (Tanagra Air Base) and states, ‘the unique characteristics of Air
became operational in 2010. Conse- Power and Air Forces necessitate their
quently, the NCSA closed after 30 years command by a single Air Commander
of successful work. with the necessary knowledge and ex-
Currently, the Hellenic Ministry of perience,’ should the Air Force advocate
Defence has two overarching space-re- for regaining authority over ISR space-
lated entities: the ‘Space Office’ at the based assets?
General Directorate of National Defence The emphasis on ISR systems
Policy and International Relations of the arises from their distinct nature com-
Ministry of National Defence (proposed pared to other tactical decentralized
by HAF in 2006), and the 2021 ‘Space systems (such as telecommunications,
Directorate’ at the Hellenic National De- positioning, and navigation). ISR prod-
fence General Staff, which, among ucts require processing and analysis,
other responsibilities, oversees the which takes time to render them useful.
Tanagra Air Base ‘Ground Satellite Sta- The fact that the Air Force targets a
tion’. greater number of locations of interest
The abolishment of HAF’s NCSA than the other two branches combined,
might explain why the 2014 HAF Doc- due to the specific geographical config-
trine made only a single reference to uration of the operational environment,
the term «space.» It stated that air was taken into account in 1995. For
power, utilising the third dimension with this reason, the responsibility for the rel-
characteristics such as speed, flexibility, evant infrastructure was given to the Air
precision, rate, and effectiveness of its Force, as it is directly related to the ef-
weapons, operates in both air and fectiveness of its mission. It is esti-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 21

mated that the same reasons still apply operations. The continued relevance of
today.” air forces without space integration ap-
This approach aligns with Douhet’s pears increasingly tenuous. The HAF’s
emphasis on targeting and air superior- return to an ‘aerospace force’ is a natu-
ity, mitigates delays and misinterpreta- ral progression, necessitating organiza-
tions from hierarchical communication tional reforms. By addressing internal
barriers, and ensures timely dissemina- challenges, HAF can strengthen na-
tion of critical information. Centralizing tional security and maintain its opera-
command under an experienced Air tional relevance in an increasingly
Commander would align with European space-centric military landscape.
trends and enhance the precision and This aligns also with recent study of
effectiveness of air operations by opti- the U.S. Department of the Air Force, in-
mally utilising ISR capabilities. cluding both the USAF and Space Force,
for 2050.28 DAF envisions seamless in-
Epilogue tegration of air and space operations to
enhance mission effectiveness and
The integration of space and air ca- maintain strategic superiority. By lever-
pabilities is essential for national secu- aging advanced technologies like AI, au-
rity and military effectiveness. This tonomous systems, and advanced
evolution is no longer a mere aspiration propulsion, the DAF aims to ensure
but a strategic imperative, as demon- dominance in both domains. The HAF’s
strated by U.S., European, and global historical ties with the U.S. and French
trends. Currently, the organization for Air Forces position it advantageously to
space matters of the Hellenic Ministry adopt best practices and reinforce its
of Defence is not yet on par with those air power capabilities through space in-
of other countries, with Greece having tegration.
been in the same space club in the past Ultimately, embedding again space-
by entering into the Helios II pro- based ISR infrastructure under HAF’s
gramme. command stems from pragmatic con-
The HAF’s pioneering role in incor- siderations. Smaller nations must bal-
porating space into its targeting capa- ance their ambitions with their available
bilities underscores the necessity of resources, and the air force’s existing
regaining authority over ISR space- infrastructure and expertise make it a
based assets. This corroborates per- logical and cost-effective choice. While
fectly with airpower theory and alternative models offer their own ad-
European trends, enhancing the preci- vantages, the air force-centric approach
sion and effectiveness of air and space remains particularly appealing for na-
22 Hellenic Air Force Review

tions seeking to leverage their existing ization, Chapter 908 - The Space
strengths while navigating the chal- Force. 2019. U.S. Government Pub-
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from fence Systems and Operations Di-
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vision, Hellenic Air Force Academy, https://www.haf.gr/wp-content/up-

2017. loads/2023//05/ΒΑΣΙΚΟ-ΔΟΓΜΑ-
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Centre. NATO, 2020. Retrieved 0_Final_30_Dec.pdf. [Accessed:
from The Joint Air Power Compe- 01-Feb-2025].
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and Space: From the Past to the Fu-
ture. Air Force Review, (127), April
2023.
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ropean space policy: ESDP and
space, 11616/3/04 REV 3. Brus-
sels.Available at:
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/ p d f / e n / 0 4 / s t 1 1 / s t 1 1616 -
re03.en04.pdf. November 16,
2004
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the Hellenic Air Force. General
Staff of the Air Force, Branch A - Di-
rectorate A1, Section 1, January
2014. Retrieved from
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Hellenic Air Force. Basic Doctrine of
the Hellenic Air Force. General
Staff of the Air Force, Branch A - Di-
rectorate A1, Section 1, March
2023. Retrieved from
 Hellenic Air Force Review 25

Short Biography

Dr. Alexandros Kolovos, Professor of Space Technology at

the Hellenic Air Force Academy (HAFA), graduated in 1980 and
has been active in the Hellenic Air Force (HAF) for 49 contin-
uous years.
He resigned as a Brigadier General in 2008 and then be-
came a professor at HAFA, a part of HAF. He holds a Law de-
gree from the University of Athens (1987) and a PhD in
space-related international relations from Panteion University
(2002). He led the National Centre for Space Applications
(1991-2006) under HAF’s Intelligence Directorate. Apart from his operational work,
he proposed inter alia the 1995 Space Policy, the participation to Helios II and MUSIS
Earth Observation programmes, and the establishment of the Space Office (2006) for
the Ministry of Defence.
During two Hellenic Presidencies, he proposed the WEU’s Space Policy (1998) and
EU’s ESDP and Space (2002-03), both adopted by their respective Councils. He repre-
sented Greece at the EU Satellite Centre (1995-2006) and served in UN, NATO, WEU
and EU space committees. Prof. Kolovos authored 4 books, 5 monographs, 9 book
chapters, and numerous articles on space.
 Space - Based ISR:
A Modern Imperative in Defence

Colonel HAF (ret.) Konstantinos Pilaftsis

Citation: Konstantinos Pilaftsis, Colonel HAF (ret.). (2025). Space-Based ISR: A Modern
Imperative in Defence. Air Force Review, 134.
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15163553
 Hellenic Air Force Review 27

Abstract tary function of Intelligence Surveillance

& Reconnaissance (ISR), as performed
Space-based Intelligence Surveil- through space-based systems. Such
lance & Reconnaissance (ISR) plays a space systems offer, multi-potent, re-
crucial role in modern military opera- mote sensing platforms that operate
tions, providing unique capabilities that from near Earth orbits to empower the
enhance situational awareness across distinct capacity of space ISR.
strategic, operational, and tactical lev- The space domain has introduced
els. This paper explores the significance unique operational qualities into ISR
of space ISR, emphasizing its opera- that support critically the strategic, op-
tional value and technological advance- erational and, lately also, the tactical
ments. By leveraging the distinct prop- level of military activities, both in peace-
erties of the space domain, ISR systems time and warfare.
enable comprehensive monitoring and By now, space has been acknowl-
intelligence gathering, which are essen- edged as a domain of military
tial for effective decision-making in operations, next to the ones of land;
complex environments. The integration sea; air; and cyber. Foremost, space is
of advanced technologies and the col- a physical domain that presents partic-
laboration between government and ular properties and challenges but also
commercial entities further enhance enables a breadth and depth of de-
the effectiveness and efficiency of fence applications that constitute today
space ISR. As military operations in- indispensable military capabilities. As
creasingly rely on information encapsulated in the words of a former
dominance, the role of space ISR be- defence minister of France “if space
comes indispensable in addressing was the new frontier of the 1960s,
contemporary security challenges and there is no doubt that today it is a new
ensuring national defense. front on the battlefield.»1 . If this stands,
armed forces should not have any high
Keywords expectations of winning the next war if
they are not capable to be present and
Space ISR, situational awareness, re- active on this front.
mote sensing, OODA loop, geospatial In this context, Space ISR deserves
intelligence, information dominance the special attention of the defence
community and will be presented here
Introduction by understanding its staging domain;
core function; emphasizing its opera-
Space ISR stands here for the mili- tional value; and by examining the
28 Hellenic Air Force Review

current advancements in technology & verification in place which can see be-
applications to acknowledge its compet- yond the perceived horizon and detect
itive edge in today’s military affairs. activities, no matter how deep they are
in the strategic hinterland.3 Capacity in
Space-based Intelligence space ISR directly correlates with the
Surveillance & Reconnaissance level of understanding of the geopoliti-
cal landscape and ultimately promotes
Although the purpose, objectives and national security and upholds the pros-
functions of space-based ISR remain perity of a country.
mostly the same, with its conventional ISR is a key enabler for freedom of
application -as historically proven- in the action and autonomous decision-mak-
land; maritime; and air domains, there ing while space is a new operational
are also unique advantages and spe- domain for military activities. Together
cific limitations while operating from they form an effective framework for
space. The space ISR framework inher- comprehensive defence & security at
its the native properties that come with national and collective level.
the particular physics of the near-earth With space being inherently of global
orbital environment; is bound by the reach; penetrative manner; and of dual-
maturity level of space technologies; use; space-based ISR is covering
serves the same military objectives on drastically the strategic level and re-
the ground; but is also subject to func- cently closing up on lending support to
tional performance characteristics that the tactical level. Space ISR comprises
prescribe its effectiveness at the strate- a stand-off operational capability, still
gic, operational and tactical level.2 largely out of harm’s way regarding its
Above all, space offers the highest assets and operators. Space offers ISR
ground possible for attaining a good ob- the basis for a capability of truly global
servation point. A primeval operational coverage, without geopolitical restric-
expediency in any conflict, still holding tions and geographical or regulatory
its military value in the era of network- constrains that other domains impose.
centric, full-digital, all domain warfare. In parallel, systems’ heritage, battle-
Space ISR allows military actors to see proven applications and technological
farther, better and more. It reinforces a advancements have established today
nation’s defence posture through en- an all-weather and any-light operational
hanced situational awareness. This capability. Altogether, resilient; cost-ef-
leads to increased deterrence since, fective; scalable; permanently fielded;
friends and opponents alike, under- and always watchful from the best -un-
stand that there are technical means of obstructed- vantage point one can get;
 Hellenic Air Force Review 29

Figure 1: Anatomy of Space ISR: space mission building blocks

Space is not fundamentally changing jects; actors involved; respective time-

the tradecraft but it has been proven in- lines; and monitoring of the evolution of
strumental in enabling consistent and activities;
persistent -global wide- ISR, both in ISR tries to piece together the most
reach and effect. complete picture possible. An iterative,
incremental, feedback loop process,
The scope of ISR entailing multi-view, multi-spectra,
multi-time sampling and elaborated
The purpose of ISR is to improve sit- knowledge-building all along.
uational awareness.4 A systematic and Towards the ultimate goal of deliver-
coordinated effort to obtain and main- ing gleaned intelligence to planners;
tain a current and credible perception decision-makers; & actors; alike. Served
of what is the situation at hand. This in- through continuous feeds of validated
volves recording, registration, correla- information, on areas of interest and
tion, re-presentation and sense-making over activities of adversaries. Aimed to
of a particular situation. understand the dynamics of a particu-
Conventionally and primarily, ISR is lar situation, the interplay of forces in
exercised to reveal and apprehend fea- the field, their assumed intentions, and
tures and activities of military interest wielded to evaluate the potential and
that are manifested within the land and options of all involved actors.
maritime domains. This covers the pre- Practically seeking all the answers to
vailing environmental conditions; prese- the major questions of what is happen-
nce or absence of anthropogenic ob- ing when & where; Who does what; and,
30 Hellenic Air Force Review

by deduction and inference, the how In the OODA framework the empha-
and why of actors and effects; sis is placed on the first two steps of
These are the broad objectives of ISR observation and orientation. Respecti-
and they lead a perpetual race to de- vely, reconnaissance and surveillance
tect, identify and track, anything that have a vigilant role to detect and make
comes under the scope. out the disposition and dynamics of ad-
This need for continuous updates versaries. Closing in, from the strategic
and appraisal of our environment and to the tactical level of operations, the
the activities therein has been captured OODA loop gets accelerated as sensor-
in the concept of the Observe-Orient- to-shooter timelines are compressed.
Decide-Act (OODA) loop. A widely While seeking to identify and exploit the
acknowledged and diversely applicable opponent’s half-beat, speed and timing
decision-making and dynamic adaption become complementary and relate with
framework. Conceptualized by a fighter the tempo and fluidity of activities.7
pilot, for all fighters & kinds of fights, it Likewise, ISR looks out for the open-
pivots around the survival skill of swiftly ings that might be exploited as
adapting and decisively prevailing in vulnerabilities through the choice of
contested environments and over highly when, where and with what to disrupt
dynamic situations. The ability to go the adversary’s planning and actions.
through the OODA process consistently Ultimately, ISR empowers us to act, with
and keep up with the tempo of opera- speed, at the right moment, to the exact
tions, effectively determines victory over location and for the maximum effect.
defeat.5 Essentially, the OODA loop de-
scribes the way we actually fight, The function of ISR
especially after the first bullet flies.6
With direct analogy, ISR forms the ISR encompasses a set of coordi-
first half of the Observe-Orient-Decide- nated and integrated processes that
Act (OODA) loop by providing dedicated are organized into relevant Concepts Of
reconnaissance & persistent surveil- Operations (CONOPS), according to the
lance (Observation segment) and level of command and the assets em-
producing reliable intelligence (Orient ployed. Although ISR applications
segment). Most importantly ISR drives differentiate across these levels -and
the vector of the whole OODA loop for- depending on the role and capacity of
ward, on the basis of factual land, maritime, air and space platforms-
information and through feedback, still, the operational logic is universal
which support critically both decision- and the functionality quite the same.
making and required actions. Expert personnel; dedicated assets;
 Hellenic Air Force Review 31

advanced technologies; distributed in- ● Installs confidence through informed

frastructure; and orchestrating conce- decisions and by taking knowledge-
pts; all organized into competent ISR able action
frameworks that reliably support mili- ● Contributes to an assertive defence
tary missions.8 & security posture
In this context, the function of ISR: ● Reduces the Sensor-to-Shooter time-
line
● Allows to observe a situation system-
atically (e.g. revisit time of satellites Anatomy of Space ISR
in Low Earth Orbit)
● Deploys, regularly, remote sensing At system level, space ISR is based
and data acquisition assets to gather on the operation of dedicated space
raw information (e.g. Optical and SAR missions and the exploitation of their
satellite imagery) image & data output. Space missions
● Brings back a first-look (e.g. spot/de- are the protagonists here, since they
tect a previously unknown object of field ISR satellites as orbital platforms
interest). for operational use. Like aircraft in the
● Provides continuous orientation by Air Force, ships in the Navy and battle
monitoring the situation at hand (e.g. tanks in the Army, satellites in Space
capture of enemy Order-of-Battle) Force departments attract all the glory
● Employs persistent surveillance to re- and are the stars of the show. Although
veal patterns and timelines of space ISR cannot be constructed with-
activity (e.g. over the threshold out the integrating elements of
spikes or absence of activity) communications networks; payload
● Keeps up with developments (e.g. data ground stations (PDGS); informa-
Battle-Damage Assessment) tion technology infrastructure; and
Produces credible intelligence to sup expert knowledge systems; satellite
port operational command and con- missions are the pivotal technical
trol (e.g. threat assessment analysis) means, around which the operational
● Introduces added value in operations capability is established.
by progressing from raw data to fac- The building blocks of a typical space
tual information, and from there to ISR mission (Figure 1) follow the con-
actionable intelligence ventional dichotomy of the space and
● Applies analytical processes includ- ground segment sides. The space seg-
ing Processing; Resolving; Correla- ment provides the satellite bus, as a
ting; Fusing; Extrapolating; Modeling; platform for fielding the remote sensing
Projecting; Assessing; to make sense payload(s) and includes the launch and
32 Hellenic Air Force Review

communications elements to enable its to issue, capable of handling joint task-

operations. The corresponding ground ing orders that execute a carefully
segment installs typically the mission detailed observation plan.10 The full set
control center, with the necessary com- of systemic image tasking orders, up-
munications ground network, and loaded through mission plan update
-especially for ISR missions- a dedicated cycles or ad-hoc events, practically en-
PDGS for producing the Analysis Ready able operators to task the spacecrafts
Data (ARD) from the satellite raw data where to fly and what to record.
acquisitions. In parallel, the function of Intelli-
Using a different approach, more gence formulates the Requests for
along a narrative that observes the ca- Information (RFI), on a need-to-know
dence of operations, space ISR starts basis of its actors and according to the
with the last letter of the acronym. objectives of the military and security
Reconnaissance is responsible for pro- operations. Intelligence is reactive but
viding the space assets as operational also proactive. It responds to users’
capabilities, organic within the military emerging needs with dynamic tasking
command structure. The U.S. National of the satellites. It also anticipates infor-
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) , is the mational needs beforehand and plans
norm setting example of this organiza- routine imaging campaigns to keep the
tional approach, mandated since the space assets effectively busy. On the
1960’s to develop & operate space mis- other hand, Intelligence receives the re-
sions and to conduct reconnaissance connaissance combined output, fuses
operations from space.9 this with collateral information and dis-
Under the same approach, Surveil- seminates the final surveillance results
lance installs the particular regime that through intelligence products & serv-
applies the operational imperatives to ices. By expertly registering &
the ISR framework. The dimensions of processing, analysing & deducting, and
this framework, like range, resolution, managing data & information,
depth and tempo of Surveillance is pre- Intelligence is able to generate and dis-
scribed by the very own operations’ and seminate actionable intelligence that
missions’ realities. The framework con- seamlessly support almost all military
nects military users with the operational operations & applications.
assets through direct tasking or indirect
access to the ISR satellites. Technology drivers
Surveillance entails persistent informa-
tion collection activities that require a Space ISR is by name and condition
proliferated space systems architecture a technologically challenging affair. It re-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 33

sides in the harsh environment of space systems and transform it into

space; it needs to cater for the opera- strategic value and operational applica-
tional complexity of military doctrines & tion.11
missions; and it is required to persist- Once enabled from space and organ-
ently capture the actual situation and ized on the ground, advanced
its ensuing evolution, no matter how ob- technology can further push the range,
scured or hard to reach is the object of depth, performances and effect of
interest and despite the change dynam- space ISR through innovation and deep-
ics or divergence from initial asses- tech industrial applications.
sments & plans. Contemporary technological trends
First of all technology enables ISR to shape the form and function of space
be performed from space. By making ISR beyond its conventional applica-
possible and available the necessary tions and capacities. In general, the
space and ground systems that can most influential of such technological
constitute the operational capability in developments are deemed to be the
the first place. The anatomy of a space ones that are now driving advanced ma-
ISR mission has revealed the prerequi- terials; extreme miniaturization; AI
site building blocks that correspond integration; responsive space concepts;
directly with high-tech space systems. autonomous platforms; optical commu-
In this context, space ISR is enabled nications; and quantum applications.
by technologies for space systems (i.e. More particular to the ISR operations
launchers; satellite platforms; power; technologies that lead to low SWaP-C
communications; avionics; propulsion; systems (i.e. reduced in Size, Weight
etc) and for remote sensing payloads and Power & Cost); ubiquitous comput-
(i.e. electro-optical cameras; IR, ing, where all becomes digital and
Hyperspectral, Thermal instruments; everything is connected with each
SAR imagers; laser & microwave spec- other; edge-computing and on-board
troscopy; etc). On the other side, space processing (e.g. compression, redac-
ISR is made meaningful by systems on tion, fast/first-look reporting); software
the ground that employ Information and defined functions (e.g. payload mode
Communication Technologies (ICT) (i.e. switching, processing configuration
infrastructure & equipment; data and choice, etc); and Artificial Intelligence
imagery processing & exploitation; for payload operations (e.g. image plan
geospatial knowledge information man- yield optimization), automation (e.g. tip-
agement; visualization; modeling & and-cue tasking) and analytics
simulation; security mechanisms; etc) generation (e.g. unsupervised image
to bring down to Earth the output of the data feature extraction);
34 Hellenic Air Force Review

In this setting and for the near future, progressed, along human civilization’s
technology altogether pushes ISR satel- transitional steps, from manpower to
lites to fly in constellations & firepower, onto manoeuvrer and by
multi-orbits; cover more ground & more today, definitely into information.13
often; converge & correlate with differ- Information is also central in the mil-
ently revealing spectral signatures and itary discourse about space and ISR,
signals; respond with agility & opera- already codified in operational direc-
tional purpose; and sort out data & filter tives and doctrines since the last
information at the edge; In parallel and century.14, 15 Space ISR is recognized to
by the same agents, geospatial intelli- contribute drastically in information
gence work is undergoing a fast paced dominance capability development. The
transformation trough technological in- ability to collect data anywhere & any-
novation and paradigm shifts in data & time; increase information sharing;
cognitive sciences; big data repositories enable comprehensive cross-domain in-
& cloud computing frameworks; ma- telligence; accelerate decision-making
chine learning & AI algorithms on the & operational tempo; ultimately en-
analysis side; content management & hances national and collective defence
knowledge information platforms; and & resilience postures. Because, a pic-
visualization, modelling & simulation ture is always needed to inform
environments.12 political-decision making and enact mil-
itary operations.
The competitive edge This becomes the fundamental tenet
of ISR, as distilled in the principle of
The competitive edge of space ISR “the right picture at the right time and
lies within its primary mission objective, in the right hands”.16 Although captured
the persistent gathering of data & infor- within this, appearing to be simple,
mation and the gleaning of compre- mandate the actual practice of attain-
hensive intelligence & insights. ing the right intelligence is an
Warfare follows the technological, intrinsically complex effort, that involves
political, economic and societal condi- people; organization; & knowledge; and
tions of its era. While considering that above all requires significant resources,
humanity is already in the age of infor- both in space and on the ground. Space
mation technology, warfare would need ISR can be improved, in terms of capac-
to be effective also in the same setting. ity, operational value and -most
The historical shift of the center of grav- importantly- cost, through a coordinated
ity in warfare represents this close approach of wielding, in conjunction,
association. This center of gravity has government-owned and commercial
 Hellenic Air Force Review 35

space-based systems, applications and generation of advanced ISR space sys-

data. tems.
Especially if considering that the new The technological, industrial and op-
space era is here and the agile busi- erational proximity & similarity, between
ness models it brings along. Leveraging Earth Observation and ISR military
private funds and public investments it satellite assets, allows for out-of-the-box
can uptake high-risk projects and fast- synergies and cross-fertilization at the
track systems, products and services to level of systems and applications. All
the markets. Employing advanced tech- major space applications (i.e. SatCom;
nologies to generate innovative EO; & PNT;) are dual-use by design and
applications; and fielding, any, function. Earth Observation in particu-
Capability with as-a-Service mecha- lar proves this to be true with its
nism; established market verticals that are
ISR can significantly benefit from one-to-one corresponding with major
new space actors since Earth defence & security applications in the
Observation (i.e. the civilian practice of field of ISR.
ISR) is an established market with a lot By joining forces with EO, ISR can ad-
of traction under the boost of new ditionally benefit from market
space. The commercially available EO investments, leveraging institutional &
capacity is already exploited the most private funds; and by Private-Public-
by defence & security users in ISR since Initiatives, for pilot & demonstration
they can easily access technologically missions in space that could make op-
advanced space assets; seamlessly in- erational potentially disruptive
tegrate credible services of proven capabilities and innovative services.
operational added value; and acquire, Ultimately, space is the overarching
gap-filling, all-spectra, passive & active domain and therein, ISR is one of the
remote sensing; primary operational applications.
ISR can benefit from industrial ca- Regarding the state of regional and
pacity combined with user-centric worldwide geopolitical security and the
business models. The proposition of technological maturity of space systems
everything as-a-Service holds promise and applications, military power is se-
in the era of big data and all digital verely constrained without space power
frameworks. This has established sus- attributes integrated effectively within
tainable industrial activities that the defence & security apparatus at na-
develop, field, and operate the high-end tional and collective level.
EO & ISR satellite systems of today and Space ISR is needed more than ever
provision, with credibility, the future into the future, to cater for a recognized
36 Hellenic Air Force Review

and consolidated picture that take into obe/4 NATO, “Joint Intelligence,
account perplexed & combined threats; Surveillance and Reconnais-
dense & wide theaters of operations; sance,” NATO. Accessed: Mar. 08,
and force asymmetries & hybrid war- 2025. [Online]. Available:
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remains in it core function since, record- tohq/topics_111830.htm
ing something is information, visualizing
5
D. Youvan, Navigating the OODA
it is perception and making sense out Loop: Multidisciplinary Perspecti-
of it is knowledge. Here, space makes ves and Strategies. 2024. doi:
ISR a persistent & global; penetrative & 10.13140/RG.2.2.22185.57448.
unobstructive; and multi-potent & high-
6
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capability for maintaining situational 2025. [Online]. Available:
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display/10.1093/acref/97801918
26719.001.0001/q-oro-ed4-
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Beat,” The Strategy Bridge.
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Shifting from a new frontier to a
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new front,” Defense News.
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R. A. McDonald, “Looking Closer
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and Looking Broader: Gambit and
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Hexagon — The Peak of Film-
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After Corona”.
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Total Military Insight.” Accessed:
Wikipedia. Feb. 28, 2025.
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Institute. Accessed: Mar. 09, 2025. 13

“The Evolution of War: The Fourth
[Online]. Available: Generation.” Accessed: Mar. 10,
https://www.sycamoreinstitute.org 2025. [Online]. Available: https://d-
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onstellation the Final Frontier: The Law of War,”
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ISR,” Air & Space Forces Magazine. 142, 2000.
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fenceiq.com/defence-technology/n Requirements Document (ORD).”
ews/transforming-isr-capabilities- MUSIS TAMG, 2009.
through-ai-machine-learning-and-bi
g-data

Short Biography

Konstantinos Pilaftsis, a former Hellenic Air Force Colonel

with 25 years of progressive military experience in Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations, transitioned
to a civilian career in the space domain in 2012. Holding an MA
in Diplomatic Studies from Westminster University and an MSc
in Geoinformatics from the National Technical University of
Athens, his expertise spans from analogue to digital geospatial
systems, orbital remote sensing, and defense and security space
programs.
He held senior military roles, including Head of Geospatial Intelligence Analysis
for the Hellenic Armed Forces, served as an EU Satellite Centre Expert, and completed
UN field missions in Iraq and Sudan.
As a former advisor to the Hellenic Government on Space Policy and the first
CEO of the Hellenic Space Agency, he significantly contributed to national space initia-
tives. Currently, he is the Business Development Manager for Defense & Security at
Planetek Hellas, leading the OptiSat cubesat mission, and lectures on space, geospatial
intelligence, and ISR operations.
Space Law & Space Security:
National & International
Challenges & Opportunities

Georgios K. Kotlidas, Fotios Kotzakioulafis

Citation: Georgios K. Kotlidas, & Fotios Kotzakioulafis. (2025). Space Law & Space
Security - Νational and International Challenges and Opportunities. Hellenic Air
Force Review, 134. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15169860
 Hellenic Air Force Review 39

Abstract militarization; outer space treaty; space

debris; anti-satellite weapons; esa;
With every aspect of space-related Greek space policy; liability; space ob-
technology in a climactic development jects; unoosa
phase, and with all the more actors
being either interested to or already en- Introduction
gaged in space exploration and the ex-
ploitation of capabilities the Space Space law is a complex system that
provides in various sectors of human governs activities in outer space. It con-
activity, it is high time that robust and sists of various components such as in-
up-to-date legal and policy frameworks ternational treaties, conventions, United
be developed, in a national and interna- Nations General Assembly (UNGA) res-
tional level. The continuous rise of op- olutions, as well as rules and regula-
portunities that space exploration tions of international organizations
provides is driving humanity in new (Lyall & Larsen, 2020). For Greece, as
space race, this time with governmental member of the European Union, and a
and non-governmental actors, and tech- partner of the European Space Agency,
nologies hitherto unfathomable. This a lot of opportunities and challenges
situation is certain to provoke security arise as per the Space exploration and
risks in various levels, and especially utilization in general, and its Security re-
those linked with nations’ defense and lated aspects in particular.
security. This essay will attempt to en- This article will explore the funda-
capsulate the basis of existing regula- mental legal framework of Space Law
tion regarding the Space domain, and on an international level, examining sig-
furthermore approach security and mil- nificant documents such as the Outer
itary-centered issues with a combined Space Treaty of 1967 [UN, 1967]. Addi-
legal and policy approach. Finally, a tionally, the article will investigate the
short and specific focus will be given to militarization of outer space by analyz-
the Greek and European general poli- ing the intersection between space law
cies that constellate with these issues, and the evolving military activities oc-
in an attempt to highlight risks and pos- curring there [Giannopapa et al., 2015].
sibilities for a stable space policy in the The legal framework of space law
near future. consists of five international treaties
and five sets of principles that govern
Keywords outer space [UN, 2002]. The UNGA res-
olutions and the UN Committee on the
space law; space security; space Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COP-
40 Hellenic Air Force Review

UOS) documents serve as subsidiary able for damages caused by their space
means for interpreting and applying objects. All parties agree to conduct
these treaties and principles [Cheng, outer space activities in accordance
1997]. In addition, customary interna- with international law [UNOOSA].
tional law also plays a crucial role in The sum of these two provisions al-
shaping space law. lows for certain specific conclusions re-
lating to Security matters in Space.
Treaties of the United Nations Firstly, there is practical and legal room
for states to move military-scale security
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 policies they already implement into the
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of Space dimension, therefore broadening
1967 is a pivotal legal instrument that the spectrum of National Defense and
established the foundation of the National Security. Secondly, following
framework for space exploration. It stip- the first conclusion, states can viably
ulates that outer space, including the develop their military and security capa-
Moon and other celestial bodies, shall bilities in Space, with dual and singular-
be used exclusively for peaceful pur- use technologies. Furthermore, the
poses. However, the term «peaceful pur- liability (or responsibility) provisions de-
poses» has been subject to scribed above mean that all of these ca-
interpretation, as space technology can pabilities require strict and robust
serve both civilian and military func- safety frameworks, in both practical and
tions. The treaty explicitly prohibits the legal levels. Hence, it can be said that
placement of nuclear weapons or other Space Security will determine National
weapons of mass destruction in orbit, Security capabilities in a structural
on celestial bodies, or stationing them level, in the very near future.
in outer space in any other manner. No-
tably, while the OST bans weapons of The Rescue Agreement
mass destruction, it does not entirely The Agreement on the Rescue of As-
prohibit the weaponization of space, tronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and
leaving room for the deployment of con- the Return of Objects Launched into
ventional weapons. Additionally, the Outer Space, commonly known as the
treaty forbids any claims of sovereignty Rescue Agreement, was adopted in
over the Moon and other celestial bod- 1968. This treaty obligates signatories
ies, mandates that states are responsi- to take all possible measures to assist
ble for national space activities whether astronauts in distress and ensure their
conducted by governmental or non-gov- safe return to the launching state. It
ernmental entities, and holds states li- also covers the recovery and return of
 Hellenic Air Force Review 41

space objects that land outside the ter- ported to the United Nations. However,
ritory of the launching state. In the con- the Moon Agreement has limited legal
text of militarization, if astronauts (or effect due to the small number of sig-
any other military-grade personnel) natory states, as major space-faring na-
were to engage in hostilities during tions have not ratified it [UNOOSA].
wartime, they would lose the protec-
tions afforded by the Rescue Agree- The Liability Convention
ment and be considered prisoners of The Convention on International Li-
war under international humanitarian ability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
law [Space Foundation]. jects, or the Liability Convention
entered into force in September 1972,
The Registration Convention and is based on Article VII of the OST.
The Convention on Registration of As described in the UNOOSA official
Objects Launched into Outer Space, webpage, “the Liability Convention pro-
known as the Registration Convention, vides that a launching State shall be ab-
entered into force in 1976. This treaty solutely liable to pay compensation for
builds upon Article VIII of the OST and damage caused by its space objects on
establishes a mechanism for identifying the surface of the Earth or to aircraft,
space objects. It requires states to fur- and liable for damage due to its faults
nish information to the United Nations in space” [UNOOSA]. The treaty directly
about the orbit of each space object, in- allocates full liability for damages
cluding its general function, thereby en- caused by any kind of space object –
hancing transparency and whether belonging to a governmental or
accountability in space activities non-governmental entity – that hap-
[UConn]. pens on the ground of the Earth or in
the air (within the atmosphere), while
The Moon Agreement on the other hand it maintains a proof-
The Agreement Governing the Activ- of-fault liability regime for damages that
ities of States on the Moon and Other happen in space. The treaty is meant to
Celestial Bodies, or the Moon Agree- provide a legal tool for any liability claim
ment, was adopted in 1979. This treaty through a state-to-state mechanism,
stipulates that the Moon and other ce- and also making a Claims Commission
lestial bodies must be used exclusively available as a forum if direct diplomatic
for peaceful purposes, and their envi- options fail. It is also important to stress
ronments should not be disrupted. It that developments in the AI realm man-
also requires that any stations estab- ifest new challenges on the existing lia-
lished on these bodies must be re- bility regime, as the strict-liability and/or
42 Hellenic Air Force Review

fault-based liability regimes are them- tional law in space is the utilization of
selves redefined by the technological outer space for peaceful purposes. This
leaps of AI, with impeding implications principle underscores the importance
in Space as well. of non-aggression and the demilitariza-
tion of outer space, advocating for co-
Conventional International Law operative and harmonious use for the
collective benefit of all nations. It ac-
Customary international law plays a tively discourages hostile or military en-
pivotal role in shaping the legal frame- deavors beyond Earth’s atmosphere
work governing outer space activities. [Oralova, 2015]. Recognized jus cogens
The development of jus cogens norms, principles in outer space law encom-
or peremptory principles recognized as pass the exploration and use of outer
fundamental to the international com- space for the benefit of all peoples,
munity, is inherently challenging in the freedom of exploration and use, and the
context of outer space [Oralova, 2015]. prohibition of national appropriation.
Such principles often emerge from con-
sistent state practices and the jurispru- A Synopsis of Space
dence of international courts, reflecting Military Operations
global public interest and moral imper-
atives. As space technology advances and
The foundation of current outer more nations acquire capabilities in
space law is anchored in global public space, the potential for tension and
interest, as articulated in Article I of the conflict, particularly in military applica-
Outer Space Treaty (OST). This article tions, increases. Historically, space has
emphasizes that Outer Space shall be been utilized for military purposes, with
free for exploration and use by all early space-age militaries employing
states, reinforcing principles such as space technologies for intelligence, sur-
the non-appropriation of Outer Space, veillance, and reconnaissance. Today,
sovereign equality, freedom of use, and space has evolved into a distinct strate-
the prohibition of nuclear weapons and gic domain, rendering military assets
weapons of mass destruction in outer vulnerable to various forms of targeting.
space [UNOOSA]. These principles are This evolving landscape has led some
often regarded as having customary in- to argue that conflict in space is in-
ternational law status due to their wide- evitable, prompting nations to seek pro-
spread acceptance and consistent tection for their space assets and
application. posing threats to those of their adver-
A core tenet of customary interna- saries. This intensified competition risks
 Hellenic Air Force Review 43

escalating tensions and conflicts in Recent developments further high-

space, underscoring the urgent need for light the evolving nature of military op-
updated legal regulations to address erations in space. For instance, the U.S.
emerging challenges and actors. Space Force has observed China con-
Despite significant advancements in ducting satellite maneuvers that mimic
space technology, the regulatory frame- aerial combat, resembling dogfighting
work governing space activities has not tactics in space. These activities involve
kept pace. Since the adoption of the synchronized movements of multiple
Moon Agreement in 1979, there has objects in geostationary orbit, indicating
been a noticeable absence of specific offensive drills and challenging existing
treaties addressing the military aspects international norms [Turner, 2025].
of space endeavors or regulating poten- Such actions underscore the pressing
tial inter-country tensions in the event need for an updated and comprehen-
of a conflict. Consequently, while outer sive legal framework to effectively ad-
space lacks national sovereignty and dress the militarization of space and
falls beyond national jurisdiction, it ensure its peaceful use for the benefit
should not be perceived as a lawless of all humankind.
frontier. The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of
1967 remains a cornerstone of space Space Security & Military issues
law; however, its applicability to contem-
porary military, civilian, and commercial The militarization of space has
space activities is constrained, given its raised significant concerns regarding
origins during the Cold War era with a the absence of clear laws and regula-
focus on state-centric space endeavors. tions governing military activities in
Article IV of the OST prohibits the place- outer space. This ambiguity has led to
ment of nuclear weapons or any other inconsistent and overlapping policies,
kinds of weapons of mass destruction creating operational and legal chal-
in orbit, on celestial bodies, or station- lenges due to the intertwining of military
ing them in outer space in any other and civilian interests. As space technol-
manner [UNOOSA]. It also mandates ogy advances and national security con-
that the Moon and other celestial bod- siderations intensify, the issues of
ies shall be used exclusively for peace- space weaponization and the potential
ful purposes, forbidding the for armed conflict in outer space have
establishment of military bases, instal- become increasingly pressing [Joyce,
lations, fortifications, the testing of any 2024]. It is crucial to distinguish be-
type of weapons, and the conduct of tween space militarization — the use of
military maneuvers on celestial bodies. space resources to support and en-
44 Hellenic Air Force Review

hance military capabilities — and space could have on the rule of law. The use
weaponization, which involves the de- of ground-based or space-based
velopment and deployment of weapons weapons in outer space is considered a
intended to target objects in outer «use of force» under international law.
space. The United Nations (UN) Charter, estab-
The lack of clear definitions for spe- lished before the space age, serves as
cific terms and scenarios in space law a fundamental component of the global
poses significant challenges. While prin- legal framework and is applicable to all
ciples governing the use of force and realms of international law, including
the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) apply space law. Various international instru-
to space activities, their application to ments have been adapted over time to
military acts in space is not always clear accommodate evolving contexts and
due to the distinct nature of the space technological advancements, justifying
environment. For example, assessing the incorporation of the UN Charter into
proportionality in the vastness of space matters concerning outer space [UNI-
and addressing potential collateral DIR, 2024].
damage, such as debris impacting The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of
other satellites, present unique difficul- 1967, a cornerstone of space law, does
ties [Berrang, 2023]. not explicitly regulate the application of
Establishing a comprehensive and the right to self-defense in outer space.
well-defined legal framework for space However, Article 51 of the UN Charter
law is crucial to resolving conflicts and recognizes the inherent right of individ-
preventing the use of force in outer ual or collective self-defense if an
space. This framework should adhere to armed attack occurs against a member
international law, extending the reach of state. This right is not confined to ter-
established legal principles into outer restrial domains and extends to outer
space. Integrating the modern laws of space, allowing states to defend their
armed conflict with space law can pro- space assets. The exercise of self-de-
mote the peaceful and responsible use fense in outer space must comply with
of outer space while mitigating the risks the principles of necessity and propor-
associated with potential conflicts in tionality, ensuring that any defensive
this increasingly contested domain measures are appropriate and not ex-
[Rozpedowski, 2024]. cessive in response to the threat posed.
Meanwhile, research into the legal The lack of explicit prohibitions in both
issues surrounding armed conflicts in general international law and space law
outer space is crucial due to the pro- regarding self-defense in outer space
found potential impact such conflicts implies that spacefaring nations retain
 Hellenic Air Force Review 45

this right. Denying the right to self-de- based on the result of any possi-
fense in outer space could place these ble use, and not on precaution
nations at a disadvantage in safeguard- (e.g. prohibition of development).
ing national security and pursuing their The PRC’s 2007 ASAT weapons
interests in the space domain. There- testing, for example, proved that
fore, it is widely accepted that interna- existing regulation is far from ca-
tional legal norms do not prohibit pable of actively regulating the
asserting the right to self-defense in sector, and also created a chain of
outer space [UNOOSA]. issues linked directly with environ-
Given all of the above, severe con- mental sustainability and – the
temporary challenges involving military below mentioned – space debris
issues can be traced in three sectors [Schellekens, 2008] It is also im-
where cutting-edge technology is about portant to stress that any action
to meet possible space militarization: a) against the earth-based compo-
regulation and use of anti-satellite nents of ASAT weapon systems
(ASAT) weapons, b) space debris issues, cannot be directly linked with
and c) autonomous (AI-powered) space Space Law provisions, and it is
objects: more likely to befall within the
- The ASAT weapons are weapons scope of the UN Charter’s self-de-
or weapon systems specifically fense provisions.
designed to target and destroy - Space Debris issues are also be-
satellites, with the use of kinetic coming an increasingly important
energy, high-intensity lasers domain of legal and practical dis-
and/or nuclear technology, and course, related to the rapid multi-
can be launched from ground, plication of human-made objects
sea, air and space. While the OST set in orbit in the recent decades,
may prohibit the use of nuclear as well as the possibility of acci-
and mass-destruction weapons in- dents or active conflict happening
orbit, conventional ASAT weapons in space, that would create large
cannot be put directly under its amounts of uncontrollable debris.
strict restriction. Even the peace- The OST in general seems rather
ful purposes relative provisions outdated to face such challenges.
cannot override the UN Charter’s On the other hand, Article IX of the
Article 51 provision on a nation’s OST specifically, may provide its
right to self-defense, hence ren- “due regard” obligation2 and the
dering any discussion about con- “no harm” principle3 in combina-
ventional ASAT weapons one tion, as a tool to allocate account-
46 Hellenic Air Force Review

ability appropriately in states, and An example of forming

entities functioning under these innovative legal structures
states’ authority. However, it
should be noted that the current In the realm of space exploration,
framework is in definite need of significant strides are being made to es-
remodeling, in order to respond to tablish regulations governing military
these contemporary challenges operations in outer space. A pivotal de-
[Radi, 2023]. velopment in this area is the Woomera
- The rapid development of Artificial Manual on the International Law of Mil-
Intelligence (AI) in every sector of itary Space Operations. Although it
the world’s economies is also evi- does not represent a strict and robust
dent in the Space sector. AI-pow- legal framework and its applicability is
ered space objects operate restricted to those willing to apply it, this
independently, enhancing capabil- comprehensive guide articulates legal
ities in any kind of task, including principles applicable to military activi-
military applications. Hence, the ties in space, addressing critical issues
whole legal framework concerned such as the definition of outer space
with the Space domain applies – and the criteria for peaceful purposes
or better, needs to apply – in au- [Beard & Stephens, 2024]. Its primary
tonomous space objects, and aim is to provide clear and comprehen-
specifically military and security- sive guidance for decision-makers in-
focused assets. Furthermore, AI- volved in space activities, promoting
powered space objects have a peace and security in outer space.
direct legal linkage with liability is- The Woomera Manual is structured
sues that have yet to be deter- to mirror national military manuals, en-
mined internationally, such as hancing its utility as a reference for mil-
determination of the “fault” in AI itary operators and decision-makers.
systems or “gross negligence”, However, its role has sparked ongoing
and so produce troubles in apply- debates regarding its impact on space
ing strict legal rules. warfare. Some scholars and practition-
These three contemporary legal and ers question whether the manual
policy issues are indicative of the gaps serves to constrain or inadvertently le-
that the age and simplicity of the al- gitimize warfare in space. These discus-
ready existing Space Law frameworks, sions are crucial, as they influence how
and further stress out the need for new the manual is perceived and applied
and innovative approaches. within the broader context of interna-
tional law and military strategy. In sum-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 47

mary, the Woomera Manual represents and Strategic Action Plan. It is, as such,
a significant effort to codify existing in- proposed – among other actions – that
ternational law as it pertains to military the Greek administration should have a
operations in space. While it provides cohesive management plan for all
valuable clarity and guidance, its influ- Greek space activity (private and pub-
ence on the conduct of space warfare lic), so as to safeguard national inter-
continues to be a subject of active dis- ests and achieve a sustainable and
cussion and analysis. secure environment for the nation’s in-
volvement in the sector. Furthermore,
Challenges and Opportunities developing and enhancing European
entangled with Space Security Space Agency (ESA) involvement is also
for Greece (and the EU) deemed essential.
Greece has recently moved on to a
Greece more aspiring approach on space activ-
Given all of the above, as well as re- ity, with its involvement with the Na-
cent developments in technology, a tional SmallSat Program (backed by the
multiplicity of challenges and opportu- ESA, PlanetScope and the Greece 2.0
nities arise for all actors aiming to par- Recovery and Resilience Fund), with
ticipate in this new age of Space strong applications in sectors such as
Exploration. Greece, both for itself as a natural disaster prevention, e.g. with
state and as a member-state of the Eu- the acquirement of several Earth obser-
ropean Union, may prove to be increas- vation microsatellites by 2026, and
ingly involved with space activities. management and (possibly) military-
Such activities will put National De- wise situational awareness in the
fense and Security at the forefront of Balkan Peninsula and Eastern Mediter-
Greek interest, as is also suggested by ranean [National SmallSat Program,
the relevant proposition made by the 2023]. Also, another recent and more
Hellenic Space Center to the competent strategic Greek initiative led to Greece
governmental authorities in 2021, becoming a main hub of the GOVSAT-
which, though, was just a first attempt COM and IRIS programs, which –
in a policy proposal that has yet to de- among others – aim to establishing se-
velop into a robust National Space Pol- cure satellite telecommunication for all
icy framework. In this first proposition, of Europe, and also partner with NATO
the Center referred to the sector of na- [HUFFPOST, 2025]. Such initiatives in-
tional defense and civil protection, and dicate that Greece is centered on a de-
their boosting, as the prime pillar of a veloping and upscaling role in its space
newfound Greek National Space Policy policy, keeping national security and de-
48 Hellenic Air Force Review

fense pillars at the forefront. It is visible, of the above, including Greek initiatives,
however, that all these undertakings may prove increasingly important for Eu-
are at a rather nascent level, and any rope as a whole in the coming years.
activity related especially with the more Systems such as Galileo and EGNOS
military issues stressed within this may become vital for European security,
essay is, as of yet, only in theory level. and this fact is directly linked with
In any cases, Greece has to take in Greek interests as well.
serious regard that any and all of these The two basic pillars of EU
initiatives require both a strong commit- space activity are the European Space
ment and integration with the relevant Agency (ESA) and the European Union
European frameworks and agencies, Agency for the Space Program (EUSPA).
and serious financial resources. Espe- - The ESA is an European intergov-
cially in the financial field, the strong in- ernmental organization estab-
tegration with European projects and lished in 1975, and comprised of
organizations involved with space explo- 23 member-states (incl. Norway
ration and security may amplify the and Switzerland), focusing on
country’s capabilities, by securing co- space research and technological
funding from European resources, development, and burdened with
rather than the limited national ones. Of designing and developing space
course, in any occasion, it is essential infrastructure, operational and
that there exists care for balancing inte- technical expertise. It aims to pro-
gration with the European industry with mote European strategic auton-
developing the national economy and omy in all aspects of space
relevant market. Else arises a strong exploration and providing a safe
risk of short-term policy limitation and and secure space infrastructure
sectorial stagnation, that Greece can- and technology for European part-
not afford if it chooses – as one can say ners [ESA, 2025].
it should – to actually invest in this do- - The EUSPA is an agency of the EU,
main that can play a pivotal and multi- established in 2021, and tasked
faceted role in national security and with operational management of
defense. the EU’s space program. Its activ-
ity is regulated by the 2021/696
European Union Regulation of the EU, and it in-
As per the EU as a whole, although volves the operation of programs
it has, as of yet, maintained a more such as Galileo, GOVSATCOM and
economy-orientated approach for its EGNOS, with a specified oversight.
general space activity development, all It is important to refer to the Fi-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 49

nancial Framework Partnership policies. All competent authorities

Agreement (between ESA, EUSPA should therefore make sure to develop
and the European Commission) of a thorough understanding of all the
2021, specifically allocates re- abovementioned frameworks and chal-
sponsibilities and authorities be- lenges, and also pioneer in multiplying
tween the three related bodies, national and European engagement in
and creates the necessary frame- all relevant discussions and activities
work for their financial and opera- internationally. No serious future secu-
tional functionality [EUSPA, rity planning and undertaking can be
2025]. carried out without guaranteeing a ro-
The EU, in the contemporary fluid bust Space Security approach.
geostrategic environment, is definite to
be required to enhance its military and Conclusion
security capabilities in Space. In such
regard, its large resources may help for In conclusion, for a robust modern
a quick – and necessary – leap in infra- policy framework, coupled with its legal
structure and technology development. twin, to exist functionally, either for a
Along with that, EU member-states’ country such as Greece or for any kind
strong engagement in all relevant inter- of national, private and international en-
national organizational may prove a tity, and with a special focus on sustain-
vital tool in shaping the frameworks able security, it is essential to
with due regard to European interests, re-evaluate international law concerning
especially in fields such as autonomous space activities, focusing on the right to
space objects and space debris. In self-defense in space. The outdated
more strictly security matters, a con- United Nations space treaties are in-
junction with the rest of the NATO part- hibiting progress in the face of a rapidly
ners, particularly the USA, is also expanding internationalized space
essential to achieving sustainable and economy. Urgent action is needed to
viable solutions that safeguard both its create clear rules protecting national
people’s interests and liberties, and at security, and security-related interests,
the same time guaranteeing their pro- while encouraging international collab-
tection from military nature threats. oration. As we navigate the complexities
In general, it can be concluded of space law, it is crucial to collaborate
that dual-use technologies, with their re- and form policies that ensure the safety
search and development, will probably and success of future space activities.
play an increasingly important role in The international society must work to-
shaping Greece’s and the EU’s space gether to create a framework that bal-
50 Hellenic Air Force Review

ances the interests of spacefaring - Giannopapa, C., Moura, D., Robin-

states, while fostering the responsible son, J., Hays, P., & Schrogl K.
use of outer space for the benefit of all, (2015). Handbook of Space Secu-
with Greece and the EU having to under- rity. Springer.
stand the importance and the required
rapidity that all this work requires, and - Greek National SmallSat Program
also making sure to secure a leading (2025). Hellenic Republic – Min-
and active role in such. istry of Digital Governance.

- HUFFPOST, Mavraganis, K.
References (2025). GOVSATCOM: What is the
European program stationed
- Beard, J. & Stephens, D. (2024). (and) in Greece. Found at:
The Woomera Manual on the In- https://www.huffingtonpost.gr/en
ternational Law of Military Space tr y/govsatcom-ti-einai-to-
Operations. Oxford University eeropaiko-proyramma-poe-tha-
Press. edreeei-kai-sten-ellada_gr_67892
ef5e4b0d7aa500678c9 .
- Berrang, S. (2023). How would
IHL apply to hostilities in outer - Joyce, J. (2024). The militarization
space?. International Committee of space: navigating the legal void.
of the Red Cross. Taylor Wessing.

- Cheng, B. (1997). Studies in inter- - Lyall, F., & Larsen, P. B. (2020).

national space law. Clarendon Space law: A treatise. University of
Press. Adelaide.

- ESA – The European Space - Oralova, Y. (2015). Jus Cogens

Agency (2025). Found at: Norms in International Space Law.
https://www.esa.int/ESA_Multi- Mediterranean Journal of Social
media/Videos/2019/11/This_is_ Sciences.
ESA .
- Radi, Y. (2023). Clearing up the
- EUSPA – About EUSPA (2025). Space Junk: On the Flaws and Po-
Found at: https://www.euspa.eu- tential of International Space Law
ropa.eu/about/about-euspa . to Tackle the Space Debris Prob-
lem. ESIL Reflections, found at:
 Hellenic Air Force Review 51

https://esil-sedi.eu/wp- tions Office for Outer Space Af-

content/uploads/2023/03/Yan- fairs.
nick-Radi.pdf .
- United Nations Institute for Disar-
- Rozpedowski, J. (2024). Beyond mament Research. (2024). Outer
Borders: Applying Modern Conflict Space and the Use of Force.
Laws as Framework for Outer
Space Governance. Geopolitical - United Nations Office for Outer
Monitor. Space Affairs. (n.d.). Agreement
Governing the Activities of States
- Schellenkens, J. (2008). The Le- on the Moon and Other Celestial
gality of Antisatellite ASAT Bodies.
Weapons. University of Malta.
- United Nations Office for Outer
- Space Foundation Editorial Team. Space Affairs. (n.d.). Agreement
(n.d.). International Space Law. on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Space Foundation. Thomas J. Return of Astronauts and the Re-
Meskill Law Library. (n.d.). Outer turn of Objects Launched into
Space Law. UConn. Outer Space.

- Turner, M. (2025). China practis- - United Nations Office for Outer

ing ‘dogfights in space’ with satel- Space Affairs. (n.d.). Space Law
lites and top secret objects, US Treaties and Principles.
chief warns. The Sun.
- United Nations Office for Outer
- United Nations (UN). (1967). Space Affairs. (n.d.). Treaty on
Treaty on Principles Governing the Principles Governing the Activities
Activities of States in the Explo- of States in the Exploration and
ration and Use of Outer Space, in- Use of Outer Space, including the
cluding the Moon and Other Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space
Treaty). United Nations Office for
Outer Space Affairs.

- United Nations (UN). (2002).

United Nations treaties and prin-
ciples on outer space. United Na-
52 Hellenic Air Force Review

*
- Georgios K. Kotlidas, Attorney-at-
Law – Board Member at “Rythmisis”
Greek National Institute for AI Law –
SGAC Space & AI Law Jr. Researcher
LL.M International Public Law, MA Syst.
Philosophy, MA (cand.) Strategic Studies,
- Fotios Kotzakioulafis, Marketing
Manager at “The Exploration Company”
- SGAC Space & AI Law Researcher,
MSc Human Resources Management,
LL.B in University of Sunderland, BA In-
ternational Business Management

1
All state parties are mandated to take
into account the interests of other
states with due regard while they
conduct their space activities.
2
All state parties carry the obligation
to conduct exploration of outer space
so as to avoid its harmful contamina-
tion and, where necessary, to adopt
appropriate measures.
 Hellenic Air Force Review 53

Short Biography
Georgios K. Kotlidas is an Attorney-at-Law focused on the fields
of Business Law and the Law of Artificial Intelligence.
He holds a LL.M on International & European Law (Aristotle Uni-
versity of Thessaloniki), with his thesis on the Law of the Sea, and
also holds a MA on Systematic Philosophy (Aristotle University of
Thessaloniki), while finishing another MA in Strategic Studies (Uni-
versity of Macedonia).
He has served for 2 years as Legal Advisor to the Regional
Vice-Governor of Grevena, Western Macedonia, Greece (2022-
2023) and is a member of the Board of Rythmisis – Greek National Institute for AI Law,
where he also leads a Research Group for AI applications in National Defense and Cy-
bersecurity. He is also a researcher of the Space Generation Advisory Council, partici-
pating in the Research Group for AI & Space Law.
He has participated in a multitude of academic programs related with AI Law
and applications, Space Law, the Law of Armed Conflict, Business Law and European
Law, while he has also participated in many MUN simulation programs focused on in-
ternational politics, Defense and Security issues.
He speaks English, German, Russian, Spanish and learning Chinese.

Short Biography

With a diverse portfolio of communication, research, and busi-

ness development roles spanning several European countries, Fo-
tios Kotzakioulafis has had the opportunity to collaborate with
renowned international organizations such as The Exploration
Company, NATO, and the European Commission.
In the space sector, he has actively contributed to organiza-
tions, including the Austrian Space Forum's legal team, the Inter-
national Institute of Space Law, and the Association for
International Legal Research on Space Sustainability. His involve-
ment extends to research initiatives, such as the Space Generation Advisory Council's
Near Earth-Objects, Space Law & Policy, and Space Safety & Sustainability Project
Groups.
Academically, he holds a BA in International Business Management and a
M.Sc. in Human Resources Management, while currently pursuing a Law degree. His
multidisciplinary educational foundation provides for a blend of business acumen, legal
expertise, and strategic insight. By integrating his experience across business, law,
and space policy, he attempts to drive impactful contributions within any forward-think-
ing organization.
 The Evolving United States
Space – Enabled
Reconnaissance –
Strike Complex: Theory,
Practice & Challenges

Professor Peter L. Hays, USAF Officer (ret.)

Citation: Professor Peter L. Hays, Former USAF Officer. (2025). The Evolving United
States Space – Enabled Reconnaissance – Strike Complex: Theory, Practice and
Challenges. Air Force Review, 134. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15163451
 Hellenic Air Force Review 55

Abstract Keywords

This article explains ways in which Anti-satellite (ASAT), John Boyd, Bril-
robust space capabilities have become liant Pebbles (BPs), Reconnaissance-
an indispensable foundation for suc- Strike Complex (RSC), Find-Fix- Track-
cess in employing modern airpower. It Target-Engage-Assess (F2T2EA) Kill
considers how military space capabili- Chain, David Lupton, Nitze Criteria, Re-
ties fit into conceptual models for mod- silience, John Warden, Low-Earth Orbit
ern warfare and uses these models to (LEO), Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO),
review evolution of the global recon- Barry Watts.
naissance-strike complex that first
emerged in 1991 during Operation Conceptual Models
Desert Storm. It discusses specific
ways space capabilities support each Many analysts today believe war-
step in the find, fix, track, target, enga- fare’s character is changing signifi-
ge, and assess “kill chain” and outlines cantly, moving away from traditional
the many space systems the United focus on annihilation or attrition of
States has deployed to modernize and fielded forces toward seeking to induce
improve these capabilities. The article strategic paralysis among enemy deci-
concludes by addressing critical cur- sion makers – approaches variously de-
rent space security challenges includ- scribed as hybrid, new generation, or
ing growth in orbital debris, increasing simply new ways of war. These discus-
worldwide deployment of counterspace sions also include debates about
capabilities, increasing efficacy of com- whether we are currently amid a revolu-
mercial space systems and the role of tion in military affairs (RMA) that ren-
the billionaire “space barons” that con- ders existing means of warfare
trol these systems, the threat of a nu- subordinate or obsolete. Whether we
clear detonation in low-Earth orbit, and are currently witnessing a true RMA or
the prospects and implications of the simply a significant transformation,
United States developing and deploy- space capabilities clearly make some of
ing proliferated space-based intercep- the most important contributions to en-
tors capable of boost-phase intercepts abling more effective and efficient use
as called for in president Trump’s Iron of airpower.
Dome for America Executive Order. In the mid-1970s the Soviet General
Staff began to postulate that advances
in precision munitions, wide-area sen-
sors, and computerized command and
56 Hellenic Air Force Review

control would fundamentally change cepts from visual dogfighting, but

warfare and potentially make conven- scores of subsequent analysts have ap-
tional weapons as effective as nuclear plied OODA analysis to everything from
weapons. Marshall Nikoli Ogarkov, Chief business to politics; in the military con-
of the General Staff from 1977-84, text, space capabilities can provide crit-
championed these concepts and en- ical observation and orientation
couraged work to combine these capa- knowledge to apply the OODA model
bilities, labeling the concept a “recon- worldwide. John Warden conceived of
naissance-strike complex” (RSC).1 the enemy as a system consisting of
Many analysts believe the decisive air- five concentric rings focused on leader-
power victory of coalition forces in Op- ship and moving outwards toward
eration Desert Storm (ODS) heralded organic essentials, infrastructure, pop-
the emergence of a nascent but opera- ulation, and fielded forces. Warden pos-
tional RSC. ODS airpower operations in- tulated that airpower could conduct
cluded stealth, long-range precision parallel attacks against all five rings si-
strikes, parallel attack of many targets multaneously, could disrupt connec-
simultaneously, denial of enemy com- tions between the rings, and contra-
manders’ ability to communicate with dicted many traditional military theories
fielded forces, and direct attack of by making fielded forces the least im-
enemy decision makers rather than portant target set.3 Space capabilities
fielded forces. The comprehensive mili- again play a critical role under this con-
tary space capabilities the United cept as they are essential for identifying
States had deployed during the Cold specific targets within each ring and en-
War enabled the emergence of this abling assessment of the effectiveness
RSC. U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen- of airstrikes.
eral Merrill McPeak labeled the conflict Another important conceptual
the “first space war” to emphasize the model for thinking about ways space ca-
highly significant and comprehensive pabilities can support national security
contributions of space capabilities to was developed by Air Force Lieutenant
the coalition’s victory.2 Colonel David E. Lupton in his 1988
Recent American airpower theorists book, On Space Warfare.4 Lupton ar-
and their heirs have built on the deci- gued there were four schools of thought
sive victory in ODS to refine conceptual regarding broad, national-level strate-
models for effective and efficient use of gies the United States could pursue in
modern airpower. John Boyd originally using space to improve its security:
developed his energy-maneuvering and sanctuary, survivability, control, and
observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) con- high ground. The first two, sanctuary
 Hellenic Air Force Review 57

and survivability, emphasized the ways riods of time. Lupton’s final school, high
space capabilities could enhance ground, argued that space holds the po-
strategic stability and improve the effec- tential to be the decisive theater of com-
tiveness of terrestrial forces. The sanc- bat operations. Reasoning by historical
tuary school argued that the primary analogy, the high ground school por-
value of space systems was in providing tends that just as holding the high
strategic stability through capabilities ground is often the decisive factor in
including nuclear command and con- land combat or as airpower often pre-
trol, missile warning, and national tech- vails over land and sea forces, in the fu-
nical means of verification (NTM) for ture, space forces will dominate
arms control. Adherents to this school terrestrial warfare. Lupton argued that
argued that capabilities to attack satel- the control school should be the basis
lites should not be developed because for U.S. space strategy. Figure 1 sum-
this would undermine strategic stability. marizes, expands, and updates Lup-
The survivability school acknowledged ton’s schools by listing the primary
that space capabilities were improving value of military space forces, outlining
not just strategic stability but also sig- deployment strategies for space sys-
nificantly enhancing the effectiveness tems, showing primary combat mis-
of tactical military operations. It empha- sions of space forces, and suggesting
sized that space systems are inherently appropriate organizational structures
less survivable than terrestrial forces for operations and advocacy.5
and should be made more resilient
against attacks so they could continue Evolution of the RSC
providing some diminished level of sup-
port to military operations even during In practice, the U.S. RSC has evolved
and after attacks. Lupton’s other two in many ways and improved significantly
schools had greater emphasis on space since its inception. Figure 2 traces
forces and the space domain. His con- satellite communication throughput to
trol school called for space to be deployed brigades, lists primary air-de-
thought of like other domains where the livered munitions (PGMs), and provides
primary military objective is to gain con- the number and percentages of PGMs
trol over operations in this area. Mili- used in various military operations to
taries seek to preserve their freedom of describe progress in the U.S. RSC dur-
action and deny freedom of action to ing the last 35 years.6 Figure 2 captures
enemies; in a domain as vast as space some of the clearest and most tangible
it is unlikely that control can be main- contributions of space capabilities to
tained for large areas over extended pe- the RSC, but their overall contributions
58 Hellenic Air Force Review

are more subtle and comprehensive. During ODS, command and com-
Most significantly, space capabilities mand and control of air operations was
have enabled the United States to move enabled by a comprehensive air tasking
from being able to employ just a small order (ATO). The ATO attempted to coor-
percentage of PGMs to having the abil- dinate several thousand daily sorties
ity to use PGMs for every time-critical launched by coalition partners to en-
target worldwide. hance unity of effort against the highest
 Hellenic Air Force Review 59

priority target sets and to deconflict air than JDAMs.

traffic along ingress, egress, and aerial
refueling tracks. Production of the ATO Space Support of the Kill Chain
required an inflexible 72-hour cycle. The
ATO was often several hundred pages Improvements in the RSC are driven
long and contained such large files that primarily by space capabilities that pro-
it could not be electronically transmitted vide critical contributions to joint all-do-
to all coalition airfields throughout the main command and control, enable
theater of operations. These drawbacks time-sensitive targeting, and help com-
sometimes resulted in not attacking press every link in the terrestrial find,
new targets or restriking targets already fix, track, target, engage, assess
destroyed because the ATO was not flex- (F2T2EA) kill chain cycle. Finding enemy
ible enough to include newly detected forces has been a difficult task for mili-
targets or account for recent battle taries throughout history; aircraft revo-
damage assessments (BDA). Continu- lutionized reconnaissance within a
ous improvements in space and other theater of operations and intelligence,
capabilities supporting the RSC have surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
enabled far greater flexibility for air op- collection from satellites has revolution-
erations under the concept of dynamic ized it globally. Change detection en-
retasking. Instead of operating under abled by sun-synchronous low-Earth
an inflexible 72-hour cycle, newer com- orbit (LEO) imagery satellites often pro-
mand and control approaches allow vides some of the most important con-
sorties to takeoff without assigned tar- tributions to ISR and enhances
gets, proceed to a “kill box,” and attack understanding of adversary capabilities
targets that may have just emerged or as they develop over time. Today, perva-
those deemed to be the highest priority sive global imagery provided by Na-
once the aircraft arrives on station. tional Reconnaissance Office (NRO),
PGM evolution reflects another specific Department of Defense (DoD), and
example of improvements in the RSC. commercial satellites means that no
The standard PGM for the past 25 significant military activities can remain
years, the joint direct attack munition hidden, and if they can be detected,
(JDAM), normally had a 2000-pound they can be engaged. Nonetheless, it
warhead; JDAMs are being replaced can be challenging to provide ISR that
with small diameter bombs, which nor- is precise and timely enough to effec-
mally carry only a 250-pound warhead, tively support the most difficult and
yet can often be employed more effec- fleeting strike opportunities.
tively and cause less collateral damage Fixing involves identifying potential
60 Hellenic Air Force Review

targets from the finding step and geolo- available and sensitivities regarding
cating them. In the past, this was some- certain targets, commanders may use
times a difficult and time-consuming decision making tools that provide ex-
process; today the Global Positioning tremely detailed modeling of weapons
System (GPS) enables near-instanta- effects based on the desired mean
neous geolocation anywhere in the point of impact, predicted damage to
world and makes a critical contribution target, and potential collateral damage.
to the kill chain. Tracking requires main- Engagement is the use of fires
taining sensor custody of targets as against the target, another link in the
they move. Persistent space imagery kill chain cycle in which space capabili-
can make important contributions in ties provide essential contributions. The
maintaining custody of targets, but it GPS system is again critical in this part
can also be a challenge to fuse together of the kill chain, as most munitions use
data from various distributed space and this capability to guide their employ-
non-space sensor networks. Compre- ment for at least some portion of the
hensive datasets of geospatial intelli- engagement. Assessment, the final link
gence collected over decades from in the kill chain is also dependent on
space and non-space sources such as space capabilities; this link is some-
digital terrain elevation data can con- times known as BDA. Many of the same
tribute to target tracking in important capabilities used initially to find targets
ways by indicating likely travel routes for are used to assess whether the engage-
military systems and identifying terrain ment achieved the desired effects. As
obstacles and areas where they cannot engagements become increasingly pre-
operate. cise and perhaps employ non-kinetic
Targeting is a complex link in the means, it can be difficult to assess
cycle that is enabled by several space whether subtle desired effects were
capabilities. Most importantly, military achieved.
satellite communications, and perhaps
commercial satellite communications, U.S. Space Systems
are usually needed to connect the en- Contributing to the RSC
tire kill chain together and allow com-
manders to control the operation. Figure 3 provides current details
Commanders determine target priori- about the primary space systems sup-
ties and sequencing, decide what capa- porting the RSC and the orbits used by
bilities will be used for engagement, these systems.7 The figure focuses on
and direct the forces that employ these dedicated military systems, but it is im-
capabilities. Depending on the time portant to emphasize that many space
 Hellenic Air Force Review 61

systems today are dual use, meaning dashed line are currently operational,
they can support both miliary and civil planned systems that are not yet oper-
or commercial applications. Data ational are below the dashed line in
streams from space systems can sup- white, those in yellow were programs of
port hundreds of thousands or even mil- record that were subsequently can-
lions of users simultaneously and are celled. Some of the data in Figure 3 is
embedded in thousands of important not specific because many of the space
applications worldwide. The GPS is one systems the United States operates are
of the best examples of this dual-use classified, this is particularly true for the
characteristic. GPS was designed for ISR mission area systems that are op-
military use, but after the most precise erated primarily by the NRO.
data was made available without any

user fees in 2000, it has become a crit- Critical Current Space

ical infrastructure technology support- Security Challenges
ing modern digital life in applications
worldwide including global telecommu- As shown in Figure 4, the world is
nications and financial transactions; facing exponential growth in the num-
today military GPS use is just a small ber and total mass of debris objects in
fraction of all use. There is a dashed Earth orbit.8 Given this debris growth
line in the bottom part of each column and the trend lines, space operations
in Figure 3: The systems above the have already become somewhat com-
62 Hellenic Air Force Review

promised, and they will clearly become debris has been destructive anti-satel-
more dangerous, particularly for sun lite (ASAT) testing such as the Chinese
synchronous LEO operations. Without DN-1 test in 2007 and the Russian
remediation efforts, LEO may even be- Nudol’ test in 2021. In this context, an
come increasingly unusable. Fortu- important development is the April
nately, there is widespread global 2022 unilateral pledge by the United
recognition of this problem and there States that it will no longer conduct de-
are some important orbital debris miti- structive direct-ascent ASAT tests. As of
gation efforts underway such as the this writing, more than 10 other states
U.S. Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard have made similar unilateral pledges;
Practices (ODMSP) that can help to at and in December 2022, 155 states
least slow the growth of orbital debris. voted for a United Nations General As-
Reversing the current orbital debris sembly resolution calling for states not
trends, however, will require moving to conduct such tests, while China and
past mitigation guidelines such as the Russia voted against the resolution and
ODMSP toward comprehensive remedi- India abstained (these are the only
ation efforts. Unfortunately, effective re- other states that have conducted de-
mediation of orbital debris is bedeviled structive ASAT tests). Despite current
by the host of technical, fiscal, political, turmoil in international security dynam-
and economic externality challenges ics, this transparency- and confidence-
that define all “tragedy of the com- building approach may be a pragmatic
mons” problems. Figure 4 also shows step toward limiting and eventually ban-
that the largest single source of orbital ning such tests.
 Hellenic Air Force Review 63

A second significant current space communications (NC3) capabilities.10

security challenge is posed by the rapid China’s new Aerospace Force has devel-
growth in counterspace capabilities – oped and is now fielding a range of sig-
an array of increasingly sophisticated nificant and comprehensive counter-
and capable means of disrupting or de- space capabilities that go well beyond
stroying space systems. Some of the anything developed by the superpowers
worldwide growth in counterspace ca- during the Cold War including ASATs
pabilities comes from the dual-use po- with direct ascent capabilities to GEO
tential of commercial systems being and satellites with rendezvous-and-
developed for on-orbit servicing, but this proximity and robotic arm capabilities in
is less worrisome than the wide range GEO. Russia has long developed doc-
of dedicated counterspace capabilities trine and capabilities to target U.S.
being developed and fielded by China satellites, including critical NC3 sys-
and Russia as shown in Figure 5.9 Chi- tems. Thus far, the United States, China,
nese and Russian counterspace capa- and Russia have appeared unwilling or
bilities increasingly challenge the ability perhaps unable to contain the rapid
of U.S. space systems to support terres- growth in counterspace capabilities and
trial military operations and provide as- the dangerous and destabilizing condi-
sured nuclear command, control, and tions created by these developments.
64 Hellenic Air Force Review

A third space security issue is the in- supporting Ukraine could lead the Rus-
creasing efficacy of commercial space sians (or the Chinese in a Taiwan inva-
systems and the role of the billionaire sion, for instance) to assess that the
“space barons” that control these sys- greatest military effectiveness from the
tems.11 As illustrated by the stunning limited use of nuclear weapons would
initial successes of the Ukrainians in de- be to detonate just one in LEO. Unfortu-
fending their country following the Russ- nately, this disastrous possibility has
ian invasion three years ago, the value moved beyond the hypothetical be-
of commercial space systems in sup- cause Russia appears to be on the
porting a wide range of military opera- verge of violating its Outer Space Treaty
tions has grown exponentially.12 These (OST) obligations by orbiting a nuclear
commercial capabilities provide critical weapon. Article IV of the OST is one of
information about ground truth in the most specific parts of the treaty and
Ukraine, supply communications con- indicates signatories are “not to place
nectivity that helps coordinate many in orbit around the Earth any objects
Ukrainian military operations, and carrying nuclear weapons or any other
demonstrate that states do not neces- kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
sarily need to own and operate space install such weapons on celestial bod-
systems to use them effectively. The ies, or station such weapons in outer
SpaceX StarLink system controlled by space in any other manner.”14 In April
Elon Musk is arguably the single most 2024, Russia vetoed a resolution sup-
important space capability supporting ported by 13 members of the United
Ukraine. In the initial stages of the con- Nations Security Council that called on
flict, Musk donated thousands of Star- all member states not to develop nu-
Link receivers to Ukraine, enabled free clear weapons specifically designed to
connection with his communications be placed in orbit.15 As shown by Fig-
network that consists of thousands of ures 6 and 7, a high-altitude nuclear
LEO satellites, and only later charged detonation (HAND) would raise the peak
the U.S. government for these serv- radiation flux in parts of the Van Allen
ices.13 Musk’s initial strong support for radiation belts by 3-4 orders of magni-
Ukraine and current seeming reversal tude and cause failure in weeks to
raises important questions about the months of all LEO satellites without spe-
role of private citizens in determining cific hardening against this effect.16
important aspects of American foreign There would be catastrophic and cas-
policy. cading worldwide consequences of
In a most disturbing scenario, the such an attack. Failure of LEO satellites
efficacy of commercial LEO satellites in would cause about $500 billion in di-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 65

rect financial damage and the overall A final and undoubtedly most com-
economic impact could be losses of prehensive and impactful current space
over $3 trillion.17 An orbital nuclear security challenge is raised by planning
weapon presents extremely daunting guidance in “The Iron Dome for Amer-
detection, deterrence, and response ica” (now called the Golden Dome) Ex-
challenges because there are few effec- ecutive Order (EO) issued by president
tive counters. The world community Trump on 27 January 2025 that in-
should address this challenge multidi- cludes: “Development and deployment
mensionally, including by ensuring that of proliferated space-based interceptors
LEO satellites supporting critical infra- capable of boost-phase intercept.”18 By
structure and safety-of-life functions the end of March, DoD is to complete
have appropriate backups and harden- initial planning for development and de-
ing to deal with this threat. ployment of the comprehensive layered
66 Hellenic Air Force Review

defense system to counter hypersonic, many independently targetable reentry

cruise, and ballistic missiles that is vehicles. The intent of the criteria was
called for in the EO. Trump’s EO signals to “enhance deterrence by ensuring
a radical redirection of United States that the structure of a full-scale attack
missile defense efforts and represents could be disrupted.”20 In June 1990, the
a far more comprehensive and ambi- Defense Acquisition Board made small,
tious defensive system than ever envi- individual LEO interceptors known as
sioned under president Reagan’s Brilliant Pebbles (BPs) the key compo-
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or nent of the Phase I SDS. Substituting in-
“Star Wars” program. With the fall of the dividual BPs for larger interceptors
Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, stored together in LEO “garages” was
the United States has never deployed an important step in reducing the esti-
any space-based ballistic missile de- mated costs for the initial defense sys-
fense interceptors, and all SDI materials tem. It also helped make the BP-based
have not yet been declassified, but it re- system arguably the first defense ap-
mains highly instructive to review the proach capable of meeting the criteria
detailed planning DoD conducted for advocated by Ambassador Paul Nitze:
such systems in the late 1980s and The system should be able to survive at-
early 1990s that is provided in Aaron tacks against it and still operate effec-
Bateman’s definitive Weapons in tively and incremental investments in
Space: Technology, Politics, and the defenses should be more valuable than
Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense incremental investments in offensive
Initiative.19 systems, this second criterion is also
In 1988, the Joint Chiefs of Staff known as being cost effective on the
(JCS) issued effectiveness criteria for margin.21 The most detailed planning
the Phase I Strategic Defense System for the Phase I SDS to meet the JCS cri-
(SDS) that included having capability to teria called for deployment of 4614 BPs
destroy half of the Soviet Union’s SS-18 costing $1.1-1.4 million each, launch
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles costs of $2-3 billion, and the total cost
(ICBMs) attacking in the first wave and for the Phase 1 SDS deployment was
to destroy 30 percent of other attacking estimated to be $55 billion.22 Shortly
systems. Intercepts during boost-phase after these estimates were made, Pres-
give defenders the greatest leverage be- ident Bush (41) significantly reoriented
cause they have the potential to destroy the program toward far more limited ob-
many warheads with a single shot and jectives known as global protection
this helps explain focus on the SS-18, a against limited strikes (GPALS). A final
very large missile capable of carrying aspect deserving of far more study and
 Hellenic Air Force Review 67

consideration is addressing all the References

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A435077.pdf.
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Growth & Spread of the Precision-
Strike Regime,” American Academy
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 Hellenic Air Force Review 69

18
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or-america/.
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and-Fall-of-Brilliant-Pebbles-Bauco
m.pdf.

Short Biography

Peter L. Hays is a Fellow for the Prague Security Studies Institute,

Advisor for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, and Sen-
ior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies.
He has been an Adjunct Professor at George Washington Uni-
versity for over 20 years and taught for six years at Marine Corps
University’s School of Advanced Warfighting. Previous service in-
cluded 20 years as a defense contractor in the Pentagon and Of-
fice of the Director of National Intelligence; and 25 years as an
Air Force officer where he transported nuclear weapons worldwide as a C-141 pilot,
and taught at the USAF Academy, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, and National
Defense University. Hays earned a Ph.D. at the Fletcher School and was an Honor Grad-
uate of the USAF Academy.
Major publications include The Handbook of Space Security (2020), Toward a The-
ory of Spacepower (2011), and Space and Security (2011).
The Russian Space Program
post 1991

Professor Konstantinos Grivas, Anastasios Seferiadis

Citation: Professor Konstantinos Grivas, Hellenic Military Academy, & Anastasios

Seferiadis. (2025). The Russian Space Program Post 1991. Hellenic Air Force
Review, 134. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15169922
 Hellenic Air Force Review 71

Abstract much by conflict and ideology as by sci-

entific pursuit.
Since the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991, the Russian space pro- Keywords
gram has undergone dramatic transfor-
mation amid political, economic, and Russia, Space, commercialization,
institutional upheaval. This paper traces crisis, cooperation, war, security, satel-
its evolution from a Cold War era super- lites, sanctions.
power to a space actor navigating finan-
cial instability, international A challenging start
cooperation, and internal reform. It ex-
plores the shift from the Soviet legacy Following the dissolution of the So-
structures to the establishment of viet Union, Russia took over manage-
Roscosmos and the commercialization ment of the former Soviet space
of the Russian space program through program. Through a government de-
international collaboration, notably with cree, the Russian Federal Space Agency
NASA for the construction and opera- (RKA), later to be known as Roscosmos,
tion of the International Space Station was formed on the 25th of February
(ISS). However, Russia’s space ambi- 1992, with Yuri Koptev, placed in
tions have been curtailed by economic charge.
sanctions and geopolitical isolation due Under the new structure, the new-
to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 born agency oversaw the entire space
and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in program, contrary to the Soviet model
2022. The war has isolated Russia from in which the design bureaus handled
Western cooperation, forcing a strategic their own initiatives, receiving govern-
shift towards the East, while the Russ- mental approval later. However, the
ian space program relies solely on do- NPO Energia was still behind the
mestic resources and technology. manned space program, providing it
Despite facing severe budget con- with rockets, spacecraft, and personnel.
straints, corruption, and technological Energia eventually became a privately
stagnation, Russia persists in asserting traded company named “Russian
its presence through strategic projects Space Corporation (RSC) Energia” due
and symbolic missions. This paper ar- to the fact that it had to generate its
gues that the Russian space program, own revenue in order to keep all the
while diminished from its Soviet projects around Mir alive, despite the
heights, remains a politically charged in- major budgetary cuts. Similarly, some
strument of state power, shaped as other supporting bureaus which pro-
72 Hellenic Air Force Review

vided hardware were also privatized.1 Mars 94, as it was pushed back two
The decline of the Russian space years, along with other projects like
program had already begun in the late Spektr observatory. Other planned plan-
Soviet era. In 1987, the Soviet space etary and asteroid missions were com-
program numbered up to 400,000 em- pletely erased form the launch
ployees in the assembly lines in schedule. In the meantime, the dissolu-
Moscow, in rocket factories in Dne- tion of the Soviet Union took place in
propetrovsk and Kyubyshev, in scientific 26th December 1991. In January 1st
institutes all around the country, as well 1992, it was replaced by the Russian
as in production plants and the tracking Federation and the Commonwealth of
network. A year later, in 1988, the Sec- Independent States (CIS).
retary General announced in a Party The newly formed Russian Federa-
conference the introduction of two poli- tion was struggling from the beginning
cies: glasnost (openness) and pere- to keep the space program on track
stroika (reform). For the first time in both administratively and financially. As
decades, Soviet citizens were provided the Soviet Union was falling apart, cos-
with the right to speak freely and monauts Sergei Krikalev and Aleksandr
openly. Although it seemed a beneficial Volkov remained on board Mir unboth-
reform for the soviet society, concerning ered as members of the ongoing mis-
the space program it had the opposite sion Soyuz TM-13, but were still
effect. During the 1989 elections, can- affected by the chaos that was unfold-
didates supporting budget cuts to the ing on Earth. Krikalev was especially
space program were elected, threaten- disadvantaged, since he was forced to
ing the stability of the space activities. extend his stay on Mir by almost six
Indeed, in April 1990, the government months, doubling the duration of his
proposed cuts to the Soviet space mission – Soyuz TM-12 – which was
budget around R300m and R220m. raised to ten months in total (311 days),
The Soviet space shuttle, Buran, posing risks to his health condition due
took the highest toll, as it saw its sec- to exposure to space radiation, muscle
ond autonomous flight being pushed atrophy –an effect of weightlessness–
back to 1992, although it was obvious etc. This was because the next mission,
that it would later be cancelled. This led Soyuz TM-13, consisted of only one ca-
to many workers leaving the sheds of reer cosmonaut, Aleksandr Volkov, with
the Baikonur cosmodrome in which the the other two seats being occupied by
Buran mission was being prepared. The Austrian researcher Franz Viehböck (pri-
list of the delayed projects was also vately funded seat) and the Kazak Tok-
filled with the upcoming Mars mission, tar Aubakirov, who was sent to Mir in
 Hellenic Air Force Review 73

order to keep the relations with the European Space Agency (ESA). The cost
soon to be independent Kazakhstan of each seat varied from 12 million US
harmonious. The Baikonur cosmod- Dollars up to 40 million, depending on
rome, on which the space program was the duration of each mission and its
heavily dependent, was located in Kaza- complexity. Those funds were under the
khstan. Thus, there was no available control of the Energiya Corporation, the
seat for Krikalev to return to Earth, ex- new Mir owner.5
cept the Randuga re-entry capsule at- The following year, 1993, the Ener-
tached to Mir which Krikalev chose not gyia Buran program was formally can-
to use.2 When both cosmonauts re- celled, throwing into the waste bin
turned to Earth on March 25, 1992, almost twenty years of hard work of the
they were named “The last Soviet citi- country’s best design bureaus and sci-
zens” as their spacesuits still had the entists, that produced only one au-
Soviet flag on them.3 tonomous Buran flight, accompanied by
just two launches of the most powerful
rocket of the time, Energyia. The loss of
The road to commercialization almost 30% of the space program’s
total workforce, at the same year, came
Commercial expeditions to Mir as a consequence. However, in April
space station had already initiated from 4th, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin re-
1990 and the mission Soyuz TM-104 leased a statement6 for US – Russian
carrying cosmonauts Gennady Man- cooperation in space, and in December
akov, Gennady Strekalov and the Japan- of the same year, the United States of-
ese TV reporter Toyohiro Akiyama, the ficially invited Russia to become a full
first full paying visitor, whose week-long partner in the creation of the Interna-
trip was paid for by the Japanese Tokyo tional Space Station (ISS), based mainly
Broadcasting System. It was one of the on Russian hardware and US funds.
most effective ways to bring in the very Russia accepted the proposal and, to
needed foreign currency to the fiscally pave the path to the ISS, the nations
stressed Russian economy. Other also agreed to establish a joint program
measures included auctions of rare for the operation of the Mir space sta-
space history items, the filming of ad- tion that included the launch of US as-
vertisements on Mir, and paid tours to tronauts and shuttle missions to the
the cosmonauts training centers. Astro- space station in exchange for good
nauts from France and Germany flew to practices and to build mutual trust. This
Mir on paid seats financially backed by was the Shuttle – Mir program, also
their national space agencies and the known as “Phase One”. 7 The construc-
74 Hellenic Air Force Review

tion of the ISS would be “Phase Two”. other space related facilities was also
By joining their forces, both nations not in a passable state. Buildings suf-
managed to strengthen their presence fered from neglect and lack of mainte-
in space while simultaneously canceling nance. The results involved blackouts,
out each other’s weaknesses: lack of destroyed launch pads that were not
extended space missions for the US and fixed, malfunctioning air conditioning
lack of funding for Russia. Thus, the systems in offices, and uncollected
space race that had begun in the 50’s, trash. Eventually, in 1996 for the first
was effectively terminated. In the pri- time since the 60’s the United States
vate sector, the companies Lockheed launched more rockets into space than
Martin (LM), Khrunichev and Energia Russia. Nonetheless, on Mir space sta-
formed a joint company, the Interna- tion, two separate events, a fire on-
tional Launch Services (ILS) which went board the Spektr module and a crash
into operation in 1995 as a private with a remotely controlled, by the Mir
spaceflight partnership, initially co-mar- crew, cargo ship threatened the peace-
keting exclusively non-military launches ful coexistence of the United States and
on both the American Atlas and the Russia, highlighting the diverging ap-
Russian Proton expendable launch ve- proach of the two space powers con-
hicles.8 cerning safety standards in space
In the interim, the financial situation activities.9
of the Russian space sector was still de- By reaching its lowest point, the re-
teriorating. By the end of 1994, employ- birth of the Russian space program was
ment was down to less than 300,000 in fact a matter of time. Besides the
people. Space spending was down to agreement with the United States for
0.23% of the national budget, com- the ISS, the Russian authorities also
pared to 0.97% spent on space re- made deals with the European part-
search in the United States. On the ners. A joint company, Starsem, was set
subject of spending, employees in up in July of 1996, as a part of an
space companies were left unpaid for agreement between the TsSKB
months, some of them were effectively Progress plant in Samara and the
bankrupt, subcontractors denied the French Arianespace company, with the
delivery of components and fuel to con- mission of developing and commercially
duct rocket launches unless their con- marketing the Soyuz rocket. Starsem’s
tracts were paid off, and the military shares were divided between EADS –
and unmanned space activities were in 35%, the Russian Space Agency – 25%,
decline. Infrastructure in Baikonur and TsSKB Progress – 25%, and Ariane-
in Plestsek cosmodromes as well as in space – 15%. Starsem also provided
 Hellenic Air Force Review 75

the necessary funds to restore facilities company Space Adventures, with a

at Samara and Baikonur, including standard price of 20 million dollars per
rocket assembly halls, payload separa- mission. Simultaneously, seats were
tion facilities, and a staff’s hotel.10 At sold to the European Space Agency
the dusk of the 20th century, Russia was (ESA) or to national space agencies in
on its way to recover from the financial Europe or combinations of the two. By
recession and the effects of the col- 2001, 87 Russian space companies
lapse of the Soviet Union on its space had entered joint ventures with Ameri-
program. can and European companies, leading
to a visible flow of new money into the
program. In a decade, Russia had man-
aged to convert the most centralized

Figure 1: Annual number of objects launched into space. Source:

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?time=
1992..1999&focus=RUS~USA

Russia in the dawn of space program to the most commercial,

the 21st century globally connected space industry in the
world.
By 2000, an organized system of In the early 2000’s, Russia’s space
commercial space tourism was intro- ambitions were rising similarly to the
duced, working through the American rise of the oil prices. Once again, the
76 Hellenic Air Force Review

Russian economy was flooded with for- above the Russian soil.12
eign currency, fueling the country’s in- Thus, during the 00’s Russia began
dustry, including the space one. In restructuring its space industry, with
2005, the Russian space strategy was Space and defence industries rerouting
published, complimented by President their production away from export mar-
Putin’s remarks that in order to achieve kets and towards national armed
global leadership, strength in space forces. Direct ascent anti-satellite
was necessary. The proposed commer- weapons (DA-ASAT), the restoration of
cial and civilian plans comprised of a the Global Navigation System
new space station, a return to the (GLONASS), and the launch of various
moon, new launch systems and robotic satellites such as those for Intelligence,
exploration. Another economic crisis Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR),
however, that of 2008, obliged the are amongst the Russian investments
Russian aspirations in space to sub- in military capabilities. On top of that,
side, causing also irregularities to Pro- on April 21, 2007, an «operational
ton and Soyuz launches. meeting» of the Security Council of the
In regard to the military part of the Russian Federation approved a «System
space program, Russia has been trans- of views for Russia’s independent ac-
parent about its national goal to exploit cess to space from its own territory for
outer space as a military asset, as well the full spectrum of tasks until 2040.»
as preventing the United States from By the end of the year, Russia made the
being benefited by space activities for potentially momentous decision to de-
security reasons.11 The Sino-Russian velop a new launch facility for manned
proposal of the Prevention of Placement missions in the nation’s Far East, and
of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty on November 6, President Putin signed
(PPWT) in 2008, is an example of this a decree on the creation of the Vos-
two-sided strategy, despite the fact that tochny (= Eastern)13 launch site in the
the Russian national strategy consid- Amur Region, planning to make Vos-
ered outer space and information sec- tochny the main Russian spaceport
tors to be developed as new warfare thus making the Russian space pro-
areas. In general, the concept of the gram and its access to space fully inde-
militarisation of space shares the same pendent from third countries
perception with the Soviet era, regard- (Kazakhstan in this case). 14

ing it as a way to protect the Russian ex- It was the war in Georgia in 2008
tensive borders and all the critical that resulted in the formation of first
facilities which are scattered all over the cracks in the Russian relations with the
country by creating a “protection zone” West by abandoning the proposed
 Hellenic Air Force Review 77

plans for a common lunar booster for civil-space and commercial satellites.16
future expeditions. Under Medvedev’s Furthermore, the budget of the Russian
presidency the Russian economy man- Space Program has been gradually re-
aged to handle successfully the global duced since then as a consequence of
economic crisis that year, mainly thanks these sanctions.17 As tensions in-
to government subsidies. The conflict in creased, Russia’s military doctrine in-
Georgia revealed the limits of the Russ- cluded the deploymnent of weapons in
ian military capabilities along with the space, enabling Russian forces to
failure of the command-and-control sys- achieve a global strike cabability when
tem. As a result, the Russian leadership necessary. In 2015, the Russian Aeror-
realized the need to invest more in pace Forces (VKS) were established
space-based systems as highly impor- through the merger of the Air Force and
tant and essential for integration of the Airospace Defence Forces. The VKS
command, control, communications, in- overseas military space operations,
formation, surveillance and reconnais- complementing the civilian focus of
sance (C31SR). Furthermore, the Roscosmos.
‘information-strike operations’ were in- Moreover, the Russian military and
troduced, which consist of ‘information- space strategy have the United States
strike battles, information-weapons as their driving force, by always seeking
engagements and strikes with the goal counter measures to lower the US capa-
of disrupting enemy troop command bilities and their efficiency, as this
and control of weapons systems and seems the only way for Russia to main-
the destruction of its information re- tain the strategic balance with the USA.
source.15 In this matter, counter-space activities,
especially cyber and electronic warfare
The second decade: 2010 – 2022 play a central part in Russian strategy.
However, after the retirement of the
Undoubtedly, the annexation of Space Shuttle in 2011, they only way to
Crimea is be considered as the turning launch astronauts and cosmonauts to
point for Russia’s relations with the the ISS was by the Russian Soyuz
West. The sanctions against Russia that spacecraft, until NASA’s SpaceX Crew-1
began in 2014 as a result of the inva- mission in 2020.18
sion of Ukraine led to restrictions on The submission by China and Rus-
technological trade and scientific ex- sia in 2014, of the renewed version of
changes between the West and Russia, their draft Treaty on the PPTW, fosters
along with a long-term, contractual, the opinion that the Russian Federa-
launch embargo on nearly 200 Russian tion’s diplomatic strategy is in compli-
78 Hellenic Air Force Review

ance with the United Nation’s context, tice the doctrines and the weapons
probably in a quest to maintain a key tested during the previous decade. The
role in the shaping of the global security effects of this invasion however, were
architecture, especially in a multipolar immediate, severe, multinational and
international system.19 multileveled.
During this decade, the Russian Orbital launches plummeted to just
space program and capabilities kept 22 in 2022, as companies like the UK’s
growing. The first launch from the new OneWeb, looked for other means of
Vostochny cosmodrome took place in launching their payloads, through
2016. At the same year, the new Na- SpaceX and India, concluding any fur-
tional Security Strategy was introduced ther international cooperation with the
replacing the one of 2010. Also, Russian authorities in space due to the
Roscosmos, was transformed from a posed sanctions. In the same manner,
stage agency to a state company in an ESA suspended in March 2022, the
attempt to boost its performance and to launch of the ExoMars Rover and Sur-
combat corruption within the organiza- face Platform mission that was sched-
tion and in 2017 Russia announced a uled for September 2022, seeking for
decrease in space launch incidents other means of launching this mis-
from 6.9% in 2015, to 4.7%. In 2019 sion.22 Despite the hostile relations with
and 2020, the country tested prototype the United States, the two nations coex-
space weapons, soliciting protests from istence in the ISS and the need to
the United States and others.20 Once launch crewed missions to the space
again in 2021, Russia drew the atten- station, have prevented the complete
tion of the international community dur- cut off of their relations, limiting their in-
ing a DA-ASAT weapon test which teractions to the absolute necessary.23
generated approximately 1.500 pieces In respect to China, the proposed col-
of debris posing a threat to the integrity laboration in space stalled too. Initially,
of the ISS and its cosmonauts China had announced a joint project in
onboard.21 2021 to construct an International
Lunar Research Station (ILRS) with Rus-
Russia in space after 2022 sia, however, its 2022 national space
strategy did not even mention Russia,
Once more, the Russian space pro- and Beijing refused to host Russian cos-
gram took a sharp turn, this time as a monauts on board the Tiangong space
result of the full-scale invasion of station,24 announcing in March 2025
Ukraine on 24 February 2022. In a the intention to train and later host Pak-
sense, Russia now had to put in prac- istani astronauts onboard the Tiangong
 Hellenic Air Force Review 79

Space Station.25 On his side, President Moscow”, say experts.27 This cyberat-
Putin welcomed the North Korean tack complemented the invasion by
leader Kim Jong Un to the Vostochny ground forces on the field, demonstrat-
cosmodrome in September 2023, seek- ing the fact that in the modern warfare
ing military cooperation with North the conflicts are multilayered and the
Korea in the context of “a fight against cyber sector’s role and significance is
imperialism” as Kim Jong Un stated growing. Just a few hours before, Russ-
himself.26 Indeed, in fall of 2024, North ian hackers used another wiper, called
Korea reportedly sent military person- HermeticWiper, against Ukrainian gov-
nel to Russia who fought against ernment computers. In this case, the
Ukraine for Russia in Russian uniforms targets were Windows machines on net-
and under Russian command. works that would be important for the
government in Kyiv to mount an effec-
Russian space activities during tive resistance in the early hours of the
the Russo-Ukrainian war invasion. A second cyberattack against
Viasat followed, disrupting the connec-
In many occasions, the Russo- tion between government and military
Ukrainian war is characterized as a fu- bodies as well as the access of Ukrain-
ture warfare and not in vain. On ian households and public infrastruc-
February 24, one hour prior to the Russ- ture to the internet.
ian invasion of Ukraine, a cyberattack Russia also has some dependence
was launched on the American satellite on space capabilities for its warfighting.
company Viasat. Russian hackers For example, the Russian GLONASS sys-
launched destructive “wiper” malware tem is a constellation of precision, nav-
called AcidRain against Viasat modems igation, and timing (PNT) satellites
and routers, quickly erasing all the data which provide Russia with its own GPS-
on the system. The machines then re- like capability. On field, it delivers PNT
booted and were permanently disabled. services for commercial aircraft, mili-
Approximately, 4000 modems in all tary navigation and weapons guidance.
zones of operation of the KA-SAT satel- Although the GLONASS system is sup-
lite, notably Ukraine, were effectively posed to guide weapons to long-range
deemed unusable. The decision to at- target with high accuracy, in reality, the
tack Viasat was of course not random: incomplete and aged GLONASS constel-
Viasat works with the US military and its lation has been unable to fulfill its mis-
partners around the world. “The attack sion, causing Russian rockets to miss
has turned out to be typical of the “hy- their targets in Ukraine by a large mar-
brid” war strategy employed by gin in some cases.28 The Western sanc-
80 Hellenic Air Force Review

tions, already in effect since 2014, have communications, and on its ability to
hampered maintenance, upgrade and help coordinate devastating artillery
introduction of new space hardware by strikes, that Russia has been looking for
Russia. Another example of Russia’s ways to disable it through jamming or by
limited operational readiness and effec- attacking it. By jamming Starlink satel-
tiveness, is the failure of the Luna-25 lites and the GPS receivers, Russians
mission, carrying Russia’s lunar lan- manage to “blind” Ukrainian drone op-
der.29 erators and the Ukrainian artillery, who
The limited in quantity orbital hard- are unable to fulfill their missions.31 Es-
ware, is not the only issue affecting the pecially for the second, Ukraine has re-
Russian space program. Until 2023, the ceived an increasing and substantial
country counted for 160 satellites in quantity of High Mobility Artillery Rocket
orbit, of which more than 100 are mili- Systems (HIMARS) and Joint Direct At-
tary equipment, including 25 GLONASS tack Munitions (JDAMs) from the US. In
satellites, 47 communications satel- fact, Starlink satellites are so popular at
lites, 7 Liana oceanic electronic recon- the Russo-Ukrainian battlefield, due to
naissance satellites, and others. the fact that they possess an un-
However, it is noted that Russia doesn’t matched advantage in comparison to
possess neither the proper mix of satel- the High Earth Orbit satellites: Operat-
lites, nor the suitable ground systems ing constellations on Low Earth Orbit
and procedures to work on, and benefit (LEO) makes it more difficult, if not im-
from the data transmitted by those possible, to take them offline because
satellites. As an example, the Liana an attacker would have to target all the
spacecraft has been designed to track satellites at once, to disable the entire
ships and US aircraft carriers in the Pa- system. Also, it is cheaper and easier to
cific Ocean. Thus, Liana spacecraft has set up a constellation on LEO, and in
little effect in the Ukrainian ground large numbers.32
war.30 Since the invasion of Ukraine, in
On the other side, the one of the order to improve its ISR capabilities,
Electronic War, Russia has made some Russia has launched a series of satel-
accomplishments, in the direction of re- lites: In August 9, 2022, the Russian
ducing Ukraine’s benefits from space made, Iranian Khayyam 133 Earth ob-
capabilities. The US launched and oper- servation satellite was launched by Rus-
ated Starlink system has been the sia for government and military use. Yet,
prime target of the Russian actions. It is the Russian officials announced the in-
due to the heavy reliance of the Ukrain- tention to not deliver the satellite to Iran
ian forces on Starlink for battlefield immediately, as Russia intended to use
 Hellenic Air Force Review 81

it in order to enhance its surveillance of ian Federation, left its footprint on the
military targets in the Ukrainian war.34 integrity and effectiveness of the Russ-
The Russian Lotos-S1 (14F145) satel- ian space program in terms of the state
lites, which are part of the next genera- of the existing infrastructure and hard-
tion ELINT satellite system “Liana”. ware, as well as the operational readi-
From April 4, 2022, Russia has ness. In a sense, Russia was forced to
launched four Lotos satellites. Lotos-S1 turn to international synergies, just like
No. 5,6,7,8.35 The Razbeg (14F169) the United States also did at the same
satellites, which are small military opti- time, but in this case not for the projec-
cal reconnaissance satellites similar to tion of power in space (Interkosmos pro-
the Iranian Khayyam. They were gram), but instead, in order to preserve
launched in December 27, 2023 and in its entity.
February 2, 2024.36 Then, the Uragan- In the first decade of the 21st cen-
K2 (GLONASS-K2, 14F160) navigation tury, the Russian space program had re-
satellites, the upgraded versions of Ura- stored its former glory, and had
gan-K (GLONASS-K) satellites, that also managed to foster a concrete joint ef-
carry classified military payload. They fort with the West through the construc-
were launched in August 7, 2023, and tion and operation of the ISS. However,
in March 2, 2025.37 Also, the civil Earth the conflict in Georgia in 2008 formed
observation satellites Resurs-P 4 and 5 the first (of the many later on) cracks on
(47KS), capable of acquiring high-reso- the relations of Russia with the West. In
lution imagery (up to 1m), which are fact, the Russian space program has
used for defense purposes too. They been suffering until today, from sanc-
were launched in March 31, 2024 and tions posed by the West as a conse-
in December 25, 2024.38 Finally, the quence of the Russian invasions in
classified military satellites labeled as Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. These sanc-
Kosmos 2581, 2582 and 2583, tions have had significant implications
launched in February 5, 2025, with an to the Russian space industry which
unknown purpose.39 has been struggling to deliver new
space hardware, nevertheless to keep
Conclusions and future prospects the existing one in operation.
As the Russian Federation has been
The Russian space program has moving away from the major global pow-
been dealing with challenges even be- ers during the war in Ukraine, it has
fore the collapse of the Soviet Union. turned to regional, and in some cases,
The economic recession of the first isolated powers like Iran and North
decade after the creation of the Russ- Korea to form alliances. Russia aspires
82 Hellenic Air Force Review

to achieve its national goals, especially viet citizen: The cosmonaut who was
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13, 2025. [Online]. Available: rome’, russianspaceweb.com,
https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/k https://www.russianspaceweb.com/
86 Hellenic Air Force Review

vostochny.html. Brink.”
14
Anatoly Zak, ‘Russian space program 24
Andrew Jones, “Russia’s War on
in the first decade of the 21st cen- Ukraine Has Caused Lasting Dam-
tury’, russianspaceweb.com, age to International Spaceflight Co-
https://www.russianspaceweb.com/ operation.”
russia_2000_2010.html. 25
闫星周 (Zhao Lei), “Tiangong to Wel-
15
Roger E. Kanet, Routledge Hand- come Pakistani Astronaut.”
book of Russian Security, 230–31. 26
Anthony Kuhn, “Kim Jong Un Vows
16
Bruce McClintock and Mélusine Le- Full Support for Russia as Putin
bret, “Russian Space Strategy and Pledges Space Tech for North
Capabilities: A Tale of Decline,” 148. Korea.”
17
Paweł Bernat, “Russia’s Strategic 27
Patrick Howell O’Neill, “Russia
Shift in Space Policy.” Hacked an American Satellite Com-
18
‘NASA’s SpaceX Crew-1 Astronauts pany One Hour before the Ukraine In-
Headed to International Space Sta- vasion.”
tion - NASA’, 28
Bruce McClintock and Mélusine Le-
https://www.nasa.gov/news-re- bret, “Russian Space Strategy and
lease/nasas-spacex-crew-1-astro- Capabilities: A Tale of Decline,” 151–
nauts-headed-to-international-space- 52.
station/. 29
Associated Press, “Russia’s Lunar
19
Michael Listner και Rajeswari Pillai Mission Failure Raises Questions
Rajagopalan, ‘The 2014 PPWT: A about State of Space Program.”
new draft but with the same and dif- 30
Michael Peck, “Why Russian Space
ferent problems’, The Space Review, Satellites Are Failing in the Ukraine
https://www.thespacereview.com/ar War.”
ticle/2575/1. 31
Sam Skove, “Using Starlink Paints a
20
Stephen Clark, “U.S. Officials Say Target on Ukrainian Troops.”
Russia Tested a New Anti-Satellite 32
“UkraineX.”
Weapon.” 33
“Khayyam 1, 2, 3, 4.”
21
Ankit Panda, “The Dangerous Fallout 34
Joby Warrick and Ellen Nakashima,
of Russia’s Anti-Satellite Missile “Russia to Launch Spy Satellite for
Test.” Iran but Use It First over Ukraine.”
22
‘FAQ: The ‘Rebirth’ of ESA’s ExoMars 35
“Lotos-S1 (14F145) - Gunter’s Space
Rosalind Franklin Mission’, Page.”
https://www.esa.int/Science_Explo- 36
“Razbeg (14F169).”
ration/Human_and_Robotic_Explo- 37
“Uragan-K2 (GLONASS-K2,
ration/Exploration/ExoMars/FAQ_Th 14F160 ).”
e_rebirth_of_ESA_s_ExoMars_Ros- 38
“Resurs-P 4, 5 (47KS).”
alind_Franklin_mission. 39
“Kosmos 2581, 2582, 2583.”
23
Anatoly Zak, “ISS Comes to the
 Hellenic Air Force Review 87

Short Biography

Dr. Konstantinos Grivas is Professor of Geopolitics and Mod-

ern Military Technologies and Director of War Theory and Analysis
Sector at the Hellenic Military Academy.
He also teaches Geography of Security at the Department of
Turkish and Modern Asian Studies of the National and Kapodis-
trian University of Athens. As a lecturer and visiting professor, he
also teaches at the National Defense School, the National Secu-
rity School, and the School of Command and Staff of the Air Force.
He has worked as the head of the research division for new military technolo-
gies at the Defense Analysis Institute of the Ministry of Defense. He has worked as the
editor-in-chief of the journals «Strategy» and «War and History» and as the managing ed-
itor of the journal «Geopolitics.»
His articles have been published in various other newspapers and journals.
From 1996 to 2004, he was an accredited journalist at the Ministry of Defense.

Short Biography

Mr. Anastasios Seferiadis is a Geopolitical Analyst and holds

a Master of Science with distinction from the National and
Kapodistrian University of Athens in Geopolitical Analysis,
Geostrategic Synthesis, and Defense and International Security
Studies.
He has participated in numerous seminars and military Eras-
mus programs under the auspices of the European Security and
Defence College. He has worked for the Greek Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, serving at the Consulate General of Greece in New York
and the Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations. He has also completed an
internship at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and
has served as an Assistant Researcher at the Institute of International Economic Rela-
tions.
 China & India as Space
Powers: Geopolitics,
Domestic Interests
& Prestige *

Dr. Dimitrios Stroikos, LSE

Citation: Dr. Dimitrios Stroikos, LSE. (2025). China and India as Space Powers:
Geopolitics, Domestic Interests, and Prestige. Air Force Review, 134.
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15163712
 Hellenic Air Force Review 89

Abstract series of human spaceflight missions, a

vigorous lunar space program, the com-
This paper employs an eclectic an- pletion of the Tiangong space station,
alytical framework, incorporating struc- and the deployment of the Beidou satel-
tural, domestic, and normative lite navigation system, which provides
perspectives to assess the drivers be- Beijing with an independent global po-
hind China and India’s space programs. sitioning capability. Alongside this, as
While security concerns, particularly discussed below, space has become in-
China’s competition with the U.S. and creasingly central to China’s military
India’s response to China, are signifi- modernization, reflecting broader
cant in explaining military space ambi- strategic goals and the growing impor-
tions, domestic political dynamics and tance of space-based assets for na-
bureaucratic interests also play a criti- tional security.
cal role in shaping space policy deci- While China’s emergence as a
sions. Moreover, space accomplish- major space power has been widely rec-
ments serve as sources of national ognized, India has also made substan-
prestige, political legitimacy, and inter- tial strides in space in recent years in
national standing. both civilian and military space capabil-
ities. Despite the fact that India has tra-
Keywords: ditionally emphasized the use of space
for socio-economic development, its
China, India, space, technonational- space program has increasingly fo-
ism, prestige cused on prestige projects, achieving
significant milestones in space explo-
Introduction ration. At the same time, like China,
India has been gradually integrating
Any discussion of contemporary space into its broader national security,
space security has to pay particular at- demonstrating a growing awareness of
tention to the role of China and India as the military and geopolitical signifi-
space powers. It is not difficult to see cance of space.
why. China has been expanding its In light of the above, the aim of this
space capabilities in a systematic man- short essay is to provide a brief
ner over the past two decades or so, overview of China and India as space
emerging as a key player in civilian powers. It begins by examining China’s
space activities. Indicative of its ambi- space program, outlining its major civil-
tion to position itself as a global space ian achievements before briefly consid-
power, China’s achievements include a ering how China utilizes space for
90 Hellenic Air Force Review

military purposes. The discussion then viet Union.3 In this respect, a few useful
shifts to India, first highlighting its civil- observations are worth making from the
ian space advancements and then of- outset. First, underpinning China’s
fering a succinct review of how space space endeavor from its inception was
has increasingly been integrated into its closed ties with the country’s strate-
national security. In lieu of a conclusion, gic weapons program. This connection
the final section briefly examines the became evident with the establishment
key drivers of China and India’s space of the Fifth Academy of the Department
programs through the prism of an ana- of Defense in 1956, led by the
lytical eclectic approach, integrating in- renowned scientist Qian Xuesen. As a
sights from structural, domestic, and missile research and development cen-
normative perspectives to provide a ter, the academy played a crucial role in
more comprehensive understanding of laying the groundwork for China’s space
their strategic, political, and technolog- ambitions.4
ical motivations. Second, the launch of Sputnik in
1957 was a pivotal moment that
spurred China’s interest in space. The
China: A major power in space Soviet achievement left a strong im-
pression on Mao Zedong, who fre-
China’s recent remarkable achieve- quently referenced it in his speeches. At
ments in space mean that one may be the Second Plenary Meeting of the
forgiven for thinking that its space pro- Eighth Party Congress in May 1958, the
gram is a relatively new endeavor.2 And Chinese premier famously an-
yet, China has one of the world’s nounced, “We too should produce satel-
longest-running space programs, with lites,” but insisted that China aim
origins dating back to the mid-20th cen- high: “If we’re going to launch one, it
tury, driven by a combination of national should be at least two tons—not a small
prestige and strategic considerations one like the Americans’ chicken egg!”.5
echoing the United States and the So- Mao’s interest led to a push for the
viet Union. Indeed, as Handberg and Li development of a Chinese satellite. But
note “the reality of the Chinese space China’s space ambitions were initially
program was that their effort grew out stalled by a combination of domestic
of that same sense of military necessity political upheavals, including the Great
along with the clear ancillary value of Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolu-
fostering China’s international political tion, and the withdrawal of Soviet tech-
prestige in a manner” that “clearly mir- nical assistance for its missile
rored those of the United States and So- program following the Sino-Soviet split.
 Hellenic Air Force Review 91

Even so, the Chinese leadership ac- of both the atomic and hydrogen
knowledged the significance of the mis- bombs, along with intercontinental bal-
sile and space programs. Consequently, listic missiles (ICBMs), while “One Satel-
it sought to protect the engineers and lite” denotes the advancement satellite
scientists working in these fields from technology. Embodying China’s inte-
the political instability that disrupted grated approach to national defense
other aspects of policymaking and soci- and technological self-reliance, the Two
ety at large. These efforts bore fruit Bombs, One Satellite project highlights
when, on April 24, 1970, China success- a techno-nationalist approach to strate-
fully launched its first satellite, Dong gic technologies that remains influential
Fang Hong 1 (The East is Red), becom- today.7
ing the fifth country to place a satellite Deng Xiaoping reoriented China’s
in orbit.6 space program toward economic devel-
China’s early space ambitions were opment, emphasizing practical applica-
not limited to satellites. The successful tions such as satellite communica-
launch of Dong Fang Hong 1 was made tions.8 However, in 1986, an important
possible by the Long March 1 rocket, effort was made to reassert a techno-
part of a broader effort to develop an in- nationalist approach to advanced tech-
digenous launch capability. Around the nological development, drawing
same time, the Chinese leadership also inspiration from the Two Bombs, One
initiated the early phases of a human Satellite project. Initiated by four promi-
spaceflight program, but Mao eventu- nent scientists, this push resulted in the
ally decided to cancel it. Nevertheless, launch of the 863 High-Technology Re-
this brief interest in human spaceflight search and Development Plan, com-
underscores the country’s long-term monly known as the 863 Program. Its
commitment to establishing itself as a primary objective was to drive innova-
major space power. tion and enhance China’s technological
What merits emphasis for the pur- capabilities in critical fields, including
poses of this discussion is that the space.9 This, in turn, led the 863 Pro-
space program’s synergies with the gram to reignite interest in China’s
strategic weapons program continued space efforts, culminating in the launch
apace in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, of its human spaceflight program in the
the launch of the first Chinese satellite early 1990s.10
was part of what is known in China as Progressing from this basis, China
the “Two Bombs, One Satellite” or has since pursued its space program
Liangdan Yixing (两 弹 一 星 ) project. with consistency and a gradual, me-
“Two Bombs” refers to the development thodical approach. Over time, it has de-
92 Hellenic Air Force Review

veloped across the board space capa- ties as a tool of foreign policy, particu-
bilities enabling a wide range of appli- larly in its engagement with the Global
cations. Not surprisingly, China’s South. For example, in 2008, it estab-
remarkable feats in human spaceflight lished the Asia-Pacific Space Coopera-
and space exploration have attracted tion Organization (APSCO) to promote
much global attention, solidifying its po- collaboration among member states
sition as a leading space power. Apart through training, data sharing, and ca-
from a rigorous human spaceflight and pacity building in space technology.14
space exploration program, China has Similarly, it has integrated space activi-
also made significant strides in satellite ties into the Belt and Road Initiative
and rocket technology. China has devel- (BRI) through the Space Information
oped an extensive array of satellites Corridor or Space Silk Road.15 Equally,
for communications, remote sensing, China attempts to bolster its image as
and navigation, with the Beidou satellite a great power in space through initia-
system standing out as a major mile- tives such as the United Nations/China
stone. More recently, it has shown a Cooperation on the Utilization of the
growing interest in the development of China Space Station, which offers inter-
satellite megaconstellations, aiming to national scientists the opportunity to
establish its own large-scale network for conduct experiments aboard its space
global broadband coverage, akin to station, enhancing its soft power.16 Like-
Starlink.11 As far as rocket development wise, the International Lunar Research
is concerned, China has made signifi- Station (ILRS), launched in partnership
cant progress in advancing its launch with Russia’s Roscosmos in 2021, is a
capabilities. The Long March rocket planned lunar base for scientific re-
family has undergone continuous up- search and exploration.17 Unlike China’s
grades, enabling the deployment of UN-backed space initiatives, however, it
satellites, crewed missions, and deep- is notable that the ILRS follows a bilat-
space probes.12 Furthermore, there has eral framework but remains open to in-
been an effort to step up the commer- ternational participation.18
cialization and privatization of its space The point to make is here is that
sector, fostering the growth of private these initiatives reflect Beijing’s effort
enterprises involved in satellite manu- to demonstrate its commitment to as-
facturing, launch services, and space- suming great power responsibilities
based applications.13 through the provision of public goods,
Beyond technological advance- though with certain limitations.19
ments, it should be noted that China
has also leveraged its space capabili-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 93

China and Military Space guidelines adopted the term “local wars
under modern informationalized condi-
Symptomatic of its growing space tions,” emphasizing the growing nexus
activities, its expanding interests across between information technology and
the globe, and its wider military mod- military operations.20
ernization, China has intensified its Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012,
focus on the military uses of space. The interest in the military uses of space
increasing role of space technology in has gained significant momentum. In
modern warfare after the Cold War drew 2014, Xi urged the PLA Air Force to
significant attention from Chinese “speed up air and space integration and
strategists, particularly following the sharpen their offensive and defensive
1991 Gulf War, often called the first capabilities”. China’s 2015 defense
space war. This conflict demonstrated white paper reinforced this priority, de-
how space assets could enhance both scribing outer space as a “commanding
strategic and tactical military opera- height in international strategic compe-
tions, prompting China to reassess its tition.” Similarly, China’s most recent
military doctrine and training. In 1993, defense white paper, released in 2019,
under Jiang Zemin’s leadership, China highlights “China’s security interests in
introduced the concept of “local wars outer space” as a key “national defense
under modern high-tech conditions,” aim” and affirms that “[o]uter space is
signaling a shift from industrial-age war- a critical domain in international strate-
fare to modern, technology-driven mili- gic competition”.21
tary capabilities. This modernization This growing focus on military space
drive prioritized research and develop- aligns with Xi’s broader push for military
ment in space-based technologies, in- modernization, which prioritizes trans-
cluding satellites, early warning forming the PLA into a world-class mili-
systems, command networks, and ad- tary by mid-century. A central aspect of
vanced communication infrastructure. China’s military transformation is the
This process accelerated with the emer- policy of military-civil fusion (MCF),
gence of the Revolution in Military Af- aimed at integrating civilian technologi-
fairs, alongside other external cal advancements into military applica-
developments, such as the transition to tions to enhance China’s defense
information warfare, the Kosovo War, capabilities. Moreover, PLA reforms
and U.S.-led interventions in under Xi have sought to streamline op-
Afghanistan and Iraq, which reinforced erations across key domains.22 In 2015,
the critical role of technology in contem- China established the PLA Strategic
porary warfare. By 2002, the strategic Support Force (PLASSF) to centralize
94 Hellenic Air Force Review

space, cyber, and electromagnetic op- bilities, all aimed at disrupting or neu-
erations. However, in a major restructur- tralizing adversary space assets.24
ing announced in April 2024, the Concurrently, space has become in-
PLASSF was disbanded and replaced tegral to the PLA’s ability to conduct op-
with new military units, including an erations far beyond continental China,
Aerospace Force.23 While the full impli- reflecting its expanding strategic reach.
cations of this restructuring remain un- Traditionally focused on internal secu-
clear, it reflects the growing importance rity and defense of the mainland, the
of space assets under informationized PLA has increasingly prioritized long-dis-
warfare and the need for greater coor- tance missions, with space-based as-
dination in joint military operations sets playing a key role as a force
across multiple domains. multiplier. In this context, a major focus
This shift in military organization has been enhancing command, control,
and doctrine has been accompanied by communications, intelligence, surveil-
China’s growing investment in counter- lance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) ca-
space capabilities. The most visible pabilities through an extensive network
demonstration of this was the 2007 di- of both dedicated military and dual-use
rect-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) test, satellites. This includes communication
which destroyed a defunct weather satellites, high-resolution remote sens-
satellite, making China the third country ing satellites such as the Yaogan,
to conduct such a test. The resulting de- Haiyang, Huanjing, and Gaofen series,
bris, estimated at over 3,000 pieces, as well as Tracking and Data Relay
sparked international condemnation Satellites (TDRS) and the Beidou navi-
and raised concerns over China’s gation system. Estimates suggest that
stance on space security. While China nearly half of China’s satellite launches
has since refrained from further debris- since 1970 have served military func-
generating ASAT tests, it has continued tions.25 Alongside its 300 surveillance
developing non-destructive direct-as- satellites in low Earth orbit, China has
cent ASAT systems, including a 2013 also expanded its geostationary orbit
test that reached approximately 30,000 (GEO) surveillance capabilities with
km, suggesting the ability to target dual-use satellites like Yaogan-41 and
satellites in medium Earth orbit or Ludi Tance-4, which enhance continu-
higher. Aside direct-ascent ASATs, China ous monitoring over Taiwan and the
is believed to be advancing a range of Indo-Pacific, complicating U.S. and al-
counterspace technologies, including lied military operations in the region.26
co-orbital systems, directed energy
weapons, and electronic warfare capa-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 95

India: A Rising Space Power lars: communications and remote-sens-

ing satellites, practical applications, and
Like China, India’s space program is space transportation systems.29 In par-
one of the oldest, with its origins tracing ticular, the Indian National Satellite Sys-
back to the early 1960s.27 However, tem (INSAT), operational since 1983,
some scholars trace its foundations and the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS)
even earlier, linking it to India’s partici- satellite program, launched in 1988,
pation in the International Geophysical supported vital functions such as mete-
Year (IGY) of 1957–1958, a global sci- orology, disaster monitoring, and re-
entific initiative that contributed to the source management. Simultaneously,
emergence of the Space Age with the India established its own launch capa-
launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957.28 No- bilities, starting with the Satellite
tably, Vikram Sarabhai, often regarded Launch Vehicle (SLV)-3 in 1980 and
as the father of India’s space program, later advancing to more sophisticated
played an important role in these early systems such as the Augmented Satel-
efforts, which helped lay the foundation lite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), the Polar
for India’s later advancements in space Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), and
technology. This led to the establish- the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch
ment of the Indian National Committee Vehicle (GSLV).30
for Space Research (INCOSPAR) in Although socio-economic priorities
1962 and the launch of the first Nike- remain central, in recent years, India’s
Apache sounding rocket from the space ambitions have broadened to en-
Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching compass exploration and strategic ob-
Station (TERLS) in 1963, followed by jectives, reflecting its aspirations for
the creation of the Indian Space Re- great power status, its growing eco-
search Organisation (ISRO) in 1969. nomic clout, and an increasingly chal-
Unlike other space powers that lenging security environment.31 The
heavily relied on military programs, launch of Chandrayaan-1 in 2008,
however, India’s space and missile de- which confirmed the presence of water
velopment efforts remained distinct, molecules on the Moon, signaled this
with minimal technological overlap. In- shift. It was followed by the Mars Orbiter
dian scientists prioritized practical ap- Mission (Mangalyaan) in 2013, making
plications deriving from space-based India the first Asian nation to reach
assets aligning with Sarabhai’s vision of Mars, a milestone some analysts
utilizing space for socio-economic devel- viewed as strategically motivated in
opment. In this respect, India’s space light of China’s space advancements. In
program evolved around three key pil- 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi
96 Hellenic Air Force Review

announced India’s first human space- bilities.33 Since 2000, ISRO has
flight mission, Gaganyaan. As part of its launched several dual-use Earth obser-
long-term ambitions, India has also out- vation satellites capable of providing
lined plans to establish its own indepen- high-resolution imagery with military ap-
dent space station by 2035, further plications. The 1999 Kargil War ex-
solidifying its position as a major space posed weaknesses in India’s
power. As well, India has increasingly surveillance infrastructure, leading to
promoted commercialization and priva- greater investment in space-based re-
tization in its space sector. connaissance.34 Some satellites in the
Importantly, as part of this reorien- IRS series are believed to have military
tation of Indian space policy, New Delhi utility, while the CARTOSAT series deliv-
has become more willing to use space ers high-resolution data. Furthermore,
technology as a foreign policy tool, the RISAT (Radar Imaging Satellite) se-
partly in response to China’s growing in- ries, equipped with synthetic aperture
fluence in South Asia. A key example radar (SAR) enable Earth observation
has been Modi’s 2014 proposal for for dual-use purposes. India has also
a South Asian Association for Regional established NavIC (Navigation with In-
Cooperation (SAARC) satellite, aimed at dian Constellation), an independent re-
enhancing regional connectivity. Re- gional navigation system providing
named the South Asia Satellite after positioning, navigation, and timing
Pakistan withdrew, it was successfully (PNT) services. While its Standard Posi-
launched in May 2017, providing disas- tion Service (SPS) is open to civilian
ter management support, telemedicine, users, the Restricted Service (RS) is en-
tele-education, and weather forecasting crypted for military operations. ISRO
services to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, has also collaborated with the Airport
Bhutan, Nepal, the Maldives, and Sri Authority of India (AAI) to develop
Lanka.32 GAGAN (GPS Aided Geo Augmented
Navigation), which has potential dual-
India and military space use utility.
Apart from these dual-use capabili-
While these advancements serve to ties, India has also prioritized the devel-
highlight India’s expanding civilian opment of dedicated military space
space capabilities, its space program assets to strengthen its defense pos-
has also taken on an increasingly ture in space. In 2013, ISRO
strategic dimension. This has been launched GSAT-7, India’s first military
manifested in the deployment of satel- communications satellite, enhancing
lites that enhance India’s defense capa- the Indian Navy’s maritime surveillance
 Hellenic Air Force Review 97

and operational capabilities. This was of the armed forces, ISRO, and the De-
followed by GSAT-7A in 2018, designed partment of Space. Following the 2019
to improve communication for the In- ASAT test, India reinforced this by creat-
dian Air Force. In 2019, India ing the Defence Space Agency (DSA) to
launched EMISAT, an electronic intelli- address space-based threats and ex-
gence (ELINT) satellite jointly developed pand its defense capabilities. Together
by ISRO and the Defence Research and with this, the government approved the
Development Organisation (DRDO), Defence Space Research Organisation
aimed at detecting and intercepting (DSRO) to support space warfare devel-
hostile radar signals.35 opment and provide technical expertise
But India’s growing focus on military to the DSA. To complement these ef-
space capabilities has not been limited forts, ISRO initiated Project NETRA (Net-
to satellites. A significant demonstration work for Space Objects, Tracking, and
of the shift toward the use of space for Analysis), a space situational aware-
national security came with Mission ness system designed to monitor space
Shakti, in which a missile launched objects and provide early warnings of
from the Kalam Island missile com- potential threats, further securing
plex successfully intercepted the Mi- India’s space assets. In tandem with im-
crosat-R satellite, which was developed proving its independent military space
by the Defence Research and Develop- capabilities, India has deepened strate-
ment Organisation (DRDO) and gic space partnerships, particularly with
launched by ISRO in January 2019, in the United States, to counter China. An-
low Earth orbit at approximately 300 other example is the Quadrilateral Se-
km. The destruction of Microsat-R curity Dialogue (Quad), compri-
marked a major milestone in India’s mil- sing Australia, India, Japan, and the
itary space program. With this test, United States, which has expanded its
India became the fourth country, after focus to space.37
the United States, Russia, and China, to
demonstrate ASAT capabilities, signal-
ing its intent to strengthen its counter- In lieu of a conclusion: Making
space capabilities.36 sense of China and India
To further integrate space into mili- as space powers
tary operations, India established the
Integrated Space Cell in 2010 under the The rise of China and India as space
Integrated Defence Services (IDS) powers cannot be understood through
Headquarters to coordinate the use of a single International Relations theoret-
space assets across the three branches ical lens.38 Instead, an eclectic ap-
98 Hellenic Air Force Review

proach integrating structural impera- mestic political motivations. The Modi

tives, domestic politics, and normative government’s decision to authorize the
considerations provides a more com- test despite the technology being avail-
prehensive understanding of their able since 2012 coincided with the
space programs.39 A focus on structural 2019 general elections, leading to ac-
factors and systemic pressures associ- cusations that it was exploited for elec-
ated with a realist-oriented approach of- toral gain. Further reflecting domestic
fers a compelling explanation for both political considerations, space projects
countries’ pursuit of military space ca- in China are tightly woven into state nar-
pabilities, including anti-satellite ASAT ratives, boosting national pride as well
weapons. China’s 2007 ASAT test was as the legitimacy of the Chinese Com-
largely seen as a response to US mili- munist Party. Similarly, for political lead-
tary space dominance. Similarly, India’s ers like Modi, space achievements can
2019 ASAT test reflected its strategic serve as a means to bolster their per-
concerns about China’s growing space sonal image by associating their leader-
power. The action-reaction dynamic be- ship with national strength and
tween these states suggests a security technological success.
dilemma in space, where one country’s Beside structural imperatives and
advancements prompt others to de- domestic politics, taking into consider-
velop similar capabilities. However, ation the role of history and identity pro-
while such concerns explain why China vides further insights into the
and India pursue military space capa- motivations behind China and India’s
bilities, they do not fully account for the space ambitions. Both countries have
timing of key decisions and the ratio- sought to leverage space capabilities
nales behind specific projects, including for great power status and prestige,
ASAT tests. using high-profile space achievements
Looking at the impact of domestic to signal their emergence as great pow-
political consideration helps bridge this ers. The 19th-century idea of scientific
gap, highlighting how internal bureau- and technological progress as a “stan-
cratic and political factors shape space dard of civilization” reinforced a hierar-
policies. In China’s case, the 2007 ASAT chical view that distinguished European
test may have been driven by project from non-European societies, influenc-
managers seeking to demonstrate tech- ing China and India, which continue to
nological maturity and secure political use space projects as symbols of power,
approval for the program. Similarly, status, and modernity, driven by an in-
India’s ASAT test was not solely about fluential techno-nationalist ideology.40
deterring China but also had strong do- Therefore, China and India’s space
 Hellenic Air Force Review 99

programs reflect a complex interplay of programs will shape the future of space
strategic, political, and identity-driven security, commercial space activities,
factors. While national security con- and global space governance. Under-
cerns have played a role, their pursuit standing their roles is essential for mov-
of space capabilities, including ASATs, ing beyond a Western-centric view of
cannot be understood solely through a space and recognizing the complex dy-
military lens. Domestic political consid- namics of contemporary space security.
erations, bureaucratic interests, and
leadership ambitions have shaped key
decisions, while space achievements
serve as symbols of national pride, po- References
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tus. An eclectic approach is essential to *
This essay is an abridged, up-
fully grasp the motivations behind their dated, and significantly revised version
space programs, showing that space of Dimitrios Stroikos, 2023. ‘Still Lost in
power is not just about power politics Space? Understanding China and
but also about prestige, domestic legit- India’s Anti-Satellite Tests through an
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To conclude, China has firmly estab- 1
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China: The Struggle to Build a Mod- Non-Governmental Space Sector in
 Hellenic Air Force Review 101

the Context of Government Support ilian Mayer. 2023. “China’s Bifur-

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13
More information on APSCO is 18
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http://www.apsco.int. Regime for Outer Space in a US-
14
State Administration of Science, Hegemonic Space Order.” In Power
Technology and Industry for Na- Transition in the Anarchical Soci-
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kongjian xinxi zoulang jianshe yu and Cornelia Navari, 329–352. Pal-
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Opinions on Accelerating the Con- 19
For detailed discussions, see Dean
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https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzggw/jg tional Military Strategy: An
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15
United Nations Office for Outer People’s Liberation Army: Exploring
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nglish/n6465652/n6465653/c6 Press.
812150/content.html 20
Dimitrios Stroikos. 2023. “Still Lost
17
A useful discussion of China’s ap- in Space? Understanding China
proach to space diplomacy con- and India’s Anti-Satellite Tests
cerning the CSS and the ILRS is through an Eclectic Approach.” As-
provided in Kunhan Li and Maxim- tropolitics 21 (2–3): 184-5.
102 Hellenic Air Force Review

21
On the potential impact of MCF on First. London: Astrotalkuk Publica-
Chinese space activities, see Xiao- tions.
dan Wu and Jie Long. 2022. “As- 27
S. Vijayasekhara Reddy. 2008.
sessing the Particularity and “India’s Forays into Space: Evolu-
Potentiality of Civil–Military Integra- tion of Its Space Programme.” In-
tion Strategy for Space Activities in ternational Studies 45 (3):
China.” Space Policy 62: 101514. 215–245.On the importance of the
22
Xinhua. 2024. “Xi Focus: Xi Pres- IGY, see Dimitrios Stroikos. 2018.
ents Flag to PLA’s Information Sup- “Engineering World Society? Scien-
port Force.” Xinhua, April 19, tists, Internationalism, and the Ad-
2024. https://english.news.cn/20 vent of the Space Age.
240419/58e7b3a4d1f043858a0 ” International Politics 55 (1): 73–
d29fce5da4cf4/c.html 90.
23
For a fuller discussion, see 28
Ajey Lele, ISRO: Institutions that
Stroikos, Still Lost in Space. Shaped Modern India (New Delhi:
24
Chandrashekar, China’s Space Pro- Rupa Publications India Pvt. Ltd.,
gramme, p. 229. 2021), 7.
25
Clayton Swope. 2024. “No Place to 29
Reddy, India’s Forays, p. 238; Lele,
Hide: A Look into China’s Geosyn- ISRO, pp. 23–40.
chronous Surveillance Capabili- 30
For a detailed discussion of this
ties.” Center for Strategic and transformation of Indian space pol-
International Studies, January 19, icy, see Rajeswari Pillai Ra-
2024. https://www.csis.org/analy- jagopalan and Dimitrios Stroikos.
sis/no-place-hide-look-chinas-geo- 2024. “The Transformation of
synchronous-surveillance-capabiliti India’s Space Policy: From Space
es. for Development to the Pursuit of
26
On India’s space program, among Security and Prestige.” Space Pol-
others, see Marco Aliberti. icy 69: 101633.
2018. India in Space: Between Util- 31
Dimitrios Stroikos. 2024. “Space
ity and Geopolitics. Cham: Diplomacy? India’s New Regional
Springer; Gopal Raj. 2000. Reach Policy under Modi and the ‘South
for the Stars: The Evolution of Asia Satellite.’” India Review 23 (1):
India’s Rocket Programme. New 46–70.
Delhi: Viking; and Gurbir Singh. 32
This section draws from Stroikos,
2017. The Indian Space Pro- Still Lost, pp. 187-189.
gramme: India’s Incredible Journey 33
Bharath Gopalaswamy. 2019. Final
from the Third World Towards the Frontier: India and Space Secu-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 103

rity. Chennai: Westland Publica- tion is provided in Stroikos, Still

tions, 80–81. Lost.
34
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan. 39
Dimitrios Stroikos, “China, India,
“India’s Space Strategy: Geopolitics and the Social Construction of
is the Driver.” ISPI Online, Decem- Technology in International Society:
ber 11, 2020. Available at: The English School Meets Science
https://www.ispionline.it/en/pub- and Technology Studies,” Review of
blicazione/indias-space-strategy- International Studies 46, no. 5
geopolitics-driver-28607. (2020): 713–731.
35
Stroikos, Still Lost.
36
On India’s space partnerships, see
Rajagopalan and Stroikos, the
Transformation.
37
On International Relations theory
and space, see Dimitrios Stroikos.
2022. “International Relations and
Outer Space.” Oxford Research En-
cyclopedia of International Stud-
ies. Available at:
https://oxfordre.com/internation-
alstudies/view/10.1093/acre-
fore/9780190846626.001.0001/
acrefore-9780190846626-e-699.
38
A detailed discussion of this sec-

Short Biography

Dimitrios Stroikos is Head of the Space Policy Programme at

LSE IDEAS and teaches at the Department of International Rela-
tions, LSE. He serves as the editor of Space Policy: An Interna-
tional Journal. His research has appeared in such publications as
Astropolitics, India Review, International Politics, Journal of Con-
temporary China, Review of International Studies, and Space Pol-
icy.
He has also co-edited the book Rising Power, Limited Influ-
ence: The Politics of Chinese Investments in Europe and the Liberal International Order
(Oxford University Press). Stroikos holds a PhD in International Relations from LSE and
an MSc in Chinese Studies from the University of Oxford, both supported by scholarships
from the Greek State Scholarships Foundation (IKY).
 Israel’s Approach Towards
Space Security
& Sustainability i

Dr. Deganit Paikowsky

Citation: Paikowsky, D., Azoulay, T., Israel, I.B. (2020). Israel’s Approach Towards
Space Security and Sustainability. In: Schrogl, KU. (eds) Handbook of Space Secu-
rity. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23210-8_17
 Hellenic Air Force Review 105

Abstract threefold: 1. Promoting a robust and di-

versified space sector that provides for
In the last forty years, Israel devel- Israel’s national security needs and (2)
oped an indigenous space capability to protecting and safeguarding Israel’s
launch, develop, operate, and maintain space assets, while 3. Maintaining a
satellites in two main niche areas: Earth safe and sustainable space environ-
observation and communications, in- ment.
cluding the ground segment of Since its establishment, Israel has
communications satellites. Israel’s suffered from acute security threats be-
space program was born out of acute yond its immediate borders. Israel’s
national security needs. However, it has space program was set to meet these
led to the growth of commercial activity. threats by supporting early warning, in-
In recent years, Israel has expanded its telligence, deterrence, and self-reliance
cooperation with international partners in advanced technologies. Israel
and established a civilian space policy adopted a pragmatic approach to space
backed by modest government funding. as a small country with limited re-
Space activities are contributing signif- sources. Israel’s pragmatic approach
icant and cross-cutting benefits to contends that its space program in-
Israel’s national security. Within this cludes the capability to build, operate,
context, Israel considers international and launch remote sensing satellites
space security, safety and sustainability into space and develop and operate
to be of importance. communication satellites. Israel does
not undertake to build all systems en-
Keywords tirely on its own. It has, for example, no
navigation or weather satellites and no
Israel, space security, national secu- indigenous human spaceflight mis-
rity, strategic depth, early warning, sions. However, Israel increasingly co-
deterrence, self-reliance, space policy, operates with international partners on
international cooperation. projects of this nature and on scientific
projects.
Introduction Beyond its security needs, Israel’s
long legacy as a spacefaring nation with
This chapter, a condensed form of a a growing space ecosystem drives an
chapter published in 2020,ii analyzes orientation toward space security and
Israel’s overall approach to space secu- sustainability. Therefore, Israel attrib-
rity and posits that Israel’s approach to utes great importance to securing the
space security may be described as space environment for peaceful uses
106 Hellenic Air Force Review

for all nations. culture means a power which cannot be

overcome easily. All of that is accom-
An Overview of Israel’s Space plished without articulating an explicit
Program considering military threat, which could provoke an
its security conception unwanted and dangerous chain reac-
tion in the region.iv
Understanding Israel’s perception of More specific and tangible is the role
space and space security demands an the space program fulfills in mitigating
analysis of its national security concep- the challenge of Israel’s lack of strate-
tion.iii Israel’s security conception is gic depth and acute need for early
based on the understanding that it suf- warning caused by Israel’s narrow bor-
fers from a significant quantitative infe- ders. Under these geopolitical circum-
riority against its rivals. To overcome stances, it was necessary to avoid the
this numeric disadvantage, Israel’s elements of strategic surprise and sud-
leadership has focused on developing den attack. For these reasons, Israel’s
a qualitative edge. From this perspec- security doctrine demands advanced
tive, Israel’s space program plays a sig- intelligence capabilities for early warn-
nificant role in the overall answer to its ing, as well as combat capabilities for a
strategic challenges. First, Israel’s rapid transfer of battle away from Is-
space program provides significant tan- rael’s population centers. The orienta-
gible capabilities to deal with the tion towards space assists Israel in
threats imposed by Israel’s enemies. coping with the challenges presented
Second, and equally important, a na- by the lack of strategic depth and the
tional space program, which includes need to provide early warning.
the ability to develop and launch satel- With this in mind, the major impetus
lites into space, indicates very ad- leading to the decision to embark on an
vanced national capabilities. Israel’s independent Israeli space program was
achievements in space, whether civilian the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and
or military, project a clear message of the perceived need to protect Israel, in-
national might. They emphasize the cluding through the need to verify
qualitative gap between Israel and its Egypt’s compliance with the treaty. The
neighbors; they contribute to the coun- treaty did not neutralize Israel’s con-
try’s accumulated achievements, cerns of hostile Egyptian aspirations.
aimed at deterrence; and philosophi- Moreover, Israel was to withdraw from
cally, they reinforce the image of the the Sinai Peninsula. The greater dis-
«Iron Wall» in the eyes of its enemies, tance from Egyptian territory meant
i.e. a phrase that in Israel’s strategic that the Israeli military lost much of its
 Hellenic Air Force Review 107

early-warning intelligence-collection ca- any distance increases tremendously.»vii

pabilities, including the ability to carry The issue of Israel’s self-sufficiency
out manned reconnaissance flights is complex, and as a small country, Is-
over the Sinai Peninsula, now part of rael cannot be completely self-reliant.
the Egyptian sovereign state.v There- However, thanks to its space assets, Is-
fore, there was a clear need for intelli- rael has a great deal of autonomy in the
gence on what was happening in Egypt field of intelligence. Possession of inde-
without violating its sovereignty. One pendent intelligence capabilities has
potential solution to the early-warning many implications for Israel beyond the
problem was using reconnaissance intelligence field. It enhances the power
satellites.vi In 1981, the Israeli space of the state and its image in the eyes of
program was established based on a its opponents as well as its allies. It pro-
pragmatic approach aimed at satisfying vides flexibility, both in its ability to col-
national security needs of early warn- lect information and the resulting
ing, deterrence, and self-reliance in ad- autonomy in decision-making. Inde-
vanced technologies. In 1988, Israel pendent capabilities also permit the
successfully launched its first satellite, country to conceal its operational plans
Ofeq–1. Ofeq would become a very suc- and areas of interest and to collect in-
cessful line of increasingly advanced formation unhindered. The space pro-
earth observation capabilities. gram is an important building block of
The opportunity to observe Earth this capability.
from space is a technological solution Israel’s space program also con-
that enables Israel to cope with threats tributes to its deterrence. The following
from hostile countries directly bordering statement by Major General (Ret.)
the country, as well as those that David Ivri, former Air Force Commander
threaten Israel but are located farther (1977-1982) and later Director General
away geographically. The Israeli Air of the Ministry of Defense provides
Force Commander, Major General Amir valuable insight into the role of the Is-
Eshel, clearly explained the value of Is- raeli space program in Israel’s deter-
rael’s space capabilities as relates to rence strategy: “The perception of one’s
strategic depth in 2013: “The threats capabilities and one’s willingness to
we must deal with come from the bor- use those capabilities are important
der fence and from far away. Today, components of deterrence. The percep-
space is our strategic depth, and it is tion of space capabilities is one of the
what allows us to maintain our qualita- primary components in Israel’s future
tive advantage. Thanks to our indige- deterrence. Therefore, Ofeq 1, 2, and 3
nous satellites, our ability to operate at contributed far more than anyone esti-
108 Hellenic Air Force Review

mated. Imaging resolution is not the optical series, subsystems, and other
strategic measurement. Rather, the equipment.
strategic measurement is the percep- Israel’s space activity has under-
tion of capabilities that the State of Is- gone a comprehensive change since
rael displays. Not what we possess, but 2012. In November 2009, a national
rather what the enemy estimates that task force was appointed to reexamine
we possess. The gaps in capabilities the Israeli space effort and recommend
and information, in the tactical field, a new framework.ix The main mission of
miniaturization field, and others are an the task force was to focus on civilian
immeasurably important component in applications and scientific activity that
the dimension of our strategic deter- would allow Israel greater industrial
rence.”viii scale and competitiveness in the grow-
Israel remains one of very few coun- ing world space market. A detailed re-
tries in the world with the capability to port and recommendations were
launch satellites into space. This is submitted in June 2010, outlining Is-
even though Israel is the only country rael’s strengths, weaknesses, opportu-
that launches westward, against the ro- nities, and challenges for achieving its
tation of the earth, to avoid launching goals in space.x Scrutinizing all of these
over its neighbors to the East with parameters, the argument was that Is-
which it has strained relations. Launch- rael has great potential to lead in space
ing westward incurs a ‘cost’ of approxi- technology in specific areas, but be-
mately one-third of boost efficiency, cause of insufficient investments, Israel
which leads to significant constraints is in danger of gradually losing its com-
on payload weight. Israel overcame this petitive edge. In order to upgrade the
disadvantage by developing expertise in scale of the local space industry, it was
the miniaturization of components. This suggested that the Israeli government
expertise was one of many that served prioritize a national civilian space pro-
the development of commercial space gram focused on developing and renew-
presence. ing infrastructures, supporting
In the 1990s, Israel’s space industry academic research, and promoting in-
followed in the footsteps of many other ternational collaborations with other
technological sectors that were origi- spacefaring nations. After careful re-
nally related to defense and began view by the treasury officials, the Fi-
commercial spin-offs. As such, Israel nance Ministry approved funding for
developed commercial platforms such Israel’s new civil space program in De-
as the Amos communication satellite cember 2012. However, it was about a
series, EROS remote-sensing electro- third of the recommended amount.xi
 Hellenic Air Force Review 109

Nevertheless, based on this new later cancellation of the GoogleX Prize,

funding, the space agency began imple- SpaceIL continued and, in February
menting its new policy, geared towards 2019, launched its spacecraft aboard
R&D and modernization of its civilian a SpaceX Falcon-9 launcher. Several
space activities. Among its objectives weeks later it succeeded putting its
were advancing the local space indus- spacecraft “Beresheet” into lunar orbit,
try, strengthening academic research, making Israel only the 7th country to
and raising the Israeli public’s aware- achieve this feat. Unfortunately, the
ness of space activities and research, landing was not successful, and the
as well as reinforcing and expanding craft crash-landed on the lunar surface
international cooperation. on April 11, 2019.
Israel is often referred to as the To conclude this part, the rationale
Start-Up Nation, and this is true for the for Israel’s engagement in space activ-
space field as well. Following the im- ities described above reveals that Is-
pressive defense-related space ad- rael, which operates a successful space
vances and subsequent commercial program on a modest budget, views
space enterprises, a community of space as a significant opportunity, es-
space start-ups emerged in Israel. pecially as a force multiplier projecting
Aside from these initiatives, various ed- the quality of force over its quantity in
ucational projects have evolved as well, the broadest manner. This opportunity
such as the Herzliya Science Center for is accompanied by significant chal-
high school students. In 2014, this lenges, especially in maintaining its
project launched its first nano-satellite, qualitative advantage and preserving
Duchifat-1, which was built by high Israel’s position at the forefront of tech-
school studentsxii Duchifat-2 was nology. The significance of space in Is-
launched in 2017. In 2018, the Israel rael’s strategic conception and its
Space Agency initiated a wider project long-term and growing space capabili-
for high-school students that spread ties in the defense, civilian, and com-
around the country. xiii This initiative led mercial fields lead Israel to look for
to establishing a dedicated research ways to protect its satellites and shape
center for small satellites at Tel Aviv Uni- its perspective on space security. The
versity. next section provides an overview and
A particularly profound educational an analysis of Israel’s perspectives and
initiative, albeit non-governmental, is activities regarding space security and
SpaceIL. This project began as a com- sustainability.
petitor in the GoogleX Prize to land a
spacecraft on the moon. Despite the
110 Hellenic Air Force Review

Israel’s Perspectives on Space pacities, Israel values international co-

Security and Sustainability operation. For example, in Space Situa-
tional Awareness (SSA). Israel signed a
Israel attributes great importance to data-sharing agreement with the US
space security and sustainability. This STRATCOMM for Space Situational
interest extends beyond security needs Awareness in 2015. This agreement en-
and derives also from the desire to ables Israel to benefit from the collec-
compete in the global space market tive data of dozens of countries and
and maintain a safe and sustainable many commercial entities to avoid col-
space environment for all users. Should lisions with satellites and space
outer space become inaccessible and debris.xv
unsafe, this will negatively impact Is- Israel’s perspective on space secu-
rael’s overall space activities. rity and sustainability is broad and con-
At the heart of Israel’s approach to cerns a safe and sustainable space
advancing space security and sustain- environment for all users. To achieve
ability is promoting a robust and diver- this goal of greater space security and
sified space sector that provides for sustainability for all users, Israel is ac-
Israel’s national security needs and pro- tively looking to contribute to a sustain-
tects and safeguards Israel’s space as- able space environment. In this
sets, systems, and capabilities. For capacity, Israel shares the idea that
example, the following statement was achieving the goal of space security and
made by the Commander of the Israeli sustainability requires international col-
Air Force, Eliezer Shkedy, in 2007: «The laboration and the development of best
operational importance of space is in- practices for responsible behavior. In
creasing constantly. Why is this field this regard, Israel recognizes the signif-
critical? There exists a concern that oth- icance of contributing to multi-national
ers who recognize its importance will try efforts. An example of Israel’s efforts to
to attack space assets. We must con- promote the responsible, peaceful, and
sider defense measures against physi- safe use of space is its involvement in
cal harm, jamming, blinding, or any UN-COPUOS and its support of the LTS.
other technique. One of the greatest Additionally, Israel favorably views
surprises that can happen in the mod- legally non-binding efforts toward space
ern world, in advanced countries with sustainability. For example, Israel con-
space assets, is a situation in which a tributed to the consultations on the In-
country is surprised to find its space as- ternational Outer Space Code of
sets damaged.»xiv Conduct.xvi
In addition to building assets and ca-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 111

A final note References

To summarize, Israel’s space pro- i

The views expressed are solely the
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tional security needs. Over the years, cial policy or opinion of any Israeli
with Israel’s development and evolution entity.
as a country, its needs and capabilities ii
Paikowsky, D., Azoulay, T., Israel,
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for day-to-day activities and the nation’s 030-23210-8_17
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Ben Israel, I., and Paikowsky, D.
security a concern for Israel and de- (2017) The Iron Wall Logic of Is-
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Ben Israel, I., and Paikowsky, D.
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Such flights were considered a vio-
On the international level, as these lation of Egyptian sovereignty and
global trends of advancing space tech- were a very sensitive issue in the
nologies and reliance on space systems embryonic relations between the
and capabilities continue to grow, the two countries.
need to maintain the space environ- vi
For a review of the history of Is-
ment safe and secured will only rise. rael’s space effort see: Paikowsky,
Hence, Israel will continue to support D., «From the Shavit-2 to Ofeq-1- A
global efforts to promote responsible History of the Israeli Space Effort»,
behavior and pursue partnerships of Quest, Vol. 18, No. 4, Fall 2011, pp.
this kind. 4-12.
vii
Chanel, L. and Michael, T.
(2013). Ha Halal Hu Ha’Omek
Ha’astrategi [Space as strategic
depth]. [online] Israeli Air Force.
112 Hellenic Air Force Review

Available at: xiii

More Information is available on
http://www.iaf.org.il/4391-40401- the Israel Space Agency website:
he/IAF.aspx [Accessed 12 Jan. https://www.space.gov.il/news-
2019]. space/131327 Accessed on April
viii
Ivry, David (2006) ‘Hahalal Kezira 15, 2019.
Estrategit Ba’avar, Bahove, Ve- xiv
Shkedy, E., General, (2007), Ad-
ba’atid’ [Space as a Strategic dress at the 2007 Ilan Ramon An-
Arena in the Past, Present and Fu- nual Space Conference, Fisher-
ture]. Fisher Institute for Air and Institute for Strategic Air and Space
Space Strategic Studies :50 Studies, Herzliya.
ix
The task force was headed by Mr. xv
Pomerleau, M. (2019). Stratcom
Menachem Greenblum, Director expands space surveillance with Is-
General Ministry of Science and rael agreement — Defense Sys-
Technology and Prof. Isaac Ben Is- tems. [online] Defense Systems.
rael, Chairman of the Israeli Space Available at:
Agency. https://defensesystems.com/arti-
x
Paikowsky D, Levi R (2010). Space cles/2015/08/13/us-stratcom-is-
as a National Project – An Israeli rael-space-surveillance-agreement.
Space Program for a Sustainable aspx [Accessed 9 Jan. 2019].
Israeli Space Industry, Presidential xvi
For the updated version of the Eu-
Task-Force for Space Activity Final ropean initiative of the Outer Space
Report. Jerusalem: Israel Ministry Code of Conduct dated June 2012
of Science and Technology. please see:
xi
The Marker (2012) State will invest http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
90 million shekels in international media/1696642/12_06_05_coc_
space cooperation. space_eu_revised_draft_work-
https://www.themarker.com/news ing__document.pdf
/macro/1.1826164.
Accessed March 2 2019
xii
Winer, S. (2017). Nanosatellite built
by Israeli high-schoolers blasts into
space. [online] Timesofisrael.com.
Available at:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/na
nosatellite-built-by-israeli-high-
schoolers-blasts-into-space/ [Ac-
cessed 1 Apr. 2019].
 Hellenic Air Force Review 113

Short Biography

Dr. Deganit Paikowsky is an expert in international rela-

tions, specializing in the intersection of global politics and tech-
nological domains, with a focus on space, cyber, and emerging
technologies. She is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of In-
ternational Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
where she leads the Techno-Strategic Research Lab.
Dr. Paikowsky is also a Non-resident Scholar at the Space Pol-
icy Institute at George Washington University. Her work bridges
academic research and practical policy experience. She has
played a key role in shaping space and cyber-security policies in Israel, including serving
as Vice President of the International Astronautical Federation (IAF) on behalf of the
Israel Space Agency.
Dr. Paikowsky is the author of The Power of the Space Club (2017) and other
significant publications on space policy, security, and governance.
 The Space Program
of Τ urkiye

Lt. Colonel Panagiotis Katsaοunis

Citation: Lt. Colonel Panagiotis Katsaounis. (2025). The Space Program of Turkiye.
Hellenic Air Force Review, 134. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15166530
 Hellenic Air Force Review 115

being implemented, albeit with a delay.

Taking into account Turkey’s capa-
bilities in the space sector, the develop-
ment of national space capabilities by
our country (Greece) in the field of
telecommunications and earth obser-
vation satellites is a one-way street, in
order to compensate significantly for
“The only way to ensure justice in
the advantages that the Turkish Armed
the world is to exist in space in
a powerful manner” Forces (TAF), currently possess.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan (February 2021)
Keywords
Abstract
Turkiye, National Space Program,
From the launch of the first satel- Autonomous Space Capabilities, Soft
lites (1950s) to the modern era, Power
progress in the exploration and ex- Introduction
ploitation of space for political, scien-
tific and military purposes has been From the time of the launch of the
rapid. As access to space becomes first satellites1 and the subsequent ri-
more affordable, so too does the effort valry between the two superpowers, the
of states to exploit it. USA and the former USSR, to modern
In addition, space is considered one times, progress in the exploration and
of the dimensions of the unified battle- exploitation of space for political, scien-
field and its use can give a military tific and military purposes has been
force significant advantages. and remains rapid.
The 10 objectives of the Turkish Moreover, space is considered one
space program emphatically state that of the dimensions of the modern uni-
Turkey is seeking a new, upgraded role fied battlefield, hence it should be
in the world. Despite the fact that the taken into account in the planning and
development of autonomous space ca- conduct of operations, since they de-
pabilities by Ankara requires significant pend on the exploitation of the capabil-
funding, which is seriously hampered by ities provided by existing satellite
the serious problems of the Turkish systems, which gives significant advan-
economy (high inflation, devaluation of tages to a military force that exploits it.
the national currency, etc.), the main A characteristic example of the im-
axes of the Turkish space program are portance of space is the continuous in-
116 Hellenic Air Force Review

crease in investments, at the level of strengthen their economies and inter-

governments worldwide, which for the national partnerships, and enhance
year 2024 amounted to approximately their reputation on the international
135 billion dollars2, representing a 10% stage.
increase compared to 2023. Of the - Space activities enhance innova-
above amount, spending related to de- tion, paving the way for the use of new
fense constitutes the majority of budg- inventions and technologies in various
ets ($73 billion, percentage 54%), fields. As space programs are not lim-
underlining the strategic importance of ited to space, they increase employ-
space. ment and productivity in all sectors.

Figure 1: Government Space Programs (GSP). Amounts in millions of dollars. Source: Novaspace

The main reasons for the surge in in- - Space-related activities make peo-
vestment in space programs are: ple’s lives easier in many ways, includ-
- Space programs do indeed have ing:
very high costs for countries budgets. ● With the production of mi-
However, the achievements, fame and croscale satellites, observation
power gained as a result of implement- has become possible, increas-
ing such programs, make the costs neg- ing productivity in many sectors,
ligible. especially in the agricultural
- Space programs increase the geo- sector.
graphical value of countries, add to ● Thanks to the capabilities of ob-
their technological capabilities, servation satellites, it is now
 Hellenic Air Force Review 117

possible to monitor natural re- tion satellite named TÜRKSAT-1A on 24

sources, transport networks, Jan 94, but it crashed into the sea
etc., in real time. about 12 minutes after the launch due
● Remote sensing satellites pro- to a problem with the launch vehicle’s
vide real-time information for propulsion rocket.
national defense purposes (in- In the same year Turkey launched
telligence gathering, early warn- the communications satellite TÜRKSAT-
ing of missile threats, targeting, 1B, and in 1996 it launched a satellite
etc.). of the same type, TÜRKSAT-1C. The
● Communication satellites are above satellites ceased operations in
also used to transmit TV and 2006 and 2010, respectively. Since
radio signals and in other com- 1995, the Turkish government set the
munication sectors-areas (civil- objective of establishing a central struc-
military), such as internet ture for space policy-making, followed
access. by political processes, proposals, deci-
● In the near future, communica- sions and bills, which came to fruition
tion satellites will allow access on 13 Dec 18, when a Presidential De-
to high-speed internet connec- cree established the establishment and
tions everywhere in the world. operation of the Turkish Space Agency
● Location and time information (Türkiye Uzay Ajansı/TÜA).
can be collected at any time in TÜA is the government agency for
the world in a fast and accurate national aerospace research. It is based
way. in Ankara and comes under the Ministry
● In the coming years the space of Science and Technology. With its es-
economy will further develop in tablishment, the Department of Avia-
areas such as space tourism, tion and Space Technologies in the
space mining, etc. Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure
was abolished. TÜA prepares strategic
Brief Ηistory plans that include medium and long-
term goals and priorities, key principles
Turkey’s satellite program was and methods to be followed and re-
launched in 1989 and aimed at acquir- source allocation for aerospace science
ing national capabilities in the field of and technologies. TÜA co-operates
satellite communications. In this con- closely with the TÜBİTAK (Space Tech-
text, Turkey has been developing the nology Research Institute).
TÜRKSAT program since the 1990s The main institutions and compa-
when it launched its first communica- nies involved in Turkish satellite pro-
118 Hellenic Air Force Review

grams and space policy, apart from postgraduate space education

TUA, are TAI, ASELSAN and the Turkish ● Creation of Turkish GPS.
Defense Industry Presidency (SSB), with
the latter two companies having a major
role in satellite programs used for mili-
tary purposes.
On 09 Feb 21, Turkish President R.T.
Erdogan presented the National Space
Program at the Turkish Presidency’s
Conference and Cultural Center
(BEŞTEPE MİLLET KONGRE VE KÜLTÜR
MERKEZİ). The main objectives of the
Turkish Space Program are:
● Οn the 100th anniversary of the
establishment of the Republic of
Turkey, participation of a Turkish
astronaut in an international
space mission.
● Establishment of a satellite pro-
duction company.
Figure 2: The 10 objectives of Turkey’s space
● Establishment of a launch site program. Source: Anadolu News Agency.
within the Turkish territory and
on the territory of a third country Recent Developments
(Somalia).
● Increase in space capabilities Satellite Launches
through research and develop- The developments of the last five
ment of expertise in space years regarding the launch of Turkish
weather and meteorology. satellites are as follows:
● Development of an Earth-based - In 2021, 2 communication satel-
meteor and planetary observa- lites were launched, TÜRKSAT-5A (08
tion capability. Jan 2021) and TÜRKSAT-5B (20 Dec
● Conduct integrated studies by 2021). TÜRKSAT-5B was launched in
the space industry. December 2021 from Florida, USA on
● Establishment of a space center SpaceX’s FALCON 9 rocket and serves
and a space technology develop- as a backup for the TÜRKSAT-3A
ment zone. (launched in 2008) and TÜRKSAT-4A
● Providing undergraduate and (launched in 2014) satellites.
 Hellenic Air Force Review 119

Figures 3-4: The communications satellites TÜRKSAT-5A and 5B Source: TUA

- On 24 Jan 21 the launch of the do-

mestic mini observation satellite ASEL-
SAT-3U took place. The launch was
carried out by the American private
company SpaceX. ASELSAT-3U collects
data on the space environment and
transmits them to a ground station.

Photo 6: The Grizu-263A nanosatellite

Source: NanoSats Database

- On 15 Apr 23 earth observation

satellite IMECE (built by the Turkish
company TUBITAK UZAY) was launched.

Photo 5: The ASELSAT-3U satellite Source: TÜA

- On 13 Jan 22, the experimental

satellite Pocket Qube (5X5X5 cm and
weight 237 grams), a Turkish-made ex-
perimental satellite called Grizu-263A,
was launched from Cape Canaveral,
USA. The satellite was designed by the
Grizu-263 Space Team of the Faculty of
Engineering of Bulent Ecevit University Photo 7: IMECE earth observation satellite
(BEU). Source: TÜA
120 Hellenic Air Force Review

- On 09 July 24 the communications

satellite TURKSAT-6A (built by the Turk-
ish company TÜBITAK UZAY) was
launched.

Photo 9: The FGN-100d1 satellite.

Photo 8: The communications satellite Source: FERGANI SPACE
TÜRKSAT-6A Source: TÜBITAK UZAY
lites, of which 6 are in operation (TÜRK-
-On 14 Jan 25, Fergani Space, a SAT-3A/4A/4B.5A,5B and 6A).
company founded in 2022 by Selcuk - Five (5) earth observation satel-
Bayraktar, President of the Turkish com- lites, of which 3 are operational (GÖ-
pany Baykar (manufacturer of the TURK I and 2, IMECE).
BAYRAKTAR and AKINCI UAVs), an- - Three (3) satellites of various types
nounced the successful launch of the (ASELSAT-3U, GRIZU-263A and FGN-
FGN-100-d1 satellite from the Vanden- 100d1), which are in operation.
berg space base in the USA. The 102- It is worth noting that both the com-
kilogram satellite is part of Fergani munication satellites and the remote
Space’s ambitious Positioning Satellite sensing satellites have a dual use since
Constellation Project. they are used for civil and military pur-
FGN-100-d1 was launched along poses (a percentage of their resources,
with other satellites as part of the Trans- which varies depending on the satellite,
porter-12 mission, through a Rideshare is used exclusively by the Turkish Armed
program. Its operation began immedi- Forces).
ately, transmitting telemetry data and
implementing the first step of an ambi- Staff Training
tious plan to complete a Turkish geolo- In the context of making the Turkish
cation satellite system. space program as independent as pos-
sible from foreign sources, Turkey has
Turkey has so far launched a total sought and is seeking to train appropri-
of: ate personnel in space technology.
- Eleven (11) communication satel- Thus, postgraduate space degree pro-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 121

grams have been established at the Future Developments

Turkish Aviation Academy as well as
Know How Technology Transfer pro- Turkey remains committed to its
grams from the British SSTL (Surrey space program in all areas of space ap-
Satellite Technology Ltd). At the same plications, building and designing new
time, TÜBİTAK funds scholarships for satellites for both civil and military pur-
postgraduate and doctoral studies poses. At the same time, it is seeking to
abroad (TÜBİTAK BİDEB 2213 and develop indigenous capabilities in areas
2230 Scholarship Programs). where it does not yet have sufficient ex-
pertise.
Creation of a Space Station in In particular, Turkey has for years
Somalia set itself the goal of acquiring au-
According to Turkish and interna- tonomous space capabilities in at least
tional media, Turkey will build a space two areas, the development of satellite
station in Somalia to carry out missile platforms and the development of pay-
tests and long-range launches. loads for communications, reconnais-
The decision to build this facility in sance (optical, IR and RADAR) and
Somalia is attributed to its proximity to tracking/navigation purposes.
the equator, a location that is advanta- Its intention is that by 2028 it will be
geous for missile launches due to its able to use its own satellite launchers
lower fuel requirements and better pay- in order not to be dependent on other
load capacity. Somalia is one of the countries or private companies. The
three ideal locations for launches near rockets are planned to be launched
the equator, along with Kazakhstan’s from the space station to be built in So-
Baikonur Cosmodrome and the launch malia, as mentioned above.
complexes used by NASA and SpaceX in The Turkish space program has as
Florida, USA. its main future goal the landing of an
The planned project follows a mar- unmanned spacecraft with a national
itime exploration agreement in the hybrid rocket. In this context, a test ver-
African country’s EEZ by a Turkish seis- tical launch of a hybrid rocket carrier
mic survey ship and marks a deepening (SORS) was successfully carried out on
of relations between the two countries. 19 Jul 21. The launch was carried out
It will be recalled that Turkey has built from Sinope, while the first vertical
and operates a large military base in propulsion test of the SORS hybrid
Somalia. rocket carrier was carried out on 11 Apr
21.
The ultimate goal of the space pro-
122 Hellenic Air Force Review

gram is to send a Turkish astronaut into SSA system) intends to develop a space
space or to carry out a Turkish scientific situational awareness capability by de-
mission to the Moon, manned or un- ploying ground-based RADARs.
manned, within the current decade. TÜBİTAK UZAY (SPACE), with the ex-
As far as the creation of a Turkish perience gained from the management
GPS is concerned, the milestone is the of earth observation satellites, has a
launch of the FGN-100d1 satellite, national program underway to develop
while the desired end state is the ability ground stations for earth observation
to provide dedicated positioning infor- satellites [Milli Yer Istasyonu Gelistirme
mation in areas such as transport, com- Projesi (MİYEG)]. The aim of this pro-
munications and military operations. gram is also to develop a station that
For the coming years there are will be able to cooperate with all types
plans for the new TÜRKSAT 7 series of of satellites.
telecommunications satellites, as well
as new telecommunications satellites, Capabilities - Advantages
both in geostationary and earth orbit. at Military Level
As far as new systems are concerned,
an exclusively military telecommunica- Turkey’s space program and in par-
tions satellite for use by the TEDs only ticular the capabilities provided to the
(MAHU: Milli Askeri Haberleşme Uy- Turkish Armed Forces, the services of
dusu) is already in the planning stage. Turkish satellites, give significant advan-
For the first time, the military satellite tages both in the planning and in the
will have UHF-Band and EHF-Band phase of conducting operations, such
transponders developed by ASELSAN. as:
Another area under consideration is - Communication satellites provide
the development of a Space Surveil- the possibility of continuous communi-
lance System. This system is related to cation of troops and assets, regardless
ground-based space surveillance which of the communication difficulty and dis-
is necessary for those countries that tance. They are an important part of the
have made a significant investment in Command, Control, Communications
their space infrastructure, since satel- and Intelligence (C3I) function which
lites are valuable assets that need to be aims to ensure uninterrupted communi-
protected from a number of events such cations in the theatre of operations with
as collision with each other, avoidance high security. Timely transmission of or-
of space debris, etc. For this reason, ders ensures a common understanding
Turkey, like other countries, and the EU of the current operational situation and
(with the Space Situational Awareness- contributes to effective Command and
 Hellenic Air Force Review 123

Control. It promotes interoperability satellite telecommunications by the

since everyone communicates with TDFs, and indeed in a secure manner,
everyone in a short time. This ensures enables military units and assets to be
short response times, seamless flow of deployed over long distances from their
information and timely information for bases, especially in isolated areas, thus
decision making, achieving centralised extending their area of operations.
control and decentralised execution. -Peacetime remote sensing satel-
- The use of communication satel- lites have been contributing to the col-
lites provides the possibility of becom- lection of information on the enemy by
ing independent of vulnerable and obtaining high-resolution satellite im-
expensive land lines, coupling nodes or ages. Satellite images provide informa-
submerged submarine cables and relay tion on terrain, layout and facilities, thus
stations, which require high mainte- facilitating the targeting process. At the
nance costs in peacetime and can be same time, the use of national remote
destroyed either by attack or sabotage sensing satellites ensures secrecy as to
in times of operations. the type of information nationally
- The use of TÜRKSAT telecommuni- sought.
cation satellites by the Turkish Armed - In times of crisis, remote sensing
Forces units ensures the ability to trans- satellites enable early detection of any
fer tactical data and imagery over the military preparations, troop movements
horizon, under any conditions, from and asset redeployments, revealing
multiple platforms (e.g., aircraft, FMS) enemy intentions and movements, thus
and to any Command and Control Cen- contributing to the prevention of strate-
tre. Satellite linking capabilities upgrade gic surprise.
the operational capabilities of Turkish - In the course of operations, early
UAVs (UAVs) by increasing the range of identification of the battle layout en-
action by ensuring deep penetration ables the disclosure of enemy inten-
missions beyond the horizon (BEYOND tions and feeds back the targeting
LINE OF SIGHT - LOS). This facilitates in- process, especially when identifying
telligence gathering and early threat de- high value and priority targets, while fa-
tection, while providing the military cilitating the assessment of post-attack
hierarchy with the ability to fully under- effects (Battle Damage Assessment -
stand the current joint operational pic- BDA). Military installations, defensive
ture in a short time, which in turn protection assets and critical infrastruc-
facilitates the decision-making process ture (power stations, oil refineries, air-
and the conduct of operations. ports, bridges, telecommunication
- The uninterrupted operation of infrastructure, etc.) are identified and
124 Hellenic Air Force Review

inter-agency coordination is facilitated. faces many challenges. Space explo-

- Possible future use by the Turkish ration requires financial resources,
Armed Forces of new satellite systems high-tech infrastructure and a skilled
capable of providing GPS services will workforce. Managing these costs while
enable complete independence from balancing other national priorities will
third country satellites and ensure un- be of key importance for Ankara.
interrupted operational use of high-tech The economic constraints resulting
and lethal GPS/INS-guided missiles and from the state of the Turkish economy
munitions. (high inflation, continuous devaluation
of the national currency, etc.) may have
Capabilities at Political Level a negative impact on the funding of
Turkey’s space program, preventing it
Turkey, as part of its strategic goal from achieving its objectives.
to become a global power, has ex- In addition, possible cooperation
panded the coverage area of its with China and Russia on the Interna-
telecommunications satellites, covering tional Lunar Research Station could fur-
communication areas in North, Central ther complicate Turkey’s relations with
and Southern Africa, Asia and the Mid- Western allies.
dle East, thus facilitating Turkish pene- Overall, while Turkey is pursuing
tration in the framework of «soft power» technological advancement and na-
in countries and regions of interest. tional prestige through its space pro-
Ankara’s continuous effort to create gram, its economic aspects and
autonomy in terms of space capabilities geopolitical alliances present chal-
is also aimed at gaining economic ben- lenges that could lead to friction with
efits and creating dependency relations Western alliance partners.
with third countries to which space serv-
ices will be provided. Therefore, it is ex- Challenges for Greece
pected that in the near future Turkey will
seek to commercialize its space capa- Turkey’s space program is bound to
bilities, as its ultimate goal is to become pose challenges for Greece, at least at
a country that will produce and launch the military level.
satellites, exporting related technology The neutralization of Turkish satel-
and providing space services. lites in wartime is considered challeng-
ing by Greece, since it is estimated that
Challenges - Weaknesses countries with high space technology
capabilities such as the US, Russia,
Despite its space ambitions, Turkey China, etc. have the ability to attack and
 Hellenic Air Force Review 125

destroy enemy satellites. Conclusions

For this reason, it is estimated that
measures should be considered to limit The Turkish space policy is a long-
the impact of the satellite capabilities of term one, and has been a long-standing
the Turkish Armed Forces, such as: government priority since the 1990s,
- Locating and recording as far as which, despite any delays, has been im-
possible the transit times of Turkish plemented consistently, at least in its
earth observation satellites over Greek main axes.
territory, so that on the one hand our Turkey has maintained a largely har-
country’s ED can significantly limit the monized national approach, character-
movement of forces and appropriate ized by a common vision and culture,
measures are taken to conceal military and close cooperation between the rel-
units and assets. evant ministries, research organizations
- Wide use of homologated wea- and the academic community, as well
pons systems and assets. as the domestic and international aero-
- Meticulous concealment of wea- space industry.
pon systems and means by appropriate Turkey’s main objectives are to be
means of camouflage, in order to make present in all space themes, to be ori-
it difficult to identify them in terms of ented towards serving foreign policy, se-
their number, deployment locations and curity and defense needs and to strive
type. for autonomy through indigenous de-
- Taking into account that in a pe- sign and production of satellite systems.
riod of operations part of the move- The main areas in which it has fo-
ments of military forces and means, cused are the development of telecom-
due to the speed of the operations, will munications, earth observation
take place in good weather conditions satellites and positioning-navigation
and therefore may be perceived by the satellites. These satellites have a dual
enemy, it is necessary in all phases of use since they are used for both civil
the battle and at all levels of command and military purposes.
to plan and implement plans and ac- The Turkish plan to develop space
tions of deception in order to create capabilities places particular emphasis
confusion for the enemy, difficulty in on the training of personnel in order to
making a decision and fragmentation of create a ‘pool’ of qualified personnel
his forces, which is necessary especially and then to use them appropriately.
when facing an opponent with greater Turkey, in the context of its strategic
numerical strength. objective to become a global power, has
expanded the coverage area of its
126 Hellenic Air Force Review

telecommunications satellites, covering References

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BC%CE%B1-%CF%84%CE%B7
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h

Short Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Panagiotis Katsaοunis serves at Hellenic

General Staff of the Army (HAGS) as an Intelligence Analyst. He
has been trained in the fields of Intelligence Collection and
Analysis, Counter-Intelligence, Cyber Defence, Counter-Terror-
ism and Strategic Communication.
In addition, he lectures as a military instructor on subjects re-
lated to his specializations at numerous Armed Forces Schools,
such as the Army Land Warfare School, the Air Force Warfare
School, etc.
 The EU Space Strategy for
Security & Defence 1

Patrick Chatard Moulin,

Senior Advisor Space Security and Defence,
European External Action Service

Citation: Patrick Chatard Moulin, Senior advisor Space Security and Defence, Euro-
pean External Action Service. (2025). The EU Space Strategy for Security and De-
fence. Hellenic Air Force Review, 134. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15165983
 Hellenic Air Force Review 129

Abstract: Introduction

In 2022, EU leaders identified Space services have become indis-

space as a strategic domain in the pensable and integral to the daily func-
Strategic Compass and called for an tioning of our societies and economies.
EU Space Strategy for Security and De- At the same time, space has always in-
fence. In a joint endeavour between volved a security and defence dimen-
the European Commission and the sion. Space is a critical enabler of
High Representative, the first EU Space modern warfare, providing vital intelli-
Strategy for Security and Defence gence and situational awareness capa-
(SSSD) was published in 2023. The bilities that allow for near real-time
Strategy establishes a foundation for a tracking of troop movements and ma-
shared understanding of space threats noeuvres, precision guidance, as well
among EU Member States and enhanc- as communications services. These are
ing the resilience and protection of crucial for ensuring swift and coordi-
space systems and services of the EU. nated military responses on the battle-
It outlines measures for responding to field: The Ukrainian army, for example,
space threats, strengthening the use in its continued fight against Russia’s
of space for security and defence, and war of aggression makes extensive and
promoting partnerships to encourage decisive use of space systems every
responsible behaviour in space. This day.
article explores the development of the As space is becoming more and
SSSD and the EU’s recognition of more essential, space systems and
space as a strategic domain, outlining services also become targets. Over the
its main pillars and reporting on the recent decades, the number of space
current state of implementation. More- threats has intensified significantly.
over, it explores the evolving role and Several nations have developed so-
growing significance of a coherent EU called counter space capabilities, which
space strategy amid changing geopo- cover a range of abilities for disrupting,
litical dynamics. degrading, destroying, or denying the
use of space systems.
Keywords: Space is now regarded as a strate-
gic domain. In 2019, the North Atlantic
EU Space Policy; Space Strategy; Treaty Organization (NATO) for the first
Strategic Compass; Space Security and time recognized space as its fifth oper-
Defence; Space Threats; Space Diplo- ational domain, next to air, land, mar-
macy itime, and cyberspace. Following
several discussions among EU leaders,
130 Hellenic Air Force Review

the EU Strategic Compass,1 formally ap- fence Agency (EDA) as well as the Euro-
proved by the EU and its Member States pean Union Military Staff (EUMS). The
in March 2022, also referred to Space EU Member States were involved
as a strategic domains and called for a throughout the entire process through
European Union Space Strategy for Se- a series of informal consultation work-
curity and Defence (SSSD). shops, briefings as well as bilateral ex-
A few months later, in the eve of the changes. Consultations of the space
Russian invasion, a number of threats industry, think tanks, and academia
in the space domain became reality: A also provided very useful inputs.
major SatCom infrastructure was cyber- Few month after the Joint Commu-
attacked by Russia, and the supply of nication on the SSSD was adopted the
launchers and other key components of Council adopted Conclusion and the Eu-
the EU space programmes became ropean adopted a Reports both of
more difficult. A few years after having which were very supportive to the pro-
destroyed one of their own satellites posed action of the strategy.2
with an anti-satellite missile back in No-
vember 2021, a test which was widely Understanding Space Threats
condemned, Russia started to publicly The first element of the SSSD ad-
declare threaten commercial satellites dresses the scope and what we under-
used by Ukraine to defend itself. stand as ‘space domain’ which
“includes any element relevant for the
functioning of space systems and the
The Genesis of Space Strategy for delivery of space-based services in the
Space Security & Defence EU and the Member States”. Impor-
tantly, this definition not only encom-
The preparation of the EU Space passes the space environment and
Strategy for Space Security & Defence space-based assets such as satellites,
mobilized a lot of relevant actors across but also ground facilities, radio fre-
EU institutions and Member States. In quency links, user terminals, as well as
its format of a Joint Communication, the the industrial space sector and their un-
SSSD was a joint endeavour between derlying supply chains.
the European External Action Service The first actions envisaged in the
(EEAS) serving the High Representative strategy relate to awareness and the
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy need to develop a strategic culture of
and the Directorate General for Defence space security across Europe. The
Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) of the SSSD emphasises the importance of a
European Commission. Further expert- shared understanding of space threats.
ise was supplied by the European De- The EU now provides an annual, classi-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 131

fied analysis of the space threat devel- gramme which may affect the security
opments based on the intelligence con- of the Union. The High Representative
tributions by the EU Member States. will propose to amend the existing legal
framework to ensure an even more
Increasing the resilience of thorough and swift EU-level reaction to
the European Space sector a wider range of space threats through
The SSSD then addresses the need a toolbox for countering space threats
to increase the resilience and the pro- using diplomatic, technical, economic,
tection of space systems delivering and potentially military responses. Such
services to the EU. This goes beyond the a mechanism would complement and
systems and services of the EU Space interoperate with the already existent
Programme, such as the Galileo naviga- cyber diplomacy and hybrid toolboxes.
tion system and the Copernicus earth The EU regularly exercises its response
observation system: The European to space threats along with the mutual
Commission and its EU Agency for the defence clause (Article 42.7 TFUE), in
Space Programme is working with the case a space incident would amount to
EU industrial space sector to increase an armed aggression on the territory of
both security awareness and the ex- a Member State.
change of best practices through so-
called Information Security Awareness Enhancing the use of space
Centres (ISACs). The Commission is also for security and defence
preparing a new European Space Act to The SSSD also addresses the need
shape a European internal market of to make better use of the space sys-
space systems and services, with a view tems and services for security and de-
to ensure a level playing field for secu- fence. This includes capabilities such
rity, sustainability, and resilience across Galileo’s Public Regulated Service
the EU. (PRS) for military-grade positioning and
timing, a strategic enabler for military
Responding to Space Threats operations, or how sensor development
The EU also needs to deter others can support the national Space Domain
from threatening the EU and its Mem- Awareness capabilities of our Member
ber States’ space systems and services. States. The new flagship IRIS2, which
To this end, the SSSD proposes to fur- will provide secure and highly resilient
ther develop the EU Space Threat Re- communications to Member State gov-
sponse Architecture originally ernments, is set to become fully opera-
established to ensure security of sys- tional by 2030. Meanwhile, the
tems and services deployed, operated GovSatCom component of the EU
and used under the Union Space Pro- Space Programme already helps with
132 Hellenic Air Force Review

the pooling and sharing of Governmen- Race in Outer Space. The EU frequently
tal Satellite Communication capabilities addresses space security issues as part
of EU Member States. of dedicated EU dialogues with third
Earth Observation is also essential countries. Such dialogues help coordi-
for security and defence: Copernicus is nate efforts with our partners and al-
a success story of the European Space lies, share our vision of peaceful uses
programme but its main purpose re- of outer space, and the establishment
lates to environmental monitoring and of relevant diplomatic channels to avoid
climate change. The SSSD now calls for miscalculation.
the establishment of a dedicated EU NATO is an essential partner. In De-
Earth Observation Governmental Serv- cember 2023, the EU and NATO
ice (EOGS) in order to ensure a highly launched a Structured Dialogue to ex-
resilient and continuously available sit- plore cooperation in areas including
uational awareness service in support space security, the need for education
of high-end security and defence appli- and training, as well as responsible
cations. This new capability would help space behaviours.
increase the strategic autonomy of Sat-
Cen, the EU’s geospatial intelligence Conclusion
centre, our eyes in orbit in support of
the EU’s common security, defence and Since the adoption of the SSSD in
foreign policy CFSP and CSDP. 2023, the geopolitical context has con-
siderably evolved and the risks did not
External engagement decrease. For the first time since the
adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, a
Finally, the SSSD highlights the es- resolution on space security was
sential role of partnerships to ensure re- brought to the attention of the UN Secu-
sponsible behaviour in space. The EU is rity Council, reminding us of the risks
committed to preventing an arms race posed by the possible deployment of
in outer space both because it would nuclear weapons in space.
prevent the use of space for future gen- In this context the reports of the
eration and because it could danger- Sauli Niinistö on Strengthening the Eu-
ously amplify tensions, given the rope’s Civilian and Military Prepared-
strategic nature of space. The EU, as ness of 2024,3 as well as of Mario
permanent observer in the United Na- Draghi on the Future of European Com-
tions (UN) supports its Member States petitiveness in September 2024 refer to
in relevant discussions, particularly in the importance of Space.4
the newly established Open-Ended To implement all of the above ac-
Working Group on Preventing an Arms tion, Europe needs to revisit its ap-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 133

proach of space cooperation. We need and Security”, 2022. Available:

to train and educate our workforce and https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/
industry in space security and defence, document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf
enable the EU to protect its interests, re-
2
European Commission and High Repre-
duce dependency on external partners, sentative of the Union for Foreign Af-
fairs and Security Policy, «Joint
and strengthen our strategic autonomy
Communication to the European Parlia-
in an increasingly competitive global
ment and the Council on the European
landscape.
Union Space Strategy for Security and
1
This article is the abstract of the Defence,» JOIN(2023) 9 final, Brussels,
presentation delivered on 28 November 2023
2024 at the Hellenic Air Force Academy, as
3
Niinistö, Sauli. Safer Together: Strength-
ening Europe’s Civilian and Military Pre-
part of the Common Module on Space Ap-
paredness and Readiness. European
plications for Security and Defence 2024.
Commission, 30 Oct. 2024,
The event was organised under the aus-
https://commission.europa.eu/docu-
pices of the European Security and Defence
ment/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-
College (ESDC) of the European Union. 8b77-8739b19d047c_en?filename
References =2024 _Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf.
4
Draghi, Mario. The Future of European
1
Council of the European Union, “A Competitiveness. European Commis-
Strategic Compass for Security and De- sion, 9 Sept. 2024, https://commis-
fence - For a European Union that Pro- sion.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiven
tects its Citizens, Values and Interests ess/draghi-report_en.
and Contributes to International Peace

Short Biography

Patrick Chatard Moulin is Senior Adviser on Space Secu-

rity and Defence at the European External Action Service (EEAS),
focusing on space security, defence, and international aspects
of European Space Policy.
With 15 years of EU experience, he has worked on initia-
tives such as Space Surveillance, GOVSATCOM, and EU SatCen.
He joined the European Defence Agency in 2005, launching co-
operative projects, before serving in the EU’s General Secre-
tariat of the Council and DG GROW’s Space Policy unit.
From 2017 to 2021, he oversaw EUROSUR and con-
tributed to drafting the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation at DG HOME. A
former French Air Force Engineering Officer with over 15 years of service, Patrick grad-
uated from the French Air Force Academy and Telecom Paris as a SATCOM Engineer.
He is an International Space University alumnus and guest lecturer.
 An Evolving Engagement of
the EU Agency for the
Space Programme in
Space Security

Dr. Christina Giannopapa

European Union Agency for the Space Programme

Copyright, European Union Agency for the Space Programme, 2025

Citation: Dr. Christina Giannopapa, European Union Agency for the Space Pro-
gramme. (2025). An Evolving Engagement of the EU Agency for the Space Pro-
gram in Space Security. Hellenic Air Force Review,
134. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15168181
 Hellenic Air Force Review 135

Abstract urban development, environment, cli-

mate change, etc. Space technologies
The EU Space Programme inte- and applications also support safety,
grates security and defence considera- security, and defence. It can assist in
tions, marking a significant disaster management, search and res-
transformation in the Union’s strategic cue, border monitoring and control, etc.
posture and strategic autonomy, reduc- which currently occupies decision and
ing dependence on non-EU space sys- policy makers with the overall geopolit-
tems and ensuring uninterrupted ical setting.
access to critical space-based services. Space security is a concept that has
At the heart of this evolution lies the Eu- been evolving over the past few years
ropean Union Space Programme and with no universally accepted definition.
European Union Agency for the Space Traditionally, it has been defined as the
Programme (EUSPA). EUSPA has a cen- ability to access and use space for all
tral role in the operational management nations. However, with the increase in
of the EU Space Programme, and a piv- space activity and the development of
otal role in the space security of the EU new technologies, the concept of space
space assets while supporting the security has been broadened to include
emergence of safety and security-re- the protection of space assets and the
lated applications. This article provides prevention of an arms race in space.
and overview of the evolving role of the The policies and strategies of the Euro-
European Union Agency for the Space pean Union (EU) outline the concept as
Programme (EUSPA) in space security. encompassing the protection of space-
based assets, ensuring the resilience of
Keywords: space systems, and safeguarding the
interests of the EU and its Member
Space Security, EU Space Pro- States in the space domain (Figure 1).
gramme, EUSPA, Strategic Autonomy,
Space Infrastructure The EU Space Programme inte-
grates security and defence considera-
Introduction tions, marking a significant
transformation in the Union’s strategic
Space has become part of everyday posture. At the heart of this evolution
life, offering a multitude of applications lies the European Union Space Pro-
and services. It can serve as an enabler gramme and European Union Agency
for sectorial policies. These include agri- for the Space Programme (EUSPA) 1.
culture, fisheries, transport, energy, EUSPA has a central role in the opera-
136 Hellenic Air Force Review

Figure 1: The seamless chain of citizens protection encompassing safety, security and defence.

tional management of the EU Space space security. Furthermore, this study

Programme, and a pivotal role in the contributes to the broader discourse on
space security of the EU space assets the EU’s strategic autonomy in space
while supporting the emergence of and its capacity to safeguard critical
safety and security-related applications. space infrastructure in an increasingly
This shift aligns with broader EU policy contested environment.
initiatives, including the 2022 Strategic
Compass for Security and Defence2 and The EU in space
the 2023 EU Space Strategy for Secu-
rity and Defence (EUSSD) 3, both of EU space framework
which underscore space as a strategic
domain critical to the Union’s resilience, The European Union (EU) has in-
autonomy, and security2,3. The integra- creased over the years its engagement
tion of security elements enhances the in the space landscape. Historically, the
resilience of EU space infrastructure EU’s engagement in space activities
against emerging threats, including cy- was primarily oriented towards the en-
berattacks, space debris proliferation, hancement of technological innovation
and counterspace capabilities. and industrial competitiveness. This ori-
Against this backdrop, this paper entation mirrored the broader tenets of
provides an introduction to the EU European integration, prioritizing eco-
Space Programme and the EU Agency nomic expansion and scientific ad-
for the Space Programme and high- vancement.
lights specific elements related to The Lisbon Treaty, which came into
space security. Moreover, the analysis force on December 1, 2009 4 provides
delves into the specific activities in the first explicit legal basis for EU action
space technologies and services for in space. Article 189 of the Treaty on
 Hellenic Air Force Review 137

the Functioning of the European Union strated by the 2022 Strategic Compass
(TFEU) granted the EU competence in for Security and Defence 2 and the
particular in drawing up a European 2023 EU Space Strategy for Security
space policy (Art. 189.1); establish the and Defence 3.
necessary measures which may take
the form of a European space pro- Union Space Programme
gramme (Art. 189.2) and establish ap-
propriate relations with the European The Union Space Programme, under
Space Agency (ESA). Today the EU has Regulation (EU) 2021/696, 1 consoli-
set up an elaborate framework based dates all space-related activities under
on Art. 189 (Table 1). a single framework. With a budget for

Table 1: Main documents of the EU space framework after the Lisbon treaty

The changing geopolitical environ- the period 2021 to 2027 of €14.8 bil-
ment has prompted the EU to recon- lion, it surpasses previous investments,
sider its strategy for space. Over the reflecting the increasing importance of
past two decades, space has increas- space in European security and compet-
ingly become a competitive and strate- itiveness.
gic area, necessitating the integration
of security goals into what was once a Galileo and EGNOS
primarily civilian-focused policy. This The involvement of the EU in the
changing environment has gradually Galileo project was defined in its initial
brought security issues into the EU’s stage through a Council Resolution in
space policy, most recently demon- 1999 21. The first phase of Galileo went
138 Hellenic Air Force Review

from 2003 to 2005, when the first ex- gramme was approved by the European
perimental satellite, GIOVE-A, was Council in 1994. It was confirmed to be
launched. Galileo kept developing and a component of Europe’s satellite navi-
in 2008 GIOVE-B was launched, fol- gation policy in 2003. In 2005, the ver-
lowed by the first two In-Orbit Validation sion 1 (v1) of the system started its
(IOV) satellites in 2011, as well as the initial operations phase, followed by the
first two Full Operational Capability v2.1 which implemented the EGNOS
(FOC) satellites in 2014 5. Data Server, while the v2.2 allowed for
In 2016 Galileo entered into Initial an extended coverage through the Re-
Services. Since then, billions of people gional Extension Module concept. In
worldwide with a Galileo enabled device 2009, EGNOS assets were transferred
have been able to use its signals for po- from ESA to the European Commission,
sitioning, navigation and timing. This and the OS was declared operational;
was a milestone that corresponded to since 2014 the EGNOS exploitation has
the availability of the first operations of been delivered by EUSPA (previously
the Open Service (OS), Public Regulated GSA) under delegation from the Euro-
Service (PRS), and Search and Rescue pean Commission. In 2018 a contract
(SAR) services. In December 2016, was signed for the development of the
EUSPA (then GSA) became the service next version of EGNOS 5.
operator for Galileo. Later in 2019, the
phase of Enhanced Services started, Copernicus
which implemented the OS Positioning Copernicus was born from the idea
for improved navigation performances, of creating a European environment
and made available the SAR Return monitoring programme, agreed upon in
Link Service (RLS). 1998. The programme was initially in-
The Open Service FOC phase is now troduced as “Global Monitoring for En-
under preparation, and it will mark the vironmental Security”; then, in 2004, a
availability of the various services in space-based observation component
their final configuration. The Initial Op- was proposed, therefore the European
erational Capability of the Public Regu- Commission and ESA signed an agree-
lated Service is under preparation, and ment setting the stage for the Sentinel
the new OSNMA (Authenticated-Open satellites family. In 2011, the Initial Op-
Service) is under testing. The High Ac- eration phase began, and the pro-
curacy Service (HAS) was declared op- gramme was renamed Copernicus the
erational in 2023, and its evolution is subsequent year. The deployment of the
under preparation. space component began in 2014 with
The launch of the EGNOS Pro- the launch of Sentinel 1-A radar satel-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 139

lite and continues until today, 7 carrying framework of the GOVSATCOM compo-
on a process aiming to place a com- nent, and developing further and grad-
plete constellation of almost 20 satel- ually integrating the European Quantum
lites in orbit before 2030 8. EUSPA has Communication Infrastructure (Euro-
undertaken various market uptake ac- QCI) initiative into the secure connectiv-
tivities in Copernicus since 2021. ity system1.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
GOVSATCOM and IRIS2 The Space Situational Awareness
The implementation of the GOVSAT- (SSA) component of the EU Space Pro-
COM component of the EU Space Pro- gramme means a high-level compre-
gramme started in 2021, under the new hensive approach to hazards in space
Space Programme Regulation, while the which could harm space-based or
GOVSATCOM Preparatory Action was ini- ground-based infrastructure or endan-
tiated by the European Parliament al- ger any activity in, or going to, space, or
ready in 2020. The GOVSATCOM will which could endanger life or health. It
use the capacities and services pro- includes the following sub-components:
vided by existing national satcom sys- (i) ‘SST sub-component’, a space sur-
tems and accredited private operators veillance and tracking system aiming to
9
. The Union Secure Connectivity Pro- improve, operate and provide data, in-
gramme, the so-called IRIS2, under Reg- formation and services related to the
ulation (EU) 2023/588 10 aims to surveillance and tracking of space ob-
deliver secure, autonomous, reliable, jects that orbit the Earth; (ii) ‘SWE sub-
and cost-effective satellite communica- component’, observational parameters
tion services to government-authorized related to space weather events; and
users, enhancing the Union’s resilience, (iii) ‘NEO sub-component’, the risk mon-
autonomy, and technological and indus- itoring of near-Earth objects approach-
trial base in satellite communication. ing the Earth.
The programme will be implemented in
phases, focusing on developing space EU Space Programme
and ground infrastructure for govern- and services
mental services, while also enabling
commercial services by the private sec- The EU Space Programme plays a
tor, thereby fostering innovation and multifaceted role in safety and security
competitiveness in the European space due to its multipurposed nature. The
industry. The programme integrating programme contributes to the EU’s
and complementing existing and future strategic autonomy in the space do-
national and European capacities in the main, reducing dependence on non-EU
140 Hellenic Air Force Review

space systems and ensuring uninter- Public Regulated Service (PRS)

rupted access to critical space-based The PRS is an encrypted service de-
services. In particular, a number of signed for authorized governmental
services provided relate to space secu- users, such as law enforcement, emer-
rity. gency services, and critical infrastruc-
ture operators. It offers robust and
Galileo Services secure PNT information, resistant to
Galileo, the European Union’s global jamming and spoofing. The PRS is cru-
navigation satellite system (GNSS), of- cial for national security and sensitive
fers a suite of services designed to applications where integrity and confi-
cater to a wide range of users, from the dentiality are paramount. Its secure na-
general public to specialized sectors. ture safeguards critical operations
These services are crucial for position- against potential threats. The PRS em-
ing, navigation, and timing (PNT) appli- ploys cryptographic techniques enhanc-
cations, and are integral to various ing the resilience of governmental
aspects of modern life, including trans- operations in the face of evolving secu-
portation, emergency response, and rity challenges.
scientific research. Several services are
developed or are under development. Search and Rescue Service (SAR)
The SAR service contributes to the
Open Service (OS) international Cospas-Sarsat system,
The OS is a free-of-charge service which aids in locating and rescuing peo-
designed for mass-market applications. ple in distress. Galileo’s SAR service
It provides positioning, navigation, and provides faster and more accurate de-
timing information to users with Galileo- tection of distress signals, and also pro-
enabled devices. The OS is fundamen- vides an important and unique Return
tal for everyday applications such as Link Service (RLS) (Figure 2). The SAR
smartphone navigation, location-based service plays a vital role in saving lives
services, and is included in various con- by significantly reducing the time it
sumer electronics. Its open nature en- takes to locate individuals in emergency
sures widespread accessibility and situations. The RLS, a distinctive fea-
fosters innovation in related industries. ture of Galileo, provides feedback to the
The OS has a significant role in enhanc- person in distress, confirming that their
ing the accuracy and reliability of GNSS signal has been received. The SAR serv-
in urban environments and challenging ice contributed to improving emergency
signal conditions, contributing to the response times and enhancing the
broader field of ubiquitous positioning. overall effectiveness of search and res-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 141

cue operations, particularly in remote or advanced signal processing algorithms,

challenging environments. which are fundamental to the HAS (Fig-
ure 3).

Figure 2: Galileo Search and Rescue (SAR) Return Link Service (RLS) (Source: EUSPA)

High Accuracy Service (HAS) Signal Service-Authentication (SAS)

The HAS is a commercial service Signal Authentication service (SAS)
that provides high-accuracy positioning is understood as the ability to provide a
information, with accuracy down to cen- level of guarantee to users regarding
timetres. It is designed for professional the use of signals and data from actual
applications requiring precise location Galileo satellites and not from any other
data, such as surveying, precision agri- source. This capacity will increase the
culture, and autonomous driving. The degree of trust on the services based
HAS caters to the growing demand for on Galileo positioning and prevent
high-precision PNT solutions in various spoofing of Galileo signals, which may
sectors, enabling advancements in au- lead to committing fraud. The purpose
tonomous systems and location-based of this service is to satisfy the demand
services. There are technical aspects in- of GNSS users and applications of a
corporated for achieving high accuracy trusted navigation solution provided by
in GNSS, including the use of precise GNSS systems.
point positioning (PPP) techniques and
142 Hellenic Air Force Review

Figure 3: Galileo High Accuracy Service (HAS) (source: EUSPA)

Emergency Warning Service (EWS) EGNOS Services

The EWS is designed to broadcast The European Geostationary Navi-
emergency warnings to users in af- gation Overlay Service (EGNOS) is a
fected areas, providing timely informa- satellite-based augmentation system
tion about natural disasters or other (SBAS) that improves the accuracy and
critical events. It is based on the Return reliability of GPS signals over Europe. It
Link Service (RLS) capabilities of plays a crucial role in enhancing the
Galileo satellites. The EWS plays a cru- performance of Global Navigation Satel-
cial role in enhancing disaster pre- lite Systems (GNSS) for various applica-
paredness and response, enabling tions, particularly in safety-critical
timely dissemination of warnings to po- domains. Several services are devel-
tentially affected populations. There are oped or are under development.
activities ongoing that are further devel-
oping the integration of GNSS with early Open Service (OS)
warning systems and the development The OS is a free-of-charge service
of effective communication strategies that enhances the accuracy of GNSS
for disseminating emergency informa- positioning for general users. Today, it
tion. provides corrections and integrity infor-
mation to improve the performance of
GPS signals. The OS benefits a wide
range of applications, including con-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 143

Figure 4: Emergency Warning Service (EWS) based on the Return Link Service (RLS)
(Source: EUSPA)

sumer navigation, location-based serv- international standards, such as those

ices, and general positioning needs. By set by the International Civil Aviation Or-
improving accuracy, it enhances the ganization (ICAO), to ensure the safety
user experience and enables more pre- of air navigation. The SoL service plays
cise location determination. The OS a role in enhancing the safety and effi-
plays a role in mitigating errors inherent ciency of air traffic management. It is
in GPS signals, such as ionospheric and crucial in enabling the transition to per-
tropospheric delays, thereby improving formance-based navigation (PBN) and
positioning accuracy and reliability for supporting the development of ad-
mass-market applications. vanced air traffic management sys-
tems.
Safety of Life Service (SoL)
The SoL service is designed for EGNOS Data Access Service (EDAS)
safety-critical applications, such as civil EDAS is a commercial service that
aviation. It provides high-integrity infor- provides access to EGNOS data through
mation to ensure the reliability of GNSS the internet. It offers high-quality data
signals for operations where safety is for professional and commercial appli-
paramount. The SoL service is essential cations requiring precise positioning
for aviation, enabling the use of GNSS and timing information. EDAS caters to
for precision approaches and other crit- users who need reliable and accurate
ical operations. It adheres to stringent data for specialised applications, such
144 Hellenic Air Force Review

as surveying, precision agriculture, and Marine Monitoring

maritime navigation. It provides a con- This service provides information on
venient and efficient way to access the forecasting of ocean state for im-
EGNOS data for various professional proved maritime safety, marine re-
needs. There are various developments sources, coastal and marine
of data processing techniques and algo- environment, and ocean and climate. It
rithms for utilizing EGNOS data in high- supports maritime operations, fisheries
precision applications. EDAS facilitates management, coastal zone manage-
the integration of EGNOS data into var- ment, and climate change research re-
ious commercial and scientific tools. lated to the oceans. Marine monitoring
plays an important role in understand-
Copernicus Services ing ocean dynamics, marine ecosys-
Copernicus, the European Union’s tems, and the impacts of climate
Earth Observation and Monitoring pro- change on the oceans. Copernicus data
gramme, provides free and open access contributes to research on ocean cur-
to a wealth of data about our planet. It rents, sea level rise, and marine biodi-
plays a crucial role in understanding versity.
and addressing environmental chal-
lenges, supporting policy-making, and Land Monitoring
fostering innovation in various sectors. This service provides information on
systematic monitoring of biophysical pa-
Atmosphere Monitoring rameters, land cover and land use map-
This service provides information on ping, thematic hot-spot mapping, and
air quality, atmospheric composition, imagery and reference data. It supports
ozone layer and ultraviolet radiation, agriculture, forestry, urban planning,
emissions and surface fluxes, solar ra- and environmental monitoring. Coperni-
diation, and climate forcing. It supports cus data contribute to land use map-
air quality monitoring and forecasting, ping, vegetation monitoring, and the
climate change research, and the devel- assessment of natural resources. Land
opment of policies to mitigate air pollu- monitoring plays a role in understand-
tion and greenhouse gas emissions. ing land use change, deforestation, and
Atmospheric monitoring is essential in the impacts of agriculture on the envi-
understanding the complex interactions ronment. Copernicus data contribute to
between human activities and the envi- studies on land degradation, desertifi-
ronment. Copernicus data contributes cation, and sustainable land manage-
to studies on air pollution, climate ment.
change, and atmospheric chemistry.
 Hellenic Air Force Review 145

Climate Change Monitoring the assessment of security vulnerabili-

This service provides information on ties.
climate observations, reanalysis, fore-
casts and projections, data, tools and Emergency Management Service
best practices supporting climate as- (EMS)
sessments, adaptation and mitigation. This service provides on-demand
It supports climate change research, mapping (all phases of the disaster
policy-making, and the development of management cycle), early warning and
adaptation and mitigation strategies. monitoring service (for floods, wildfires,
Copernicus data contributes to climate droughts), and exposure mapping (dif-
modelling, sea level rise monitoring, ferent indicators for exposure). It sup-
and the assessment of climate change ports disaster preparedness, response,
impacts. Climate change monitoring and recovery. Copernicus data con-
plays a role in understanding the tribute to the mapping of disaster-af-
Earth’s climate system, predicting fu- fected areas, the monitoring of natural
ture climate scenarios, and assessing hazards, and the assessment of disas-
the impacts of climate change on soci- ter risks. Emergency management plays
ety and ecosystems. Copernicus data a role in reducing disaster risks and en-
contributes to research on climate vari- hancing disaster resilience. Copernicus
ability, extreme weather events, and cli- data contribute to the development of
mate change adaptation. early warning systems, the assessment
of disaster impacts, and the planning of
Security Monitoring disaster response and recovery opera-
This service provides information on tions.
border surveillance, maritime surveil-
lance, and support to EU security ac- GovSatCom Services
tions. It supports border management, GovSatCom is designed to provide a
maritime security, and the monitoring of suite of secure and reliable communi-
security threats. Copernicus data con- cation services tailored for governmen-
tribute to the detection of illegal activi- tal users. These services address a
ties, the monitoring of maritime traffic, wide range of critical applications, from
and the assessment of security risks. crisis management and surveillance to
Security monitoring plays a role in ad- the protection of critical infrastructure.
dressing security challenges, such as il- GovSatCom is integral to ensuring the
legal immigration, piracy, and terrorism. EU’s strategic autonomy in secure com-
Copernicus data contribute to the devel- munications, offering capabilities that
opment of early warning systems and are essential for national security and
146 Hellenic Air Force Review

defence. The service portfolio, as de- lite communications ground infrastruc-

fined by Commission Implementing De- ture and be also embedded as part of
cision (EU) 2023/1054, comprises the end-to-end services category. It can
three core service categories 11: be then comprised of raw satellite ca-
pacity and ground station facilities pro-
End-to-end services vided by the service provider. The user
These services allow the user to has the flexibility to install its own
connect to a satellite network that can ground equipment (e.g. network, base-
provide the required user-to-user con- band equipment) and establish its net-
nectivity services (Mbps) typically based work and communication links with the
on SLAs. This means the governmetal satellite terminals.
customers can access to a complete The service’s architecture, which in-
end-to-end communication solution in- cludes a ‘Common Union Pool’ and a
cluding their satellite terminal without token-based compensation mecha-
needing to set up their own infrastruc- nism, allows for flexibility and prioritiza-
ture. Under this service modality, also tion in service allocation. This approach
known as manged services. The satel- not only optimises resource utilisation
lite service provider handles all aspects but also reinforces the EU’s capacity to
of the satellite communications to en- respond effectively to security chal-
sure the delivery of assured Mbps. lenges, underscoring the program’s sig-
nificance in the European security
Raw capacity services framework. Govsatcom services will be
These services allow the users to accessible through the Govsatcom Hub
utilise satellite capacity (bandwidth in currently under development. Each par-
MHz). An example of this would be a ticipating EU Member State will have a
military unit using satellite capacity designated authority Competent Gov-
(MHz) to transmit data from a drone. satcom Authority (CGA) to manage its
The military user would be responsible requests and interactions with the GOV-
for setting up and managing the satcom SATCOM hub (Figure 5).
ground infrastructure, the drone termi-
nal and the communication link be- Space Situational Awareness Serv-
tween the drone and the satellite. ices
Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
Anchored capacity services is a critical capability for ensuring the
This service, also known as teleport long-term safety and sustainability of
or uplink facilities, can complement raw activities in space. By providing data, in-
capacity services with additional satel- formation, and services related to the
 Hellenic Air Force Review 147

Figure 5: The Govsatcom service provision (Source: EUSPA)

space environment, SSA enables in- tive satellites, rocket bodies, and debris,
formed decision-making to mitigate po- to help prevent collisions between
tential risks and protect space-based space objects, predict re-entry of ob-
assets. The SSA framework encom- jects into Earth’s atmosphere, and de-
passes the following key components: tect and characterise fragmentations
events (Figure 6).
Space Surveillance and Tracking
(SST)
SST involves the detection, tracking,
and cataloguing of artificial objects or-
biting Earth, including active and inac-

Figure 6: The EU SST service provision (Source: EUSST)

148 Hellenic Air Force Review

Space Weather Events (SWE) moni- was established by the Council Regula-
toring tion No 1321/2004, to supervise the
SWE monitoring focuses on observ- development of the European Geosta-
ing and forecasting space weather phe- tionary Navigation Overlay Service
nomena, such as solar flares, coronal (EGNOS) and Galileo 13. GSA officially
mass ejections, and geomagnetic took over GJU and assumed its tasks on
storms. These events can disrupt or 1 January 2007. In 2010, another
damage space-based and ground- change took place since GSA acquired
based infrastructure, including commu- the status of an EU Agency and there-
nication and navigation systems, power fore became the European GNSS
grids, and pipelines. Agency as settled by Regulation (EU) No
912/2010. It was entrusted with the
Near-Earth Object (NEO) tracking Galileo and EGNOS service provision
NEO tracking involves the detection and uptake and its location was set in
and monitoring of asteroids and comets Prague 5. The most recent stage in the
that may pose a collision risk to Earth. evolution of the Agency happened in
This service provides data on the orbits May 2021 when the Regulation (EU)
and physical characteristics of NEOs, 2021/696 was adopted, establishing
enabling the assessment of potential the Union Space Programme and
impact hazards and the development of EUSPA, which replaced GSA 1.
mitigation strategies. As specified under Article 29 of the
EU Space Programme Regulation, the
The European Union Agency for Agency has tasks such as to ensure the
the Space Programme: its role security accreditation of all of the Pro-
gramme’s components through its Se-
EUSPA history and main curity Accreditation Board (SAB), to
competences carry out risk and threat analysis (in
particular setting of technical specifica-
The origins of the EU Agency for the tions and operational procedures) for
Space Programme can be traced back Galileo and EGNOS, to provide the Com-
to 2002, when the Council Regulation mission with its technical expertise, to
(EC) No 876/2002 set up the Galileo undertake communication, market de-
Joint Undertaking (GJU). The main task velopment and promotion activities as
assigned to this legal entity was the regards the services offered by Galileo,
management of the Galileo develop- EGNOS, and Copernicus. In addition,
ment phase 12. Later in 2004, the Euro- the Agency is entrusted with managing
pean GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA) the exploitation of EGNOS and Galileo,
 Hellenic Air Force Review 149

coordinating user-related aspects of Commission, and specifically the Direc-

Governmental Satellite Communica- torate General for Defence Industry and
tions Programme (GOVSATCOM) for the Space (DG DEFIS), is in charge of the
purpose of crisis management missions Union Space Programme and entrusts
and operations, with actions in support EUSPA with all its tasks related to
of an innovative and competitive Union Galileo, Copernicus, EGNOS, GOVSAT-
space sector 1. The European Commis- COM and the Space Situational Aware-
sion may also decide to entrust the ness (SSA). The European Space
Agency with other tasks in the future. Agency (ESA) is also a key partner of
In order to accomplish the specific EUSPA for the implementation of the
tasks specified under Article 29, the Union Space Programme. Furthermore,
Agency ensures the safe and secure the Union Space Programme counts
management of all space components. several partnerships beyond the EU bor-
In addition, it provides support to re- ders that let it ensure the compatibility
search and innovation through various and interoperability of the European
projects such as CASSINI to stimulate GNSS with the other constellations
innovation and entrepreneurship, and around the world. The European Com-
Fundamental Elements and Horizon to mission, together with the Member
increase the EU industry competitive- States and the European Parliament (as
ness. EUSPA additionally engages with a non-voting Member), is member of the
market stakeholders to develop innova- Administrative Board of EUSPA. The EU
tive and effective applications for Member States are also in charge of
Galileo, EGNOS, Govsatcom, as well as overseeing the Security Accreditation of
leverages synergies between the differ- the Programme through the Security Ac-
ent components of the Union Space creditation Board, as does the High
Programme. Furthermore, EUSPA is en- Representative of the Union for Foreign
gaging in promoting the development of Affairs and Security Policy 5.
applications for the commercialisation Apart from the headquarters in
of Copernicus and has been operating Prague, EUSPA’s workforce is present in
the Front-Desk of EU SST. The Agency various sites across Europe (Figure 7):
further provides its expertise through in- the Galileo Security Monitoring Centre
depth market analysis and ensures that with a site in France and another site in
Europe’s space-based services are se- Spain with the EU SST front-desk, the
cure, safe, and accessible. 14,15,16 Galileo Reference Centre in the Nether-
EUSPA engages with multiple part- lands, and the European GNSS Service
ners on the European, national and in- Centre in Spain. The EUSPA EGNOS
ternational levels. The European team is located in France. The Interin-
150 Hellenic Air Force Review

stitutional Relations team and the Joint Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/
Office are located in Belgium. Addition- 1067 19 concerns the implementation
ally, EUSPA manages industrial teams of the Union Secure Connectivity Pro-
in the Galileo Control Centres based in gramme, specifically focusing on the lo-
Italy and Germany, as well as in other cation of control centres for the
facilities 17. program’s ground infrastructure, which
will be Toulouse in France, Fucino in
In addition to the current EUSPA Italy, and Bettembourg in Luxembourg.

Figure 7: EUSPA sites across the EU Member States (Source: EUSPA)

sites, the Commission Implementing The role of EUSPA in security

Decision (EU) 2024/3195 18 focuses on
the location of the GOVSATCOM Hub EUSPA is an agency with security at
under the EU Space Programme. This its core. The role of EUSPA according to
decision specifies that the GOVSATCOM the Regulation (EU) 2021/696 1 in se-
Hubs, which are central to organising curity is multifaceted, encompassing
and managing demand and supply for governance, operations, and accredita-
governmental satellite communica- tion. The agency acts as a central hub
tions, will be located in two sites: Agios for security-related activities, ensuring
Ioannis in Greece, and Cologne in Ger- the protection of the EU Space Pro-
many. Furthermore, the Commission gramme’s assets and services. The
 Hellenic Air Force Review 151

three-pillar structure is elaborated as Security Accreditation Board (SAB):

follows: ● Security Accreditation Authority
Security Governance: for All Components of the EU Space Pro-
● Operational Security: EUSPA is gramme: The SAB, established within
responsible for carrying out all the nec- the Agency, is the central authority for
essary activities to ensure and monitor security accreditation of all components
the security of Galileo and EGNOS, in of the EU Space Programme. This in-
particular setting of technical specifica- volves assessing the security posture of
tions and operational procedures, and systems and services, and granting se-
monitor their compliance with the gen- curity accreditation based on compli-
eral security requirements established ance with established security
by the European Commission. EUSPA standards.
supports the European Commission in In order to ensure the security and
performing such tasks also for the other uninterrupted operation of critical
Space Programme Components. space-based services of the EU, the
● Security Risks and Threat Analy- Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/698 20
sis: EUSPA conducts security risk as- establishes the legal framework for the
sessments and threat analyses to security of the EU Space Programme. It
identify potential vulnerabilities and de- focuses on securing the EU Space Pro-
velop mitigation strategies. gramme (EUSP) from various threats. It
establishes a framework for how the
Security Operations: Council of the European Union and the
● 24/7 Monitoring Operations: High Representative will respond to se-
EUSPA oversees security monitoring of curity threats affecting the EUSP sys-
the EU Space Programme’s navigation tems and services.
(Galileo and EGNOS) infrastructure and Overall, this Council Decision helps
services to detect and respond to secu- ensure a coordinated and effective re-
rity incidents. sponse to security threats impacting the
● Galileo Public Regulated Service critical space infrastructure of the Euro-
Provision with Competent Authorities in pean Union.
EU Member States: EUSPA ensures, in In addition, the EU Space Strategy
collaboration with competent authori- for Security and Defence 3 calls for an
ties in EU Member States, the access EU Space Information Sharing and
management of the Galileo Public Reg- Analysis Centre (ISAC). The EU Space
ulated Service. ISAC has been established by the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) with the support
of EUSPA. It was inaugurated in 2024
152 Hellenic Air Force Review

and is a network of EU companies from Union’s broader security framework. Si-

the space sector who are willing to de- multaneously, it emphasises the culti-
velop their expertise to better prevent, vation of a robust and innovative space
tackle and mitigate security-related industry, advocating for autonomous
challenges, including cybersecurity. and cost-effective access to space
through the strategic development and
The road ahead utilisation of key EU space assets, in-
cluding Copernicus, Galileo, and Gov-
The European Commission, under SatCom/IRIS2. A notable emphasis is
President Ursula von der Leyen, has placed on the development of an EU
outlined seven key priorities for its Space Law, aimed at establishing com-
2024-2029 mandate. 23. These priori- mon standards and licensing proce-
ties aim to address current challenges dures. Furthermore, the Commissioner
and shape a stronger, more resilient Eu- is tasked with formulating a Space Data
rope for the future. These include a new Economy Strategy, recognising the
plan for Europe’s sustainable prosperity transformative potential of space-de-
and competitiveness, a new era for Eu- rived data for economic growth and
ropean Defence and Security, support- technological advancement. These di-
ing people and strengthening societies, rectives collectively reflect a concerted
sustaining quality of life with a focus on effort to enhance the EU’s strategic au-
food security, water and nature, protect- tonomy, technological competitiveness,
ing democracy and upholding values, and regulatory coherence within the dy-
leveraging global power and partner- namic and increasingly contested space
ships, and delivering together while domain.
preparing the Union for the future. Finally, on February 2025, the Euro-
For the first time there is a dedi- pean Commission provided its perspec-
cated Commissioner for Defence Indus- tive on the upcoming Multiannual
try and Space, which underscores the Financial Framework (MFF) 22. It empha-
European Union’s engagement to elab- sises the necessity for the EU budget to
orate its position in the space domain strategically address key policy chal-
24
. The mission letter the Commissioner lenges, including enhancing European
received from the President delineates competitiveness through research and
a comprehensive approach, prioritising innovation, and tackling security threats
the implementation of the EU Space amidst geopolitical tensions. There is a
Strategy for Security and Defence, reference to the need for ‘Stronger de-
thereby solidifying the inextricable link fence readiness, including through
between space activities and the space assets, and military mobility is
 Hellenic Air Force Review 153

necessary both as a deterrent against References

future aggression and to support
Ukraine towards peace’. It is highlighted 1
Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the Euro-
that there is a need for increasing and pean Parliament and of the Council of
28 April 2021 establishing the Union
optimising financing for defence across
Space Programme and the European
the EU. The document also calls for a Union Agency for the Space Programme
more focused, simpler, and impactful and repealing Regulations (EU) No
EU budget to ensure that the funds de- 912/2010 (EU), No 1285/2013 and
liver on EU policy priorities. (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision No
541/2014/EU, Off. J. Eur. Union L, vol.
170, pp. 69-148, 2021. Available: Pub-
Concluding remarks lications Office (europa.eu) (Accessed:
March 6, 2025).
The EU’s evolving approach to 2
Council of the European Union, “A
space security reflects a strategic shift Strategic Compass for Security and De-
from a traditionally civilian-centric policy fence - For a European Union that Pro-
tects its Citizens, Values and Interests
to one that integrates also key security
and Contributes to International Peace
and defence considerations, as seen in and Security”, 2022. Available:
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Defence 3 and the Strategic Compass 2. document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf
In this context, EUSPA plays an increas- (Accessed: March 2, 2025).
European Commission and High Repre-
ingly vital role in the EU Space Pro-
3

sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs

gramme, ensuring the operational and Security Policy, «Joint Communica-
security and resilience of key compo- tion to the European Parliament and the
nents such as Galileo and EGNOS. Its Council on the European Union Space
mandate in security-related applica- Strategy for Security and Defence,»
tions underscores its contribution to the JOIN(2023) 9 final, Brussels, 2023.
4
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on
protection of critical space infrastruc-
European Union and the Treaty estab-
ture and the delivery of secure services. lishing the European Community, signed
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abilities, and geopolitical tensions grow, Eur. Union C, vol. 306, pp. 1-244, 2007.
the EU continues to enhance the re-
5
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Programme (EUSPA) Official Website.
silience and autonomy of its space in-
EU Agency for the Space Programme
frastructure within the broader security (europa.eu) (Accessed: March 6, 2025).
framework 23,24. 6
European Commission Directorate-Gen-
eral Defence, Industry and Space,
Galileo FOC Programme Roadmap,
2021.
7
European Commission Directorate-Gen-
154 Hellenic Air Force Review

eral Defence, Industry and Space, pp. 1-9, 2004.

“Copernicus History Overview”, Coperni- 14
European Union Agency for the Space
cus History Factsheet, 2022. Available: Programme (EUSPA), “EUSPA EO and
Copernicus | Earth Observation - Euro- GNSS Market Report,” Publications Of-
pean Commission (Accessed: March 6, fice of the European Union, Luxem-
2025) bourg, 2024.
8
European Commission Directorate-Gen- 15
European Union Agency for the Space
eral for Communication, “Copernicus – Programme (EUSPA), “EUSPA Secure
Europe’s Eyes on Earth”, Copernicus SATCOM Market and User Technology
brochure, Publications Office of the Eu- Report,” Publications Office of the Euro-
ropean Union, Luxembourg, 2015. Avail- pean Union, Luxembourg, 2023.
able: 16
European Union Agency for the Space
Copernicus_brochure_EN_web_Oct201 Programme (EUSPA), “GNSS and Se-
7_0.pdf (Accessed: March 6, 2025) cure SATCOM User Technology Report,”
9
European Commission Directorate-Gen- Publications Office of the European
eral Defence, Industry and Space Web- Union, Luxembourg, 2025.
site. Defence Industry and Space 17
European Union Agency for the Space
(europa.eu) (Accessed: March 6, 2025). Programme (EUSPA), Single Program-
10
Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the Euro- ming Document Years 2022-2024,
pean Parliament and of the Council of 2022.
15 March 2023 establishing the Union 18
Commission Implementing Decision
Secure Connectivity Programme for the (EU) 2024/3195 of 18 December 2024
period 2023-2027, Off. J. Eur. Union L, laying down rules for the application of
vol. 79, pp. 1-39, 2023. Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the Euro-
11
Commission Implementing Decision pean Parliament and of the Council as
(EU) 2023/1054 of 30 May 2023 laying regards the location of the GOVSATCOM
down rules for the application of Regu- Hub, Off. J. Eur. Union L, vol.
lation (EU) 2021/696 of the European 2024/3195, pp. 1-2, 2024.
Parliament and of the Council as re- 19
Commission Implementing Decision
gards the service portfolio for the Gov- (EU) 2024/1067 of 12 April 2024 laying
ernmental Satellite Communications down rules for the application of Regu-
services offered by the system estab- lation (EU) 2023/588 of the European
lished under the Union Space Pro- Parliament and of the Council as re-
gramme, Off. J. Eur. Union L, vol. 141, gards the location of the control centres
pp. 49-56, 2023. belonging to the ground infrastructure
12
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of 21 May 2002 setting up the Galileo gramme, Off. J. Eur. Union L, vol.
Joint Undertaking, Off. J. Eur. Union L, 2024/1067, pp. 1-2, 2024.
vol. 138, pp. 1-8, 2022. 20
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13
Council Regulation (EC) No 1321/2004 30 April 2021 on the security of sys-
of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of tems and services deployed, operated
structures for the management of the and used under the Union Space Pro-
European satellite radio-navigation pro- gramme which may affect the security
gramme, Off. J. Eur. Union L, vol. 246, of the Union, and repealing Decision
 Hellenic Air Force Review 155

2014/496/CFSP, Off. J. Eur. Union L, ment/download/1f8ec030-d018-41a2-

vol. 170, pp. 178-182, 2021. 9759-c694d4d56d6c_en?filename=
21
Council Resolution of 19 July 1999 on Mission%20letter%20-%20KUBILIUS.
the involvement of Europe in a new gen- pdf (Accessed: March 2, 2025).
eration of satellite navigation services –
Galileo – Definition phase, Off. J. of the 1
REF [10], Art.10, L79/3
European Communities C, vol. 221, pp.
1-3, 1999.
22
European Commission, «Communica-
tion from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the European Council,
the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Commit-
tee of the Regions: The road to the next
multiannual financial framework,»
COM(2025) 46 final, Strasbourg, 2025.
23
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Union priorities 2024-2029», 2024.
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29_en (Accessed: March 2, 2025).
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European Commission, «Mission letter -
KUBILIUS», 2024. Available:
https://commission.europa.eu/docu-

Short Biography

Dr. Christina Giannopapa is the Head of the Office of the Ex-

ecutive Director of EUSPA. Previously, she was advisor in the
Greece’s Ministry of Digital Governance, seconded from ESA.
In ESA she held various roles including Head of Political Af-
fairs Office of the Director General. From 2010-2012 at ESPI,
lead studies on Galileo and Copernicus and the EISC secretariat.
Prior consulted high-tech industries and taught at Eindhoven
University of Technology and the University of London.
With 14 scholarships, over 80 publications, and co-editorship
of the «Handbook on Space Security,» she is an elected member of IISL and IAA, vice-
chair of IAF’s Space Security Committee, and Chair of Women in Aerospace Europe
(WIA-E).
She holds a Ph.D, MEng and MBA from the University of Lon-
don, and serves as an assistant professor at Eindhoven University of Technology.
 The European Satellite
Centre: Geospatial
Intelligence at the Services of
the EU & its Member States

Rear Admiral Louis Tillier, SatCen Director

Citation: Rear Admiral Louis Tillier, SatCen Director. (2025). The European Satel-
lite Centre: Geospatial Intelligence at the Services of the EU & its Member States.
Hellenic Air Force Review, 134. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15168417
 Hellenic Air Force Review 157

Abstract rapid evolution in data management

and secure processing, SatCen invests
In view of an increasingly tense heavily into advanced technologies like
geopolitical landscape, caused by con- Artificial Intelligence (AI). Through its
flicts such as Russia’s aggression in timely and accurate geospatial intelli-
Ukraine and crises in the Middle East gence services, the Centre functions as
and Africa, the EU’s need for an au- Europe’s “eyes from the sky”, support-
tonomous and responsive decision- ing EU decision-making by exploiting
making capacity in security and defence data coming from space assets.
has drastically increased. The European
Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) in Keywords
Torrejón / Madrid is the EU’s central
provider of imagery and geospatial Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT);
analysis services for CFSP/CSDP. European Union Satellite Centre
Working under the political guidance of (SatCen); Situational Awareness; EU
its Member States, the Centre plays a Strategic Compass; Common Security
crucial role in enhancing the EU’s situ- and Defence Policy (CSDP); Space-
ational awareness at the nexus of based Intelligence.
external and internal security. It has be-
come an essential capacity for swift and Introduction
decisive action, in direct support to key
intelligence and security actors in The geopolitical landscape is be-
Europe. The article traces SatCen’s evo- coming increasingly tense, as demon-
lution from its establishment in 1992 as strated by Russia’s war of aggression in
a strategic Western European Union ini- Ukraine as well as rapidly evolving
tiative to its current function as the EU’s crises and wars in the Middle East and
agency at the crossroads of space, de- Africa. In this context, European strate-
fense and security. Beyond strategic gic autonomy has become more vital
situational awareness, the Centre sup- than ever1. This applies especially to the
ports EU military operations and civilian domain of security, defence and space
missions, disaster relief operations, and aligned with the Strategic Compass ob-
collaborates with European agencies jective to enhance the EU’s capacity to
like FRONTEX and strategic partners act swiftly and decisively in response to
such as the UN. It also acts as the en- emerging threats.
trusted entity for the Copernicus In this context, situational aware-
Support for External and Security Action ness is an essential capability on which
(SESA) service. To stay ahead of the effective decision-making is based,
158 Hellenic Air Force Review

across the full spectrum from opera- Luxembourg, and made the strategic
tional to the top political level. As Eu- decision to establish a satellite data in-
rope’s “eyes from the sky”, the terpretation centre. Later that year, on
European Union Satellite Centre (Sat- 19 November, the WEU Council of Min-
Cen) in Torrejón (Madrid) is the EU’s isters met in Bonn and chose Torrejón
geospatial intelligence agency, provid- Airbase, near Madrid in Spain, as the
ing analysis services to the EU member Centre’s location. Formally created as a
states, its institutions and international body of the WEU, its mission was to pro-
partners. vide actionable geospatial intelligence
analysis services, based on satellite im-
SatCen’s path agery and other relevant data, to sup-
port the European security and defence
In 2022, SatCen celebrated its 30th efforts.
anniversary, marking three decades of The creation of this Centre in the
dedicated service in geospatial intelli- early 1990s was a visionary initiative,
gence. The origins of the Centre date shaped by the strategic minds sur-
back to 1991, when the Western Euro- rounding WEU Deputy Secretary, Mr.
pean Union (WEU) Ministerial Council, Horst Holthoff. He pushed for an inde-
composed of Foreign and Defence Min- pendent WEU military capability to ex-
isters, convened on 27 June in Vianden, ploit satellite imagery for defence

I
In 2014 the COUNCIL DECISION 2014/401/CFSP of 26 June 2014 revised the Centre’s mission and
activities. Article 2 states that: “SATCEN shall support the decision making and actions of the Union in
the field of the CFSP and in particular the CSDP, including European Union crisis management missions
and operations, by providing, at the request of the Council or the HR, products and services resulting
from the exploitation of relevant space assets and collateral data, including satellite and aerial imagery,
and related services.”
 Hellenic Air Force Review 159

purposes2. In recognition of his strate- Cen in bolstering the European Security

gic foresight, his name was given to the and Defence Policy through satellite im-
Centre’s main meeting room3. agery analysis for intelligence, early
One of the Centre’s earliest support warning, and crisis management oper-
missions in 1996 was assisting on-site ations.6 It highlighted SatCen’s cooper-
inspectors in Kosovo in verifying the dis- ation with EU entities, such as the Joint
mantling of armaments and equipment, Research Centre and other key actors,
a milestone in operational support. The to improve decision-making and effec-
WEU’s experimental capability for situ- tively tackle capability gaps, thereby
ational awareness during crisis events strengthening the EU’s capacity to ad-
proved so successful that it was trans- dress security threats.
ferred to the EU in 2002, then re-named The European External Action Serv-
the European Union Satellite Centre ice (EEAS) was created in 2011 and
(SatCen), by decision of the Council of over time it became one of SatCen’s
the European Union. And until today, it main usersI. Following this, in 2016, the
has remained a unique operational Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and
geospatial analysis agency in the EU’s Security Policy was published, reinforc-
security and defence toolbox4. ing the EU’s commitment to a stronger
A year later, in 2003, the European and more autonomous security and de-
Security Strategy was introduced, mark- fence framework. In 2022, the EU
ing a pivotal moment as the EU began Strategic Compass identified space as
launching military operations and civil- a critical strategic domain, paving the
ian missions. SatCen, in coherence with way for the first Council Conclusions on
the European Security Strategy, was the EU Space Strategy for Security and
mandated to enhance the decision- Defence in November 2023, to address
making of the European Union in the relevant CSDP challenges including pro-
field of Common Foreign and Security tecting space assets and deterring
Policy (CFSP), in particular the Euro- threats.
pean Security and Defence Policy SatCen is now a pillar of the EU’s
(ESDP), renamed the Common Security strategic autonomy. By providing fast,
and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 2009. The reliable and accurate geospatial intelli-
first EU operation supported by SatCen gence services, the Centre strengthens
was EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herze- the EU’s ability to take autonomous de-
govina5. cisions in security and defence, crisis
The Council Decision «European management and foreign policy. It is
Space Policy: ESDP and Space» of 2004 SatCen’s mission to enhance opera-
emphasised the critical role of the Sat- tional effectiveness by providing sup-
160 Hellenic Air Force Review

port for both civilian missions — such as SatCen is a task-based agency,

humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and which means “everything starts with a
emergency management — and military question, or more precisely with many
operations. Currently the EU is engaged questions”8. The request which could
in 21 civilian and military missions, in- e.g. originate from a Member State or
cluding military and naval operations7. from within the European External Ac-
European engagement worldwide cen- tion Service (EEAS) are then prioritised
tres on peacekeeping efforts, conflict by the EU High Representative, accord-
prevention, international security, up- ing to political guidance given by the
holding the rule of law, combating Council.
piracy, enhancing maritime security, SatCen’s analysis room serves as
and supplying military equipment and the core of the Centre, where highly
support to EU partners. SatCen thus skilled analysts — drawn from both mil-
supports national as much as EU lead- itary and civilian backgrounds — work
ers, providing situational awareness to on large screens displaying satellite im-
support their strategic priorities on both agery and other suitable data sources.
national and collective security chal- Organised into several specialised
lenges. teams, this structure is optimised for
high performance in a fast-paced oper-
Operations ational environment, reaching an out-
put of approximately 6,000 products
The Geospatial Intelligence annually9.
(GEOINT) discipline integrates multiple
elements, including mapping, cartogra-
phy, imagery analysis, and imagery in-
telligence. Its core principle
is to consolidate all avail-
able data related to a spe-
cific geographic location
and analyse it to produce
actionable information.
These insights are then
transformed into user-
friendly products designed
to support decision-makers
at political and operational
levels.
 Hellenic Air Force Review 161

Engagement NAVFOR ASPIDES in the Red Sea are

just a few examples. The Centre also
Which specific activities does Sat- contributes to civilian missions for bor-
Cen support? The counter-piracy naval der monitoring or the assessment of
operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA off the military activities, like EUMM Georgia or
Horn of Africa, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, a the EU Mission in Armenia10.
naval operation aiming at enforcing the Another essential and time-critical
arms embargo in Libya, as well as EU- aspect of SatCen’s mission is its sup-
162 Hellenic Air Force Review

port for disaster relief and rescue oper- restricted (“no-go”) areas within the af-
ations: in October 2024, torrential rains fected region. This information proved
devastated Valencia in Spain, resulting instrumental in allowing emergency res-
in over 200 fatalities, submerging cue teams to take informed decisions
streets and homes, and displacing hun- for optimising search and rescue oper-
dreds of residents. In response, Span- ations.
ish authorities launched an emergency SatCen also closely collaborates
operation to coordinate relief efforts. As with other EU agencies and interna-
the full scale of the disaster became tional partners focusing on common se-
clear, the responsible units of the Span- curity challenges. Most notably, the
ish Ministry of Defence activated Sat- Centre is supporting the European Bor-
Cen to support its emergency der and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX)
operations. on migration issues. In 2025, this col-
In response to this urgent request, laboration will mark 10 years, repre-
the Centre established an ad-hoc oper- senting a significant milestone in EU
ations team, working around the clock institutional interoperability. Joint ef-
to provide critical geospatial intelli- forts are focused on combating irregu-
gence. Within six hours, the team deliv- lar immigration and cross-border crime.
ered its first mapping product, followed For the last decade, SatCen has pro-
by a series of additional outputs. The in- vided more than 6000 geospatial prod-
telligence products enabled the Span- ucts and services to Frontex11. This
ish authorities to assess accessible and effective collaboration is taking place as
 Hellenic Air Force Review 163

part of the Border Security service of Space Agency (ESA)12. In line with its
Copernicus, the EU’s flagship space mandate, the Centre focuses on service
programme. evolution, synergy and complementar-
International users of SatCen’s serv- ity, continuous improvement, innova-
ices include the Organisation for Secu- tion, and knowledge transfer.
rity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) As a special focus complementing
and the Organisation for the Prohibition its mission, SatCen has established
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The re- strategic cooperation across various
quests typically involve facility assess- components of the EU Space Pro-
ments, analysis of surrounding areas, gramme. Also, within the framework of
and road network evaluations. EU research and innovation initiatives,
such as Horizon Europe, SatCen has
Capabilities Development successfully implemented projects
and Training aligned with and supporting its core
mission.
SatCen continuously invests into ex- The evolving global security environ-
panding and further developing its ca- ment has highlighted the necessity for
pabilities, and in this effort collaborates European strategic autonomy, driving
closely with relevant national and EU key EU security initiatives. As an opera-
entities like the European Commission tional geospatial analysis entity, SatCen
and European Defence Agency (EDA), plays a pivotal role in their implementa-
and international partners as European tion, strengthening the EU’s capacity to
164 Hellenic Air Force Review

respond effectively to emerging crises. Centre maintains extensive on-site data

The Centre’s collaboration across the storage and processing capacities, but
EU in space, defense and security en- - more importantly - it hosts the first
ables the deployment of cutting-edge ever “EU SECRET” cloud service. This
technologies for its operational use as important innovation is available since
well as the collective benefit of the EU 2021, providing its users with real-time
and its Member States. access to secure operational services
In a key operational function, Sat- and processes including an innovative
Cen serves as the entrusted entity for and operational AI factory13.
Copernicus Support for External and Se- Further, the development and inte-
curity Action (SESA). The Centre’s en- gration of Artificial Intelligence tools into
gagement in maritime security and the operational process has signifi-
border surveillance in cooperation with cantly enhanced efficiency in satellite
Frontex, which is a clear demonstration image analysis. For instance, when ex-
of interoperability, complementarity and amining maritime imagery, traditional
synergies, in line with the Centre’s man- methods require analysts to manually
date. inspect each section for relevant de-
In addition to its research and inno- tails. AI, however, can automatically
vation activities, SatCen provides spe- identify small vessels, such as migrant
cialised training courses to further boats, within vast oceanic areas. To en-
develop geospatial capabilities for its sure the required level of accuracy and
staff as well as across Member States reliability, and while the AI tool is provid-
and users. These trainings cover essen- ing effective semi-automatic support,
tial topics like data processing and im- the final output is still produced under
agery analysis, as well as advanced the control and supervision of the es-
training in Synthetic Aperture Radar im- sential expertise of highly trained, expe-
agery, industrial site interpretation, and rienced analysts14.
nuclear facility analysis: in 2024 alone,
the Centre recorded almost 3.000 at- Challenges
tendees per day at SatCen courses.
In line with the continuously growing
High-Tech level of EU ambition in security and de-
fence, as well as responding to the dras-
Processing large amounts of data tic changes in the European security
from a wide range of satellites would be landscape, SatCen has increased its
impossible without the extensive com- output about tenfold in the past
puting capacities available today. The decade. This trend is multiplied by in-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 165

creasing demands on product complex- climate and environmental crisis and

ity, speed of delivery, and quality expec- hybrid warfare.
tations15. To meet these evolving require-
To stay ahead of the quickly evolving ments, SatCen is establishing a dedi-
geopolitical context, as much as prepar- cated maritime analysis team, while
ing for the requirements expressed in also expanding capabilities in AI and cy-
the EU Strategic Compass and the EU bersecurity to counter emerging
Space Strategy for Security and De- threats. Continued investments in au-
fence, the Member States have man- tomation and machine learning will im-
dated the Centre to implement an prove scalability and efficiency,
ambitious development plan, further in- ensuring timely and reliable analysis
creasing the Centre’s operational ca- processes. Additionally, reinforcing the
pacity over the next years. SatCen will training unit will allow SatCen to better
thus continue its investment in IT, data support Member States and key institu-
and expert staff, to meet the challenges tional partners in decision-making for
ahead and to satisfy the demands security, crisis management, and de-
posed by the EU and its Member States fence operations.
for state-of-the-art geospatial intelli- Further projects of high priority are
gence services in the 21st century. the Centre’s potential role in the future
Earth Observation Governmental Serv-
The way forward ice (EOGS) and the envisioned Climate
and Environment Security Data and
In the current geopolitical context of Analysis Hub (CESDA). These initiatives
evolving threats to European security aim to enhance Europe’s climate situa-
and stability, SatCen as the geospatial tional awareness and security foresight.
intelligence agency remains a key asset SatCen will thus continue to serve
for the EU and its Member States, with as Europe’s «eyes from the sky», deliv-
the mission to support situational ering tailor-made, user-driven geospa-
awareness and thus strengthen the tial intelligence services to support the
EU’s strategic autonomy, particularly for EU’s decision-making in security and
the CSDP. The Centre will continue to defence. Through its advanced analysis
operate within the guidelines provided capabilities, the Centre plays a pivotal
by – inter alia - the Strategic Compass role in supporting European security
and the EU Space Strategy for Security and defence, equipping decision-mak-
and Defense, while also responding to ers with the intelligence necessary to re-
further challenges in non-proliferation spond effectively to crises, threats, and
and space, the maritime domain, the strategic challenges.
166 Hellenic Air Force Review

References u/pdf/en/04/st11/st11616-
re03.en04.pdf.
1
Fiott, Daniel. “Strategic Autonomy: 7
IMPETUS – The EUMS Common
Towards ‘European Sovereignty’ in Security and Defence Policy Mag-
Defence?” European Union Insti- azine, no. 33 (December 13,
tute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2024)
2018, page 1. 8
Nannette Cazaubon, «Europe’s
http://www.jstor.org/stable/resre Eyes in the Sky – A Story from
p21120 Spain,» The European – Security
2
Kolovos, Alexandros. “Develop- and Defence Union 51 (July
ment of a Space Security Culture: 2024): [32]
Case of Western European Union 9
Cazaubon, «Europe’s Eyes in the
in Schrogl KU (Ed), Handbook of Sky,» [33]
Space Security. Policies, Applica- 10
Ibid
tions and Programs, Volume 2, 11
SatCen and Frontex Forge Deeper
Springer, (2020); page 401-420 Ties in Virtual Signature Cere-
3
Geospatial Intelligence in Support mony,» European Union Satellite
of the EU’s Foreign, Security and Centre, accessed [17/02/2025],
Defence Policy and Beyond: 30 https://www.satcen.europa.eu/N
Years of the European Union ews/satcen-and-frontex-forge-
Satellite Centre (SatCen),» The Eu- deeper-ties-in-virtual-signature-
ropean, no. 41 (2022); page 40- ceremony
41, 12
Council Decision 2014/401/CFSP
https://www.magazine-the-euro- on the establishment of a Euro-
pean.com. pean Union Satellite Centre, OJ L
4
The European, no. 41 (2022): 188, 27.6.2014, p. 73–84,
(41p) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
5
European Union Satellite Centre, content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A
30 Years of SatCen, accessed 32014D0401
[17.02], 13
The European, no. 51 (2024):
https://30years.satcen.europa. (33p)
eu/ 14
Ibid
6
Council of the European Union, 15
EU’s Satellite Centre Over-
European Space Policy: ESDP and stretched Amid Crises,» Euractiv,
Space, 11616/3/04 REV 3. Brus- February 7, 2024,
sels. Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/sec-
http://register.consilium.europa.e tion/defence-and-security/inter-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 167

view/eus-satellite-centre-over-
stretched-amid-crises-its-boss-
warns/

Short Biography

Rear Admiral Louis Tillier became Director of the EU Satel-

lite Centre (SatCen) on 1 June 2024, following his appointment
by the SatCen Board and confirmation by Josep Borrell, having
served as Deputy Director since September 2021.
His naval career, commencing in 1995, included service on
various vessels and significant responsibilities, alongside ad-
vanced engineering training in telecommunications, culminating
in his role as Joint Staff Program Officer for Defence Satellite
Communications, contributing to EDA and NATO SatCom groups.
He commanded the French Ship Dupuy de Lôme and the Mar-
itime Intelligence Centre, before transitioning to the French Space Command, where
he oversaw European and international space cooperation, leading efforts on European
space security and defence, collaborating extensively with EU stakeholders and allies,
prior to his SatCen appointment.
 NIS 2 in Orbit:
Cyber Challenges &
Risk Management in Space

Dimitrios Papamartzivanos,
Evangelos Rekleitis, Nikolaos Tantouris (ENISA)

Citation: Dimitrios Papamartzivanos, Evangelos Rekleitis, Nikolaos Tantouris.

(2025). NIS 2 in Orbit - Cyber Challenges & Risk Management in Space. Hellenic
Air Force Review, 134. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15168580
 Hellenic Air Force Review 169

Abstract Keywords

The rapid expansion of space- Cybersecurity, ENISA, Space threat

based services has introduced signifi- landscape, Risks, Controls, NIS 2
cant cybersecurity challenges. Satellites
support essential services such as com- Introduction
munications, navigation, and Earth ob-
servation, making them prime targets As satellites are essential for global
for cyber threats. Building upon the communications, navigation, and a
foundational analysis presented in the wide spectrum of critical services, the
ENISA «Space Threat Landscape», this economic and societal impact of a cy-
paper examines the evolving threat bersecurity incident disrupting their op-
landscape dynamics of the space do- eration makes (cyber)security a critical
main, taking into account the entire life- concern. As a matter of fact, Directive
cycle of satellite systems—from design (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Par-
and development to decommissioning— liament and of the Council of 14 De-
while considering a comprehensive tax- cember 2022 on measures for a high
onomy of assets. The threat landscape common level of cybersecurity across
constructed through an analysis of his- the Union1, (NIS2 Directive) recognizes
torical cyber incidents, highlights key the space sector as a sector of high crit-
threats and proves an assessment of icality, underscoring the need for robust
the major threat actors operating within cybersecurity measures to protect this
the domain. The paper introduces an in- critical ecosystem 2.
teractive tool designed to offer clear Satellite navigation systems like
and actionable recommendations for GPS (USA), GLONASS (Russia), BeiDou
securing space systems. This tool lever- (China), and Galileo (EU), constitute the
ages a comprehensive analysis of 281 backbone of modern life as they play a
controls, drawn from 13 frameworks, crucial role in the delivery of a wide
and maps them to each phase of the range of applications, from geolocation
satellite lifecycle. Additionally, the paper and emergency response to scientific
underscores the importance of interna- research. However, their widespread
tional cooperation and adherence to cy- use makes them attractive targets for
bersecurity standards and regulatory cyber-attacks causing the disruption of
frameworks, such as the NIS 2 Direc- critical services [3].
tive, to safeguard the space sector. While navigation satellites are es-
sential for geo-positioning, another cru-
cial type of satellites is the
communications satellites used for in-
170 Hellenic Air Force Review

ternet access, broadcasting, and global 20323. While this fosters innovation, it
connectivity. Companies like SpaceX also introduces risks. A 2022 report
(Starlink), OneWeb, Iridium, and Global- from Northern Sky research4 highlights
Star are revolutionizing global internet the growing cyberthreats to space-
access, especially for remote areas, op- based assets and ground infrastruc-
erating in total over 8,000 satellites in ture. The rapid proliferation of
orbit, making cybersecurity critical to commercial satellites, particularly
preventing data interception, signal dis- small, inexpensive, and rapidly deploy-
ruption, and unauthorized access. Fur- able ones, exacerbates cyber risks.
thermore, earth observation satellites Undoubtedly, the space sector’s
provide crucial data on weather, cli- rapid growth brings immense opportu-
mate, and environmental monitoring, nities, but also significant cybersecurity
supporting disaster response and re- challenges. This requires a fundamen-
source management. With nearly 600 tal shift in mindset, moving away from
active satellites dedicated to Earth ob- the assumption that the physical inac-
servation, establishing secure commu- cessibility of satellite systems provides
nication channels and preventing data inherent security and, in general, secu-
manipulation is vital to ensure accurate rity exceptionalism and security by ob-
and reliable information. Space obser- scurity. Instead, we must prioritize
vation satellites are used for monitoring cybersecurity from the design phase
deep-space phenomena and measuring and throughout the entire lifecycle, rec-
cosmic events. Despite their direct im- ognizing that vulnerabilities in satellite
pact on daily life being less, securing infrastructures could have far-reaching
their operation and data ensures the in- consequences for global security and
tegrity of astronomical research. connectivity. This involves adopting
The current surge in satellite long-established cybersecurity prac-
launches is mainly driven by private tices, such as security by design, privacy
companies and marks a new space by design, zero-trust architectures, ro-
race, resulting to over 75 countries op- bust supply chain security, secure cod-
erating satellites nowadays. Commer- ing practices, and cryptographic agility.
cial reports postulate an ever-increasing To this end, this paper builds upon
reliance on space applications, predict- of the foundational analysis presented
ing 38,000 additional satellites to be in the ENISA «Space Threat Landscape»
build and launched by 2033, 52 Ex- [1] leveraging its insights to explore the
abytes of data traffic passing through evolving threats and threat actors
satellites by 2029, and a $1.7 trillion within the space domain, with respect
market revenue for space industry by to a structured analysis of lifecycle
 Hellenic Air Force Review 171

phases of satellites. Using the «Space and structured analysis approach. Vari-
Threat Landscape» as our “launch plat- ous satellite lifecycle models are em-
form”, this work underscores the urgent ployed by prominent organisations
need for tool-aided risk management in governing the space sector and cyber-
space operation and emphasizes the security. However, despite variations in
importance of adhering to robust cyber- the ways in which actions are grouped
security standards. In response to these into phases or the terminology em-
challenges, we introduce an interactive ployed, at their core these lifecycles re-
mapping tool [13] designed to facilitate main the same, regardless of the
the implementation of security controls, ownership or intended use of the satel-
along with the control dataset, for easy lite systems, and whether they are com-
consumption though GRC tools. This mercial, military, or state-owned.
tool is the result of a systematic analy- Well-known satellite operation lifecycle
sis of 13 prominent risk management models[12] are those of ESA[8],
frameworks, tailored to address the NASA[7], and JAXA[9], while BSI[10]
unique complexities of space systems. and NIST[11] are similarly phased life-
Furthermore, we position the NIS 2 Di- cycle models but with particular focus
rective as a main driving force for en- on cybersecurity aspects of operations.
hancing risk and incident management ENISA in [1], follows a unified perspec-
practices, as well as fostering greater tive for the lifecycle model (see FIGURE
cooperation among stakeholders in 1) that allows easy mapping to the
space operations. By integrating these aforementioned models. With this uni-
elements, this paper aims to contribute fied model as a frame and search
to a more secure and resilient space space analysts can systematically
ecosystem. analyse the threat landscape of space

FIGURE 1 - SPACE LIFECYCLE

Space Ecosystem Lifecycle domain and highlight the hostile actions

and threat actors that can potentially
Towards identifying the challenges
appear in each phase.
and threats of an ecosystem, it is vital
Phase 1 – Design and Development
to first identity all phases that comprise
phase focuses on defining require-
its lifecycle so as to follow a systematic
172 Hellenic Air Force Review

ments and mission goals and objec- often outsourced. Cyber threats can tar-
tives. Apart from mission concepts, sys- get launch devices, installations and
tem-level requirements, and technology safety systems, requiring robust cyber-
needs, security requirements shall be security measures, while outsourcing
incorporated into the technical docu- also introduces supply chain risks.
mentation for satellite components. Phase 5 – In-orbit testing takes place to
Thus, security must be integrated from verify systems’ operational integrity.
the start and be ensured, through rigor- This phase includes the steps of inject-
ous testing and controls, throughout the ing the satellite to transfer orbit and
entire lifecycle. transfer of custody to the customer. Cy-
Phase 2 - Assembly phase involves in- bersecurity is crucial to ensure opera-
tegrating spacecraft components, in- tional integrity of systems and ensure
cluding hardware and software assets that there are no opportunities for ma-
for satellite operations. Supply chain cy- licious actors to exploit vulnerabilities
bersecurity and risk mitigation meas- during the transfer of custody.
ures are crucial, requiring validation Phase 6 – Operations phase involves
through tests and compliance audits for mission-specific functions like data ac-
SW/HW used in the assembly. While SW quisition, processing, and communica-
modifications may be possible after the tion, managed via ground stations.
mission launch, hardware changes are Cybersecurity is essential to protect
limited. sensitive data, communication, system
Phase 3 – Pre-launch phase focuses on integrity and secure firmware/software
testing satellite functionality and estab- updates.
lishing connectivity with ground control. Phase 7 - Decommissioning is a high-
Cybersecurity is crucial as it involves the risk process involving disposition of
secure integration, validation, and veri- satellites and space structures. During
fication (IVV), of the satellite with the this phase there are considerations for
launch vehicle, infrastructure, opera- the secure handling and disposal of
tions centre and all the supporting and sensitive data, including intellectual
operational systems, while verifying property. Cybersecurity risks include
hardware, software, and human inter- data loss, unauthorized access, and po-
actions. tential hijacking of decommissioned
Phase 4 – Launch phase sends the satellites.
space system to its operational environ-
ment and involves several safety and Asset Taxonomy And Domain
security-sensitive steps. Due to high Segmentation
costs and complexities, this phase is
For defining an assets’ taxonomy
 Hellenic Air Force Review 173

for space landscape, one needs to look users to access and benefit from the
on the Ground, in Space and also con- services provided by a satellite, either
sider the end users of services and the through ground stations or the satellite
human resources that underpin the op- directly. Thus, assets of the user seg-
erational aspects of satellites through- ment fall into the categories of Con-
out their lifecycle. sumer interfaces, such as
The ground segment includes the Very-small-aperture terminals (VSATs)
terrestrial systems that facilitate com- and antennas, and Consumer endpoint
munication, monitoring of satellite ac- devices (e.g., SAT phones and TV re-
tivities, and relaying of essential ceivers, vehicles, etc.)
telemetry data, as well as ground phys- Finally, humans participating in de-
ical facilities. In fact, one needs to con- velopment activities (Human Resources
sider the assets that play a crucial role segment), supporting tasks and satel-
during the lifecycle of satellites on the lite operations, is an overarching aspect
ground, considering the union of the spanning across the entire lifecycle of
Production, Transportation, Launch and satellites and segments, as they are in-
Operation phases. extricably linked to the security of mis-
The Space segment contains satel- sion-critical assets.
lite(s) orbiting the Earth, either in the
form of constellations or under arbitrary Space Threat Landscape
synergies in the context of specific mis-
Understanding the threat land-
sions and services. The assets compris-
scape for satellite systems is crucial for
ing the space segment stem from two
safeguarding their operations and con-
categories: Satellite Operations (BUS),
tinuity of satellite-based services. This
including all assets required to operate
chapter delves into the web of threats
and maintain a satellite in orbit (e.g.,
and offers a threat taxonomy based on
RTOS, Antennas, etc.), and Mission Ex-
ENISA’s work in [1].
ecution, referring to assets needed to
fulfil the mission (e.g., payload data I. Threats
handling system). Although, mission ex- In an effort to create a threat taxon-
ecution assets may rely on BUS assets omy, ENISA examined publicly know at-
there is an increasing trend for keeping tacks against satellite systems as those
these two systems separated to serve collated by the Space Attacks Open
distinct functions among different con- Database Project5 covering the period
sumers. between 1977 and 2019, alongside
The User segment contains inter- available information on more recent in-
faces and devices that enable end cidents included in ENISA Foresight Cy-
174 Hellenic Air Force Review

bersecurity Threats for 20306. ruption, state-nexus actors are some-

The majority of the space-based at- times directed by the military, intelli-
tacks took place on government and gence or state control apparatus of
commercial targets. The majority of ob- their country and often spend consider-
served attacks took place between able time investigating their targets to
2001 and 2010 (30 recorded attacks in identify weaknesses and entry points.
total), with a slight reduction from 2011 Cybercrime actors and hacker-for-hire
to 2019. Prior to 2000, only 12 attacks actors, are primarily motivated by finan-
had been identified. This list can be up- cial gain. Mainly targeting data or infra-
dated with an additional three major at- structure, cybercrime actors often
tacks in the space domain which took employ social engineering and either
place by 2022. These attacks involved steal from their victims, engage in extor-
hijacking, jamming and Distributed De- tion, or aim to monetise the stolen infor-
nial of Service and were primarily tar- mation.
geted the commercial satellite sector. Private Sector Offensive Actors (PSOA),
Overall, Jamming was among the most who are engaged in the cyber-surveil-
frequent materialised threats targeting lance industry. Focused on enabling
mainly Global Navigation Satellite Sys- other actors (e.g., governments, private
tems (GNSS), followed by hijacking and individuals) to gain a competitive advan-
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). tage against their peers, PSOAs spe-
Attacks aimed at control functions, as cialise in developing and selling
well as spoofing, eavesdropping and the cyberweapons to their clients, equip-
employment of anti-satellite weapons ping them with advanced cyber capabil-
(ASATs) were far less frequent during ities.
the observed period. Hacktivists (a.k.a. Civil Activists), whose
primary goal is to extract and expose
II. Threat Actors
data or disrupt business operations for
By examining the incidents outlined ideological reasons or to draw attention
in the previous paragraph, the threat to a specific cause.
actor taxonomy from ENISA’s Threat Hackers, comprising a diverse set of
Landscape [2] can be adapted to the malicious actors’ subgroups that vary in
space domain. The following threat ac- their motivation, objectives, skillsets
tors have been identified as the most and capabilities. These may range from
prominent within the domain: Cyberwarriors and Cyber Fighters to
State-nexus actors, rely on government Blackhat hackers/Crackers.
resources to achieve their objectives. Disgruntled Employees or Insider At-
Primarily engaged in espionage and dis- tackers, who have detailed insight of
 Hellenic Air Force Review 175

the organisation and its systems. This Physical Attacks (PA): actions which aim
includes staff, contractors, vendors, to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal
customers, or former employees. or gain unauthorised access to physical
Untrained/Reckless Employees, who assets such as infrastructure, hard-
may not have the intention to cause ware, or interconnection. While one
harm but may still do so as a result of could think that physical attacks can
negligence or insufficient training. happen only on the ground, interest-
The above analysis highlights that ingly, recent advancements make suck
threat actors, regardless of whether attacks applicable also in space7.
they utilise resources of their support- Unintentional Damage (UD): uninten-
ing organisation -if any-, can execute a tional actions causing destruction,
wide range of attacks. That is, the pro- harm, or injury of property or persons
file of these attackers is a critical factor and results in a failure or reduction in
to consider as part of comprehensive usefulness. This is usually related with
risk assessment efforts. Untrained/Reckless Employees actors.
Failures or malfunctions (FM): partial or
III. Threat Taxonomy full insufficient functioning of an asset
(hardware or software).
Building upon the asset taxonomy, Outages (OUT): unexpected disruptions
the following threat taxonomy focuses of service or decrease in quality falling
on applicable attacks against assets for below a required level.
which a direct cyber-relevant threat has Disaster (DIS): a sudden accident or a
been identified via a thorough analysis natural catastrophe that causes great
of academic and industrial resources damage or loss of life.
for attacks applicable to the space do- Legal (LEG): legal actions of third par-
main as part of [1]. The taxonomy in- ties (contracting or otherwise), in order
cludes: to prohibit actions or compensate for
Nefarious Activity/Abuse (NAA): refer to loss based on applicable law.
intended actions that target ICT sys- On top of the above, one needs to con-
tems, infrastructure, and networks by sider threats stemming from the use of
means of malicious acts with the aim to legacy infrastructure and systems,
either steal, alter, or destroy a specified which is a common case in the space
target. domain, as well as the vulnerabilities
Eavesdropping/Interception/ Hijacking that arise as result of the extended use
(EIH): actions aiming to listen, interrupt, of commercial off-the-shelf software
or seize control of a third-party commu- (COTS) for different satellite compo-
nication without consent. nents, as an aftermath of the intensive
176 Hellenic Air Force Review

commercialisation of the domain. nents used in satellites and infrastruc-

tures are publicly available, easing ma-
Risks and Challenges licious actors to familiarise themselves
with the targeted systems.
- So, what are the main risks and
Legacy Systems: given the nature and
challenges identified then?
the location of the space systems, many
space-based assets have been de-
To answer this question, we examine
signed without the security considera-
the interplay between the lifecycle
tions needed to foresee or mitigate
model, asset taxonomy, real-life
some of the present-day cyber chal-
incidents, and threat actors along with
lenges. Their remote nature adds an-
their motivations. In what follows, we
other layer of complexity, making
present a set of risk cases worth
necessary updates difficult and in some
highlighting due to their likelihood of
instances impossible, leaving vulnera-
occurrence and possible cascading
bilities that render satellite systems sus-
effects.
ceptible to cyberattacks.
Supply Chain Risk: the space sector is
Limited Visibility: the remote nature of
heavily dependent on vast global supply
the space systems poses challenges in
chains, introducing potential vulnerabil-
detecting and responding to cybersecu-
ities that adversaries could exploit to
rity incidents and addressing vulnerabil-
compromise critical systems. The risk of
ities. In contrast to legacy systems,
supply chain intrusion is two pronged:
modern satellites require regular up-
software components are vulnerable to
dates through remote access, which
insertion, modification, or removal of in-
creates another layer of risk for intru-
formation, and corruption of the code or
sion into the system.
functionality during development, up-
Weak Configuration/Lack of Encryption:
grade, or update of the system; hard-
depending on the nature of the space
ware components are susceptible to
system and communication infrastruc-
intentional or unintentional introduction
ture and protocols employed, there is a
of components or electronic chips con-
high potential for interception. This is
taining defects, malware, or backdoors
particularly the case for systems relying
for system sabotage or espionage.
on radio frequency signals, which may
Use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
lack encryption or use a low-grade one,
components: economy of scale leads to
heightening the risk of unauthorised ac-
increasingly rely on off-the-shelf compo-
cess and collection of transmitted infor-
nents for communication, launch, data
mation. Bear in mind that the very same
reception, and control facilities. This
communication channels are used for
poses a challenge as details compo-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 177

transmitting software updates and op- in the frame of [1], ENISA offers an
erational commands. open-source “Controls-to-Threats Map-
Human Error: with space systems hav- ping” interactive tool [13] to aid experts
ing a high degree of human interaction, navigate through mazelike regulations,
there are increased risks of uninten- international frameworks, best prac-
tional data leaks, system misconfigura- tices, and national guidelines, as an all-
tions, and insider threats. encompassing tool. The tool aims to
Sophisticated Cyber Attacks: with space assist cybersecurity analysts identify
systems serving an interconnected web clear and actionable recommendations
of services and industries, there is an for securing space systems through a
increased risk of nation-state actors thorough mapping of controls. More
and APT groups, which may attempt to specifically, each control is mapped to
gain unauthorized access and exfiltrate identified threats and applied across
data or disrupt critical systems and relevant lifecycle phases.
could affect constellations of satellites An instance of the interactive tool is
operating in synergy. illustrated in Figure 2, where for each

FIGURE 2 - INSTANCE OF “CONTROLS-TO-THREATS MAPPING” INTERACTIVE TOOL

Risk Management phase of the satellite lifecycle the tool

And Recommendations maps the available controls to the cor-
responding Risk Management Frame-
Given the evolving threat landscape work. Built for versatility, more views
of the space domain, security experts and mapping variations are provided by
and domain-specific professionals need the tool to enable experts navigate and
to capitalise on validated tools and pinpoint the proper control that fits to
frameworks for getting informed deci- the nature of the incident that needs to
sion on the implementation of cyberse- be tackled or the space mission at
curity controls. As part of this work and hand. Overall, as indicated in Table I,
178 Hellenic Air Force Review

281 controls of 13 frameworks under from the outset is crucial.

18 control clusters are considered by Leveraging lessons learned from
the tool, covering all the 7 phases of the other critical sectors can strengthen
satellites’ lifecycle, addressing 58 dif- satellite security. Best practices include
ferent threats. implementing cryptographic mecha-
Apart from tools, recommendations nisms that offer crypto agility (e.g., hy-
and proactive measures are essential brid Post Quantum Cryptography
to mitigate risks and enhance satellite systems8) in alignment with aspiring
security. At the EU level, NIS 2 is now at technologies of the future where satel-
the forefront. Satellite operators must lites will play a role, such as Quantum
comply with it, which mandates incident Secure Communication in Space based
reporting to facilitate information shar- on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)9.
ing and improve response strategies. Security measures such as network
TABLE II elaborates on the applicability segmentation, thorough patch testing,
of NIS 2 risk management measures system hardening, and a zero-trust ap-
(Art. 21) and reporting obligations (Art. proach are vital to minimizing risks.
23) in the space domain, while in paral- Finally, adopting rigorous cyberse-
lel it provides a mapping with the con- curity hygiene practices across all satel-
trol clusters of our tool. lite operations will enhance resilience
In addition, the Directorate-General against cyber threats stemming from
for Defence Industry and Space (DG- human factors. By prioritizing these
DEFIS) is the European Commission’s strategies, the space sector can safe-
department tasked with developing and guard its infrastructure and ensure the
enforcing the regulatory frameworks continued security and reliability of
that govern space activities within the satellite-based services.
EU while actively supporting the growth
and competitiveness of the European
space industry.
As aforementioned, complex supply
chains exist in the space domain, imply-
ing the need for continuous monitoring
of suppliers to prevent vulnerabilities,
while thorough analysis and testing
should be conducted to avoid blindly
trusting and integrating commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) solutions. Furthermore,
integrating security-by-design principles
 Hellenic Air Force Review 179

Conclusions References
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curity ENISA, «Space Threat Land-
based assets for critical infrastructure scape.», doi:10.2824/8841206,
and global connectivity demands imme- 2025
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curity, Lella, I., Theocharidou, M.,
As demonstrated in this paper, satellites
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[3] Tantouris, N., Polemi D., and Dellios
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ternet of things, Data and Cloud
Addressing these challenges requires a Computing. 2017.
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(e.g., [5][6]), continuous threat monitor- tection and isolation techniques for
actuator failures in dynamical sys-
ing, and adherence to international cy-
tems», 2017.
bersecurity standards. The implementa- [5] Tantouris N, Polemi D., and Dellios K.
tion of encryption, resilient network ar- «Euresis-filter: a robust multiple-
chitectures, and supply chain security model FDI technique for small satel-
lites’ thruster faults.» Int. Journal of
measures will be critical in mitigating fu- Modelling, Identification and Control
ture threats. Moreover, international co- 28.4 (2017): 349-360.
operation and adherence to regulatory [6] Tantouris N., and Dellios K. «Eupho-
ria-filter: a robust H2/H∞ technique
frameworks, such as NIS 2, is essential
amenable to the Lisa-Pathfinder
for establishing best practices and in- thruster faults.» Int. Journal of Space
creasing the resilience of the space sec- Science and Engineering 4.1 (2016):
tor. As the space industry continues to 45-63.
[7] NASA, «NASA Systems Engineering
evolve, cybersecurity must be an inte- Handbook, NASA/SP-2007-6105,»
gral part of its development [4], ensur- NASA, December 2007.
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dent services. mentation, ECSS-M-ST-10C, Revision
1,» ECSS, March 2009.
[9] JAXA, «System Safety Standard, JMR-
001, Revision B,» JAXA, March 2008.
[10] BSI, 2022, IT-Grundschutz Profile for
Space Infrastructures,
https://www.bsi.bund.de/Shared-
180 Hellenic Air Force Review

Docs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Grund- content/uploads/2022/04/NSR-
schutz/profiles/Profile_Space-Infra- Space-Cybersecurity-White-Paper-
structures.html FINAL.pdf.
[11] Scholl, M. & Suloway, T. NIST, 2023. 5
Space Security Community. Space At-
Introduction to Cybersecurity for tacks Open Database Project.
Commercial Satellite Operations. https://www.spacesecurity.info/en/s
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/ pace-attacks-open-database/
2023/NIST.IR.8270.pdf 6
ENISA. 2023. ENISA Foresight Cyber-
[12] Shiotani, Bungo & Fitz-Coy, Norman security Threats for 2030.
& Asundi, Sharan. (2014). An End-to- https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publi-
End Design and Development Life- cations/enisa-foresight-cybersecu-
Cycle for CubeSat class Satellites. rity-threats-for-2030
10.2514/6.2014-4194. 7
Although innovations in on-orbit serv-
[13] ENISA Space Threat Landscape Con- icing capabilities might be rendering
trol Framework interactive tool and this restriction moot, e.g., China’s Shi-
dataset jian-21 [Krebs, Gunter D. “SJ 21”;.
https://github.com/enisaeu/Space- Gunter's Space Page.
Threat-Landscape https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat
/sj-21.htm], and NASA’s OSAM-1
https://www.nasa.gov/mission/on-
orbit-servicing-assembly-and-manu-
1
Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the Eu-
facturing-1
ropean Parliament and of the Council 8
In this context a hybrid implementa-
of 14 December 2022 on measures
tion uses a combination of pre-quan-
for a high common level of cyberse-
tum (classical) and post- quantum
curity across the Union, amending
schemes, and the mixing of pre-
Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Di-
shared keys into all keys established
rective (EU) 2018/1972, and repeal-
via public-key cryptography (vide
ing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2
ENISA "Post-Quantum Cryptography -
Directive).
Integration study” (2022),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publi-
tent/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32022L25
cations/post-quantum-cryptography-
55
integration-study)
2
NIS 2 Directive considers under the 9
https://defence-industry-space.
Space sector: “Operators of ground-
ec.europa.eu/eu-space/research-de-
based infrastructure, owned, man-
velopment-and-innovation/quantum-
aged and operated by Member
technologies_en
States or by private parties, that sup-
port the provision of space-based
services, excluding providers of pub-
lic electronic communications net-
works.”
3
Cloud Computing via Satellite report
(source: Northern Sky Research)
4
Northern Sky Research. 2022. Space
Cybersecurity: Current State and Fu-
ture Needs. White Paper. April.
w w w . n s r . c o m / w p -
 Hellenic Air Force Review 181

Short Biography
Dr. Dimitrios Papamartzivanos is a Cybersecurity Officer at
the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) since
2024. With over 13 years of experience in cybersecurity across
both academia and industry, he has contributed to various re-
search and cybersecurity projects.
He holds an MSc and a Ph.D. in Information & Communica-
tion Systems Security, with his research focusing on advanced
machine learning methods for network intrusion detection and
response systems.
He has published numerous papers in international journals
and conferences and has submitted patent applications in the
field of adaptive intrusion detection and response systems. Dimitrios has actively par-
ticipated in several EU-funded cybersecurity research projects and innovation initia-
tives, serving as both a research associate and a technical coordinator.
His research interests include security and privacy for the Internet of Things (IoT),
Intrusion Detection and Response Systems, Artificial Intelligence and Bio-inspired Al-
gorithms, Adversarial AI, and Trusted Computing.

Short Biography
Evangelos Rekleitis is a Cybersecurity Expert working at the European Union
Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) since 2019. With over 17 years of experience in cy-
bersecurity, he has been providing expert advice and technical assistance to the EU
Member States.
He specializes in risk management, capacity building, and emerging threats. Cur-
rently, he is responsible for capacity building activities, including trainings and exer-
cises, under the Support Action program, providing cybersecurity services to NIS 2
essential sectors across EU Member States.
He contributed to significant projects like the ENISA Space Cyber Threat Land-
scape report, publications on Security Operations Centers (SOCs), cryptography, and
AI, organizes the ENISA Learning and Training (Letra) events and is supporting the bian-
nual Cyber Europe Exercise project. Before joining ENISA, he provided cybersecurity
consultancy services to critical infrastructure in the Greek and Cypriot public sectors.
he holds a MSc in Advanced Computing from Imperial College London and is certified
as a CISM and GIAC Security Operations Manager.
He is a member of IEEE and ACM, as well as has authored academic publications
in journals, conferences, and cybersecurity textbooks.
182 Hellenic Air Force Review

Short Biography

Dr. Nikolaos Tantouris is the Head of Sector Security and In-

frastructure at the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). He is
also a member of the Knowledge and Information Team, where
he focuses on the Space Cybersecurity domain.
With over 12 years of experience in both industry and acade-
mia, Nikolaos is a cybersecurity expert who has worked on var-
ious projects, including space projects, the Internet of Things,
Industry 4.0, smart cities, and smart mobile.
He has considerable expertise overseeing and safeguarding
network systems and interconnected and smart devices. Nikolaos has authored and co-
authored numerous research papers and scientific reports and is a regular presenter
at various international conferences.
Hellenic Air Force Review 183
ESA’s Potential Contribution
to the EU Space Strategy
for Security & Defence
(EU SSSD), From Ambition
to Implementation

Pascal Legai, Senior Security Advisor to ESA DG

Citation: Pascal Legai, Senior Security Advisor to ESA DG. (2025). ESA’s Potential
Contribution to the EU Space Strategy for Security & Defence (EU SSSD) - From
ambition to implementation. Hellenic Air Force Review, 134.
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15168912
 Hellenic Air Force Review 185

Abstract Agency (ESA), resilience, Information

Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC), ac-
ESA welcomes the important step celerator, Galileo, Copernicus, secure
taken with the publication of the EU connectivity, space safety, cyber secu-
Space Strategy for Security and rity, critical technologies.
Defence (EU SSSD) in 2022, giving the
Space domain a key role for security Introduction
and defence purposes. Thers is no
European Defence without Space. In 2022, EU leaders identified space
However, the key challenge remains as a strategic domain in the Strategic
now the concrete implementation of the Compass(1) and called for an EU Space
EU SSD. In this regard, the European Strategy for Security and Defence.
Space Agency can play a significant role Building on this political momentum,
as a unique R&D organisation in the the Commission and the High Repre-
space domain in Europe, able to lead sentative have developed the first-ever
complex space architectures and pro- EU Space Strategy for Security and De-
curement processes involving relevant fence (EU SSD)(2).
European companies. In a fierce com- In a disrupted geopolitical context by
petitive and aggressive international the two major powers, Russia and the
context, emphasized by the new US ad- USA, creating total uncertainty for the
ministration and a critical international future, increasing power competition
security situation, only a collective and and intensification of threats, the EU
coordinated approach mobilizing all the must take action to protect its space as-
European Space Actors involved (EU, sets, defend its interests, deter hostile
ESA and their Member States) in their activities in space and strengthen its
respective fields of responsibilities, ex- strategic posture and autonomy.
isting or already planned capabilities, In this highly competitive and aggres-
but also missing capabilities to be iden- sive international context, only a collec-
tified, the available resources must tive and coordinated approach
enable the implementation of the EU mobilizing all the European Space Ac-
Space Strategy for Security and tors involved (EU, ESA and their Mem-
Defence within the tightest deadlines. ber States) in their respective fields of
responsibilities, existing or already
Keywords planned capabilities, but also missing
capabilities to be identified, the avail-
EU Space Strategy for Security and able resources must enable the imple-
Defence (EU SSD), European Space mentation of the EU Space Strategy for
186 Hellenic Air Force Review

Security and Defence within the tightest strengthen the resilience and protection
deadlines. of space systems and services in the
Like any strategy, the next phase is EU. For this purpose, the Commission
indeed that of its implementation by will:
mobilizing all the good will, the ● Consider proposing an EU Space
necessary human and financial Law to provide a common frame-
resources. It is ultimately the political work for security, safety, and sus-
will of the EU and its Member States to tainability in Space that would
make this strategic work a reality. In this ensure a consistent and EU-wide
regard, the European Space Agency approach. That also means to set
presents all the skills and experience to up an Information Sharing and
contribute significantly to the EU’s Analysis Centre (ISAC) in order to
objectives. raise awareness and facilitate ex-
change of best practices among
The EU Space Strategy for commercial and relevant public
Security and Defence entities on resilience measures
for space capabilities.
The EU SSD constitutes an important ● Launch preparatory work to en-
step in awareness and recognition of sure long-term EU autonomous
the contribution of space systems to our access to space, addressing in
daily lives, but also for the vital needs particular the security and de-
of guaranteeing their use for security fence needs.
and defense purposes. ● Enhance the technological sover-
The EU SSD identifies the following eignty of the EU by reducing
broad areas of interest and action(2). strategic dependencies and en-
The Strategy outlines the counter- suring security of supply for space
space capabilities and main threats in and defence, in close coordina-
space that put at risk space systems tion with the European Defence
and their ground infrastructure, building Agency and the European Space
on a common definition of the space Agency.
domain. To increase the common un- ● Propose to expand the existing
derstanding of threats across Member space threat response mecha-
States, the High Representative will pre- nism which is already used for the
pare a classified annual space threat protection of Galileo to all space
landscape analysis at EU level, drawing systems and services in the EU.
on Member States intelligence. The It calls for the efficient and timely
Strategy proposes as well actions to mobilisation of relevant EU tools to re-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 187

spond to space threats. The Strategy responsible behaviours in outer space

proposes appropriate access to space through concrete and pragmatic steps.
domain awareness information through The strategy calls for developing
relevant national space commands to space security dialogues with third
characterize inappropriate behaviours countries, in particular with the Unites
in orbit and protect EU assets. Space ex- States and other likeminded countries.
ercises, including with partners, will EU-NATO cooperation will also be devel-
help to test and develop EU response to oped. However, the most reliable part-
space threats and to explore solidarity ner remains ESA.
mechanisms.
The Strategy proposes to maximise ESA’s analysis of the EU SSD
the use of space for security and de-
fence purposes. The development dual- ESA’s analysis of the EU SSD
use services requires to take into highlights the desire for continuity of
account defence requirements when space activities undertaken over the
preparing the evolution of the EU space last decades, but also the need to
programmes. complement existing capabilities with
The Strategy proposes the launch of new services in order to have a
two pilots: one for the delivery of initial complete and coherent space package
space domain awareness services to contribute to European strategic
building upon capacities of Member autonomy. These EU orientations are
States, and another for a new earth ob- consistent with or complementary to
servation governmental service as part ESA’s activities and missions.
of the evolution of Copernicus and com- Indeed, the strategy constitutes a
plementing existing assets. defining political and a critical step and
The strategy also commits to better pillar to further build the European
connect space, defence and security at space policy. Based on the extension of
EU level and ensure synergies and the Galileo model, this is also a critical
cross-fertilisation, notably in terms of re- capability step with the planned
search and development. It proposes implementation of an Earth
concrete measures to foster collabora- Observation Governmental Service, but
tive work between space and defence also with the confirmation of the
start-ups and to enhance skills. development and deployment of the
The EU will strengthen its engage- IRIS2 constellation. The Strategy also
ment in multilateral fora to partner for strongly confirms the need for a strong
responsible behaviours in space and space transport capacity, because
promote norms, rules and principles of access to space is clearly a major
188 Hellenic Air Force Review

component of strategic autonomy for and from space is essential for world
the orbiting of all necessary space stability, the welfare of people and
systems, but also for transport in outer health of our economies and the com-
space between planets or celestial petitiveness of European industry.
bodies, or between artificial objects.
The Space Domain Awareness (SDA) The implementation of
Services identified by the EUSSD would the EU SSD
be of strategic added value to ESA
operations & European autonomy. The implementation of the EU SSD
Similarly, partnerships with the United requires the mobilization of all existing,
Nations, NATO or third countries that planned space capabilities and the
share a similar approach will allow identification of capacity gaps, and a
substantial progress, sharing of real willingness of EU Member States to
capabilities and possibly costs. In this contribute, a key condition for success.
partnership context, ESA is recognized As such, ESA is the only European
for its expertise in the field of space organization capable of leading
technologies promoting EU-ESA complex space architectures and
synergies. Finally, concerning industrial soliciting all the most relevant European
policy, the EU role in space and defence companies.
is an opportunity for competitiveness. For years, ESA has been a clear
According to the ESA assessment, proponent of taking full advantage of
the SSSD confirms the pertinent ESA’s technologies, innovation, and space-
well documented and long-standing po- based services for security. The growing
sition that space infrastructure have a criticality of space data and
critical bearing on security activities technologies in security has now found
(Agenda 2025(3), Accelerators(4). ESA is resonance in key European policy
mandated by its Member States to pur- orientations, such as the Strategic
sue its work on independent access to Compass, EU Space Strategy for
space, Galileo, Copernicus, secure con- Security and Defence (EU SSSD).
nectivity, space safety, cyber security, Through its programmes and its
critical technologies for non-depen- space-based data, ESA contributes to a
dence. Moreover, ESA’s governance and better, safer and more sustainable
regulatory framework enables it to con- planet and to the protection of people
duct every type of activities, including of in Europe and around the globe. In
a classified nature which is of high rele- order to avoid further fragmentation
vance for security and defence-related and potential duplications in terms of
activities. ESA reaffirms that security in space and security capabilities, the ESA
 Hellenic Air Force Review 189

DG has thus proposed to contribute to lution of ESA. In particular, the three Ac-
the implementation of the Strategy, with celerators (R3, PROTECT, Space for a
all of ESA’s expertise, in support of its GreenFuture) directly or indirectly secu-
Member States and the EU. Based on rity-related, focus on responding to ur-
its long-standing R&D experience in the gent societal needs, upscaling existing
field of security-related activities, ESA space investments to the next level,
identified areas and activities where with users at the centre of a program-
ESA can make a significant contribution matic evolution that would combine the
and create synergies. strengths of ESA, EU, Member States
Indeed, ESA programmes offer a and the private sector. These accelera-
comprehensive contribution to Europe’s tors could be part of structured dia-
security and world peace and stability. logue between involved stakeholders.
While the breadth of ESA programmes ESA, thanks to its telecommunica-
contributing to security, and thus to the tions heritage of ARTES Programme, is
EU SSSD, the main pillars of this in- a natural established leader to develop
volvement are: Independent access to secure space communication systems
space, Galileo(5), Copernicus(6), IRIS2(7). based on critical technologies, aiming
Eagle1, SAGA, Civil Security from Space, to satisfy societal needs in terms of re-
Earth Explorers, Weather Forecast, silient and sovereign connectivity for
ARTES 4S(8), Technologies, Security of both institutions/governmental entities
Space Infrastructures, the ESTEC Test and citizens/business users.
Centre and the ESTEC secure labora- Moreover, ESA supports the emer-
tory, in addition to the ESA-EDA Admin- gence of New Space industry through
istrative Arrangement of 2011 and the ARTES programme such as Pioneer,
2012 ESA-EDA Security Agreement and which aims to help space startup com-
the role of the ESA Security Office en- panies across the continent in their ac-
sures that an harmonised approach is cess to space for in-orbit demonstration
followed in terms of security engineer- and validation.
ing, certification and accreditation, im- The EU SSSD is not perceived as an
plementing the ESA security framework impacting element on ESA telecommu-
across the Agency. nications on-going programmes which
These are but the most noticeable mainly rely on the Agency Member-
ESA investments in security, which are states fundings and support. In partic-
building blocks and contributions to Eu- ular, the development of commercial
rope’s security at large, and space se- systems through public-private partner-
curity in particular. ships projects, developing New Space
Security is strongly linked to the evo- is, and shall remain, highly complemen-
190 Hellenic Air Force Review

tary to EU programmes. gramme Regulation(9) defines ‘Coperni-

This entails that all satellite commu- cus’, as a “civil Earth observation sys-
nication activities that may emerge tem under civil control, (…) offering
from the EUSSD’s implementation geo-information data and services (...)
ended to be tailored according to al- where appropriate, integrating the
ready existing and planned activities, needs and requirements of security.” It
whether in Member States or ESA in further identifies as a specific Coperni-
order to avoid duplicating effort at con- cus objective “to deliver accurate and
tinental level. In addition, an institu- reliable Earth observation data, infor-
tional competition stemming from mation and services (…) to support the
uncoordinated policies and programme formulation, implementation and moni-
initiatives needs to be avoided at all toring of the Union and its Member
costs: Member States should not have States’ policies and actions based on
different intermediaries for their fund- user requirements”.
ing high-risk technological develop- To date, within the context of Coper-
ments. This inevitable dilution of nicus and Security, ESA has acted on
resources available between European the following main lines of security re-
institutions and ESA will be detrimental lated activities, upon request and in co-
to the effort of building a world leading operation with the European
European industry in security and de- Commission. Nonetheless, to perform
fence. sensitive or classified activities, includ-
Furthermore, ESA has consistently ing protection of data and interest of its
demonstrated in the navigation domain Member States, a secure context must
that it has protected and continues to be guaranteed.
protect the interests of its Member
States and partners. The mechanism The Role of ESA
that ESA currently has in place through
the Security Agreement with the EU has ESA is a civil R&D organisation. That
not only never been questioned, but means that ESA designs and develops
rather lauded for its effectiveness in space capabilities to meet various
protecting the interests of EU and its needs, and although ESA validates and
Member States. EU classified informa- demonstrates services, ESA does not
tion and also sensitive unclassified in- play an operational role. This responsi-
formation, have been zealously bility befalls upon national and regional
protected by ESA and at no moment actors who can best determine how
compromised. they will use these space assets to
In addition, The EU Space Pro- serve their interests. Regardless, a tai-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 191

lored regulatory framework enables the Council-approved ESA Security Regula-

delivery of such assets for its con- tions and the ESA Security Authority,
stituencies. The ESA Convention and its which is responsible, on behalf of the
regulations, as well as the legal instru- Director General, for the coordination of
ments binding it to the EU, guarantee ESA Security Management activities.
the protection of the security interests The ESA security management func-
of its Member States and those of its tion, delegated to the ESA Security Of-
partners. fice, distributed across all ESA
Security by design has always been Directorates, and exercised in synergy
ESA’s approach based, in particular on with the security bodies of the Member
policies, regulations and technological States, ensures a centralized and trans-
expertise: ESA can undertake any pro- versal security management approach
gramme, at any level of sensitivity or through, inter alia, a unique Point of
even classification. This was clearly contact for internal and external stake-
recognised in the Resolution by ESA’s holders and a unique, coordinated Se-
Ministerial Council in November 2023 curity Strategy for Security from Space.
during which Member States affirmed In addition to the mechanisms provided
“the role of ESA in (…) delivering secu- for in the Convention(10) and pro-
rity-relevant benefits to its Member gramme-specific legal frameworks, this
States and partners through technical set-up is a pivotal element to the proper
excellence and its unique or leading ca- protection of the EU security objectives.
pabilities in response to stakeholder re-
quirements.” Member States Conclusion
furthermore “[recognised] the Agency’s
internal security governance enabling it In conclusion, ESA welcomes the im-
to securely manage its activities and portant step taken with the publication
programmes.” of the EU SSSD: with the evolution of
technology, its more widespread avail-
ESA thus ensures a comprehensive ability, governments, and institutions
security management approach: need to rethink and update our struc-
tures to deliver better adapted security
Credibility relies on reliability, in se- systems to users, in a controlled and se-
curity-sensitive domains even more cure manner, fully respecting national
than in non-security critical areas. The sovereignty.
reliability of the ESA security service is The Strategy is a defining political
already today ensured by an elaborate step that will contribute positively to
internal security framework, with the making Europe a better equipped
192 Hellenic Air Force Review

strategic player. It is furthermore a crit- been considered as strictly national.

ical capability step with the Earth Obser- During CM22, Member States have
vation Governmental Service, the agreed to programmes covering inde-
extension of the Galileo model, IRIS2, pendent access to space, Galileo,
the confirmation of orientations that Copernicus, secure connectivity, space
ESA has already begun in space trans- safety, cyber security, critical technolo-
portation, while Space Domain Aware- gies for non-dependence.
ness services would be of strategic Europe must better coordinate its
added value to all space operations, in- space capability developments and co-
cluding those of ESA. operatively deliver those space services
ESA has been proposing and urging that Member States require for their do-
for long, such as accelerating synergies mestic security and at their borders.
in space and security, a shared under- ESA is not the sole architect of such
standing of space threats, the resilience evolutions, only a part of this evolution,
and protection of space systems and as the distinction between civil and de-
services which obviously also affect ESA fence, or public and commercial do-
assets and our Member States invest- mains become increasingly irrelevant
ments. and as we witness a growing accept-
ESA has the regulatory framework ance that new synergies must be built
(including sensitive / classified projects) as part of a consistent and comprehen-
and technical savoir faire to accompany sive approach towards space and secu-
the EU in its new ambitions and to en- rity, allowing a more efficient use of
sure the protection of the security inter- funding, public and private, concentrat-
est of the EU and EU/ESA Member ing on user needs addressing major
States. challenges, shared by all on Earth.
Security can be a defining factor of The Accelerators form a solid basis
ESA’s future evolution: because of the to deepen the dialogue with EU institu-
increasing relevance and criticality of tions on how to better synchronise and
space in crisis response combined with consolidate fragmented space and se-
the wider availability of such services, curity efforts in Europe.
we will need to tackle a governance evo- Security in and from space is essen-
lution regarding the control – which tial to the welfare of people, robustness
some call “sovereignty” - over some of our economies and the competitive-
specific technologies relevant to secu- ness of European industry.
rity operations, as well as the develop- The Paris Ministerial Council in No-
ment in cooperation of some vember 2022 invited “the strengthen-
capabilities that have up until today only ing of ESA’s ability to serve its Member
 Hellenic Air Force Review 193

States and cooperate with its partners, munication, JOIN(2023)9, Direc-

including the European Union, in the torate-General for Defence Industry
and Space, 10/03/2023
context of security, by reinforcing Euro- (3) ESA Agenda 2025, Make space for
pean industry and its competitiveness, Europe, 31/03/2021
fostering exchange and dialogue with (4) ESA Accelerators, Accelerate the use
of space, 02/2022
security actors of Member States, and
(5) Galileo EU programme, https://de-
developing technologies and capabili- fence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/
ties to better protect Europe and its cit- eu-space/galileo-satellite-naviga-
izens from crises and risks.” It is tion_en
(6) Copernicus EU programme, https://de-
precisely in this spirit that ESA proposes fence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/
to engage the EU in a constructive eu-space/copernicus-earth-observa-
space and security dialogue, that ought tion_en
(7) IRIS2, https://defence-industry-spa-
to not only “recognise the sovereignty of
ce. ec.europa.eu/eu-space/iris2-se-
the Member States in the field of secu- cure-connectivity_en
rity” but also the roles and added value (8) ARTES,https://www.esa.int/Applica-
of both the EU and ESA. tions/Connectivity_and_Secure_Com-
munications/ARTES/About_ARTES
References (9) Regulation (EU) 2021/696 Of The Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council
(1) A Strategic compass for security and of 28 April 2021, article 3
defence, European Commission, (10) The ESA Convention, CSE/CS(73)19,
Council of the European Union, rev.7, 31/05/1975
7371/22, 21/03/2022
(2) The EU Space Strategy for Security
and Defence, for a stronger and more
resilient European Union, Joint com-

Short Biography
Pascal LEGAI is currently the Senior Security Adviser to ESA DG.
He has a military background (Major General in the French Air and
Space Force). He acquired experience mainly in the fields of geog-
raphy, imagery intelligence, international relations, Space and Se-
curity issues.
He has extensive international experience in the geospatial
information domain. Before joining ESA, he was Director of the EU
Satellite Centre, an imagery analysis centre, based near Madrid,
Spain, providing Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) prod-
ucts and services to support the EU external action. He has a
PhD in International Relations, a qualification as Research Director, a law degree, sev-
eral Master degrees in Imagery Processing, Computer Sciences, in History, in Irish Civ-
ilization, in Mathematics. He is an aerospace engineer and has also an Engineer
Diploma in the field of the geographic sciences.
The Popularisation of Space
A European Perspective 1

Professor Kai-Uwe Schrogl

Special Advisor for Political Affairs,
European Space Agency (ESA)

1
Reprinted from Space Policy, 41, Kai-Uwe Schrogl, The popularisation of space:
A European perspective, 70-72, Copyright (2017), with permission from
Elsevier. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2017.01.004
 Hellenic Air Force Review 195

Abstract unanimous consent: astronauts!

But is that still valid for the broader
It is a legitimate question to ask, public of today and even more so for the
whether space is really popular in Eu- young? Astronauts, most fortunately,
rope. But why should it be? This view- still draw crowds wherever they speak
point tackles both the whether and the and share their experience. For many,
why. It looks at deficiencies as well as they are role models. Not the heroes of
advancements in communicating the 1960s and of today’s Hollywood
space to the European public and de- movies, but men and women who have
cision-makers. Before anything else, it made a special experience. This astro-
provides an idea of the aim to make naut generation is not regarded as one
space (even more) popular in Europe, of outward explorers, leaving the Earth
reflecting the continent’s development and leaving Earth orbit. They are re-
and identity garded as explorers with the direction
Earth. They can share and are re-
Keywords quested to share with us their view on
Earth for under-standing its vulnerability
Space Popularisation, European and the arbitrariness of frontiers and
Identity, space activities, astronauts, nationalism. People want them to pro-
space education, younger generation vide them with a global identity and in-
spiration.
What is popular today? But is human spaceflight all there is
or all that should be popular about
You like astronauts? Of course you space activities, which have developed
do. And certainly you can even be char- and extended so tremendously during
acterized as being part of the Apollo the past decades? Can anything else
generation, which does not necessarily than astronauts compete with what is
require a birthdate before 1960, but popular today? And what is actually
which rather means that the Moon land- popular today? Are Soccer players or
ing is a paramount personal memory, rock stars more popular than space?
whether it was actually witnessed or Are games more popular than the real
not. In this respect, the entire space stuff?
community, whether 70 or 20 years old, Ask any young person, how much
is part of the Apollo generation. So if they like the websites of the space
you ask this space community, what agencies. If they actually have ever vis-
makes space popular, one there is ited them, they might regard them as
196 Hellenic Air Force Review

being from the Stone Age. If not, landing a tool for education are however mostly
on Mars or a comet, any sports star has seen altruistically by the space agen-
more followers than all space agencies cies in their education programmes in
put together. But is this a measure for that a clear objective is to raise the in-
popularity? Competing for attention in a terest of young people in all the STEM
smart and modern way and popularity (science, technology, engineering and
could there-fore be the motto for the mathematics) fields, even if the high
space community. school student attracted by space in his
or her curriculum will not automatically
Why should space be popular? become a rocket scientist, but may turn
out to be a biologist or a civil engineer.
When dropping the word lobbying, And here we are again. As the astro-
the intention should be clear. It shall not nauts are ambassadors of an idea and
refer to the pejorative use of the term an ideal, education with and through
meaning to viciously get money, bene- space is also dedicated to a broader
fits or undeserved privileges with which benefit. These are good preconditions,
it is usually associated in Europe. It one may think, to run a successful pop-
shall be the understanding that the ularisation campaign meeting today’s
space community wants to popularise expectations of European citizens.
space, because it is fully convinced of
the positive effects space utilization has How to popularise space?
on society and the benefits which are
derived from space for economics, sus- The real question is, how to do it? It
tainability, progress and prosperity. does not help anymore if governments
From this perspective, it is legitimate to advertise for it. Also putting publicity in
make efforts (and spend money, the tax newspapers and on TV is not really
payers’ money) to popularise space, be- promising. To give the last point a differ-
cause it has more the character of in- ent spin: space can become the back-
formation, dissemination and ground for advertisement, but for this,
education. it has to be popular already. Space has
When looking at education, the ap- seen limousines on the Moon or beer-
proach and the intentions are even drinking astronauts watching mete-
more diverse in Europe. Space as an at- orites hitting the Earth in commercials.
tractive tool for education shall certainly Returning to means of popularisation,
lead to develop the future workforce in blogs, tweets and Facebook are not re-
the space sector. Concepts for space as ally promising either, since it is done
 Hellenic Air Force Review 197

now by more people than there are fol- tive new instruments.
lowers and readers. The current stan- Another instrument are prizes. In Eu-
dards of popularisation are not enough rope, no prize can match the power of
for a high-flyer like space. the X-Prizes. But Europe learned and
Popularisation can work through sur- adapted for this situation. The Galileo
veys. They meet the double objective of and the Copernicus Masters are the
learning what people think and at the flagships in the field. They promote new
same time they engage people. Space ideas in navigation and EO applications.
in Europe has continuously been a topic They target entrepreneurship, but they
for surveys mostly run by Eurobarome- also are an effective tool for disseminat-
ter on behalf of the European Commis- ing information and messages about
sion. They lead to good information and the benefits of space applications.
intelligence. Sometimes, however, the Other, much smaller competitions such
client is happy about the result that al- as the ESA-EISC (European Interparlia-
most 100% are in favour of using Earth mentary Space Conference) Award on
observation (EO) to monitor the climate, Space for Sustainability are also a
but this delight is immediately reduced, means for popularisation, but they ad-
when in the next question zero percent ditionally have a side-effect of positive
can name a single EO satellite mission. political communication. The highest
So, surveys have to become smarter. scores are hit with programming com-
ESA actually tried that out. In Septem- petitions, be it manoeuvring rovers on
ber 2016, it organized what was called celestial bodies, be it docking space-
a “Citizens’ Debate on Space”. On one craft to space stations. In these cases,
day in September, around 100 persons European aficionados join with a global
met for a day in each of its 22 Member community in creative frenzy, which
States to discuss space issues under highlight the potential of space as a
the guidance of a moderator, touching cool object for up-to-date pursuits.
all major aspects of space and thus tak- The most modern means in this re-
ing a step further from a normal non-in- spect is certainly the hackathon. While
teractive sur-vey. This Citizens’ Debate it does not really popularise to the
was modelled after an approach ap- broadest level of society, it can tell sto-
plied already for COP21, where the in- ries of space, its infrastructure and its
teraction took place in 100 countries. applications. It also provides an excite-
The result was amazing and showed ment, which can be exploited in many
that with a bit of creativity traditional ways. This case shows how space in Eu-
means can be transformed into effec- rope is embracing new means of popu-
198 Hellenic Air Force Review

larisation, transforming and enhancing tutions and regulations can. A European

them through its special touch and launcher, a European navigation satel-
preparing the young generation for look- lite system, European astronauts on
ing at space from diverse perspectives. board of a European module at the ISS
Apart from the high-end efforts, a - all this can help to produce a feeling of
well-crafted mix of traditional and new pride in joint European efforts, allowing
media is necessary to reach the broad- people to feel a bit more European,
est possible spectrum of society as well which is required as a basis for any po-
as the decision-makers. We have to litical integration.
continuously extend our reach through No one should joke about UEFA and
addressing new target groups with new the Eurovision Song Contest. They are
formats and new platforms in the digital more powerful drivers for European in-
as well as the real world. And we have tegration in the minds of the people
to overcome the negligence of building than any treaty. But only the aerospace
a trademark for Europe in space, which sector has such highly-visible joint Eu-
can only be to make “ESA” the brand ropean technology developments. Pop-
around which Europeans’ expectations ularisation of space can thus lead to
in such a trade-mark converge. It is the direct positive political and societal ef-
a step towards United Space in Europe, fects. You want to respond to Brexit?
where all partners, be they space agen- Use space. The United Kingdom has
cies, research establishments or indus- never questioned its membership in
try, can benefit from the power of such ESA.
a rallying trade-mark. With this, co- The second point besides identity is
branding comes naturally to the benefit inspiration. Inspiration can take the
of all those associated with it. most diverse forms: scientific, techno-
logical, political, ethical or societal, to
Space, Identity and Inspiration name only a few. It is what brings soci-
eties forward. It is at the basis for an
One of my last projects as Director even better future. The Apollo genera-
of the European Space Policy Institute tion from above has received its inspi-
(ESPI), and one of my favourite ones, ration from the Moon landing. It worked
was “Space and European Identity”. It for many decades. But where is the in-
was driven by the idea that space can spiration stemming from space today?
be a powerful tool for building and Is it Landsat 7 or Sentinel 1B? Are you
strengthening the European identity fur- inspired by the precision of the clocks
ther and better than its little loved insti- operated for GPS and Galileo? You cer-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 199

tainly should be. But it is not easy to On the right track?

convince the public.
Maybe the “Moon Village” concept We want to popularise space. We do
promoted by ESA’s Director General, un- that because we are convinced that
derstood as a growing ensemble suited space is worth being taken account of
for multiple uses and open to multiple by as many people as possible, maybe
users, can be the next vision for space. even by the whole society. Not by
It already begun to create a global mo- chance, the Joint Statement between
mentum. Until it deploys its full potential ESA and the European Union of 2016
as an inspirational tool, the “overview on a Shared Vision and Goals for the Fu-
effect” of astronauts perceiving the ture of Europe in Space says that “Every
fragile and borderless Earth from orbit, single European citizen shall benefit
re-mains the key emotional and inspira- from Europe’s space capacities and ca-
tional facet. pabilities.” And the citizens shall know
You will hardly convince anyone with this. But it’s not so much about getting
brochures, websites or a survey any- the citizens’ consent to spend their
more. You can do that when you take money.
the time, effort and resources to run It is much more that we, the space
something like a Citizens’ Debate. community, can and want to provide, al-
Rosetta and Philae inspired. They ac- most dedicate, to society to achieve
complished a first and they did so un- benefits and progress. A noble cause,
imaginably far away from Earth in which we have to justify and reaffirm
breath taking reality. So, inspiration as continuously, through information, inno-
a means for as well as a result of popu- vation, interaction and inspiration. We
larisation is unbeatable. It always is au- have to use space for education and
thentic and it makes you wonder what making society STEM-friendly. We also
can be accomplished now and what we have to contribute to the development
would like to contribute to accomplish- of identity, a specificity for Europe in tur-
ments in the future. We have to make moil. We have to adapt our methods
and instruments and should not be
efforts to prepare new narratives that
afraid of taking risks and using unortho-
actually touch people, making space
dox methods. While money is scarcer
tangible and helping to reach the level
for communications in the space sector
of human empathy.
than in other places, we still have the
hot topics. The single most important
thing to do, however, is to merge the un-
200 Hellenic Air Force Review

matched inspiration of the long Apollo

generation with modern expectations
and methods. Then popularity comes
unfailingly and allows us to make space
work effectively for society.
 Hellenic Air Force Review 201

Short Biography

Professor Dr. Kai-Uwe Schrogl is the Special Adviser for Political Af-
fairs of the European Space Agency (ESA). Before, he was seconded
from ESA to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and En-
ergy in Berlin to support the German Presidency of the Council of the
European Union.
Until 2019, he was the Chief Strategy Officer of ESA in Paris.
From 2007 to 2011 he was the Director of the European Space Policy
Institute (ESPI) in Vienna.
Kai-Uwe Schrogl is the President of the International Institute of Space Law
(IISL), the global association of space lawyers from more than 50 countries. He served
from 2014 to 2016 as chairman of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) and was from 2020 to 2022
Co-Chair of the Global Future Council on Space of the World Economic Forum (WEF).
He recently co-edited “A Research Agenda for Space Policy” at Elgar.
Advancing National Security:
Greece’s Strategic Plan
for Next-Gen
MILSATCOM Systems

Lt. Colonel (Pilot) Giantsis Fotios

Citation: Lt. Colonel (Pilot) Giantsis Fotios. (2025). Advancing National Security:
Greece’s Strategic Plan for Next-Gen MILSATCOM Systems. Hellenic Air Force Re-
view, 134. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15169197
 Hellenic Air Force Review 203

Abstract Keywords

This article proposes a plan for the Military Satellite Communications,

development of the Greek satellite sys- MILSATCOM, Governmental Satellite
tem (GR-MILSATCOM). The benefits of Communications, GOVSATCOM, Secure
such a project would be significant for SATCOM, Space Security and Defence,
strengthening national (and interna- Hellenic Air Force, HAF
tional) Defence, Security and Economy.
Such a system will also be a catalyst for Introduction
the Hellenic Air Force (HAF) in transition-
ing to the new space era, enhancing its In the modern era, information is
operational capabilities and the re- one of the most decisive factors for na-
silience of its communications. Greece tional Security and Defence. Satellite
currently seeks to acquire its own satel- Communications (SATCOM) play a cen-
lite system, primarily for military and tral role in the defence strategies of na-
governmental communications. Greece tions, offering resilient and reliable
aims to design, develop, launch, and exchange of information, in a rapidly
operate a telecommunications satellite changing geopolitical environment.
equipped with advanced technologies Their utilisation is critical for the effec-
and strong encryption, operating in a tive conduct of military operations and
geostationary orbit (GEO). This satellite the safeguarding of national security.
will provide continuous wide-area cover- The strategic importance of SATCOM in
age and connectivity to the national national Defence is very high, offering
Armed Forces (and governmental enti- significant capabilities for Command,
ties) in various operational theaters1. Control, Communication, Computer and
While existing national telecommunica- Intelligence (C4I).
tions infrastructures are capable, they Space is an enabler not only for the
have inherent limitations that hinder na- digital transformation. The Space indus-
tions from operating with maximum ef- try is rapidly evolving as we enter a new
ficiency and security. A modern SATCOM era, including SATCOM. Agile New
system can enhance existing national Space players are embracing new
military communication networks, en- trends in the space technology in order
suring fast, reliable, and secure data to develop services benefiting diverse
transmission during military operations. users in both public and private sec-
Additionally, it can provide the desired tors2. By following a comprehensive
nations’ autonomy in the field of SAT- roadmap for leveraging these technolo-
COM while contributing to technological gies, nations can not only enhance their
superiority and economic growth. defence capabilities but also maintain
204 Hellenic Air Force Review

strategic superiority in the increasingly resilient, and high-speed space-based

digitised and interconnected realm of connectivity to satisfy the needs of EU
global Security. institutions, bodies, agencies and Mem-
Secure SATCOM are essential for the ber States. Secure SATCOM provide one
resilience and strategic autonomy of the or two-way reliable, accessible and
nations, both in Space and on the guaranteed satellite service for commu-
ground. They provide the basis for secu- nications. To connect European Govern-
rity - and safety - of critical missions and ments, the EU is working on both the
operations, including crisis manage- deployment of GOVSATCOM, a compo-
ment, land and border surveillance, and nent already part of the “EU Space Reg-
protection of the key infrastructure3. ulation, 2021” 7, and the deployment of
Space has long been an important the IRIS2, the new “EU Secure Connec-
domain for military operations and has tivity Programme” 3, 8, to be operational
been used actively by NATO for its own by 2030.
SATCOM programme for almost 55 In this context, the development of a
years. However, it was not until 2019 national military telecommunications
that NATO Allies formally recognised satellite (MILSATCOM) is a strategic im-
Space as an operational domain, open- perative to enhance a nation’s defence
ing the door to a greater focus on how capabilities and secure communica-
Space can play a pivotal role in De- tions infrastructure. It is also an oppor-
fence4. tunity to advance technological
A little later, in 2022, after the Russ- capabilities, and enhance research and
ian invasion in Ukraine, the European innovation in space sector. The techno-
Union (EU) leaders also identified Space logical advancements made during the
as a strategic domain through the “EU system’s development could also lead
Strategic Compass” 5 and called for an to numerous spin-off technologies that
EU Space Strategy for Security and De- benefit civilian sectors, by Enhanced
fence. Building on this political momen- (and Secure) Communication Networks.
tum, the Commission and the High The primary purpose of establishing
Representative have developed the a national MILSATCOM system in Space
first-ever “EU Space Strategy for Secu- is to provide a secure, resilient and
rity and Defence, 2023” 6. As high- high-capacity communication network
lighted in this Strategy, the gap between tailored specifically for military use. This
Space and Defence should be bridged, satellite will ensure fast, seamless and
while flagship programs in Space for Se- real-time communication across all
curity and Defense purposes must be branches of the Armed Forces, enhanc-
prioritized. ing coordination, operational efficiency
The EU needs independent, secure, and decision-making capabilities.
 Hellenic Air Force Review 205

Strategic Impact of National mitting orders, intelligence, and real-

MILSATCOM Systems time data between Command Centers
and deployed forces, ensuring synchro-
Contribution to National Security nized and efficient mission execution.
NATO’s SATCOM infrastructure supports
The development and deployment of operations at all levels (strategic, oper-
a MILSATOM system will ensure na- ational and tactical), providing access
tional autonomy in safety and Security. to mission-critical information10.
The utilization and development of Intelligence Gathering and Surveil-
space infrastructure contribute to lance
achieving autonomous capabilities to SATCOM support Intelligence, Sur-
respond to national Security needs. veillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) op-
The system will also provide a dedi- erations by transmitting data from
cated, secure and resilient communica- various sensors and platforms to analy-
tion infrastructure for defence sis centers. This capability enhances
operations. It will serve as a critical Situational Awareness and decision-
component in ensuring that military making processes, critical to national
forces can maintain superiority in all op- Security9.
erational environments. The forecasted Resilience and Redundancy
improved communication capabilities In times of crisis, terrestrial commu-
will provide a tactical advantage, facili- nication networks may be vulnerable to
tating real-time data sharing and deci- disruption. SATCOM provide an alterna-
sion-making. tive communication pathway, ensuring
The critical role of SATCOM in several continuity of operations even when
key areas is underscored by NATO: ground-based systems are compro-
Secure and Reliable Communica- mised. NATO’s strategic rivals have
tions across vast distances been conducting space operations that
This capability is vital for coordinat- threaten the security of the Alliance,
ing operations, especially in remote or highlighting the need for resilient space-
hostile environments where traditional based infrastructure4.
communication infrastructure is lack- Integration of Allied Forces
ing. NATO’s recent investment of €1 bil- SATCOM enable different nations’
lion in SATCOM services over 15 years forces to operate cohesively, during
highlights the importance placed on multinational operations. NATO’s re-
these capabilities9. liance on member states to provide
Support for Command and Control space capabilities, such as SATCOM,
(C2) underscores the collaborative nature of
SATCOM are fundamental for trans- these operations11.
206 Hellenic Air Force Review

Economic Benefits sector may be supplemented by com-

mercial contracts as required. With the
The development of a new MILSAT- huge growth in the commercial supply
COM system is expected to create jobs of high-quality SATCOM capability, it is
and drive economic expansion through becoming opportune to explore dual-
technological advancement and manu- use scenarios in collaboration with in-
facturing. Apart from that, any excess dustry: deploying commercial SATCOM
telecommunications capacity can be infrastructure for military applications.
leased to Allies, such us national/gov- Through limited co-investment, defence
ernmental organisations, or to private sector could have this commercial ca-
telecommunication companies, con- pability made suitable for military de-
tributing to the rapid amortisation of the ployment, and also strengthen the
project. The Greek RFI, published in business case for industry12.
2024, also incorporated this option1.
Moreover, in the field of narrowband Operational Support for Forces
communications for the tactical do- Deployment
main, there has been a rapidly increas-
ing structural shortage of satellite Some of the EU member states have
capability worldwide in recent years. deployed forces in external theatres
This issue requires intensive interna- over the last decades as part of na-
tional coordination and cooperation. By tional or international missions or oper-
investing proactively, nations and organ- ations (such as under NATO, or the EU).
izations such as NATO, could have tac- Those missions and operations involve
tical satellite capability over extended the use of satellite communications ei-
areas, be well-prepared to fulfill their in- ther based on proprietary governmental
ternational role in this domain, and be satellites or third-party assets (such as
able to further build this capacity12. systems managed by private commer-
These requirements could potentially cial operators) 3, 5.
be addressed by EU systems like GOV-
SATCOM and IRIS2, which aim to provide Evolving Landscape of Secure
secure and resilient satellite communi- SATCOM: Drivers, Challenges
cations for EU citizens and governmen- and Future Trends
tal users. However, their ability to fully
cover the increasing demand for tactical Factors driving the demand for
narrowband SATCOM—especially for secure SATCOM
highly mobile, real-time battlefield com-
munications—remains uncertain. The need for secure SATCOM was
SATCOM capabilities of the defence first presented in 2004 with the EU
 Hellenic Air Force Review 207

Council’s decision “European Space ciency technologies are inextricably

Policy: ESDP and Space” 13 and again in linked. Military operations are becom-
2016 with the “EU Global Strategy” 14. ing more complex as conflict areas grow
However, the Russian invasion high- more dispersed on a global scale, with
lighted the necessity to address this a growing need to support a diversity of
issue more effectively. The 2022 EU on-the-move, on-the-pause and fixed
Strategic Compass is the last key driver platforms. At the same time, security
for future demand. It is estimated to threats are becoming more apparent,
lead to new investments, modernisation raising concerns that nations, terrorist
of forces and new operations. groups, criminals and individual hack-
At the same time, an increase in the ers can jam, interrupt and endanger
data transmission requirement for es- military operations. The challenge is to
sentially all of the terminals used by mil- meet, in a secure and guaranteed way,
itary forces is anticipated. the increased demand for raw capacity
The sensitivity to new and/or in- generated by continuous growth in
creasing threats (i.e. contested opera- space data rate requirements for mili-
tions, jamming, cyber security, etc.) is tary purposes15.
also estimated to result in a demand for Existing SATCOM systems, while ro-
more “secure” capabilities compared to bust, face several critical challenges
traditional commercial SATCOM solu- that limit their effectiveness in support-
tions3. ing modern military and national secu-
Furthermore, the locations of future rity operations. Primary challenges
threats, crises and operations is diffi- include:
cult to anticipate, as exemplified by the  Bandwidth limitations
war in Ukraine in 2022. As such, the  Cyber Security vulnerabilities
ability to rapidly adapt, with an increas-  Coverage gaps
ing level of flexibility and mobility is es-  Latency issues
timated to represent an important  Aging infrastructure
driver. The trend towards an increasing  Capacity constraints
number of units equipped with a com-
munication on the move capability is es- Technological Drivers
timated to increase3. transforming the Secure Satellite-
based Connectivity
Current Challenges in SATCOM
Several structural drivers have
In today’s military applications sup- started to transform and largely in-
ported by SATCOM, security, resilience, crease the volume of capacity offered
information assurance, and link effi- through satellite assets. These will likely
208 Hellenic Air Force Review

also impact the capacity and services across various and multiple orbits, not
available for secure connectivity. Over- just the traditional single satellites in
all, digital technologies are at the heart GEO orbit. In GEO, innovations such as
of this transformation alongside the use micro-GEO satellites are also emerging.
of higher frequency bands and other Additionally, the adoption of multi-band
features. and high-frequency bands is becoming
Ultimately, the technological benefits more widespread, enhancing the flexi-
will likely go in three directions3: bility and capacity of SATCOM systems.
 An increase in the volume of High Throughput Satellites (HTS),
available capacity software-defined satellites, and satel-
 A higher flexibility in the ability to lites equipped with on-board Artificial In-
dynamically allocate the capac- telligence (AI) and edge computing
ity and design of services capabilities, are also key trends that are
 A higher cost efficiency of satel- revolutionizing SATCOM. Moreover, Di-
lite assets rect-to-Device (D2D) technology is ad-
dressing connectivity challenges in
Latest Trends in SATCOM underserved regions, offering a practi-
cal solution for extending communica-
The SATCOM domain is undergoing tion networks.
unprecedented development across the Meanwhile, there is evidence that
board. Technical developments in satel- state actors are increasingly focusing
lites, terminals and ground infrastruc- on developing SATCOM specific attacks.
ture are moving at lightning speed. These attacks are also being developed
New innovative launch capability across the spectrum: ranging from at-
providers, such as Space-X, are making tacks in the electromagnetic domain
satellite launches increasingly common. (such as jamming, directed energy dep-
Today, we see huge investments in com- osition and interception) to kinetic at-
mercial constellations of satellites, tacks and cyber-attacks on
mainly in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Exam- ground-based infrastructure, including
ples include Starlink and OneWeb. Be- management infrastructure. Technical,
cause of the short distance between geopolitical and commercial develop-
the satellite and Earth, these constella- ments in the SATCOM domain require a
tions provide connections that can com- broad (re)orientation of Defence’s need
pete with land-based fiber networks in for more secure and robust high-capac-
terms of latency and bandwidth12. ity SATCOM links12. Recent advance-
Beyond the prominent rise of LEO ments in quantum and laser
constellations, there is a growing trend communications, along with blockchain
toward deploying satellite constellations technology, are showing great promise
 Hellenic Air Force Review 209

in providing robust protection against satellites, micro-GEO satellites are

the above security threats. being placed in the geostationary orbit
and already provide (successfully) satel-
The GR-MILSATCOM System lite communications. Their advantages
and its Impact on the - such as lower weight and size, simpler
Hellenic Air Force construction, reduced costs, easier and
quicker deployment, and streamlined li-
The GR-MILSATCOM system censing from regulatory authorities -
make them increasingly popular. They
Greece is pursuing the development are an ideal choice for countries with
of a single satellite in GEO, capable of smaller budgets that still wish to de-
providing autonomous and secure velop their own MILSATCOM and/or
satellite communications. The satellite GOVSATCOM systems. It is worth noting
should also be positioned to lease any that Micro-GEO satellites (as well as
excess capacity, which is a key element laser communication satellites) do not
for recouping the overall project costs. require approval from the International
Another important aspect is the Telecommunication Union (ITU) for GEO
Greece’s intention to offer these serv- deployments.
ices to allied nations and/or organisa- The leasing of excess capacity from
tions, which will create funding the Greece’s first satellite could support
requirements from those entities1. the financing of the second one. This
Since the exact budget, project time- option offers the redundancy and unin-
line, and specific intentions regarding terrupted operation required for a MIL-
collaborations with other countries and SATCOM system. A realistic estimate for
organizations remain still unknown, the first deployment would be a budget
only a general idea for developing such of under €60 million, and a timeline of
a system can be outlined. If the initial approximately two years. This satellite
mission parameters (requirements and could use high military frequency
orbit) are not altered along the way, the bands, such as X or MIL-Ka band, and
recommended approach is to opt for de- is projected to have a lifespan of 10 to
ploying 2x Micro-GEO satellites, with a 15 years in geostationary orbit.
different timeline for each of them. Ini- The second Micro-GEO satellite
tially, Greece should procure a Micro- could further improve connectivity be-
GEO satellite, which will be small and tween existing national or European
cost-effective, allowing for rapid deploy- satellite constellations in lower orbits by
ment and the provision of desired serv- utilizing laser Inter-Satellite Links (ISLs).
ices. Additionally, it could be equipped with a
Although much smaller than GEO Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) pay-
210 Hellenic Air Force Review

load to further enhance security. This dinator for the HellasQCI project18.
approach aligns with Greece’s recent Additionally, the world’s first com-
efforts to integrate into the EuroQCI mercial OGS has been established in
framework. As a reminder, the country Greece, by the Norwegian-based com-
is already taking steps to participate in pany K-SAT, with plans to integrate it
this broader EU initiative, which the into a multi-mission network opera-
country’s Ministry of Digital Governance tion19. This K-SAT telescope could po-
(GR-MoDG) signed on 3 December tentially establish optical links with the
201916. proposed GR-MILSATCOM system. Fur-
Greece’s focus has been primarily thermore, optical telescopes designed
on developing the terrestrial infrastruc- for laser communication with the sys-
ture for the EuroQCI, with three Optical tem could be deployed on military ships
Ground Stations (OGS) selected in col- within Greece’s territorial waters and/or
laboration with the European Space on Greek islands, providing additional
Agency (ESA): redundancy to the overall system.

Figure 1: Greece’s terrestrial infrastructure for the EuroQCI, Source: HELLAS QCI17

The National Infrastructures for Re- Here is an illustration of the pro-

search and Technology (GRNET), oper- posed integration of the GR-MILSAT-
ating under the auspices of the COM system into the existing
GR-MoDG, is at the moment, the coor- GreeCom20 network:
 Hellenic Air Force Review 211

Figure 2. The Proposed Integration of the GR-MILSATCOM System into the

existing GreeCom Network,
Source: C. Giannopapa, A. Staveris-Polykalas and S. Metlallinos21

A hybrid approach (1x Micro-GEO (FOC), GEO satellite. In any case, while
satellite + 1x GEO satellite) should also the first Micro-GEO satellite is being de-
be considered, particularly given the ex- veloped and deployed, efforts to ac-
tensive space heritage of “traditional” quire the second satellite should be
military GEO communication satellites. initiated concurrently.
Additionally, part of the revenue gener- Throughout all phases of the project,
ated from leasing the capacity of the comprehensive cost assessments must
first satellite could be allocated towards be conducted, and funding sources
funding the larger (and more expensive) should be secured in a timely manner.
GEO satellite. This strategy could play a Additionally, technological trends (e.g.,
pivotal role in ensuring the overall eco- D2D connectivity or laser SATCOM) and
nomic feasibility of the project. challenges surrounding MILSATCOM
To further reduce the overall project systems (particularly cyber-security
costs, Greek governmental authorities threats) should be continually re-
could first wait to evaluate the perform- assessed. Adhering to the project time-
ance of the initial satellite. If they are line is another critical success factor for
sufficiently satisfied with its results, the mission.
they could then deploy another similar At the same time, engaging with al-
Micro-GEO satellite, rather than invest- lied countries that have similar systems
ing in a more expensive and slower-to- could yield benefits by helping to avoid
establish Full Operational Capability mistakes and missteps. Greece can
212 Hellenic Air Force Review

draw insights from the examples set by nation of operational information, en-
other pioneering countries and organi- hances shared Situational Awareness
sations that have successfully devel- at all levels of warfare, and conse-
oped state-of-the-art communication quently contributes to the flexible and
satellites. In those cases, at least two effective use of Air Power22.
GEO satellites were typically developed, Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) and
with investments amounting to several Interoperability
hundred million euros. The HAF is shifting towards a NCW
Building on this approach, Greece environment, where seamless intercon-
should also pursue a system with inter- nection of military units (aircraft, Com-
connectivity capabilities, both with its mand Centers, surface and ground
national LEO micro-satellite network forces) is critical. A MILSATCOM system
and with European SATCOM networks will enable:
such as IRIS2, EU GOVSATCOM or  Real-time ISR data transmission
EUQCI. Regardless of which option Integration of information
Greece ultimately chooses, it is crucial across all branches of the
to focus on the timeline, budget and Armed Forces
funding, collaboration with stakehold-  Superior Situational Awareness
ers, partnerships with allied countries and battlefield coordination
and/or organisations, risk assessment,  Autonomous and seamless in-
and compliance with international reg- teroperability with Allied Forces
ulations. Support for Unmanned Aerial Vehi-
cles (UAVs) and C2 Systems
Contribution to the Hellenic UAVs have acquired significant pay-
Air Force (HAF) load capabilities (weapons, optical sen-
sors, radars, etc.), leading to their
Communications are a fundamental increasing use in modern warfare and
factor both for the effective C2 of Air their integration into the military arse-
Forces and for the successful conduct nals of most countries22. With the rapid
of operations. Military communication advancement of UAVs, the HAF will re-
systems must be interoperable with the quire SATCOM for:
communication systems of other  Remote control of UAVs over
branches of the Armed Forces, as well long distances
as with other governmental, Allied, and  “From sensor to shooter” capa-
civilian communication and information bility, to locate, acquire, and
systems. Secure, continuous, resilient strike targets with pinpoint accu-
and real-time connectivity between Air racy
Units and assets enables the dissemi-  Transmission of high-resolution
 Hellenic Air Force Review 213

video, images and data in real commercial networks are vulnerable,

time to Operations Centers whereas a MILSATCOM system ensures
 Better integration of UAVs with exclusive use and control.
manned aircraft in a Common Autonomous Strategic SATCOM
Operational Environment A national MILSATCOM system will
Hostile missiles or drones intercep- provide autonomy, reduce dependence
tion on third parties, and strengthen na-
The MILSATCOM system will en- tional strategic planning for the Armed
hance the HAF’s ability to intercept Forces, including the HAF.
enemy ballistic missiles or drones by
providing real-time data and intelli- Conclusion
gence through systems like the Shared
Early Warning (SEW) satellite system. The development of the GR-MILSAT-
Support Air Lift Operations COM system marks a significant strate-
Airlift operations are vital to the suc- gic advancement in national Security,
cess of joint operations, as they enable technological innovation and economic
the airborne transport, deployment, growth. By establishing a secure, re-
sustainment and recovery of personnel, silient, and autonomous SATCOM sys-
assets and equipment. At the same tem, Greece will enhance its defence
time, airlift provides fast and flexible op- capabilities while reducing dependence
tions for military, national and interna- on third-party infrastructures. The pro-
tional organizations, allowing them to posed Micro-GEO satellite system en-
respond effectively to crises at a local, sures cost-effectiveness, rapid
regional or global level22. A MILSATCOM deployment, and potential revenue
system will play a crucial role in support- through leasing excess capacity. This
ing airlift operations by ensuring secure, initiative not only aligns with broader
real-time connectivity between Com- European security frameworks but also
mand Centers and airborne assets, en- strengthens the country’s position
hancing coordination and mission within NATO and EU defence collabora-
effectiveness in complex operational tions.
environments. Acquiring such a system will also
Secure and Resilient Communica- mark the HAF’s transition to the new Air
tions and Space Force era, enabling it to op-
The system will provide resilient, se- erate in a modern, interoperable and
cure and encrypted communications, NCW environment, ensuring operational
essential for modern Air Force opera- superiority and resilient communica-
tions. In the event of conflict or cyber at- tions against current and future chal-
tacks, communications relying on lenges.
214 Hellenic Air Force Review

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Short Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Fotios Giantsis graduated from the Hel-

lenic Air Force Academy in 2002. He served for several years at
the 117 Combat Wing as a pilot on F-4E AUP fighter aircraft. He
has been a flight instructor and test pilot, having accumulated
nearly 2,500 flight hours. He was assigned to NATO as an Air Op-
erations Expert at NRDC-GR HQ and later commanded the Oper-
ational Support Squadron of the 113 Combat Wing. He is a
graduate of the Hellenic Supreme Joint Defense College and the
Hellenic Air Force War College. He holds a Master’s degree (MSc)
in Space Technologies, Applications & Services from the National and Kapodistrian Uni-
versity of Athens (NKUA). His training also includes certifications in Artificial Intelli-
gence, Machine Learning and Cyber-security from various universities. He has authored
several scientific studies on Space Technologies, and has actively participated in nu-
merous workshops, conferences, and forums on Defence, Space and High Technolo-
gies.
 BEYOND Centre - National
Observatory of Athens:
Securing National &
European Autonomy in
Earth & Space

Kontoes Charalampos (Haris) et. al, (2025)

BEYOND Centre of Excellence for Earth Observation Research and Satellite
Remote Sensing, Institute for Astronomy, Astrophysics, Space Applications
and Remote Sensing (IAASARS) of the National Observatory of Athens
(NOA)

Citation: Kontoes Charalampos (Haris), et. al, (2025). BEYOND Centre - National
Observatory of Athens: Securing National and European Autonomy in Earth and
Space. Hellenic Air Force Review, 134. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15172105
 Hellenic Air Force Review 217

Abstract

The BEYOND Centre for Earth

Observation Research and Satellite
Remote Sensing plays a crucial role in
supporting both national and European
autonomy through the provision of cut-
ting-edge services in Earth Observation
and Space Security. An overview of BE-
YOND Centre activity is highlighted
herein together with its active involve- lite Remote Sensing is an Operational
ment in both the Copernicus Emergency Unit of the Institute for Astronomy, As-
Management Service (CEMS) and the trophysics, Space Applications and Re-
European Space Surveillance and mote Sensing (IAASARS) of the National
Tracking (SST) Partnership. Moreover, Observatory of Athens (NOA). Poised to
the Centre supports informed decision deliver significant services for the ulti-
making for disaster resilience with its mate benefit of all European citizens,
specialized tools like FireHUB for wild- BEYOND plays a pivotal role in develop-
fire management, FloodHUB for ing cutting-edge research and providing
comprehensive flood risk assessment, innovative services in crucial thematic
GeoHUB for geophysical disaster moni- areas of security
toring and response, and DustHUB for and crisis manage-
advanced dust forecasting. ment and social
growth relating to
Keywords: national and EU in-
dependence such
Disaster Risk Reduction – DRR, as: Space Safety
Emergency Management, Risk Assess- and Security, Disas-
ment, Humanitarian Aid, Space Secu- ters and Crisis
rity, Space Surveillance and Management, Citi-
Tracking-SST, Hazard Modelling, Coper- zen Safety, Human-
nicus Emergency Management Service itarian Aid, Food and Energy Security
- CEMS and Societal Wellbeing and Health. BE-
Introduction YOND Centre addresses stakeholders
needs across Europe, and the neighbor-
BEYOND Centre of Excellence for ing Regions including Bal-kans, Middle
Earth Observation Research and Satel- East, and Africa. Leveraging large scale
218 Hellenic Air Force Review

satellite acquisitions established at BEYOND, in the delivery of its tasks,

NOA’s facilities, actionable infor- mation collaborates with leading organizations,
is provided on time for enhanced deci- including, but not limited to, the World
sion and policy making in the aforemen- Meteorological Organization (WMO), the
tioned areas of expertise. European Centre for Medium-Range
Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), the
Barcelona Supercomputing Center
(BSC) and the European Organization
for the Exploitation of Meteorological
Satellites (EUMETSAT). As key partners
these institutions consistently drive to-
gether with BEYOND Centre advance-
ments in meteorology, climate
modeling, extreme weather, and man-

BEYOND Centre's Role in 2021 Wildfire Crisis: Utilizing Copernicus Data for
Emergency Response

In August 11th, 2021 the whole Europe went through one of the hottest summers since
records began. At this same time, the scientists of BEYOND Centre monitored and informed
in real time on wildfires caused by the extreme drought and unprecedented high temper-
atures all over Greece and Europe. We have had about 10 days of unrelenting action to
analyse EU Copernicus Sentinel-1/-2/-3/5P downloaded from the Hellenic Mirror Site
(CollGS) and the Copernicus Open Access Hub, both operated by BEYOND Centre to provide
warnings and situational pictures of the disaster to fire controllers, authorities, and inform
citizens and health authorities about the atmospheric burden due to the transfer of black
carbon over the whole Mediterranean. In Greece alone, about one hundred thousand
hectares of land were on fire and many communities and local economies had been seri-
ously hit in the last ten days. And the damages in Greece was just a small portion of the
enormous disasters recorded in the same period on the Sentinel images in Europe, the
western coast of the US, in Siberia, South America, Central and South Africa, the Middle
East. The global need for quick reliable information to support the emergency response
was reflected by the systematic use of Sentinel-1/-2/-3/5P data delivered through the
Hellenic Mirror Site that was installed back in 2014 at BEYOND Centre, the first Collabo-
rative Ground Segment ever put in routine operation at European level. Since then, BE-
YOND’s operations have grown in line with the growth in demand for Copernicus Sentinel
data worldwide and a number of additional Copernicus Data Hubs which are also based
at BEYOND Centre offering petabytes of satellite data in the support of European and in-
ternational critical services and authorities. For example, the host of the Sentinel-5P Data
Hub, which went into operation on 11 July 2018, has been publishing on average around
54,000 images per month. This is due in large part to the global interest in both the cir-
culation of NO2 and CO resulting from the large bushfires. In BEYOND Centre we are ex-
cited to be one of the three international nodes of the Copernicus Data Access Ecosystem
that supports the uninterrupted massive publication of more than 15 million Copernicus
Sentinel data on a yearly basis serving more than half a million of users over the globe.
 Hellenic Air Force Review 219

made related hazards reduction. Fur- ture supports acquisition, processing,

thermore, BEYOND Centre has the role storing and disseminating of EO data at
of UN-SPIDER Regional Support Office scale. Data engineering best practices
to advance Capacity Building and serv- enable efficient ingestion and analysis
ices for DRR worldwide and is an active of big data for any type of application
member of the CEOS Working Group on herein after, ranging from disaster re-
Disasters, GEO/LEO/SAR Flood Pilot sponse to climate monitoring and scien-
“Understanding Flood Risk from Space” tific production. The ecosystem
for the Balkan flood pilot (Evros river encompasses high-performance com-
basin), and the GEO Disaster Risk Re- puting (CUDA), container-based work-
duction Working Group. The Centre co- flows (Docker, Kubernetes), scalable
ordinates the GEO-CRADLE enabling a geospatial databases, STAC cataloguing
mechanism that is leveraging the GEO and EO-specific data cubes, ensuring
and EuroGEO innovation in Balkans, interoperability with European and inter-
Black Sea, Middle East, Africa and Pa- national standards. This proprietary in-
cific Asia areas for addressing security frastructure provides a reliable and
and DRR priorities of national civil pro- secure foundation for EO data utiliza-
tection and civil safety authorities. tion, and ensures national and Euro-
pean autonomy in space-based
services.
BEYOND Data & IT Ecosystem: It guarantees seamless access to
Infrastructure, Hubs, Tools Sentinel and other satellite data, en-
abling decision-makers, public authori-
BEYOND Centre Big Data infrastruc- ties and researchers to base their

Figure 1: Infrastructure model of BE-

YOND, illustrating the integration of con-
tainers, data cubes, versioned code,
libraries and notebooks with cloud-
based infrastructure (e.g. Cloudferro).
The system utilizes a SpatioTemporal
Asset Catalog (STAC) and PostgreSQL for
data management, enabling re-
searchers and external collaborators to
access and contribute via APIs and ex-
ternal data sources.
220 Hellenic Air Force Review

decisions on EO data analysis for dy- ogy means include (a) Scalable Pro-
namic landscape and surface monitor- cessing of Data: Cloud and on-premises
ing, emergency response and security. hosted data pipelines to process vast
BEYOND’s infrastructure enables EU quantities of EO imagery, (b) Docker &
Space Strategy, EU Space Surveillance Kubernetes: Containerized deployment
and Tracking (STT), the European Green of processing workflows to enable scal-
Deal, and the Digital Europe Pro- able data workflows and automation, (c)
gramme to foster technological sover- Data Cubes: Multi-source EO data
eignty in EO-based services. model for standardize time-series analy-
The infrastructure (a) Supports Eu- sis and AI-powered analytics, (d) APIs &
ropean & National Autonomy by reduc- Databases: RESTful APIs and spa-
ing reliance on third-party EO infra- tiotemporal databases (PostGIS, Open
structure, (b) Improves Decision-Making Data Cube) for efficient and structured
through fast, AI-driven EO data process- retrieval of EO data, (e) High-Perfor-
ing pipelines, and (c) Enhances Security mance Computing (HPC-CUDA): Paral-
from Space with elastic infrastructure lelized image processing pipelines for
for monitoring and security related accelerated feature extraction and
events. The key end users of the Data model inference.
and IT Ecosystem are Governmental in- The Infrastructure effectively per-
stitutions & Civil Protection Authorities forms (a) Scalability: Addressing the in-
activating BEYOND Centre through creasing requirement for high- reso-
Copernicus CEMS, the European Union lution EO data storage and processing,
SST, Security stakeholders employing (b) Interoperability: Seamlessly integrat-
EO analytics for situational awareness, ing Copernicus, DIAS platforms, and Eu-
Scientific and commercial EO analytics ropean Data Spaces, (c) Algorithms and
providers accessing large-scale, struc- practices: Maintain state of the art prac-
tured data. tices and provide cutting edge scientific
The applied Research and Technol- insights for EO data processing

Links for more information on BEYOND Centre Infrastructure:

http://beyond-eocenter.eu/index.php/infrastructure
http://beyond-eocenter.eu/index.php/web-services/sentinels-greekhub
http://beyond-eocenter.eu/index.php/web-services/satellite-access-polar-
orbit
https://github.com/noa-beyond/eoProcessors
https://github.com/noa-beyond/ADC
https://sentinels.space.noa.gr/
http://beyond-eocenter.eu/index.php/web-services/hellenic-mirror-site
 Hellenic Air Force Review 221

pipelines, (d) Real-time Processing: Fa- BEYOND Centre leads the Space
cilitating near-real-time ingestion and Surveillance and Tracking (SST) opera-
dissemination of EO data for emergency tions in Greece in the support of the Eu-
response, (e) Cybersecurity & Data Pro- ropean SST Partnership. It involves
tection: Implementing secure access detecting, tracking, cataloging, and
control and attack resilience for EO- characterizing artificial objects orbiting
based infrastructures. The infrastruc- Earth, including active satellites, de-
ture sector of BEYOND Centre is used funct spacecraft, rocket bodies, and
by key European and national authori- space debris. By leveraging ground-
ties, research organizations, and indus- based and space-based sensors along-
try players including the Copernicus side advanced data processing
Services (CDSE, Emergency Manage- techniques, BEYOND as the Greek Na-
ment Service, Climate Change, Secu- tional Operations Center (GR-SST NOC)
rity), the National Meteorological & Civil for SST enables real-time monitoring of
Protection Authorities, the EU Cloud the orbital environment, supporting in-
providers such as: Cloudferro, Euro- formed decision-making for satellite op-
pean Open Science Cloud (EOSC) & Eu- erators, policymakers, and defense
roHPC initiatives and Universities. entities. The role of BEYOND and its so-
cietal and national impact in terms of
BEYOND Centre in the support of security is high, considering that the
National and European Space number of Resident Space Objects
Surveillance & Tracking: (RSOs) orbiting Earth is continuously in-
Enhancing Safety, Sustainability, creasing due to the surge in satellite de-
and Risks in Space Operations ployments and the accumulation of
space debris.

Figure 2: High-level overview of

the Greek SST activities. The
Greek National Operations Cen-
ter for SST (GR-NOC SST),
hosted by the BEYOND Centre,
is responsible for the coordina-
tion of the SST activities. These
include, but are not limited to,
the generation of sensor plans
for the Greek telescopes, the
correlation of observations
against space object catalogs,
and the contributions to EUSST
and its services.
222 Hellenic Air Force Review

This growing congestion increases ing SST services and security of mis-
the risk of collisions, posing a challenge sions in Space. Practically, BEYOND as
to the sustainability of space operations GR SST-NOC lays the foundation for
and the continuity of space services space operations toward the autonomy
provision, reinforcing the need for effec- in both National and EU-level, while sig-
tive space surveillance and situational nificant benefits arise for the country as
awareness. BEYOND as GR-NOC SST, a whole, including (a) Enhancing the se-
supports the operations of the Greek curity of Greek satellite missions and,
observing telescopes offered by NOA, consequently, national security, by pro-
AUTH, FORTH, and NTUA. The Centre is tecting from threats originating from or
responsible for the relevant activities at passing through space, (b) Monitoring
the national level, and at the EUSST and predicting the re-entry of space de-
level, and represents the Greek SST pro- bris and other objects (e.g., spent
gram in broader international collabora- rocket stages, ballistic missiles) of
tions, including with the United States known or unknown origin, (c) Advancing
Space Command. GR-NOC SST over- space surveillance technologies (detec-
sees activities that involve, but are not tion and tracking) by leveraging
limited to (a) Coordinating Greek sen- Greece’s existing scientific expertise
sors for conducting space surveillance and infrastructure, (d) Integrating into
observations, (b) Processing observa- emerging space markets that invest in
tional data in accordance with EUSST space-related services, (e) Developing
specifications, (c) Correlating observa- technological capabilities, specialized
tions with known objects in space cata- training and expertise, fostering a
logs and (d) Contributing correlated skilled workforce and advancing re-
results (in the form of Tracking Data search in space surveillance, (f) Estab-
Messages - TDM) to the EUSST data- lishing collaborations between the
base. As part of the Greek participation Greek space industry and European
in the EUSST Partnership, GR SST-NOC and international organizations, con-
actively supports the main EUSST serv- tributing to economic growth and (g)
ices in collaboration with the opera- Supporting European policies on space
tional centers of other EU member traffic management, security, and de-
states that include the: Collision Avoid- fense, while safeguarding the interests
ance (CA) - Re-entry analysis (RE) - Frag- of the EU and its Member States.
mentation Analysis (FG). The Strategic Partners & End users
Moreover, the Center GR-NOC SST of BEYOND consist of entities such as
runs comprehensive analysis of state- NOA, AUTH, NTUA, FORTH, HELLENIC
of-the-art AI methodologies for advanc- SPACE CENTER, Hellenic Ministry of De-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 223

fense, Hellenic Ministry of Digital Gover- tion and preparedness activities at

nance, Hellenic Ministry of Develop- global level with a high impact in as far
ment, EUSPA, GMV, HELLAS SAT, Libre as the national and European security
Space Foundation, USSPACECOM, and safety are concerned.
NKUA, etc. The infrastructure and excellence
developed in the BEYOND Centre are
BEYOND Centre in the support actively used in Risk & Recovery Map-
of the Global Copernicus ping, nationally and worldwide, and on
Emergency Management Service a routine basis towards the effective
for Risk and Recovery preparedness, prevention and recovery.
The research and services developed
are exploiting Earth Ob-
servation and geospa-
tial data, when and
where needed, for en-
hanced modelling of
hazards and climate re-
lated disasters, mitiga-
tion and impact asses-
Links for more information on CEMS Activations of BEYOND Centre: sment for an effective
https://mapping.emergency.copernicus.eu/ https://mapping.emer- and timely humanitar-
gency.copernicus.eu/activations/EMSN197/ https://mapping.emer-
gency.copernicus.eu/activations/EMSN200/ ian aid. BEYOND has
https://mapping.emergency.copernicus.eu/activations/EMSN205/ been activated in the
https://mapping.emergency.copernicus.eu/activations/EMSN206/
framework of the CEMS
18 times since 2024
The Copernicus Emergency Man- and has successfully been undertaken
agement Service (CEMS) provides vali- to support 12 activations worldwide
dated assessments primarily based on
from which 5 in the domain of wildfires,
satellite imagery for before, during or af-
2 in floods, 1 volcanic unrest, 1 in
termath crisis, as well as early warning
drought and water management, 1 in
services for disasters. The BEYOND
forest degradation, 1 in illegal waste
Centre supports through CEMS the cri-
dumping, 1 in multi-hazard analysis.
sis managers, Civil Protection authori-
To address the challenging task of
ties and humanitarian aid actors
hazard and disaster management
dealing with natural disasters, man-
worldwide, BEYOND has developed and
made emergency situations, and hu-
validated a number of methodologies
manitarian crises, as well as those
which exploit big EO data, expert/do-
involved in recovery, disaster risk reduc-
224 Hellenic Air Force Review

main knowledge and AI techniques to ing detection speed and detail are used
model Seismic Hazards and Seismic for the delivery of the service that in
Risks, Fire Risk Forecast, Fire Early De- turn allows the provision to first respon-
tection, Burn Severity Grading, Biodiver- ders of situational awareness pictures
sity and Food Losses, Fire Spread and fire hazard assessments at na-
dynamics in time and space, Population tional level every 5 minutes.
& Assets Impact, Tsunami and Extreme In practice, FireHUB integrates
Weather Disasters Forecasting, Soil Ero- state-of-the-art models and scientific re-
sion and Landslides, Volcanic Eruption search to deliver to civil protection agen-
and Lava Flow, Ground Deformation Dy- cies, defense units and the public
namics; Flood Delineation, Flood Depth detailed fire ignition forecasts before
and Flood Damage Assessment, Disrup- crisis, as well as real-time warnings and
tion of Transportation and Businesses. fire monitoring during crisis, and last yet
The BEYOND strategic partners in this importantly post-fire assessments to
application area are among others: The allow informed decision-making at
Joint Research Center of EC, the DG every stage of disaster management.
DEFIS, Crisis managers and Civil Protec- Artificial Intelligence based fire risk fore-
tion authorities across the globe, the casting is of utmost importance as it uti-
Humanitarian aid actors dealing in- lizes cutting edge Machine Learning
volved in natural disasters, manmade models to handle the task of next day
emergency situations, and humanitar- detailed fire prediction for the whole
ian crises. Greek territory in a 500mx500m wide
area. Moreover, FireHUB creates a com-
FireHUB: A Comprehensive prehensive forest fire inventory by ob-
Wildfire Management System taining and fusing data from multiple
data sources, including the FireHUB
FireHUB is an advanced wildfire system of BEYOND, the NASA FIRMS1,
management system that leverages and the European Forest Fire Informa-
free and open and big satellite data to tion System (EFFIS)2. A complete Ma-
predict, detect, monitor, and assess chine Learning (ML) workflow trains
wildfire impacts across Greece, South- classification models on this large his-
ern Europe, North Africa, Balkans, Black torical dataset, for which labels (occur-
Sea and the Middle East. A multitude of rence or absence of fire) are derived
satellite systems acquired at the acqui- and the trained classifiers are then able
sition facilities of BEYOND Centre with to provide binary predictions (fire or no-
varying spatial resolutions (low, fire) along with the best use of firefight-
medium, high) and revisit times, balanc- ing resources in every area at risk
 Hellenic Air Force Review 225

(Apostolakis et al., 2022; Girtsou et al., gests and processes medium-resolution

2021; Alexis et al., 2023). data multiple times per day from polar-

Figure 3 (left): Fire risk map generated on September 28, 2024 for the next day. Right – Actual wild-
fire perimeter in the Corinth area
Figure 4 (right): Model prediction explained in a very high-risk area. Key fire drivers include vegeta-
tion type

The BEYOND Centre advanced a orbiting satellites (EOS/Terra, EOS/

24/7 real-time fire monitoring service Aqua, Suomi NPP, and NOAA-20), ac-
leverages cutting-edge technology to quired in real time through the BE-
provide continuous, high-resolution fire YOND/NOA Ground Reception Station
detection and monitoring. Satellite ME- enabling near real-time active fire de-
TEOSAT MSG SEVIRI data are ideal to tection and continuous wildfire tracking.
early and timely detect and monitor the For high-resolution burned area map-
fast evolving fires. Every 5 minutes, the ping, Sentinel-2 imagery acquired at
FireHUB system detects active fires into Node 3 of Copernicus operated by BE-
500 m × 500 m wide cell. The system YOND as part of the Hellenic Collabora-
runs prototype image processing and tive Ground Segment of Copernicus
data classification algorithms, which offers detailed assessments of fire-af-
have been developed with the active fected regions.
participation of fire brigades for incor- In addition, the smoke dispersion
porating their expert knowledge in the service4 provides high-precision calcula-
delivery of a useful fire disaster opera- tions of smoke transport resulting from
tional picture. wildfires, industrial accidents, and other
Another fundamental part of FIRE- large-scale fires on an hourly basis at
HUB that is developed by BEYOND is national level. Elevated smoke concen-
known as Forest Fire Information Sys- trations pose serious health risks, im-
tem (FFIS)3 . It provides rapid, satellite- pacting air quality and public safety
based fire detection and burned area across vast regions. Last yet worth
mapping in real-time across Europe, noted, the Diachronic Burnt Scar Maps
Balkans, North Africa, the Black Sea, (BSM) service5 is a fully automatic but
and the Middle East. The system in- off-line multi-sensor processing chain
226 Hellenic Air Force Review

that takes as input satellite images of recorded worldwide, killing 7763 peo-
any available spatial and spectral reso- ple, affecting 32.4 million people, and
lution and produces precise diachronic resulting in 20.4 billion USD losses
burnt area and damage assessment (CRED, 2023 Disasters in Number). The
products over the Greek territory for the FloodHUB services of BEYOND Centre
last 42 years. It has been based on increase flood resilience and support
using archived USGS Landsat TM, SPOT the flood risk management focused on
XS, IKONOS, FORMOSAT and Sentinel- early awareness, prevention, protection
2/3 imagery over the entire Greece. The and preparedness to reduce the flood
BSM is offered online and is publicly risk and safeguard human health. In
open, providing an invaluable dataset order to mitigate flood risk, decision-
for public authorities, civil protection makers and civil protection authorities
and scientific community. need reliable, timely and high-resolu-
The FireHUB system is connected to tion information on flood risk assess-
the Emergency Operations Center of the ment, covering all disaster manage-
Hellenic Fire Service. Additionally, Fire- ment stages, particularly prevention,
HUB serves multiple critical stakehold- preparedness, response, and recovery.
ers, including the Hellenic Army for the This need is even more crucial in highly
safe planning of outdoor activities, the dense urban river basins that are prone
EC LUCAS for ensuring the safety of sur- to flash floods. In this regard the Flood-
veyors in the field, as well as the civil HUB service supports the relevant au-
protection authorities and the general thorities in adopting effective policies
public. FireHUB is instrumental in Dis- and practices for better flood risk man-
aster Management operations, covering agement, prevention and mitigation in
not only the entire Greek region but also near-real-time. It supports the imple-
the Balkans, North Africa, the Black mentation of the EU Floods Directive
Sea, and the Middle East. 2007/60/EC at national level as well as
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
FloodHUB: A Flood Risk Reduction, and the UN SDGs, and the
Management and Resilience UN Early Warnings for All initiatives at
Service through Innovative global level. The Near-Real-Time Floods
Monitoring and Mapping based Monitoring and Early Warning prototype
on Earth Observation service runs operationally and delivers
a reliable operational awareness pic-
Floods are the most frequent disas- ture of the flood extent and depth every
ters, affecting the largest number of
people. In 2023, 164 floods were The FireHUB relevant link:
http://beyond-eocenter.eu/index.php/web-services/firehub
 Hellenic Air Force Review 227

5 minutes to all the relevant stakehold- preprocesses Sentinel-1A/B SAR GRD

ers across the river basin. It is built data and then, using Machine Learning
around a fully scalable and transferable based models, automatically maps wa-
modular architecture that allows the ter surfaces across the river basin. It
real-time ingestion and assimilation of uses the Copernicus Dataspace Ecosys-
a variety of data, depending on their tem as well as a set of technologies
availability, including, but not limited to, (Python scripts/libraries, ESA SNAP,
hydrometeorological parameters meas- OpenDataCube, GeoServer), and covers
ured on the site by telemetric hydrome- the time period since 2018. The service
teorological stations, satellite data, also includes the burnt scar mapping
crowdsourced information on the evolv- produced by the FireHUB Diachronic
ing flood, and pre-run simulations of a Mapping Service, in order to spatially
series of flood scenarios using validated correlate the burnt scar mapping and
tools as HEC-HMS & HEC-RAS in a multi- the flood mapping towards analyzing
source data fusion concept. Moreover, the impact of the wildfires on the floods.
the prototype Flood Diachronic Mapping The BEYOND FloodHUB Service is
Service is based on a fully automated used by strategic partners worldwide as
system that searches, downloads and UN-SPIDER, the CEOS Working Group

Figure 5: The Floods Diachronic Mapping Service for the Evros River Basin

The FloodHUB relevant link:

http://beyond-eocenter.eu/index.php/web-services/floodhub
228 Hellenic Air Force Review

on Disasters, GEO/LEO/SAR Flood Pilot ing their occurrence and the broader
“Understanding Flood Risk from Space” tectonic activity in affected regions. The
for the Balkan flood pilot (Evros river produced interferograms enable the
basin), the Civil Protection Volunteer As- identification of the location, extent,
sociations which are used for the im- and intensity of occurring geological
provement of near-real-time flood hazards and related disasters. It also
monitoring, following dedicated training. provides emergency management au-
Between the key stakeholders using the thorities with real-time information on
FloodHUB service are the Ministry of ground deformation, facilitating in-
the Environment and Energy, Prefecture formed decision-making and the imple-
of Attica, Prefecture of Eastern Macedo- mentation of appropriate disaster
nia and Thrace, Fire Service, Civil Pro- response measures.
tection authorities at national, regional The so-called geObservatory system
and municipal level, Civil Protection Vol- that supports GeoHUB, is developed by
unteer Associations, international scien- BEYOND Centre to promptly deliver to
tific community. stakeholders constantly updated infor-
mation on the evolution of the ground
GeoHUB: The Global Ground deformation in the geological hazard af-
Deformation Monitoring Services fected area. This information is ex-
for Timely Geophysical Disaster tremely useful for the local authorities
Assessment and Response responsible for decision making for
evacuation, emergency response, relief
Timely monitoring and mapping of and reconstruction planning, and taking
ground deformation worldwide, induced measures to protect peoples’ lives and
by major geological hazards, such as their property. The service applies Dif-
earthquakes, volcanic activity, land- ferential SAR Interferometry (DInSAR)
slides, etc. The GeoHUB’s geoObserva- on Sentinel-1 SLC images, to produce
tory1 service pre- and co-seismic interferograms.
(http://geobservatory.beyond-eocen- The GeoHUB provides timeliness
ter.eu/) provides emergency manage- and consistency in detecting and moni-
ment authorities with timely toring ground deformation on a global
assessments of ground deformation scale.
and establishes a global observatory of
differential interferograms related to
major catastrophic geological events.
The service provides a deeper under-
standing of both the mechanisms driv- The GeoHUB relevant link:
http://geobservatory.beyond-eocenter.eu/
 Hellenic Air Force Review 229

Figure 6: The geObservatory service.

DustHUB: Advanced Dust service is provided daily with a forecast-

Forecasting Services for ing horizon of 3 days ahead. DustHUB
Environmental, Health, and products include the aerosol optical
Climate Impact Management depth of dust, concentrations of dust at
the surface as well as dry and wet dep-
The DustHUB service in BEYOND ositions which make important informa-
provides timely forecasts of dust out- tion for a sustainable health system and
breaks along with their spatiotemporal solar energy ecosystem.
and quantitative properties to local au- The impact of the service is high.
thorities and the public. The forecasting Mineral dust affects radiation and al-

Figure 7.: Aerosol Optical Depth, Near Surface Dust Concentration (μgr/m3), Dry and Wet Deposi-
tion of Dust (mg/m2), as forecasted by DustHUB
230 Hellenic Air Force Review

The DustHUB relevant link: 7.1 µm respectively. The service offers

http://dusthub.beyond-eocenter.eu/ (a) Prediction of dust outbreaks over
the Mediterranean region, (b) Estima-
ters liquid and ice cloud properties,
tions of expected dry and wet dust dep-
modifying significantly the precipitation
osition, to mitigate against impacts on
processes. The dust particles when de-
energy (PV panel cleaning, etc). A future
posited have diverse impact. The
challenge is to separate the mineralog-
smaller PM2.5 particles are easily in-
ical composition of dust, through which
haled and deposited on the lungs and
we can identify specific attributes that
are related to human health disorders,
induce specific impacts on radiative
both respiratory as well as cardiovascu-
transfer, cloud formation, ocean fertil-
lar. On the other end, they provide micro
ization and human health.
nutrients to the ocean and/or land
ecosystems, thus affecting fishery and
agriculture and food security. Desert
References
dust is always present in North Africa,
Middle East and the Mediterranean
1. Alexis, K., Girtsou, S., Apostolakis,
with adverse effects in various scientific
A., Giannopoulos, G., Kontoes, C.
and societal sectors including climate
(2025). Next Day Fire Prediction
change, weather conditions, health, avi-
via Semantic Segmentation. In:
ation, energy and tourism. Thus, contin-
Meo, R., Silvestri, F. (eds) Machine
uous monitoring and forecasting of dust
Learning and Principles and Prac-
transfer as provided by BEYOND Centre
tice of Knowledge Discovery in
through the DustHUB service assists
Databases. ECML PKDD 2023.
policy makers for natural hazards and
Communications in Computer and
climate change mitigation activities. In
Information Science, vol 2135.
the running operational version of
Springer, Cham.
DustHUB the forecasts are provided by
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
using DREAM-NMM numerical model.
031-74633-8_31
The meteorological core is the NCEP
2. Apostolakis, A., Girtsou, S., Alexis,
Nonhydrostatic Mesoscale Model on E-
K., Giannopoulos, G., Bartsotas, N.
grid (NCEP/NMME). Surface properties
S., & Kontoes, C. (2022). Estimat-
are defined using the USGS global 1-km
ing Next Day’s Forest Fire Risk via
land cover data and the USDA global 1-
a Complete Machine Learning
km soil. The model is configured at
Methodology. Remote Sensing
0.2°×0.2° resolution and includes 8
2022, Vol. 14, Page 1222, 14(5),
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1222.
0.15, 0.25 0.45, 0.78, 1.3, 2.2, 3.8 and
 Hellenic Air Force Review 231

https://doi.org/10.3390/RS1405 Operations Centre (ESOC), July

1222 2024.
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234 Hellenic Air Force Review

Contributors’ CVs
Kontoes Charalampos (Haris) holds the position of Research Di-
rector at the IAASARS/NOA and leads the Operational Unit BEYOND
Center. He received his PhD in Earth Observation holding a grant from
EC (JRC/ISPRA). He leads Space related projects funded by ESA, EC,
and International Institutions (WB, EIB). He acts as National Delegate
contributing to Space Policy and Program Committees of ESA, EC,
COPERNICUS, SST/SSA. He is member of the Steering Committee of
Geohazard Supersites and Natural Laboratories of Group of Earth Ob-
servations and the Committee of International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, and
is actively involved in the GEO Disaster Risk Reduction and Capacity Building Working
Groups. He is the GRSS GEO principal and leader of the Disasters Resilience and
Health Action Group of EuroGEO. He is responsible for Node 3 of Copernicus Data Ac-
cess Service, the Hellenic Mirror Site, and the NOA’s Ground Segment. He is author
of more than 200 publications (h-index 35). He speaks English, French and Italian.

Dr. Alatza Stavroula is a Post-doc Researcher, with a focus on moni-

toring natural disasters using InSAR, EO, and AI techniques.
She has participated in Νational and European research projects and
studies on natural hazards monitoring through geodetic observations
and remote sensing data, as o co-investigator.

Archonti Stefania holds an M.Sc. in Computational Physics and a

B.Sc. in Physics. With a background in AI, numerical methods, and as-
trophysical modeling, she has worked on algorithm optimization and
automation using machine learning. She is supports the Greek National
Operations Centre within the EU SST partnership.

Dr. Bartsotas Nikolaos (Nikos) has a Ph.D. in Atmospheric Modeling

and Remote Sensing. He has been actively involved in a number of
FP6/FP7/H2020/Horizon Europe research programs as well as the im-
plementation of operational forecasting platforms and staff training in
meteorological agencies around the world.

Choumos George is a PhD candidate in AI applications for Space

Surveillance and Tracking at the National and Kapodistrian University of
Athens. With a background in Computer Science (BSc), Data Science, he
has been specializing in software engineering, DevOps and infrastruc-
ture.

Drivas Thanassis is a software and ΕΟ data engineer, with a focus

on scalable EO data processing, development of geospatial applications
and design of data cubes.
 Hellenic Air Force Review 235

Girtsou Stella is a PhD candidate focusing on Forest Fire prediction

systems, with a specialization in the application of artificial intelligence
(AI) techniques. She is a Rural, Surveying and Geoinformatics Engineer,
while during her Master’s degree in Space Applications, she was trained
on advanced Machine Learning methodologies, big data management
and algorithms for data analysis and prediction systems.

Papakonstantinou Maria (Marietta) graduated from the school of

Philosophy at the University of Athens and holds an MA in Heritage
Management with an expertise in Project Management. She has been
working as project manager in European and national co-funded pro-
grams.

Pissaridi Katerina holds a diploma in Chemical Engineering and a

PhD in the field of Biomaterials and Biospectroscopy. Her Postdoctoral
studies were at the Laboratory of Food Chemistry and Biotechnology
(Department of Chemistry, University of Patras). She has a strong back-
ground in fields such as food technology, food safety, nutrition and cir-
cular economy. She is Project Manager at the BEYOND Centre.

Stathopoulos Nikos is f Mining and Metallurgical Engineer. He

holds two Master’s Degrees, in “Science and Technology of Water Re-
sources” and in “Geoinformatics”. He completed his Doctoral research
in the subject “Research Methods for Geoenvironmental Hazards &
Water Resources. His research is focusing on Natural Hazards and Nat-
ural Disasters, Soil Erosion and Degradation, Water Resources.

Tsaprailis Konstantinos, is a PhD candidate in Space Situational

Awareness with a background in Electrical & Computer Engineering
(MEng), Data Science (MSc) and Space Technologies (MSc). He has 11
years of experience in software engineering, focusing on AI applications
in Space Surveillance and Tracking and supporting the Greek National
Operations Center within the EU SST partnership.

Tsouni Alexia is a Research Associate and PhD Candidate on flood

risk assessment and flood monitoring in urban areas using multiple data
sources. She is a graduate of the School of Civil Engineering of the Na-
tional Technical University of Athens (NTUA) with specialization in Water
Resources, Hydraulic and Maritime Engineering. She also holds a post-
graduate diploma in Water Resources and Technology.
 The ERMIS Nanosatellite
Constellation: Defence
& Security Applications

Professor Vaios Lappas,

Professor Antonios Paschalis
University of Athens

Citation: Professor Vaios Lappas, & Dr. Antonios Paschalis. (2025). The ERMIS
Nanosatellite Constellation: Defence & Security Applications. Hellenic Air Force
Review 134. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15169272
 Hellenic Air Force Review 237

Abstract Introduction

The ERMIS mission, part of The advent of microelectronics, ma-

Greece’s £200M National Small Satel- terials, sensors, microprocessors, artifi-
lite Programme, is a pioneering constel- cial intelligence, new manufacturing
lation of three cubesats (two 6U and techniques such as 3D printing, couples
one 8U) designed to enhance national with private initiatives and investment
security and defence capabilities. Coor- has allowed for the miniaturisation of
dinated by the National Kapodistrian satellites and for the more frequent and
University of Athens with key partners, affordable launch of them to orbit. This
ERMIS will deliver advanced connectiv- has allowed small satellites (mass <
ity and Earth observation services tai- 500 kg) to become an important tool for
lored to Greece’s needs. Scheduled for many nations, businesses, start ups
launch in January 2026, the £4.8M and has led to a massive expansion of
project features a 5G-IoT network, inter- space applications though constella-
satellite links, and hyperspectral imag- tions and mega-constellations of small
ing (5m GSD) for applications such as satellites in remote sensing/earth ob-
precise agriculture monitoring and real- servation, satellite communications,
time data collection. Funded by the technology demonstration and space
EU’s NextGenerationEU and the Greek exploration. Small satellites have be-
Ministry of Digital Governance, ERMIS come the ‘Personal Computer – PC – of
bolsters Greece’s space infrastructure space’ allowing various actors including
and can support security and defence start ups, academia, scientists and in-
through secure laser optical downlinks dustry to develop and demonstrate an
(1 Gbps), paving the way for a robust idea, concept or business application in
national space presence. orbit in a very short time 1.
ERMIS is a pathfinder demonstra-
Keywords tion of key space connectivity capabili-
ties linked to, Greece’s 200M€ national
ERMIS mission, small satellite con- small satellite project using a constella-
stellation, space security, defence ap- tion of small satellites. Coordinated by
plications, hyperspectral imaging, the National Kapodistrian University of
5G-IoT connectivity, Greece space pro- Athens (NKUA) the consortium includes
gramme leading space, small satellite and
IoT/communications entities OQ Hellas,
University of Patras, University of the
Aegean and the National Observatory of
238 Hellenic Air Force Review

Athens. Governance – to expand the nascent

As the first Greek small satellite space industry in Greece, enabling the
constellation, ERMIS will bring novel digital transformation of society while
space communications (Low Earth Orbit creating jobs and generating prosperity,
5G-IoT communication services, Inter- as part of the nation’s EU-funded Re-
Satellite Link (ISL) and laser optical covery and Resilience Facility. The
downlink), hyperspectral earth observa- ERMIS 4.8M€ project is funded by the
tion applications focused on national European Union – NextGenerationEU
needs (e.g. precise agriculture) and and by the Greek Ministry of Digital Gov-
small satellite technology capabilities ernance and is coordinated by the De-
for Greece and Europe, and create new partment of Aerospace Science and
unprecedented space capacities, syner- Technology of the National and
gies, and infrastructure in Greece. Kapodistrian University of Athens
The ERMIS mission consists of a (www.aerospace.uoa.gr) 3.
constellation of three (3) advanced
(two 6U and one 8U) cubesats focused Nanosatellites
on demonstrating key communica-
tions/connectivity and earth observa- In recent years, small satellites have
tion technologies and applications, opened up new possibilities for the
utilizing a mixture of existing Greek space industry. Ranging from the size of
space technology such as communica- a refrigerator to a shoebox, these very
tions (IoT/5G, ISL), CCSDS on-board small spacecraft are much smaller than
data processing, state-of-the-art FPGA traditional ones. This allows small satel-
accelerators for hyperspectral image lites to leverage benefits like lower de-
compression and optical channel-cod- velopment and launch costs, rapid
ing, attitude control tracking algorithms, deployment, and operation in large con-
laser optical communications demon- stellations. Countless missions, includ-
strating 1 Gbps downlink to the Helmos ing navigation, research, and remote
Optical Ground Station, hyperspectral sensing, rely on these compact devices.
imaging (5m GSD), associated EO appli- The miniaturisation of spacecraft has
cations and national space infrastruc- brought in numerous attractive scien-
ture for its ground segment. Launch of tific and business possibilities, and the
the ERMIS constellation is planned for space sector is exploiting the benefits
the end of 2025 2. of this more sustainable and demo-
The initiative underpins efforts – led cratic approach.
by the European Space Agency (ESA) on When discussing spacecraft, the
behalf of the Greek Ministry of Digital term “small” is typically used to de-
 Hellenic Air Force Review 239

scribe their mass and size. Any satellite lites and market segment, that is now
with a mass below 500 kg is considered indispensable to space operations. Re-
a small satellite, also called a smallsat, cent developments in miniaturization,
or a miniature satellite. Satellites small in-space propulsion, onboard process-
in size are not new, though modern ing and control, and communication
ones differ from their predecessors in systems have completely transformed
many ways, the most notable of which the space sector by allowing smallsats
is the use of widely accessible micro- to carry out complex tasks that were
electronics in conjunction with innova- previously achievable only with larger
tive management approaches. This spacecraft 4.
allows for the creation of spacecraft, There is no universally accepted cat-
working alone or in satellite constella- egorization for small-size satellites, and
tions that can carry out complex func- various factors are considered when
tions with great utility while consuming classifying these spacecraft. These fac-
far less space, money, and time than tors include mass, size, orbit, applica-
previous generations 1. tion, mission duration, and more. Table
Compared to the market for large- 4 shows the most prevalent classifica-
size spacecraft, the financial and tech- tion of small satellites which is based
nological barriers to entry into the on mass and size.
smallsat market are typically much

lower. Because of their tiny

size, easier construction,
and greater launch possi-
bilities, these devices are
affordable to many busi-
nesses and organizations.
From their initial begin-
nings as experimental enti-
ties, smallsats have come
a long way to become an
independent type of satel- Figure 1:Nanosatellites (< 10 kg) Launch to Date (from nanosats.eu)
240 Hellenic Air Force Review

Figure 1 shows the significant adap- around four objectives1:

tation and proliferation of small satel- 1. Strengthen national security and
lites and in particular nanosatellites (< Defence, especially with the uti-
10 kg) to date. lization and development of space
infrastructure. Ensure national au-
The National Small Satellite tonomy in safety and security (e.g
Program border control, disaster manage-
ment) by enhancing existing infra-
Since 2017, the General Secretariat structures (e.g. GreekCom) and
of Telecommunications and Post of the developing new ones (e.g small
Ministry of Digital Governance (MDG) is satellites). The goal is to au-
the responsible authority for all civilian tonomously respond to national
space matters in Greece. The MDG col- safety and security needs.
laborates with the Ministry of National 2. Development of the Greek space
Defence in the field of space systems industry. Maximise the integration
and applications of MoD competence, of Greek companies into the Euro-
focusing on enhancing national security pean industrial space landscape.
and defence capabilities. The Secre- The goal is to create a sustainably
tariat is tasked to develop and imple- competitive Greek space industry.
ment the national space policy, strategy 3. Utilise of space data and the de-
and plan. It represents Greece in all Eu- velopment of relevant applica-
ropean and international organisations tions. Foster the integration of
including European Union Space Pro- space into the society and econ-
gramme Agency (EUSPA), European omy, by facilitating the use of
Space Agency (ESA), International space technologies and applica-
Telecommunications Union (ITU) as well tions to support public policies and
as in other European or International business development (e.g. tele-
Organizations with focus in Space re- com, transport, maritime, agricul-
lated activities 5. ture, energy, and environment).
Law 4727/2020 - Digital Gover- The goal is to create public and
nance (Incorporation into Greek Law of commercial services.
Directives (EU) 2016/2102 and (EU) 4. Support space research and inno-
2019/1024) and Other Provisions), de- vation.
fines Greece’s objectives for participa-
tion in the European Space Agency.
Specifically, Article 119, Paragraph 9, 1
Greek National Law, 2020 N4727.
states that these objectives arepivoting
 Hellenic Air Force Review 241

The related activities and projects telecommunications.

are: The National Small Satellite pro-
1. Development of a national small gramme is a 200M€ multi-mode space
sat programme. Achieving au- programme funded by the European
tonomous capabilities to respond Commission Recovery and Resilience
to national needs, strengthening Facility focused on developing new
the Greek industry competitive- space capabilities, capacities, technolo-
ness with the possibility for com- gies and applications for Greece 5. It is
mercial utilisation in the global composed by multiple elements such
market. as:
2. Flight heritage. Achieving flight ● Upgrade of existing telescopes/in-
heritage though the EU, ESA and frastructure to Optical Ground Sta-
national programmes by maximis- tions (OGS)
ing technological and financial ● A cubesat based in-orbit Verifica-
synergies. tion/Validation and Demonstration
3. Ground infrastructure. Utilising (IOV/IOD) programme with the
and further developing existing in- launch of 11 cubesats in 2025
frastructures: nationally or pri- and 2026
vately owned stations (e.g ● Development of a national small
Tanagra, Koropi, Ag. Paraskeui), satellite Assembly, Integration and
telescopes, lasers, radars, etc Testing (AIT) facility
4. User alignment (ministries). Sup- ● Development of a radar facility for
porting through space the develop- Space Situational Awareness
ment implementation and (SSA) applications linked to the EU
monitoring of sectorial policies SST initiative
(e.g. telecom, transport, maritime, ● Development of a 130M€ earth
agriculture, energy, environment, observation capability which in-
safety and security) cludes the launch of 7 optical
5. Exploit data of existing infrastruc- (Open Cosmos), 2 SAR (ICEYE), 4
ture. Opening of public information Thermal IR (Ororatech) micro and
will increase the size of the domes- nanosatellites in 2026, together
tic market, especially when the pri- with the development of a space
vate and the public sector work data government hub and a group
together. In navigation Galileo will of specialised earth observation
boost commercial activities and in- R&D projects for niche applica-
tegrated applications will tie Earth tions such as precision agriculture,
Observation and navigation to forestry, security and water
242 Hellenic Air Force Review

Europe, and create new un-

precedented space capac-
ities, synergies, and
infrastructure in Greece.
The ERMIS mission
consists of a constellation
of three (3) sophisticated
(two 6U and one 8U) cube-
sats focused on demon-
strating key communica-
Figure 2: ESA/Greek Cubesat in Orbit Validation Project Logo [3]
tions/connectivity and ear-
th observation technologies
and applications, utilizing a mixture of
The ERMIS Hellenic Cubesat existing Greek space technology such
Demonstration Mission as communications (IoT/5G, ISL),
CCSDS on-board data processing, state-
ERMIS is a pathfinder demonstra- of-the-art FPGA accelerators for hyper-
tion of key space connectivity and earth spectral image compre- ssion and
observation capabilities linked to, optical channel-coding, attitude control
Greece’s 200M€ national small satel- tracking algorithms, laser optical com-
lite project using a constellation of small munications demonstrating 1 Gbps
satellites. Coordinated by the National downlink to the Helmos Optical Ground
Kapodistrian University of Athens Station, hyperspectral imaging (5m
(NKUA) the consortium includes leading GSD), associated EO applications and
space, small satellite and IoT/commu- national space infrastructure for its
nications entities OQ Hellas, University ground segment. Launch of the ERMIS
of Patras, University of the Aegean and constellation is planned for January
the National Observatory of Athens. As 2026 2.The ERMIS 4.8M€ project is
the first Greek small satellite constella- funded by the European Union –
tion, ERMIS will bring novel space com- NextGenerationEU and by the Greek
munications (Low Earth Orbit 5G-IoT Ministry of Digital Governance and is co-
communication services, Inter-Satellite ordinated by the Department of Aero-
Link (ISL) and laser optical downlink), space Science and Technology of the
hyperspectral earth observation appli- National and Kapodistrian University of
cations focused on national needs (e.g. Athens 3.
precise agriculture) and small satellite
technology capabilities for Greece and
 Hellenic Air Force Review 243

Figure 3: EMIS Mission Partners and Mission Patch

The ERMIS Nanosatellite Mission control algorithms and their suit-

objectives are: ability for use with the Optical Link.
● Demonstrate an optical laser com- ● Spearhead the development of
munication payload achieving up new space connectivity capacities
to 1 Gbps downlink capacity to the in Greece, including a Payload
OGS compatible to SDA Optical Clean Room and a small satellite
Communications Terminal Stan- ground station.
dard and optionally to upcoming ● The mission shall demonstrate the
CCSDS O3K standard. capability to operate an IoT com-
● Acquire hyperspectral image cube munications payload from orbit
focused on precision agriculture ● The mission shall demonstrate the
using a hyperspectral imager with capability to provide IoT connectiv-
8 days average revisit time. ity using a Nanosatellite platform
● Incorporate state-of-the-art high- by connecting to a (at least 1) ter-
data rate FPGA accelerators to op- restrial terminal
timize the execution of CCSDS ● The mission shall demonstrate the
algorithms for onboard payload capability to exchange information
data compression of both Hyper- between its platforms via an Inter
spectral and panchromatic im- Satellite Link
ages. ● Develop new space capabilities,
● Conduct in-orbit demonstration applications and infrastructure in
and validation of Attitude Determi- Greece
nation and Control System (ADCS)
244 Hellenic Air Force Review

Figure 4: ERMIS Mission Architecture

Figure 4 shows the ERMIS mission an Optical Communications Terminal.

architecture block diagram including all The two platforms will share the major-
elements of the space and ground seg- ity of the bus, mission analysis and op-
ment. The mission objectives are a erations planning. Accommodating the
combination of earth observation and different payloads inevitably leads to
connectivity goals. To address all objec- some differences in bus component se-
tives, two different platforms will be lection. Table 1 shows the ERMIS orbit
used: (i) two 6U cubesats equipped with (500 km SSO) and launch date which
communication payloads operating in will take place in January 2026 (Trans-
S-Band and with an intersatellite link (ii) porter 16) and sues a Falcon 9
an 8U cubesat equipped with a high- rideshare opportunity.
resolution hyperspectral payload and
 Hellenic Air Force Review 245

Figure 5: ERMIS 1 and 2 Nanosatellite CAD Drawings with S-band Payload based
on a 6U Cubesat (OQ Tech)

Figure 6: ERMIS 3 Nanosatellite CAD Drawings with 5-m GSD Hyperspectral and Laser Optical Link
Payloads based on a 8U Cubesat (University of Athens and Patras)

Figure 7: Computer Visualisation of the ERMIS Constellation with all 3 nanosatellites over Greece
246 Hellenic Air Force Review

Currently all satellite components, Using an existing fleet of 10

ground stations are being assembled in nanosatellites which is being rapidly
the University of Athens (UoA) clean scaled up, low data services are offered
room. ERMIS 1-3 will be tested over the for various civil and defence related ap-
summer of 2025 at the UoA AIT/clean plications such as:
room facilities. Delivery of the satellites ● Hybrid Satellite-Cellular Terminal:
to the launch broker is expected to take Uses a flexible, robust, and pro-
place in November 2025, in prepara- grammable dual-mode terminal
tion for a launch in January 2026 on a with pre-paid data packages. It is
SpaceX Falcon 9. ideal for remotely monitoring and
controlling fixed and mobile assets
Defence and Security in industries as diverse as trans-
Applications portation, oil and gas, utilities,
maritime, agriculture, and more. It
The ERMIS nanosatellite constella- supports GSM/LTE-M/NB-IoT and
tion will focus on demonstrating key Satellite link both in uplink and
telecommunications and earth observa- downlink. It can connect to 1000
tion capabilities which can have signifi- sensors using multiple I/Os. It sup-
cant defence implications. The ERMIS 1 ports multiple SIMs and can be
and 2 nanosatellites will be able to offer powered with a battery that sur-
low memory messaging services based vives multiple years. All this is for
on OQ Hellas’ S-band network and con- a fraction of the cost used by in-
stellation as a global satellite 5G IoT op- cumbent operators.
erator providing uninterrupted cellular ● Smart Mobility: Connected smart
coverage for assets and machines any- vehicles/drones are entering the
where on the planet 6. OQ uses a fleet market and offer companies the
of nanosatellites in LEO which connect chance to deliver goods further
to its proprietary ultra miniature dual- and in more efficient ways. Track-
mode satellite-cellular IoT modem and ing of fleets and goods is not pos-
tracker which is a plug and play small, sible outside cities where no
low-cost, and low-power solution that cellular coverage is available. OQ
can collect data from more than 1000 offers an end-to-end satellite 5G
sensors. The modem/tracker has built- integrated solution that allows
in GPS, and supports 5G NB-IoT, GSM, monitor assets and fleets in real
LTE-M, and bi-directional Satellite links time, anywhere they may go. Fur-
with data bundles ranging from few thermore, bi-directional communi-
Kbytes to Megabytes per day. cation to machines can be offered
 Hellenic Air Force Review 247

Figure 8: OQ Technology Model and Smart Mobility, Smart Ocean Applications

such as banking ATMs in poor con- manage your applications. This in-
nectivity areas. A dual satellite-ter- cludes SCADA systems, pipeline
restrial solution that can switch monitoring, and leak detection,
automatically between OQ and predictive maintenance reports of
partner networks can create ro- machinery and windmills, inven-
bust communications for mobile tory and asset tracking, mining,
platforms. environmental monitoring, oilfields
● Smart Ocean: Maritime connectiv- monitoring, tracking of workers
ity today is limited to expensive and their well-being, and finally in-
satellite VSAT and M2M high-end dustrial smart metering.
terminals, this is not suitable for ERMIS-3 is a pilot earth observation
IoT data collection and control. nanosatellite with a SIMERA Sense 5m
IoT/satellite solutions can help GSD hyperspectral payload, a laser op-
track fishing boats, smart nets, tical link which can provide secure
weather buoys, and commercial downloads of satellite data and a Greek
containers. In addition to that real- Payload and Data Processing Unit
time tracking solutions can be pro- (PDPU) which can compress, distribute
vided for transport ships and satellite data on board the satellite plat-
yachts. Finally managing sensors form. The mission application for
and devices on offshore rigs, un- ERMIS-3 is focused on precision agricul-
derwater pipes and oil wells have ture and specifically:
never been easier, all using a ● Vegetation mapping: Hyperspec-
highly secure and reliable system. tral imagery (HyI) can support the
● Smart Energy: IoT/satellite solu- mapping of plant varieties.
tions can enable efficient opera- ● Crop health monitoring: HyI can
tions of smart energy grids detect stress in crops, nutrient de-
efficiently, and at full capacity and ficiencies, and disease outbreaks,
avoid disruption or loss of assets enabling timely interventions.
by giving full access remotely to ● Soil analysis: HyI can assess soil
248 Hellenic Air Force Review

composition, moisture content, s with a minimum revisit time of 13

and fertility levels. hours and a maximum revisit time of 60
● Precision agriculture: Data from hours.
hyperspectral imagery helps opti- ERMIS-3 even as a single satellite
mize irrigation, fertilization, and will enable unique mapping capabilities
pest control. which can support various defence and
security applications for Greece and en-
Hyperspectral imaging at 5 GSD can able scaling up ERMIS with multiple ad-
give very unique features for earth ob- ditional satellites to provide a high
servation for a multitude of applica- revisit earth observation capability in
tions. Figure 9 shows the preliminary the near future.
analysis of imaging Greece with a single Further to the ERMIS-3 imaging ca-
satellite which can provide full coverage pabilities, ERMIS-3 carries a unique,
of Greece’s territories and islands twice high performance laser optical link pro-
a month. vided by Astrolight and which will be

Figure 9: Coverage Analysis of Greece with the ERMIS-3 Nanosatellite

In the interest of imaging the whole linked with multiple Optical Ground Sta-
Greek region, a coverage analysis was tions (OGS) including the Helmos OGS
conducted to deduce the maximum im- upgraded through ESA’s Scylight pro-
aging time required to capture a com- gramme and operated by the National
plete pass over Greece, as shown in Observatory of Athens (NOA).
Figure x. For a duration of 7 days with 7
passes one will have a minimum dura-
tion of 107s, maximum duration of 130
 Hellenic Air Force Review 249

Table 3: ERMIS-3 Passes and Contact Time Analysis at 500 km SSO

Conclusion Acknowledgements: The ERMIS

ERMIS is a groundbreaking project project is funded by the European Union
which promises to push cubesat tech- – NextGenerationEU and by the Greek
nology boundaries. Three satellites are Ministry of Digital Governance and man-
currently being developed and assem- aged by the European Space Agency.
bled in Greece two 6U (10 x 20 x 30 cm) The project is coordinated by the De-
and one 8U (10 x 20 x 40 cm) for satel- partment of Aerospace Science and
lite communications and earth observa- Technology of the National and
tion applications. Combined with other Kapodistrian University of Athens. The
satellite investments currently taking authors would like to acknowledge the
place in the Greek National Small Satel- support and contributions of all 39
lite Programme, Greece will be launch- team members of ERMIS and its part-
ing 24 small satellites in the next 16 ners from the University of Athens, Uni-
months creating a comprehensive con- versity of Patras, OQ Hellas, Aegean
stellation with R&D, operational, com- University and National Observatory of
munications and earth observation Athens.
capabilities which can support a multi-
tude of national needs including de-
fence and security. ERMIS is a cubesat
constellation ‘made in Greece’ which is
creating very unique national capabili-
ties and links with academia and indus-
try and can become the backbone of a
new space generation in Greece.
250 Hellenic Air Force Review

References gram’, Link:

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Greek National Small Satellite Pro-

Short Biography
Professor Vaios. Lappas holds a BEng in Aerospace Engi-
neering from Ryerson University (Canada), an MSc in Space Tech-
nology from NASA Goddard via the International Space University
(France), and a PhD in Space Vehicle Control from the University
of Surrey (UK), and has led significant research grants on satellite
technology, space missions, and space debris, funded by the US
Air Force, NASA, Airbus, ESA, and the European Commission, in-
cluding the EU-funded QB50 and RemoveDEBRIS missions, the
EDA EuroSWARM defence project, and the ERMIS nanosatellite
constellation (Greek Ministry of Digital Governance/ESA); he currently serves as Pro-
fessor of Aerospace Systems and Head of the Department of Aerospace Science & Tech-
nology at the University of Athens (Greece) and Consulting Professor at Cranfield
University (UK), focusing research on unmanned vehicles for defence, satellite systems,
launch vehicles, and small satellites (EU, US Air Force, ESA), while teaching Flight Con-
trols, Dynamics, and Satellite Communications and supervising MSc and PhD students
in Astronautics, Space, and Autonomous Systems at Cranfield.
 Hellenic Air Force Review 251

Short Biography
Dr. Antonios Paschalis, born in 1960, is Professor at the De-
partment of Computer Science and Telecommunications at the
University of Athens, where he directs the Digital Systems and
Computer Architecture Laboratory (DSCAL) and the Interdiscipli-
nary MSc in Space Technologies, Applications and Services
(STAR), serves as an academic member of the si-Cluster Board,
and has held roles including member of the Hellenic Space
Agency Board, the provisional assembly for the Department of
Aerospace Science and Technology (UOA), and President of the
Department of Computer Science and Telecommunications (UCA, 1916-1920); he
earned a B.Sc. in Physical Sciences (1982), an M.Sc. in Electronic Automation, and a
Ph.D. in High Reliability Computing (1987) with a fellowship from the National Research
Centre “Demokritos,” all from NKUA’s Department of Physics, bringing over 10 years
of experience in designing on-board payload data processing units for space applica-
tions and recognition as a Golden Core Member of the IEEE Computer Society.
 Can a Hellenic Air Force
Pilot Become an Astronaut?

2 nd Lieutenant (Pilot) Georgios-Marios Margos

Citation: 2nd Lt. (Pilot) Margos Georgios - Marios. (2025). Can a Hellenic Air-Force
Pilot Become an Astronaut? Hellenic Air Force Review,134.
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15169410
 Hellenic Air Force Review 253

Abstract Earth provide critical operational capa-

bilities such as global communication,
One of the most emblematic dimen- earth observation, navigation, and early
sions of outer space is the astronauts, warning. These capabilities allow the
who symbolize human exploration and Armed Forces to maintain uninterrupted
the quest for knowledge. Since its in- connectivity and monitor the move-
ception, U.S. NASA has selected 360 ments of adversaries, effectively assist-
astronaut candidates: 212 military and ing in the planning and execution of
138 civilians; 191 pilots and 169 non- military operations.
pilots. The majority of astronauts re- At the same time, it is worth noting
main in the military, a trend likely to the significance of their contribution to
continue due to the unique skills and disaster prediction and response, hu-
abilities pilots bring to space missions. manitarian assistance guidance and in-
This article briefly describes the selec- telligence gathering. This enables
tion criteria for the first astronauts inter- military forces to operate and respond
nationally, highlighting the significant effectively to a broad range of security
role of pilots. It also explores the past
initiative of the Hellenic Ministry of De-
fence to select a Greek astronaut from
the Air Force, aligning with international
practices and providing direction for fu-
ture efforts.

Keywords

Hellenic Air Force; Pilots; Astro- challenges. Consequently, the opera-

nauts; Space Exploration; Military Per- tional exploitation of space enhances
sonnel; Hellenic Ministry of Defence. situational awareness, operational plan-
ning, and the overall effectiveness of
defence strategies, reaffirming the cru-
The Recognition of the Dimension cial role of space in global security and
of Space in the defence.
Hellenic Air Force Doctrine In the context of modern Greek re-
ality, the recognition of space as a di-
The realm of space plays a pivotal mension is evident in the military
role in the sphere of modern military op- doctrine of the Hellenic Air Force. With
erations. Satellite systems orbiting the recent revision of the doctrine
254 Hellenic Air Force Review

guarding national interests and

maintaining national security and
defence.3
However, the symbolic dimen-
sion of space presents an equally
important and intriguing aspect
beyond its operational utilization,
the spaceflight. This term refers to
Revolutionizing Connectivity through astronautics and is conducted by
Satellite Technology 1 individuals with specific qualifica-
(March 2023), space has been officially tions who actively contribute to
acknowledged for the first time by an in- human exploration and the advance-
stitutional document of the Hellenic ment of scientific knowledge.
Armed Forces as a vital domain for safe- Astronauts are educated and pro-
guarding and advancing national inter- fessionally distinguished individuals
ests. The concept of «Space Power» has who have left their mark in the annals
been recognized and placed promi- of world history, inspiring and motivat-
nently in the Armed Forces, fundamen- ing humanity along the path of explo-
tally upgrading all three levels of ration. This is admirable and
warfare (strategic, tactical, and opera- praiseworthy. Nevertheless, it may
tional), thus serving as an undeniable prompt reflection as to why Greece, as
force multiplier in modern battlefields. a country, has not yet seen a Greek cit-
Furthermore, the emergence of the izen - military or civilian - join the elite
Space dimension by the Hellenic Air ranks of astronauts and serve as a role
Force can ensure the potential for fur- model for Greek society.
ther development, evolution, and quali-
tative improvement in the planning and The First Astronauts
execution of multi-domain operations in
today’s multidimensional battlefield. 2 A The origins of astronautics can be
similar initiative was undertaken on De- historically traced back to the Cold War
cember 20, 2019, by the President of era (1945-1991) between the United
the United States of America Donald J. States of America (USA) and the Soviet
Trump, who institutionalized the Space Union (USSR). During this period, the
Force as a separate branch of the U.S. two nations engaged in an endless
Armed Forces. This move reflects the competition for dominance in Space
evolution of strategic thinking regarding (Space Race), which fundamentally al-
Space and highlights its value in safe- tered levels of human knowledge and
 Hellenic Air Force Review 255

exploration. The first major milestone

focused on placing the first human in
space. This was achieved by the Soviet
Union on April 12, 1961, when cosmo-
naut Yuri Gagarin left Earth’s atmos-
phere for 108 minutes aboard the
Vostok 1 capsule. This mission was con-
sidered a tremendous success by the
standards of the time, as it marked the
first instance of a human leaving Ear-
th’s atmosphere, making Gagarin an in-
ternational hero within Soviet society. 4
The American response came just
three weeks later when astronaut Alan
B. Shepard became the first American
citizen to conduct a suborbital flight
Alan B. Shepard, May 5, 1971 6
aboard the Mercury Freedom 7 capsule.
However, the significant decision and M. Schirra, Alan B. Shepard, and Donald
the ultimate goal of the space race were K. “Deke” Slayton, also known as the
articulated three weeks later, when U.S. Mercury Seven.
President John F. Kennedy declared in From 1964 onwards, the criteria
a speech the ultimate objective of the were revised, and NASA focused on in-
U.S. space program: landing the first dividuals with strong academic back-
human on the Moon before the end of grounds, such as master’s or doctoral
the 1970s. 5 degrees in engineering, physical sci-
In 1959, for the first time in history, ences, and medicine. These selected in-
NASA in its search for astronauts, re- dividuals formed the scientific
quested the U.S. Air Force to prepare a community of astronauts, which was
list of members meeting specific crite- considered of primary importance in
ria. Attention was focused on individu- space exploration.7
als with flight experience and a In 1978, the Space Shuttle was
background in engineering. The list was launched for the first time, crewed by
initially narrowed down to 500 individu- five astronauts from NASA’s 8th series,
als, and those who stood out and were four of whom were pilots from the USAF
selected as the first astronauts were M. and one a scientist (astronomer). Inter-
Scott Carpenter, L. Gordon Cooper, John est was now centered on the scientific
H. Glenn, Virgil I. “Gus” Grissom, Walter exploration of space and the construc-
256 Hellenic Air Force Review

physiology, as they fly in aircraft of un-

known performance and limits, a fact
that cultivates instincts such as en-
hanced virtual-acoustic perception,
alertness and decisiveness in decision-
making and initiatives, in an environ-
ment where consequences truly count.
The first space vehicles were construc-
tions of unknown limits and capabili-
ties.
For this reason, it was considered
necessary that the first astronauts who
would be called upon to operate them
be former fighter aircraft test pilots, as
only they could to a certain extent
The Mercury 7 Astronauts: NASA’s First
Space Travelers 8 simulate the performance, speed and
handling skills required of a space cap-
tion of an International Space Station
sule. 9
capable of conducting scientific experi-
ments aimed at further understanding
the universe and Earth. This aspiration
began to materialize in 1998 and was
completed after ten years with the con-
tribution of fifteen countries and a total
of thirty space missions.
It is an undeniable fact that to this
day that the preference for pilots has Hellenic Airforce (H.A.F) Rafale H3-R Jets 10
stood out, if not dominated, in the field
of astronautics. This is mainly due to
the skills that a pilot develops, such as
The Role of Military Personnel
enhanced space perception, three-axis
in Modern Astronauts
movement, alertness, determination
and the ability to multitask.
Modern astronaut missions,
A special category of pilots, which
due to their complex nature and high
has the greatest impact in the field of
demands, require adequate and appro-
astronautics, is that of Test Pilots. The
priate crew training and preparation.
reason why test pilots stand out is their
This training focuses on technical ex-
deep knowledge of flight and flying
 Hellenic Air Force Review 257

pertise, survival in harsh conditions, Neil Armstrong (and the first man to set
physical fitness improvement, scientific foot on the Moon), as he managed to re-
education, and preparation for upcom- gain control manually, thus demonstrat-
ing space exploration. ing the great importance of aviation
These requirements make the role training in addressing the unexpected
of military personnel extremely impor- of space.11
tant and multidimensional. Military
training, particularly in the Air Force,
which has a flight element, shares
many commonalities with astronaut
training, making this branch of the
Armed Forces highly preferable.
Military personnel, especially pilots,
have valuable experience in managing
dangerous and critical situations, coor-
dinating crews, and adhering to mission
schedules. These skills are vital for the
effectiveness of space missions. History
has shown that combining military ex-
pertise and astronautics shapes disci-
plined and fully prepared individuals
Neil Armstrong and David Scott after Gemini
capable of taking responsibility for VIII Mission 12
space missions and meeting any risky
demands. The first selection of astronauts
An example worth noticing, is the (Mercury Seven), focused exclusively on
Gemini VIII mission that took place on military personnel, as NASA was in
March 16, 1966, in which astronauts close cooperation with the US Depart-
Neil Armstrong and David Scott at- ment of Defence at the time. In the fol-
tempted a space rendezvous and dock- lowing years, many believed that space
ing of two different spacecraft. Minutes exploration, especially by humans,
after the successful docking, the astro- should be a civilian, not a military, pur-
nauts faced a series of malfunctions suit.
that caused the unified spacecraft to This view was strongly opposed by
spin at a rate of one full rotation in less the US Air Force, which argued that
than a second. space flight had many inherent charac-
This was masterfully handled by for- teristics with that on Earth and that
mer test pilot and fighter aircraft pilot Space was simply an extension of the
258 Hellenic Air Force Review

scope of its operational scope. At the 60% of the global astronaut community
same time, an equally widespread view are former military personnel and pilots
was that until then, human exploration in particular.
and discovery of new areas had been
carried out mainly by civilians, not by Hellenic Minister of Defence
military forces. This fact led to the mod- Guideline for a HAF Astronaut
ification of the selection restrictions and
opened the path of astronautics to In Greece, to date, there has been
many civilians. one astronaut of Greek descent,
Since its inception, NASA has se- Theodore Yurchikhin, who participated
lected 360 astronaut candidates: 212 in the 2002 joint American - Russian At-
military and 138 civilians; 191 pilots lantis mission and later (2006-2007)
and 169 non-pilots. The absolute major- worked on the International Space Sta-
ity of astronauts remains in the military, tion (ISS).
a percentage that is unlikely to de- The Greek government’s willingness
crease, considering that space explo- to select an astronaut was first ex-
ration will always require the skill and pressed in 2003 by the Minister of De-
abilities possessed by a pilot. 13 velopment, who conveyed the country’s
The question that arises and may desire to explore the possibility of se-
essentially concern the Hellenic Air- lecting and training an astronaut to the
Force is whether a Greek pilot could Director of External Relations of ESA
meet the difficulties and high demands (European Space Agency) and former
of astronautics and why it has not al- Belgian Minister of Defence, Jean-Pol
ready been done, given that a specific Poncelet. The Greek request at the
path for selecting astronauts is ob- time, concerned the individual national
served and at a time when more than selection and training of a Greek astro-
naut, given that there was no open ESA
astronaut selection competition in
progress at that time.
Two years later, the Minister of De-
fence, Spilios Spiliotopoulos, a former
pilot of the Hellenic Air Force, showed
genuine interest in the scenario of se-
lecting an astronaut from the HAF per-
sonnel. To this end, he accepted a
relevant proposal from the Space Office
Space Shuttle Launch April 4, 1983 14 of the Ministry of Defence Staff, which
 Hellenic Air Force Review 259

of Aeronautical Engineer and ATPL

pilot Dr. Panagiotis Vitsas, and for-
mer Fighter Pilot and holder of two
Postgraduate Diplomas, Major
(HAF, ret) Ioannis Lignos. Both
managed to advance in ESA’s
2021 astronaut selection reaching
the fourth and third stage of the
competition respectively. Given
Theodore Yurchikhin (bottom row, centre), pictured these data, it is hoped that in the
with the Expedition 37 and 38 crew 15 future another Greek will manage
to complete their effort, highlight-
was established in 2005 following a
ing Greece and the Air Force, provided
suggestion by the Hellenic Air Force.
that the astronaut comes from its
ESA, through its representative Daniel
ranks.
Sacotte, responded positively to the
Greek request. An initial cost estimate
for astronaut training was set at 20 mil-
Epilogue
lion euros. 16
Becoming an astronaut, from the
Interest was focused on the ranks of
early days of space exploration to the
the Hellenic Air Force, as the required
present, highlights the critical role of
qualifications included completing over
skilled pilots and military personnel in
1,000 hours in high-performance air-
advancing human presence in
craft (fighter jets), a test pilot license, a
space. Looking ahead, the role of astro-
master’s or doctoral degree in the phys-
nauts will continue to evolve, driven by
ical sciences, and fluency in Russian.
technological advancements and the
However, none of the Hellenic Air Force
expanding frontiers of space explo-
personnel met all those qualifications.
ration. The Hellenic Ministry of De-
The change in ministerial leadership
fence’s initiative to select an astronaut
eventually diminished the enthusiasm
from the Air Force exemplifies a forward-
for astronaut selection.
thinking approach, aligning with interna-
Although the Greek effort to select
tional practices and recognizing the
an astronaut has not garnered signifi-
strategic importance of space. By fos-
cant attention from subsequent govern-
tering such initiatives, Greece can con-
ments, it has not deterred citizens of
tribute to the global effort of space
Greece from applying to ESA’s open as-
exploration and inspire future genera-
tronaut selection competitions. Τwo
tions to reach for the stars. The path to
particularly inspiring examples are that
260 Hellenic Air Force Review

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Smithsonian National Air and 2008. Accessed September 29,
Space Museum. Available: 2023. Available:
https://airandspace.si.edu/multi- https://bit.ly/3M4hycn.
m e d i a - g a l l e r y / 10 4 - k s c - 6 6 c -

Short Biography
Second Lieutenant (Pilot) Margos Georgios Marios graduated
from the Hellenic Air Force Academy in 2024.
He has accumulated a total of 150 flying hours in Technam
P2002JF and T-6 Texan II aircrafts. Currently, he is undergoing
advanced jet training on the M-346 Aermacchi Jet at the 120
IFTC (International Flight Training Center), further honing his
skills in fast-jet operations and combat aviation.
He is particularly interested in the expansion of the role of Αir Πower in Space.
His HAFA thesis focused on “The Role of Mega-Constellations of small Satellites in De-
fence.”
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