IN THE CHANCERY COURT FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE

TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, DAVIDSON COUNTY

MAYOR LEE HARRIS, ​ )

in his official capacity,​ )
​ )
COMMISSIONER ERIKA SUGARMON,​ )
in her official capacity,​ )
​ )
COMMISSIONER HENRI E. BROOKS,​ )
in her official capacity,​ )
​ )
COUNCILMEMBER JB SMILEY, JR., ​ )
in his official capacity,​ )
​ )
REPRESENTATIVE G.A. HARDAWAY,​ )
in his official capacity,​ )
​ )
REPRESENTATIVE GABBY SALINAS​ )
in her personal and official capacity, and​ )
​ )
SENATOR JEFF YARBRO,​ )
in his personal and official capacity,​ )
​ )
​ Plaintiffs,​ )
v.​ )​ No. ​ ​ ​
​ )
GOVERNOR BILL LEE,​ )
in his official capacity,​ )
​ )
ATTORNEY GENERAL JONATHAN​ )
SKRMETTI, in his official capacity, and​ )
​ )
MAJOR GENERAL WARNER A. ROSS, III )
in his official capacity,​ )
​ )
​ Defendants.​ )

COMPLAINT
 I. INTRODUCTION

1.​ The “traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into civilian

affairs” has “deep roots in our history.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). Our nation’s

founders recognized that military rule was incompatible with liberty and democracy. Wary of the

tyrannical threat posed by a militarized federal government, the founders took pains to enshrine

in the Constitution civilian control of the military, limits on the maintenance of a national army,

reliance on the states’ militia for national defense, and local control of the general police power.

Foundational principles of American law therefore limit the military’s involvement in domestic

affairs.

2.​ Those principles were likewise enshrined in the Tennessee Constitution, which was

drafted against the backdrop of a governor who used the State’s militia to suppress political

opponents and imposed martial law in 11% of Tennessee’s 84 counties. While the State’s

Constitution recognizes the Governor as the Commander-in-Chief of Tennessee’s military forces,

it also carefully limits the Governor’s authority to use the State’s militia—what is today known

as the Tennessee National Guard—to specific circumstances.

3.​ Specifically, “the Militia shall not be called into service except in case of rebellion or

invasion, and then only when the General Assembly shall declare, by law, that the public safety

requires it.” Tenn. Const., art. III § 5.

4.​ Tennessee statutes also sharply constrain the governor’s use of the military for civilian

law enforcement and, particularly, forbid him from doing so unilaterally, rather than in a

response to a request from the affected city or county. See Tenn. Code. Ann. 58-1-106(a), (c).

5.​ ​ Defendants have trampled on Tennessee law by unilaterally deploying Tennessee

National Guard members in Memphis as a domestic police force. On October 10, 2025, military

police in fatigues descended upon Memphis, in a deployment of the Tennessee National Guard

1
authorized by Governor Bill Lee. Governor Lee acted at the request of President Donald Trump,

but not at the request of any Memphis or Shelby County officials. He also had no approval or

authorization from the Tennessee General Assembly.

6.​ ​ The deployment is patently unlawful.

7.​ ​ Municipal, county, and state officials bring this action to seek injunctive relief to

preclude this unlawful militarization of the communities residing in Memphis.

II. PARTIES

8.​ ​ Plaintiff Lee Harris is the duly elected Mayor of Shelby County and serves as the

chief elected official in Shelby County Government, one of the largest local governments in the

South. Mayor Harris sues in his official capacity as the Mayor of Shelby County. In his capacity

as mayor, he serves as Shelby County’s chief financial officer. He also enjoys veto power over

any resolutions adopted by the Shelby County Board of Commissioners.

9.​ ​ Plaintiff Erika Sugarmon is a duly elected Commissioner of Shelby County,

representing District 12. Commissioner Sugarmon sues in her official capacity as a member of

the Shelby County Board of Commissioners.

10.​ Plaintiff Henri E. Brooks is Sugarmon is a duly elected Commissioner of Shelby

County, representing District 7. Commissioner Brooks sues in her official capacity as a member

of the Shelby County Board of Commissioners.

11.​ Plaintiff JB Smiley, Jr., is a duly elected council member of the City of Memphis,

representing Super District 8-1. Councilmember Smiley sues in his official capacity as a member

of the Memphis City Council.

12.​ Plaintiff G.A. Hardaway, Sr., is a duly elected member of the Tennessee General

Assembly, representing District 93 in the Tennessee House of Representatives. Representative

Hardaway sues in his official capacity as a member of the Tennessee General Assembly.

2
 13.​ Plaintiff Gabby Salinas is a duly elected member of the s a duly elected member of

the Tennessee General Assembly, representing District 96 in the Tennessee House of

Representatives. Representative Salinas sues in her official capacity as a member of the

Tennessee General Assembly and also as a taxpayer. Representative Salinas is a resident of

Memphis, Tennessee. She pays sales, gasoline, and motor-vehicle taxes that contribute to the

Tennessee’s general funds that are levied under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-4-101, 55-4-105, and

55-4-111. She objects to the use of state funds for the unlawful deployment of the National

Guards.

14.​ Plaintiff Jeff Yarbro is a duly elected member of the Tennessee General Assembly

representing District 21 in the Tennessee Senate. Senator Yarbro sues in his official capacity as a

member of the Tennessee General Assembly and also as a taxpayer. Representative Yarbro is a

resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. He pays sales, gasoline, and motor-vehicle taxes that

contribute to the Tennessee’s general funds that are levied under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-4-101,

55-4-105, and 55-4-111. He objects to the use of state funds for the unlawful deployment of the

National Guards.

15.​ Defendant Bill Lee is the Governor of Tennessee. Governor Lee is sued in his

official capacity.

16.​ Defendant Jonathan Skrmetti is the Attorney General of Tennessee. Attorney

General Skrmetti is sued in his official capacity.

17.​ Defendant Warner A. Ross III is the Adjutant General of the Tennessee National

Guard. Major General Ross is sued in his official capacity.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

18.​ This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 1-3-121

and 29-14-102.

3
 19.​ This Court is vested with the authority to issue a declaratory judgment and an

injunction with the force and effect of a final decree pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 1-3-121,

29-1-106, and 29-14-102.

20.​ Venue is proper in this Court under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-4-104. See Morris v.

Snodgrass, 871 S.W.2d 484 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1993) (establishing venue for suits against state

officials such as the state attorney general in Davidson County).

IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.​ National Guard Service Categories

21.​ Today, the National Guard is a state-based military reserve force that consists of two

overlapping but distinct organizations: the National Guard of the various States and the National

Guard of the United States.1 Since 1933, anyone who enlists in a state’s National Guard is

simultaneously enlisted into the National Guard of the United States. And when a member of a

state’s National Guard is ordered into federal service, that member is relieved of his or her status

in the state’s National Guard for the duration of their federal service.

22.​ Members of the National Guard may serve in one of three capacities: State

Active-Duty status, Title 10 status, or Title 32 status.

23.​ First, members of the National Guard may serve in “State Active Duty” status. This

means they exercise state functions under the authority of their state’s governor, and their actions

generally are governed by state law.

1
The Dick Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 775, modernized the organized state militias and codified
the circumstances in which those militias would be called into federal service. Since that time,
the state militias subject to federal conversion, as contemplated by the U.S. Constitution’s Militia
Clauses and the Tennessee Constitution’s Commander-in-Chief Clause, have been called the
“National Guard.” See Lipscomb v. FLRA, 333 F.3d 611, 613 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he national
guard is the militia, in modern-day form, that is reserved to the states by Art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16 of
the Constitution.”); see also Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 342-43 (describing
the Dick Act’s reformation of the militia into the modern National Guard system).

4
 24.​ Second, members of the National Guard may be “federalized” and called into federal

service in what is known as “Title 10 status.” In rare circumstances, set forth in Title 10 of the

U.S. Code, the President may activate the National Guard, thereby making it part of the federal

military subject to his direct control. See 10 U.S.C. § 12406. But these circumstances are limited

to the most severe exigencies not present here.

25.​ Third, members of the National Guard may serve in a hybrid federal-state status

known as “Title 32 status.” At the request of the President or Secretary of Defense, a state

National Guard unit may be activated by its state governor to perform training or “other duty”

under state command and control, but with certain funding available from the federal

government. See 32 U.S.C. § 502(f). A state’s National Guard personnel in such a deployment

“serve[] under the Governor and subordinate authority.” Yount v. State, 774 S.W.2d 919, 920

(Tenn. 1989).

26.​ Here, President Trump requested that Governor Lee deploy Tennessee National

Guard members under Title 32, and Governor Lee obliged.

B.​ The Tennessee National Guard is a State-Based Military Reserve Force

27.​ The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress “to provide for calling forth the militia to

execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,

cl. 15–16. This state-based militia that existed at the nation’s founding was the forerunner of the

modern National Guard.

28.​ At the nation’s founding, the Framers divided control over state militias to protect

“individual liberty” and “the sovereignty of the separate States.” Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496

U.S. 334, 340 (1990). The Founding generation “strongly disfavored standing armies” and

believed that “adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia”—a

force composed of “civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.” United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.

5
174, 179 (1939). At the same time, the experience of the Revolutionary War and the Articles of

Confederation taught the Founding generation that “[t]he steady operations of war” required “a

regular and disciplined army” under centralized federal command. The Federalist No. 25

(Alexander Hamilton).

29.​ The Constitution therefore reflects a compromise. It “reserv[es] to the States” the

principal power over the “Militia,” including the authority to appoint its officers, train its

members, and “govern[] such Part of them” as are not in federal service. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,

cl. 16. At the same time, the Constitution vests Congress with authority “[t]o raise and support

Armies” for terms of no longer than “two years.” Id. art. I, § 8 cl. 12. It also grants Congress the

powers necessary to ensure that the Militia is a professional force available for national

emergencies: it states that Congress may provide for “organizing, arming, and disciplining, the

Militia,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16, and for “calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,

suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.

30.​ Because the U.S. Constitution preserved state authority over state militias,

Tennessee’s militia (and its use by the governor) is subject to Tennessee law when it is not called

into federal service under Title 10. E.g., Oregon v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-1756-IM, 2025 WL

2817646, *2 (D. Or. Oct. 4, 2025) (“State Active Duty National Guard troops and those activated

under Title 32 may engage in domestic law enforcement functions, subject to restrictions under

state law.”) (emphasis added); see also Perpich, 496 U.S. at 348 (1990) (“[M]embers of the state

Guard unit . . . must keep three hats in their closets – a civilian hat, a state militia hat, and an

army hat – only one of which is worn at a particular time.”) (emphasis added).

C.​ The Tennessee Constitution Limits Circumstances When Governor Can Deploy
Tennessee National Guard

31.​ Tennessee’s First Constitution was adopted in 1796. It recognized the Governor as

the Commander-in-Chief of the State’s military forces and identified the “Militia” as the entity

6
subject to being “called into the service of the United States,” just as the federal Constitution

imagined. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 5 (1796).

32.​ That formulation has been consistent in the State’s two subsequent constitutions. See

Tenn. Const. art. III § 5 (1834); Tenn. Const. art. III, § 5 (1870).

33.​ Since statehood, the State’s Constitution has restricted the military’s role in

Tennessee society across each version, stating that “in all cases the military shall be kept in strict

subordination to the civil authority.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 24 (1796); Tenn. Const. art. I, § 24

(1834); Tenn. Const. art. I, § 24 (1870).

34.​ Adopted in 1870, the third and current version of the State’s Constitution restricts the

military’s role in Tennessee Society, including that the governor cannot call out the militia

without consent of the legislature.

35.​ Specifically, the Tennessee Constitution provides that the State’s “Militia,” known

today as the Tennessee National Guard, “shall not be called into service except in case of

rebellion or invasion, and then only when the General Assembly shall declare, by law, that the

public safety requires it.” Tenn. Const. art. III, § 5.

36.​ By its very terms, the State Constitution permits the Governor to deploy the National

Guard in only two circumstances: “rebellion or invasion.” And even in those

circumstances—neither of which exists here— “only when the General Assembly shall declare,

by law, that the public safety requires it.” Id.

37.​ Notably, Article III, Section 5 assigns to locally elected officials concurrent and

non-preemptible authority to consult and consent on the calling out the militia. Therefore,

Defendants cannot unilaterally call out the National Guard.

7
 D.​ Tennessee Law Prohibits Defendants’ Unilateral Deployment of Tennessee’s
National Guard as a Domestic Police Force

38.​ Defendants’ authority over Tennessee’s National Guard is also subject to State

statutory constraints.

39.​ The General Assembly of Tennessee is the state legislature, a bicameral body that

creates laws for the state of Tennessee.

40.​ In addition to the constitutional requirements for deployment of the Tennessee

National Guard, the General Assembly has, over time, adopted legislation to regulate the

Governor’s authority to deploy troops as a domestic police force within the State.

41.​ As relevant here, the principal source of the Governor’s statutory authority to deploy

National Guard personnel is Section 58-1-106 of the Tennessee Code. Subsection (a) authorizes

the Governor “to order” “all or part of the national guard” “into active service of the state,” “in

case of invasion, disaster, insurrection, riot, attack, or combination to oppose the enforcement of

the law by force and violence, or imminent danger thereof.” T.C.A. § 58-1-106(a).

42.​ Notably, this provision does not allow for deploying the National Guard to do police

work or to fight crime.

43.​ Alternatively, subsection (c) of Section 58-1-106 permits the Governor to order the

National Guard into active service “upon the request of the governing body of a city or county .

. . that there is a breakdown of law and order, a grievous breach of the peace, a riot, resistance to

process of this state, or disaster, or imminent danger thereof.” T.C.A. § 58-1-106(c) (emphasis

added).

44.​ Separately, Section 58-1-301, provides that “[t]he governor, with the advice and

consent of the general assembly, and pursuant to the laws of the United States, shall call the

militia, or any portion thereof, into active service at any time that public safety requires it.” But

in 2021, acting Attorney General Henry Slatery opined that Section 58-1-301 “does not appear to

8
comport with article III, section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution.” Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen No.

21-05 (May 6, 2021) (citing T.C.A. § 58-1-301).2 Likewise, in January 2024, Attorney General

Skrmetti endorsed Attorney General Slatery’s interpretation before doing an inexplicable about

face three months later to allow for “the federalization of troops for crime-fighting work.”3

45.​ In light of these restrictions—together with local citizens’ “traditional insistence on

limitations on military operations in peacetime,” Laird, 408 U.S. at 15—Defendants’ unilateral

decision to deploy the Tennessee National Guard as a domestic police force is patently unlawful.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A.​ President Trump Requests Tennessee’s National Guard for Routine Domestic Law
Enforcement

46.​ The legal and normative constraints on presidential authority to federalize and

deploy a state’s National Guard are so well established that President Trump previously

acknowledged them. Questioned in September 2020 about his commitment to restore law and

order, the President stated, “[w]e have laws. We have to go by the laws. We can’t move in the

National Guard. I can call insurrection, but there’s no reason to ever do that.” “Even in a Portland

[Oregon] case, we can’t call in the National Guard unless we’re requested by a governor. If a

governor or a mayor is a Democrat, like in Portland, we call them constantly.”4

2
Sam Stockard, “Tennessee Lawmaker Says AG Omitted, Altered Guard Deployment
Opinions,” Tennessee Lookout (Oct. 1, 2025),
https://tennesseelookout.com/2025/10/01/tennessee-lawmaker-says-ag-omitted-altered-guard-dep
loyment-opinions/ (last viewed Oct. 16, 2025).
3
Sam Stockard, “Tennessee Governor Takes AG’s Altered Advice on Guard Deployment,”
Tennessee Lookout (Oct. 3, 2025),
https://tennesseelookout.com/2025/10/03/tennessee-governor-takes-ags-altered-advice-on-guard-
deployment/ (last viewed Oct. 6, 2025).
4
Meg Kinnard & Adriana Gomez Licon, In His Own Words: Trump Said During 2024
Campaign He Would Use Military for Immigration Enforcement, AP News (June 10, 2025, at
5:10 PM PT),
https://apnews.com/article/trump-immigration-military-los-angelesa2611009fd40d593f07c58255
911513d.

9
 47.​ Despite prior statements, President Trump has sought to deploy National Guard

troops for civilian law enforcement purposes in several urban areas. For example, President

Trump has called national guard personnel to Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Chicago, and

Portland. All these cities have filed lawsuits alleging that President Trump has circumvented

legal requirements when deploying national guard personnel. See, e.g., Illinois v. Trump, No.

1:25-cv-12174 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2025); Oregon v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-01756 (D. Or. Sept. 28,

2025); Newsom v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-04870 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2025); Dist. of Columbia v.

Trump, No. 1:25-cv-02678 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2025).

48.​ On September 13, 2025, President Trump posted a message about Memphis for his

social-media followers:

49.​ Two days later, on September 15, 2025, Defendant Governor Lee and President

Trump met in the Oval Office. During the meeting, President Trump signed a presidential

memorandum to establish the Memphis Safe Task Force.

10
 50.​ President Trump released a presidential memorandum titled “Restoring Law and

Order in Memphis” (the “Memphis Memo”).5 This memo alleges that “[t]he city of Memphis,

Tennessee, is suffering from tremendous levels of violent crime that have overwhelmed its local

government’s ability to respond effectively.” Id. § 1.

51.​ The memo further directed the U.S. Secretary of Defense (referred to as the

“Secretary of War”) to request that Governor Lee “make available National Guard units of

Tennessee,” under Title 32 for the purpose of supporting “public safety and law enforcement

operations in Memphis.” Id. at § 3(a).

52.​ The Memphis Memo did not include details on when troops would be deployed or

what exactly any law enforcement efforts in the city would look like. The deployment of

National Guard members to Memphis is part of a broader pattern by the President to use the U.S.

armed forces domestically, particularly in jurisdictions with which he has political

disagreements, whether to address supposed “crime emergencies” or to “protect” federal

facilities, personnel, or interests.

B.​ Defendants Deployed Tennessee National Guard Members as Domestic Police

53.​ Following Defendant Governor Lee joining President Trump inside the Oval Office

for the signing of the Memphis Memo, Governor Lee’s office issued a press release committing

Tennessee National Guard personnel to the “Memphis Safe Task Force.” Defendant Governor

Lee’s related press release explicitly characterized the State’s National Guard as a “law

enforcement agency.” Press Release, Gov. Bill Lee, President Trump Meet in Oval Office to

Discuss Strategic Mission to Address Crime in Memphis (Sept. 15, 2025), available at

https://www.tn.gov/governor/news/2025/9/15/icymi--gov--lee--president-trump-meet-in-oval-off

ice-to-discuss-strategic-mission-to-address-crime-in-memphis.html. Specifically, the press

5

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/restoring-law-and-order-in-memphis/.

11
release from the Governor’s Office states that “[t]he Memphis Safe Task Force establishes strong

coordination and shared resources between law enforcement agencies at all levels of

government, including the Tennessee National Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug

Enforcement Agency, Tennessee Highway Patrol, Memphis Police Department, and others.” Id.

According to the press release, the task force “will accelerate the positive momentum of

Operation Viper—an ongoing FBI mission.” Id.

54.​ Defendant Governor Lee’s press release explained that he met with President Trump

to: (1) establish a multi-agency law enforcement taskforce and (2) request that President Trump

activate the Tennessee National Guard under Title 32 status.

55.​ The press release further explained that “[t]his public meeting [in the Oval Office] is

the result of months of coordination with the Trump Administration to develop a multi-phased,

strategic plan to leverage the full extent of both federal and state resources to fight crime in

Memphis.” Id.

56.​ Tennessee National Guard troops began patrolling Memphis on October 10, 2025.

See NPR, National Guard Troops being patrols in Memphis (Oct. 10, 2025),

https://www.npr.org/2025/10/10/nx-s1-5550398/national-guard-memphis-tennessee-trump.

57.​ The members of the Tennessee National Guard deployed to Memphis have been

called on to serve as law enforcement officers. According to the Memphis City website, the

“Tennessee National Guard is playing a supporting role, acting as a force multiplier, supporting

Memphis Police Department and other local law enforcement agencies on the ground.”

https://memphistn.gov/safeandclean/. Tennessee National Guard members will be deputized by

U.S. Marshals, id., the nation’s first federal law enforcement agency.

58.​ Notably, Defendant Governor Bill Lee has not declared a state of emergency. Id.

12
 C.​ Defendants’ Deployment of the National Guard Does Not Satisfy a Single
Requirement Under Tennessee Law

59.​ There is, at present, neither a rebellion nor an invasion in Tennessee. The General

Assembly has not declared that public safety requires a military deployment. And none of the

statutory conditions that further limit the deployment of the National Guard has been satisfied.

(1)​Tennessee is Not Under Threat of a Rebellion or Invasion

60.​ The facts on the ground cannot justify Defendants’ overreach. While Defendant

Government Lee explained the deployment “is all about” making crime “a story of the past,”

crime is not a circumstance that passes constitutional muster.

61.​ The Constitution does not permit a state-law deployment absent a “rebellion or

invasion.”

62.​ A rebellion is a “deliberate, organized resistance, openly and avowedly opposing the

laws and authority of the government as a whole by means of armed opposition and violence.”

Illinois v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-12174, 2025 WL 2886645 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2025); accord

Newsom v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1251–53 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting authorities); see

also Merriam-Webster, Rebellion (defining “rebellion” as “opposition to one in authority or

dominance,” or an “open, armed, and usually unsuccessful defiance of or resistance to an

established government”).

63.​ Rebellions and invasions are existential threats to a sovereign government. There is,

at present, no “rebellion” or “invasion” in Memphis within the meaning of the Constitution.

(2)​The Statutory Pre-Requisites for Deployment of the National Guard Have Not Been
Satisfied.

64.​ There is no “invasion, disaster, insurrection, riot, attack, or combination to oppose

the enforcement of the law by force and violence, or imminent danger thereof, or other grave

emergency” in Memphis, nor has the “general assembly . . . declare[d] by law that the public

13
safety requires the deployment of National Guard troops to Memphis. See Tenn. Code Ann. §

58-1-106(a). See also Tenn. Code Ann. 58-1-301 (conditioning the governor’s authority to call

up the militia on “the advice and consent of the general assembly”).

65.​ For example, on September 10, 2025, Plaintiff Salinas wrote Governor Lee a letter

asking him not to deploy the Tennessee National Guard to the City of Memphis as such an act

would be an abuse of power and misappropriation of state and federal resources. Plaintiff

Salinas letter further states that instead of militarizing Memphis citizens against one another and

wasting valuable resources, elected officials should focus on investing in public schools, health

care clinics, hospitals, and increasing wages for workers. Plaintiff Salinas expressed that citizens

do not need, nor want, these armed force in Memphis neighborhoods. Inviting armed guardsmen

to Memphis would only raise tensions and undo recent progress made in community safety.

66.​ There has likewise been no “request of the governing body” of Memphis or Shelby

county “by resolution duly and regularly adopted that there is a breakdown of law and order” that

would provide Governor Lee with a basis for deploying the National Guard to Memphis.

D.​ Defendants Pointedly Refuse to Identity the Statutory Authority for this
Deployment

67.​ Tennessee law does not authorize this brazen usurpation of the role reserved for local

elected officials. Indeed, the Governor and Attorney General have pointedly refused to identify

the authority in Tennessee law that would authorize this deployment.6

68.​ In 2021, the acting Attorney General Herbert H. Slattery III recognized that he

Tennessee Constitution and long-settled judicial precedents provide that “only circumstances

amounting to a rebellion or invasion permit the governor to call out the militia, and even then,

6
See, e.g., Vivian Jones, Is Deploying National Guard Troops To Fight Crime in Memphis
Legal? Gov, AG Won’t Say How, The Tennesseean (Oct. 9, 2025), available at
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2025/10/09/national-guard-memphis-legality-go
v-lee-ag-skrmetti/86584438007/.

14
the legislature must declare, by law, that the public safety requires it.” Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen No.

21-05 (May 6, 2021).7

69.​ Attorney General Skrmetti has vacated his predecessor’s opinion, but refused to

articulate how a deployment of National Guard-as-police comports with apparently contrary

Tennessee law.

70.​ On September 29, 2025, General Assembly Jeff Yarbro sent Defendant Skrmetti as

letter regarding the improper revision and withdrawal of attorney general opinions regarding

national guard deployments.8

E.​ Defendants’ Action Harm Plaintiffs by Usurping Their Authority, Depriving Them
of Their Constitutionally or Statutorily Assigned Responsibilities

71.​ Defendants’ unlawful deployment of Tennessee National Guard members infringes

on Tennessee elected officials’ authority to manage law enforcement within its own borders,

including when guard members serve as police.

72.​ Defendants’ deployment of National Guard troops to combat crime deprives elected

officials of their constitutional and statutory functions.

73.​ Under governing constitutional and statutory standards, Plaintiffs must play a role in

authorizing any deployment of the National Guard to Memphis.

7
See Sam Stockard, “Tennessee Lawmaker Says AG Omitted, Altered Guard Deployment
Opinions,” Tennessee Lookout (Oct. 1, 2025),
https://tennesseelookout.com/2025/10/01/tennessee-lawmaker-says-ag-omitted-altered-guard-dep
loyment-opinions/ (last viewed Oct. 16, 2025).
8
For a full copy of Plaintiff Jeff Yarbro’s letter to Defendant Attorney General Skrmetti see:
Sam Stockard, “Tennessee Lawmaker Says AG Omitted, Altered Guard Deployment Opinions,”
Tennessee Lookout (Oct. 1, 2025),
https://tennesseelookout.com/2025/10/01/tennessee-lawmaker-says-ag-omitted-altered-guard-dep
loyment-opinions/ (last viewed Oct. 16, 2025).

15
 74.​ But Defendants have deployed the National Guard to Memphis unilaterally, usurping

their authority, for a purpose not permitted by Tennessee law that exceeds their legal authority

under both the Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee Code.

75.​ The deployment also inflicts financial harms on Shelby County, including increased

costs for pre-trials services and detention resulting from the National Guard’s force multiplier

effect on arrests in Memphis. The deployment is thus interfering with Mayor Harris’s ability to

perform his functions and to allocate the County’s limited financial resources consistent with the

priorities that best serve the people of Shelby County.

76.​ Recent deployments of troops elsewhere in the country have provoked civil unrest

and escalated tensions. Those military incursions included operations that were directly

calculated as shows of force, intended to demonstrate federal presence and strength in otherwise

peaceful locations. See Newsom, 2025 WL 2501619, at *7 (describing “Operation Excalibur,”

where federal troops were stationed in Humvees and tactical vehicles outside MacArthur Park in

Los Angeles and blocked traffic along a stretch of Wilshire Boulevard while federal law

enforcement officials marched across the park as a “show of presence”). As in those instances,

Defendants’ deployment of troops in Memphis communities threaten to provoke unrest and will

require the State to divert its law enforcement personnel and resources to deal with unrest that a

military presence has created.

77.​ Local elected officials at the city, county, and state level represent the sovereign

interest of Tennessee citizens. Defendants’ action harm the State of Tennessee by interfering with

citizens’ interests in managing its own law enforcement activities.

F.​ Defendants’ Actions Will Also Harm the State of Tennessee and the City of
Memphis by Suppressing Business Activity

78.​ Defendants’ conduct threatens the economic well-being of the people of Tennessee.

In recent months, unlawful federal deployments and militarized raids in California and the

16
District of Columbia have directly and rapidly chilled economic activity. The deployment of

troops in California stifled economic activity in the Los Angeles area. Restaurants, festivals, and

farmers’ markets shut down, as individuals were afraid to leave their homes due to militarized

raids. Similarly, the deployment of National Guard troops in the District of Columbia depressed

key industries, including tourism, restaurants, and hospitality services. Within a week of the

deployment of federal troops in D.C., foot traffic and restaurant reservations in the District

dropped substantially.9 Defendants’ military incursion into Memphis threatens similar immediate

harms by depressing business activities, travel, and tourism in Tennessee communities.

79.​ Defendants’ conduct also threatens financial harm to the government of Tennessee in

multiple ways. The military incursion’s chilling effect on economic activity will directly decrease

tax revenue collected by the City of Memphis, Shelby County, and the State. In the District of

Columbia, troop deployment has resulted in a reduction of work hours for some District workers,

and a corresponding decline in income tax withholding paid to the District government.

Deployment of troops in Tennessee communities threatens similar harm to Tennessee tax

revenues.

G.​ Defendants’ Actions Harm the State of Tennessee by Diverting National Guard
Personnel and Rendering Unable to Engage in Other Critical Work

80.​ Defendants’ unlawful deployment of the Tennessee National Guard concretely harms

the State’s interests by rendering those members unable to engage in other critical work.

81.​ Members of the National Guard are called into active duty to serve the needs of

Tennessee in numerous ways, including to assist with emergent and unpredictable situations the

State could face at any moment, such as natural disasters. Defendants unlawful and unilateral

9
Andrea Sachs & Federica Cocco, D.C. Tourism Was Already Struggling. Then
the National Guard Arrived, Wash. Post (Aug. 29, 2025, at 5:00 AM ET),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/travel/2025/08/29/dc-tourism-trump-takeover-nati
onal-guardimpacts/.

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deployment of even a portion of these Guard members impairs elected officials’ capacity to

respond to emergencies.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I
Violation of Tennessee Constitution Section 5, Article III

82.​ Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in each of the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

83.​ “State Active Duty National Guard troops and those activated under Title 32 may

engage in domestic law enforcement functions, subject to restrictions under state law.” Oregon

v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-1756-IM, 2025 WL 2817646, *2 (D. Or. Oct. 4, 2025) (emphasis added).

84.​ While the Governor serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the Tennessee National

Guard, see Tenn. Const., art. III, § 5, his authority to deploy its members is subject to stringent

restrictions under state law.

85.​ Specifically, Section 5, Article III of the Tennessee Constitution states that “the

Militia shall not be called into service except in case of rebellion or invasion, and then only when

the General Assembly shall declare, by law, that the public safety requires it.” Tenn. Const., art.

III § 5; see also Tenn. Const. art. I, § 24 (“[I]n all cases the military shall be kept in strict

subordination to the civil authority.”).

86.​ By its very terms, then, the state Constitution permits the Governor to deploy the

National Guard under only two circumstances: “rebellion or invasion;” and even then, “only

when the General Assembly shall declare, by law, that the public safety requires it.”

87.​ Neither of the conditions identified by Article III, Section 5, exists in Memphis: there

is no “rebellion or invasion” in Memphis, nor has the General Assembly declared that a rebellion

or invasion “requires” the National Guard to preserve “public safety.” Therefore, Defendants

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have thus violated the Constitution twice over, by cutting out the role committed to the General

Assembly by law, and by exceeding the factual circumstances in which deployment is available.

88.​ In unilaterally deploying Tennessee National Guard members as domestic police

enforcement, Defendants have exceeded the authority provided to the Governor by Article III,

Section 5, of the Tennessee Constitution.

89.​ The deployment of Tennessee National Guard members must be set aside as in

excess of constitutional jurisdiction, authority, or limitations. “Nothing can destroy a government

more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard for the charter of its

own existence.” See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).

COUNT II
Violation of Tennessee Code Section 58-1-106

90.​ Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in each of the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

91.​ The principal source of the Governor’s statutory authority to deploy National Guard

personnel is Section 58-1-106 of the Tennessee Code. The deployment does not satisfy the

provisions of Section 58-1-106.

92.​ Subsection (a) authorizes the Governor “to order” “all or part of the national guard”

“into active service of the state,” “in case of invasion, disaster, insurrection, riot, attack, or

combination to oppose the enforcement of the law by force and violence, or imminent danger

thereof.” T.C.A. § 58-1-106(a).

93.​ None of these conditions is satisfied in Memphis. Neither President Trump nor

Defendants have suggested otherwise, and the facts belie any such suggestion. Instead, as

recounted above, Governor Lee has explicitly stated that the Memphis deployment’s purpose is

to fight crime. But Section 58-1-106(a) does not allow that.

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 94.​ Subsection (c) of the statute confirms the illegality of the Governor’s National Guard

deployment. It provides that the Governor may order the National Guard into active service

“upon the request of the governing body of a city or county . . . that there is a breakdown of law

and order, a grievous breach of the peace, a riot, resistance to process of this state, or disaster, or

imminent danger thereof.” T.C.A. § 58-1-106(c) (emphasis added). For three reasons, this shows

that the statute does not justify the Memphis deployment.

95.​ First, Subsection (c) shows that none of Subsection (a)’s conditions allows deploying

the National Guard merely to maintain “law and order.” Subsection (c) demonstrates that the

statute’s drafters considered Subsection (a)’s conditions not to be equivalent to a need for simple

law enforcement; otherwise, they would have included the “law and order” provision in

Subsection (a). If a National Guard deployment “to maintain law and order” is to occur at all, it

must occur under Subsection (c).

96.​ Second, even when a need arises to address “a breakdown of law and order,” a

National Guard deployment may come only “upon the request of the governing body of a city or

county, and its representation, by resolution duly and regularly adopted.” T.C.A. § 58-1-106(c).

The City of Memphis’ governing board is the Memphis City Council, of which Councilman

Smiley is a member. See T.C.A. § 6-53-104(d) (“As used in this section, ‘governing body of a

municipality’ means that body, board, or council in which the general legislative powers of an

incorporated city or town, including a home rule city, are vested.”); T.C.A. § 6-54-512

(describing “governing body of a municipality” as the municipal entity responsible for enacting

ordinances). Similarly, the Shelby County Board of Commissioners is Shelby County’s

legislative body, of which Commissioner Sugarmon is a member, see T.C.A. § 5-5-102(f), and its

law enforcement authority (via the Shelby County Sheriff’s Department) extends into Memphis.

See T.C.A. § 38-3-102. Therefore, any National Guard deployment addressing “a breakdown of

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law and order” in Memphis must come only at the request of either the Memphis City Council or

the Shelby County Board of Commissioners. Neither body has made such a request, and

Governor Lee has unlawfully excluded both the City Council and the County Commission (and

their Plaintiff-members) from the role assigned to them by statute.

97.​ Third, the real-world facts in Memphis belie the deployment’s justification. In

Memphis, there are no facts to support the existence of a “breakdown of law and order” that

requires the military to intervene. T.C.A. § 58-1-106(c). By President Trump’s own

acknowledgement, “crime is somewhat down in Memphis.”

https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115199460946450022 (Sept. 13, 2025) (last

viewed Oct. 6, 2025). It should come as no surprise that neither Subsection (a) nor Subsection (c)

of Section 58-1-106 supports the Memphis deployment: police work is not the National Guard’s

job.

Count III
Violation of Tennessee Code Section 58-1-301

98.​ Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in each of the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

99.​ Section 58-1-301, provides that “[t]he governor, with the advice and consent of the

general assembly, and pursuant to the laws of the United States, shall call the militia, or any

portion thereof, into active service at any time that public safety requires it.”

100.​ Even if that provision comported with the Tennessee Constitution, notwithstanding

the recently withdrawn opinion of Attorney General Slattery, Section 58-1-301 authorizes the

Governor to deploy “the militia, or any portion thereof” only “with the advice and consent of the

general assembly.” Governor Lee has not requested the General Assembly’s advice and consent,

and he has not received it.

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 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:

a.​ Issue a temporary restraining order and/or temporary injunction requiring the

Defendants to cease deploying National Guard troops to Memphis for civilian law

enforcement purposes.

b.​ Declare that Defendants’ unilateral decision and order to deploy members of the

Tennessee National Guard is unconstitutional and/or unlawful;

c.​ Hold unlawful and enjoin Defendants’ deployment of members of the Tennessee

National Guard;

d.​ Vacate and set aside Defendants’ unilateral order to call Tennessee National

Guard members to serve as a domestic police force in Memphis and Defendants’ other

actions to implement this order, and declare that these actions are contrary to law;

e.​ Award Plaintiffs’ costs of suit and reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses under

any applicable law; and

f.​Award such additional relief as the interests of justice may require.

Respectfully Submitted
Date October __, 2025 /s/ Lawyer at Law
Cocounsel at law (Bar No. 123456) Lawyer at law (Bar No. 123456)
Unadmitted cocounsel* Unadmitted Lawyer*
Application Pending cocounsel+ Application Pending Lawyer+
National Association of Cocounsel Democracy Forward Foundation
123 H Street, NE P.O. Box 34553
Washington, DC 20043 Washington, DC 20043
Phone: (202) 123-4567 Phone: (202) 448-9090
Fax: (202) 123-4567 Fax: (202) 796-4426
[email protected] [email protected]
[email protected] [email protected]
[email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Plaintiffs

* Admission to court’s bar pending

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 +
Motion to appear pro hac vice pending

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